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A REVIEW OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITIES

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Introduction

This is the inaugural issue of the Disarmament Bulletin of the Department of External Affairs. The publication is produced and distributed by the Office of the Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs.

The Bulletin is part of the Department's programme to make more information available about international disarmament activities of special interest to Canada. It is also a direct result of the recommendations of the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament held in 1978.

The Final Document of the Special Session pointed out the importance of greater public awareness of the issues related to disarmament and arms control. To meet this challenge, the Department of External Affairs appointed an Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, Mr. G.A.H. Pearson, in July of 1978, and established a small fund to promote research and public liaison.

The Disarmament Bulletin will seek to meet the need for a publication which would deal with Canadian Government policies and actions, the activities of international organizations and conferences, and current research projects underway in Canada in the field of disarmament and arms control.

Further issues of the Bulletin will be distributed as time and resources permit.

Consultative group formed to discuss disarmament issues

At the invitation of the Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs to the Department of External Affairs, 22 representatives of non-governmental organizations met with officials and MPs in Ottawa on October 4 and 5, 1979. The terms of reference of the group are to meet on a semi-annual basis at the invitation of the Adviser to exchange views on matters of mutual interest relevant to Canada's policies on disarmament and arms control, and give advice to the Office of the Adviser on information and research activities that might be sponsored by the Office including UN studies, keeping in mind the objectives agreed by

the UNSSOD in 1978. Among the subjects discussed at the meeting were the role of research, education and information in the promotion of disarmament issues and the main issues to be considered at the 1979 session of the United Nations General Assembly. External Affairs and National Defence officials also gave briefings on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Study.

Participants expressed their support for the initiative taken in forming the Group and most saw it as a positive step in meeting the need for greater public awareness of defence and disarmament issues, and for more public involvement in government policy-making.

The composition of the Consultative Group is intended to be flexible in order to reflect a broad spectrum of Canadian organizations interested in the subject, although it is not expected that more than 25 persons will be invited at a time.

The Disarmament Bulletin is meant to be a source of information on disarmament and arms control to a broad spectrum of the Canadian public from academicians to the man in the street. Does the Bulletin fulfill this mandate? Are there areas of improvement which could be made? Do you know of other individuals who might find the publication useful? Your comments are welcome and should be addressed to the Office of the Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, K1A 0G2. This first issue has been unavoidably delayed and we regret any inconvenience this may have caused.

Disarmament at UNGA 34

The United Nations General Assembly has for many years been critical of the slow and painful pace of disarmament negotiations amongst the great powers. While there has been limited progress in some areas, negotiations to further limit weapons systems, both conventional and nuclear, have been held up largely by a lack of trust and fear among nations of the consequences of disarmament. This is partly because the UN has not been able to put in place the security system envisaged by the Charter, and without such an alternative security system, governments are not likely to abandon reliance on their own defence systems.

Nevertheless, this year's General Assembly discussed and adopted 41 resolutions on disarmament which, if acted upon positively, could push the world a little farther down the road toward arms control and, ultimately, a balanced process of disarmament. The resolutions considered this year included 18 on nuclear issues, 13 on non-nuclear or conventional issues and 10 on procedural matters and disarmament studies. Nineteen of the resolutions were adopted by consensus.

In view of their disarmament prospects, three important resolutions to which Canada gave particular attention this year were those on a comprehensive test ban, a chemical weapons ban, and a prohibition on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Canada participated actively in the drafting of all three resolutions and co-sponsored them in the First Committee of the General Assembly. Canada also co-sponsored four other resolutions on confidence building measures, an international satellite monitoring agency, disarmament and development, and UN institutional arrangements. Other important initiatives which received the approval of the majority of UN members were three resolutions calling for the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear weapons states against the threat or use of nuclear weapons, separate resolutions calling for further negotiation toward a treaty on radiological weapons, on new types of weapons of mass destruction, and on particularly indiscriminate or inhumane conventional weapons. Three resolutions supporting the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia were also adopted.

The resolutions concerning UN studies

dealt with a number of important projects which may be useful in the process of completing the basic groundwork for the negotiation of future disarmament initiatives. Ongoing studies which received consideration included disarmament and development; and disarmament and international security. Among new studies commissioned were those on a comprehensive test ban, confidence building measures and UN institutional arrange-

ments for disarmament.

In addition to the resolutions on chemical weapons, fissionable material, and a comprehensive test ban, Canada voted in the affirmative on 27 other resolutions. Canada voted against three resolutions — two were directed against the NATO nuclear deterrent and one was a polemical resolution on "hegemonism" which included a reference to "zionism" as a form of racism.

Disarmament Resolutions at UNGA XXXIV

(Canadian votes are underlined)

Resolution No.	Resolution	Vote (Yes/No/Abst)
34/71	Treaty of Tlatelolco (Protocol I)	Consensus
34/74	Treaty of Tlatelolco (Protocol II)	Consensus
34/72	*Chemical Weapons	Consensus
34/75	1980s as Disarmament Decade	Consensus
34/76 (B)	South African Nuclear Capability	Consensus
34/81	World Disarmament Conference	Consensus
34/82	Certain Conventional Weapons	Consensus
34/83 (L)	Committee on Disarmament (Resources)	Consensus
34/83 (H)	Report of Disarmament Commission	Consensus
34/83 (I)	Disarmament Week	Consensus
34/83 (D)	Disarmament Fellowships	Consensus
34/83 (C)	Negotiations on Disarmament	Consensus
34/83 (K)	*Disarmament and Development	Consensus
34/87 (F)	SALT	Consensus
34/87 (A)	Radiological Weapons	Consensus
34/87 (B)	*Confidence Building Measures	Consensus
34/83 (A)	Disarmament and International Security	Consensus
34/102	Peaceful Settlement of Disputes	Consensus
34/73	*Comprehensive Test Ban	<u>137</u> :0:2
34/77	Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Middle East)	<u>136</u> :0:1
34/78	Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (South Asia)	<u>96</u> :2:40
34/83 (F)	Reduction of Military Budgets	Consensus
34/83 (B)	Report of Committee on Disarmament	<u>130</u> :0:11
34/422	Studies on Disarmament (CTB)	<u>126</u> :9:4
34/83 (E)	*International Satellite Monitoring Agency	<u>124</u> :0:11
34/83 (M)	Disarmament Research Institute	Consensus
34/87 (D)	*Fissionable Material	<u>118</u> :9:12
34/87 (E)	*Study of Institutions	<u>121</u> :9:9
34/86	Negative Security Assurances	<u>110</u> :1:29
34/85	Negative Security Assurances	<u>120</u> :0:22
34/84	Negative Security Assurances	<u>114</u> :1:25
34/76 (A)	Denuclearization of Africa	<u>128</u> :0:24
34/79	New Weapons of Mass Destruction	<u>117</u> :0:24
34/80 (A)	Indian Ocean as Zone of Peace (a)	<u>117</u> :0:23
34/80 (B)	Indian Ocean as Zone of Peace (b)	<u>126</u> :0:14
34/83 (J)	Nuclear Weapons Negotiations in CD	<u>120</u> :2:19
34/88	International Cooperation for Disarmament	<u>116</u> :0:27
34/89	Israeli Nuclear Armament	<u>97</u> :10:38
34/83 (G)	Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons	<u>112</u> : <u>16</u> :14
34/87 (C)	Non-Stationing of Nuclear Weapons	<u>99</u> : <u>18</u> :19
34/103	Hegemonism	<u>111</u> : <u>4</u> :26

*Co-sponsored by Canada

Disarmament adviser speaks to First Committee*

"The difference between goals of disarmament and the realities of international security has always been wide". Thus Mr. G.A.H. Pearson, the Department of External Affairs Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, began his address to the First Committee of the Thirty-Fourth United Nations General Assembly on October 23, 1979. He went on to note that the goals of disarmament can be articulated and explained with greater modesty and realism, without giving them up. Expenditures on defence can be reconciled with initiatives in arms control without the need for apology.

Mr. Pearson said that Canada's general approach to arms control and disarmament negotiations would be governed by four principles. First, Canada will give preference to initiatives which involve real measures of restraint, reduction or elimination of weapons and armed forces and which, therefore, qualify the actual capabilities of states to wage war. Second, Canada believes that the Committee on Disarmament should be more involved in dealing with the main issues. Third, Canada will continue to attach importance to methods of verification which give confidence that agreements are being observed. Finally, Canada is disposed in principle to support other initiatives which help to strengthen the role of the United Nations as an important source of information and expertise on arrangements for the control of arms.

*Copies of complete text of this speech and others are available from the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

Biological Weapons Review Conference scheduled for March 1980

Canada is one of 128 member states of the United Nations to attend a conference from March 3-21, 1980, to review the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction. This Convention was established and signed in 1972 after considerable negotiation between the U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and U.K., and came into force in 1975. It has sought to ban all development, production, stockpiling and destruction of bacteriological

substances such as toxins, bacteria, or viruses, for weapons purposes. The actual use of biological weapons has been prohibited since 1925 by the Geneva Protocol.

Since the agreement was opened for signature on April 10, 1972, 83 countries have ratified the Convention and 45 others have signed but not yet ratified. Article VII of the Convention calls for such a review conference five years after its entry into force to review the operation of the Treaty and ensure its provisions are being realized.

The United Nations Secretariat has been given the task of preparing a background paper as a working document for the meetings in March, and the Convention's depository governments — the U.S.A., U.S.S.R., and United Kingdom — are also expected to table papers on the latest scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. The UN Secretariat's background paper will be largely devoted to the two major subjects of compliance with the obligations of the treaty, and the status of efforts to reach agreement on a chemical weapons treaty. In addition, there is expected to be considerable discussion on the verification articles of the Convention.

Canadian academics study disarmament and development

The concept of a linkage between disarmament and development was given special emphasis at the 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament. At the General Assembly later that year, a special study group was commissioned to investigate the subject. At the request of the Secretary-General, Canada agreed to participate in the expert group. The three major themes currently under study are (a) the present day utilization of resources for military purposes; (b) the social and economic effects of a continuing arms race and the implementation of disarmament measures; (c) the conversion and redeployment of resources from military to economic and social development purposes.

The experts group has commissioned 45 studies on various aspects of the question. Twenty of these projects are being funded by the United Nations, the remainder are being financed by individual national governments. In this latter category, the Canadian Government, through the Office of the Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, is currently

sponsoring two studies being carried out at the Universities of Laval and Waterloo.

The Laval project is being carried out by Professors Truchon and Bernard and is entitled, "The Impact of Disarmament on The Canadian Economy". The study is concentrating on such areas as the current importance of the defence industry to the Canadian economy, the problem of the conversion of industries from military to civilian production, technological spin-offs, and the redirection of funds available from reduced military expenditures to other sectors of the economy.

The study taking place at Waterloo is being conducted by Mr. Ernie Regehr of Conrad Grebal College. Mr. Regehr is investigating the impact of U.S. defence procurement and Canadian defence expenditures, sales, and production on the utilization of resources and industrialization in Canada. The study will examine defence exports to the United States, NATO, and other countries from Canada over the past 25 years, Department of National Defence procurement in Canada and from abroad, defence research contracts, and other factors during the same period, to determine the effect of such expenditures and transactions on the Canadian industrial sector during the last quarter of a century.

The results of both studies will be examined by the UN experts group who have been asked to prepare a final report for the 1981 General Assembly.

Inter-Parliamentary Union adopts resolution on disarmament

The 66th Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, which met in Caracas, Venezuela, from September 13 to 21, 1979, unanimously adopted a resolution calling for greater emphasis by all countries, particularly the nuclear weapons states, on measures to control the proliferation of arms. This resolution was one of several resolutions resulting from the discussions which took place during the conference.

The Inter-Parliamentary Union is an organization made up of representatives from the national legislative bodies of over 75 countries. Its goals are to encourage and strengthen contacts between national parliamentary groups throughout the world and to collaborate in the pursuit of world peace and understanding, in harmony with the objectives of the United Nations.

The Inter-Parliamentary Union has for many years devoted serious attention and discussion to disarmament issues. The resolution resulting from this year's conference is indicative of this interest. Among its recommendations were initiatives calling upon the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to begin discussions as soon as possible on a SALT III agreement aimed at an effective and gradual reduction of nuclear weapons. It noted the importance of the need for all nations to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty not only to control vertical and horizontal proliferation but also to ensure the right of access of all nations to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The resolution also called for additional nuclear-weapons free zones; security assurances to the non-nuclear weapons states guaranteeing the non-use of nuclear weapons against them; and the conclusion of agreements banning chemical weapons; new weapons of mass destruction; and excessively injurious or indiscriminate weapons. The Conference also expressed its desire to see a further deepening of the political and military detente begun during the CSCE process, including the adoption of confidence building measures, and asked for increased emphasis by the United Nations and national governments on controlling the proliferation of conventional arms.

The Canadian delegation to the Conference was headed by Senator Gildas L. Molgat, and included 13 members of Parliament. Mr. Charles Caccia, M.P., assumed responsibility for Canadian interests in the disarmament field during the plenary debates.

Statement for disarmament week 1979

The United Nations declared the week of October 24-30, 1979, as Disarmament Week. The purpose of Disarmament Week was to emphasize the importance of mobilizing public opinion around the world in support of disarmament, and to emphasize the objectives set forth in the Final Document of the UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honorable Flora MacDonald, issued the following statement to mark Disarmament Week in 1979.

"The question of disarmament continues to occupy a large part of the UN's attention, much as it has since the organi-

zation's inception 34 years ago. October 24-30, 1979 has been officially designated Disarmament Week by the United Nations. Disarmament and arms control is a long and painful process. Nevertheless, progress has been made in some areas over the years to limit weapons of war, and I remain optimistic that more progress will be made in the future.

"The United States and the Soviet Union have, as a result of the SALT negotiations, taken a first step to placing equal numerical ceilings on the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons possessed by both of these states. Discussions between the U.K., U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. concerning a comprehensive test ban have succeeded in defining the major elements of a treaty. At Canada's initiative the General Assembly has called for negotiations to ban the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Nevertheless, the nuclear arms race continues, and the danger of the spread of these weapons remains.

"Last year about \$400 billion was spent on military purposes, of which some 80 per cent was allocated to non-nuclear weapons. Thirty-two countries spend more than 20 per cent of their annual central government expenditures on defence. The control of the sales of conventional weaponry is therefore a growing concern. Canada is particularly interested in such UN initiatives as proposals for reductions in military spending and the establishment of public records of arms sales and transfers. We have supported efforts by regional groups, especially in Latin America, to limit levels of arms spending and participate in the talks to reduce forces in Europe.

"A significant event in the history of disarmament was the UN Tenth Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. An important aspect of the resulting final document was the call for more research and education on disarmament, and greater contact with interested non-governmental organizations. As a result, the UN is carrying out eight major research projects, of which the study of disarmament and development is the most extensive. Canada participates in this study and a Canadian is also taking part in the UN study of the implications of nuclear weapons. The Department of External Affairs is fostering research in other aspects of arms control, such as verification, and has formed a consultative group of non-governmental organizations to exchange views on these

and other matters of common concern. It is also hoped to publish a newsletter.

"There will be a second special session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in 1982. Before that, there will be meetings on the operation of the Biological Weapons Convention and of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will meet again in 1980, and there will be further UN negotiations on limiting the use of certain conventional weapons that are considered especially inhumane. So there will be no lack of activity. Our hope must continue to be that the nations of the world can reach agreement, step by step, on real measures of detente and security that enable human energies to be diverted from preparations for war to peaceful cooperation".

Of general interest...

...CMP announces international prize

The Canadian General Secretariat of the international Christian Movement for Peace organization has indicated it will sponsor an International Peace Prize in 1980. The project is an effort to stimulate concern and awareness of the global peace/war/disarmament/development issues facing the world today.

Competition for the prize is open to teachers, students, youth groups, youth organizers, and others interested in making a creative statement on the theme, play, skit, film, video tape, poster or photographic display, or other idea which if selected could be published or used by other groups for their own disarmament activities.

Further details are available from the Christian Movement for Peace, 121 Avenue Road, Toronto, Ontario M5R 2G3.

...Disarmament Times needs subscribers

The Disarmament Times, a publication of the NGO Disarmament Committee at the United Nations, is seeking to increase its readership in Canada. The periodical, which appears in newspaper form provides an excellent overview of international disarmament activities, particularly those involving the United Nations. Subscriptions can be obtained by contacting Mr. Homer Jack, Secretary-General of the World Conference on Religion and Peace, Room 7B, 777 UN Plaza, New York, New York 10017.

...1980 calendar indicates heavy schedule
February 5 — Committee on Disarmament, Geneva

End of February — Final Report of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation

March 3-21 — Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference, Geneva

May 12-June 6 — Disarmament Commission, New York

August 11-September 5 — Second NPT Review Conference, Geneva

September 15-October 3 — UN Conference on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva

September 16-December 19 — UNGA XXXV, New York.

...UNESCO conference set for June 1980

A world conference on disarmament education will be held in Paris, France from June 9-13, 1980, under the auspices of UNESCO. Educators, representatives of non-governmental organizations and other individuals from many nations will be meeting to exchange views on the place given to disarmament in the education process.

...Canada participates in UN study groups

In addition to the UN Study on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development, Canada is also participating in UN studies of nuclear weapons and of confidence building measures (CBMs).

The nuclear weapons study, which is investigating current trends in the technological development of nuclear weapons, the effects of their use, and the implications for international security and negotiations on disarmament, was the result of a resolution passed at the 33rd General Assembly. Dr. A. Legault of Laval University is Canada's representative to the expert group, which will submit its final report to UNGA XXXV. The CBM study recently initiated at the 34th General Assembly will attempt to assess the practicality of measures which seek to build confidence among nations by diminishing the danger of armed conflicts resulting from misunderstandings or misinterpretations of military activities. The CBM expert group is now being formed and will begin substantive work in the near future with a view to submitting a final report to UNGA XXXVI in 1981.

...PRI, Dundas conducting peace/war conference

The Peace Research Institute in Dundas, Ontario, will be conducting its 11th annual Conference and Seminar on Global Peace/War Issues at Carleton University in Ottawa from June 15-30, 1980. The conference

itself will include presentations from a large number of Canadian and foreign speakers on the issues of interdependence in the world, human behaviour, and inter-national behaviour. Seminars will be held following the conference sessions and will focus on topics discussed by the guest speakers. Further information on the conference/seminar is available from the Peace Research Institute, Dundas, 25 Dundas Ave., Dundas.

...UN Centre for Disarmament fact sheets

In cooperation with the UN Information Service, the UN Centre for Disarmament in Geneva has issued a series of fact sheets on various aspects of disarmament and arms control. These fact sheets, aimed at increasing public awareness of disarmament efforts and the dangers of the arms race, provide concise information on a variety of topics from international disarmament machinery to nuclear test ban agreements. Copies of the sheets are available for a nominal fee from the United Nations Association of Canada, 63 Sparks Street, Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5A6. One of

the fact sheets appears in this issue.

...New films available

Two new films on disarmament and arms control have been recently released. Both films, made in the United States, are largely tailored to American audiences but are also useful sources of background information on the arms race. "War Without Winners" is a 27 minute colour film dealing with the thoughts of people in the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. living in the 'Centre' for

Defence Information in Washington. It can be rented from the Project Ploughshares office at No. 175, 1075 Meadowlands Drive, Ottawa, K2C 3M7. A second film, "Survival or Suicide", has been released by the American Committee on East-West Accord. While primarily dealing with the issues of the SALT II agreement, it also provides an accurate and easily understood history of the nuclear arms race between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. Further information on this film can be obtained from the Committee at 227 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20002.

Cost of the arms race*

The arms race wastes resources, diverts economies away from constructive purposes, hinders development efforts and blocks progress towards a new international economic order.

World Military Spending today is in the range of \$400 billion a year — or over \$1 billion every day. Since World War II, direct costs of the arms race have exceeded \$6,000 billion (\$6,000,000,000,000) — about as much as the combined Gross National Product of the entire world in 1975.

A report prepared in 1977 by a United Nations expert group gave these details:

On average, countries have been devoting 5 to 6 per cent of their output to military ends.

If half the funds spent on armaments throughout the world from 1970 to 1975 had been invested in the civilian sector, annual output at the end of the period could have been perhaps \$200 billion larger than it was — more than the aggregate

GNP of Southern Asia and the mid-African region, two large regions of acute poverty with a total population over one billion.

Every year military activities throughout the world absorb a volume of resources equivalent to about two-thirds of the aggregate gross national product of countries comprising the poorest half of the world's population. World military expenditure over the past half century has increased in real terms by a factor of 10, corresponding to an annual increase of nearly 5 per cent.

Six countries — the United States, Soviet Union, China, France, United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany — account for about 75 per cent of world military spending, 90 per cent of military exports, 95 per cent of exports of major weapons to developing countries, and 96 to 97 per cent of all research and development for military purposes.

Developing countries with almost 50 per cent of the world's population accounted for only 12 to 13 per cent of world military expenditure, and the poorest regions spent about \$5 per capita for military purposes — only 1 to 2 per cent of what the highly industrialized countries' spend per head of population.

*Article reprinted from fact sheet, *Costs of the Arms Race*, prepared by the United Nations Center for Disarmament in cooperation with the UN Information Service — Fact Sheet No. 9, October 1979.

But arms budgets of developing countries, while small in the global context loom larger and larger in relation to their limited resources and to their urgent social and economic needs.

Military expenditures in developing countries doubled in constant prices over five years, rising from \$17.0 billion in 1970 to \$33.8 billion in 1975.

Although half a billion people are severely malnourished and per capita food production in developing countries as a whole has been declining, the poor countries spend on average about as much for military activities as they spend on agricultural investment.

Figures reported in 1979 by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicated that in the 1970s three countries had accounted for 82 per cent of supplies of major weapons to Third World countries — United States (39 per cent), U.S.S.R. (32 per cent) and France (11 per cent).

Manpower: The armed forces around the world totalled approximately 22 million people, the 1977 expert group said. It was estimated that for the world as a whole 60 million people are engaged in military-related occupations, uniformed or civilian, public or private. This corresponds to the entire labour force in manufacturing in Europe outside the U.S.S.R. or to 70 per cent of total employment in the United States in all branches of activity.

The number of draftsmen required for the design of a World War II bomber was on the order of 170 man-years, spread over two to three years; the design of a military aircraft today requires 4,000 man-years over a period of seven to ten years.

Research and Development: About 25 per cent of the world's scientific personnel are engaged in military-related pursuits. It has been estimated that of the total cumulative research and development (R and D) spending since the Second World War, some 40 per cent has been directed at achieving military ends. Together the six main military spenders are reported to account for over 96 per cent of world military R and D. Military research and development in the world absorbs perhaps ten times the entire scientific and technological capabilities available in developing countries.

Use of Resources: The world's armed forces are major consumers of a wide range of non-renewable resources, both energy and raw-material reserves. World

military consumption of liquid hydrocarbons (excluding petroleum products used in the production of weapons and equipment) has been estimated to be about 700 to 750 million barrels annually — twice the annual consumption for the whole of Africa and approximately 3.5 per cent of world consumption.

Jobs and Arms: There is still a widespread belief that disarmament or a discontinuation of some specific weapons programme would swell the ranks of the unemployed. In fact, unemployment is already high. In fact, the growing high-technology component in military expenditures has eroded their job-creating potential. There is evidence that high military budgets contribute to over-all unemployment instead of alleviating it. United States Government estimates have indicated that while \$1 billion of military expenditure creates 76,000 jobs, the same amount released in tax cuts would create 112,000 jobs.

Examples of military vs. civilian costs:

- \$500,000 is the cost of one tank — or equipment for 520 classrooms.

- \$20 million is the cost of one jet fighter — or 40,000 village pharmacies.

- \$100 million is the cost of one destroyer — or electrification for 13 cities and 19 rural zones with a population of nine million.

- In two days the world spends on arms the equivalent of one year's budget for the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

Development Aid: Limited disarmament steps or budgetary cuts to date do not appear to have resulted in any "disarmament dividend". In fact, official development assistance declined from 1970 to 1975 even though military budgets of the main spenders diminished slightly in real terms during that period.

Studies by expert groups, carried out in response to General Assembly requests, have demonstrated the harmful effects of military spending and the economic and social benefits that could result from disarmament measures. They have recommended that Governments make plans to assist in conversion from military to civilian production, and have emphasized that reductions in military spending would help rather than hurt national economies.

The comprehensive expert report on these issues submitted to the General Assembly in 1977 said that as long as the arms race is allowed to continue, it will aggravate world problems of develop-

ment, economic imbalance and inflation, pollution, energy and raw materials, trade relations and technology, and delay progress in areas such as health, education and housing. The Group recommended the adoption of a specific time-schedule for gradual but substantial co-ordinated reduction of budgets, first of all of those of the largest and most heavily armed countries, specifying criteria and proportions for these reductions and ensuring that they are irreversible and that the means saved are in fact allocated for peaceful purposes.

Current Study: In view of "the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development and the necessity to release real resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries", the special session of the Assembly initiated a major study of the relationship between disarmament and development.

The expert group set up to carry out the Assembly's request is expected to report on the results of the study before the 1981 Assembly session. It has commissioned a number of research projects, which are being conducted by institutes and researchers in all parts of the world. Three main areas are being investigated; present utilization of resources for military purposes; economic and social effects of a continuing arms race and disarmament measures; and conversion and redeployment of resources from military to development purposes. The Assembly said a principal aim of the study should be: "to produce results that could effectively guide the formulation of practical measures to reallocate those resources at the local, national, regional and international levels".

Disarmament and Development: The hopes of the General Assembly have remained the same since it adopted its 1962 Declaration on the Conversion to Peaceful Needs of the Resources Released by Disarmament. The Declaration called on countries to develop plans and policies for making economic and social adjustments in successive stages of disarmament, bearing in mind the imperative needs of the developing countries. In later years, the General Assembly repeatedly urged that funds released through disarmament be made available for assistance to development, and beginning in 1973 declared that such funds should be provided by reducing military budgets.

In the Final Document of its special session on disarmament, the Assembly stated: "The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries. Thus, the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that its continuation is obviously incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order based on justice, equity and cooperation. Consequently, resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries".

Weapons conference concludes first session in Geneva

The United Nations Conference on the Prohibition or Restriction of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, held in Geneva, concluded its first session on the 28th of September 1979. The Conference was convened to discuss certain conventional weapons such as mines, booby traps, incendiaries, and other devices that have in the past caused considerable civilian casualties because of their indiscriminate nature.

Two draft protocols and an outline for a draft convention were accepted by the 80 participating countries during the meetings as a basis for further discussions on measures to prohibit or limit the use of weapons of this nature. The final report of the first session, adopted by the conference members, recommended a second meeting which will be held beginning September 15, 1980 in Geneva.

CD begins 1980 Session

The Committee on Disarmament reconvened for its 1980 session at the Palais des Nations in Geneva on February 5, 1980. In its first round of meetings, which will last 12 weeks, it resumed consideration of such major subjects as the question of a nuclear test ban, cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, chemical weapons ban, prohibition of radiological weapons and security assurance for non-nuclear weapon states against nuclear weapons attack. These topics were among those discussed at the first session of the CD held last year.

The 40-member committee is part of the revitalized and expanded international machinery on disarmament as that resulted from the 1978 United Nations Special Session on Disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament is the world's principal forum for multilateral negotiations in the disarmament field, including those negotiations which have derived from the goals and objectives set out in the Special Session's Final Document. At its first session last year, in addition to resolving such key organizational issues as agreement on its work program, framework of its activities, and procedural questions on the conduct of its meetings, the Committee also received the draft elements of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons as submitted by the USSR and USA; and progress reports on bilateral talks (USA/USSR) on chemical weapons, and trilateral negotiations (USA/UK/USSR) on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

This year's session is continuing the work begun last year, along with consideration of new recommendations addressed to it by the UN General Assembly XXXIV. These include the negotiation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The February 5th opening meeting was held under the chairmanship of Mr. Donald McPhail, Canadian Ambassador to the CD and the Committee's Chairman for February. Under the committee's rules of procedure, the chairmanship rotates among its members on a monthly basis in English alphabetical order. High level government representatives who attended the opening meetings in February included Zheng Wen-Jin, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, and Ola Ullsten, Foreign Minister of Sweden. The February 5 meeting was

Military Expenditures as % of GNP	GNP Per Capita				
	Less than \$200	\$200 - 499	\$500 - 999	\$1000 - 3000	More than \$3000
More than 10%		Egypt	North Korea Syria	Oman Israel Iraq Iran Bulgaria	United Arab Emirates Saudi Arabia Soviet Union
5-10%	Somalia Cape Verde Pakistan	China Yemen (ADEN) Mauritania Congo	Jordan Peru Korea (ROK)	Taiwan Poland Singapore Hungary Turkey South Africa Romania	Kuwait Germany (GDR) Czechoslovakia United States
2-4.99%	Chad Tanzania Ethiopia Mali Burma India Mozambique Upper Volta Afghanistan Burundi	Rhodesia Sudan Indonesia Thailand Uganda Philippines Zambia Madagascar Kenya Togo	Morocco Malaysia Nigeria Guyana Bolivia	Yugoslavia Greece Portugal Algeria Uruguay Argentina	United Kingdom Bahrain France Netherlands Germany (FRG) Sweden Belgium Norway Spain Italy Australia Denmark Switzerland Canada
1-1.99%	Malawi Zaire Rwanda Bangladesh Nepal Sierra Leone	Cent. Afr. Emp. Honduras Senegal Papua New Guinea Cameroon Benin Haiti	Nicaragua Ecuador Tunisia Dom. Rep. Ivory Coast Paraguay El Salvador	Venezuela Cyprus Ireland Brazil	New Zealand Finland Libya Austria Luxembourg
Less than 1%	Niger Sri Lanka Gambia	Liberia Ghana Botswana	Guatemala Colombia Swaziland Mauritius	Jamaica Mexico Panama Malta Fiji Trinidad & Tobago Barbados Costa Rica Surinam	Japan Gabon Iceland

significant as it marked the first time, with the participation of China, that all 5 nuclear weapons states were represented in the CD's discussions.

Mr. Geoffrey Pearson, Canadian Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, spoke to the CD on February 12. In his statement, he said that Canada continued to believe that disarmament negotiations should be vigorously pursued, and that the CD remained the focal point for multilateral negotiations in the disarmament field. He also noted that negotiations outside the committee should also be encouraged whenever and wherever there was a mutual interest in lower levels of armaments at equal security.

Disarmament negotiations, he said, could only succeed if there was some degree of trust and confidence between the states involved. Acts of aggression or intervention in the affairs of other states would undermine such confidence and would make more difficult the reaching of agreements on arms limitations and disarmament. The world had been reminded once again, he stated, by recent events in Afghanistan and other regions of the world that the negotiating process could not be divorced from politics among nations, particularly among nations which carried special responsibilities for the control and reduction of armaments. Turning to the committee's agenda, Mr. Pearson said Canada agreed that the six points of the agenda for last year should again be considered with the addition of the item on a comprehensive programme for disarmament.

How much is too much?

The world's military budget equals the annual income of 1,800,000,000 people in the 36 poorest nations.

In two days the world spends on arms the equivalent of a year's budget for the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

The developed nations spend 20 times more for their military programs than for economic assistance to the poorer countries.

The developing nations import arms at the rate of more than \$6 billion a year.

The U.S. and U.S.S.R. together account for 60 per cent of the world's military expenditures and for 75 per cent of the world's arms trade; they have more military force than all other nations combined.

Although first in military strength, the superpowers rank lower than many other nations in indicators of social well-being.

World military expenditures average \$14,800 per soldier; public expenditures for education \$230 per school-age child.


The cost of one Trident submarine equals the cost of a year's schooling for 16,000,000 children in developing countries.

The \$80 billion a year spent on arms procurement makes munitions one of the largest industries in the world.

Military and space research together get more public research funds than all social needs combined.

The cost of the existing stockpile of weapons in the world is estimated at more than twice the value of the capital stock of all manufacturing industry in the United States.

— Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures, 1976 and 1977*. WMSE Publications, Box 1003, Leesburg, Va. 22075.



The Organization of Petroleum Export Countries (OPEC) includes Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.

A REVIEW OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITIES

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Committee on Disarmament Wraps Up 1980 Session

The Committee on Disarmament (CD) completed its 1980 deliberations in Geneva on August 9, 1980, with the adoption of the Committee's annual report by its 40 members. The Committee will now stand adjourned until February 1981. This year's sessions, while they did not produce any concrete agreements to limit or reduce arms, did result in a number of positive initiatives which will provide a good basis for next year's discussions. For the first time, China participated in the work of the CD, whose membership now includes all five nuclear weapons states.

The Committee's spring session, which ran from February 5 to April 29, was largely devoted to opening statements by the members followed by intensive discussions on the agenda and work program for this year's meetings. The Committee finally approved in March a six-point agenda and work programme which included consideration of a nuclear test ban; the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; chemical


weapons; a comprehensive program of disarmament; new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, such as radiological weapons; and effective international agreements to assure non-nuclear weapons states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

There was also prolonged discussion during the spring session regarding the approval of the CD to requests from non-member states to participate in the work of the Committee. The membership of the CD is restricted to 40 states. Six non-member nations, including Kampuchea and Vietnam, requested permission to participate, however the Committee was unable to reach a consensus on this issue.

Just prior to its Easter recess on April 29, the CD established four ad-hoc working groups to prepare the ground, in concrete negotiations, for agreed measures respectively to ban chemical weapons, prohibit the development and production of radiological weapons, elaborate on a comprehensive program of disarmament,



Canada's Ambassador to the Committee on Disarmament, Mr. D.S. McPhail (third from right), as chairman of the CD in February of this year.



and provide assurances for non-nuclear weapons states against nuclear attack. The working groups were considered by some to be an historic event which might provide the take-off stage for serious negotiations on these issues.

The ad-hoc working groups began their discussions in concert with the resumption of the CD's regular deliberations on June 12, 1980. In contrast to the spring session, the summer session was conducted in a much more positive and business-like atmosphere. In connection with the working group on chemical weapons, a chemical experts meeting to discuss such subjects as verification, the impact of a chemical weapons ban on the commercial chemical industry, and toxicity criteria was held from June 24-26. This meeting proved to be a worthwhile addition to the work of the group which made considerable progress toward defining the problems associated with the negotiation of a chemical weapons ban. The working group discussing negative security assurances for non-nuclear weapons states also produced some interesting and useful debate. The groups dealing with radiological weapons and a comprehensive program for disarmament made less progress. The major stumbling block with regard to the former was the definition and scope of a radiological weapon. With regard to a comprehensive program for disarmament, there remained considerable difference of opinion among states on the nature of such a program, its points of emphasis, target dates and other issues.

The Committee also received, near the end of its summer session, a report from the tripartite negotiators (UK/USA/USSR) working on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. The report noted that while considerable progress had been made, including in the area of verification, several important issues remained outstanding.

Canada was particularly active at this year's CD. The delegation played a prominent role in such areas as chemical weapons, verification, and discussion on a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. In addition to making numerous statements and interventions during the regular sessions of the CD and in the four working groups, Canada tabled five working papers on various aspects of the three subjects mentioned above. Canada also chaired the Committee's proceedings during the month of February.

The CD's slow start and polemical atmosphere reflected the current international climate. Nevertheless, the members

of the Committee on Disarmament were able to carry out useful discussions on a variety of disarmament and arms control issues, thus continuing the work initiated at last year's CD. The Final Report of the 1980 Committee on Disarmament will be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly for its approval this fall.

"A Security Imperative for the Eighties"

The first major Government statement on arms control and disarmament since the February 22 election was made by Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, in a speech to the World Federalists of Canada in Winnipeg on June 13, 1980.

In his address, entitled "A Security Imperative for the Eighties", Dr. MacGuigan noted that despite the current tendency to assume that international arms control and disarmament efforts had come to a complete halt, the Canadian Government did not share this pessimism and pointed to this year's Throne Speech as an indication of its continuing commitment to active cooperation "in international efforts to negotiate agreements on verifiable means of arms control and disarmament". He also noted that the decision to appoint an Ambassador at Large for Disarmament testified "to our conviction that there will be continuing opportunities for constructive initiatives in Canada".

Following are excerpts from his speech:

"...I realize that in recent months it has been fashionable to assume that arms control and disarmament efforts have come to a complete halt, and some do not

even acknowledge the real achievements which have taken place over the last twenty years in the field of disarmament. But the Government does not share this pessimism and I would, to indicate that, quote from this year's Speech from the Throne;

'Canada's imperative is clear. This Government must continue its strategy to suffocate the deadly growth in the nuclear arsenals of the world. We must, and we will, actively cooperate in international efforts to negotiate agreements on verifiable means of arms control and disarmament, and seek to rally others to a cause that is no less than human survival on this planet.' "

"...The Government is convinced that real security rests on a three-cornered foundation. First, there is the foundation of deterrence — the capacity to deter war and, if deterrence fails, to defend ourselves. But the second element is equally important and it is about that I really want to talk this evening. That is arms control. I wanted to set the foundation of deterrence because I believe that it is on this that everything else can be built. But I don't think that it is nearly enough. The second theme of arms control is equally important. The third element of the foundation of peace are mechanisms and arrangements for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Dispute settlement is not at the same level of sophistication in the world, unfortunately, as it is within our states, where we have courts that make decisions. In the world, where we have courts, nations are not always willing to refer cases to them. The limitations of course are greater than that because then there is no way of enforcing the judgment

Nuclear explosions, 1945-79 (known and presumed)

I. 16 July 1945-5 August 1963 (the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty)

USA	USSR	UK	France	Total
293	164	23	8	488

II. 5 August 1963-31 December 1979

a atmospheric
u underground

USA		USSR		UK		France		China		India		Total
a	u	a	u	a	u	a	u	a	u	a	u	
0	360	0	262	0	7	41	37	21	4	0	1	733

III. 16 July 1945-31 December 1979

USA	USSR	UK	France	China	India	Total
653	426	30	86	25	1	1,221

A comprehensive nuclear test ban remains one of Canada's top priorities

which an international court may give.”

“...Our first priority is to encourage the continuation of the SALT process... Our second priority is to promote the realization of a comprehensive, multilateral treaty banning nuclear weapons tests... Third, we will assist in preparing a convention to completely prohibit chemical weapons... Fourth, we will promote the evolution of an effective non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty... Fifth, we will participate actively in negotiations to limit and reduce conventional forces... Finally, we will be striving, step-by-step, to ultimately achieve general and complete disarmament, consistent with the legitimate security needs of states.”

“...A Consultative Group of representatives of interested non-governmental organizations has met twice under the chairmanship of the Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs. I hope the work of this group will lead to better mutual understanding of points of view and to practical measures of cooperation on education and research. The success of this Consultative Group leads me to think that the time may soon be ripe for the creation of an autonomous Association for Arms Control and Disarmament in Canada. Such an association could bring together experts and interested members of the public to analyse and evaluate the critical issues. We in Government believe that it is important to raise the level of debate in Canada on these issues. Too often we have accepted without question the terms of the debate as it is conducted across the border or in Europe. In addition to focusing interest, such an association could also assist the Government by providing reports and ideas on, for example, the negotiation of verifiable agreements — that is, realistic, practical and forceable agreements. Declaratory and vague proposals can lead to disillusionment and to the discrediting of the institutions which espouse them.”

“...Canada has taken initiative before. We have been the country which has been most permanent in peacekeeping. And this really is another form of peacekeeping, this search for disarmament, and that will be one of the major goals of the Government, because it is a goal without which we will all be the poorer, the world itself will be weaker and certainly without which the world would be permanently unstable. And I think that you can rest assured that there will be no flagging in our determination to press the countries of the world in the direction of as complete a disarmament as is possible at

the present time.”

(Copies of the full text of Dr. MacGuigan's remarks are available from the Publications Section, External Information Programs Division (FIA), Department of External Affairs, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G2.)

Biological Weapons Convention Reviewed

The Biological Weapons (BW) Convention, signed in 1972 and cited as the only real disarmament measure since World War II, was reviewed, in Geneva, from March 3 to 21, 1980, by 61 delegations from its 87 adherents and 37 signatories. However, near the end of the Conference, the U.S.A. announced that it had requested clarification from the Soviet authorities about an accident near Sverdlovsk in April 1979 in which a number of people died from anthrax. The U.S.S.R. replied that the outbreak of the disease had been caused by poor handling of meat. There have been further diplomatic exchanges, but the U.S. authorities have not indicated they are satisfied with the explanation given. It is thus too early to predict how or if the problem will be resolved.

Partly because of the doubts engendered by the exchanges on the Sverdlovsk incident, the Review Conference's final declaration avoided the question as to whether all states parties had complied with the Convention. However, the Conference did deal with a number of significant aspects of the Convention, notably the rather weak verification-by-complaint procedure used when a violation is suspected, and the state of progress of the negotiations to ban chemical weapons (CW).

Sweden led a movement during the Conference to strengthen the verification procedure, and to make it less discriminatory. Canada supported this initiative, but opposed amending the Convention because of the implications this could have for other arms control treaties, in particular the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is being reviewed at a Conference from August 11 to September 5, 1980, in Geneva. The outcome was that the mechanism by which consultations may be requested by any state was slightly strengthened by an interpretative statement in the Conference's Final Declaration. The language did not go far enough for a number of countries, including Canada, but the door was left open for a re-examination of the question.

The Conference also spent some time

discussing the slow rate of progress toward the negotiation of a prohibition of chemical weapons. The BW Convention includes an article which commits all the States-Parties to continue negotiations on CW with a view to reaching “early agreement” on their prohibition and destruction.

A review mechanism is included in a number of the other arms control and disarmament treaties. It is a useful device to attempt to ensure that the obligations of the agreement are being honoured. More important in this regard is the adequacy of the verification provisions. The provisions of the BW Convention were not made stronger in 1972 because it was thought that the weapons were not very attractive ones, as they were almost as dangerous to the user as to the victim. However, the importance of adequate verification has been underlined by the Sverdlovsk incident; now that doubts have been cast, it will be very difficult to dispel them.

Canadian Views on 1980's as Second Disarmament Decade

The Canadian Government sent the following reply to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim on April 25, 1980, concerning its views on the Declaration of the 1980's as the Second Disarmament Decade:

“Canada supports the decision to declare the 1980's a Second Disarmament Decade because it draws attention to the continuing significance of disarmament as a goal for the international community. It is equally important, however, that the credibility of this goal not be undermined if it is to remain a matter for action as well as words and if the United Nations is to contribute to its achievement.

“Resolution 34/75 rightly draws attention to the fact that the purposes and objectives of the First Disarmament Decade have not been realized and that a substantial part of world resources continues to be wasted on armaments. If ten years from now the United Nations is not to draw the same sombre conclusion, it will be important that the Declaration of the 1980's as a Disarmament Decade be aimed at realizable objectives within the framework of a comprehensive program of disarmament, which in turn is considered to be a long term process. Canada believes it would be misleading to indicate specific targets during the Second Disarmament Decade “for accomplishing the major objectives

and goals of disarmament". These objectives and goals will remain credible in the eyes both of peoples and governments as long as some progress is being made towards them, but will not do so if they are associated with artificial time frames. One enemy of disarmament goals is public apathy, if not cynicism. The gap between declarations and concrete actions is growing and ought not to be allowed to grow wider.

"While keeping in view the goals themselves, the Declaration of the 1980's as a Disarmament Decade might therefore suggest some intermediate and specific steps to achieve them. It should recall that during the 1970's some limited progress was made, particularly in respect of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and that negotiations are continuing in several areas of arms control despite political obstacles and new technical challenges. One difference between 1970 and 1980 is that all nuclear weapons states are now participating in negotiations on arms control and disarmament.

"The Final Document of the UNSSOD remains the basic statement of disarmament principles and measures. The Declaration should build on this Document, taking into account as well the elements of a comprehensive program of disarmament adopted by the U.N. Disarmament Commission in 1979. Canada believes it should refer in particular to the following principles and guidelines:

- Arms control and disarmament negotiations are an integral part of efforts to strengthen international peace and security, including procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

- Negotiations ought to observe the principle of equal security for all, keeping in mind that some weapons systems threaten the survival of states and of millions of people.

- Negotiations on disarmament and arms control measures may be pursued concurrently, whether in a regional or a global framework, or on a comprehensive or restricted basis.

- Nuclear weapon states have a special responsibility to engage in negotiations in regard to these weapons, including both quantitative and qualitative controls.

- Notwithstanding this special responsibility, steps should be taken to reduce levels of conventional armaments, by limitation of arms transfers, reduction of military expenditures, and any other useful means.

- The role of the UN system in promoting and implementing disarmament

negotiations and agreements is of continuing importance, especially insofar as the UN can collect and distribute information, help with measures of verification, and sponsor research.

- Greater openness by states in co-operating with others through agreed measures of inspection and observation, as well as procedures for communication, would enhance international security by raising the level of confidence, the lack of which can inhibit or prevent agreements; this is especially the case in respect of codes of conduct in crisis situations which might otherwise lead to war.

"The Declaration of the 1980's as the Second Disarmament Decade should be a strong, forceful and realistic call to all nations to move positively towards disarmament. The unanimous adoption of a resolution at UNGA XXXIV calling for a Declaration of the 1980's as a Second Disarmament Decade reflected a general desire for international peace and co-operation in the decade ahead. The Declaration can provide the framework; the member states must provide the content."

"Survival in the Nuclear Age"

"Survival in the Nuclear Age" was the subject of a seminar held on May 31, 1980, at the University of Quebec in Montreal, in connection with the 1980 Learned Societies meetings. Academics interested in or associated with the study of disarmament and arms control issues were joined by a number of leading experts in the field including Dr. M.M. Kaplan, Director-General of the International Pugwash Movement, Major-General Indar Rikhye, President of the International Peace Academy, and Mr. G.A.H. Pearson, Canadian Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs.

Prime Minister Trudeau sent greetings to the seminar, noting that the central theme of the meeting was one that is "exercising the minds of all members of the world community... It is imperative that nations seek their security at lower levels of armament if we are to survive in the nuclear age". The Prime Minister nevertheless pointed out that against the background of the Canadian Government's determination to suffocate the proliferation of nuclear arms, the need to provide for greater security among Western powers and the NATO Alliance must also be recognized.

The seminar was divided into two sessions, entitled "Technological and Political Implications of the Arms Race" and

"Conflict Resolution and Peace-keeping". In the first session, a panel of experts, chaired by Dr. G. Ignatieff, President of the United Nations Association of Canada, discussed a variety of subjects including the media's role in communicating disarmament issues to the public, global military expenditures, and the reluctance of the public to consider the imminent danger of nuclear war. While it was considered that public apathy might be the result of the highly technical nature of such subjects as SALT and MBFR, one panelist noted that "survival is never too complex for people to understand".

All the participants emphasized the urgency of calling a halt to the arms race. Canada's role in international disarmament and arms control negotiations, and its excellent reputation in such fora as the UN, were considered important in this regard, and it was generally agreed that Canada should be doing more to encourage negotiations toward this end.

At the afternoon session, Major-General Rikhye spoke on the subject of conflict resolution and the usefulness of peace-keeping as a tool in resolving military conflicts. A second panel of experts, led by Dr. A.C. Smith, Chairman of the International Peace Academy and a professor at Carleton University in Ottawa, commented on several aspects of General Rikhye's speech including Canada's role in international peace-keeping efforts and its potential as a mediator in conflict situations.

Canada Tables Verification Compendium

Verification has become the most important, and perhaps also the most difficult and controversial aspect of international disarmament and arms control negotiations. Recognizing the need for greater knowledge and understanding of the problem of verification, Canada tabled a compendium of arms control verification proposals in the Committee on Disarmament on June 12, 1980. In tabling the compendium, Canada's Ambassador to the CD, Mr. D.S. McPhail, made the following statement:

"I believe it is safe to say that no single issue in the decade of the 1980s is likely to be of greater significance in international disarmament and arms control negotiations than verification. Particularly in an era of increased suspicion and uncertainty, nations are unlikely to accede to treaties affecting their own national security without some adequate

means of assurance that other signatories will in fact be living up to the terms of the agreement. The records of our Committee are replete with attestations from all quarters underscoring the necessity of adequate verification as a vital ingredient to successful negotiations as recognized under point IX of the permanent framework of the agenda of our Committee.

"Although this principle has been recognized in previous negotiations leading to arms control agreements, it has, almost without exception, been discussed on an *ad hoc* basis and developed specifically to meet political sensitivities and perceptions of national security criteria. The effectiveness of verification procedures negotiated under these conditions in agreements such as the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention will undoubtedly be tested in the years to come. While the superpowers have on occasion submitted working papers on verification relating to selected subjects, as have other nations at time using a general approach, the subject has not been approached on a generic basis. Indeed, we have detected in our negotiations, from time to time, problems of definition and concept. Therefore, we consider that a document which could serve as a firm base of reference would prove useful to this Committee and its working groups.

"The Operational Research and Analysis Establishment of the Canadian Department of National Defence began basic research some time ago on the subject of verification in general. With particular emphasis on the ENDC, the CCD and the CD, but not to the exclusion of other sources, a compendium of arms control verification proposals was developed. We do not claim that all verification proposals are included in the compendium, though it does contain certainly all which have come to the attention of the researchers in Ottawa.

"It is in this context that we submit the compendium to this Committee as a document which might help to establish a common working basis for us all. We hope that by so doing the necessity of other members expending their efforts in like ventures may be obviated. Recognizing that a publication like this quickly loses its value if it does not remain current, the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment has already begun the process of updating. The results will be made available to this Committee when completed. We would, therefore, welcome comments and submission of material which may be considered relevant and invite the Committee to develop

its own updating mechanism in due course if considered appropriate.

"I believe you will find the reference matrix which serves as an index to the publication an interesting document in its own right. I must readily admit that the development of the compendium has been a learning process for all who have been associated with it. There has been no attempt on our part to provide a value judgement for any of the abstracts and perhaps we could be criticized for not doing so. We wished only to provide an objective document which could be accepted and utilized by all Committee members. Data contained in each proposal abstract and the summary of each proposal is therefore presented from the perspective of the originators of the proposal. We would like to point out that some abstracts represent the results of official consultations while others are the product of the academic community. In this context one should also recognize that technological innovations may have altered the relevance of some of the proposals. The relative value of each abstract and of the document as a whole rests therefore with the user.

"For our part, we have found the process of getting back to basics of considerable value. We hope later in the year to table in the Committee a paper quantifying some aspects of our basic research and intend at a later stage to develop a conceptual paper on verification. Recognizing the complexities of the overall verification process, we submit that it is necessary first to develop and understand the basic elements and to reach some consensus regarding definitions, concepts and objectives, even if in doing so we must modify to some degree some of our present inhibitions. On behalf of my Government, I submit this document for your consideration and use and would welcome your comments and cooperation in tailoring future editions more specifically, if possible, to the Committee's needs."

(Copies of the Compendium are available from the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Canada, K1A 0K2.)

Consultative Group Discusses ACD Issues

Current disarmament negotiations, Canadian NGO activities, and the CSCE Review Conference were the major topics discussed at the semi-annual meeting of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs held in Ottawa

on April 24-25, 1980.

Representatives from 16 Canadian non-governmental organizations active in the disarmament field joined officials of the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence, in the day and a half discussions. Also in attendance was Mr. Louis Duclos, M.P., and Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

In opening the meeting on April 24, the Chairman, Mr. G.A.H. Pearson, Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, presented a brief tour d'horizon of the current situation regarding disarmament and arms control and new trends in the field. He noted during his presentation that the current international situation should not be viewed as a permanent condition and that arms control would eventually prevail as it was in the best interests of all nations.

Turning to Canada's activities in the field, Mr. Pearson mentioned the Government's active interest in such subjects as a comprehensive test ban, chemical weapons, and verification. Lt. Col. F.R. Cleminson presented a briefing on various aspects of the verification question and discussed Canada's Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals which was recently tabled in the Committee on Disarmament. The domestic activities of Mr. Pearson's Office were also discussed at some length. Special mention was made of the Office's interest in Canadian research on disarmament and arms control and its financial assistance to NGO's and other groups.

The afternoon session was devoted to the NGO's and a discussion of their activities and programs. A major result of this discussion was the formation of a working group to consider the implications for Canada of the U.N. Secretary-General's recommendation that .1 per cent of nations' annual military expenditures be devoted to disarmament. The findings of the working group will be tabled at the next meeting of the Consultative Group.

The April 24 meeting was also highlighted by a luncheon hosted by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mark MacGuigan.

On April 25, the members received a substantial briefing on the issues of the upcoming review conference on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe from Mr. L. Rogers, Coordinator and Ambassador at Large for the CSCE. After his briefing, Mr. Rogers responded to questions from the members of the Group.

Discussion then turned to the future

of the Consultative Group itself. After comments and suggestions from a number of members regarding the composition and status of the Group, Mr. Pearson announced that its next meeting would feature an expanded membership and a full two-day agenda.

The Consultative Group will meet again on September 25-26, 1980.

United Nations Disarmament Commission

The 1980 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission met for four weeks in New York ending June 6, 1980.

The three main items on this year's agenda were the Declaration of the 1980's as the Second Disarmament Decade, an elaboration of a general approach to negotiations on nuclear and conventional disarmament, and the reduction of military expenditures. Agreement was reached on the texts of reports on the last two items but not on the first item. The draft Declaration on the 1980's as the Second Disarmament Decade therefore will be submitted to this fall's UN General Assembly with a number of bracketed elements indicating disagreement over certain sections of the text of the draft.

After opening round statements by the participants, open-ended drafting groups were established to consider each of the three main items. The UNDC uses the consensus procedure during its deliberations, thus ensuring that decisions or recommendations made at its sessions have the unanimous approval of all member states.

The UNDC agreed to a Danish proposal for a study of all aspects of the conventional arms race, which the General Assembly will be asked to approve at its 35th session. In addition, there was agreement that the Commission should pursue its consideration of the reduction of military budgets, including an elaboration of principles to govern the actions of states.

The main differences of opinion on the Disarmament Decade declaration centered on the nature of the guidance to be given to the Committee on Disarmament, the necessity of target dates, and the language proposed for some sections of the declaration.

The Canadian representative to this year's UNDC sessions, Mr. G.A.H. Pearson, reaffirmed Canada's support for the work of the UNDC in a statement to the Commission on May 19, 1980. Mr. Pearson said the Commission provides an

opportunity for all states to exchange views on what might be called the medium-range future, in contrast to the General Assembly and Committee on Disarmament which are both oriented to current issues.

UN Disarmament and Development Study Group Continues Work

The United Nations Expert Group Studying the Relationship between Disarmament and Development has met twice thus far in 1980.

A five-day session in February was largely devoted to organizational matters. At that meeting, the Group, working under the chairmanship of Mrs. Inga Thorsson, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, agreed on arrangements for the submission and review of the 41 research projects commissioned in 1978 to study various aspects of the relationship between disarmament and development, and four others on aspects of the proposal to establish an international disarmament fund for development. The Group hopes to complete its final report in time for the 1981 U.N. General Assembly. It was also announced that two of the research projects, undertaken by individuals in Nigeria and Norway, had already been completed. The final reports of these two projects were examined during the meeting. Canada was represented at the February meeting of the Expert Group by Mr. Geoffrey Pearson, Canada's Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs.

A more substantive meeting of the Group took place from June 2-20 in New York. Nine more of the 45 studies had been received by this meeting and were examined by the experts in attendance. Canada was represented by Mr. Bernard Wood, Executive Director of the North-South Institute. There was, in addition, considerable discussion of the outline of the final report of the Group and consideration of an idea to produce a popular version of the report.

Canada is funding two of the disarmament and development studies at a total cost of \$57,400. The two Canadian projects, *L'Impact du désarmement sur l'économie Canadienne* (Laval University) and *The Utilization of Resources for Military Purposes in Canada and the Impact on Canadian Industrialization and Defence Procurement* (University of Waterloo), were recently completed and have now been submitted to the UN Experts Group for consideration at its next meeting.

Of General Interest...

...1981 Pugwash International Conference in Banff

The Canadian Pugwash Group is currently preparing to host the 1981 Pugwash International Conference in Banff, Alberta, from August 27 — September 2, 1981. This will be the first time since 1958 that the Pugwash International Conference will be held in Canada. The international Pugwash organization, made up of leading scholars and scientists from around the world concerned with current international issues and problems, held its first conference in Pugwash, Nova Scotia under the sponsorship of Cyrus Eaton in 1957. The 1981 Conference will focus on such issues as the problems of nuclear disarmament, the status of other disarmament questions, international security, energy and international security, security in the developing world, and a preview of the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament.

...Organizations Plan for Disarmament Week 1980

Reports of disarmament activities and special projects in connection with Disarmament Week, October 24-30, 1980, are being received from across Canada. In Ottawa, a committee of NGO representatives is planning a wide range of activities for the entire week from speakers to music to a play especially commissioned for presentation during the week. In the Maritimes, internationally known speakers have been invited to speak and conduct seminars in Fredericton and Halifax. Mr. Murray Thomson, executive Director of Project Ploughshares, in Ottawa, is acting as national coordinator for a series of activities being organized by NGO's in a number of Canadian cities. Other programs are planned for Toronto, Montreal, Regina, Vancouver, Winnipeg, Sudbury and other centres. If your organization has any special plans for Disarmament Week, please let us know. You may find useful the UN fact sheet dealing with Disarmament Week which is available from the UN Association of Canada office in Ottawa.

...IWO Unveils "Network to Educate for World Security"

The Institute for World Order, a peace education organization based in New York, has designed a plan aimed at strengthening the foundations of world peace through education. Using the traditional way to transmit culture (education) and the basic tool for forming and

reforming adult opinion (communication), the Institute's plan attempts to transform the universal desire for peace into habitual practices of peace. The Institute has drawn on the expertise and experience of scholars, government officials, specialists, and others from around the world to produce suggestions for a flexible worldwide education program for world peace entitled "Network to Educate for World Security".

Further information on the elements of the program is available in brochure form from the Institute for World Order, 777 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.

...UNAC Disarmament Kit

The United Nations Association of Canada is currently preparing a disarmament kit containing information material on various aspects of the arms race, disarmament initiatives, and ways the public can become involved in debate and discussion of the issues in this field. UNAC hopes in particular to encourage wide distribution of the kit in secondary and post-secondary schools across Canada where it could be a useful teaching aid.

The kit will be available after August 1, 1980, from the United Nations Association of Canada, 63 Sparks Street, Ottawa, K1P 5A6, at a cost of \$4.00 plus third class postage or \$3.00 plus postage for bulk orders of 25 or more.

...Disarmament Times Special Edition

The *Disarmament Times* publication, produced eight times yearly by the NGO Disarmament Committee in New York, will be moving to Geneva in August to cover the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference which begins August 11, 1980. The *Disarmament Times* will produce 10 special editions during the four-week conference. Individuals or groups interested in receiving copies of each of the special editions free of charge should write to the Office of the Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, Department of External Affairs, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa K1A 0G2.

...1980 Disarmament Calendar

Aug. 11 - Sep. 5 — NPT Review Conference, Geneva
Sep. 15 - 26 — UN Study Group on Disarmament and Development, Geneva
Sep. 15 - Oct. 10 — UN Conference on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva
Sep. 16 - Dec. 19 — UNGA XXXV, N.Y.
Oct. 24 - 30 — Disarmament Week 1980.

UNESCO Holds Conference on Disarmament Education

The role of education in efforts to encourage greater public awareness and understanding of disarmament issues was the theme of the UNESCO World Conference on Disarmament Education held in Paris from June 9-13, 1980. Specialists from 48 countries, joined by observers from 82 non-governmental organizations and 55 member states of UNESCO, met during the five-day Conference to take stock of the situation with regard to disarmament education throughout the world and promote the development of disarmament education at all levels in both school and out-of-school education.

Canada was represented by: Mr. Michael Cooke of Toronto (Christian Movement for Peace), Mrs. Madeleine Dubuc of Montreal (Voice of Women), Mr. Bal Naipaul of Regina (Project Ploughshares), and Mrs. Marilyn Whitby of Halifax (Voice of Women).

The first two days of the Congress

were devoted to general statements by the participants. The assembly then divided into two "commissions", where substantive discussions on the role of disarmament in education and the media took place. Over 40 papers, prepared by leading experts in various aspects of education or disarmament, were presented during the Conference and were supplemented by oral presentations by a number of participants calling for specific curriculum guidelines and increased dialogue among researchers, educators and activists. Agreement on the wording of the Final Document of the Conference was however not obtained by the end of the week and the draft text is now in the hands of the UNESCO Secretariat for further work.

(A complete list of the documents and papers issued at the Conference is available from the Canadian UNESCO Commission, 255 Albert St. Ottawa, Canada K1P 5G5.)

Canadian Opinion and Disarmament

by J. King Gordon

There is a curious assumption that since arms are the working tools of the military, the military have all the answers on armament and disarmament. In the age of modern technology, the makers and users of arms are deemed to be the experts with the sophisticated knowledge that is inaccessible to the man in the street. The choice of fighter plane A as against fighter plane B may become a matter of public interest because of the jobs dependent on the choice. But the necessity of a couple of billions of dollars paid by the Canadian taxpayers for a new fighter aircraft hardly raises a ripple of public concern. The decision has been taken by those who know best. If any question is raised, the argument that Canada must do its part in continental defence is usually sufficient to silence the questioner.

This is why it is so difficult to make disarmament a public issue. It is a matter for the military experts even though from time to time a dissenting voice may be raised calling attention to the \$400 billion arms race that appears headed for a finish line of nuclear destruction.

There is a further and more profound difficulty that historically armaments have been regarded as a coefficient of security. "To preserve peace, prepare for war" despite all the evidence to the con-

trary is still a popularly accepted slogan and apparently still at the centre of most strategic defence planning. This despite the recognition from the days of the Concert of Europe to the United Nations that international security depends more on international political agreements, institutions and procedures than on military hardware. More recently there has emerged the recognition that, as a national societies, social justice and a fair distribution of resources is a necessary basis of stability and security. The Brandt Report has as much relevance to disarmament as the recommendations of the UN Special Session.

Any efforts to mobilize Canadian opinion in favour of disarmament should, therefore, take into account the broader issues of security having to do with the promotion of *detente* — north and south as well as east and west — the strengthening of international institutions as instruments in the resolution of conflict and the promotion of cooperation, the increased efficiency of peacekeeping forces, and the restructuring of the international community to achieve greater justice and more equitable distribution.

One great advantage of this approach is that there are already in existence many active and influential organizations in Canada which are committed to the promotion of a number of these international objectives and which see the issue of disarmament in a global context. For

instance, the CCIC at its upcoming annual meeting and conference is devoting one of its workshops to Disarmament and Development and with special reference to the Brandt Report. Many of the CCIC family of Non-Governmental Organizations would I am sure be prepared to promote educational and information activities along these lines. So would many church organizations. So would many womens organizations. And organized labour. Universities are thinking in much more interdisciplinary terms of international relations, strategic studies and developmental social science. And

the United Nations Association in much of its work and detailed position papers on disarmament has recognized the global context in which the issue must be placed.

I have been impressed by the final statement of Willy Brandt in the introduction to his report:


"The shaping of our common future is much too important to be left to governments and experts alone. Therefore, our appeal goes to youth, to women's and labour movements; to political, intellectual and religious leaders; to scientists and educators; to technicians and managers; to members of rural and business

communities. May they all try to understand and to conduct their affairs in the light of this new challenge."

Granted the existence of this constituency — or group of constituencies — not much more is needed, in the way of a new central mechanism. Would it not be possible for the existing advisory group on disarmament and arms control affairs to undertake some coordinating activity that would lead to joint programs involving several non-governmental organizations? Some funding might be needed to make available existing and relevant literature and to encourage workshops and seminars. It might also be very useful to fund some new research and writing with particular relevance to the Canadian scene but not to attempt to duplicate any of the excellent work of SIPRI. I would be particularly interested in new approaches which would place the issue of disarmament in the global context and in the setting of world security in the broadest sense. It should be possible as well to enlist the interest of CBC, Ontario Public Television and other community television stations or networks to engage in programs dealing with the inter-related complex of issues with a focus in disarmament.

And all of this would, one would hope, provide a base for public discussion and informed opinion that would be of value to government policy-makers.

(Mr. Gordon is a long-time member of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs who has also served with the UN Secretariat. He was asked by this Office to comment on this subject.)



The CF-18: Do Canadians devote too much attention to bread and butter issues such as jobs, and too little attention to the disarmament and arms control or international security aspects of such military acquisitions?

A REVIEW OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITIES

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Canada Pursues Initiatives at UNGA XXXV

In an atmosphere tainted by reaction to adverse international events during the year such as Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war, the XXXV United Nations General Assembly nevertheless again highlighted the importance of the goal of arms control and disarmament during its 1980 session.

The UN's perception of the need for immediate action in this field was underlined by the 43 resolutions adopted by the First Committee of UNGA XXXV which covered 20 separate arms control and disarmament subjects.

Canadian interest and participation in the activities of the First Committee of the General Assembly were emphasized by Mr. A.R. Menzies, Ambassador for Disarmament, in his speech to the Committee on October 27, 1980 in which he stated that "Canada views its participation in disarmament and arms control negotiations as one of the most important aspects of its foreign policy. The cause of arms control and disarmament is no less than human survival on this planet... This Committee is reviewing developments in the field of disarmament in the light of recent events. The conclusions we reach will enable us to assess prospects for the future. The Committee can equip itself to look ahead towards 1982, for at the second Special Session devoted to disarmament we will be passing judgements on both the machinery set up in the disarmament field and the over-all progress realized in implementing the Programme of Action. The intervening period between now and 1982 is, therefore, critical if we are to break the present impasse and take positive steps towards the realization of measures we all agreed to in the Programme of Action."

Mr. Menzies went on to outline Canada's priorities in the arms control and disarmament field, noting the importance of the SALT process and expressing Canada's regret that SALT II had not yet been ratified. He also commented on the necessity of completing negotia-

tions on a comprehensive test ban treaty and looked forward to a time when a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes could also be negotiated. Regarding the idea of an immediate moratorium on nuclear testing, he said that "the frustration over the apparent deadlock in negotiations leading to a CTB ...is no reason for us to settle for a moratorium on nuclear testing — which, of course, makes no provision for verification, and leaves it up to the nuclear powers to begin testing, as they see fit, at the end of the period. Indeed, a moratorium is likely to delay the negotiations and consequently any conclusion of a treaty which is, after all, our common goal."

Mr. Menzies also noted Canada's interest in efforts to ban chemical weapons and to investigate the persistent rumors regarding the use of chemical weapons in certain countries. He also drew the Committee's attention to three subjects highlighted in the Final Document of the UN Special Session on Disarmament which had as yet received little attention.

"The first is paragraph 81 on conventional disarmament. Useful discussions on conventional weapons took place in the United Nations Disarmament Commission last spring. This should be just the beginning of our efforts to show balanced progress in the field of arms control. The recent successful conclusion of the UN Weapons Conference is a contribution to the development and elaboration of international humanitarian law.

"The second is paragraph 80. It says, 'to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held.' The fact is that there already is an incipient arms competition in outer space. The continuation of this competition could well have a destabilizing effect on the present balance of weaponry and it is consequently Canada's view that efforts should be intensified to reach an interna-



tional agreement on this matter.

"The third subject is the central issue of any meaningful arms control agreement. It is verification. Point IX of the permanent framework of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament recognizes the necessity of adequate verification as a vital ingredient in negotiations. To encourage understanding of the complexities of verification, Canada tabled in the Committee last June a Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals. A second paper quantifying some aspects of this

research was tabled more recently. A conceptual paper is in preparation, as is an updated version of the compendium. While these papers may help to develop an understanding of the basic elements in verification, there is also a need for papers on the verification problems of particular agreements under negotiation."

Canadian activity in the First Committee of UNGA XXXV reflected these priorities. Canada introduced for the third consecutive year a resolution on a ban on the production of fissionable

material for weapons purposes, which received slightly wider support from the Third World, but lost ground with the nuclear weapon states and failed to sway a number of near nuclear states. In addition, there were two resolutions on a comprehensive test ban one of which was co-sponsored by Australia and Canada, but which all five nuclear weapons powers declined to support.

Canada also co-sponsored two resolutions on chemical weapons; one "traditional" item concerning the necessity of a chemical weapons ban which was adopted by consensus, and a second which called upon the Secretary-General to establish an impartial commission to investigate reports of alleged use of such weapons.

Other resolutions passed by the First Committee which Canada co-sponsored dealt with reductions in military budgets, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, indiscriminate and inhumane conventional weapons, and confidence building measures.

Emphasizing its interest in the issue of verification, Canada also introduced a procedural resolution on verification which was subsequently withdrawn when Mexico introduced amendments which deflected its original purpose.

Disarmament Resolutions at UNGA XXXV

Resolution Number	Resolution	Vote (Yes/No/Abst)
35/46	1980's Disarmament Decade	Consensus
35/47	Preparations for UNSSOD II	Consensus
35/141	Economic and Social Consequences of Arms Race	Consensus
35/142(A)	Reduction of Military Budgets	Consensus
35/144(A)	*Chemical and Biological Weapons	Consensus
35/144(B)	*Chemical and Biological Weapons	Consensus
35/147	Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Middle East)	Consensus
35/150	*Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	Consensus
35/151	World Disarmament Conference	Consensus
35/152(A)	Disarmament Fellowships	Consensus
35/152(E)	Implementation of Recommendations of UNSSOD I	Consensus
35/152(F)	Report of Disarmament Commission	Consensus
35/152(H)	Programme of Studies	Consensus
35/153	*Certain Conventional Weapons	Consensus
35/156(B)	*Confidence Building Measures	Consensus
35/156(D)	Study on Regional Disarmament	Consensus
35/156(E)	Study on Disarmament and International Security	Consensus
35/156(G)	Radiological Weapons	Consensus
35/156(J)	General and Complete Disarmament	Consensus
35/156(K)	SALT	Consensus
35/142(B)	*Reduction of Military Budgets	113:0:21
35/143	Treaty of Tlatelolco (Protocol I)	138:0:5
35/144(C)	*Chemical and Biological Weapons	78:17:36
35/145(A)	Comprehensive Test Ban	111:2:31
35/145(B)	*Comprehensive Test Ban	129:0:16
35/146(A)	South African Nuclear Capability	132:0:13
35/146(B)	Denuclearization of Africa	133:0:12
35/148	Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (South Asia)	96:3:44
35/149	New Weapons of Mass Destruction	117:0:26
35/152(B)	Nuclear Weapons in All Aspects	118:18:7
35/152(C)	Nuclear Weapons in All Aspects	124:4:17
35/152(D)	Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons	112:19:14
35/152(G)	Paragraph 125 of UNSSOD Final Document	104:19:17
35/152(I)	World Disarmament Campaign	128:0:17
35/152(J)	Report of Committee on Disarmament	132:0:13
35/154	Negative Security Assurances	110:2:31
35/155	Negative Security Assurances	121:0:24
35/156(A)	Study on Conventional Disarmament	101:14:27
35/156(C)	Non-Stationing of Nuclear Weapons	95:18:27
35/156(F)	Study on Nuclear Weapons	126:0:19
35/156(H)	*Fissionable Material	125:11:8
35/156(I)	Report of Committee on Disarmament (Membership)	135:0:10
35/157	Israeli Nuclear Armament	99:6:38

*Co-sponsored by Canada

Canada's New Ambassador for Disarmament

In a press release issued by the Department of External Affairs on October 23, 1980, the Secretary of State for External Affairs announced that Mr. Arthur Menzies had taken up his appointment as Ambassador for Disarmament.

The creation of this new position was announced in the Speech from the Throne and builds on the decision two years ago to appoint an Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs in response to the programme of action agreed at the Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly. At the mid-point between that Session and a further Special Session scheduled for 1982, the appointment of an Ambassador for Disarmament marks the beginning of Canadian preparations for the next Special Session. It also reflects the importance the Government attaches to international efforts to negotiate verifiable agreements on arms control and disarmament.

Mr. Menzies will also hold the title of Special Adviser on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs. Based at headquarters,

he will have general responsibility for the formulation of policies bearing on arms control and disarmament issues, and will remain the chief liaison point for non-governmental organizations and individuals outside the Government interested in these questions. The fund established in 1979 to encourage research and stimulate information activities will be continued.

As Ambassador, he will normally represent Canada on international bodies concerned with arms control and disarmament, including the General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Born in China in 1916, Mr. Menzies is one of the Department's most senior diplomats. He has served with distinction in a wide variety of assignments both at home and abroad. From 1958 to 1961 he was High Commissioner to Malaya and concurrently Ambassador to Burma. From 1965 he was for seven years High Commissioner to Australia and concurrently High Commissioner to Fiji from 1970 to 1972. He was Permanent Representative and Ambassador to the North Atlantic Council in Brussels from 1972



Mr. Arthur Menzies

to 1976. From 1976 until his return to Canada this fall, he served as Ambassador to China and concurrently Ambassador to Vietnam after 1977.

In addition, Mr. Menzies was director of the Department's division dealing with disarmament, defence, and peace-keeping matters during the sixties.

Olof Palme Heads Independent Commission on Disarmament

Citing a disappointing record of more than three decades of efforts at arms control, a press release issued in Vienna on September 13, 1980 announced the formation of an Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, with former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme as chairman. The Commission dedicated to developing concrete steps toward building peace, is focussing its attention on national and international security concerns and the contribution that can be made to these concerns by disarmament and arms control.

Mr. Robert Ford, former Canadian Ambassador to the USSR, is a member of the Commission. The Canadian Government has agreed to contribute \$160,000 toward the Palme Commission's operating budget.

Other members include Mr. Georgi Arbatov (USSR), Mr. Egon Bahr (FRG), Mr. Jean-Marie Daillet (France), Mr. Alfonso Garcia Robles (Mexico), Mrs. Gro Harlem-Brundtland (Norway), Mr. Haruki Mori (Japan), General Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigeria), Dr. David Owen (UK), Mr. Shridath Ramphal (Guyana), Mr. Salim Salim (Tanzania), Mr. Joop den Uyl (Netherlands), and Mr. Cyrus Vance (USA).

The Palme Commission is a logical continuation of the work initiated by the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, chaired by former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. While the Brandt Commission sought to deal with global issues that would constitute threats to peace in the 1980's, particularly in the economic sphere, the Palme Commission will try to complete this broad overview of global issues by concentrating on security and disarmament matters that can contribute to peace in the decade ahead.

The Commission has publicly outlined three objectives:

(a) to chart a course for substantive agreement and actual measures with particular regard to the Second UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1982;

(b) to report and comment on current disarmament and security questions with a view to focussing national and international attention on current opportunities for promoting peace through arms limitations;

(c) to stimulate an informed public debate on these issues.

During the first two meetings in September and December 1980, the members of the Commission developed a

work programme geared to understanding why past efforts of disarmament worked or failed and how progress in current issues of security and arms control could be stimulated as well as to proposing longer term measures of disarmament and arms control that could be usefully pursued at the next UN Special Session on Disarmament.

Future meetings of the Commission are scheduled every two months throughout 1981. The Commission hopes to issue its final report well in advance of the second Special Session.

Canada Continues Work in Verification

On July 31, 1980 Canada tabled in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva a quantification working paper on the Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals (see September 1980 edition of the Disarmament Bulletin). The working paper sought to quantify some aspects of the basic research in the Compendium. Using a reference matrix and source index contained in the quantification paper, the proposals listed in the Compendium can be analyzed and collated in terms of the arms control objectives of each proposal. The paper highlights, through simple arithmetic analysis, the generalized perceptions of verification in terms of predominant emphasis and preferred methodology.

Canadian Disarmament Activity and Chemical Warfare

Chemical warfare and its probable effects have figured second only to nuclear warfare in the activities of disarmament negotiations within the United Nations since World War II. Although negotiations on nuclear arms limitations have been and probably will remain primarily a function of bilateral negotiations between the two super powers, there has been an increasing attempt, particularly within the Committee on Disarmament, to bring chemical weapons discussion more to the fore in multilateral negotiations. While weapons of this type are for the most part held by the two super powers and several other militarily significant nations, expertise in the field of chemistry is more widespread.

Serious attempts to limit the use of chemicals in war date back to the late 1800s. The prospect of widespread use of chemical agents in warfare was recognized

and the first concerted attempt to ban such use was made at the peace conferences held in The Hague in 1899 and 1907. A resolution outlawing "the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases" was adopted with 26 nations signing the treaty in 1899. By 1914, however, research and development of both gases and means of delivery had gone far beyond the narrow wording of the resolution.

Chemical agents were employed early in World War I and by the war's end it is estimated that about 17,000 chemical troops had been employed by both sides and that their activities had resulted in the creation of 1.3 million casualties including 91,000 deaths. A total of 124,000 tons of toxic gases were employed, slightly less than half by the Allied countries. Although introduced late in the war, over 9 million shells filled with mustard gas were fired by both sides creating an estimated 400,000 casualties.

Chemical warfare was burned into the Canadian psyche at Ypres on April 22, 1915 when the First Canadian Division was subjected to the first massive gas attack of the war. Although not in possession of defensive equipment, the Canadian troops held their ground. Remembered with pride by the Canadian Army, that day probably produced a psychological effect in generations of Canadians and in part at least accounts for a preoccupation on the part of Canada concerning research and development of defensive measures. Canadian activities on chemical weapon disarmament stem from the same source.

Revulsion over the use of such weapons and particularly the hideous results of mustard, led to the convening of a Geneva Conference in 1925 to outlaw all uses of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases. The Geneva Protocol was eventually ratified by 32 nations, one of which was Canada. The Canadian agreement not to use chemical weapons in war carried the reservation "unless these weapons should be used against the military forces or the civil population of Canada or its allies".

The Canadian Armed Forces were equipped from the outbreak of the Second World War with defensive equipment and training. Of more significance from a disarmament point of view was the establishment of a research centre at Suffield, Alberta and the subsequent experience gained in the field.

The research station, a 1,000 square mile stretch of prairie about 150 miles south of Calgary, was originally developed to carry out the R & D necessary to provide a chemical warfare capability to

the British and Canadian armies. As a part of that effort, stocks of mustard gas were produced and stored in several half-buried vats on the Suffield range. Since chemical warfare was not initiated during the war, the material about 700 tons in all, remained there at the end of the war. These were the only viable stocks of chemical warfare agents possessed by Canada at that time or since.

The Canadian experience in the destruction of the mustard gas has been documented by Canadian disarmament experts both in Pugwash seminars and in the Committee on Disarmament as practical input to the disarmament process. With advanced environmental standards in force, destruction of the mustard gas was completed in 1976 but residue disposal remains a problem. Cost of the destruction of the mustard has been very high, much more than the cost of its original production. It has required the time and effort of many engineers, scientists, technicians and others over a period of several years, and study and analysis will probably continue into the 1980s.

In the immediate post war years with the advent of nuclear weapons, attitudes of military planners and the informed public toward chemical weapons underwent a noticeable change. Although efforts continued to ban chemical and biological weapons (CBWs), they were regarded as perhaps a lesser evil than nuclear weapons. Because of the unpredictable effects of such weapons and because of improvements in nuclear weapons, less emphasis was placed on CBWs as offensive weapons.

By the late 1960s, talks between the USA and USSR resumed in earnest. On March 24, 1970, the Canadian position with respect to chemical or biological warfare was declared before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in the following terms:

"The Government of Canada intends to contribute fully to the efforts of the United Nations and of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to reduce and, if possible, eliminate the possibility of chemical and biological warfare. Canada intends to participate actively in negotiations toward agreements which would supplement and strengthen the Geneva Protocol of 1925 by prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons. Practical progress need not wait until the conclusion of these negotiations. The Protocol can be strengthened significantly through unilateral declarations of policy and intentions on the issues involved."

The declaration went on to note that Canada had never possessed biological weapons (or toxins) and did not intend to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, or use such weapons at any time in the future. In addition, Canada noted its intention to destroy the remainder of its then present stocks of chemical weapons and refrain from any future use of chemical weapons in war, or their development, production, acquisition, or stockpiling for use in warfare, unless as stated in its agreement to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, these weapons were used against the military forces or the civilian population of Canada or its allies. The 1970 declaration noted that Canada would consider formally withdrawing this reservation if effective and verifiable agreements to effectively ban chemical weapons could be concluded.

The negotiations between the USA and the USSR (the two major holders of chemical weapons) since 1977, although sporadic, have led to a narrowing of the outstanding differences between them. Issues between the major powers are discussed in the United Nations Fact Sheet No. 7.

For many reasons, the Biological Weapons Convention signed in 1972 was relatively simple to achieve. Canada as signatory to the 1972 treaty looked to it as constituting a model for the more complicated chemical weapons convention. The Sverdlovsk incident of 1979, however, brought into question the adequacy of the verification procedures which are still being pursued. The work, to-date and in the future, on a chemical weapons convention is likely to be increasingly complex as a result. In addition chemical weapons as opposed to biological weapons, can be effectively employed in a conflict, are more readily available, and come in a variety of different types. There have been widespread and disturbing reports of possible use of chemical weapons of some sort in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea. With these peripheral issues pointing out the significance of countries developing a greater understanding of the banned agents and activities, it is important to recognize that prior to the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and facilities an effective system of verification must be in place.

Since the declaration of 1970, Canada has actively participated in the work of the Committee on Disarmament (CD) to develop an effective ban on chemical warfare. Canadian Defence Research scientists at DRE Suffield and in Ottawa have contributed a series of working papers designed to explore various

aspects of the problem centering mainly on verification. Canada actively supported the establishment of an ad-hoc committee to study the problem in the 1980 session of the CD and will be studying the effectiveness of its approach in the months to come.

As a firm advocate of chemical weapons disarmament, Canada co-sponsored both chemical weapons resolutions at UNGA XXXV in 1980; one which reiterated the immediate need for an agreement banning chemical weapons, and another which called upon the UN Secretary-General to establish an international commission to investigate the allegations of use mentioned above.

The next 12 to 18 months may be crucial in determining whether or not a chemical weapons treaty is attainable. If progress is made between the super powers and negotiations become increasingly multinational, it is likely that Canada's role will expand. Relatively few member nations of the CD are knowledgeable in the chemical weapons field. Based on the negotiating experience dating back to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and backed by its technological and analytical capability in the defensive aspects of chemical weapons, Canada will be expected to take the lead, along with other nations in ensuring that the multinational aspects of the negotiations are more than form.

UN Weapons Conference Concludes Agreement

The Second United Nations Conference on the Prohibition or Restriction of the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects concluded its deliberations on October 11, 1980 with the announcement of the successful negotiation of a general agreement and three protocols dealing with incendiary weapons, booby-traps and mines, and non-x-rayable fragments.

While in the larger context of disarmament the agreement is a modest one, it nevertheless represents concrete progress in the area of humanitarian law and arms control. It is a signal as well that meaningful arms restriction agreements can be reached despite a very difficult international political ambience.

The agreement, concluded at the 72-nation conference in Geneva, will be opened within six months along with its three protocols, at the United Nations for all nations to sign and ratify. Govern-

ments signing within the first six months of the agreement will be considered "original parties". The treaty and its protocols will enter into force when 20 countries have ratified them.

In the area of incendiary weapons, one of the most important achievements of the conference was the banning of incendiary attacks on cities and other areas of civilian concentrations, even those containing military objectives.

In addition, a second protocol places restrictions on the use of booby-traps. Designed primarily to protect civilians, this protocol forbids the attaching of booby-traps to wounded or sick individuals, and such things as toys, kitchen utensils, food and drink, as well as their concealment at grave sites and medical facilities. The protocol also requires that charts and records be kept of all landmine emplacements so that they may be located and made harmless at the end of hostilities. There are also restrictions on the dropping of land mines from the air.

The conference adopted a third protocol, drafted at the first session in 1979, banning weapons which scatter fragments, such as plastic or glass, which are undetectable by x-ray in the human body.

In his remarks at the close of the conference, the Head of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. D.S. McPhail, Ambassador to the Committee on Disarmament, said that Canada had approached the Conference "with the idea that we should not let the best be the enemy of the good". Noting that Canada did not view the protocols on incendiaries and on booby-traps and mines as going far enough, and that the general agreement did not bind signatories to all three protocols or establish consultative machinery, he said, nevertheless, "the Canadian delegation considers that, in the general treaty and attached protocols, we have remained true to this concept — we have developed important and worthwhile instruments to serve the humanitarian goals to which we all aspire."

To become a party to the treaty, a government must accept at least two of the protocols. The treaty and its protocols will apply not only to wars between nations but also to conflicts in which, as provided by the 1949 Geneva convention, "peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their rights of self-determination".

A provision of the general agreement allows another conference to be called to amend the treaty or elaborate new protocols banning or restricting the use of additional conventional weapons.

SSEA Highlights Disarmament Week 1980

In expressing his support for the United Nations declaration of October 24-30, 1980 as Disarmament Week, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, issued the following statement on October 23, 1980.

"Disarmament Week serves to remind Canadians of the great importance the Government of Canada attaches to the achievement of verifiable disarmament and arms control agreements as one of the essential foundations of international security. The Government views Canadian participation in disarmament and arms control negotiations as one of the most important aspects of its foreign policy. As indicated in last spring's Speech from the Throne, 'We must and we will, actively co-operate in international efforts to negotiate agreements on verifiable means of arms control and disarmament, and seek to rally others to a cause that is no less than human survival on this planet'.

"1980 marks the midpoint between the first UN Special Session on Disarmament and a second such session scheduled for 1982. This year is also the beginning of the Second Disarmament Decade.

"Despite the increase in international tensions since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there have been during 1980 almost constant discussions on disarmament and arms control, many of which Canada has participated in. Bilateral discussions between the USA and USSR on banning chemical weapons have continued as have the trilateral talks among the USA, UK and USSR on a comprehensive test ban. The annual session of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva focused this year in particular on chemical weapons, radiological weapons, security assurances to non-nuclear weapons states, a comprehensive programme for disarmament, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In March, a review conference on the Biological Weapons Convention was held in Geneva. The United Nations Disarmament Commission met in New York in May. The Second Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference recently concluded its sessions in Geneva. It was immediately followed by the reconvening of the UN Special Weapons Conference which was successful in achieving agreement on limiting the use of mines and booby-traps and some incendiary weapons. The Mutual and

Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna have continued, and the USA and USSR began talks a week ago on limiting nuclear missiles in Europe. The First Committee of the UN General Assembly has also just begun its annual deliberations on disarmament.

"As profound Canadian experience since 1945 has taught, arms control and disarmament is a long process. The international situation this year has meant that progress has been slower than might have been anticipated even a year ago. Canadian priorities, however, remain unchanged. They are:

(1) to encourage the continuation of the SALT process;

(2) to promote the realization of a comprehensive multilateral test ban treaty;

(3) to assist in the preparation of a chemical weapons convention;


(4) to promote the evolution of an effective non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty;

(5) to participate actively in negotiations to limit and reduce conventional forces; and

(6) to strive, step by step, to ultimately achieve general and complete disarmament, consistent with the legitimate security needs of states.

"The Final Document of the UN Special Session on Disarmament highlighted the need for greater emphasis on research, information and education programmes. The Department of External Affairs has responded in several ways. It convenes semi-annually a Consultative Group of representatives of Canadian non-governmental organizations which have a special interest in disarmament and arms control. It encourages greater research and information programmes through financial assistance from its disarmament fund. It also produces a newsletter on national and international disarmament activities which is distributed to interested groups and individuals. In addition, I have suggested that the creation of an autonomous association for arms control and disarmament would help to expand activity and raise the level of debate in Canada on these issues.

"Disarmament Week is held annually from October 24-30. Initiated in 1978 after the UN Special Session on Disarmament, it is an opportunity to emphasize the importance of mobilizing public opinion world-wide in support of disarmament and to underline the objectives set forth in the Final Document. Community groups, non-governmental organizations and individuals in Canada have accepted the challenge proffered by Dis-



The Honourable Mark MacGuigan

armament Week to involve the public to a greater degree in these issues, and have planned numerous projects and activities in many centres across the country. Disarmament affects all Canadians individually and collectively. For this reason alone, we must join in efforts to encourage progress toward world peace through reductions in the levels of armaments and world military spending."

Disarmament Week 1980 Attracts Wide Public Attention

A nation-wide campaign of disarmament activities coordinated by the Project Ploughshares organization in connection with Disarmament Week 1980 received considerable attention during the week of October 24-30, 1980.

Scores of events, both large and small, took place in centres across Canada in an effort to emphasize to the public the importance of arms control and disarmament issues. As a result of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers from numerous disarmament organizations across the country, Disarmament Week 1980 in Canada has been widely regarded both nationally and internationally as a considerable success. The international NGO publication, the *Disarmament Times*, for example, noted in its October edition that "probably the most extensive activities of any single country are taking place in Canada."

These activities included public meetings and discussions involving such speakers as Mr. Jan Martenson, Director of the UN Centre for Disarmament, Ms. Ingrid Lehmann and Mr. Ron Huiskens

also of the Centre, the Honourable David MacDonald, Dr. William Epstein and Dr. Norman Alcock. There were also poster contests, multi-media displays, film showings, and concerts.

Federal Government support for Disarmament Week was also strongly indicated in the special statement made on this subject by the Secretary of State for External Affairs on October 23. In addition, officials from the Department of External Affairs participated in a number of activities during the week, highlighted by the presence of Dr. MacGuigan and the Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. A.R. Menzies, at a symposium held at the University of Waterloo from October 30 to November 1, 1980. Funding covering the travel costs of several speakers and other individuals in connection with a number of activities across the country was also afforded to Project Ploughshares by the Department of External Affairs.

SSEA Participates in Disarmament Symposium at Waterloo

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, addressed a disarmament symposium held October 30 to November 1, 1980 at the University of Waterloo in connection with Disarmament Week 1980.

The symposium, organized by Conrad Grebel College, was entitled "Seven Minutes to Midnight: Defusing the Arms Race" and examined several aspects of the arms race, in particular, the international arms trade and its implications for the underdeveloped countries of the world.

Dr. MacGuigan told the participants, that while security for the two major alliances in the developed world rested chiefly on a system of deterrence, including a stable balance of forces, "this form of security is clearly not ideal... Real security will be achieved only when there is a disarmament which has international agreement and is verifiable. In the meantime, our immediate disarmament objective must be the pursuit of undiminished security at lower levels of armaments, both in terms of destructive capability and cost."

Dr. MacGuigan went on to note the relationship between disarmament and development, expressing his concern at the rapid increase in military spending in recent years by the developing countries, particularly when compared to their limited resources and their urgent social and economic needs. In this context, he

underlined the fact that 80 percent of all military spending was on conventional arms and for this reason, "Canada holds the view that disarmament efforts must not be directed solely to the nuclear threat."

The Minister also remarked on the importance of reducing conventional arms sales, noting that "Canada has supported the establishment of a UN arms transfer register. We have done so not to deny developing countries the right to provide for their security, as some have alleged, but because we believe it would be a useful confidence building measure, especially among arms importers in the same region, and because it could eventually lead to a reduction of this burden on developing countries, thereby providing more resources for development."

In concluding his remarks, Dr. MacGuigan suggested that "those in the academic field, whether as professors or students, have a role to play in this approach to disarmament, both in the recognition of these realities and dispelling the forces of inaction. The problems of disarmament have been with us for several decades; the shape of the new economic order has emerged more recently. But recognition of our difficulties has not necessarily brought us closer to resolving them. And for many, this failure brings the risk of discouragement, despair and cynicism. In the final analysis, that may be the greatest impediment to breaking down the barriers to effective action. We must reject the notion that it is naive to pursue disarmament in a world whose existence is threatened by the armaments of two superpowers. Likewise, we must help our people to understand that it is imperative to work towards closing the economic gap that separates the world into the very rich and the very poor."

The Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. A.R. Menzies, participated throughout the symposium and also led a discussion which focussed on Canada's possible contribution to the strategic situation on October 30.

A second discussion group involving Dr. John Gellner, editor of *Defence Quarterly*, Ms. Randall Forsberg of the Institute for Defence and Disarmament Studies in Boston, Dr. Ashok Kapur of the University of Waterloo, and Dr. Alan Newcombe of the Peace Research Institute in Dundas, also concentrated on the question of arms and security. Several workshops took place on various aspects of this question on the following day. This was followed on November 1 by a

breakfast meeting on the "Christian Response to Militarism", and an address by Dr. Conrad Brunk of Conrad Grebel College on "Militarism, Pacifism, and a Just War".

Institute for Disarmament Research Established Within UNITAR

The Secretary-General and the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) have announced the establishment of a United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research within the framework of UNITAR as an interim arrangement until the 1982 Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The new Institute, located in Geneva, has been established in accordance with resolution 34/83 M of the General Assembly.

The Institute for Disarmament Research will carry out research for the purpose of assisting ongoing disarmament negotiations, stimulating initiatives for new negotiations and providing a general insight into the problems involved. It will perform its tasks on the basis of the provisions of the Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

A 17-member advisory council will be set up to assist the Institute in planning its programme, in determining research priorities and in exploring possibilities for fund raising. The advisory council, whose membership will be announced in due course, will comprise: five members of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies; four members of the UNITAR Board of Trustees; three specialists designated by the Executive Director of UNITAR in consultation with the Secretary-General; and as *ex officio* members: the Chairman of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies; the Chairman of the UNITAR Board of Trustees; the Assistant-Secretary-General, United Nations Centre for Disarmament; the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission; and the Chairman or a representative of the Committee on Disarmament.

A grant of over \$260,000 has been made by the Government of France for setting up the Institute. Other member states have also been called upon by the UNITAR Board of Trustees to contribute funds for the programme of the new Institute.

Liviu Bota of Romania has been appointed Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Mr.

Bota was Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary-General, United Nations Centre for Disarmament. He joined the United Nations in 1973, and has served as Secretary of the Group of Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and of Military Expenditure and the Group of Experts on the Relationship between Disarmament and International Security. Prior to joining the United Nations, Mr. Bota was a member of the diplomatic service of Romania.

Jacques Huntzinger of France has been appointed Assistant Director of the new Institute. Mr. Huntzinger is professor of law and political science at the University of Paris and has published extensively on disarmament topics.

Of General Interest...

...IPRA Conference to be held in Canada

The biennial World Conference of the International Peace Research Association will be held in Canada at Geneva Park, Ontario in June 1981. The conference is being hosted by the Peace Research Institute and the Canadian Peace Research Education Association. Peace research scientists from around the world are expected to attend to discuss a wide range of disarmament and peace-related issues.

...UNAC Disarmament Kit Still Available

The Disarmament Kit, prepared and produced by the United Nations Association of Canada, has proven to be a valuable resource aid in disarmament information and education programmes. The kit is a most useful source of information on the state of world armaments, international efforts in disarmament and arms control, and the role of the Canadian public in this field. Copies of the Disarmament Kit are still available from the UNAC, No. 808, 63 Sparks St., Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5A6, which also carries a number of UN publications and information material on the subject of disarmament.

...Canadian Student Pugwash Group to Hold Conference

The newly-formed Canadian Student Pugwash Group will be hosting a national Student Pugwash Conference at Carleton University in Ottawa from June 12-14, 1981. Several internationally known scientists and other academics have been invited as speakers to the conference. Further information on the conference is available from Mr. F. Homer-Dixon No. 806, 474 Wilbrod Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 6M9.

...Calendar of Events – 1981

February 3-August: Committee on Disarmament, Geneva

February 6-8: Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (Palme Commission), Vienna

April 24-26: Palme Commission, Vienna

May 18-June 12: UN Disarmament Commission, New York

June 12-14: Palme Commission, Vienna

June 12-14: First Canadian Student Pugwash Conference, Ottawa

June 21-26: International Peace Research Association General Conference, Geneva Park, Ontario

August: Annual Grindstone peace seminar, Portland, Ontario

August 27-September 2: International Pugwash Conference, Banff, Alberta

September 13-18: Palme Commission, Vienna

September-December: UNGA XXXVI

...Government Appoints Special Nuclear Safeguards Negotiator

The Government has announced the appointment of Mr. J.J. McCardle as Canada's Special Negotiator (Nuclear Safeguards). The establishment of this position is a recognition of the importance attached by the Government to the effective implementation of its nuclear non-proliferation/safeguards policy. Mr. McCardle's mandate is to negotiate non-proliferation/safeguards agreements with governments of those countries with which the Government of Canada wishes to enter into nuclear co-operation.

...Consultative Group Meets in September

The Department of External Affairs' Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs met on September 25-26, 1980 in Ottawa to exchange views on matters of mutual interest relevant to Canada's policies on disarmament and arms control. Among the subjects discussed at the meeting were the current international situation in the disarmament and arms control field, NGO activities and programmes, and efforts in the areas of disarmament information, education and research.

...Public Meeting Held in Connection with AAAS

The Committee for Directing Science Towards Peace hosted a public meeting on January 3, 1981 in Toronto in connection with the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The theme "Directing Science Towards Peace" was one of many topics discussed by the AAAS delegates

during their meetings. The public meeting held on January 3, which involved such speakers as Dr. Everett Mendelsohn of Harvard University, and Dr. George Ignatieff, President of the United Nations Association of Canada and Chancellor of the University of Toronto, provided a forum for interested members of the public and AAAS delegates to discuss various aspects of the arms race and the influence of such factors as science and religion on this issue.

...Disarmament Education Makes Inroads in Saskatchewan

Largely as a result of the work of local representatives of Project Ploughshares in Regina along with other disarmament groups in that city, the Minister of Education in Saskatchewan has given his approval for the discussion of disarmament and arms control issues as part of existing curricula in Saskatchewan schools. In this context, the Minister also expressed his support for Disarmament Week 1980 in a recent edition of the pedagogical publication, *Chronicle*.

Disarmament machinery*

An important achievement of the General Assembly's Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 was its agreement on ways to give new impetus to negotiations and deliberations on disarmament. Adequate results had not been produced with the previous machinery, the Assembly said. There was an urgent need to revitalize the disarmament machinery. The Special Session thus endorsed arrangements for a *Committee on Disarmament* (CD) to meet the need for "a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of limited size". It also established a *Disarmament Commission* composed of all United Nations members, to discuss disarmament matters and make recommendations.

Committee on Disarmament: The arrangements welcomed by the Assembly in 1978 for the new Committee on Disarmament were aimed at making the negotiating body "more effective and less removed from the security concerns of the membership of the UN" as Secretary-General Waldheim observed.

The CD's enlarged composition ensures the better representation of different regions and viewpoints. The chairmanship

is rotated on a monthly basis, by alphabetical order of countries. The work is conducted by consensus. Non-member countries are able to take part in discussions. In addition to formal meetings (open to the public, unlike meetings of the ENDC and CCD), the CD holds frequent informal meetings which permit more spontaneous discussions.

Members of CD: The Committee on Disarmament is open to the nuclear weapon States and the following 35 others including 21 non-aligned countries and 14 others divided between socialist and Western groups: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

France, which had not joined in the work of the ENDC and CCD, became an active participant in the CD. China did not take its seat as a member in 1979, but followed its work and subsequently joined the Committee at its 1980 session.

Disarmament Commission: While the Assembly's First Committee now deals exclusively with disarmament and related matters during the Assembly sessions, the creation of the Disarmament Commission provides a forum for discussion of disarmament proposals when the Assembly is not in session. It is the successor to the Disarmament Commission established by the Assembly in 1952 with limited membership, and later expanded to include all UN Members. The earlier Commission, active in the 1950s, had not met since 1965.

The Commission began its substantive work by outlining elements of the comprehensive programme of disarmament to be elaborated by the CD. It also has on its agenda the following items: "Consideration of various aspects of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, in order to expedite negotiations aimed at effective elimination of the danger of nuclear war", and "Harmonization of views on concrete steps to be undertaken by States regarding a gradual, agreed reduction of military budgets and reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries".

*Excerpts from fact sheet No. 3, "Disarmament Machinery", UN Centre for Disarmament, Geneva.

DISARMAMENT

Bulletin

SEPTEMBER 1981

A REVIEW OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITIES

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Canada Member of UNSSOD II Preparatory Committee

Canada is a member of the UNSSOD II Preparatory Committee, a group of 72 nations charged with the organization of the second Special Session. The Preparatory Committee held its first meeting in May 1981 at which states' views on UNSSOD II which had been submitted to the UN Secretary-General were discussed. Canada's representative on this Committee is Mr. A.R. Menzies, Ambassador for Disarmament.

In his main statement to the Preparatory Committee meeting, Mr. Menzies noted that "in this Preparatory Committee, we need vision, the imagination to look ahead to figure out ways in which UNSSOD II can give further momentum to disarmament negotiations. What can be done to prepare new approaches for our leaders that would enable them to re-animate stalled negotiations? There has been talk of mobilizing public opinion and that will be important. But I suggest that we should also think about opportunities for our leaders to make statements individually or jointly which would give assurances needed to bridge the gap of confidence and which would announce commitments to give new vitality to arms limitation negotiations.

"In addition to vision we need realism. Some here have stated that linkage should not be used to defer negotiation. And it has been pointed out that in other periods of international tension arms control agreements have been negotiated which, in turn, have helped to ease tension. But we must also be realistic in recognizing that political, as well as military confidence building measures, will be needed to create sufficient international trust for productive arms limitation discussions. Some of that international trust can be built up through the provision of private assurances as well as by public declarations. And, of course, private or public assurances will have little impact unless restraint is exercised in the period ahead in areas of international tension.


"Mr. Chairman, the Canadian reply which has been circulated indicates prin-

ciples and priorities to which we attach importance. Like others, Canada attaches importance to the maintenance of the Final Document of the first Special Session as a very important statement of principles and Programme of Action agreed to by the whole international community. We should cherish that document and not try to rewrite it. In reviewing the Programme of Action there will be an opportunity for the second Special Session to discuss priorities in the light of recent experience but we see dangers in attempting to fix rigid time frames for the conclusion of agreements."

The Government's views on UNSSOD II were outlined in greater detail in its written reply to the Secretary-General, which stated:

"Canada views its efforts toward progress in disarmament and arms control as one of the most important aspects of its foreign policy. The cause of arms limitation and disarmament is no less than the cause of human survival on this planet. It is thus the responsibility of all states to make every possible effort to reach verifiable agreements on limiting and reducing present levels of armaments while maintaining undiminished security. Canada intends to participate actively at UNSSOD II and during the preparations for it, and its approach will be both objective and constructive.

"Canada continues to believe that the United Nations is the principal forum for focusing world attention on disarmament and arms limitation, and for exchanges of views among member states on these subjects. The first Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) succeeded in adopting the most comprehensive document on disarmament ever accepted by the world community. In spite of UNSSOD I's accomplishments, it must admitted that the hopes nurtured in 1978 for concrete progress toward disarmament and arms control have remained largely unfulfilled. The worsened international climate has been partly the reason for the minimal progress recorded,



and it will be necessary to take account of these changed conditions during both the preparations for and the proceedings of UNSSOD II.

"Canada believes that UNSSOD II should have two objectives: it should review the implementation of the Final Document of UNSSOD I, and it should give renewed impetus to its implementation by suggesting new measures, approaches and procedures.


"The Session should not dwell on the lack of substantive progress since UNSSOD I, but should make an objective attempt to reach a common understanding of the complex factors which have impeded progress. Member States should put forward new measures which go beyond those of the Final Document, if such measures might lead to progress. However, the Session should not attempt to rewrite or revise the Final Document. Emphasis might be placed on those subjects in the Final Document which have as yet received little attention. It follows from this view of UNSSOD II's objectives that the Final Document itself could usefully serve as the basis for an agenda for the Session, and Canada hopes that its validity will be unanimously reaffirmed by UNSSOD II.

"As mentioned above, Canada believes that there should be no attempt at UNSSOD II to amend UNSSOD I's Final Document, or to produce another document which would rival it. Whatever is agreed upon should be complementary to the Final Document. Although all possible efforts should be made to achieve consensus on whatever document is produced, the solution used recently in the Committee on Disarmament (CD) and the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), of describing the different views of the issues on which consensus is not possible, should be kept in mind.

"Canada considers that the discussions in preparation for and at UNSSOD II should be as concrete and practical as possible and should respect certain principles and themes. Some of these should be the following:

(a) Arms limitation and disarmament cannot be divorced from the wider political context; prescriptions which ignore the international situation are not useful;

(b) Arms limitation and security are inseparable; discussions which ignore states' security interests are also not useful;





SALT II limits and US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces as of 18 June 1979

SALT II limits		USA	USSR
(MIRV) 1200	820 MIRVed ICBM launchers	550	808
1320	MIRVed SLBM launchers	496	144
	Heavy bombers equipped for long-range ALCMs	3	0
	Non-MIRVed ICBM launchers	504	790
	Non-MIRVed SLBM launchers	180	806
	Heavy bombers not equipped for long-range ALCMs	570	156
	Total	2,283	2,504

Total systems by deployment category		USA	USSR
	ICBM launchers	1,054	1,398
	SLBM launchers	656	950
	Heavy bombers	573	156
	Total	2,283	2,504

KEY: ALCM (air-launched cruise missile)
ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile)
MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle)
SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missile)



Some key issues likely to be discussed at UNSSOD II: comprehensive test ban; arms trade; SALT; and world military expenditures.

Tables courtesy of Stockholm Peace Research Institute

(c) The only secure route to progress in arms limitation is through specific and verifiable agreements which include those states at risk of military confrontation. Agreements which are merely declaratory in nature do not provide the assurance of real disarmament;

(d) Greater openness is necessary to make possible adequate verification of agreements. In the absence of agreements, greater openness is essential to build confidence among those attempting to negotiate agreements;

(e) Nuclear weapon states bear a special responsibility to negotiate both quantitative and qualitative limits on these weapons. In this regard, reference should be made to the measures envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document;

(f) Notwithstanding this special responsibility, efforts should be increased to reduce levels of conventional armaments, using the regional approach as the one most likely to produce results.

"Canada hopes that UNSSOD II will give highest priority to the following issues:

(a) continuation of the SALT process;

(b) conclusion of a multilateral comprehensive test ban treaty;

(c) conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on their destruction;

(d) the evolution of an effective non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and

(e) the promotion of concrete measures to limit and reduce conventional forces.

"Finally, in its search for new measures, approaches, and procedures, UNSSOD II should take advantage of the significant and noteworthy work which has been and is still being done on a number of United Nations studies. Governments will have had the opportunity to examine the studies themselves, and to consider their own and other governments' assessments of the studies' conclusions. One of these studies deals with the United Nations institutional arrangements necessary for the proper management of disarmament efforts. Its conclusions should be considered in the context of discussions under new measures, approaches and procedures."

Importance of ACD Noted in House Debate

Major highlights of the two-day foreign policy debate held in the House of Commons on June 15 and 16, 1981 were lengthy statements by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Substantial portions of both speeches dealt with the importance of arms control and disarmament. The following are extracts from those speeches.

Prime Minister Trudeau

"We must also recognize that a good *sine qua non* condition of stability would be a basic agreement between the super-powers. In this respect, the super-powers must reactivate the best arrangements between the United States and the U.S.S.R. of the early '70s, when the "red phones" were installed and when the world could rely on a basic compatibility of interests between the two countries.

"We will also witness an increased number of crises which, should the worst come to the worst, could degenerate into an all-out confrontation between the super-powers.

"Moreover it seems, that a large proportion of these crises will arise in the undeveloped areas of the world, where the West has provided no set of arrangements to protect its own interests such as those between North America and Japan or Western Europe. We would be well advised, therefore, to ascertain what are the means at our disposal to meet crises everywhere and especially in Third World countries, where the interest of the western world would be at stake.

"As far as Europe, the principal theatre of confrontation between East and West, is concerned, we are in a position today to reply to this question with more confidence than we were a year ago. This is not due so much to a lack of tension in Europe, but rather to the fact that at least the political consultation process with the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) allies has greatly improved to meet the challenges of the future. The willingness of the allies to develop a concerted strategy to deal with East/West relations in Europe has increased. The policy of reinforcing NATO defence preparedness, while proposing again to the Soviet Union to negotiate the arms-limitation agreements, is supported by the whole Organization, as confirmed by a recent meeting of NATO

ministers. Thus, NATO remains an indispensable instrument to the maintenance of cohesion and strength which ensure stability and balance in Europe, which is clearly in the interest of the West. And the Soviet Union, in spite of its open criticism of the Organization, would undoubtedly concede that stability and balance in Europe rank among its higher priorities.

"It is more difficult to feel confident about emergency arrangements made for situations that arise outside Europe. Neither East nor West are on their own territory there. The rules of the game have not been established. While a few firm lines have been drawn, such as in the Gulf area, the situation remains ambiguous, and this ambiguity can be dangerous. Western leaders must continue to ask themselves what is the best way to protect western interests in these areas while respecting the sovereignty of the countries involved. East and West must try to redefine a mutually acceptable code of behaviour for international relationships, but before this can be done, an answer must be found to the crisis in Afghanistan, whose invasion goes against everything that the western world as well as the Third World considers acceptable.

"The Ottawa summit should provide the opportunity for western leaders to bring into line their general views on this matter. This is undeniably a concern which should come foremost on the agenda of any meeting on international affairs. The prospect of a new arms race when billions of people are starving to death is truly shocking. If we decided to use for peaceful purposes the amounts we spend in two weeks for military purposes, we could provide drinking water and basic health care to the population of the entire world. However, people feel the need for even more protection, and an increase in our military spending to offset the increased amounts allocated to armaments by the U.S.S.R. seems inevitable for the moment. It is up to the western world to find an answer to this serious problem, if possible in consultation with the Soviet Union.

"Moreover, SALT (Strategic Arms-Limitation Talks) negotiations should resume as soon as both parties have enough confidence in each other to conduct such talks effectively, and I must say

that the sooner, the better. Putting an end to the nuclear arms race involves tremendous difficulties. However, the government of Canada still believes that as discouraging as these difficulties might be and as small as any immediate chance of progress might seem, the super-powers must be urged to reflect with all due gravity on the consequences of a resumption of nuclear escalation. The government still firmly believes that the nuclear arms race must be stopped and reversed, and that a new balance must be sought to increasingly lower arms levels. The stifling strategy which I suggested at the first special session of the UN on disarmament in 1978 remains valid in this regard. Nothing has occurred in the meantime to weaken my convictions on this point.

"The Canadian nuclear safety policy, revised in 1974 and 1976, sets high standards. However, we apply it pragmatically in a spirit of respect for the sovereignty and sensibilities of our partners in the nuclear field. We shall continue to refine this policy so as to develop an effective national system of non-proliferation and guarantee as much as possible that Canadian nuclear exports do not contribute to nuclear proliferation."

Secretary of State for External Affairs MacGuigan

"There are two themes — working for peace and security and safeguarding sovereignty and independence — which are fundamental to everything else. There can be little hope for economic growth or social justice if one's security or sovereignty is threatened. Themes interlink.

"Canada defends its sovereignty and independence through a variety of means — through boundary and territorial negotiations, for example — but working for peace and security represents the most important way for Canada to defend its sovereignty.

"Canadian security policy in the past 30 years has been based on three foundations of peace: first, deterrence of war through collective defence represented by participation in NATO and NORAD; second, verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements; and third, mechanisms and arrangements for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

"When it was clear that the collective arrangements for peace provided for under the United Nations Charter were not going to be allowed to work, it became imperative to make other security arrangements. Canada joined with others in

creating the North Atlantic Alliance in 1949 and has since contributed to the collective deterrence and defence capacity of NATO.

"For the Canadian government, along with defence capacity, security also requires the search for arms control. If the armaments spiral is ever to be broken, verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements must be concluded. Arms control and disarmament is the pursuit of undiminished security at lower levels of armaments and expenditure. The step-by-step approach takes time, beginning with the mutual perception of security which can lead to agreements to limit arms and to control their development and deployment. Once arms competition is contained, efforts can be focused on reductions, which would continue to reflect that same approximate security balance.

"The prospects for concluding arms control and disarmament agreements continue to be limited. The postponement of consideration of ratification of SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) by the U.S. Senate followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979. The review of arms control and disarmament policies by the new U.S. administration should result in a new start in the SALT process. At the last NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Rome, which I attended, the United States reaffirmed the intention of the previous administration to go forward with discussions on the limitation of theatre nuclear forces. Negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty and on a ban on chemical weapons have continued to be protracted.

"It is, indeed, in the process of peacemaking that real disarmament progress is likely to be registered. Many of the crisis spots in the world are not cast in ideological and imperial terms as is the current case between the East and the West. The vast majority of disputes, particularly in the Third World, are regional in scope and often reflect deep-seated and historical quarrels in relation to local and ill-defined issues. Canada has been active in seeking solutions to international conflicts.

"A major focus of Canada's recent arms control activities was the Prime Minister's proposal at the first United Nations Special Session Devoted to Disarmament in 1978 in the context of restraining the technological momentum behind the strategic nuclear arms race.

The elements of the "strategy of suffocation" — a comprehensive test ban treaty, a ban on the flight testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles, a ban on production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons purposes and an agreement to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on new strategic nuclear weapons systems — were not new to the arms control discussions. What was new was the concept of their interaction in combination to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons among heretofore non-nuclear weapons states or the nuclear weapons states themselves.

"Three years later the concept of the strategy of suffocation remains valid. The government takes every opportunity to reaffirm the importance it attaches to the continuation of the SALT process and to the realization of a verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty. These priorities, together with assisting in the preparation of a convention banning chemical weapons and the promotion of the evolution

of an effective non-proliferation régime will guide Canadian preparations for the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament next year in which Canada intends to take an active part.

"As the Prime Minister has indicated, in the 1980s we must look for new ways of dealing with tension and threats to peace through new forms of consultation and crisis management, including ways of dealing with regional crises. Peacekeeping has been an important Canadian contribution to the search for international stability in the 1970s. We are hopeful that the wide range of multilateral machinery built in the 1970s will provide us with a good basis for developing these new ways of approaching security-related issues. It is particularly important to recall that the instability of our world, which we expect to deepen in the 1980s, is of a different, less predictable character, centred to some extent in the growing interdependence between industrialized and Third World nations."

Committee on Disarmament

The 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva ended on August 21. No significant progress was made on the issues on its agenda for this year. However, some useful work was accomplished in specific areas, particularly chemical weapons.

The forty-member multilateral negotiating body, which began work on February 3, met regularly in plenary. While the Committee has a mandate to conduct substantive negotiations on various arms control and disarmament subjects, its plenary meetings tended towards deliberation rather than negotiation. Plenary meetings addressed a nuclear test ban; cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; effective international arrangements to reassure non-nuclear weapons states; chemical weapons; new types of weapons of mass destruction; radiological weapons; and a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

As was the case in 1980, four working groups were established, dealing with chemical weapons, negative security assurances, radiological weapons and a comprehensive programme of disarmament. These working groups met throughout the session.

Perhaps the greatest progress at the 1981 CD was made in its working group

on chemical weapons. In this group, consensus was achieved on the elements of a chemical weapons convention. The stage now appears set for actual negotiation of such a convention.

Although little real progress occurred in the working group on radiological weapons, agreement on the text of a treaty in time for the second U.N. Special Session on Disarmament in 1982 remains a possibility. Discussion focussed on the draft treaty submitted by the USA and USSR in 1979. Differences remain, however, on the scope of prohibition, the definition of a radiological weapon, the procedure for verifying compliance, and the inclusion of a provision on peaceful use of radioactive materials.

The working group on negative security assurances failed to agree on a common formula that would guarantee the non-nuclear weapons states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapons states. A suggestion that the U.N. Security Council be invited to pass a resolution based on elements common to the individual declarations of the five nuclear powers was not supported by those CD members who sought a more legally-binding instrument.

In its efforts to negotiate a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the working group was plagued by numerous

proposals, counter-proposals, working papers, and "non-papers". A major point of disagreement is whether or not specific time frames should be assigned for disarmament measures. It is expected that the draft comprehensive programme to be submitted to UNSSOD II next year will contain many bracketted passages, indicating major areas of disagreement.

Canada once again played an active role in the CD. In addition to several interventions in plenary, Canada also tabled a number of working papers, including a "Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification".

Thirty-Five Nations Sign Pact on Certain Conventional Weapons

Thirty-five nations, including Canada and 10 other NATO countries, became original parties to the Convention on the Prohibition or Restriction of the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, through signing the treaty on April 10, 1981 at the United Nations in New York.

The Convention and its three protocols concerning the use of incendiary weapons, booby-traps and mines, and non-x-rayable fragments represent a degree of progress in the area of humanitarian law and arms control, particularly in attempting to offer some measure of protection to civilians from weapons such as napalm and booby-traps.

The treaty and its protocols will enter into force when 20 countries have ratified them.

Canada Completes Trilogy of Verification Papers

On June 11, 1981, the Canadian Ambassador to the Committee on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva tabled the third and final paper of a series dealing with the question of the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements. Entitled "A Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification", it follows the tabling of a "Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals" a year ago, and a "Quantitative Working Paper" on the Compendium a short time later (see September 1980 and February 1981 issues of the Bulletin).

In introducing the paper, Ambassador

McPhail said that the two areas of CD negotiations currently of greatest importance — a comprehensive test ban and a treaty on chemical weapons — "are representative of those in which verification plays a pivotal role. Very often it appeared that difficulties in verification issues were based on preconceived differences regarding purpose, methodology and definition. It was in part the frustration of being so close to and yet so far from a number of agreements which prompted the initiation of the basic research programme of which this conceptual paper is a result.


"We accept the argument put forth very often that specific terms of verification cannot be negotiated before the arms control problem itself is defined. It has been our view, however, that there are similarities in the concept of verification which extend across the spectrum of the arms control problem. Hence we can and should learn from our experience. It is in this spirit that we developed the "Compendium", to see what had actually been proposed and why, with the objective of developing a common perspective and verification typology. There has been a virtual revolution in terms of verification technology. Yet, argumentation has remained largely unchanged. On the one hand, information which might have been kept from hand-held cameras in 1960 is now made available, often by mutual agreement through national technical means today. On the other hand,

while intrusion has indeed changed, in any practical sense we tend here to be rather historical, and updating is needed.

"Prior to the Second World War — the 1922 naval accords and the 1925 Geneva Protocol were examples — arms control and disarmament agreements negotiated under comparatively normal peace-time conditions did not normally make provision for systematic and effective verification of compliance with obligations. In post-World War II negotiations, however, provision has generally been made for some type of verification. In fact, verification in some form is now normally a part of almost any significant agreement, whether public or private. As members of this Committee, we must recognize therefore, that to insist upon verification in an arms control agreement is not necessarily to question the good faith of any one of the negotiators entering into an agreement, but rather through the reciprocal nature of the provision, to build confidence and ultimately strengthen mutual trust.

"In submitting this latest working paper on verification, Canada continues on a course set 20 years ago, in the then multilateral negotiating body here in Geneva. Canada then took a special interest in the verification provisions of the Sea-Bed Treaty; and today, we apply the same concept of verification to other subjects, recognizing the special requirements of each area.

"We hope that this conceptual work-



Canada's most recent contribution to study of verification.

ing paper will lead to greater consideration of verification in this body. We are not looking to the Committee to conduct a study of verification, which would be inappropriate for the Committee. We are looking to others to contribute to greater consideration of this subject: we hope others will choose to table papers on aspects of verification in which they may have special expertise and which can contribute to common understanding."

(The complete text of his statement is being issued in the "Statements and Speeches" series available from the Domestic Information Services Division (FID) of the Dept. of External Affairs. Copies of the Conceptual Working Paper are available from the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Dept. of National Defence.)

MBFR Talks Complete 24th Round

NATO and Warsaw Pact delegations discussing the reduction of forces in Europe concluded their 24th round of negotiations in July 1981, without reaching agreement on the nature of first phase reductions in the forces levels both alliances maintain in central Europe.

The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks began in Vienna in 1973. Despite many meetings on a regular basis since that time, the negotiations have been unable to make any significant progress on the basic issues contested. MBFR was the result of a Western initiative aimed at balancing the West's participation in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process of the early 1970's, which was essentially a Soviet initiative.

Because Warsaw Pact forces outnumber those of NATO, since the beginning the West has been seeking to obtain "assymetrical" reductions (greater by the East than by the West) to achieve parity between the Eastern and Western forces in central Europe at lower levels. The NATO negotiators have also supported collectivity of reductions to avoid force level ceilings on individual countries.

The Warsaw Pact has called for equal reductions, insisting that present Eastern forces are not larger than those maintained by the West. This view is not shared by the Western alliance. Eastern negotiators have also suggested individual national reductions in order to obtain a permanent limit on the armed forces of

certain Western nations.

As indicated above, the major source of disagreement since the talks began has been the question of the establishment of a mutually agreed "data base" on which reductions would be based, that is, the actual present size of the Warsaw Pact forces, and the related question of how such force figures and other data would be verified through "associated measures".

In its press release issued at the end of the 24th round, the Western alliance stated that "in the West's view, the unresolved data dispute is the main obstacle to progress toward a first agreement in the Vienna Talks. Although some of the details of this question are complex, the fundamental issue is not: it is simply that there is a substantial difference between western figures and eastern figures on the number of Warsaw Pact military personnel located in Central Europe. And, until the two sides can reach agreement on these figures, they are prevented from coming to agreement on the reduction and limitation of such personnel."

The statement concluded by saying that "in order to try and resolve the data discrepancy and to enter on a more productive discussion of figures on specific force components, the West has, in the effort to develop an earlier eastern idea, now made a proposal which contains suggested procedures for this kind of discussion. The proposal shows the continued interest of the western participants in resolving this problem and opening the way for progress here."

Poster Competition Held

At a reception held in Toronto on June 18, 1981, the winner of the Canadian Disarmament Poster Competition was announced by the United Nations Association of Canada (UNAC). Mr. Louis Larochelle of Ste-Foy, Quebec received the first prize award of \$500 from Mr. A.R. Menzies, Ambassador for Disarmament, for his winning entry.

The competition, which ran from March to May of this year, was organized and sponsored by UNAC with financial assistance from the Dept. of External Affairs. Mr. Larochelle's winning design will now represent Canada at an international competition to be held this fall at the United Nations in New York. The winning poster in the UN contest will be

used in connection with the second Special Session on Disarmament in 1982.

In presenting the award to Mr. Larochelle, Mr. Menzies pointed out the significance of the public's role in bringing about greater awareness and understanding of the issues facing us in the arms control and disarmament field. He said that "citizens who are concerned about the risks of outbreak of war and its escalation into a nuclear holocaust, and who deplore the enormous sums of money spent on arms often feel frustrated about their seeming inability to influence the course of events. Others take a fatalistic attitude or conclude cynically that governments attach a low priority to disarmament as an unrealizable ideal."


"Public influence on national security and arms control policies varies from country to country, depending on education levels and the extent of democracy. But I think that we would be unwise to underestimate the influence of non-governmental opinion on even the most authoritarian governments."

"In a country like Canada, with a democratically elected Government, the citizen and non-governmental organizations can play a significant role in informing and focusing public opinion on the policy issues involved in national security, arms control and disarmament. The Canadian Government endorses the view expressed in the Final Document of the United Nations first Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 that a greater effort toward informing and educating world public opinion about the issues facing all of us in this field is of major importance. To this end the Government has undertaken a number of initiatives since the first Special Session aimed at increasing the Canadian public's awareness and understanding of current arms control and disarmament issues. Research projects have been commissioned, modest financial support has been given for conferences and public information programmes. A Consultative Group of representatives of non-governmental organizations provides comments and advice on disarmament matters."

"In May-June 1982 the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament will be convened in New York to review the impact of international developments since the first Special Session in 1978 on the Programme of Action in the Final Document and to consider ways to give some impulsion to international disarmament negotiations. The Canadian Gov-

ernment considers it important that there should be maximum public awareness, understanding and support for the second Special Session. It is hoped that a significant number of groups in Canada — including non-governmental organizations especially interested in disarmament, and other groups with a broad interest in international affairs such as United Nations Association branches, labour unions, professional groups, universities, schools and church groups will take a direct interest in studying the issues to be addressed in the second Special Session. To assist in this process the Department of External Affairs is commissioning the preparation of a pamphlet providing background and a suggested discussion guide which should be available early in the autumn.

- "The interested citizen or group need not wait for this pamphlet to appear. One can get into the subject right away:
- (1) Tap your United Nations Association branch, public or school library for books and articles on disarmament, and the role of the United Nations in disarmament;
 - (2) Propose that an organization you are connected with have, beginning this autumn, a study group on the United Nations second Special Session on Disarmament and persuade some of your friends to prepare papers for it;
 - (3) Propose that your local newspaper or radio station run a series on disarmament and offer to help with research;
 - (4) Keep in touch with developments leading up to the second Special Session by ensuring that your organization or library subscribes to relevant periodicals;
 - (5) Write to your local Member of Parliament about your interest in disarmament and ask him to send you literature.



UNDC Struggles Through 1981 Session

The 1981 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, held from May 18 to June 5, 1981 in New York, could not be considered a propitious one in terms of cooperation and agreement. The Commission this year managed agreement on only one of the four items on its agenda.

The UN Disarmament Commission meets once per year when the General Assembly is not in session and provides the member countries of the UN with a forum for the discussion of arms control and disarmament issues.

This year's agenda included consideration of nuclear disarmament, reductions in military budgets, a study on conventional weapons, and South African nuclear capability. Of these subjects, consensus was achieved on only the final report of the discussion on nuclear disarmament. The remaining three items were merely noted in the UNDC's report to UNGA XXXVI, and referred them back to the General Assembly for further consideration.

Canada's general statement at the UNDC was delivered on May 22, 1981 by Mr. A.R. Menzies, Ambassador for Disarmament. At that time, Mr. Menzies said, "The Canadian delegation considers that the two items on which the Disarmament Commission should be concentrating its attention in the limited time available this year are the reduction of military budgets and the terms of reference of the study on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces. By concentrating on these subjects, the Commission will contribute to the balanced approach to the priority areas for disarmament advocated in the Final Document adopted at the first special session devoted to disarmament.

"In reply to the Secretary-General's request for views on the principles which should govern states' actions in the field of freezing and reducing military expenditures, the Canadian Government stated that the principle of openness is of great importance. Openness is a confidence building measure. Openness should be instituted and maintained to the extent of providing sufficient details of military expenditures so that budgets may be adequately measured, compared and verified. Without this degree of openness, states cannot be assured that other

states, especially those which might be perceived to constitute a military threat, are carrying out their obligations under any agreement to freeze or reduce military expenditures.

"The Canadian delegation has read the views of other states and notes with regret the views of those which consider recent efforts to develop a budgetary reporting instrument to be without value. Such an instrument, if completed by all militarily significant states, would provide an objective and concrete basis on which to negotiate an agreement leading to the reduction of military budgets. These same states state that political will is important in reaching agreement. The Canadian delegation agrees and suggests that, in a world where mutual distrust exists between certain states, an effective means of demonstrating political will would be to take measures to dispel distrust. One measure of particular relevance would be to give details of military budgets so that future reductions could be seen to be equitable. Until such concrete gestures are forthcoming, it is understandable that some will consider that such calls for political will may be just a smokescreen behind which an unwillingness to take effective action is being hidden. For its part, the Canadian Government has completed the budgetary reporting instrument in two successive years, and cannot see how progress towards reducing military expenditures is possible while the states which call for political will continue to refuse to make a comparable gesture.

"With regard to the elaboration of the general approach, structure and scope of the study on disarmament relating to conventional weapons and armed forces, the Canadian delegation considers that the draft working paper developed by Denmark takes into account all the relevant factors and is a satisfactory document on which to base the study. If there are any delegations which believe that the paper does not represent a balanced approach, we would urge them to propose constructive amendments as expeditiously as possible so that serious consideration of drafting changes may be given. If agreement can be achieved during the present session of the Disarmament Commission on the general approach, structure and scope of this study, I believe that all delegations

may derive a certain degree of satisfaction. Whereas this study cannot itself produce a dramatic breakthrough in reversing the conventional arms race, we do think that it may point to areas in which measures to curb it are most urgent and seem most feasible. Such conclusions, agreed to by a geographically balanced group of experts, would be a valuable contribution and could then be followed up by concrete measures."

In Brief

...CIIA's International Journal Edition Devoted to ACD

The Canadian Institute of International Affairs devoted its summer 1981 edition in its entirety to arms control and disarmament. Articles by well-known Canadians active in arms control and disarmament cover a wide variety of current issues in the field. Copies can be purchased from the CIIA, Edgar Tarr House, 15 King's College Circle, Toronto, M5S 2V9.

...Student Pugwash Concludes 1st Conference

The first national conference of the Canadian Student Pugwash Group was June 14, 1981 in Ottawa. The theme of the Conference, "Science in Society: Its Freedom and Regulation", included a wide variety of related topics, including arms control and disarmament. A special debate and workshop in this latter area was entitled "International Security and the Regulation of Defence Technology." Participants at this very successful conference included Mr. A.R. Menzies, Ambassador for Disarmament, Professor Kosta Tsipis of MIT, Dr. G. Lindsey of the Dept. of National Defence and a number of other distinguished individuals.

...Ambassador Menzies Tours Canada

Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. A.R. Menzies, made two tours of Western Canada and the Maritimes so far this year to exchange views with NGOs and academics active in the disarmament field. In January, Mr. Menzies undertook a 6-city tour of the 4 Western provinces, and in May visited 4 centres in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island.

...Palme Commission Holds 3 Meetings

The Independent Commission on Dis-

armament and Security Issues, chaired by former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, has met 3 times this year in Vienna, Geneva and Moscow. Among the subjects discussed at these meetings were SALT, MBRF, the medical effects of nuclear war, long-range theatre nuclear forces and the research and development of new military technology. The Commission will hold its next meeting September 13-18, 1981 in Mexico City, and intends to prepare its final report early in 1982.

...IPRA Conference at Geneva Park

The 9th General Conference of the International Peace Research Association was held in Canada this year. Over 200 peace researchers and others from 30 countries attended the meetings in June at Geneva Park on Lake Couchiching. Topics addressed included Militarism, Disarmament, and Alternative Security; Resources, Technology and the New International Order; Human Rights, Cultural Autonomy, and the World Community; Peace Education; and Cooperation and Interdependence. A welcoming statement from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, was read by Mr. D.L.B. Hamlin, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department. It noted the Government's involvement in research and information activities related to arms control and disarmament as well as the important role of arms control and disarmament in Canadian foreign policy.

...Work Continuing on D & D Study

The UN Experts group Studying the Relationship Between Disarmament and International Development has continued to meet throughout 1981 in anticipation of the submission of its final report to UNGA XXXVI this fall. In addition to the Group's report, a "popular version" of the final report is being written by a Canadian author, Mr. Clyde Sanger, under funding by the Canadian Government. It should be available commercially in early 1982.

...CSCE Review Conference Adjourned

The Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe adjourned at the end of July until October 1981. The Conference began last fall. No agreement has been reached on proposals for a conference on disarmament in Europe which would initially be devoted

to the negotiation of confidence building measures. Canada has supported the Western position that such measures must be militarily significant, binding, verifiable, and applicable throughout the European continent from the Atlantic to the Urals.

...CPRI Produces ACD Bibliography

The Canadian Peace Research Institute, under a contract with the Arms Control and Disarmament Division (DFD) of the Department of External Affairs, recently produced a Canadian arms control and disarmament bibliography. This bibliography presents a comprehensive look at Canadian contributions to the study of arms control and disarmament from 1965-80. Copies of the bibliography are available from the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment of the Department of National Defence or DFD, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

Calendar of Upcoming Events

August 28 - September 2: International Pugwash Conference, Banff, Alberta.

September 10-11: Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, Ottawa.

September 13-18: Palme Commission, Mexico City.

September 15 - December: United Nations General Assembly XXXVI, New York.

October 5-16: UNSSOD II Preparatory Committee, New York.

October 23-25: Palme Commission.

October 24-30: Disarmament Week.

December 4-6: Palme Commission, Tokyo.

DISARMAMENT

Bulletin

FEBRUARY 1982

A REVIEW OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITIES


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UNGA XXXVI: A Session of Transition

The XXXVI United Nations General Assembly could be termed a transitional session for arms control and disarmament issues. Little was accomplished as the mood appeared to favour leaving serious discussion to the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II) which is to take place from June 7 to July 9, 1982. An unusually high proportion of resolutions in the First Committee of UNGA XXXVI were of a procedural nature. International events such as the invasion of Afghanistan and Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor under construction inevitably affected the proceedings. Towards the end of the session, the commencement of talks on limiting intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe improved to some extent, the atmosphere in the First Committee.

Canadian concern about arms control and disarmament and the need to strengthen international institutions were expressed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, in his address to UNGA XXXVI on September 21, 1981:

"Circumstances in 1981 call for a UN which is more meaningful and more relevant to global concerns and events, not less. As the challenges to all of us increase in complexity and urgency, the need for more sophisticated, agile and responsive instruments to meet them grows apace. The problems of the rest of the century and beyond englobe the ecology and use of our land, our space, and our seas, as well as the security of peoples and their rising expectations in a world more concentrated through technology — for instance, the military applications of nuclear technology. For example, in 1961, most countries here were consoled by progress being made in negotiating a nuclear test-ban treaty. It looked then as if we were headed towards a halt in the arms race. It was a brief illusion. Today, it is one of the most unequivocally disturbing features of international life, and indeed of our interdependence, that the



Mark MacGuigan
Secretary of State for External Affairs

dangers of nuclear war are now even greater. Nuclear proliferation threatens on two axes — the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons to previously non-nuclear-weapon states, and the vertical amassing of even greater number of weapons by the superpowers. I urge in the name of all sanity that this danger be recognized and resisted."

On the specific subject of arms control and disarmament, Dr. MacGuigan said:

"...international peace and security, as well as development, freedom, and life itself, will ultimately depend on whether we can successfully work towards arms control and disarmament. Security can be consistent with lower levels of armaments and expenditures. The coming Special Session on Disarmament must point the way to more concrete progress than in recent years if credibility is to be maintained. Deliberations on disarmament at this General Assembly can be of crucial importance in preparation. The remarkable consensus reached in 1978 needs reaffirmation and further direction. It is true that the international climate is less favourable today. At the same time, we cannot ignore the growing impatience of



the world's peoples with the lack of progress towards verifiable arms limitation and disarmament agreements. Our efforts on their behalf should take into account the situation as it is in covering realistic proposals which have some substantive

chance to effect change. Canada is committed to breaking the pattern of madness which spiralling rearmament represents, and these priorities will guide our endeavours to fulfil this commitment."

Canada played an active role in the

First Committee's deliberations on arms control and disarmament issues. Complementing Dr. MacGuigan's general reference to arms control and disarmament issues, Mr. A.R. Menzies, Ambassador for Disarmament, delivered a major statement to the First Committee on October 28, 1981, outlining specific Canadian priorities. Those words were translated into action as Canada co-sponsored resolutions calling for a comprehensive test ban; prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction; and reduction of military budgets.

Reflecting the Government's commitment to the strategy of suffocation and the evolution of an effective non-proliferation treaty, Canada again introduced a resolution calling on the Committee on Disarmament to consider at the appropriate time the question of an agreed ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. As well, Canada co-sponsored resolutions on the relationship between disarmament and development; extension of the mandate of the group of experts investigating reports on the use of chemical weapons; the arms race in outer space; and confidence building measures.

The 49 arms control and disarmament resolutions considered in First Committee surpassed the number of resolutions considered at previous sessions. However, there were also a greater number of competing resolutions on the same subjects. Divergent approaches to the same problem tended to replace the more usual efforts to achieve compromise on draft resolutions. This partially explains why there were fewer arms control and disarmament resolutions passed by consensus at UNGA XXXVI than at previous sessions. Despite limited real achievements UNGA XXXVI will be remembered as a session of transition and preparation for UNSSOD II.

Disarmament Resolutions at UNGA XXXVI

Resolution Number	Resolution	Vote (Yes/No/Abst)
36/81 (A)	Preparations for UNSSOD II	Consensus
36/81 (B)	Prevention of Nuclear War	Consensus
36/82 (A)	Reduction of Military Budgets	Consensus
36/82 (B)	*Reduction of Military Budgets	120:0:19
36/83	Treaty of Tlatelolco (Protocol I)	138:0:5
36/84	Comprehensive Test Ban	118:2:23
36/85	*Comprehensive Test Ban	140:0:5
36/86 (A)	South African Nuclear Capability	129:4:10
36/86 (B)	Denuclearization of Africa	132:0:12
36/87 (A)	Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Middle East)	Consensus
36/87 (B)	Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Middle East)	107:2:31
36/88	Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (South Asia)	93:3:44
36/89	New Weapons of Mass Destruction	116:0:27
36/90	Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	Consensus
36/91	World Disarmament Conference	Consensus
36/92 (A)	Disarmament Fellowships	Consensus
36/92 (B)	Report of the Disarmament Commission	Consensus
36/92 (C)	World Disarmament Campaign	143:0:2
36/92 (D)	International Cooperation for Disarmament	116:0:25
36/92 (E)	Nuclear Weapons in All Aspects	118:18:5
36/92 (F)	Report of the Committee on Disarmament	136:0:9
36/92 (G)	*Disarmament and Development	Consensus
36/92 (H)	Multilateral Disarmament Agreements	115:0:23
36/92 (I)	Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons	121:19:6
36/92 (J)	World-Wide Signature Collection	78:3:56
36/92 (K)	Enhanced Radiation (Neutron) Weapon	68:14:57
36/92 (L)	Programme of Research and Studies	Consensus
36/92 (M)	Implementation of Recommendations of UNSSOD I	Consensus
36/93	Certain Conventional Weapons	Consensus
36/94	Negative Security Assurances	115:17:12
36/95	Negative Security Assurances	145:0:3
36/96 (A)	*Chemical and Biological Weapons	147:0:1
36/96 (B)	Chemical and Biological Weapons	109:1:33
36/96 (C)	*Chemical and Biological Weapons Use	86:20:34
36/97 (A)	Conventional Disarmament	114:0:26
36/97 (B)	Radiological Weapons	Consensus
36/97 (C)	*Arms Race in Outer Space	129:0:13
36/97 (D)	Study of Institutional Arrangements	Consensus
36/97 (E)	Non-Stationing of Nuclear Weapons	84:18:42
36/97 (F)	*Confidence-Building Measures	Consensus
36/97 (G)	*Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes	125:14:6
36/97 (H)	Study on Regional Disarmament	Consensus
36/97 (I)	SALT	Consensus
36/97 (J)	Report of the Committee on Disarmament — Membership	134:0:12
36/97 (K)	Disarmament and International Security	132:0:11
36/97 (L)	Study on Disarmament and International Security	Consensus
36/98	Israeli Nuclear Armament	101:2:39
36/99	Weapons in Outer Space	123:0:21
36/100	Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe	82:19:41

* Co-sponsored by Canada

Disarmament Week 1981 Observed Across Canada

A Joint Coordinating Committee for Disarmament Week 1981 was formed by the United Nations Association in Canada and Project Ploughshares to coordinate nation-wide disarmament activities during Disarmament Week, October 24-30, 1981.

Over 150 activities took place across Canada from Victoria to St. John's involving even more people than was the case in the very successful program in 1980. There was also increased local and

national media coverage of the various activities. The activities were sponsored by many concerned citizens and groups ranging from the ad hoc Committee of the Toronto Disarmament Network and the Vancouver Island Coalition for Disarmament to the United Church, and the Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace. Activities included public meetings and discussions involving such speakers as Mr. Derek Boothby and Mr. Bhaichand Patel from the UN Centre for Disarmament; Dr. Helen Caldicott; Mr. Julian Perry Robinson; Dr. George Wald, Nobel Laureate in Physiology, 1967; Mr. King Gordon, 1980 Pearson Peace Medal Laureate; Archbishop E.W. Scott, Primate of the Anglican Church of Canada and Moderator of the World Council of Churches; and Dr. V. Goldbloom, President, Canadian Council of Christians and Jews. Public displays, special worship services, film and slide showings, concerts and poetry readings were among the other activities which contributed to the success of Disarmament Week 1981.

Federal Government support was varied. The Secretary of State for External Affairs issued a special statement on the occasion of Disarmament Week, on October 22, 1981, in which he outlined ways in which the Government was encouraging increased public awareness of disarmament issues:

"The government is supporting efforts to encourage research and information activities on arms control and disarmament issues. Financial assistance is provided by a number of government departments and agencies to Canadian organizations for such activities. In the case of the modest disarmament fund of the Department of External Affairs, over 20 contributions were made during the past year and in the coming months, available funds are being channelled toward activities related to UNSSOD II. Contracts have included: the preparation of a Canadian bibliography on arms control

and disarmament which will be distributed in the near future and a booklet entitled *UNSSOD II and Canada*, which is being distributed to assist those wishing to study issues likely to arise at UNSSOD II. In addition, Canada is assisting in covering the costs of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. Its report, to be issued early next year, will help to stimulate informed public discussion on the issues.

"The *Disarmament Bulletin*, a semi-annual newsletter on national and international activities, has a growing distribution and is reaching more citizens taking an interest in complex arms control and disarmament issues....

"The government has also undertaken studies. For example, the importance which Canada has attached to the subject of verification over the years has been reflected in three papers tabled in the Committee on Disarmament, the multi-lateral negotiating body in Geneva. They

have also been distributed in Canada.

"Canadian experts have participated in two UN studies being submitted to this year's General Assembly: one on confidence-building measures; the other on the relationship between disarmament and international development. In the case of the latter, Canada is funding the preparation of a popular version of the report to be published prior to UNSSOD II."

Mr. D.L.B. Hamlin, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs, participated as a speaker in Ottawa. Additional copies of the *Disarmament Bulletin* and the booklet *UNSSOD II and Canada: A Canadian Perspective* were printed for distribution during Disarmament Week. As well, a contribution of \$5,000 was made by the Department of External Affairs to the Joint Coordinating Committee to assist in defraying travel costs of speakers and resource persons.

UN Study of CBM's


by Peter M. Roberts

At the thirty-third session of the UN General Assembly in 1978 a resolution, which Canada co-sponsored, asked states to send to the Secretary General an account of their experience of and views about confidence building. Thirty states did so, some of them in detail and very thoughtfully (UN Document A/34/516). A further resolution, at the next General Assembly, asked the Secretary General to carry out a 'comprehensive study' of confidence building measures (CBM's) calling for that purpose on the assistance of a group of 'qualified governmental experts' from all regions of the world. Governmental experts certainly existed: since the beginning of the Helsinki negotiations confidence building had become a full-time business in many governments, at least in Europe. A group was put together, representing both superpowers, and governments from every other region of the world except the Middle East — a regrettable but perhaps unavoidable omission. Canada was among them. It was a useful and promising initiative, for which a good deal of the credit has to go to the imagination and energy of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The experts met four times in 1980 and 1981, for about five weeks altogether. The Chairman was Mr. Gerhardt Pfeiffer, then Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Committee on Disar-

mament in Geneva and now Ambassador to Sri Lanka. It was something of a miracle that, on the last day — indeed in the last hour — of the last meeting, they produced a report on which they all agreed, more or less. (On some points their agreement was to disagree, and they said so in the report itself.) The report was sent to the Secretary General (UN Document A/36/474) and the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly decided to submit the study to the second UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II) for further consideration.

Nobody is likely to sit up late to read this study. It has all the imperfections of committee drafting, and it is necessarily full of compromises, substantive and linguistic, which reflect the very divergent views of the members of the group of experts. Nevertheless, there is something there to hold the attention of people interested in disarmament and arms control, who recognize that it is precisely a lack of confidence between states which has prevented much progress in these subjects so far. There is valuable background material (not necessarily original, but much of it agreed to internationally for the first time) on the objectives and characteristics of CBM's, on the opportunities for putting them into effect, on the principles which govern them, on their development, on their present application in various parts of the world. There is a list of possible CBM's. But what is perhaps more interesting emerges between the lines: all states — certainly all represented



Canadian publication prepared by Mr. Robert Reford to facilitate the study of issues likely to arise at UNSSOD II.

on the group of experts — believe that CBM's can be useful in a dangerous world. But beyond that fundamental unanimity, two great differences open up, and are reflected in the study. The first is between those states which believe that CBM's are mainly if not exclusively a military matter, and those which think they are — or should be — much more. The second is an in-house disagreement, so to speak, among the military believers, between those on the one hand who think CBM's should be limited to exchanges of information about military activity, and those who would go far beyond this, to open up military budgets, military intentions, and military doctrine.

To take the second difference first, some experts contend that the military CBM's now in place in Europe were far too little to be effective. If real confidence was to be built, they argued, governments must be prepared to reveal their entire military life to international scrutiny. If you have nothing to hide, they asked, why hide anything? The surest way to build confidence in your neighbour's mind is to give him incontrovertible proof that you harbour no bad intention towards him. The other group thought that this was going much too far and too fast. A fundamental principle of CBM's is that they must not imperil national security, which every state has a right to assure for itself. The world, this group held, was still much too cold a place for total military nudity, so to speak. That fundamental difference of view could not be reconciled, and as the study indicates the experts simply agreed to disagree.

The other difference of view, between those who thought CBM's were mainly a military matter (as in Europe at the present time) and those who thought they were mainly something more, perhaps points the way to further study. The experts from third-world countries, in particular, argued forcefully that military confidence building was no doubt right for Europe, where military questions were at the top of the agenda. But in many parts of the world it was not armies which undermined confidence among states. Rather it was political, social, economic and cultural problems. Underdevelopment was as serious a threat to good relations among states as was the arms race. A study of confidence building in the UN, these experts said, had to take account of these non-military concerns. (One expert from a developing country remarked that if he went home with a study that dealt only with military

matters he would be fired.) In the end the study dealt with more than military CBM's, indeed quite extensively. But it is clear from a reading of the text that the experts were not ready for this part of their work, and in fact only scratched the surface. It may be that a future study, at the UN or elsewhere, will give these important, non-military subjects, the attention they deserve.

The recent history of arms control and disarmament has been characterized by a certain amount of illusion and a great deal of rhetoric. CBM's are not disarmament, nor arms control, but they are by definition real, significant and verifiable. However small they are — and in the

military field they have up to now been very small indeed — they have the wholesome qualities of substance and reality. They do not lend themselves to declamation; they lie more in the realm of the international lawyer and military expert than in that of the propagandist. That 16 experts from every corner of the world managed to agree on as much as they did about building confidence among states is a remarkable achievement, even if only a first step. But as the experts observe on the title page of their report, even the longest journey begins with a single step.

(Mr. Roberts, the Canadian Ambassador to Romania, participated in the UN study.)

UN Study on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development

On October 20, 1981, Mrs. Thorssen of Sweden, as Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts, presented to the General Assembly the final report on the UN study on the relationship between disarmament and development. The 195-page document (A/36/356 of October 5, 1981) is the result of three years of work, which saw forty-five research projects commissioned (24 by the UN, at a cost of \$600,000, and 21 nationally), and experts from 27 countries meeting for ten sessions of about two weeks each. Although a small number of reservations were submitted by some countries on certain parts of the Final Report, most of the report, including the conclusions and recommendations, was adopted unanimously.

Of the nine recommendations of the Final Report, five are directed toward member-states, and four to the UN. Of the first group, three involve information gathering and dissemination, and two involve aspects of conversion planning. Of the four recommendations directed toward the UN, two involve fostering the disarmament and development perspective within the UN system. It is also recommended that the UN further investigate the possibility of establishing a disarmament fund for development, and finally, that the UN system give increased emphasis, in its public information activities, to the cost of the arms race and the benefits of disarmament.

A Canadian expert participated in the study, and Canada is contributing to its dissemination through the production of a version of the Report suitable for widespread distribution. The writing of this version by a Canadian author, Mr. Clyde Sanger, is being financed from the Disarmament Fund of the Department of

External Affairs. This popular version, entitled "Safe and Sound", is being published commercially and will be available this spring. Arrangements have been made to publish a French version and consideration is being given to translation of the book into other languages.

The statement of the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament in the First Committee of the General Assembly, included the following, with regard to the completed study:

"We believe that one finding of the study in particular is of universal import: that is that military spending cannot benefit the economy of any given country any more than any alternative economic endeavour. That is, the study clearly shows that for developed and developing countries alike, military spending does not generate or contribute to the enhancement of capital assets, and on the contrary such spending is in fact inflationary. Another important element in the study is its emphasis on a broad concept of security, which extends beyond purely military relationships but addresses the problem of inter-dependence as a whole, particularly in its economic aspects. The study on the relationship between disarmament and development therefore represents a serious approach to a complex problem, and we are encouraged that it has produced such tangible results. In this, the Chairman of the Study Group, Mme Inga Thorsson, is to be commended for her role in bringing this enterprise to such a successful conclusion."

The Assembly later passed a resolution which transmits the study to UNSSOD II "for its substantive consideration and appropriate action", and invites states to transmit their views to the UN Secretary General by April 15, 1982.

Statement on Canadian policy to Standing Committee

A major statement on Canadian policy was made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, on February 25. He was appearing before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence of the House of Commons during its hearings on "security and disarmament issues with special attention to Canada's participation in the second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament". Following are excerpts from his address:

"I come now to the question of negotiations on limiting strategic arms which have become increasingly important as a means of enhancing the stability of the mutual balance of deterrence. The process, begun in 1969, was suspended in the aftermath of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. It is still indispensable that the two major nuclear powers renew their efforts to establish both quantitative and qualitative limits on their strategic nuclear forces as well as pursuing the more ambitious goal of mutual reductions in nuclear arsenals.

"Some months ago the United States announced its readiness to resume talks on strategic arms early this year. It is regrettable that because of the deterioration in the international situation caused by rigours of martial law in Poland a date for the resumption has not yet been fixed. Unless the Polish situation continues to deteriorate, I do not consider that it should be the cause for an unduly long delay in resuming talks on strategic arms. The United States has indicated that it intends to emphasize reductions. Canada supports this objective and looks for a similar statement of intent from the Soviet Union....

"I want to make it clear that our support for the maintenance of forces sufficient to deter aggression and defend the NATO area is entirely consistent with our commitment to a vigorous arms control and disarmament policy. Indeed, the two policies are more than consistent; they complement and support each other, forming a coherent whole. They serve the same goal of enhancing security and preserving peace. Security is the key. For only on a basis of undiminished security can nations be expected to accept limitations on the numbers and quality of their weapons. And only on such a basis can they be brought to consider mutual and balanced reductions of their armed forces.

"It is against this background of a

balanced security policy that Canadian interests and efforts in disarmament at UNSSOD II should be viewed. It was against such a background that the Prime Minister proposed, at the first Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, a strategy of suffocation which called for the negotiation of verifiable agreements by the nuclear powers on its four elements. The proposal addressed the problem of vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The problem remains, as does the validity of the concept....

"From the earliest deliberations on disarmament after World War II, a consistent Canadian theme has been the importance of ensuring that terms of any agreement are being observed. Canada has also sought to encourage, where useful and possible, the involvement of the international community in witnessing compliance. That is what is meant by the term international verification. Concern about verification is even more important today with the growing complexity of weapons systems and the declining degree of international confidence. When compliance is called in question and verification provisions are inadequate, the whole process of arms control and disarmament becomes more difficult, not least as a result of the inevitable decline in confidence. I therefore become impatient with those who argue that concern for verification is little more than an obstructionist tactic or that taking an interest in verification is "playing the American game". The Government is serious about arms control and disarmament as an instrument of security policy, and we will continue to emphasize the importance of verification, as the Prime Minister did at UNSSOD I, as the Speech from the Throne did two years ago and, I might add, as did the Final Document of UNSSOD I.

"By stressing the practical aspects of verification and applying expertise in other areas to arms control and disarmament issues, Canada has been able to play a role in the past and can continue to make a contribution in the future. Canada's non-proliferation and safeguards policy makes us a world leader in this important aspect of promoting the evolution of an effective non-proliferation régime, a priority of Canadian policy on arms control and disarmament....

"As in 1978, I think that the Canadian Delegation should strive, in cooperation with other delegations, to chart the way ahead and give a further impetus to arms

control and disarmament negotiations. We should not be unrealistic in our expectations from a conference which is expected to take decisions by consensus.

"Canada has a number of contributions to make. It has idealism and ideas. It has a role of liaison. It has leverage on horizontal non-proliferation. It has expertise in seismic detection and chemical weapons verification. In these and other ways we can and will do our best to contribute to the success of UNSSOD II."

(Copies of the full text are available from Domestic Information Programs Division of the Department of External Affairs.)

Preparations for UNSSOD II

The Canadian Government outlined its views on UNSSOD II in a letter to the UN Secretary-General in April 1981 (see September 1981 issue of the Bulletin). Canada has also participated in the UNSSOD II Preparatory Committee meetings. Numerous bilateral and multilateral consultations have been undertaken, and are planned, to seek international cooperation to ensure the best possible outcome to UNSSOD II.

In Canada, preparations are also well underway for Canadian participation at UNSSOD II. The Department of External Affairs has channelled financial contributions from the Disarmament Fund toward UNSSOD II related activities such as the York University Conference on UNSSOD II and the United Nations Association annual conference in Toronto which will focus on UNSSOD II. The Department of External Affairs is distributing the booklet *UNSSOD II and Canada: A Canadian Perspective* prepared by Mr. Robert Reford, to groups and individuals wishing to study the issues likely to arise at UNSSOD II. The Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs discussed UNSSOD II at its September 1981 meeting and will do so in more depth at its April 1-2 meeting. The Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence examined security and disarmament issues with specific reference to Canada's participation at UNSSOD II. The Committee's report is to be tabled in the House of Commons in early April.

As the Government prepares its position for UNSSOD II it will take into account the Standing Committee's recommendations, and those of interested members of the public.

North Atlantic Alliance Recognition of Public Concern

At the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Session in Brussels, December 10 and 11, 1981, much consideration was given to public concerns about the current level of military spending and arms inventories. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, on December 10, in his capacity as Honorary President of the Session commented as follows on those concerns, on organizations which advocate unilateral disarmament, and on the continued Alliance commitment to negotiation of verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements.

"...We are meeting today at a critical period in the history of the (North Atlantic) Alliance. The maintenance of an effective deterrent has never been more important — yet, significant segments of our publics, particularly young people, have become confused about the necessity for defence and disillusioned with the concept of deterrence. Worse, many of them simply do not believe that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is treading the path of peace. Some even believe that a nuclear war would somehow become more likely if the Theatre Nuclear Force (TNF) modernization decision is implemented.

"We hear within our countries loud voices in denunciation of NATO's nuclear defences. We see street demonstrations directed against the TNF modernization component of our December 1979 decision. There are demands that NATO should forego its modernization plans regardless of whether the Soviet Union accepts corresponding reductions in its nuclear forces. At the same time there is all too little awareness of the arms-control negotiations component of the same decision, or of the awesome nuclear weapons of the East....

"The East-West situation has been perceived by many as more or less stable over the past decade. For a while, we seemed to be building bridges with the East. We lived in the decade of *détente* — the superpowers were talking to each other about limiting strategic arms, and negotiations began on the mutual and balanced reduction of conventional forces.

"However, during this same period, the Soviet Union has been quietly but resolutely building up its nuclear and conventional forces. It has shown by its invasion and continued occupation of Afghanistan that it is prepared to resort to military force in pursuit of what it considers to be its national interests. Unfortunately, the serious implications of

these developments were not perceived among large segments of our people. To them, *détente* gave the promise of reversing the nuclear arms race. Now they mistakenly imagine that it is our modernization decision which threatens *détente* rather than Soviet missiles, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and Soviet pressure on Poland. In truth, the peace movement is more a product of fear than of logic.

"We must do a better job of addressing these fears. We must convince our publics that unilateral disarmament increases rather than reduces the risk of war. We agree with the peace movement that the nuclear arms race can and must be arrested. They should be assured that we are not trying to match the other side one for one and that we are not seeking military superiority but greater security at the lowest possible level of armaments, nuclear and non-nuclear. We should do all we can in our communiqués and with the communication resources of the Alliance to show that this is an essential purpose for us. The fears of the peace movement need to be addressed, but the real campaign for nuclear disarmament has to be waged at the bargaining table....

"We need now to maintain a sense of momentum in arms control as an integral part of efforts to improve NATO security. We must be constant in our approach, not only in our public utterances but also in our willingness to negotiate in all areas — TNF, strategic arms reductions, and mutual and balanced force reductions. Above all, we must maintain our solidarity. Without it, the Soviet Union would not have been brought to the negotiating table, and success there will not be possible unless Alliance solidarity is maintained in complete support of the 1979 two-track decision."

Subsequent to Dr. MacGuigan's address, the North Atlantic Council Ministers issued a communique on December 11, 1981 in which they resolved to pursue peace and security through a stable balance of forces, reduced tensions and more constructive East-West relations:

"The Alliance is resolved to strengthen — without seeking military superiority — its capacity to deter aggression and defend peace. Improvements in Allied defence readiness and military capabilities contribute to this end. Ministers expressed their support for the determination of the United States to ensure the deterrent capabilities of its strategic forces. An effective defence is also the

essential basis for fruitful negotiations on arms control and disarmament.

"The Allies remain committed to vigorous efforts in all appropriate fora to achieve substantial, balanced and verifiable arms limitations and reductions. Recalling President Reagan's historic speech of 18th November 1981 they registered their full support for his far-reaching and constructive program for the achievement of a stable peace. They share the United States' resolve to work for the establishment of a military balance of lower levels of forces and welcomed the four-point agenda which President Reagan conveyed to President Brezhnev.

"On this basis, as well as on the basis of restraint and responsibility, the Allies offer the Soviet Union comprehensive negotiations with the aim of effective arms control and disarmament. Soviet acceptance of this offer would benefit the peoples in East and West and in the Third World and promote peace and security worldwide."

(The complete text of Dr. MacGuigan's statement is available in the "Statement and Speeches" series issued by the Domestic Information Programs Division of the Department of External Affairs.)

31st Pugwash Conference

The 31st International Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs was held in Banff, Alberta August 28 to September 2, 1981. The Conference, with the support of contributions of \$50,000 each from the Department of External Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency, brought together scientists and other people from 40 countries to discuss "The Search for Peace in World in Crisis".

In a message to the Conference, Prime Minister Trudeau noted the difficulties in putting an end to the nuclear arms race and reaffirmed Canada's views that the arms race must be stopped and reversed and that a new balance must be sought.

Six Working Groups considered and discussed the following: Avoiding Nuclear War; Avoiding Conventional War; Negotiating Arms Limitation and Disarmament; Enhancing International Security; Energy Resources and International Security; and Security in the Developing World. The Honourable Gerald Regan emphasized the importance of negotiating verifiable agreements in the Conference closing speech. The proceedings of the conference including the text of all papers presented are to be published.

MBFR: Canadian Statement on Verification

In a plenary statement on October 15, 1981, the Head of the Delegation of Canada to the MBFR negotiations, Ambassador David C. Reece, speaking on behalf of the Western participants, underlined the necessity of achieving agreement in Vienna on verification provisions assuring a water-tight agreement in which all participants can have well-founded confidence. To date, however, agreement on measures contributing to verification was still a major unresolved issue between East and West, he said.

He pointed out that participants of an agreement must be in a position to detect possible violations and respond to them, particularly in the Central Europe region which is the site of the world's largest concentration of potentially opposing forces. Possible breaches of an agreement here could be seriously damaging to participants' security. Following reductions, residual levels of armed force manpower will have to be monitored on a continuous basis — a difficult task given the large number of personnel involved and their mobility.

In order to accomplish the tasks of verifying such an agreement, Western participants are convinced, Ambassador Reece said, that agreed data was essential as a common point of departure for the sides. In addition, permanent measures would be needed to verify continuing

compliance with residual manpower ceilings.

No single type of measure by itself, including national technical means alone, would be adequate for verifying an agreement as innovative and complex as the one providing for force reductions in Central Europe. Such considerations, he pointed out, are reflected in the West's December 1979 package of associated measures. The West has, for example, proposed Associated Measures, calling for a modest quota of on-site inspections for a limited area and duration; for the stationing of permanent observers at entry-exit points; for information exchanges; and for non-interference with national means of verification.

Ambassador Reece pointed out that there appeared to be agreement between the sides on the concepts underlying the measures for exchange of information and for non-interference with national technical means. Unfortunately, however, the East has thus far abstained from a detailed discussion of measures proposed by the West for on-site inspections and the establishment of exit and entry points permanently manned by observers.

In concluding his remarks, Ambassador Reece called on the East to participate in a serious dialogue on the verification provisions which any agreement reached here must contain.

UNGA36 calling for the establishment of a working group, although, as stated in our intervention in CD Plenary on July 16, 1981, 'our objective is the achievement of a CTBT and not the establishment of a working group per se; and our support for a working group rests on our belief that it could assist in this direction: that is to say, the working group should be viewed as a means to an end and not the end itself.... Let us not permit debates on this issue to become bogged down in symbolism to the detriment of the actual matter at hand'.

"In the present context, the question of setting up a CTB working group is essentially a procedural matter, although of great symbolic importance to many. Our substantive interest should be the eventual conclusion of a Test Ban Treaty. It is not the setting up of a working group as such. We would be advised to focus our efforts towards areas where progress is possible.

"Canada would support the establishment of a political experts group under the aegis of the CD, to discuss matters which were not at issue in the trilateral negotiations from 1977 to 1980. They could include the financial/legal/administrative aspects of an international seismic data exchange as proposed in the CD in April 1980 by Australia. The mandate for such a group would of course have to be agreed in consultation with the trilateral negotiating states.

"Canada is not convinced that nuclear weapon testing must go on forever nor at its current disturbing pace. Restrictions on the number and yield of tests should be possible, as well as on geographic locations of testing sites. To existing nuclear testing agreements could be added further agreements which would move towards the objective of an eventual CTBT. There is a need to generate some movement in the negotiating process. There is a need to avoid the risks inherent in a continued freeze in the negotiating process on nuclear testing. A number of arms control treaties were realized as a result of the precedents created in working out the PTBT of 1963. They include the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976. It has been argued by some that the ratification of TTBT and PNET would be undesirable and could be counterproductive. We do not agree. Fully implemented, these two treaties, with international co-operation, could be utilized and built upon to move towards a CTBT.

"Ratification of the TTBT and PNET would bring into force limitations on yield, albeit at a high level. It would also bring into force the exchange of technical

Canadian Suggestions on Comprehensive Test Ban

Canada's Ambassador to the Committee on Disarmament, Mr. D.S. McPhail, delivered a statement during the general debate in the CD on February 18, 1982. The following portion of the speech dealt with the important subject of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT):

"The realization of a verifiable multilateral CTBT, to end all nuclear testing in all environments for all time, continues to be a fundamental Canadian objective. It is one of the four interrelated nuclear arms control measures of the 'Strategy of Suffocation' proposed by my Prime Minister in UNSSOD I in 1978. The concept of the strategy was reaffirmed in the Canadian House of Commons last June.

"The subject of a Nuclear Test Ban has been part of the United Nations agenda since 1954. Since 1963, when the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed, the negotiating body in Geneva has annually been requested by the UN General Assembly to reach agreement on a CTBT. The

UK/USA/USSR conducted negotiations from July 1977 to November 1980, when they were recessed. The consensus necessary for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to deal with the negotiation of a CTBT as requested by the UN General Assembly, continues to elude us.

"For the past two years or so, our principal concern has been that the CD should assume some substantive role in the elaboration of a CTBT — that this negotiating body do some useful and constructive work, at an early date, without prejudicing the accomplishments of the trilateral negotiations. Canada has called for the resumption of these trilateral negotiations. A year ago, in this Committee, Canada announced its 'readiness to contribute to the definition of the Committee's substantive role'. We have publicly stated we were in favour of the establishment of an ad hoc working group with an appropriate mandate. Canada co-sponsored resolutions at UNGA 35 and

data about testing programs and the limiting of testing to specific designated sites, as provided for in the protocol to the TTBT. It would also bring into force the provisions of the PNET protocol dealing with technical arrangements for monitoring and exchanging information.

"A very useful further step would be the resumption of the trilateral negotiations for the specific purpose of negotiating a second stage agreement which would further restrict the numbers and yields of tests, and the locations of testing sites. Such an agreement could be for specific reductions or, even better, for sets of reductions over time.

"With such a process in motion, it would seem possible to envisage a greater role for the CD's ad hoc group of seismic experts by involving it in aspects of the exchange of information which would be occurring with the TTBT and PNET in force. Also, at some stage in the not too distant future, the implementation of the International Seismic Data Exchange (ISDE) would appear to be useful.

"The implementation of this international verification measure in connection with an interim agreement implies that such an agreement, once reached in trilateral negotiations, would in certain respects at least lead to CD involvement.

"Canada would hope that in such a process the other nuclear weapon states, France and China, would join and would sign the PTBT.

"The confidence which a verifiable second-stage agreement would build should, in turn, bring within the realm of possibility whatever further agreements on limitations and reductions may be required to move towards a permanent CTBT.

"The above ideas are being contributed in an effort to help focus our efforts towards what seems to us to be possible — some positive and constructive movement in the negotiating process on nuclear testing. My delegation will be glad to work towards this end, the ultimate objective of which is the achievement of an important goal of the international community — a CTBT."

In Brief...

...September 1981 Consultative Group Meeting

The Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs met in Ottawa September 10-11, 1981. Special speakers Mr. D.S. McPhail, Ambassador to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva; Mr. B. Wood, Executive Director of the

North-South Institute and Canadian member of the UN Group of Experts studying the relationship between disarmament and development; and Mr. R.L. Rogers, Ambassador at Large for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, provided reports on their work in the arms control and disarmament field. The Consultative Group also considered UNSSOD II issues.

...Science for Peace Workshop

A workshop on chemical warfare was held in Toronto on January 9, 1982 sponsored by Science for Peace. Presentations included topics such as the utilization of chemicals in war, activities of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and Canadian arms control and disarmament activity relating to chemical warfare. Science for Peace is considering holding other workshops on specific arms control and disarmament issues.

...York University Seminar

The York University Research Program in Strategic Studies held a conference in Toronto on February 10-11 entitled *UNSSOD II: A Canadian Perspective*. Academics, representatives of non-governmental organizations, government officials and individuals with particular interest in arms control and disarmament issues from across Canada contributed to the discussion of the issues and other factors which had an impact on arms control and disarmament efforts since 1978. There was also discussion of the approaches and options which the Canadian Government could consider for UNSSOD II. The proceedings of the conference and the six papers presented will eventually be published in a York University Program Monograph.

...Disarmament Times Special UNSSOD II Coverage

The *Disarmament Times*, the publication of the NGO Disarmament Committee at the United Nations will be printing four special issues per week during each week of UNSSOD II. Subscriptions for the special issues may be obtained by contacting Disarmament Times, Room 7B, 777 United Nations Plaza, New York, New York 10017, U.S.A.

...SCEAND Studies Security and Disarmament

On December 18, 1981, the House of Commons empowered the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence to examine security and disarmament with specific attention to Canada's participation in UNSSOD II.

The Standing Committee, chaired by Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P., heard presentations from over 50 individuals and groups. The report of the Committee is to be tabled in the House of Commons by April 2. The report and the minutes of the hearings may be obtained from the Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 45 Sacré-Coeur Blvd., Hull, Québec, K1A 0S7.

...UN Fact Sheets

The United Nations Centre for Disarmament publishes *Disarmament Fact Sheets* which deal with selected arms control and disarmament questions that are under active consideration or are the subject of studies in United Nations bodies and other fora. Fact sheets on confidence-building measures and UNSSOD II are the latest in this series. Copies may be obtained from the United Nations Association in Canada, Suite 808, 63 Sparks Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5A6. The UNAC also carries other UN publications and information material relating to disarmament.


...Calendar of Events

February 2—April: Committee on Disarmament, Geneva.
February 10-11: York University Conference on UNSSOD II.
March 6: Dalhousie Workshop on arms control and disarmament, Halifax.
March 6-7: Coalition for World Disarmament Conference on UNSSOD II, Vancouver.
March 16-18: Palme Commission, Ditchley Park.
April 1-2: Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, Ottawa.
April 2-3: University of Saskatchewan Disarmament Seminar, Saskatoon.
April 23-26: Palme Commission, Stockholm.
April 26—May 14: UNSSOD II Preparatory Committee, New York.
May 5-7: Project Ploughshares/Canadian Council on International Cooperation Conference on Disarmament and Development, Ottawa.
May 13-16: United Nations Association in Canada Conference on UNSSOD II, Toronto.
May 17-28: UN Disarmament Commission, New York.
May 28-30: Atlantic Regional Conference of Canadian Student Pugwash, Halifax.
Late May: Palme Commission, Vienna.
June 3-6: World Federalists of Canada Annual Conference, Ottawa.
June 7-July 9: UNSSOD II.
September—December: UNGA XXXVII.

SEPTEMBER 1982

A REVIEW OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITIES

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


UNSSOD II and Canada

The Second UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II) took place in New York from June 7 to July 10. It did not succeed in properly completing the items on its agenda, but the official Canadian view, in retrospect, is that the tasks the Session set for itself were too ambitious.

UNSSOD II, during three preparatory conferences in the preceding year, prepared for itself an arduous agenda containing six complex tasks. The two most lengthy and controversial were to reach unanimous agreement on: a review of the implementation of the recommendations of UNSSOD I in 1978; and a "comprehensive programme of disarmament", which some wished to see as a legally binding disarmament schedule, complete with dates for specific agreements to be concluded. It was not surprising that the drafting of the review document became a finger-pointing exercise. The drafting of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the forward-looking equivalent of the review document, was an exercise of even greater futility, although all delegations continued to hope, until the last week, that the necessary compromises could be made. Although far from homogeneous, the NNA, during the preparatory drafting in the Committee on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, had recognized the comprehensive programme of disarmament as a means of using its numerical superiority in the UN to somehow pressure both East and West into committing themselves to progress in disarmament. However, because of the poor state of East-West relations, a spirit of compromise was in short supply. Having received a 44-page draft of mostly unagreed language from the 40-member Committee on Disarmament, the 157 delegations at UNSSOD II decided, after countless hours of unsuccessful negotiations, to return the comprehensive programme to the CD for further elaboration.

Canada used its position as a middle-power, and its reputation as a progressive member of NATO, to good advantage. Prime Minister Trudeau's speech was seen



as statesmanlike. It built on the "strategy of suffocation" elaborated at UNSSOD I, recognized what may be a sign from the USSR of willingness to allow a degree of on-site inspection to verify a treaty on chemical weapons, and pointed to the urgent necessity to agree on arms control measures related to outer space. The Prime Minister also stressed the importance of verification in negotiating disarmament agreements, and announced that Canada would be substantially increasing research in verification. He also announced that increased Canadian funding for arms control and disarmament would allow Canada to join the international verification mechanisms which would form part of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The Canadian Delegation exercised a leadership role by its chairmanship of the "Barton Group", an informal consultative body grouping the sixteen NATO members plus Ireland, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. A.R. Menzies, while guiding discussions in the Barton Group, attempted to find compromises among the often markedly different outlooks of its members and to work toward positions which could serve to advance work in the Session's various drafting groups. Canadian leadership was also instrumental in reaching agreement on the guidelines for an increased UN role in information dissemination on disarmament, one of the few areas in which agreement was reached. Considerable efforts were also made to maintain a dialogue with the large number of Canadians in New York for the Special Session.

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Dr. MacGuigan summed up the Canadian Government's view of UNSSOD II: "it should be a mistake to dwell too long on what was not achieved at UNSSOD II or to succumb to the temptation of sustained hand-wringing about failure. Rather, we should be grateful that it was held in spite of an exceedingly unpropitious international atmosphere.

"We should also welcome the fact that UNSSOD II preserved intact the viability of the United Nations system to deliberate constructively on international security matters, particularly arms control and disarmament. Despite the temptation to vote resolutions which could not achieve consensus, the non-aligned countries in the end chose the path of realism rather than a procedure which could only devalue the system.

"An important achievement of UNSSOD II was its reaffirmation of the Final Document of UNSSOD I. The Program of Action in that Final Document highlighted the importance of the negotiating process, as did the many world leaders who addressed the Special Session."

UNSSOD II and Canada: The Prime Minister's Address

The importance which Canada attaches to arms control and disarmament was symbolized by the attendance of the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable P.E. Trudeau, at the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament. In his June 18 address to the plenary, he concentrated on nuclear issues, a focal point of public concern today. Following are excerpts from his address:

"Instability is the fuel that feeds the nuclear arms race. That is why, four years ago, I put before this Assembly a 'strategy of suffocation' designed to deprive the nuclear arms race of the oxygen on which it feeds, from the laboratories to the testing sites.

"The main elements of the strategy had long been familiar features of the arms-control dialogue: a comprehensive test ban; a halt to the flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles; a cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and a limitation, and eventual reduction, of military spending for new strategic weapons systems. It was in the combination of these elements that I saw a more coherent, a more efficient and a more promising instrument for curbing the nuclear arms race.

"But the strategy was never meant to be applied unilaterally. It always envisaged negotiated agreements between the nuclear powers. All elements of the strategy would probably not fall into place at once. But all were essential if the strategy were to have its full effect: the halt of the technological momentum of the arms race by freezing at the initial or testing stage the development of new weapons systems.

"While I continue to believe that such a technological freeze is fundamental to controlling the arms race, I would now propose, however, that it be enfolded into a more general policy of stabilization. I do not consider the strategy of suffocation to be in competition with current negotiations or with negotiations shortly to commence. Indeed, I believe that the more successful these negotiations are, the more likely will they need to be entrenched in agreements along the lines I have proposed.

"The impact of the current and proposed negotiations, if they succeed, will be to produce a stable balance at a much lower level of armament. It will involve not only important quantitative reductions, but a qualitative change, in that destabilizing systems will have been reduced. We will be dealing not only with a balance at lower levels but with a different kind of balance, in that it will be more stable.

"Thus a policy of stabilization has two complementary components: the suffocation strategy which seeks to inhibit the development of new weapons systems, and our current negotiating approach aimed at qualitative and quantitative reductions in nuclear arsenals designed to achieve a stable nuclear balance at lower levels.

"Before I leave the subject of suffocation, I must underscore the urgency of coming to grips with the development of new weaponry for use in outer space. Twenty-five years ago, the first man-made satellite was launched. That event marked a leap in man's mastery of the earth's environment. Fifteen years ago, it did not seem premature to close off the possibility that space might be used for other than peaceful purposes. But today, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space is patently inadequate. That is how quickly, in today's world, science fiction becomes reality.

"The treaty lays down that nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction are not to be placed in orbit, around the earth or stationed in space. In retrospect, that

leaves loopholes which risk being highly destabilizing. I am thinking particularly of anti-satellite weapons or anti-missile laser systems. I believe that we cannot wait much longer if we are to be successful in foreclosing the prospect of space wars. I propose, therefore, that an early start be made on a treaty to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in outer space.


"Of course, the whole edifice rests on key assumptions about verification, and it is to the theory and practice of verification that we must increasingly give attention.

"Openness is central to the process of verification. But here, too, technology has taken us well beyond the notions about openness that were prevalent only 25 years ago. When we speak of verification by 'national technical means', we have in mind the vast range of activity that is detectable by the magic eye of highly sophisticated satellites plying their intrusive orbits around the globe. I sometimes wonder whether we realize the immensity of the leap we have made; and whether a certain reluctance in accepting the rigours of verification is not an insufferable anachronism.

"Verification is not only a matter of access. Verification entails a technology of its own that differs, from weapons system to weapons system. Therefore, ideally, the work on verification should prepare the way for arms control agreements that still lie ahead; otherwise, problems of verification will inevitably prevent the conclusion of even well advanced arms control negotiations. In this context I am encouraged by the positive approach to verification procedures contained in the remarks of the Soviet foreign minister earlier this week.

"However, given the complexity and characteristics of many modern weapons systems, so-called national technical means may not be adequate for verifying arms control or disarmament agreements. Consequently, the international community should address itself to verification as one of the most significant factors in disarmament negotiations in the 1980s.

"In Canada we are allocating increased funds for arms control and disarmament initiatives. This decision will allow us to take two important steps. First, we are committing resources to enable Canada to become a full participant in the international seismic data exchange, the international verification mechanism which will form part of the provisions of a comprehensive test ban treaty. We believe that the exchange should be



Prime Minister Trudeau at UNSSOD II.

fully operational at an early date and in advance of the treaty. Secondly, we will substantially increase research in verification. To develop effective verification procedures, Canada will be devoting more attention to utilizing expertise available inside and outside government....

"In the process of sifting the proposals before us, I hope that the Special Session will concentrate on what, with goodwill, is achievable. This Assembly has a right to expect sincerity of purpose and a determination to achieve concrete results on the part of all participants. A particularly heavy responsibility rests with the

two super-powers. They must give their undivided attention to negotiations to reduce their arsenals of nuclear weapons and should not deviate from that central objective by imposing political preconditions.

"This implies that the super-powers agree to communicate, to talk to each other, and to recognize the unquestionable common interest which unites them in a fundamental way; that is, the need to avoid a catastrophe which would destroy them both...."

(Copies of the full text are available from the Bureau of Information of the Department of External Affairs.)

NGO's and UNSSOD II

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's) played an active part at UNSSOD II both inside and outside the Conference. Apart from the massive June 12 rally for disarmament, NGO's organized panel discussions, film presentations, coffee houses, etc. As well, on June 24 and 25, representatives of over 50 NGO's and 20 peace and disarmament research institutes addressed the General Assembly. Speakers included Sean McBride, president of the International Peace Bureau and 1974 Nobel Peace prize recipient; Lord Philip Noel-Baker, 1959 Nobel Peace prize recipient; Dr. Homer Jack, Chairman of the NGO Committee on Disarmament at UN Headquarters; Rear Admiral Gene Larocque, Director of the Centre for Defense Information and Frank Mackaby, Director of the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute.

The Canadian speakers who addressed the plenary were Douglas Roche, M.P., International Chairman of Parliamentarians for World Order; Right Reverend Lois Wilson, Moderator of the United Church and representative of Project Ploughshares; Edgar M. Bronfman, President of the World Jewish Congress; Maurice Tugwell, Director of the Centre for Conflict Studies (University of New Brunswick) and Ruth Klaasen, Peace Research Institute-Dundas.

Fifteen representatives of Canadian NGO's, academics and other prominent individuals with an active interest in arms control and disarmament issues acted as consultants to the Canadian Delegation to UNSSOD II. The Canadian Delegation also provided briefing sessions for Canadian NGO's on issues relating to the Special Session.

SCEAND Report on Security and Disarmament Tabled

The House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence Report on security and disarmament issues was tabled in the House on April 7, 1982. One of the main purposes of the study was to recommend policies which Canada should follow at UNSSOD II.

The organizational work, hearings and report-writing involving over 50 Members of Parliament took place between January and April, 1982 under the chairmanship of Mr. Marcel Prud'homme, M.P. Fifty-one meetings were held, fifty witnesses appeared before the committee, and over one hundred briefs were received. All the views brought to the attention of the Committee were taken into account in the preparation of its report.

Because the international security and disarmament question is such an immense one, the Committee has recommended that work on this issue should continue now that its own mandate is completed. It recommends that a new special joint committee of the Senate and the House of Commons be established to examine the report of the United Nations second Special Session on Disarmament and to consider further the general question of international security and disarmament.

The Committee Report contains six main chapters, starting with an Introduction which notes the importance of international security and how it is pursued through defence and disarmament policies. Other chapters set out facts and figures about world armaments; summarize the testimony heard by the Committee during its hearings; provide a history of the international quest for security and disarmament since 1945; and provide a brief history of Canadian disarmament policies.

The final chapter deals with Canadian policies for the United Nations second Special Session on Disarmament, and contains specific recommendations.

For a general strategy on arms control and disarmament, the Committee recommended: strong support for urgent negotiations and agreements on strategic armaments and intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe; and the pursuit in UNSSOD II of rapid progress towards improvement in world political conditions; the establishment of confidence-building measures and crisis-management systems; and the negotiation of effective and verifiable measures of arms control and disarmament including a compre-

hensive test ban, prohibition on chemical weapons, the prohibition of weapons for outer space, a verifiable ban on new weapons based on new scientific principles or new technologies, and regional force reductions under an MBFR agreement and similar accords.

Six Committee members presented

Palme Commission Final Report

The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme, issued its report on June 1, 1982. On that day, Mr. Robert Ford, former Canadian Ambassador to the USSR and a member of the Commission, made an official presentation of the report to the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau.

The Commission aimed at producing a realistic report to assist UNSSOD II in its deliberations. There were difficulties in constructing a report which would reflect political realities, the idealism of so many thinking people around the world, and so many very differing approaches — Soviet, American, Canadian, German, Japanese, and Third World. It was therefore a considerable achievement to get an agreed report, above all with Soviet and American signatures. This happy result was in part due to the willingness of both sides to accept compromise.

In a general way the main themes of the report are (a) that a nuclear war will not produce any victors, and that it is an illusion to think that a limited nuclear war is possible; it is bound to escalate; and (b) that security cannot be achieved

by attempting to achieve military superiority; it must be based on the concept of mutual security.

The Report and the minutes of the hearings may be purchased from the Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 45 Sacré-Coeur Blvd, Hull, Québec, K1A 0S7.

by attempting to achieve military superiority; it must be based on the concept of mutual security.

The most important proposals and recommendations included:

- (a) re-affirmation of the significance of observing SALT I and continuing the SALT/START process;
- (b) the need for parity in conventional forces in Europe at the lowest possible levels which could then lead to agreement on the withdrawal of battlefield nuclear weapons in an area up to 150 kilometres on each side of the present East-West frontier;
- (c) re-affirmation of the importance of the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty;
- (d) support for Intermediate Nuclear Forces Talks;
- (e) the need for a Chemical Weapon Free Zone in Europe;
- (f) restrictions on the development of new weapons and other measures such as a ban on anti-satellite weapons; a call for a chemical weapons disarmament treaty, comprehensive test ban treaty;
- (g) a non-proliferation treaty with universal adherence, and confidence building measures;
- (h) a call for a limitation on conventional arms transfers together with guidelines;
- (i) a call for the strengthening of the role

of the U.N. Security Council and the office of the Secretary-General; (j) improvement of peace-keeping machinery and the use of U.N. Stand-by forces and regional security arrangements; (k) the need for economic security, noting the costs of the arms race and its effect on developing countries.

In his speech at UNSSOD II, the Prime Minister referred to the significant contribution of the Palme Commission Report to public awareness and understanding of arms control and disarmament issues.

Schiefer Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in Southeast Asia

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mark MacGuigan announced in Bangkok, Thailand on June 21, 1982 that Canada was submitting to the UN Secretary-General, an independent report prepared by Dr. Bruno Schiefer, Chairman of the Toxicology Group, University of Saskatchewan, on the alleged use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia. Dr. Schiefer, recognized as one of the foremost experts on toxicology (mycotoxins) in Canada, was invited by the Department of External Affairs in February 1982 to undertake a scientific study on certain aspects of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia, in particular the use of mycotoxins as a lethal agent.

Canada has been concerned about the alleged use of chemical weapons in Laos and Cambodia since reports of the use of some sort of lethal or incapacitating agents began to be received from Laotian refugees in Thailand in 1976. In addition to humanitarian concerns, Canada has been concerned about the credibility of the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits the use of chemical weapons. To ensure that the extensive reports of the use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia were investigated, Canada co-sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution in 1980 which established an international group of experts to investigate these reports, and a subsequent resolution in 1981 which extended the group's mandate. In March 1981, Canada had submitted to the UN Secretary-General information volunteered by refugees in Thailand on the alleged use of chemical weapons.

Dr. Schiefer's report is based on the results of a two-week visit to Thailand in February where he held discussions with Thai government authorities, Thai



Official presentation by Mr. Robert Ford to Prime Minister Trudeau of the Palme Commission Final Report.

scientists, and Canadian Embassy officials, in addition to visiting refugee camps on the Laotian and Cambodian borders with Thailand, where he collected control samples and conducted interviews with victims of alleged attacks. His report concludes that events which are reported to have taken place at the time of alleged chemical weapons attacks cannot be explained on the basis of naturally occurring phenomena. Neither mycotoxins nor diseases naturally occurring in Southeast Asia can explain the reported symptoms of victims of the alleged chemical weapons attacks. The symptoms described, however, are consistent with tricothecene mycotoxicosis. The UN Experts' Group is to report to the General Assembly in the fall and it is hoped that Dr. Schiefer's report will provide a valuable scientific contribution to its work. In particular, Dr. Schiefer's report should serve to answer the many scientific questions that have been posed, particularly by the Soviet Union, regarding the natural occurrence of mycotoxins in Southeast Asia.


Dr. Schiefer's report, in its final conclusion, identified an urgent need to improve the verification and control procedures for chemical and/or biological weapons in order to determine if they are being used in Southeast Asia.

The report, which received much media coverage will be translated by the United Nations into French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, and Arabic, and circulated as a UN document, a rare undertaking. Two other reports on the same issue have been made available to the United Nations by

Canada. The first, an epidemiological investigation by a medical team from the Surgeon General Branch of the Department of National Defence was conducted in March 1982. Separate from the investigation carried on by Dr. Schiefer, and approaching the issue from the epidemiological perspective, the conclusions reached were strikingly similar. This report was submitted to the United Nations on August 25, 1982.

On September 7, 1982 the Department of External Affairs submitted a third report which constituted interviews obtained on a voluntary basis by Canadian immigration officers from refugees who claimed to have experienced CW attacks in April 1982. Similar in some respect to Canada's initial submission in March 1981, this report included photographs taken by the Canadian officials and certain other details.

Throughout this exercise now spanning some 15 months, the Canadian government has never attempted to point an accusing finger at any particular authority. It had been hoped that an increased public awareness of the issue would have resulted in the cessation of CW use from whatever source. This appears not to have happened. Nevertheless, in supporting the United Nations Group of Experts by providing data in addition to that obtained by the Group itself, Canada is hopeful that the international community can determine the facts and come to a conclusion. The Group of Experts is expected to submit its report at the 37th session of the General Assembly.



*Secretary of State for External Affairs
Mark MacGuigan.*

already exchanging data on a provisional basis. In several months, Canada will be able to join these countries and, therefore, to be a full member of the Exchange from the outset. Canada has called for the early implementation of the Exchange in advance of a treaty.

Canada has been playing an active role in the Chemical Weapons (CW) Working Group of the Committee on Disarmament since its inception three years ago. A Canadian technical expert has been made available to the Canadian Delegation in Geneva for brief periods. Henceforth it will be possible to provide an expert for longer periods as and when warranted, thereby more effectively applying internationally recognized Canadian expertise in defensive measures in the course of negotiations on a treaty banning chemical weapons.

The increase in the Disarmament Fund will be used to assist research and teaching facilities in Canada through contributions and contracts. An initial step already underway is to provide depository libraries in Canada with the documents of the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva for the years 1974-1980, which most are missing, in order that they may have complete sets available to researchers. A second early step will be to increase assistance to research projects, which until now has been a relatively small part of the programme under the Disarmament Fund. As the Fund continues to grow in the next financial year, the programme will include assistance directed to enhancing teaching on arms control and disarmament.

New Initiatives in Arms Control and Disarmament

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, announced new initiatives in arms control and disarmament on July 7, 1982.

The initiatives underline the continuity of Canadian arms control and disarmament policy and reinforce the Government's commitment to the pursuit of verifiable agreements to limit and reduce forces. They are directly related to two specific Canadian priorities: to promote the realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty; and to assist in the preparation of a chemical weapons convention. They also include a substantial increase in the Disarmament Fund of the Department of External Affairs. This increase will permit a broadening of research and public information activities which have formed an important part of Canadian policy and

which have been a response to the recommendations in the Final Document of the first U.N. Special Session on Disarmament.

In the balance of the current financial year, which ends March 31, 1983, a total of \$300,000 has been allocated in addition to the existing Disarmament Fund of \$150,000. There will be a further substantial increase in the next financial year.

Part of the international verification provisions of a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) will be an International Seismic Data Exchange. Canada has been playing an active role for the past six years in the development of the exchange carried out in the Ad Hoc Group on Seismological Experts under the aegis of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Some countries are

The SSEA on UNSSOD II and Canadian ACD priorities

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Mark MacGuigan, in his keynote address to the 25th Anniversary Commemorative Meeting of the Pugwash Movement at Pugwash, Nova Scotia on July 16, 1982, spoke of the second UN Special Session on Disarmament. Highlighting the active Canadian role at UNSSOD II, he underlined the importance Canada attaches to giving an impetus to the negotiating process through the policy of stabilization which Prime Minister Trudeau had proposed. Dr. MacGuigan also drew attention to Canada's traditional role as Chairman of the Barton Group, the consultative body of like-minded Western countries and to Canada's key contribution in promoting agreement on a world disarmament campaign.

"Canadian statements in the working groups and the Committee of the Whole underlined Canada's flexibility and desire to search for consensus language on such agenda items as a comprehensive program of disarmament, enhancement of the effectiveness of disarmament machinery, and a world disarmament campaign. It was a Canadian informal paper which formed the basis of deliberations on a world disarmament campaign, and sustained Canadian efforts played no small part in the consensus achieved on the conduct of the campaign. Canada was also active in its traditional role of chairman of the Barton Group, the informal consultative body of twenty like-minded Western countries...."

"Although the second Special Session on Disarmament did not achieve all that many people and governments hoped for, it did serve to focus attention on the crucial and often complex arms control and disarmament issues of our time. It also served, I believe, to underline the extent to which an exceedingly heavy responsibility rests with those countries which have embarked on serious arms control negotiations...."

Dr. MacGuigan outlined Canadian views on current negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons and described the new draft treaty tabled at the Vienna talks on reducing conventional forces in Europe. He stressed the high priority Canada attaches to an agreement on chemical weapons. In addition to referring to the new initiatives on arms control and disarmament which he announced on July 7, Dr. MacGuigan spoke of Canada's non-proliferation policy and of the expanding role in verification, "one of

the most significant factors in disarmament negotiations in the 1980's".

"...individuals with expertise and non-governmental organizations also have a vital role to play not only in achieving greater public understanding but also in ensuring that all available expertise is applied to this increasingly complex subject. Since World War II Canada has attached special importance to the development of international verification mechanisms. In recent years the Government has drawn on technical expertise in a number of departments. Further steps are being taken at the present time..."

"Within our research and public information program, established after UNSSOD I and substantially increased in size this year, we intend to put special emphasis in the coming year on research projects related to verification by Canadian universities, institutes and individuals.

"We will also institutionalize an expanding Canadian role in verification issues in order to utilize effectively expertise in several government departments and in the private sector in the negotiation of agreements on nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons systems. I am referring in particular to expertise in seismology, nuclear safeguards, remote sensing, toxicology and protective measures against chemical weapons, and communication satellites..."

Dr. MacGuigan concluded his speech with a call to Pugwash members to promote better understanding of arms control and disarmament issues:

"Part of the educational task of the Movement is, I believe, to increase public understanding that to attain peace and human survival one must seek to limit and reduce all weapons systems. It would be a tragedy if a result of the understandable and justifiable public concern about nuclear weapons were to make non-nuclear war more likely. Your business and the business of governments must continue to be the promotion of steps which reduce the likelihood of the use of force — the use of any weapons system..."

"I have no quarrel with those who wish to alert our peoples to the potential horrors of a nuclear war. The objective they seek, a world safe from the threat of a nuclear conflict, is the same goal which the Canadian Government pursues by every means at its disposal. We are not always in agreement,

however, on how this end can best be achieved. To explain complex negotiating positions to the general public can be exceedingly difficult. Simple declaratory statements are fairly easy to grasp but the potential negative implications for our overall objective — peace and security — are seldom self-evident. Moreover, in my experience, efforts to describe them can often be misunderstood. I very much hope that the Pugwash Movement will play its part, for which it is so eminently suited, in explaining that facile declaratory measures are no substitute for the negotiation of equitable and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements."

"The easy response to the current tensions of the international situation is to argue that only disarmament or only defence fundamentally matters. However, to insist that only one or the other can enhance security and preserve peace is to misunderstand the basic components of security policy. The realistic position is to recognize that disarmament and defence complement and support each other. Our challenge as responsible internationalists is to search for and discover new approaches to a balanced security policy which will both maintain our dedication to our ideals and enable us to move towards a realizable possibility of world peace."

(The complete text is available in the "Statements and Speeches" Series issued by Domestic Information Programs Division of the Department of External Affairs)

World Disarmament Campaign Launched

"World Campaign Reborn" was the way the *Disarmament Times* put it on July 19. Delegates called it "nothing short of a miracle", and singled out Canada as playing a leading role in the successful outcome of a text on the World Disarmament Campaign (WDC) launched at UNSSOD II. Perhaps it was a miracle; more likely it was dogged determination and a spirit of compromise on all sides that enabled a consensus to be achieved.

It was a comprehensive Canadian paper on WDC that focussed discussion in Working Group III of UNSSOD II, and pointed the way to a set of guidelines for a campaign under U.N. auspices that can be effective in all parts of the world. The WDC text is one of the only substantive agreed documents to emerge from the three working groups of the

Special Session.

The guidelines for WDC state that the campaign should be carried out in all regions in a balanced, factual and objective manner, should provide an opportunity for discussion and debate in all countries on all points of view relating to disarmament issues, objectives and conditions, and recognize the respective roles of the U.N. system, member states and non-governmental organizations in the Campaign. Another major Canadian objective was embodied in the WDC text, namely the inclusion of a review mechanism whereby the effectiveness of the Campaign can be examined periodically. In the Canadian statement to UNSSOD II on WDC on June 23 the Canadian representative said with regard to the importance of ensuring universality, balance and objectivity: "Canada is strongly of the view that this Special Session should provide for a review mechanism to assist member governments and the Centre for Disarmament in meeting this requirement. Canada therefore proposes that the Special Session mandate the Centre for Disarmament to make a detailed annual report on disarmament information, education and research activities in the U.N. system for consideration by the First Committee." This Canadian proposal is reflected in the WDC text adopted by UNSSOD II.

The WDC text also recognizes the central guidance role of the Centre for Disarmament within the U.N. system for WDC activities as advocated in the Canadian statement. Canada also urged recognition for the major role NGO's have to play in the Campaign: "It is Canada's view that this Special Session should encourage the efforts of all participants in the Campaign by formally recognizing in whatever wording it produces on this subject the important part Member States and non-governmental organizations, as well as the U.N. system, have to play in it."

Bilateral and Multilateral ACD Fora

Apart from Canada's arms control and disarmament activities in the United Nations, it also participates actively in other international fora to encourage greater progress in this field. Having advocated a continuation of the SALT/START process, Canada is encouraged that the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks began in Geneva on June 29, 1982. In these talks, the US made an initial proposal to reduce in a first phase the overall number of ballistic missile warheads by at least one-

third below current levels with no more than half of these warheads deployed on land-based missiles. In a second phase the United States will seek equal ceilings on ballistic missile throw-weight, that is, the payload a missile can carry to a target.

The Soviet side has called for an interim freeze on strategic nuclear weapons to coincide with the beginning of the negotiations without making it a precondition. The US and the USSR seem to agree on the principle of seeking major reductions. It is encouraging that both sides have stated that they could respect the main provisions of the unratified SALT II Agreement while the negotiations proceed.

Canada has been a strong proponent of the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) talks which began earlier this year. Since the NATO Ministerial meeting of December 1979, Canada has supported the "two track" decision to plan to deploy, starting in late 1983, Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles and at the same time to engage the Soviet Union in negotiations with the aim of setting limits on the INF of both sides at the lowest possible level. The maintenance of the resolve of the allied governments to improve NATO's INF capabilities in order to counter the threat posed by the Soviet mobile, triple warhead SS-20 missile, if the negotiations should fail to reduce that threat, is considered essential to provide an inducement for the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously on mutual constraints.

The "two-track" policy of NATO was undoubtedly the main factor in bringing the Soviet Union to the negotiating table in Geneva last November. Draft treaties have now been tabled by both sides. The US position, which was worked out in consultation with its allies, including Canada, is based on the "zero-level" proposal, under which no Pershing II or cruise missiles would be deployed if the Soviet Union agreed to dismantle its SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. The Soviet Union, starting from a claim of current equality in INF in Europe based on what is considered to be a distorted comparison of the delivery systems of the two sides, is seeking equal reductions from existing levels that would leave a preponderance of Soviet SS-20 missiles in place with no new INF on the NATO side.

Within the North Atlantic Alliance, Canada has promoted progress towards arms control and disarmament. (See article on SSEA address to NAC in the February 1982 Disarmament Bulletin.) On June 10, 1982 the Alliance issued a document on

arms control and disarmament calling for progress in the INF, START and MBFR talks as well as in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Alliance also reaffirmed its commitment to efforts to promote stable peace on a global scale:

— "In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the Allies will actively pursue efforts to obtain equitable and verifiable agreements including a total ban on chemical weapons.

— "In the Second Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly ... we trust that new impetus will be given to negotiations current and in prospect, especially by promoting military openness and verification, that the need for strict observance of the principle of renunciation of force enshrined in the United Nations Charter will be reaffirmed and that compliance with existing agreements will be strengthened."

In the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in which Canada is a direct participant, the West tabled a proposal on July 8, 1982 for a new negotiating position. The draft treaty, which makes substantial concessions to the Eastern side, is aimed at injecting new life into these negotiations.

The West has proposed that in a single agreement (as contrasted with the two sequential agreements proposed previously) all direct participants — that is, all countries having troops in the area of reductions — will undertake a binding obligation to reduce to a common collective ceiling on each side of approximately 700,000 ground force manpower and 900,000 ground and air forces combined. These reductions would be in four stages over a period of six years, with the United States and the Soviet Union withdrawing 13,000 and 30,000 troops respectively in the first year after conclusion of the Agreement. Agreement on manpower data remains a pre-condition.

In the Committee on Disarmament, the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva, Canada has been participating in the new Working Group on a Comprehensive Test Ban which is considering verification and compliance measures, and in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Canada is also playing an active role in the discussions on arms control and outer space. In his speech to UNSSOD II the Prime Minister drew attention to the serious gaps in the present international agreements and proposed that an early start be made on a treaty to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in outer space.

In Brief...

...The CIIA looks at ACD Issues

The Canadian Institute of International Affairs has recently focussed considerable attention on arms control and disarmament issues. A CIIA Working Group prepared a report entitled *The Other Road to Security: Canada and Disarmament* with recommendations for Canadian arms control and disarmament policy. The CIIA also conducted a survey of its members on arms control and disarmament. The initial results of the survey appeared as an article in the July/August issue of *International Perspectives*.

...UNAC Annual Conference

The United Nations Association in Canada and the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education sponsored a major conference on disarmament in preparation for UNSSOD II, May 13-16 in Toronto. Speakers included John Kenneth Galbraith; Ambassador Paul C. Warnke, former Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Shridath Ramphal, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth; the Honourable Charles Caccia, M.P., P.C., Minister of Labour; and Inga Thorsson, Swedish Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

...Atlantic Student Pugwash

The Student Pugwash Movement organiz-

ed a successful regional Conference in Halifax, May 28-30, entitled *Science in Society: Where Lies the Future*. The conference brought together sixty students and senior participants for workshops on various subjects. The workshop on "Science and International Security" considered arms control and disarmament issues.

...Safe and Sound

The Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, met with UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar on June 18, 1982 and presented him with English and French copies of the publication "Safe and Sound", a popular version of the important UN study on the relationship between disarmament and development. The writing of this book by the Canadian author Clyde Sanger was financed from the Disarmament Fund of the Canadian Government as a reaffirmation of Canada's commitment to the vital issues of disarmament and development, and to the value of greater public knowledge of these issues.

...Couchiching Conference

The fifty-first annual Couchiching Conference, entitled *The New Cold War: Political and Military Options for East and West* considered disarmament and security questions. A balanced programme of speakers presented various views to

stimulate discussion of the complex arms control and disarmament issues. Participants included Richard V. Allen, former Assistant to President Ronald Reagan for National Security Affairs; S.M. Plekhanov of the Soviet Academy of Science; and Norman Alcock, former Director of the Canadian Peace Research Institute. CBC television provided national coverage of the conference.

...Canada and the NPT

The Domestic Information Programs Division issued a paper on Canada's nuclear non-proliferation policy in its *Canadian Foreign Policy Texts* series. The 22-page paper outlines the evolution of Canadian policy in this field and Canadian safeguards policy. It also comments on the current international situation. Dr. MacGuigan also elaborated on this subject in his Keynote address to the 25th Anniversary Commemorative Meeting of the Pugwash Movement.

...Chemical Warfare Pamphlet

A pamphlet entitled *The Chemical Workers' Report on Chemical Warfare* has been produced by the International Federation of Chemical Energy and General Workers' Unions based in Geneva, Switzerland. The pamphlet provides a succinct overview of the CW issue as it exists today and contains a number of innovative ideas concerning the verification aspects of the issue. A highly readable publication, it is an excellent example of a useful and practical contribution by an NGO to public understanding of a significant and sensitive arms control and disarmament issue. Now in its second printing, the pamphlet can be obtained from the Federation at 48 rue de Moillebeau, P.O. Box 277, 1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland, or through the Canadian Labour Congress in Ottawa.

...Disarmament NGO Directory

The *Peace Unearth Directory* which provides general information about Canadian NGO's involved in peace and development work will soon be available. Copies may be purchased from PEACE UNEARTH, 1483 Pembina Hwy, Winnipeg, Manitoba R3T 2C7.

...Peace and Disarmament Information Centre

An Information Centre for Peace and Disarmament Studies is being established at McGill University. It is intended to be a community oriented information centre aimed at developing a greater awareness and a better understanding of disarmament problems and issues.



Prime Minister Trudeau presents a copy of "Safe and Sound" to UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar.

A REVIEW OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL ACTIVITIES

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SSEA's address to the Committee on Disarmament

On February 1, 1983, Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, addressed the opening plenary of the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. In this, his first major arms control and disarmament speech since becoming Secretary of State for External Affairs last September, he reaffirmed the importance Canada attaches to progress in this field and stressed the importance of mutual security considerations in negotiations in 1983.

"The Government of Canada believes that 1983 must be a crucial year in re-viving the momentum of arms control and disarmament negotiations.

"Just a little over a year ago there were no negotiations on nuclear weapons. Since then, the United States and the Soviet Union have begun negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and more recently have resumed talks on strategic nuclear arms (START). The emphasis not just on limitations but on

reductions is most welcome.

"Recently, there have been signs that the negotiating process is beginning to work. The leaders of both superpowers have publicly reaffirmed their commitment to serious negotiations. Proposals have been made by both sides, some of which have been vigorously promoted in public. A greater sense of urgency appears to be developing. In the meantime, both superpowers continue to agree informally to abide by the main provisions of the SALT agreements....

"An increase in mutual security is the only sound basis for effective arms control and disarmament. As Prime Minister Trudeau stressed at the second UN Special Session on Disarmament, security in today's world cannot be achieved on a purely national basis. Attempts by one side to make gains at the expense of the security of the other ultimately will not work. Security is a matter of weaponry but also of perception and confidence. Action by one side which is perceived by the other to be



Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan J. MacEachen, at the plenary of the Committee on Disarmament.

threatening creates or widens a gulf of suspicion. Action produces reaction, and in the end neither side achieves a long-term gain. Both suffer from the effort and the political relationship is poisoned. Arms control negotiations offer an escape from this danger only if the parties accept as their fundamental objective increased mutual security rather than unilateral advantage. It follows from this that an attempt by any power to develop a policy which assumes that nuclear war can be winnable contributes to mutual insecurity."

The SSEA noted the relevance of the concept of mutual security to the present talks on intermediate nuclear forces (INF).

"The period since November 1981 has been marked by exchanges of concrete proposals. The negotiations have been conducted seriously and have made some progress. Given the underlying need to take into account the legitimate security concerns of both sides, NATO ministers have agreed that this requirement could best be met through the elimination of all existing Soviet and planned United States' missiles in this class. We have also confirmed our earlier decision to begin deploying the missiles (Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles) at the end of 1983, unless there were concrete results from the negotiations. We are willing to give full consideration to any serious Soviet proposals that would enhance the chances for effective and verifiable agreements.

"Recently, the Soviet Union made a proposal concerning possible reductions of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. While the proposal is unacceptable in many respects, it appears to recognize that NATO governments have a legitimate concern about the number of SS-20s aimed at their European member states, and that a reduction is necessary.

"This in itself is progress. However, it is not yet clear both sides have accepted that mutual security must be the basis of the negotiations. That is why 1983 is crucial.

"Canada has a large stake in the INF negotiations. We intend to press vigorously the following basic approach:

- Canada places its full weight behind the negotiations. We strongly support a negotiated solution that will make deployment of the missiles in Europe unnecessary.

- Likewise, in the absence of concrete results in the negotiations, Canada considers that there is no viable alternative to deployment of the missiles.

- Every serious proposal must be

seriously examined. By the same token, propaganda ploys must not be permitted to undermine serious negotiations.

- Statements aimed at public opinion cannot be a substitute for genuine willingness to reach an agreement.

- Increased mutual security must be accepted as the fundamental consideration in the negotiating process."

Mr. MacEachen then focussed on four other Canadian priorities for negotiations in 1983, "where there are prospects for genuine progress and where progress can make a direct contribution to mutual security".

"The pursuit of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is a fundamental nuclear issue before this Committee. We were pleased by the establishment last year of a working group in the Committee on a nuclear test ban, but we were disappointed that, having waited so long for consensus, the Committee did not move quickly to begin substantive work. I urge that this new working group begin to discharge its mandate as a matter of urgency in 1983.

"Another promising avenue is the ad hoc group of seismic experts. Since its inception in 1976, it has been developing an international seismic data exchange system which will be an international verification mechanism forming part of the provisions of an eventual comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.... We are convinced that the early entry into operation of the data exchange would be an effective way to make progress towards the objective of a comprehensive test ban.

"This step-by-step approach can ensure that key elements of a treaty are in place even before the final political commitment to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. This process can develop a momentum toward the conclusion of a treaty and can be complementary to the necessary negotiations among nuclear weapon states.

"I take this opportunity of drawing to the attention of this Committee an equally high Canadian priority for 1983, the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons through the evolution of an effective non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT emphasizes the non-discriminatory transfer of peaceful nuclear technology. It also provides for the de-escalation of the arms race on the part of nuclear weapon states and for the rapid and effective movement towards disarmament. More states have adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, such voluntary renunciation has not been matched by corresponding action by the nuclear weapon states to halt the build-

up of nuclear weapons. Only tangible moves by the superpowers will demonstrate the sincerity of their commitment to non-proliferation. Those of us with nuclear technology and those without must seek to persuade the nuclear weapon states to live up to their bargain to which they are committed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

"Canada is prepared to seek international consensus on the development of principles which would result in a more universal and effective approach to non-proliferation. Such principles should include a formal renunciation of nuclear explosive devices and an agreement to permit the safeguarding of all nuclear activities throughout the entire range of the nuclear fuel cycle. This is fundamental to the creation of a stable and permanent non-proliferation régime. Under such conditions, bilateral nuclear commitments could then be subsumed into a truly equitable and responsible international order....

"Arms control and disarmament also must extend to non-nuclear weapon systems, some of which are as potentially horrifying as nuclear weapons.

"The time is right for progress this year towards a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks. We intend to participate vigorously along with others in seeking to realize the maximum from the present opportunity.

"Continuing Canadian research on defensive measures enables us to put forward suggestions on such aspects as the verification provisions of a treaty banning chemical weapons. Canada has contributed working papers. We have allocated funds to enable Canadian technical experts to participate here in Geneva for longer periods beginning with the 1983 session. Expertise from many countries, including non-members, has been brought to bear in this Committee on the complex issues involved. The achievements of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons again illustrate that work in this body can complement bilateral negotiations.

"...Another area for progress is the subject of weapons for use in outer space. This issue has been described as the first arms control problem of the twenty-first century. I urge the Committee to begin as soon as possible its essential task of defining legal and other issues necessary to build upon the outer space legal régime Canada contributed to this objective in a working paper tabled here last summer. Verification is likely to loom large, as i

does for a nuclear test ban and a chemical weapons ban. The expanding programme of verification research in Canada will seek to identify possible solutions. We intend to participate actively in this work. It is the view of my Government that it is time to establish a working group on this subject....

"Recent years have not been propitious for negotiations on arms control and disarmament. Yet the process has continued and is again beginning to show hopeful signs. Public statements by world leaders have underlined that the arms spiral is a major world-wide danger and that the negotiation of arms control and disarmament agreements is vital. There is room for optimism if arms control and disarmament negotiations are based on realism. Mutual security is our common goal."

(The complete text of the speech is available in the "Statements and Speeches" series issued by the Domestic Information Programs Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0G2.)

Committee on Disarmament

The Committee on Disarmament (CD) resumed its 1982 session under the cloud of the limited success achieved at the second UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II). It met from August 3 to September 17, 1982.

A Canadian priority in the CD is the chemical weapons issue. Canada continued to play a leading role in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons (CW) which resumed its work on July 20. Dr. Mervin Hamblin, Director, Defence Sciences Division, Defence Research Establishment in Suffield, Alberta is co-ordinator of the Western CW Experts in the Working Group. As well, Canada tabled a working paper on "A Proposed Verification Organization for a Chemical Weapons Convention" (CD Document CD/313 of 16 August 1982). The paper proposes an organization which combines the national and international aspects of CW verification in a manner of application which is fair, simple, reciprocal and non-discriminatory in nature. It outlines three complementary agencies comprising international and national elements to verify compliance with the terms of the convention dealing with (a) the initial declarations of states regarding the amounts and types of CW holdings; (b) the destruction of chemical stocks and production facilities; and (c) the total and general prohibition of development, production and

stockpiling of such weapons. The paper goes on to describe the functions of the agencies, which could be entitled: (i) an International Consultative Committee (ICC); (ii) an International Verification Agency (IVA); and (iii) National Implementation Authorities (NIA).

In the nuclear field, Canada played an active role both in debates and behind-the-scenes efforts at consensus-building to achieve progress on verification provisions for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, another Canadian priority. Since the Seismic Group was established in 1976, Mr. P.W. Basham of the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources has been an active participant in its work.

Canada's Ambassador to the CD, Mr. D.S. McPhail said on August 3, 1982: "The threat of an arms race in outer space has concerned the international community for some time. Indeed, the United Nations General Assembly has acknowledged the Committee on Disarmament's responsibility to deal with this subject. As a beginning, we believe that the Committee should attempt to define the dimensions of this problem."

To this end, Canada submitted a working paper on "Arms Control and Outer Space", on August 31, 1982, (CD document CD/320 of August 26, 1982). Mr. Gerald Skinner, Counsellor of the Canadian Permanent Mission in Geneva made the following introductory comments: "...a good amount of useful work can be undertaken in preparation for substantive negotiations. For example, an inventory of background material relevant to outer space is essential. There are a number of treaties, both multilateral and bilateral, which have served to attempt to reserve



Ambassador D.S. McPhail

the 'use of outer space for peaceful purposes'. In addition to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty there is the 1983 Partial Test-Ban Treaty, certain aspects of SALT I and SALT II, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and multilateral treaties such as the 1979 Moon Treaty, all of which have a certain significance in this regard. A compendium of relevant portions of these and other aspects of space law, drawn up in a fashion similar to that used by the experts in United Nations document A/AC.206/14 on the implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency would, in our view, be useful indeed.

"There is a considerable scope, in these preliminary stages, for dealing with other essential and basic matters such as definitions, for it must be recognized at the outset that if we are to proceed in this Committee we must do so on the basis of a common and understood language.... Among other things, the paper presents the dangers in attempting to categorize space systems in a rigid manner — that is, some systems might lend themselves to categorization; most however, have characteristics which, depending upon the situation, can be either stabilizing or destabilizing."

CD Documents for Depository Libraries

As an initial step to assist research and teaching facilities in Canada, the Department of External Affairs provided interested university depository libraries in Canada with documents of the multilateral negotiating body in Geneva for the years 1974-1980. The documents include working papers and the minutes ("provisional verbatims") of the 40 member Committee on Disarmament (1979 and 1980) and its predecessor, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1974 to 1978).

Libraries at the University of British Columbia, University of Saskatchewan, University of Toronto, University of New Brunswick and Dalhousie University were the first recipients of the documents provided through the Disarmament Fund of the Department of External Affairs (see September 1982 issue of the *Bulletin*).

The documents will assist Canadian researchers to analyze the issues involved in recent efforts to reach arms control and disarmament agreements on various categories of weapons. It is hoped that the resulting greater knowledge will eventually result in new approaches and initiatives being proposed.

XXXVII United Nations General Assembly: Little Real Dialogue

Although there were markedly more disarmament resolutions passed by the 37th UNGA than at previous sessions, this was more an index of decreased dialogue among the political groupings than greater activity or accomplishment. With a discouragingly greater frequency, the East, West and Non-Aligned member states promoted their own resolutions on the same subject, rather than attempting to reach compromise positions. Canada will be attempting, in consultation with others, to arrest this trend and encourage a more intensive search for common positions acceptable to all states.

In the keynote Canadian intervention to the General Assembly the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, spoke about arms control and disarmament in the following terms:

"In recent years, the breakdown of détente and an increasing anxiety over the unpredictability of events have fuelled public fears of nuclear war. Our peoples fear that everything is at risk: the economic and technological systems which sustain us, the political and social systems which underpin them, and the very biosphere which permits the exist-

ence of life itself.

"The world had high hopes for the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament. When the Session ended without having reached final agreement on a comprehensive program of disarmament, there was much disappointment and frustration. However, a disservice is done to the Special Session, and to the UN as an institution, if it is simply dismissed as a failure. Of course the results were disappointing. But then, the expectations of many were probably unrealistically high given the prevailing international climate. Moreover, in this climate, it is essential that the campaign for nuclear disarmament be waged at the negotiating table. My country strongly supports the present negotiations in Geneva to limit and reduce the level of nuclear arms.

"Canada has chosen to contribute to the arms control and disarmament process by concentrating on the vital issue of verification. We are doing this through participating in the international seismic data exchange and by substantially increasing research in verification. I would appeal to other member states to consider how their particular circumstances and re-

sources might be drawn upon to contribute to the arms control process. It is basically the same question as with development: given the need for selectivity, what can you contribute?"

The Canadian Delegation to the First Committee headed by J. Alan Beesley, Ambassador for Disarmament, was very active in the Committee and in the Barton Group, which is traditionally chaired by Canada. Canada cosponsored resolutions on a number of key issues, including: the Swedish approach to reducing military budgets; a comprehensive test ban; a proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency; arms control related to outer space; a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; institutional arrangements for disarmament; allegations of use of chemical weapons; and the negotiation of a complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

In his intervention during general debate in the First Committee Ambassador Beesley referred to the crucial importance of the INF and START negotiations and outlined Canada's position on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and on the essential aspect of verification by an international seismic data exchange. He went on to remind the Committee of Canada's approach to nuclear issues:

"At the second Special Session, Prime Minister Trudeau proposed a policy of stabilization which, he said, had two complementary components: the suffocation strategy which seeks to inhibit the development of new weapons systems, and our negotiating approach aimed at qualitative and quantitative reductions in nuclear arsenals designed to achieve a stable nuclear balance at lower levels.

"This is what we mean by 'freeze'; the halt of the technological momentum of the arms race should be accomplished by freezing at the initial or testing stage of the development of new weapons systems and the number of nuclear arms should be frozen at lower levels. Here it is necessary to make two points. This approach cannot be applied unilaterally; it envisages concrete negotiations between nuclear powers. Second, we note that a number of other kinds of proposals for freeze have already been put forward. Many suffer from the same fundamental flaw; not being verifiable, they do not contribute to creating the conditions of stability we all seek."

In light of this, Canada was unable to support the various freeze resolutions voted on at UNGA 37. In contrast to the Canadian approach to halting the technological momentum through the negotia-



Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs Allan J. MacEachen addressing the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Disarmament Resolutions at UNGA XXXVII

(Canadian votes are underlined)

Resolution Number	Resolution	Vote (Yes/No/Abst)
37/70	Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race	consensus
37/71	Treaty of Tlatelolco	<u>136-0-7</u>
37/72	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NNA)	<u>124-2-19</u>
37/73	*Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (West)	<u>111-1-35</u>
37/74A	Denuclearization of Africa	<u>134-0-13</u>
37/74B	South African Nuclear Capability	<u>132-4-11</u>
37/75	Nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East	consensus
37/76	Nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	<u>99-2-45</u>
37/77A	New Weapons of Mass Destruction	<u>119-0-26</u>
37/77B	Science and Technology for Military Purposes	<u>114-10-17</u>
37/78A	START/INF Talks	<u>114-1-32</u>
37/78C	Nuclear Weapons in All Aspects	<u>118-19-9</u>
37/78D	Disarmament Week	consensus
37/78E	Enhanced Radiation (Neutron) Weapon	<u>81-14-52</u>
37/78F	UNSSOD I Implementation	<u>134-0-12</u>
37/78G	Selected requests to the Committee on Disarmament (NNA)	<u>131-0-17</u>
37/78H	Report of the Disarmament Commission	consensus
37/78I	Prevention of Nuclear War	<u>130-0-17</u>
37/78J	Non-First Use of Nuclear Weapons	<u>112-19-15</u>
37/78K	*International Satellite Monitoring Agency	<u>126-9-11</u>
37/79	UN Conference on Excessively Injurious Conventional Weapons	consensus
37/80	Negative Security Assurances (East)	<u>108-17-19</u>
37/81	Negative Security Assurances (Pakistan)	<u>144-0-3</u>
37/82	Israeli Nuclear Armament	<u>106-2-34</u>
37/83	Outer Space (NNA)	<u>138-1-7</u>
37/84	Disarmament and Development	<u>136-0-10</u>
37/85	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (East)	<u>115-5-25</u>
37/95A	Reduction of Military Budgets (Romania)	consensus
37/95B	*Reduction of Military Budgets (Sweden)	<u>96-13-9</u>
37/96	Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	consensus
37/97	World Disarmament Conference	consensus
37/98A	Chemical Weapons	<u>95-1-46</u>
37/98B	*Convention banning chemical weapons	consensus
37/98C	Strengthening of BW Convention	<u>124-15-1</u>
37/98D	1925 Geneva Protocol — Verification Mechanism	<u>86-19-33</u>
37/98E	*Experts Group's Report on Chemical Weapons Use	<u>83-22-33</u>
37/99A	Non-Stationing of Nuclear Weapons	<u>70-18-51</u>
37/99B	Palme Commission Report	consensus
37/99C	Radiological Weapons	consensus
37/99D	*Outer Space (Western)	<u>112-0-29</u>
37/99E	*Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes	<u>121-0-22</u>
37/99F	Nuclear-weapon-free Zones	<u>141-1-2</u>
37/99G	Objective Information on Military Capabilities	<u>121-0-17</u>
37/99H	Seabed Treaty Review Conference	consensus
37/99I	*ENMOD Treaty Review Conference	<u>135-0-7</u>
37/99J	Military Research and Development	<u>137-0-8</u>
37/99K	*Institutional Arrangements Relating to Disarmament	consensus
37/100A	Nuclear Arms Freeze	<u>122-16-6</u>
37/100B	Nuclear Arms Freeze	<u>119-17-5</u>
37/100C	Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons	<u>117-17-8</u>
37/100D	Confidence Building Measures	consensus
37/100E	Disarmament and International Security	<u>115-0-28</u>
37/100F	Regional Disarmament	consensus
37/100G	UN Disarmament Fellowships	consensus
37/100H	World Disarmament Campaign (East)	<u>108-0-33</u>
37/100I	World Disarmament Campaign (NNA)	consensus
37/100J	World Disarmament Campaign (West)	consensus

*Co-sponsored by Canada

NNA indicates neutral and non-aligned

tion by the nuclear powers of a number of separate verifiable agreements, the resolutions called for a "package" approach which would be neither practical nor realistic. Furthermore, an immediate global freeze would have the disadvantage of acting as a disincentive to negotiations on reductions of existing arsenals.

The Canadian Delegation was pleased that it was able to table in cooperation with the Polish Delegation, a consensus resolution on the prohibition of chemical weapons (CW). Canada interprets this as a strong encouragement to the Committee on Disarmament where Canada will be doing its utmost to have the Committee make a significant advance in the negotiation of a comprehensive prohibition.

Another source of satisfaction was the passage of a resolution designed to provide a verification mechanism for the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans the use of CW and biological weapons (BW) in war. The recurrent reports of the use of CW and/or BW in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan have raised the level of mistrust and have demonstrated the importance of verification provisions — lacking in the Geneva Protocol — in any arms control and disarmament agreement. The resolution requests the UN Secretary General to investigate information brought to his attention about activities which may constitute violation of the Protocol and requests that a number of arrangements be made in advance to facilitate such an investigation.

Also noteworthy were some of the decisions taken by consensus on institutional arrangements relating to disarmament. For example, the UN Disarmament Centre became the Department for Disarmament Affairs with its head reporting directly to the UN Secretary General, possibly pointing to a more active role for the UN Secretariat in disarmament. The resolution also put the UN Institute for Disarmament Research on a permanent footing.


The high number of resolutions introduced in the Committee is a reflection of the intense interest in disarmament of peoples in all states, just as the decrease in meaningful dialogue reflects the poor state of East-West relations. This expression of interest and concern may assist in spurring on the USSR and the USA to greater efforts in the INF and START negotiations. As Ambassador Beesley said in the First Committee: "...our interest in their success is fundamental and, indeed, progress in talks on nuclear issues is in the interests of all, because all will be affected by their results and not only the parties directly concerned."

Canada's new Ambassador for Disarmament

The Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, announced on October 21 that J. Alan Beesley, Q.C. has been appointed Ambassador for Disarmament. Mr. Beesley, who will reside in New York, is replacing Mr. Arthur Menzies who has retired. In the course of his career, Ambassador Beesley has been involved with arms control and disarmament issues relating to non-proliferation and the military uses of the seabed.

The establishment of the position of Ambassador for Disarmament, announced in the Speech from the Throne two years ago, reflects the importance the Government attaches to international efforts to negotiate verifiable agreements on arms control and disarmament. As Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Beesley will represent Canada at certain international meetings concerned with arms control and disarmament including the First Committee of the UN General Assembly and the UN Disarmament Commission. He will also be the chief liaison point for Canadian non-government organizations and individuals outside of Government interested in arms control and disarmament. In this capacity he will undertake speaking engagements across Canada to explain Canadian positions on arms control and disarmament and the work of international forums in which he represents Canada.

Ambassador Beesley, originally from British Columbia, joined External Affairs in 1956, after practising law for five years. His previous ambassadorial posts include Austria, with accreditation as



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley

Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and as High Commissioner to Australia with accreditation to Papua, New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. In Ottawa he has been Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and has served twice as Legal Advisor to the Department. He has also been Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for External Affairs on the Law of the Sea. He held the post of Canadian Ambassador to the Law of the Sea Conference in New York, until the Signing Ceremony in December 1982.

Disarmament Week — October 24-30, 1982

UN Disarmament Fact Sheet 24, Disarmament Week, states that the main aim of activities during the Disarmament Week "should be to increase the flow of objective, factual knowledge about the armaments situation to a wider public audience and to create an informed public opinion in favour of disarmament." In the words of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the public "must be actively interested in current negotiations, if they are to produce results."

Of the various roles for participants in Disarmament Week activities, "Governments might consider supplying information to the public about their own policies and initiatives relating to efforts to end the arms race. Governments could

also use the occasion of Disarmament Week to give prominence to official policies and programmes relating to disarmament goals, for example, through statements reaffirming support for the disarmament objective." Non-governmental organizations could generate involvement and participation by the public "through a variety of programmes and activities including publications, seminars, conferences, meetings, film shows, photo and art exhibits and public rallies. Non-governmental organizations and concerned individuals could furthermore encourage governments to implement the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly as expressed, foremost, in the Final Document of the first special

session devoted to disarmament."

The Government participated actively in Disarmament Week activities. The Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, issued a special statement on the occasion of Disarmament Week. The Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. J. Alan Beesley, was the main speaker at an interschool conference, "Thinking and Deciding in the Nuclear Age", organized by the Toronto Board of Education. Mr. D.L.B. Hamlin, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, spoke to the Canadian Study Group on Arms Control and Disarmament in Toronto during Disarmament Week, while Mr. B.J. Cherkasky of the Division was the keynote speaker at the 31st International Peace Garden Conference at Boissevain, Manitoba. Department of External Affairs and Department of National Defence representatives also participated in various other activities. Copies of the *Disarmament Bulletin* and Statements and Speeches on arms control and disarmament issues were provided to interested groups and a contribution of \$4,000 was made to Project Ploughshares and World Conference on Religion for Peace, (Canada) for their joint national programme of activities which included speakers, public displays, film and slide showings. Speakers included Ms. Swadesh Rana and Mr. Proslav Davinic of the UN Centre for Disarmament; Mr. Linus Pauling, Nobel Peace Laureate; Dr. Norman Alcock, founder of the former Canadian Peace Research Institute; and the Rt. Rev. Clarke MacDonald, Moderator of the United Church of Canada. Many other groups, contributed to the success of the events and activities held during Disarmament Week across the country.

(United Nations *Disarmament Fact Sheets* may be obtained from the United Nations Association in Canada, Suite 808, 63 Sparks Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5A6.)

The CSCE and Disarmament

Most people think of the Madrid Meeting of the CSCE, which began on November 11, 1980, as being concerned exclusively with human rights.

In fact a large part of its work concerns setting the terms of reference for a Conference on Confidence — and Security — Building Measures (CSBMs) and Disarmament in Europe. The purpose of the first stage is to promote greater openness and thereby prevent surprise

attack by the massive military forces which exist in Europe and to make it more difficult to use military forces for the purpose of exerting political pressure. When it was established that the CSBMs were being satisfactorily observed, a second stage of the conference would deal with disarmament.

As of the end of the sixth session of the Madrid Meeting on December 17, 1982, new proposals had been submitted by both the Eastern and the Western sides to deal with the crucial question of the area of applicability of the CSBMs — the only major issue still outstanding but also the most difficult. The Madrid Meeting is to resume its work on February 8 in what may prove to be the final session.

SSEA Disarmament Week Statement

On the Occasion of Disarmament Week, October 24-30, 1982 the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, made the following statement:

"Disarmament Week is observed in many ways throughout the world. I am pleased that in Canada activities coast-to-coast, organized by community groups, non-governmental organizations and individuals, will not only reflect the growing concern of many Canadians about the arms race but also help to underline the vital role which arms control and disarmament negotiations play in promoting the more secure world we all desire.

"A year ago there were no negotiations on nuclear weapons. Since then the United States and the Soviet Union have begun negotiations on intermediate range nuclear forces and have resumed the process of talks on strategic arms. The emphasis not just on limitations but on reductions is one Canada welcomes, recognizing the complexities involved in arriving at balanced and verifiable agreements. In the case of another category of weapons of special interest to Canada — chemical weapons — the prospects for progress toward a ban in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva are greater today than a year ago. Also, recent proposals at the nine-year old talks in Vienna on reducing conventional forces in Europe hold out the possibility of progress toward agreement.

"The past year has seen greatly increased activity in the deliberative bodies at the United Nations, particularly in the First Committee of the General Assembly and the second Special Session on Disarmament. Canada could not but share the

disappointment of other countries that its ambitious agenda could not be realized. Yet the Special Session did focus the attention of many world leaders on arms control and disarmament issues. Equally important, it led to greater public discussion and understanding of the issues involved, of what has been accomplished in the past and of how much remains to be done. Prior to and during the Special Session, Canada devoted particular efforts to the promotion of public awareness. For example, the extensive hearings on security and disarmament in the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence led to a report which will be a valuable continuing reference, a record of a wide spectrum of Canadian views....

"Disarmament Week, initiated in 1978 by the United Nations, underlines the challenge facing governments and non-governmental organizations: the promotion of greater public awareness and understanding of the importance of negotiating verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements."

Disarmament and Development

Following are excerpts from the Canadian Government's comments which were submitted to the UN Secretary-General on April 28, 1982 on the UN Study on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development:

"The main value of this study is, in Canada's view, that it has emphasized the economic motivation for disarmament. It has added another nail to the coffin of the myth that military expenditures are of net benefit to society. It is now generally accepted that the same expenditures, if devoted to non-military purposes, would produce increased benefits both in material wealth and in employment....

"This message, however, is only one of the means to an end, that end being a revolution in man's behaviour which, from the beginning of history, has been to search for security through armaments. Security is man's common goal, as it should be, but in its attainment, it has become another man's — or state's — insecurity.

"However, the level of a state's security must be the main criterion against which efforts for disarmament must be measured, not its level of economic gain. The economic well-being of a state is indeed one aspect of its security, and there has begun to develop a much wider view of how improved international economic cooperation for development could contribute to security and gradually reduce

tensions.

"But security is still seen mainly in terms of military strength. It is Canada's view that security must also be sought after by means of negotiating specific and verifiable agreements to control and/or reduce the level of armaments. If an undiminished level of international security can be attained at lower levels of armaments and expenditures, the minimum objective of disarmament can be said to be achieved. The economic benefits of such an achievement would be immense, as this study well shows. Security, however, is the touchstone.

"...Generally speaking, Canada is pleased with the report, and is satisfied at having participated in the study, both by financing two research projects, and by being represented on the Group of Inter-governmental Experts...."

Recommendation No. 1: *"...all Governments ... particularly those of the major military powers, should prepare assessments of the nature and magnitude of the short and long-term economic and social costs attributable to their military preparations so that their general public be informed of them."*

"Both research projects financed by the Canadian Government for the Study are related to this recommendation, and one of them ("The Utilization of Resources for Military Purposes in Canada and the Impact on Canadian Industrialization and Defence Procurement") is directly related to it. It is the Canadian Government's view that such research projects done by someone having no connection with the Government or with activities which might be construed as being "anti-disarmament", is likely to be viewed with fewer reservations than one prepared by the Government itself. This project, and the popular version of the final report, should serve to inform the Canadian public of the short and long-term economic and social costs attributable to Canadian military activities, as is recommended.

"Annually, the Canadian Department of National Defence presents estimates of the following year's expenditures, and the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence of the House of Commons has an opportunity to question the Minister of National Defence, in a number of public hearings, on any aspect of the estimates it wishes. In addition, the Department of National Defence publishes a detailed annual report of its operations, command structure and activities, all its significant programmes, and a summary of its estimates and expenditures. A detailed account of its

expenditures is published in the Public Accounts of Canada, which is reviewed in detail, also in public hearings, by the Public Accounts Committee. Both the estimates and expenditures are published and available to the public.

"The Canadian authorities will be interested in learning what the Soviet Government and other Warsaw Pact governments tell their publics about the costs of their military activities."

Recommendation No. 3: *"In order to fill ... major gaps in the existing data, the Group therefore recommends a fuller and more systematic compilation and dissemination by Governments of data on the military use of human and material resources and military transfers...."*

"The Canadian Government wholeheartedly supports the spirit and the letter of this recommendation, and can point to concrete action on its part as proof of this support. Each year detailed information is published concerning Canada's military expenditures. It would be difficult for a foreign country to use the low degree of secrecy which exists in the Canadian defence budgetary area as a pretext for its own arms build-up.

"Believing that efforts to reach effective and verifiable agreements on the multilateral reduction of military budgets could bear fruit if sufficient statistics from all countries were available, Canada supported the UN studies in this area. From the first test run onwards, the Canadian Department of National Defence has expended considerable effort to adapt its cost figures to fit the format of the reporting instrument developed by the UN Group of Experts conducting the study. However, the Canadian Government has been disappointed, although not surprised, that not one country from the Warsaw Pact has apparently made any effort to shed more light on its military accounts for international examination. In the light of past calls from the Soviet Union to reduce military budgets, it is therefore difficult to view these calls as anything more than empty gestures for propaganda effect. These calls appear all the more hypocritical when judged against estimates of Soviet expenditures by recognized neutral and objective organizations such as SIPRI, estimates which show a steady increase in military expenditures during the 1970s, whereas some significant Western states' defence budgets actually decreased. The Warsaw Pact Organization's total military spending is estimated as having increased, from 1971 to 1980, by 16.3 per cent, whereas NATO's increase over an equivalent

period was 3.6 per cent.

"Therefore, the Canadian Government sees this recommendation as being directed for the most part to closed societies, particularly those in the Warsaw Pact. For its part, the Canadian Government cannot commit itself to continue indefinitely completing the UN reporting system unless it can see that (a) there is some sign of reciprocity from the states of the Warsaw Pact; or (b) the Canadian effort advances in some other way the efforts of the UN and the states which have participated toward effective and verifiable agreements in this area."

Recommendation No. 9: *"...the Department of Public Information and other relevant United Nations organs and agencies, while continuing to emphasize the danger of war — particularly nuclear war — should give increased emphasis in their disarmament-related public information and education activities to the social and economic consequences of the arms race and to the corresponding benefits of disarmament."*

"This recommendation is supported by the Government of Canada. There is a disturbing and long-lasting tendency to view the concept of security in its narrowest sense, and to concentrate on raising the level of military strength without fully realizing the negative effects on social and economic security. It is therefore suggested that, while increasing the emphasis on the social and economic consequences of the arms race, the motive of positive self interest be used by also emphasizing the benefits which would result for those states reducing military expenditures themselves. If these benefits were clear and convincing, there would be more pressure on governments to view security in its larger sense, and to moderate military spending.

"However, if this kind of process is to achieve practical impact in allowing all governments to reduce the priority they now place on military aspects of security, it obviously must be a mutual and balanced process. In this light the Canadian authorities and public would welcome some indication that the message is also being heard directly by the populations of closed societies and that they will be able to influence the priorities of their governments."

In Brief...

...UNAC Briefing Paper

The first of a series of briefing papers planned by the United Nations Association in Canada on topical issues being

discussed in UN fora is about arms control and disarmament negotiations. It provides factual information about existing agreements and current negotiations. It also has a short, but useful, glossary of terms. Copies of this six page paper may be purchased from the United Nations Association in Canada, 63 Sparks Street, Suite 808, Ottawa, Ontario K1P 5A6 (50 cents).

...Special Edition of NATO Review

On the occasion of the Thirty-third anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the magazine NATO REVIEW produced a special edition entitled *Peace and Security: Choosing the Right Way*. The six articles in the Review consider, among others, the question of the future of NATO, the disarmament movement in Alliance countries, détente and East-West arms control issues. The special edition provides an insight into the Alliance approach to arms control and disarmament issues. Copies are available, without charge, from the Domestic Information Division, Department of External Affairs, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0G2.

...Church leaders meet Prime Minister

On December 14, 1982 Prime Minister Trudeau discussed arms control and disarmament issues with six church leaders. At the meeting held at their request, they put forward their concerns, primarily on nuclear issues. The meeting and a subsequent session with Mr. J. Alan Beesley, Ambassador for Disarmament, provided an opportunity to explain Government priorities on the broad range of issues. The six leaders were: Dr. Russel Legge, President of the Canadian Council of Churches; Archbishop Henri Légaré, President of the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops; Archbishop E.W. Scott, Primate of the Anglican Church of Canada; Dr. Robert Binhammer, President of the Lutheran Church in America (Canada Section); Dr. Wayne Smith, Moderator of the Presbyterian Church in Canada; and Dr. Clarke MacDonald, Moderator of the United Church of Canada.

...ACA Bibliography on Verification

The Arms Control Association in the United States, 11 Dupont Circle, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20036, prepared a comprehensive bibliography on arms control and disarmament verification. The bibliography will be useful for researchers considering the complex issue of verification, one of the most significant factors in disarmament negotiations in the 1980's.

Lacking Sept. 1983

Lacking Feb, Sept. 1984

The **Disarmament** Bulletin

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A review of national and international disarmament and arms control activities

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The *Disarmament Bulletin* is published periodically by the Department of External Affairs. It is intended to be a source of information on arms control and disarmament issues to a broad spectrum of Canadians. If you wish to be placed on our mailing list, or need additional copies, please write to:

The Editor, *The Disarmament Bulletin*, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Dept. of External Affairs, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G2

Introduction by the Secretary of State for External Affairs

It is with pleasure that I have agreed to provide this short introductory statement marking the resumption of publication of the *Disarmament Bulletin* by the Department of External Affairs.

I believe the new-look *Disarmament Bulletin* will make a valuable contribution to the discussion of arms control and disarmament issues in Canada both as an important reference document and as a source of information on these questions for a broad spectrum of the Canadian public.

In my view, Canadians want more information on the activities and positions of the Government of Canada on these issues. For this reason, I am pleased that the *Bulletin* will contain a wide variety of information including feature articles, reports on the efforts the Government is making in this area, and excerpts from major statements made by the Prime Minister and Ministers as well as by Canadian representatives to disarmament forums wherein Canada is represented.

The public information role of the *Disarmament Bulletin* cannot be over-stated when one considers the crucial nature of the issues involved — issues that ultimately affect the well-being of all mankind and that must be seriously addressed by all nations. For its part, the Government



of Canada will continue to do all it can to pursue those useful and realistic initiatives that can make positive contributions to on-going efforts in the arms control and disarmament field.

I am pleased to announce the return of the *Disarmament Bulletin* and hope that the readers will find it of value in their discussions and activities.

The Right Honourable Joe Clark
Secretary of State for
External Affairs



Joint Security Declaration Issued Following Canada-U.S. Summit in Quebec City

On March 17th, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney welcomed U.S. President Ronald Reagan to a two-day summit in Quebec City. Their discussions ranged over matters of common concern, including acid rain, trade and international peace and security. The following are excerpts, highlighting defence and arms control, from the joint statement entitled "Declaration by the Prime Minister of Canada and the President of the United States of America regarding International Security" and issued by the two leaders at the end of the summit:

A Commitment

We are neighbours and allies dedicated to the defence and nourishment of peace and freedom. The security of Canada and the United States is inextricably linked.

We have committed ourselves at Quebec to reinvigorate the defence and security partnership between the two countries. To reinforce deterrence and to reduce the risk posed by threat of nuclear attack, we agreed to strengthen continental defence, with particular reference to our joint participation in the North American Aerospace Defence Command. Accordingly, we concluded an agreement to modernize the North American Air Defence Surveillance and Warning System . . .

Full and Regular Consultation

In the spirit of mutual trust and confidence between our countries, we have committed ourselves to consult fully, frankly, and regularly on defence and arms control matters.

To permit systematic consultation and over-all review, at the most senior levels, of arrangements bearing on the security of Canada and the United States, we resolved that the responsible ministers of our governments will meet together on a regular basis. We have also agreed to make greater use of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence . . .

Commitment in Europe

The security of Canada and the United States is inseparable from that of the European members of the North Atlantic alliance. We remain fully dedicated to preserving the security of the alliance as a whole through the maintenance of adequate military strength, an effective deterrent posture, and a stable balance of forces. We attach great importance to our continuing commitment to station Canadian and United States forces in Europe . . .

Significant, equitable, durable and verifiable arms control measures can play a role in strengthening strategic stability, maintaining our security at a lower level of force and armament, building trust and confidence between East and West, and reducing the risk of war. We have agreed to consider joint



Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and U.S. President Ronald Reagan stroll the grounds of the Citadel in Quebec City before the departure of the President to Washington. In the background is the Chateau Frontenac where the President stayed during his visit.

Canapress

research efforts to strengthen our capacity to verify agreements on the control of armaments. We will work to gain agreement on effective measures in the international negotiations in Vienna, Geneva, and Stockholm, and we will strive, with the countries of Europe, to progress towards the aims enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act.

Arms Reduction

We further agreed that we can have no higher goal than the reduction and eventual elimination to the threat to peace, whether by nuclear or conventional means. Our aim is . . . to enhance deterrence of armed aggression and bring about significant arms reductions between East and West. We seek a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms. The prospect of an enhanced ability to deter war based upon an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defences against offensive nuclear arms has prompted the US research effort embodied in the president's Strategic Defence Initiative. We are agreed that this effort is prudent and is in conformity with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty . . .

Dialogue and negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union at Geneva provide a historic opportunity to set East-West relations on a more secure foundation. We hope that these negotiations will lead to major steps toward the prevention of an arms race in space and to terminating it on earth, ultimately and reducing nuclear arms, and, ultimately, eliminating them everywhere.

The security of Canada and the United States is linked increasingly with that of other regions in the world. We will therefore encourage and support the strengthening of multilateral and international mechanisms for the control and peaceful resolution of disputes. We will vigorously oppose the exploitation of regional instability, and promote . . . the social, economic, and political development essential to the achievement of the stable and enduring peace.

Our one truly strategic aim is human freedom in a world at peace.



Peace and Disarmament First Priority in Canadian Foreign Policy

On September 25, 1984, shortly after the new Government assumed office, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, addressed the thirty-ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. The following are excerpts from that address:

"In the nearly four decades since the Second World War, the international community has come to count on Canada as a moderating influence in a world beset by extremes. Our new government is in the mainstream of this tradition, and intends to build on it, consistently and pragmatically.

"We want to ensure that we are using our influence, and defining our interest, in ways which reflect the contemporary challenges facing Canada and the world. As a new government should, we shall undertake a thorough and public review of Canadian foreign policy, aimed at the creative renewal of a moderate and constructive Canadian role in the world. Citizens of Canada, and friends of Canada, will be encouraged to suggest how the Canadian international tradition can best be applied to the increasing tensions and interdependence of the modern world, including those of the nuclear age.

"Mr. President, the frightening facts of

the nuclear arms race are well known. The superpowers are developing new kinds of nuclear weapons; more countries are developing nuclear capacities; and the risk rises that terrorists groups could acquire nuclear devices. Physicians and scientists warn that, even for survivors, the world would be virtually uninhabitable after a major nuclear conflict.

"On these questions, Canada's influence is limited but real. We have no corner on moral authority or technical expertise, but we do enjoy a reputation as a people who are serious about peace and skilled at mediation. Those qualities are critically important in reversing the ominous trends which threaten to unravel arms control. The essential problem today is not moral or technical — neither superpower wants a holocaust; and human ingenuity, which can invent weapons, can devise controls. The problem is political, and this is one of the fora in which we must work together to inch the world away from nuclear devastation.

"Some despair that anything constructive can be done in the present state of international tension. They point to the recent lack of progress in virtually every area of arms control. The Canadian view is that something must be done and so it can be done.

"The major decisions rest with the superpowers, but the responsibility rests with us all. Multilateral efforts, led and encouraged by the medium and smaller-sized countries, can help improve the atmosphere, and can put specific, workable ideas on the agenda.

"Canada, for its part, is determined to continue to play a leading role in the search for peace and disarmament. We believe the nuclear buildup threatens the life of every Canadian, and the existence of human society. Countries like our own must use our influence to reverse that buildup and reduce the danger of destruction. That will be a constant, consistent, dominant priority of Canadian foreign policy.

"My country is not neutral in the contest between open and closed societies. We defend, and actively assert, the values of democracy and individual freedom. We believe it is essential to pursue the goals of peace and freedom simultaneously.

"We shall seek, through concrete and realistic steps, progress toward a comprehensive test ban treaty. We shall encourage superpower and multilateral discussion on all outer space weapons, and shall commission further studies on how a space weapons ban might be verified. We shall work for the success of next year's Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, in order to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. We shall bring to bear our technical expertise in verification measures to ensure mutual confidence and security in areas where arms control agreements can be achieved. We shall encourage agreement on a mutual and balanced reduction of conventional forces in Europe, and hence reduce the danger of escalation to nuclear war. We shall continue to press for a verifiable convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. Canada will continue its financial support of the World Disarmament Campaign. We shall, in addition, expect that the newly-created Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security will contribute its share of studies and advice on specific arms control proposals and measures to reduce international tension."



The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, addressing the General Assembly, September 25, 1984.

UN photo




Profile: Douglas Roche, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament

Douglas Roche was appointed Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament October 5, 1984.

Mr. Roche, 55, was born in Montreal, Quebec. Before entering Parliament, he was a journalist and lecturer and, from 1965 to 1977, the founding editor of the "Western Catholic Reporter" of Edmonton. He was first elected to the House of Commons in 1972 for Edmonton-Strathcona, was re-elected in 1974, and again in 1979 and 1980. Between 1977 and 1979, Mr. Roche was the Progressive Conservative Spokesman on External Affairs. In 1979, he became Chairman of the Progressive Conservative Caucus Committee on External Affairs and was appointed Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1979. He was a Canadian Delegate to the 34th General Assembly of the United Nations. He served for four years, from 1980 to 1984, as the International Chairman of Parliamentarians for World Order. He was named, in 1980, the Vice-Chairman of the Parliamentary Task Force on North-South Relations. In 1982, he was appointed a consultant to the Canadian Delegation to the United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament.

Ambassador Roche has served as President of the United Nations Associa-



Douglas Roche

tion in Canada. A member of the North-South Roundtable of the Society for International Development, he has lectured at Harvard, Columbia, Nehru University, New Delhi, and several other universities.

He has received an Honorary Doctorate of Divinity from St. Stephen's College, Edmonton, was awarded the 1983 Peace Award of the World Federalists of Canada, and received the Alberta Premier's 1984 Award for Excellence.

He is the author of eight books, including *Justice Not Charity: A New Global Ethic for Canada*. The latest, *United Nations, Divided World*, is a contemporary examination of the United Nations amidst the global crises of the nuclear arms race and economic development.

As Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Roche represents Canada at international meetings concerned with arms control and disarmament, particularly the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission in New York. He also attends meetings of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva from time to time, although Mr. J. Alan Beesley remains the Canadian Permanent Representative to the Conference. Mr. Roche is also the principal point of contact for Canadian non-governmental organizations and persons interested in arms control and disarmament. As such he undertakes cross-Canada speaking engagements to explain Canada's position and the work done in the international fora where he represents Canada.

Consultative Group

The Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, which brings together over 50 interested Canadians — private individuals, members of non-governmental organizations peace associations and universities — met in Ottawa on November 9 and 10, 1984. A second meeting of members drawn from the Consultative Group and outside experts took place in Ottawa on April 11 and 12, 1985.

The Consultative Group was created in 1979 to give effect to recommendations of the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD) in 1978. In addition to exchanging views with officials, members of the Group may, individually or collectively, give advice to

the Department through the Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche.

Issues dealt with at the four sessions of the first meeting included the international context for arms limitation, specifically the idea of developing "ground rules" for a safer East-West relationship; Canada's exercise of influence in Washington, Moscow and its allies, and NATO, the UN and the CD, and on the means by which Canadians can energize government policy; various aspects of Canada's arms control agenda (nuclear weapons, new technologies, militarization of space, non-proliferation, verification, conventional and chemical weapons, comprehensive test ban and the disarmament-development linkage etc.); and the future direction of the Consultative Group.

The idea of introducing a number of

regional and/or functional consultations to supplement a large annual meeting was received positively. There was general support for creating a steering committee to examine and advise on the options for restructuring the consultative process. This committee has since been created and meets periodically with the Ambassador for Disarmament.

The sessions of the April meeting of members drawn from the Consultative Group focused primarily on Canadian preparations for the Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, scheduled to be held in Geneva in September 1985. The group also discussed the Strategic Defense Initiative. The next meeting of the full Consultative Group is scheduled for the fall of 1985 and will focus on Canadian activities in the multilateral disarmament fora.



Canada Votes at the First Committee of the 39th General Assembly of the UN

In a recent speech to the Victoria branch of the United Nations Association in Canada, the Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, surveyed Canada's participation in the UN's First Committee, which is responsible for disarmament and related matters. He prefaced his remarks by stressing the need for patience and perseverance, the need to understand that even the smallest progress is worthy of the greatest effort, and the need to place determination in the forefront of the qualities Canada must have in the search for peace and disarmament.

Mr. Roche noted that at the past session of the First Committee, of a total of 64 resolutions that came to a vote, Canada co-sponsored 13, voted in favour of 36, voted against 14 and abstained on 14.

At that session, there were three areas — outer space, a comprehensive test ban, and chemical weapons — in which the United Nations met with conspicuous success; in all three areas Canada played a leading role.

Outer Space: Ambassador Roche summarized Canada's contribution in this area as follows: "The outcome of the resolution-making process was a success. Negotiations in which Canada played a leading role produced a resolution around which virtual consensus was achieved that expressed the desire of the international community for talks to begin in the Conference on Disarmament. Much more will need to be done before actual negotiations take place, but the adoption of this resolution is a clear step forward."

Comprehensive Test Ban: The achievement of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has also been a Canadian priority. With Canada as co-sponsor, a resolution was developed that would permit the Conference on Disarmament to resume immediately its substantive work on a Test Ban. After complex negotiations, that resolution was also passed by a large majority; this will ensure that work will continue in Geneva towards the negotiation of a Test Ban Treaty.

Chemical Weapons: The problem of chemical weapons is the subject of one

of the few substantive resolutions before the United Nations that unites all countries, East and West, North and South. In 1983, under Canadian chairmanship, the *Ad Hoc* Working Group on Chemical Weapons of the Committee on Disarmament (now the Conference on Disarmament) produced for the first time a consensus document which contained major elements required for a comprehensive treaty. That document clearly outlined the areas in which there was agreement or disagreement. At this past session of the First Committee, Canada and Poland shared the challenge of constructing a U.N. resolution that would give unified voice to this encouragement; again our collaboration proved successful, and the unanimous support of the United Nations for these negotiations was confirmed.

On the issue of a *nuclear freeze* no consensus was possible. Three freeze resolutions were introduced. A Soviet proposal called on all nuclear states to freeze their nuclear arsenals. A Swedish-Mexican draft urged the Soviet Union and the United States to proclaim an immediate nuclear arms freeze as a first step towards comprehensive disarmament. An Indian draft called on all nuclear-weapon states to agree to a freeze on nuclear weapons and stoppage of any further production of nuclear weapons and a complete cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

The Soviet proposal passed with 95 votes for, 18 against and 13 abstentions. The Swedish-Mexican proposal passed 111 for, 12 against, and 7 abstentions. The Indian draft passed 110 for, 12 against, and 9 abstentions.

Canada voted no on all three resolutions, the government stating that mere declarations of a freeze are not a meaningful response to the nuclear danger. Rather, as the government has said many times, Canada wants the immediate, unconditional resumption of negotiations on reductions. A return without preconditions to meaningful, bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which take into account the legitimate security interests of both sides and with adequate verification measures, constitutes

the most realistic means of reducing nuclear arms.

Thus, Canada's vote reflected the genuine doubt about the practicality of the concept of the freeze as it is currently being advocated. Declaring a freeze, rather than negotiating one, would inevitably raise numerous and likely intractable problems about definitions, exclusions and inclusions. The negotiation of a freeze would be as intricate and as prolonged as would the negotiation of reductions.

Prevention of Nuclear War: A draft resolution co-sponsored by Canada and our European Allies sought to put prevention of nuclear war within the context of preventing all wars, and within the framework of the United Nations Charter. Some of the more radical Non-Aligned states sought to turn the issue of preventing nuclear war into a critique of Western security policies and alliance relationships and, regrettably, efforts to reach a consensus had to be abandoned. A substantive and balanced discussion of an issue of central concern to the international community was thus put aside as the result of ideological conflict (as well as posturing) at the U.N.

Nuclear Winter: Canada's role in the *Nuclear Winter* debate provides an object lesson in the difficulties of obtaining consensus at the U.N.

A year ago, more than 100 scientists endorsed a study headed by Professors Carl Sagan and Paul Ehrlich, projecting that a nuclear outbreak between East and West, in addition to the human casualties the total of which might approach half the population of the world, would so damage the environment as to produce a "nuclear winter". The Canadian government also commissioned the Royal Society of Canada to examine the Nuclear Winter theory; their report was recently released.

It should be remembered that the Sagan-Ehrlich study has not met the unanimous support of scientists. Some are not convinced of the gravity of Nuclear Winter. In an effort to have all pertinent studies on this important subject brought into the U.N. for further dissemination, the Canadian delega-



tion attempted to develop a consensus vote, which would give added weight to the Nuclear Winter material.

A draft resolution, introduced by Mexico, Sweden, India, Yugoslavia, Pakistan and Uruguay, accepted Nuclear Winter as a foregone conclusion and called on the Secretariat to compile a document consisting of excerpts from national studies. When the spokesmen for this draft advised that it was not open for amendment, Canada introduced a similar resolution.

Canada's resolution was not intended to undermine the Neutral Non-Aligned (NNA) resolution; we proceeded with our draft because we believed the scope of the resolution should be broader and should also include the climatic effects of nuclear war, including nuclear winter. We also believed that the resolution should not attempt to prejudge the studies that countries might be asked to submit to the U.N. The western co-sponsors of the Canadian resolution, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Belgium, authorized the Canadian delegation to negotiate to find the basis for a consensus draft. Our delegation succeeded in negotiating a text with NNA sponsors and believed it had reached agreement. This, however, turned out not to be the case, and a small but significant element of the Non-Aligned leadership objected to confining the compilation of the Secretariat's report "within existing resources".

Though the possibility of achieving consensus was lost, Canada voted for the non-aligned resolution, even in its weakened state, so great is our concern about spreading knowledge about the possible effects on climate of a nuclear war.

In his summary of Canada's participation at the U.N. in the area of disarmament Ambassador Roche concluded:

"The U.N. is an imperfect institution, to be sure. But it reflects the 'atmospherics' of our time. These atmospherics are dominated by the sense of antagonism and mistrust between East and West, which spill over into the various sets of multilateral relationships. There is too much confrontation in the U.N. debates, not enough cooperation. The process of consensus, as I learned, is an easy victim. And it is the people of the world who are the losers."

Pearson Appointed Executive Director of Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

Mr. Geoffrey Pearson was appointed Executive Director of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS) by the Government of Canada on January 1, 1985. Mr. Pearson, Canada's Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1980 to 1983, and previously Advisor on Disarmament, had a long and distinguished career in the Canadian foreign service prior to his appointment. The Chairman of the Board of Directors of the CIIPS is Mr. W.H. Barton, former Canadian Ambassador to the U.N. The Vice-Chairman of the Board is Dr. Margaret Fulton, President of Mount St. Vincent University in Halifax.

The CIIPS, which was created by Parliament in August 1984, is funded by direct annual statutory appropriations. It was established to promote and foster informed public discussion and deepen Canadian expertise on international peace and security issues. Its emphasis is on defence, arms control, disarmament and conflict resolution in both the Canadian and global context.

The CIIPS collects and disseminates information and ideas and acts as a central resource for Canadian interest, activity and work in this area. It encourages public discussion of international peace and security issues through the



Geoffrey Pearson

promotion and holding of seminars and conferences as well as through publications. It fosters, funds and conducts research on issues of particular interest to Canadians or to the Government of Canada. The CIIPS will bring a distinctive Canadian perspective to the issues of international peace and security. It will cooperate closely with Canadian groups and organizations, as well as develop contacts with institutes of a similar nature abroad.

New Disarmament Fund Publication

The Department of External Affairs, through the Disarmament Fund, is encouraging Canadians to discuss, research and disseminate information on arms control and disarmament issues. The Fund is designed to help Canadians meet together and engage in a constructive dialogue with their government on these questions. This will enhance Canada's ability to make a distinctive Canadian contribution to the international discussion of these questions. An informative pamphlet describing Disarmament Fund activities and how to apply to the Fund has been published recently by the Department of External Affairs. It is available by writing to: Disarmament Fund Secretary, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Dept.

of External Affairs, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ont. K1A 0G2.

Since its inception in 1980, the Disarmament Fund has assisted 149 groups, organizations and individuals. For the fiscal year 1984-5, Disarmament Fund grants and contributions totalled \$575,000 with another \$178,000 allotted for research and publications.

Any non-governmental organization, formal or informal academic or public interest group, or individual in Canada engaged in *balanced* discussions, research, dissemination or publishing of information on disarmament or arms control may be a recipient of contributions from the Fund.



External Affairs Minister and Soviet Foreign Minister Discuss Arms Control Issues During Moscow Visit

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, led a Canadian delegation to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from March 30 to April 7. The four-city visit was the first by a Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs since 1973.

Talks between Mr. Clark and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on April 3 highlighted the visit. The two ministers discussed a number of bilateral issues, including the resumption of officially sponsored cultural, scientific and educational exchanges between the two countries and questions of human rights and trade.

Arms control issues were also on the agenda. Mr. Clark remained firm on the Canadian position of US weapons research including both the cruise missile and the Strategic Defence Initiative. He said that Canada and other North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries support the research initiative for a ballistic missile defence system and that deployment of a space-based defence system which goes beyond the limits imposed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty should be a matter for negotiations and discussions. Mr. Clark reiterated that, in light of ongoing Soviet activities in this field, Western research on ballistic missile defence was prudent.

Regarding the testing of cruise missiles in northern Canada, Mr. Clark said the missiles being tested are unarmed and he pointed out that "Canada is one of the few nations with nuclear capability that chose not to go that route."

Foreign Minister Gromyko and Mrs. Gromyko hosted the Canadian delegation at a luncheon on April 3. In his toast, Mr. Clark made the following comments:

"Your Excellency, Mrs. Gromyko, Ladies and Gentlemen,

"I wish first of all to thank you, our hosts, for the warmth and hospitality with which you have greeted me, Maureen and my delegation, on this my first visit to the Soviet Union.

"My visit to the Soviet Union bears witness to the depth of the Canadian government's certainty that through such contacts our respective interests will be promoted, mutual confidence enhanced, and a contribution made to easing international tensions. It would be naive to deny the depth of the differences between Canada and the Soviet Union, but these differences themselves provide compelling reasons why we should seek to increase our efforts to understand each other.

"Canada is committed to NATO and to the cornerstones of the alliance — collective security and the search for a relaxation of East/West tensions. Canada and the other Western countries wish to see East/West relations become less confrontational and more cooperative. All of us share a planet and a common human identity and from this emerges one of the most ancient of human aspirations — the aspiration to live in peace.

"In this regard we in Canada, and I suspect men and women worldwide, were particularly pleased at the opening in Geneva of arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

"The course of these negotiations will no doubt be arduous. The issues are complex and the differences between the two sides are many, but the goal of those talks is vital to all mankind — and it is the duty of statesmen to give their full measure to the search for agreement.

"The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are the responsible partners at Geneva, but the interests of many others, including Canada, are very definitely on that table as well. Therefore, Canada will continue to assert the importance we attach to the successful completion of the Geneva talks."



Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko greets External Affairs Minister Joe Clark at the airport in Moscow on April 2, 1985.

Canapress

The Strategic Defense Initiative

On January 21, some months before his trip to Moscow, the Secretary of State for External Affairs made a statement in the House of Commons on the U.S.A.-Soviet arms control talks. A part of that speech was devoted to discussing the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a five-year research and development programme announced by U.S. President Reagan on March 23, 1983 and aimed at exploring the possibilities of developing certain space-based ballistic missile technologies for defensive purposes.

Mr. Clark discussed the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative and Canada's views regarding it, in the following terms:

"The United States President, Mr. Reagan, has stated that the Strategic Defense Initiative is a research programme designed to examine the feasibility of strengthening strategic stability and reducing reliance on nuclear weapons through greater attention to non-nuclear defensive measures. To date, the full extent of the programme

has not been explored and it would therefore be premature to draw definitive conclusions about it. Given the extraordinarily complex technical questions which SDI raises, questions which even an intensive research programme is unlikely to resolve for many years — if ever — it is obvious that it is a highly hypothetical concept.

As the programme is presently understood, research on SDI does not in and of itself contravene the provisions either of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty or of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, both of which Canada strongly supports. In light of significant Soviet advances in ballistic missile defence research in recent years, and deployment of an actual ballistic missile defence system, it is only prudent that the West keep abreast of the feasibility of such projects.

However, actual development and deployment of space based ballistic missile defence systems by either side would transgress the limits of the ABM Treaty as currently constituted. That could have serious implications for arms control and would therefore warrant close and careful attention by all concerned. We welcome in this regard President Reagan's affirmation that the U.S.A. would not proceed beyond research without discussion and negotiation."

U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Talks: Canadian Statement



Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz during recent bilateral talks in Stockholm.

Canapress

After two days of talks in Geneva on January 7 and 8, 1985, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko announced agreement to engage in bilateral negotiations on nuclear arms — of both strategic and intermediate range — and space weapons. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, declared that this represents an important step forward in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The negotiating process will have far-reaching and positive implications for East-West relations in general and for negotiations in multilateral arms control fora in which Canada is a direct participant.

Mr. Clark stated: "Canada will continue to play an active and constructive role in the search for the common understanding between East and West needed for

the achievement of durable, effective and verifiable arms control agreements.

"Canada is particularly encouraged by the agreed objectives for the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. negotiations: the prevention of an arms race in space and its termination on earth; the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms; and the strengthening of strategic stability, leading ultimately to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. These themes have long been central elements of Canadian foreign policy. Canada welcomes the opportunity to consult further with the U.S.A., both bilaterally and in NATO, as these negotiations unfold."

Mr. Clark cautioned that there should be no illusion that the course charted at Geneva will be an easy one. It will be long and arduous.

Kroeger Task Force

More recently, the Government of Canada has, along with its NATO allies, been invited by the Government of the United States to participate in research associated with the SDI, consistent with existing international obligations including the ABM Treaty. There are a number of questions for which the Canadian Government would wish to have fuller information before replying to the U.S.A. invitation. Accordingly, the Government has appointed Mr. Arthur Kroeger, a senior public servant, to head up an interdepartmental task force of officials to examine the nature and scope of the SDI research and, in particular, its strategic, scientific and economic implications. While there is no specific deadline for the task force to report, it is expected to be completed in the near future. This exploration will be without prejudice to the Canadian Government's eventual decision regarding possible participation in SDI research.



Ambassador Beesley Addresses Conference On Disarmament

On April 4, 1985, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. J. Alan Beesley, made a major statement to that Conference. He discussed numerous aspects of arms control and disarmament, after outlining Canada's fundamental priorities both outside and inside the Conference on Disarmament (CD). He described Canada's priorities outside the framework of the CD as follows:

- "to contribute to progress in the nuclear arms talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, and to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."

Within the Conference on Disarmament he said that the major priorities of the Canadian Government are:

- "a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;
- preventing an arms race in outer space; and
- the early conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons.

While pursuing these objectives, the Canadian Government is also committed

to moving forward on other arms control subjects in the Conference on Disarmament, including in particular:

- the prevention of nuclear war; and
- a treaty on radiological weapons."


In his address, Mr. Beesley dealt with a number of important questions on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

On the subject of *outer space*, Ambassador Beesley said that the recently agreed consensus regarding the outer space mandate reflected great credit on the members of the Conference on Disarmament, particularly on the major space powers. The Canadian Government, he noted, has already commissioned a study on the relevant aspects of international law and existing treaties and agreements applicable to outer space. Canada is fully prepared to share the results of its research in this field.

With respect to the *Nuclear Test Ban*, Canada has advocated the re-establishment of a subsidiary body to help iron out the practical aspects of verification and compliance. Establishing an international seismic monitoring network will be one way to assist in achieving this goal.

Regarding *chemical weapons*, Ambassador Beesley stressed the importance of verification, including procedures for the inspection of stockpile and production sites, and the problem of challenge verification. He noted that Canada, in agreement with many other countries, has imposed controls on the export of certain chemicals which could be useful in the production of highly toxic warfare agents. The closing-off of routes to producing all agents can, however, be achieved only through a verifiable ban on all chemical weapons.

Ambassador Beesley also stressed that *the prevention of nuclear war* needs some common ground as a starting point for discussion, and that a point of departure constituting such common ground is the charter of the United Nations which prohibits the use and the threat of the use of force. The prevention of nuclear war cannot and should not be considered in isolation.



Canadian Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament J. Alan Beesley.

Ambassador Beesley encouraged the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. to act on their expressed desire to achieve an early agreement on the issue of *radiological weapons*. He emphasized the positive effects on the credibility of the Conference on Disarmament of reaching an agreement on radiological weapons. Such an agreement could reinvigorate the Conference on Disarmament and be extremely valuable as a stepping-stone to further, broader agreements.

Ambassador Beesley concluded on an optimistic note regarding the future of the Conference on Disarmament:

"It is our firm view that with some better working methods and a willingness to accept sensible accommodations of interests — not compromises on matters of principle, but genuine reconciliations and accommodations — we should be able to agree not only to a realistic and practical mandate for an *Ad Hoc* committee on a nuclear test ban, as well as on a procedural framework to proceed with substantial discussion on the prevention of nuclear war, but also to achieve concrete progress on a comprehensive convention on chemical weapons and even to conclude a limited agreement on radiological weapons."



View through an archway of the Palais des Nations in Geneva where CD meetings take place.

Canapress

Canada at the Stockholm Conference

The following article has been prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

The Stockholm Conference, or as it is formally titled, the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, is a creation of the on-going 35-state Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Proceeding on the basis of a mandate carefully worked out at the CSCE Follow-Up Meeting which concluded in Madrid in September 1983, the Conference is "to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations."

The first stage of the Conference is specifically devoted to "the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe." These confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs for short) represent a novel and largely undefined approach to East-West arms control and disarmament. While the mandate stipulated that the CSBMs are to be militarily significant, politically binding, adequately verifiable and applicable to the whole of Europe, the exact nature of these measures is left up to the Conference to determine. Indeed, since its January 1984 opening, the Stockholm Conference has been engaged in the very exercise of trying to arrive at a mutually agreed understanding of what these CSBMs should consist of. It will probably come as no surprise that conceptions as to the appropriate nature of the CSBMs the Conference is to adopt differ considerably, particularly between those held by the West and the East.

How The West And The East Approach Confidence Building

The Western approach to confidence building emphasizes the need for better mutual understanding of the normal military activity of participating states through imparting a greater degree of

openness and regularity to this activity, with a view to reducing the risk of military conflict caused by surprise, misperception and mistrust. The East, on the other hand, has favoured the adoption of broad political undertakings which in their view create a necessary climate or background of confidence which can then facilitate the acceptance of more practical 'military/technical' measures — as the East describes the 'concrete measures' approach to confidence-building. To put it another way, the West favours a gradual building up of confidence through a series of concrete steps whereas the East prefers an initial declaration that confidence exists and its subsequent reinforcement with subordinate and limited specific measures.

Proposals Tabled

The states of the North Atlantic Alliance were the first participants to table (in January 1984) actual proposals for CSBMs at the Stockholm Conference. These proposals, which were amplified in a series of working documents put forward at the beginning of this year, contain six concrete measures: 1) the exchange of general military information, 2) the exchange of information on planned military activities one year in advance, 3) the announcement of

manoeuvres involving at least one division or 6,000 men 45 days in advance, 4) compulsory invitations to observers for announced military activities, 5) methods of monitoring compliance and of verification including challenge on-site inspections and 6) the establishment of communication links in order to implement or facilitate rapid contact in situations of tension.

The Western proposals were followed by proposals from Romania, the Neutral and Non-Aligned (NNA) states, the Soviet Union, Malta and Bulgaria.

The Soviet proposal which was tabled in May 1984 with the support of the other member states of the Warsaw Pact contained six elements, five of which were declaratory in nature (no-first use of nuclear weapons, non-use of force, a freeze and reduction of military budgets, chemical weapon free zones, and nuclear weapon free zones). The sixth element concerned certain practical military measures relating to limits on exercises, prior notification of troop movements and development of the practice of exchanging observers, although these were without parameters and remained undeveloped. Since the beginning of the Conference, however, the Soviet Union has made it clear that its primary objective is a treaty on the non-use of force. If this were to be accepted by the other participating states, the USSR would then consider further expansions of the CSBMs contained in the Helsinki Final Act. The West has indicated that it would be prepared to discuss the reaffirmation of the non-use of force principle in return for Soviet readiness to negotiate meaningful CSBMs. The nucleus of an agreement could well lie in some combination of these two elements. The NNA could possibly play a 'honest broker' role in bringing about the necessary compromise that this would entail.

The NNA has, however, a particular interest of its own in advocating the adoption of 'constraint measures' which would limit or constrain military activities through geographical restrictions or ceilings on the manpower and/or equipment committed to such activities. The West has generally taken the view that constraints represent an intermediate step between confidence-building mea-



Opening Session of Stockholm Conference, January 17, 1984.

Canapress



Canadian Ambassador to the Stockholm Conference W.T. Delworth.

asures and disarmament measures and should be considered only once the former have been agreed to. The East has supported the notion of constraints, in part because the prevailing asymmetries of the European military situation would tend to render any constraint measure more disadvantageous to the West. It remains to be seen how the NNA will develop the idea of constraints at the Conference and how they will figure in any eventual concluding document.

First Year Activities

The first year of the Conference was largely taken up with a general debate in plenary outlining the different approaches to confidence building espoused by the various participants. In early December after considerable preliminary negotiations the Conference finally agreed to a Finnish/Swedish procedural proposal that established a working structure. Specifically, two subsidiary working groups were created, working group 'B' which would consider measures of observation and notification (i.e. those CSBMs which are already present in the Final Act) and working group 'A' which would examine all other proposed measures (i.e. CSBMs which are not now included in the Final Act). There is also a combined 'A' and 'B' Working Group which is supposed to discuss the interrelationships between the two working groups. It is hoped that these working groups will facilitate the Conference moving from the general to

the specific and lead it into a serious and detailed negotiation of actual CSBMs. During the Conference's fifth session (Jan. 29-March 22, 1985), both the West and the East provided separate elaborations of their original proposals. These elaborations, while useful, and indeed essential in the longterm process of the Conference, have not, however, of themselves helped to bridge the gap between the contending Western and Eastern approaches to confidence building.

Outlook For Sixth Session

It is our hope that the Conference's sixth session (May 14-July 5) will witness some significant forward movement on the basis of a degree of consensus that does exist on the need to improve on the existing and admittedly modest confidence-building measures contained in the Helsinki Final Act. Canada believes that the Stockholm Conference should produce a substantial

result by the time of the November 1986 CSCE Follow-Up Meeting, in Vienna, which is to review its progress.

The Canadian delegation at the Conference will continue to be active and innovative in exploring means to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion. This will require, however, the willingness of Eastern participating states to expand their view of CSBMs beyond static declarations of good intentions to embrace the concrete and militarily significant measures that will give meaning to these professions of peaceful intent.

As the Canadian Ambassador to the Conference, Mr. W.T. Delworth, remarked during the last session; "It is not a restatement or a re-working of the principle of non-use of force that is needed now. What is needed now, as confirmed in the mandate of our Conference, is to give dynamic expression and effect to this principle."

Conference on Disarmament Establishes an Ad Hoc Committee on the Outer Space Issue

At its March 29, 1985, meeting in Geneva, the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD), the only international multilateral body mandated by the United Nations to negotiate on arms control and disarmament issues, reached agreement on establishing an *ad hoc* committee to deal with the issue of arms control and outer space.

Initially, the *ad hoc* Committee will serve to identify, through substantive examination, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It will take into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives in preparing its report on the progress of its work to the Conference on Disarmament in August 1985.

From the Canadian perspective, the creation of the *ad hoc* committee on outer space is in line with Canada's expressed policy and constitutes a significant step forward in coming to grips with the issue. It is in conformity with a resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly without dissent during its 39th session on December 12, 1984, which requested the Conference on Disarmament to consider as a matter of

priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space. Canada has been a strong and consistent supporter of such an outer space resolution in the United Nations and elsewhere.

The mandate of the *ad hoc* committee both complements and accurately reflects the realities concerning the bilateral arms control negotiations already underway between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva. It neither undermines nor undercuts nor prejudices or in any way interferes with those negotiations and this fact is considered by Canada to be absolutely central to the successful process of both sets of deliberations.

In the past, Canada has taken an active role in general discussions within the CD on the outer space issue including the submission of working papers. Now, with the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee, which will permit a more selective focussing on the issue, Canada will reinforce its efforts and will participate actively and effectively. Our objective will be to foster consensus and an understanding of actions required with a view to preventing an arms race in outer space.



The Verification Research Programme

The following article was prepared by the Verification Unit of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

Canada has played a unique role in the multilateral aspects of the arms control and disarmament process over the last thirty years. In 1954 Canada became a member of five power sub-committee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission along with the four permanent members of the Security Council, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. Five years later the Ten-Nations Committee on Disarmament was established by decision of the foreign ministers of the Security Council permanent members with the two sided East-West pattern of representation. The ten participating countries were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and the U.S.S.R. on one side, and Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States on the other. This grouping was expanded in 1962 to eighteen nations by including representation from the Neutral and Non-Aligned (NNA) nations and, through a number of modifications, is now constituted as the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. Canadian participation in multilateral arms control activities and analysis has been recognized internationally as professional and a serious contribution to the disarmament process.

It is against this background that, following a restructuring of the arms control and disarmament function in the Department of External Affairs, an analysis was undertaken to determine an area in which Canada might wish to concentrate. Verification was quickly recognized as a problem area which spanned the broad spectrum of arms control issues.

It was also recognized as an area in which much misunderstanding existed and in which relatively little research was being directed. While the necessity of some sort of verification in arms control and disarmament negotiations had been recognized, it was discussed, almost without exception, on an *ad hoc* basis and was developed specifically

to meet certain sensitivities and security criteria within a single negotiating package. It was decided therefore to redirect some of the scant resources in Canada toward a programme which would serve to broaden specialist as well as public understanding of the issue.

Initial efforts

As a result, an initial modest cooperative programme was developed between the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment of National Defence and the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of External Affairs. The aim was to study arms control verification in a conceptual manner and to attempt, through the establishment of a generally accepted philosophy and the development of a common lexicon, to introduce a degree of gentle leadership and coordination into the process while at the same time leaving the field open to other nations in areas of their own expertise. This modest programme resulted in the production of a trilogy of studies on verification which, it is fair to say, serve today as basic reference documents on the subject in international negotiating fora.

On June 18, 1982, during a speech to the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II), former Prime Minister Trudeau identified arms control and disarmament issues which Canada considered to be priority matters and focussed on the process of verification.

During Disarmament Week, October 24-30, 1983, the Department of External Affairs announced the establishment of a verification research programme with an initial budget of \$500,000. The current budget of the Unit is \$1 million.

Verification Programme Activities

The programme will focus on certain Canadian arms control and disarmament priorities. Projects would include: (i) research studies for application to problems in international negotiations; (ii) specialized technical training programs; (iii) hosting of international symposia of experts on specific subjects; (iv) liaison with national and international

bodies outside of Canada engaged in verification issues; and (v) public presentation of verification issues.

In sharing the results of our work with the international community, we hope to contribute to easing the political and security concerns and overcoming the lack of confidence that have kept nations divided.

Since January 1, 1985 the research unit within the Arms Control and Disarmament Division has been at full strength. In addition to a modest in-house capability, the Unit will be responsible for coordinating the variety of studies and projects to fully support Canadian arms control and disarmament activities in Geneva, Vienna, Stockholm, Brussels, New York and Ottawa.

Priorities

In descending order of priority, the verification research programme will be applied to:

1. The achievement of a comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons.
2. The negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.
3. The development of a treaty to ban weapons for use in outer space.
4. The pursuit of arms control and military confidence-building in Europe through the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna and the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE).
5. The conclusion of a convention to ban radiological weapons.
6. The conduct of other research as may be required from time to time.

To date nearly forty different projects have been identified in areas ranging from chemical weapons use through seismic detection of nuclear tests to outer space. The impact of the overall research programme on the Canadian negotiating posture will become increasingly apparent as time goes on. It will constitute a significant step in the forward planning process of the Department of External Affairs.



U.S. Arms Control Advisor Visits Ottawa

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, Special Advisor on Arms Control to U.S. President Reagan, met with Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and other Canadian representatives during a one-day visit to Ottawa on March 6, 1985.

This meeting followed an exchange of views and letters between the Prime Minister and the U.S. President. In the course of the exchange, the Prime Minister underscored the importance that Canada attached to the resumption of the U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. Arms Control negotiations in Geneva, and he invited key figures in the President's administration to visit Canada before the negotiations began, in order to discuss preparations with them.



Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (right) meeting in Ottawa with U.S. Ambassador Paul Nitze on March 6, 1985.

Green Paper Released on Foreign Policy

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, tabled on May 14 in the House of Commons a Discussion Paper (Green Paper) entitled *Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's International Relations*. The Paper is the first step in a broad review of Canada's international relations to be conducted by Parliament.

As indicated by Mr. Clark in his Foreword to the Green Paper, the Paper "is designed to illustrate the dramatic changes which have taken place in the world and to raise some of the principal questions which Canadians need to consider at this time". The Green Paper gives particular attention to questions relating to Canada's international economic competitiveness and to the security implications of recent developments in East/West relations and arms control. There is special emphasis on the need for careful setting of policy priorities. As Mr. Clark observes, "we do not have the resources to do all we would like in international affairs . . . Priorities will have to be established; difficult choices will have to be made."

The Green Paper is not a proclamation of Government policy. Its purpose is to prompt public discussion and debate.

Parliamentary Committee Created

On June 12 Parliament approved the creation of a Special Joint Committee of the House and Senate to discuss the Green Paper. The Committee will submit an interim report dealing with the United States' Strategic Defence Initiative and trade with the U.S. no later than August 23, and a final report no later than May 31, 1986. In preparing its reports the Committee will be seeking the views of Canadians across the country. Public input will be a fundamental and vital component of the review process.

Additional copies of the Green Paper can be obtained by writing to the following address: Domestic Information Service (SCI), Department of External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson Building, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0G2

Lord Carrington Meets Canadian Leaders

Lord Carrington, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, made a four-day visit to Canada in January 1985. It was Lord Carrington's first formal visit to Canada since becoming NATO Secretary General. During his visit Lord Carrington met with the Governor-General, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the

Secretary of State for External Affairs, as well as members of the House of Commons and Senate committees dealing with external affairs and defense. Discussions were held on East-West relations, the state of the North Atlantic Alliance, Canada's continuing political and military commitments to NATO, arms control, and the Strategic Defense Initiative.



Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (right) and Lord Carrington prior to their meeting on Parliament Hill in Ottawa on January 22, 1985.

Canapress Photos



Fora for Arms Control and Disarmament Discussions

BACKGROUNDER

The following summary was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

Multilateral

(1) United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)

— A *deliberative* body; operates by majority vote; meets September to December in New York.

— All 159 UN members are represented on the First Committee of the UNGA which deals with arms control, disarmament and international security issues.

— First Committee agenda covers the whole range of nuclear and non-nuclear issues; about 55 items and sub-items last year.

— Arms control, disarmament and international security resolutions adopted: 72 out of the total of 247 adopted by all United Nations General Assembly Committees last fall (i.e. 29% of all resolutions).

(2) United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC)

— A *deliberative* body; an offshoot of the UNGA; operates by consensus; meets in May in New York.

— All 159 UN members are represented.

— Its agenda contains a limited number of items, both nuclear and non-nuclear, requested by the UNGA; five items last year, six this year.

(3) Conference on Disarmament (CD)

— A *negotiating* body; operates by consensus; previously called Committee on

Disarmament, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament; meets from February to August (with a break in May) in Geneva.

— Only 40 UN members; decision has been made to increase to 44 but not yet implemented.

— Its agenda contains a limited number of items, both nuclear and non-nuclear.

(4) Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE or CDE)

— A *negotiating* body; operates by consensus; has been meeting in Stockholm since January 1984 (with breaks).

— Established by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) with same membership, i.e. 33 Europeans + Canada + U.S.A..

— Second stage (relating to disarmament) is to be worked out at the November 1986 Vienna Review Conference of the CSCE.

— Its mandate is to *negotiate* a set of mutually complementary Confidence- and Security-Building measures (CSBM's) to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe;

— CSBM's are to be militarily significant, politically binding and provided with adequate forms of verification.

— The West has proposed a series of practical CSBM's (i.e. ways of distinguishing normal military activities from potentially threatening aberrations). The Soviet bloc's approach is different. It espouses a process of confidence-building through the adoption of political commitments, including the Non-First Use of Force.

(5) Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR)

— A *negotiating* body; operates by consensus; has been meeting in Vienna since 1973 (with breaks).

— Certain members of Warsaw Pact (WPO) and NATO.

— Its mandate covers the reduction of conventional force levels in Central Europe; non-nuclear issues.

— The principal objective is the reduction to parity at 900,000 of the NATO and WPO troops in the area.

— Problems (a) Data — differences over the size of the WPO forces in the "reduction area" (West believes there are more Eastern forces than the WPO is willing to acknowledge); (b) Verification — differences over measures for verifying the reductions and subsequent adherence to troop ceilings.

(6) Third Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPTRC III)

— A *deliberative* body; operates by consensus; to be held August 27 to September 24, 1985, in Geneva; previous review conferences were held in 1975 and 1980.

— Participants consist of all 127 signatories of the NPT which include three of the nuclear weapon states (NWS), i.e. U.K., U.S.A., U.S.S.R., but not the other two NWS, China and France.

— Its mandate is to review the implementation of the NPT which was concluded in 1968 and which came into effect in 1970.

— The NPT represents a bargain that was struck:

(a) NWS would not provide nuclear weapons or explosive devices to others, and the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) would not seek to acquire them;

(b) in return, the NNWS would have the right to full benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the NWS undertook to "pursue negotiations in good faith of effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" (Article VI).



— NPTRC I was a highly political conference as a result of the unhappiness of the NNWS at the lack of progress by the NWS on negotiating as required by Article VI. Nevertheless, it managed to agree on a consensus Final Document. NPTRC II was an even more difficult conference and no Final Document was agreed upon. NPTRC III is expected to be particularly difficult for the same reasons as before.

Bilateral Fora

(1) Geneva Talks

— These negotiations between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. were agreed to during the January 7-8 meeting between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary of State Shultz; they began March 12 and take place in Geneva.

— The objectives agreed upon by the two sides: the prevention of an arms race in space and its termination on earth; the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms; and the strengthening of strategic stability, leading ultimately to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

— These themes have long been central elements of Canadian foreign policy and we therefore welcomed them.

— These talks are perhaps one of the most important developments since they bring the two superpowers back to the negotiating table.

— It was expected there would be spill-over into other fora with some progress on negotiations that had been stalled, especially since the Soviets walked out of the Geneva bilateral negotiations on INF and the START talks in November-December 1983.

(2) Canadian Bilateral Discussions

— Canada is active in bilateral arms control discussions with countries from the East and West, and with the Neutral and Non-aligned nations. In recent months government officials have held arms control discussions with the United States, the Soviet Union, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary.

U.N. Official Discusses World Disarmament Campaign During Ottawa Visit

Mr. Jan Martenson, U.N. Under Secretary General, Department for Disarmament Affairs, paid a one-day visit to Ottawa on March 19, 1985. During his visit, he discussed U.N. activities in the field of arms control and disarmament and the U.N. World Disarmament Campaign with Canadian officials. He also met with parliamentarians and members of Canadian non-governmental organizations and made a public address on the World Disarmament Campaign at the Department of External Affairs.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, welcomed the visit of Mr. Martenson in view of the Government of Canada's continuing support of United Nations' efforts to inform, educate and generate public understanding of the efforts being made in the field of arms control and disarmament. In this regard, he referred to a letter sent by Mr. Martenson to Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Stephen Lewis, on Febru-

ary 25. In the letter, Mr. Martenson expressed his gratitude to the Government of Canada for its contribution of \$100,000 to the World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Fund. This contribution was in addition to a similar contribution of \$100,000 in 1983 towards the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign including the work of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Mr. Martenson stated that he was particularly impressed by the fact that Canada is among the few member states to make a double contribution to the campaign fund. "It will indeed further the goals of the campaign," he said, "and we are grateful for your generosity."

Canada has been actively involved in the World Disarmament Campaign since its inception and continues to meet the objectives of the campaign within Canada through a variety of information and research activities in the field of arms control and disarmament.



General view of the United Nations General Assembly.

UN photo/M. Grant



Canada and the NPT: The Enduring Relationship

Canada will be a participant at the Third Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in Geneva from August 27 to September 24, 1985. The following are excerpts from an address on this subject by Douglas Roche, Ambassador for Disarmament, at York University in Toronto on May 16, 1985.

"Keeping in mind the problems of the present international security situation, Canada will strive to achieve two basic objectives at the forthcoming Review Conference:

a) the maintenance of the NPT as the basic element of an effective international non-proliferation régime and,

b) the reaffirmation by the Review Conference of the purpose and provision of the NPT.

Specifically, Canadian goals on the disarmament side will be:

(i) to ensure that the debate on Article VI issues contributes in a positive manner to the overall objectives of the NPT and does not degenerate into an acrimonious debate between the NNA and the nuclear weapon states;

(ii) to reconfirm the need for nuclear weapons states, and particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, to negotiate in good faith toward the adoption of effective measures to achieve a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and a reduction in nuclear arms;

(iii) to emphasize the importance of the NPT as a major contribution to international security;

(iv) to reiterate Canada's strong sympathy for the concept of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) as specified in the NPT where these are feasible and seem likely to contribute to stability; and,

v) to continue to explore, in close consultation with Canada's NATO allies and other like-minded countries, the possibility of other measures, both in nuclear and non-nuclear arms control

fields, which would help to contribute to general progress in arms control and an amelioration of the East-West political climate.

As another practical step in maintaining and strengthening the NPT, Canada, and a number of like-minded countries, have undertaken to approach non-signatory states in an effort to have more countries sign what is already the most widely adhered to international security treaty.

In reaching out to hard-core critics and non-signatories of the NPT, we are making these points:

— To those countries which remain critics of the NPT, and argue that the Treaty is discriminatory, we point out that the same discrimination exists in the United Nations Security Council.

— To those nations that call for an end to the nuclear arms race while refusing themselves to sign the NPT, we suggest that their appeal would be more credible were they a party to the Treaty.

— To those states which retain the nuclear option for perceived regional security considerations, we ask them to consider the tragic and devastating consequences of a limited regional nuclear war.

— Finally, to those nuclear weapons states which insist on remaining outside the Treaty, we strongly suggest that they follow the example already set by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union and to note that the security and sovereignty of these nations has in no way been compromised — on the contrary, it has been enhanced.

The efforts of Canada and other nations in attracting new adherents to the Treaty has already had some success — there are now 128 signatories with every indication of other nations signing in the near future. Whatever the numerical success of this exercise, it has the additional benefit of demonstrating to non-signatories that Parties to the NPT believe in the intrinsic merits and value of the non-proliferation régime offered by the Treaty.

Some criticisms of the NPT are not unfounded. Any agreement that brings together so many diverse nations will be subject to certain strains and problems of compliance. In the international community it is difficult to legislate security — that is what certain articles of the NPT are attempting to do. The NPT, for all its strengths, is still a fragile international instrument whose credibility and applicability must be constantly monitored and nurtured. The NPT cannot be taken for granted.

To those who continue to criticise the Treaty, either from within or without, I would simply reiterate Canada's view. The NPT has weaknesses and flaws, certainly. However, it remains of fundamental importance to the international community and has, in general, served its members well.

What would happen if the non-proliferation régime implemented and protected by the NPT were to collapse? Would the world be better off? I think not. I believe strongly that the world would be much worse off without the NPT — more uncertain, more unstable, more dangerous; it would also be less equitable in the sharing of technological resources and expertise.

The NPT is a rare international instrument, having at once both practical and moral dimensions. The fact that countries are continuing to sign the NPT, and continuing to feel that they should sign the NPT, is a tribute to both the moral force and practical utility of the Treaty. It reflects a basic belief within the international community that proliferation is a bad thing.

The Treaty has survived its first 15 years — not untarnished and not without criticism. An honest review at the Third Review Conference, assessing how the treaty has worked so far, where it has succeeded and where it may have failed, can only serve to strengthen it.

It is the responsibility of Canada, and all nations of the world, to work to strengthen the NPT. Adherence to the letter and spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would result in a powerful non-proliferation régime guaranteeing the reduction, and eventual elimination, of nuclear weapons. That is a goal that commands our highest priority."

Disarmament Bulletin

A review of national and international disarmament and arms control activities



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SSEA Address to the Fortieth Session of the United Nations



The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, addressing the General Assembly, September 25, 1985.

Canapress

On September 25, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, addressed the fortieth session of the United Nations. Following are excerpts from that address.

"Surveying the landscape of world affairs on this fortieth anniversary, we find no field is bleaker than that of arms control and disarmament. We must face the fact that not a single substantive agreement has come out of the multilateral arms control process during the first half of the Second Disarmament Decade. Not at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, not

at the MBFR talks in Vienna, not at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

But I have not come here to lament, rather to offer the encouragement and support of Canada in building a climate of confidence necessary for disarmament agreements. No matter the frustration, we must never give up in our determination to construct a world security system that depends on fewer, not more, arms. If more political will is necessary, then let us assert that political will, particularly as we move into 1986, which has been designated International Year of Peace.

The Disarmament Bulletin is published periodically by the Department of External Affairs. It is intended to be a source of information on arms control and disarmament issues to a broad spectrum of Canadians. If you wish to be placed on our mailing list, or need additional copies, please write to:

The Editor, *The Disarmament Bulletin*, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Dept. of External Affairs, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G2

Cette publication existe également en français.



In the complex process of arms control and disarmament, priorities must be set straight.

First, Canada believes that deep and verifiable reductions in the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons is the highest priority. Moving to lower levels of arms while preserving the stability of the balance at each successive stage of reduction is the only practical way to make progress. Thus we give our full support to the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union now taking place in Geneva. The summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, in 55 days' time, provides an opportunity to chart a new course for the future, leading to practical steps to unlock the disarmament impasse.

Second, for Canada, the achievement of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty continues to be a fundamental and abiding objective. Our aim is to stop all nuclear testing.

Third, the early conclusion of a Chemical Weapons Treaty is now within reach in the Conference on Disarmament.

Fourth, the prevention of an arms race in outer space is now on the world agenda.

Thus, we know where we are going in arms control and disarmament measures. The Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 should continue to be our guide. The remarkable consensus achieved by the world community on that occasion must again be renewed as we look towards the Third Special Session on Disarmament.

The successful review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which concluded last Saturday in Geneva, was a significant step forward. For, by consensus, the states attending the review reaffirmed the viability and vitality of this 130-nation treaty that prevents the spread of nuclear weapons while assuring the international community at large of the benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The international cooperation that characterized the NPT review shows that the multilateral process can and does contribute to strengthened world security.

Canada will continue to play an active role in all the multilateral forums and to strengthen our contributions to confidence-building. In this respect, Canada has devised a Programme of Action for the latter half of this Disarmament Decade. In this Programme, we will step up our work in improving the



Canadian logo marking the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations.

verification process, so necessary to ensuring compliance with negotiated treaties.

To advance work on the verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, we will upgrade our analytical capability in seismic research. We will improve our large seismic facility in the Canadian North. We will expand the ability to differentiate between small earthquakes and underground nuclear tests.

As part of the Programme of Action, we will develop, and make available to the UN, practical studies on chemical weapons use along with Canadian specialists to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons.

Moreover, we will pursue a multilateral agreement to ban the possession as well as the use of all radiological weapons. I call on the United States and the Soviet Union to conclude an effectively verifiable treaty banning radiological weapons. Canada is ready to sign such a treaty immediately.

Details of the day-to-day Canadian work of building the foundation of treaties that will endure will be spelled out in the First Committee.

Also, the relationship between disarmament and development needs further constructive examination. A global military expenditure of nearly \$1 trillion — in the face of dire poverty, famine and destitution in many places in the developing world — is not acceptable. The Canadian people, so well represented in a widening network of non-governmental organizations, feel this discrepancy intensely. They want a world of true human security, in which there is more food and fewer weapons."



The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark (left), has point of interest shown to him by Canada's United Nations Ambassador, Stephen Lewis, just before Mr. Clark's address to the United Nations General Assembly.

Canapress



Canada's National Agenda for Peace

On October 16, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, made the Canadian address to the United Nations First Committee, the main UN General Assembly forum for arms control, disarmament and international security matters. Following are excerpts from that statement.


"Canada, which has a seat at every multilateral disarmament forum, is determined to strengthen the multilateral process in building an enduring peace. We bring to these forums a Canadian policy on arms control and disarmament, which focuses on six areas:

- negotiated radical reductions in nuclear forces and the enhancement of strategic stability;
- maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime;
- support for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as a fundamental and abiding objective of Canadian foreign policy;
- negotiation of a global chemical weapons ban;
- prevention of an arms race in outer space;
- confidence-building measures to facilitate the reduction of military forces in Europe and elsewhere.

To support this policy, the Canadian Government has developed a Programme of Action for the remaining half of the Second Disarmament Decade. Concentrating on practical measures, the Programme aims at laying the groundwork for the creation of confidence and trust vital to achieving disarmament agreements.

With an annual budget of one million dollars, the Department of External Affairs, Verification Research Division, concentrates on several key issues relating to a Comprehensive Test Ban, a global chemical weapons convention and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Both the UNSSOD I Final Document and the Declaration of the Second Disarmament Decade recognized that arms control and disarmament agreements must provide for adequate measures of verification. Some allege that verification is a smokescreen to prevent agreement. But that is not Canada's view. We



Douglas Roche

believe that verification is indispensable because meaningful arms control agreements that will endure cannot be negotiated on the basis of trust alone.

To advance work on the verification of a CTB, Canada will expand seismic research by upgrading our large seismic facility in Yellowknife, in northern Canada. As well, we are continuing work designed to differentiate between small earthquakes and underground nuclear tests. We have participated substantially in the International Seismic Data Exchange.

To support the negotiations on a global chemical weapons ban, Canada has lent its expertise to investigating allegations of chemical weapons use and will shortly present to the UN a manual of procedures for use in such investigations. As well, Canada has undertaken specialized research on a portable kit for the detection, identification and quantification of certain mycotoxins. During its past session, the CD's progress towards concluding a chemical weapons convention was minimal. We call upon all members to redouble their efforts in the urgent conclusion of a global chemical weapons ban.

On the Outer Space question, Canada welcomed the establishment of an *Ad Hoc* Working Group to discuss in greater detail this complex issue. In support of the CD's deliberations, Canada has sub-

mitted a comprehensive study of existing international law relating to arms control and outer space. This survey identifies a number of important themes for examination if an international treaty preventing an arms race in space is to be successfully written. It also serves as an excellent example of the evolution and contemporary relevance of international law to the disarmament process. Canada is also working on the application of space-to-space remote sensing for arms control and disarmament purposes. Follow-up work on the application of space-to-ground sensing is planned.

While much of the world's attention is focused on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, there is a fourth weapon of mass destruction — radiological weapons. Although these weapons were identified by the United Nations almost 40 years ago, there is, as yet, no international agreement of any kind regarding radiological weapons. Since these weapons do not yet exist, the international community has a rare opportunity to prohibit a potentially devastating weapons system, to prevent even its conception, and to do so while the political obstacles to such a ban are at a minimum. There is an urgent need to conclude a Radiological Weapons Convention.

Since 1979, the United States and the Soviet Union have been agreed on the basic text of a treaty to ban radiological weapons. Despite the fact that there has been little or no objection to the substance of the draft treaty, agreement has eluded the Conference on Disarmament which has tried to meet the concerns of some nations to provide, in the same treaty, provision for adequate protection of peaceful nuclear facilities. We believe that agreement on a radiological weapons ban should not await the resolution of this particular problem.

On September 25, in his speech to the General Assembly, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, called on the US and the Soviet Union to conclude a verifiable treaty banning radiological weapons. As well, he indicated Canada's immediate readiness to sign such a treaty.

Canada's Programme of Action, then, is comprised of specific, practical contributions designed to make the arms control process viable and the goal of disarmament realizable."

Canadian Address to Third Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference

Following are excerpts from the statement by the Head of the Canadian Delegation, Douglas Roche, Ambassador for Disarmament, in the General Debate of the Third Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in Geneva on August 29.

"Mr. President, no one under-estimates the gravity of the present situation in the world; there are too many nuclear weapons in existence, and the potential for further development, in quality and quantity, is too strong. There are inequalities among states, resentments, fears. We have to deal with all these reactions. But in the end, logic compels, history demands and the people of the world plead that governments build the process of order, not degenerate into anarchy. Any weakening of the NPT will lead to the very condition — nuclear anarchy — that we are pledged to prevent. The implications of nuclear proliferation are so dangerous for all that we must find a realistic way to constrain such an unacceptable threat to common security and stability. In short, the existing nuclear arms race must cease and the spread of nuclear arms blocked off to prevent nuclear anarchy.

It is with the solid reputation of a country committed to non-proliferation, as well as to nuclear cooperation, that Canada comes to the Third Review Conference of the NPT. Canada's credentials have long been established. Although Canada participated together with the United Kingdom in helping the United States develop the world's first atomic weapons during World War II, it was the first country consciously to forgo the development of nuclear weapons, despite clearly having the technology and capability to do so from the earliest days of the nuclear era. Canada declined to develop a capability to produce nuclear weapons and has adhered firmly to this principle ever since. Instead, Canada has concentrated all of its efforts to the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Canada's nuclear programme is strictly for peaceful purposes and entirely subject to safeguards. With respect to nuclear exports, Canada has a comprehensive nuclear exports policy which is based upon and fully recognizes the central



Aerial view of the Palais des Nations in Geneva, the European Office of the United Nations and site of the Third Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which was held from August 27 to September 24.

UN Photo

value of the NPT as the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime. Specifically, Canada will only export nuclear materials, equipment and technology to those non-nuclear weapon states which have made a comprehensive binding commitment to non-proliferation, either by ratifying the NPT or by having taken an equivalent binding step, and have thereby accepted IAEA safeguards on their entire nuclear programme, current and future....

Mr. President, as we go through our complete review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it will be important to be con-

scious of the successes and failures of not only the past five years but those since the beginning of the nuclear age. Keeping in mind the problems of the present international security situation, Canada will strive to achieve two basic objectives at this Review Conference:

- the maintenance of the NPT as the basic element of an effective international non-proliferation regime;

- the reaffirmation by the Review Conference of the purpose and provisions of the NPT.



These objectives, which may appear modest at first glance, are truly critical ones in the long run. They mean that we must ensure that the debate on Article VI issues contributes in a positive manner to the overall objectives of the NPT and does not degenerate into an acrimonious debate which will only hold hostage progress in other areas of the NPT. They mean a reconfirmation of the need for nuclear weapon states, and particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, to negotiate in good faith towards the adoption of effective measures to achieve a cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and a significant reduction in nuclear arms.

Progress towards a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been traditionally associated with compliance on Article VI. For Canada, the achievement of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty continues to be a fundamental and abiding Canadian objective. We believe that a CTB is a concrete, realistic measure which would constitute a major step in curbing the development of new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons. It is regarded as an extremely important step towards halting both the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. As the UN Secretary-General stated earlier this year, 'It is of direct importance to the future of humanity to end all nuclear explosions. No other means would be as effective in limiting the further development of nuclear weapons.'...

While a review of events in the field of international security provides a checkered image of progress achieved, the situation is quite different if one turns to Articles III and IV of the Treaty. In the area of nuclear non-proliferation/nuclear cooperation, the Treaty has served the world well. Proliferation risks have largely been contained and enhanced cooperation has taken place....

Regarding Article VII, and consistent with Canada's policy of promoting an effective non-proliferation regime based on the NPT, Canada has been strongly supportive of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) where they command the support of the countries in the area and promote regional and international stability. Such zones are not a fully satisfactory alternative to the ratification of the NPT by some of the countries of the areas concerned; nonetheless, in the absence of

universal or near-universal adherence to the NPT, the creation of such zones can make a significant contribution to the objective of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Canada has supported United Nations resolutions calling for such zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia and has welcomed the very important recent declaration of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. Canada has also backed measures which would consolidate the establishment of a NWFZ in Latin America in accordance with the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in spite of Canadian opposition to a provision in the Treaty which allows for the explosion of nuclear devices for so-called peaceful purposes.

In this regard, under Article V, we reiterate Canada's view that the economic value of the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions remains in doubt. We believe that the independent possession of peaceful nuclear explosive devices by

non-nuclear weapon states would pose a threat to regional and international security.

Mr. President, any agreement that brings together so many diverse nations will be subject to certain strains and problems of compliance. In the international community, it is difficult to legislate security — that is what certain articles of the NPT are attempting to do. The NPT, for all its strengths and weaknesses, is still an international instrument whose credibility and applicability must be constantly monitored and nurtured. The NPT cannot be taken for granted. It is a valuable international instrument, having at once both practical and moral dimensions. The fact that countries are continuing to sign the NPT, and continuing to feel that they should sign the NPT, is a tribute to both the moral force and practical utility of the Treaty. It reflects a basic belief within the international community that proliferation is a bad thing and the absence of the NPT would have disastrous results."

NPT Conference a "Glowing Success"

Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, discussed Canada's objectives at the NPT Conference and the results of that Conference during his appearance before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND) on October 6. Following are excerpts from his address to SCEAND.

"A significant step in this direction was taken by the NPT Review Conference. In fact, it was a glowing success. While bad news is frequently its own messenger, good news often goes unnoticed, yet the review, which occurs only every five years, shows what can be achieved in multilateral diplomacy when cooperation replaces confrontation at the basic negotiating stance.

By consensus, the states attending the review reaffirmed the viability and vitality of this 130-nation treaty which prevents the spread of nuclear weapons while assuring the international community at large of the benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The 1980 review

had not been able to achieve this consensus. A second perceived failure would have weakened the NPT at a time when its effectiveness at stopping nuclear weapons proliferation is vital to world security. Thus, the review reaffirmed participating nations' commitment to the NPT as essential to international peace and security. The Conference affirmed its continuing support for the treaty's objectives, which are: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, achieving the cessation of the nuclear arms race and promoting expanded cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Canada's own objectives in the Review Conference were clearly met. Those were two: the maintenance of the NPT as a basic element of the non-proliferation regime and a reaffirmation of the purpose and provisions of the NPT. As well, a wider and enduring objective of Canadian foreign policy was also met. That is, the strengthening and enhancing of the multilateral process. Multilateralism, like an effective global non-proliferation regime, is a cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy."

NATO Ministerial Communiqué

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Lisbon, June 6-7. The following is the text of their joint communiqué.

"1. We are a defensive Alliance dedicated to the preservation of peace and the protection of freedom.

2. Reaffirming the principles of last year's Washington Statement on East-West Relations, we remain determined to maintain both our political solidarity and the military strength necessary for our defence. On this basis, we seek genuine *détente* through constructive dialogue and broad cooperation with the Soviet Union and with each of the countries of Eastern Europe in all areas. We call on the new Soviet leadership to join us in seeking tangible improvements in East-West relations, which would permit us to build on areas of common interest. A positive Soviet response to the US approach at the US-Soviet negotiations recently opened in Geneva would contribute substantially towards that end.

3. We do not seek military superiority for ourselves. None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. But, faced with the continuing build-up and modernization of Soviet nuclear and conventional arms, we shall preserve credible deterrence through sufficient conventional and nuclear forces. The Allies participating in the military structure of the Alliance are making an effort to improve, in particular, their conventional capabilities. Our strategy of deterrence has proved its value in safeguarding peace; it remains fully valid. Its purpose is to prevent war and to enable us to resist intimidation.

4. The security of the North American and European Allies is inseparable. The cohesion of the Alliance is sustained by continuous consultations on all matters affecting our common interests and security.

5. Deterrence and defence together with arms control and disarmament are integral parts of the security policy of

the Alliance. We wish to strengthen the peace by establishing a stable military balance at the lowest possible level of forces.

6. In this spirit, we welcome the US-Soviet negotiations in Geneva on their strategic nuclear weapons, on their intermediate-range nuclear weapons and on defence and space systems. These negotiations are intended to work out between the two countries effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability. We strongly support US efforts in all three areas of negotiation, and we call on the Soviet Union to adopt a positive approach. The Allies concerned reiterate their willingness to modify, halt, reverse, or dispense with Longer-Range INF (LRINF) deployment as part of an equitable and verifiable arms control agreement. In the absence of such an agreement, they will continue to deploy LRINF missiles on schedule. We will continue to consult closely on all of these issues¹.

7. We are determined to achieve progress also on other aspects of arms control and disarmament and urge the Soviet Union to work with us for balanced and verifiable agreements. In particular:

- in the Vienna MBFR negotiations the participating Allies are seeking equal collective manpower levels through verifiable reductions in conventional forces in Europe and effective associated measures;
- in Stockholm (CDE) we are seeking agreement on militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable confidence and security building measures covering the whole of Europe to give new, concrete effect and expression to the existing duty of all participating states to refrain from the threat or use of force;
- in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament we seek in particular a world-wide comprehensive and verifiable ban on Chemical Weapons; we remain deeply concerned about the proliferation and use of such weapons.

8. We attach great importance to the full implementation by all participating states



Opening statement by Portuguese Prime Minister Mario Soares at the start of the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Lisbon on June 6, 1985. Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos

¹ Greece and Denmark reserve their positions on the INF part of this paragraph.



of all principles and provisions enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and to balanced progress in the CSCE process in all its aspects. The tenth anniversary of the Final Act in August 1985 should be commemorated by a meeting of the participating states at Ministerial level. We would like to see the anniversary marked by substantial progress in the CSCE process, including meaningful results at the important meeting on Human Rights in Ottawa. We also hope for a positive exchange of views at the Cultural Forum in Budapest in the Autumn.

9. We strongly condemn terrorism and will continue to work to eliminate this threat to our citizens and to the democratic values we hold in common.

10. In the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, we remain fully committed to promoting the stability and well-being of our community of free nations, sharing common values. We consequently reaffirm the importance of special programmes for less favoured partners.

11. The maintenance of a calm situation in and around Berlin, including unhindered traffic on all access routes, remains an essential element in East-West relations. We support the efforts of the Federal Republic of Germany to achieve progress in inner-German relations which can make a significant contribution to the building of confidence in Europe and benefit the German people, particularly the Berliners.

12. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, now in its sixth year, violates fundamental principles of international law. We urge the Soviet Union to put an end to the suffering of the Afghan people, by withdrawing its troops and agreeing to a political solution restoring the independence and non-aligned status of Afghanistan.

Events in Poland underscore the continuing need for genuine dialogue between the various elements of society and for national reconciliation.

We, for our part, respect the sovereignty and independence of all states. We will remain vigilant and will consult on events outside the Treaty area which might threaten our common security."

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain reserves his Government's position on the present communiqué.

Prime Minister's Statement Regarding the Strategic Defence Initiative

On September 7, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney made the following statement regarding Canadian participation in the Strategic Defence Initiative.

"On March 26 the United States invited Canada and other friendly countries to participate directly in research under the Strategic Defence Initiative. After careful and detailed consideration the Government of Canada has concluded that Canada's own policies and priorities do not warrant a government-to-government effort in support of SDI research. Although Canada does not intend to participate on a government-to-government basis on the SDI research program, private companies and institutions interested in

participating in the program will continue to be free to do so.

As stated in the House of Commons on January 21, 1985, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, this Government believes that SDI research by the United States is both consistent with the ABM Treaty and prudent in light of significant advances in Soviet research and deployment of the world's only existing ballistic missile defence system.

I conveyed this decision today to the President of the United States and informed him of this. I had discussed it, as you might imagine, with my caucus and my cabinet. And that is our position with regard to this particular item."

The Strategic Defence Initiative: Nielsen Letter

On September 7, the Prime Minister's Office released the text of a letter from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence, Erik Nielsen, to the US Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger. The following is the text of that letter.

"Dear Mr. Weinberger:

On March 26 you wrote to me extending to the Government of Canada and to other friendly governments an invitation to participate directly in research under the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI).

My colleagues and I have given this issue careful and detailed consideration. A Parliamentary Committee has conducted extensive public consultations across the country. Upon reflection, the Government of Canada has concluded that Canada's own policies and priorities do not warrant a government-to-government effort in support of SDI research.

In conveying this decision to you, there are a number of additional points I would like to make. We believe that the

extensive existing cooperation in defence research between our two countries is mutually beneficial and should be encouraged to grow. The Government is committed to further development of this cooperation and will continue to welcome further research arrangements with the United States, consistent always with Canada's national interest and its research and development priorities. Although Canada does not intend to participate on a government-to-government basis in the SDI research program, private companies and institutions interested in participating in the program will continue to be free to do so.

As Canada has previously stated, our Government believes that SDI research by the United States is both consistent with the ABM Treaty and prudent in light of significant advances in Soviet research and deployment of the world's only existing ballistic missile defence system.

I look forward to continuing to work closely with you as we together address the vital security issues facing us.

Sincerely, Erik Nielsen"



The United Nations Disarmament Commission

The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), a deliberative body operating as an offshoot of the UN General Assembly, met at the United Nations in New York in May of this year. The six items on its agenda were the arms race in all its aspects, the reduction of military budgets, South Africa's nuclear capability, curbing the naval arms race, the role of the UN in disarmament and the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. All 159 UN member states are represented in the UNDC.

On May 8, Mr. Douglas Roche, the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, made the opening Canadian address to the Commission. He said that a central task before delegates was to appraise the progress made during the Second Disarmament Decade. He pointed out that "at the midway point of the decade, achievement has been zero". He stated:

"Instead of concrete progress, we are slipping away from the goal to which all countries subscribed when they gave a consensus agreement to the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978.

It is as though we have forgotten the ringing call to sanity that we flashed around the world in 1978: 'Mankind is confronted with a choice; we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation'."

In dealing with the item on the arms race, Ambassador Roche outlined the Canadian Government's priorities: to contribute to progress in the US/USSR bilateral talks; to work for a comprehensive test ban treaty; to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; to work for the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons; and to work towards the prevention of an arms race in outer space. He referred to the resumption of bilateral negotiations in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union as offering renewed hope for substantive cuts in nuclear arms. He said "every step possible must be taken in the multilateral forums to reinforce the bilateral

process" and that "we must find a way to break out of the present impasse on arms control and disarmament issues if the multilateral process is not to lose all credibility". As he pointed out, "our job — here in the UNDC and in all other multilateral forums — is clear: cut out the dithering and get down to work".

In addressing the other UNDC agenda items, he made the following points: "Last year the UNDC continued its effort to elaborate the principles that should govern states in freezing and reducing military budgets, but could not reach final agreement on a set of guidelines. The Canadian delegation has supported the idea of reducing military expenditures. In our view, the reporting exercise which the United Nations has devised is a prerequisite for progress on this issue and we have given it our support by annually completing the standardized reporting instrument. We urge states which have not yet completed the standardized reporting instrument to do so as soon as possible to enable real progress to be made in reducing military spending levels globally. Without such a data base, any attempt to reduce military budgets will remain but a pious profession of intent.

There is currently underway a comprehensive study on the naval arms race by a group of governmental experts established by the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly... Consequently, the Disarmament Commission would be advised to consider this item only after completion of the study which is to be submitted to the fortieth UNGA.

It is our hope that a consensus can be reached at this session on the item relating to South Africa's nuclear capability. Canada's position is one of clear and consistent opposition to the repugnant apartheid policies of South Africa. We have also consistently attempted to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime. We, therefore, support calls for all states, including South Africa, to make an internationally binding non-proliferation commitment and to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards."

In a later intervention when dealing

with the role of the United Nations in disarmament, the Canadian delegation warned the UN about "overextending its limited resources to too many inconclusive undertakings. It should aim at successfully accomplishing a few important tasks." What these tasks should be is "a matter of priorities:

"Certain priorities have already been set in the UNSSOD I Final Document. The highest priority has been given to the question of nuclear weapons. Concern about preventing the weaponization of outer space before it is too late is also uppermost in the minds of most countries. The dangers regarding the proliferation and actual use of chemical weapons surely warrant that that subject be included in the short list as well. The UN has already embarked on two other global projects — the Reduction of Military Budgets and Disarmament and Development — on which it should follow through. Whatever mechanism is devised to set the UN's priorities, it surely will include these major items as requiring the UN's full attention at this stage."

The Canadian delegation expressed concern that "unless it can produce some concrete results, the United Nations General Assembly runs the risk of losing credibility and of having only a marginal role in arms control and disarmament matters."

The delegation made the following comments on ways to strengthen the UN's role in the field of disarmament:

"(a) We would like to see a sharper focus on top priority issues by the General Assembly.

(b) We would like to see strong, practical support for the United Nations disarmament efforts from the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the Secretariat and related United Nations bodies which will enhance the negotiating and deliberative processes and broaden public knowledge of the issues.

(c) We would like to see the removal of the procedural obstacles to negotiations by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

(d) We would like to see a greater sensitizing of the Security Council to the arms control and disarmament problem in the context of the broad efforts to



prevent the resort to force and to create the positive political atmosphere which is needed for negotiations on arms control and disarmament.

(e) We would also like to see the Secretary-General's good offices role developed further as a contribution to 'preventive diplomacy'.

(f) We believe greater attention needs to be paid to dealing with the tensions and sensitivities in a regional context, such as to reduce the pressure for armaments."

While focusing on improvement of the United Nations machinery for dealing with disarmament, the Canadian delegation emphasized the importance of improving the political dialogue among member states and groupings.

In another intervention concerning the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, Ambassador Roche noted that the various objectives, goals and

priorities set out in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade had yet to be realized.

He hoped that the spirit of cooperation which the USA and the USSR seemed to be seeking at the UNDC would be reflected in the bilateral negotiations in Geneva and that it would lead to significant and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

In outlining Canada's efforts, Ambassador Roche pointed out that:

"— Essentially, our objective is the prevention of all war in the nuclear age, not only nuclear war but conventional war.

— The task of preventing war requires all states to do their utmost to ensure that force is no longer viewed as an appropriate instrument for settling international disputes and that both its use and the threat of its use are eliminated from international relations as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

— It is our intention to contribute first and foremost, to the extent that we can, to improving the political atmosphere, particularly between East and West, in an effort to encourage the creation of trust and the political will that are essential for progress on these issues.

— It is also our intention to work towards practical proposals and to develop technical back-up for negotiations.

— There is a need for an improved climate of confidence, for concrete disarmament commitments and for respect for them.

— Effective disarmament commitments will be achieved only through negotiations that ensure international stability and security at the lowest level of arms.

— Disarmament agreements, to be accepted, will, in our view, require effective verification systems that will provide the necessary confidence and trust.

— We regard verification as a means for facilitating the conclusion of agreements on disarmament, not for dragging them out or preventing them."

The importance of establishing effective verification systems was underlined by the Canadian Government's allocation of \$1 million annually to a Verification Research Programme to provide back-up technical support to Canada's disarmament negotiations.

At the concluding plenary session on May 30, Ambassador Roche said that the UNDC session had not been devoid of some value. Among other things, it did reveal the direction of the international community's thinking on disarmament issues. Nevertheless, "any concerned observer would be forced to conclude that the UNDC had been sleepwalking through one of the most important moments in history". Canada hoped that the UNDC would begin to play a more worthwhile role.

If it were to do so, however, there had to be political will: "in the end, we come back, as we always do, to the question of political will... The words are so easily spoken, so difficult to generate. Yet we can never give up. Future generations depend on us".



Opening Session of the 1985 Disarmament Commission on May 6. Chairman Mansur Ahmad (Pakistan) (left) addressing the opening meeting. Next to him are Fehmi Alem, Secretary, and Don Arturo Laclaustra (Spain), Rapporteur.

UN Photo



Disarmament: The Western Approach

Canada, along with other members of the Western Group, submitted the following working paper on Agenda Item 4 of the Disarmament Commission entitled "The general approach to nuclear and conventional disarmament negotiations."

Working paper: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

"1. The objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, proclaimed for many years now, still appears remote in the light of the international situation and the current arms build-up.

2. In order to define a coherent and realistic approach to the problem of disarmament, the first question that must be asked is what were the determining factors in this course of events.

3. Most States have always considered their own military means of defence, or those of the alliances to which they belong, as an essential factor in their security and their independence.

4. The process of arms accumulation, triggered by a particular concept of defence requirements, is brought about by the mutual distrust which, in turn, it helps to aggravate. The sponsors of this document are aware of the risks stemming from the arms race in various sectors. Under these circumstances, general and complete disarmament cannot be envisaged in the absence of effective measures to eliminate the threat or use of force. Fundamental provisions in this respect were laid down by the founders of the United Nations, who called for peaceful settlement of disputes, sovereign equality and cooperation, and a collective security system.

5. For this reason, it is essential, in order to arrive at general and complete disarmament, to enhance the role of the United Nations, particularly the role which derives from the above provisions.

6. The countless violations of these prin-

ciples and the consequent realization that effective means of preventing or punishing them are lacking have given rise to an increase in the mistrust which is one of the basic causes of the arms build-up. The restoration of a climate of trust must be sought in specific commitments which would strengthen the principles already solemnly established so as to eliminate the gap between outward intentions and reality.

7. Solving the problem of disarmament must therefore necessarily entail a search for all possible means of ensuring that the solemn commitments already entered into are respected, and that the respect for them is not seen as lacking credibility.

8. The sponsors of this document are convinced that the objective of disarmament can be attained only in an international environment of increased stability and equilibrium, as well as through the application of balanced and verifiable reductions in all sectors of armaments.


9. They are equally convinced that all States have a vital interest in disarmament, and that each State therefore bears a share of the responsibility for efforts towards reducing armaments.

10. In the opinion of the sponsors, negotiations are the only realistic way of achieving progress in the sphere of disarmament. There is thus an urgent need to step up and broaden bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations aimed at a balanced and verifiable decrease in the level of armaments.

11. The sponsors feel bound to emphasize their satisfaction at the resumption in Geneva of the bilateral negotiations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on nuclear and space weapons.

12. The vital importance of these talks should, however, not divert attention from all the efforts that must be made in other forums, or from the need for balanced and verifiable reductions in all types of armaments.

13. In this context, the sponsors of this document consider that the United Nations, as well as the Conference on



General view of the United Nations headquarters in New York. UN Photo

Disarmament at Geneva, have a basic role to play so as to make a decisive contribution to the attainment of the objective of disarmament under effective international control.

14. Since the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all their aspects is a matter of universal concern, all States are urged to contribute to the attainment of the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. States should implement fully all the provisions of the relevant international treaties to which they are parties.

15. Under current international circumstances, it would appear that a general approach to disarmament negotiations can only envisage gradual or sectoral measures, which would, however, contribute to the objectives of balanced and verifiable reduction of the general level of armaments, to stability and to an improvement in the international climate.

16. To this end, it is essential to ensure that the application of future agreements should not give rise to doubts as to their effectiveness and to questions regarding compliance, since this would have the effect of increasing distrust and making the search for subsequent progress still more difficult.



17. It is for this basic reason that the sponsors of the present document believe it essential for any disarmament agreement to include an effective verification system. A general approach to disarmament negotiations can establish priorities only in the light of this fundamental requirement.

18. The magnitude of the risk that a nuclear conflict would entail has been, and still is, an essential element in the prevention of conflicts. It also explains the importance which is attached to disarmament negotiations in the nuclear field.

19. Successive events since 1945 have shown the consequences, in millions of deaths and in devastation, of the use of conventional weapons. The sponsors are therefore convinced that a gradual and balanced reduction of conventional weapons would have a positive impact on the reduction of tension and hence on the prospects for disarmament in general, and the reduction of nuclear weapons in particular.

20. The study on conventional disarmament carried out by the group of experts set up for this purpose drew attention to a series of other positive aspects which should make progress in this area possible.

21. On the basis of these considerations, the sponsors believe that a general approach to disarmament negotiations on both nuclear and conventional weapons should be based on the following principles:

- (a) The priority objective is the prevention of all conflicts;
- (b) all States should contribute to negotiations aimed at the conclusion of balanced and verifiable disarmament agreements, while bearing in mind the special responsibility of the two major Powers;
- (c) the agreements should provide for concrete measures, and should not be limited to declaratory and rhetorical commitments;
- (d) the agreements should include an effective verification system so as to avoid the risk of suspected or actual violations heightening mistrust between the parties;
- (e) the negotiations on the subject of disarmament should result in a balance at the lowest level of forces and promote stability;
- (f) with a view to preventing all types of conflicts, the negotiations should take

into account the risks not only of nuclear conflicts, but also of those of a conventional nature;

(g) within this framework, conventional disarmament should be considered as an essential element of the global disarmament process;

(h) negotiations in this field should be pursued with the parallel aim of concluding balanced and verifiable agreements

on measures to lessen the risk of surprise attacks and build confidence;

(i) the Conference on Disarmament, as the single standing multilateral negotiating body, should play a leading role in solving the complex of items that are on its agenda, as well as in drawing up vital agreements such as the one now being negotiated on the subject of chemical weapons."

University of Saskatchewan Hosts Symposium on Bhopal Gas Tragedy

The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

The University of Saskatchewan hosted an international symposium September 25-27 entitled "Highly Toxic Chemicals: Detection and Protection Methods". Participants came from the USA, UK, Sweden and France as well as from Canada. The keynote speaker was Professor J.M. Dave, Dean of the School of Environmental Sciences at Jawaharlal Nehru University in India. Professor Dave and his staff were involved in the immediate scientific investigation as well as in the longer-term inquiry related to the Bhopal gas tragedy in early December 1984.

The Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs recognized that there might be lessons to be learned from the Indian investigation of this tragic event which could be relevant to Canada's interest in developing procedures for the investigation of allegations of the use of chemical weapons. Given the scientific focus of the symposium and its relation to verification problems, it was partially funded by the Department's Verification Research Programme.

The tragedy that befell Bhopal had nothing whatsoever to do with the production or use of chemical weapons. It was an industrial accident, albeit one of mammoth scale, in which approximately 2 500 people are reported to have died and many thousands of others required medical treatment. Apparently the release of methyl isocyanate (used for the production of the insecticide Sevin) and, pos-

sibly, certain other chemicals occurred over a period of less than an hour. It is estimated that 150 000 to 200 000 people of a city population of 800 000 were exposed to the gas discharge.

In this context, the problems encountered by the Indian authorities in investigating the gas release and in determining the cause of injury and death were all of particular concern to participants in the symposium. Even in this well-defined situation where officials and scientists had timely access to the site and knowledge of what the plant was producing and of its production process, there is still considerable speculation and controversy over the cause of the immediate (as opposed to longer-term) deaths. If such problems exist in "verifying" an incident in which authorities have timely access with all of the necessary medical and scientific support, this highlights the difficulties involved in verifying allegations of the use of chemical weapons in remote areas where access — timely or otherwise — may not be permitted.

One presentation at the symposium, by Dr. Ron Sutherland of the University of Saskatchewan, drew a parallel between the requirements of investigations of accidental discharges of chemicals and investigations of the alleged use of chemical weapons. He suggested that an ancillary role for a technical secretariat, which might form part of the verification regime of a future chemical weapons convention (currently being negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament), could be to assist national authorities, especially of developing countries, in the event of industrial disasters in the future.



Canadian Statement at Helsinki Meeting

The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, attended the meeting to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in Helsinki, Finland, July 31. Following are excerpts from that address.

"Ten years ago, the signature of the Final Act evoked a wide range of reactions. Some believed that the hostility and uncertainty which had marked East-West relations for so long would quickly melt away under the bright sun of *détente*. Others viewed the Final Act as a hortatory set of principles which would be ignored and soon forgotten. Most of us, however, viewed the Final Act with both hope and realism. Certainly Canada did.

Hope was essential: Canada has deep roots in Europe; our historical origins are in Europe; and we have shared both the profound benefits of Europe's political and social ideals and the tragic costs of Europe's wars. Experience had shown that even longstanding divisions could



The Secretary of State for External Affairs addressing the Helsinki Meeting on the CSCE Final Act on July 31. Canapress

be healed, or at least managed peaceably. We wanted to nurture the hope that solutions could be found to those divisions which still threatened the peace and security of the family of Europe, wherever we might live.

Hope, however, was tempered by realism. The tortuous negotiations which had led to the Final Act made it painfully clear that distrust and hostility were very deeply rooted and that productive dialogue would take time, patience and, above all, commitment.

The Final Act, nevertheless, represented a beginning. A balanced product of compromise, it seemed to express a common determination among the participating states that desire for understanding and cooperation prevail over sterile confrontation. The CSCE had established itself as a multilateral forum in which participating states, without seeking to threaten the systems of others, could seek common ground. It agreed upon a set of norms and principles which, if adhered to in their totality, formed a sound basis for the conduct of civilized relationships not only among governments, but also between governments and their own citizens. Finally, the CSCE provided an opportunity for *all* signatory states to contribute to efforts to relax tensions between East and West.

It was therefore possible, in 1975, to be hopeful without being unrealistic, and Canada was determined to make a constructive contribution to a process which held out the promise of a new and positive approach.

We have maintained that commitment, Mr. Chairman, but when the accomplishments of the past decade are measured against the potential which seemed to exist in 1975, Canadians feel disappointment and concern.

During the review of the implementation of the Final Act in Belgrade and in Madrid, it was clear that there had been very little progress in implementing the undertakings of 1975, and what is worse, that in most fields, there had been a slipping back.

Since then, the situation has become

even less promising. Denial of self-determination to the people of one country began even before the Madrid meeting opened. It continues today, and is intervention in the true meaning of the sixth principle, even if the victim is not a participating state, since we all agreed in 1975 to behave towards states outside the circle of the 35 in the same way we behave towards the states within it. We have seen the fear of intervention affect a participating state during the course of the Madrid meeting. Non-compliance on this scale inevitably corroded the hopes we shared in 1975 and threatened the credibility of the CSCE process.

Canadians have a deep and abiding concern about human rights. The situation in some countries is much worse than it was in 1975. Individuals who believed the assurance of their leaders that they had the right to know and to act upon their human rights have paid for their trust in prison, in labour camps and in exile. In the recent Human Rights Experts Meeting in Ottawa, we did not attempt to expand the human rights which should be assured to all individuals. There is little point in adding new undertakings when some states will not implement the rights which they have already agreed are inherent in the dignity of human beings.

The Ottawa meeting did produce one good result: some states had claimed that the discussion of human rights in all countries of the Final Act was beyond the ambit of CSCE meetings, but made their own claim indefensible by themselves engaging in criticism of practices in other countries. This is a development we welcome. However, those countries — and they included those which maintained that the Final Act was a sacred text which could not be varied, having been signed by the highest political leaders — made an attempt to turn the Final Act on its head by claiming that rights which received only indirect treatment in the Final Act were of greater consequence than those fundamental human rights which were the main object of the seventh principle. It will have to be recognized that certain rights are fundamental and others are goals to be pursued — goals which will be progressively elaborated and expanded. This distinction is found in the language of the seventh principle and also in the United Nations documents to which the final paragraph of that principle particularly refers.



At the opening of the Ottawa meeting, I said that issues of central importance such as human rights cannot and must not be avoided just because they are sensitive and can sometimes give rise to disagreement between governments. The subject of human rights will remain prominent on the international agenda, because respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is essential to the development of friendly relations and cooperation among us.

Mr. Chairman, when the Final Act was adopted, nobody expected an instant change in human rights practices, or in other fields. What we expected was a gradual improvement, just as those of us who believe deeply in individual human rights continually try to improve our own performance. It is movement in the opposite direction, inadvertently or deliberately, that we must guard against: non-compliance in one area raises serious doubts about the likelihood that commitments in other fields will be fulfilled.

I recognize, Mr. Chairman, that there is a gulf within the CSCE between two very different approaches to the relationship between the individual and the state. We would be deluding ourselves if we thought these differences in approach would disappear quickly. Others, however, would be mistaken if they concluded that Canada's concerns about human rights, human contacts and freer and wider dissemination of information arose from a desire to disturb the internal stability of other states; we simply do not believe that any government represented here is so weak or should feel so insecure that it must treat as criminals or traitors those individuals who believe that we all meant what we said in the Final Act. We take this occasion to affirm that failure to implement the provisions dealing with human rights is related directly to progress on other provisions.

In the field of security, results have been very slow in coming. After more than 18 months, the Stockholm Conference has not achieved any visible progress in concluding the tasks specified in the Madrid mandate. Canada has high hopes that substantive cooperation can emerge from honest dialogue — that the Conference can make a major contribution to the process of building mutual confidence. But these hopes become difficult to sustain — and difficult for our people to share — in the face of an



Group photo of 35 foreign ministers assembled in Helsinki to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the CSCE Final Act.

Canapress

apparent attempt to avoid negotiating a set of confidence-building measures, including a comprehensive programme for cooperation in military affairs. I think it is important to note, Mr. Chairman, that these measures were designed to apply equally to the two alliances in Europe. Security is reciprocal: it does not flow from one side demanding unilateral advantages at the expense of the other. We will go forward together, or not at all. Deeds, not words, are the key to mutual confidence, and we shall therefore continue to press for specific undertakings in the field of information and verification....

It is obvious that the CSCE process has not yet fulfilled the promise which so many of us saw in it in 1975. However, despite the lack of measurable progress, the CSCE provided, and will continue to provide, an opportunity for dialogue. That should not be underestimated, particularly if the many strands of dialogue can be woven into a fabric of greater understanding and broader agreement among all signatory states, regardless of their size. But if the CSCE degenerates further into a dialogue of the deaf; if we consistently talk past each other; if, indeed, the very words we use have different meanings, then what can we accomplish? If we continue to indulge in semantic manoeuvring and avoid concrete ac-

tion, how long can the credibility of the CSCE process survive? The credibility of the process is vital, Mr. Chairman. If we simply keep issuing documents and restating our obligations, without carrying out the undertakings we have committed ourselves to at the highest political level, then we run the risk of destroying faith in the utility of the CSCE system. Moreover, without steady progress towards full implementation of all aspects of the Final Act, it will be impossible to create the confidence which is essential to the improvement of East-West relations, which was our primary goal ten years ago. In my view, unless we can create that confidence, it will be particularly difficult to make progress in the fields of arms control and disarmament.

We must never lose sight of the fact that the people whose representatives and leaders we are, will inevitably — and justifiably — question the value of the forms of cooperation spelled out in the Final Act if they do not see concrete and tangible evidence of this cooperation touching their everyday lives. Does cooperation contribute to our sense of security? Does it make it easier for people to get together, regardless of the ideological community in which they live? These are questions for which our people expect more positive answers than we have provided so far."

Canada Contributes to CD Discussions on Outer Space

The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva began detailed consideration this year of the question of arms control and outer space. On March 29 the 40 members of the CD agreed on a mandate for an *Ad Hoc* Committee (AHC) on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. This mandate called upon the AHC to examine, "through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space," taking into account all existing agreements, existing proposals and future initiatives.

Canada took an active role in the development of this mandate and, as in the past, participated in general discussions within the CD on the subject of arms control and outer space. For example, in 1982 Canada tabled the first substantive working paper on the issue which dealt with the possible stabilizing and destabilizing effects of systems in space. This year, with the establishment of the AHC, Canada made a significant, practical contribution to the AHC's deliberations by submitting two additional working papers.

On July 2, Canada's Ambassador to the CD, Alan Beesley, tabled a comprehensive, two-volume compendium of working papers and final records of the CD which relate to outer space (CD 606, July 4, 1985). The compendium is similar to those which Canada had previously tabled on chemical weapons and on radiological weapons. This working document had the practical aim of providing to the members of the AHC, early in their discussions, concrete documentation upon which they could draw. The size of the two-volume compendium also illustrated the extent of past work by the CD on this matter.

This Canadian contribution was very well received. The Swedish delegate, for example, speaking in the AHC on July 29, thanked Canada for this "excellent reference" source. Numerous other delegations also privately expressed



The Conference on Disarmament opened its 1985 Session in Geneva on February 5. At the presiding table are (from left to right): Ambassador R. Ian T. Cromartie (United Kingdom), outgoing President; Erik Suy, Director-General, UN Office at Geneva; Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs; Thomas Barthelemy (United States), Deputy Representative to the Conference; Ambassador Donald Lowitz (United States), President; and Miljan Komatina, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General.

UN Photo

their appreciation to Canada. More than 100 copies were distributed to the 40 members of the CD.

The second Canadian working paper was tabled on July 23 as part of Canada's participation in the AHC's review of existing agreements related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Canada felt that such a review was an essential step to the fulfilment of the mandate of the AHC. Not only did it help underline the full scope of the questions involved but, more importantly, it helped to ensure that what the AHC accomplished would be in conformity with, and not at cross purposes to, existing treaties and international law. It was felt that the time spent in reviewing the existing legal regime would speed up rather than delay the successful results of the AHC's deliberations.

This second working paper by Canada, entitled *Survey of International Law Relevant to Arms Control and Outer Space* (CD/618, July 23, 1985), derives in part from a study undertaken by the Institute of Air and Space Law at McGill University in Montreal at the invitation of the Department of External Affairs. The McGill study forms part of a programme by the Government of Canada to include non-governmental organizations, where possible, in the arms control and disarmament process.

The working paper identifies more than 20 international agreements, including the United Nations Charter itself, which are of significance to the process in which the AHC is engaged. The paper does *not* put forth nor represent a Canadian Government position on any issue. Rather it seeks to provide a broad interpretation of a variety of views in a



balanced, non-provocative manner, so as to provide a useful data base for the benefit of each member of the CD.

The working paper highlights a number of areas in international law relevant to outer space which deserve attention. During the period between the end of the AHC's present deliberations and the commencement of the CD session in 1986, the Canadian Government will make full use of this survey when reviewing Canadian policy relevant to arms control and outer space. It is Canada's hope that other governments might similarly use the Canadian working paper as a reference point in their own review of the subject.

Several delegations publicly expressed their appreciation for Canada's second working paper. The Sri Lankan delegate, for example, speaking on July 30, congratulated Canada for the survey paper and stated, "We are particularly impressed by the non-partisan and objective approach of the paper apart, of course, from its sound professionalism and thoroughness."

Both Canadian working papers and Canada's active participation in the deliberations of the AHC on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space demonstrate Canada's sincere commitment to the successful fulfilment of the AHC's mandate. Canada will continue its practical efforts towards a thorough examination by the CD of this important area and towards taking whatever necessary steps emerge from this examination.

The Committee on Disarmament concluded its 1985 discussions on August 30. The wide-ranging discussions, which highlighted the complexity of a number of problems, led to a better understanding of positions. The importance and urgency of arms control and outer space were recognized.

Canada believes that the exploratory work begun by the CD this year under the AHC's mandate remains incomplete and that a similar mandate next year would be relevant and realistic. It would permit a considerable amount of concrete work to be accomplished while not interfering or prejudicing the bilateral negotiations underway on this subject between the USA and USSR.

Contribution to World Disarmament Campaign

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, announced on October 31, a Canadian contribution of \$100 000 to the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs said this contribution demonstrates the continuing support of the Government of Canada for the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign — to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. The Government of Canada has made two previous contributions of \$100 000 each to the World Disarmament Campaign, in March 1983 and in October 1984.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs announced that Canada will direct \$50 000 of its contribution to the United Nations *Disarmament Yearbook*. The *Yearbook*, prepared by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, is a reference document serving both a specialized readership and those among the general public interested in learning more about activities in the multi-lateral arms control and disarmament forums. It fulfills an important information role in the context of the World Disarmament Campaign. Canada's contribution is to be used towards all aspects

of the production and distribution of the *Yearbook* so that this useful publication will be accessible to a larger audience.

Canada will direct \$40 000 of its contribution to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). UNIDIR, based in Geneva, is an autonomous institution within the United Nations framework that was established in 1980 and undertakes independent research on disarmament and related security issues. UNIDIR is funded from voluntary contributions from states, public and private organizations. The Canadian contribution will facilitate research by UNIDIR into the verification issue in current arms control and disarmament negotiations. This is in keeping with the important role that verification has to play in this area and with the emphasis on verification in the Canadian Programme of Action for the second half of the United Nations Disarmament Decade announced by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 25, 1985. The Secretary of State for External Affairs announced that the remaining \$10 000 of the contribution would be directed to the International Year of Peace (IYP) Voluntary Trust Fund, to assist in the financing of activities undertaken by the United Nations during the IYP in 1986.



Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations, Stephen Lewis (left), presenting a cheque for \$100 000 to UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Jan Martensson, on February 21. The cheque represented Canada's second voluntary contribution to the World Disarmament Campaign.

UN Photo



Nuclear Winter: Royal Society of Canada Report

In January 1985, the Committee on the Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War presented its report to the Royal Society of Canada. This study was undertaken at the request of the Government of Canada. Following are the summary and conclusions of the report.

"1. A nuclear winter in the wake of a major nuclear exchange appears to be a formidable threat. If calculations are correct — and the Committee believes them credible — temperatures in the interior of continents will plunge by many degrees shortly after the exchange, probably far below freezing in many mid-latitude areas. Severe damage or destruction will ensue for crops and vegetation. The winter will last for some weeks to several months, and will have lasting repercussions.

Strategic Considerations

2. Canada should consider at once the military, strategic and social consequences of such a major climatic anomaly, notwithstanding the many uncertainties;

3. A nuclear winter would globalize the potential environmental impact of major nuclear war. No country would be immune;

4. A nuclear winter would imperil the food and drinking water supplies of all survivors in mid-latitude nations, and probably the whole world;

5. An aggressor who delivered a first strike sufficient to knock out an opponent could not win. A strike on such a scale, even if there were no response, would trigger a nuclear winter even for the aggressor;

6. There would be few spectators; non-combatant nations would be the helpless victims of a nuclear winter, just as would the combatants;

7. Even if Canada were not attacked, there would be major damage to its agriculture, forests and fisheries. A summer exchange would be especially damaging to Canada;

8. The USSR is also extremely vulnerable. The nuclear winter would

affect her territories severely. Her agriculture is already very sensitive to drought and frost. It could not survive a nuclear winter.

There remain many uncertainties. We cannot be sure that these effects are certain, and we hope that they never happen. But we are convinced that the Canadian Government should include them in its strategic reckoning.

The Models

9. The models are for the most part credible as to the broad nature of the climatic impacts that will follow a major nuclear exchange, though the details are no more than plausible;

10. Although the results must be interpreted with care, a *prima facie* case has been made that a nuclear winter will follow from nuclear explosions of a wide range of severity, including those that are considered quite small in present strategic scenarios. Every effort should be made to clear up the uncertainties that remain;

11. Criticisms of the models by Teller, Singer, Maddox and others make some valid points, but do not invalidate the main thrust of the model results.

Climatic Impact

12. Although the main impact on climate would be manifest in three latitudes where the major nuclear exchange took place — presumably northern mid-latitudes — there would be substantial cooling and disturbance of the circulation in tropical latitudes and the southern hemisphere, and long-term climatic perturbations are possible;

13. To clarify the nuclear winter hypothesis, it is important that the impact of nitric oxide (formed in nuclear fireballs) on ozone levels be examined further. It has been widely assumed that decreases in ozone caused by nitric oxide produced in this manner would lead to ozone dissociation, and hence increased levels of damaging ultraviolet radiation at the earth's surface. This may be so, but other circumstances must now be taken into account. Related processes may result in substantial generation of ozone in the troposphere. The altered thermal

structure of the upper troposphere and lower stratosphere implies a possible radical change in the chemistry and dynamics of the ozone layer.

Biological Impact, including that on Agriculture and Fisheries

The Committee agrees with numerous spokesmen that the nuclear winter hypothesis implies severe threats to living communities, and thereby to the security of the human species. There may possibly be extinctions on a scale comparable with known events caused in the past by meteorite or asteroid impacts. But work on the biological impact is less advanced than that on physical events. Tentatively the Committee concludes that, in the case of a major nuclear exchange,

14. Canadian agriculture would be severely affected even if there were only small reductions in growing season temperature, and reductions in sunlight;

15. The degree of damage would depend to a great extent upon the season of attack. Damage might be extremely severe if it affected the early growing season, or destroyed seeds and rootstocks in late summer and fall;

16. Prairie agriculture would be severely affected by even small counterforce strikes, because the main US missile sites are close at hand;

17. Canadian forests are vulnerable to radiation damage from fallout. They might also suffer blow-down by blast from nearby detonations;

18. The forests might suffer extensive fire damage. A 50 megatonne detonation over forests might destroy from 13 000 to 500 000 square kilometres, depending on place and season;

19. All the above stresses would likely encourage pests and weeds at the expense of useful species, so that regrown ecosystems would be inferior in quality for many years and perhaps generations;

20. There may be damage to ocean ecosystems, and hence to fisheries. A few days of darkness could kill much of the phytoplankton, the green plants at the base of the food system. Increased ultraviolet when the sun returns would also damage phytoplankton. A wide-



spread loss of fisheries and of non-commercial fish within two to six months has been inferred;

21. The long-term rebuilding of agriculture and fisheries, once normal climate had returned, would be difficult because of our heavy dependence on technology, seed banks, fertilizers and other aids likely to be in short supply;

22. It is possible that long-term climatic anomalies caused by a nuclear war might hinder or prevent the re-establishment of pre-war (or indeed any) high-intensity agriculture in Canada.

Impact on Society

The Committee was not explicitly asked to consider the social impact of the nuclear winter, nor did its composition allow it to do so in an expert fashion. Nevertheless it tried to visualize what might happen. Clearly the answer for Canada will depend on at least these unknowns:

- the size and nature of the nuclear exchange
- whether Canada will be a target, and if so in what regions
- the extent of physical damage
- the impact on other countries, especially the USA
- the state of survival of services, infrastructure and institutions
- the degree of conflict or cooperation between urban and rural parts of the nation
- the state of preparedness (food storage, security of energy supply, hardening of communications against electromagnetic pulse, etc.).

In the light of these considerations the Committee came to no firm conclusions about the impact on society, but includes in the Supplement speculations on short, intermediate and long-term adaptations to the new, forbidding environment. One conclusion is that

23. The socioeconomic consequences of the various scenarios should be examined in much greater detail by a qualified group of social scientists."

Copies of the *Nuclear Winter Report* are available at a cost of \$15 from the Royal Society of Canada at 344 Wellington Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0N4.

Canadian Government Response

The following is the Government's response to the Royal Society of Canada report, as made by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the House of Commons on June 27.

"The Royal Society's study focuses on the possibility of a nuclear winter and its consequences for Canada. The conclusions of the study are in basic agreement with the findings of other scientific organizations such as the Swedish Academy of Science and the US National Academy of Science. The principal conclusion is that a major drop in global temperature could follow a nuclear exchange. This phenomenon, popularly called nuclear winter, is the result of smoke and dust particles reducing the incoming energy from the sun.

The Royal Society puts forward many recommendations for further research to reduce the current scientific uncertainties surrounding the nuclear winter hypothesis. These uncertainties concern, for example, the amount of smoke that could be generated by burning cities and forests; how that smoke would be distributed in the atmosphere; the magnitude of the drop in surface temperatures; and most importantly, how these factors will affect agriculture, livestock and fish, other species and, of course, the survival of man.

There is general agreement within the Government that the nuclear winter hypothesis is scientifically credible even though the details regarding its magnitude and duration are subject to great uncertainties. Some of the scientific uncertainties may be reduced by continuing research within existing programmes.

The Government agrees with the Royal Society that any Canadian studies pertaining to nuclear winter should be fully coordinated with similar efforts in other countries. With this in mind, copies of the report will be forwarded to the United Nations in accordance with the resolution (39/148F) passed during the thirty-ninth session of the UN General Assembly. During the last session of the General Assembly, Canada stressed the importance for nations to carry out studies on the phenomenon and to report their findings to the United Nations as part of an international undertaking to reduce

the possibility of a nuclear war. The submission of the Royal Society's report to the United Nations will serve as a useful Canadian contribution to international recognition that in a nuclear war there would be no winners.

The Royal Society's study does support, however, the basic tenet of civil defence that there would be survivors. It is the humanitarian duty of government to have at least modest plans to increase the number of possible survivors. Current civil defence planning has concentrated on problems related to short-term survival. The nuclear winter hypothesis introduces new longer-term concerns and the Government accepts the Royal Society's recommendation that our post-nuclear attack preparedness, including the implications for agriculture, transportation, communication and general living conditions, should be re-examined.

Beyond its scientific nature, the Royal Society report also has national security implications. It is clear that a nuclear conflict would be catastrophic. This reinforces our basic conviction that any nuclear war must be prevented. Consequently, the Government continues to support NATO and its deterrence policy which has ensured our security for over 35 years. Our adversaries must appreciate that no nuclear war can be won in the traditional understanding of victory. The Royal Society report reinforces this basic conviction. It follows, therefore, that we must continue to do all that is within our power to deter the initiation of all war.

In this regard, Canada will maintain the high priority we have assigned to our participation in those multilateral arms control fora — Geneva, Stockholm, Vienna — in which we have a direct negotiating role. At the same time, we have welcomed the resumption of United States-USSR negotiations in Geneva and support the USA in its efforts to achieve a more stable strategic relationship at the lowest possible balanced level of nuclear forces.

Finally, the federal Government wishes to thank the Royal Society of Canada and its committee of experts for preparing this report. They have provided a unique and thought-provoking perspective concerning the possible implications for Canada of a nuclear war."

**Arms Control and Disarmament: Glossary of Acronyms****BACKGROUNDER**

ABM — Anti-Ballistic Missile (Treaty, system, etc.)

ACD — Arms Control and Disarmament

ACDA — Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (US)

ALBM — Air-Launched Ballistic Missile

ALCM — Air-Launched Cruise Missile

ASAT — Anti-Satellite

ASW — Anti-Submarine Warfare

AWACS — Airborne Warning and Control System

B-1 — Designation for a type of US heavy bomber

BMD — Ballistic Missile Defence — same as ABM in most contexts

BMEWS — Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

BW — Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons (Convention)

C³ — Command, Control and Communications

C³I — Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence

CAT — Conventional Arms Transfers

CBM — Confidence-Building Measure

CCACD — Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament

CCD — Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (1969-1979)
— Successor of ENDC (1969)
— Succeeded by CD (1980)

CD — Committee on Disarmament (1980-1983)
— Successor of CCD (1969-1979)
— Changed name in 1984

CD — Conference on Disarmament (1984-)

CDE — Conference on Disarmament in Europe (refer to CCSBMDE)

CCSBMDE — Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe ("Stockholm Conference")

CEP — Circular Error Probable

CIIA — Canadian Institute of International Affairs

CIIPS — Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

CISS — Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies

COPUOS — Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
— Also: UNCOPUOS

CPD — Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament

CSBM — Confidence- and Security-Building Measure

CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe — "Helsinki Agreement"

CTB — Comprehensive Test Ban

CTBT — Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

"Cut-off" — Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes

CW — Chemical Weapons

DEW — Distant Early Warning (replaced by "North Warning")

DMZ — Demilitarized Zone

ENDC — Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
— Successor of Ten Nation Committee

on Disarmament
— Succeeded by CCD (1969) and CD (1979)

ENMOD — Environmental Modification (Convention)

ERW — Enhanced Radiation Weapon
— Also: Enhanced Radiation Warhead
— Also: "Neutron Bomb"

EUREKA — Proposed by France in early 1985 as plan to unite Europe in field of high tech research

FBS — Forward-Based Systems

FROD — Functionally Recognizable Observable Difference
— Assists NTM to distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons of the same generic type under SALT II

GCD — General and Complete Disarmament

GLCM — Ground-Launched Cruise Missile

IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM — Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

ICDSI — Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (Palme Commission)

INF — Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
— Also: IRTNF; (this acronym is replacing TNF)

INFCE — International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation

IOZOP — Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

IRBM — Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile

IRTNF — Intermediate-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces — Also: INF or TNF

ISDE — International Seismic Data Exchange

ISMA — International Satellite Monitoring Agency

KT — Kiloton
— Equivalent to 1 000 tons of TNT



LOAD — Low-Altitude Defence (system)	NSG — Nuclear Suppliers Group	SDI — Strategic Defence Initiative
LRCM — Long-Range Cruise Missile	NTM — National Technical Means – Assets which are under national control for monitoring compliance with the provisions of an agreement. NTM include photographic reconnaissance satellites, aircraft-based systems (such as radar and optical systems), as well as sea- and ground-based systems such as radars and antennas for collecting telemetry.	SEWS — Satellite Early Warning System
LRTNF — Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces – Subsumed in I(RT)NF or TNF		SIPRI — Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
MAD — Mutual Assured Destruction		SLBM — Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
MAP — Mutual Assured Protection; also used for Multiple Aim Point basing system for MX		SLCM — Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
MARV — Manoeuvrable Re-entry Vehicle – Manoeuvrable MIRV	NUF — Non-Use of Force	SRAM — Short-Range Attack Missile
MBFR — Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (talks, negotiations) – Began in Vienna in 1973	NWFZ — Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone	SSBN — Nuclear-Powered Submarine Equipped with Ballistic Missiles
MIRV — Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicle	NWMD — New Weapons of Mass Destruction	SSN — (SSBN Hunter) – Nuclear-powered attack submarine
MLF — Multilateral Force	NWS — Nuclear-Weapon State or North Warning System	SSOD — Special Session on Disarmament – Also: UNSSOD
MPS — Multiple Protective Shelter – to shelter mobile versions of the MX	PGM — Precision-Guided Munitions	“Stand-Off Missile” — An air-launched I, missile that can be fired beyond the reach of enemy air defences, an ALCM, for example
MRTNF — Medium-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces	PNE — Peaceful Nuclear Explosion	START — Strategic Arms Reduction Talks – Substitute for SALT acronym
MRV — Multiple Re-entry Vehicle	PNET — Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 1976	TNF — Theatre Nuclear Forces – Also: INF or IRTNF
Mt — Megaton – Equivalent to 1 000 000 tons (or 1 000 Kt) of TNT	PUNE — Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy	TTBT — Threshold Test Ban Treaty 1974
MX — Missile Experimental	ROMB — Reduction of Military Budgets	UNCOPUOS — United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization	RV — Re-entry Vehicle	UNDC — United Nations Disarmament Commission
NBC — Nuclear-Bacteriological (Biological)-Chemical	RW — Radiological Weapons – Any device other than a nuclear explosive, designed to employ radioactive material by disseminating it to cause destruction; any radioactive material other than that produced by a nuclear explosive device, designed for employment, by its dissemination, to cause destruction	UNGA — United Nations General Assembly
NFU — No-First-Use	SAC — Strategic Air Command (US)	UNSSOD — United Nations Special Session on Disarmament – Also: SSOD – UNSSOD I (1978) – UNSSOD II (1982)
NFZ — Nuclear-Free Zone – Also: NWFZ	SALT — Strategic Arms Limitation Talks – Also: Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty	WDC — World Disarmament Campaign
NGO — Non-Governmental Organization	SALT I — 1969-72	WDF — World Disarmament Fund
NNA — Neutral and Non-Aligned	SALT II — 1972-79	WPO — Warsaw Pact Organization
NNWS — Non-Nuclear-Weapon State	SAM — Surface to Air Missile	WTO — Warsaw Treaty Organization – Occasional substitute for “Warsaw Pact”
NORAD — North American Aerospace Defence (Command)	SCC — Standing Consultative Commission – Bilateral forum responsible for implementation of strategic arms limitation agreements between the USA and USSR	ZOPFAN — Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
NPT — Non-Proliferation Treaty		
NSA — Negative Security Assurances		

Canada Takes Part in Allied Consultations Prior to Geneva Summit

In a statement to the House of Commons on October 28, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney discussed the gathering of the leaders of five of the principal allies of the United States which was held in New York on October 24. Following are excerpts from the Prime Minister's statement.

"Mr. Speaker, many heads of state and heads of government had come to New York on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the United Nations. President Reagan took advantage of that rather unique situation and gathering to initiate discussions with the leaders of five of the principal allies of the United States of America, including Canada. The purpose was to exchange views about the forthcoming meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. I had already conveyed some of my views on this subject to President Reagan in private correspondence and telephone conversations.

The President was surely right to have taken this initiative. The first meeting between the Soviet and United States leaders at the summit in six years would

be a crucial event, whatever the circumstances. But it is all the more so now — it is all the more important. The Soviet Union has an impressive new leader and the United States has an experienced President who enjoys massive public support in his own country. That is so important because of the requirement of an American President to submit whatever is agreed to the Senate for ratification. As we met in New York, the six western leaders recognized that these circumstances represented perhaps a historic opportunity to set relations between the United States and the Soviet Union on a new and constructive course.

Our talks I think, Mr. Speaker, fully justified the unprecedented time devoted to them. In two sessions lasting more than five hours the President was able to present his own ideas at length and to take the views of others. The degree of mutual understanding was impressive. The President knows that he carries with him to Geneva the hopes and expectations not only of his own people, but those of all the western countries. He knows he has their full support. He understands and agrees that progress in arms control and disarmament is central

and vital. But equally, he shares the view that, if progress is to be made on the central issue, all other issues that bear upon it will have to be considered, among them human rights, trade and cultural relations and regional issues. The leaders agreed that it would be unreasonable to presume bad faith on the part of the new Soviet leadership. If an honourable agreement is possible at all, we shall seek to conclude one.

In New York we agreed that it would be extremely useful if the President could provide NATO members with a full debriefing immediately following the Geneva summit. As a result, Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to tell the House today that NATO heads of government will gather in Brussels on Thursday, November 21, to hear President Reagan's impressions of his meeting with Mr. Gorbachev....

We are aware of the deficiencies and limitations of the UN, but we continue to believe that what nations can accomplish by working together will always be greater than what any one nation can accomplish by doing it alone. In this regard I take particular satisfaction from the strength, unity and vitality of the western alliance. When the leaders of the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, West Germany and Canada met with President Reagan to discuss the forthcoming summit, the strength of cohesion of our common purpose was strongly evident. We are all deeply committed to the alliance and the principles it represents. We were also agreed that every reasonable avenue must be explored and every thoughtful attempt made to reduce tensions and promote co-operation between the two superpowers.

I encountered no disagreement, Mr. Speaker, when, on behalf of all Canadians, I urged President Reagan to go that extra mile to seek a just agreement, to presume that Mr. Gorbachev is no less interested in a secure peace. These are the ingredients that Canadians view as indispensable to the conclusion of a fair and verifiable accord. The quest for peace is everyone's business, Mr. Speaker. While Canada will not be present at the table in Geneva, our interests will. We shall remain vigilant to ensure that they continue to be defended effectively and well."



Heads of government (from left): Bettino Craxi (Italy), Margaret Thatcher (Britain), Ronald Reagan (US), Yasuhiro Nakasone (Japan), Helmut Kohl (West Germany) and Brian Mulroney (Canada), at New York meeting.

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Disarmament Bulletin

A review of national and
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and arms control
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PM at NATO Meeting on Geneva Summit

*After the post-Summit meeting of
NATO leaders in Brussels on
November 21, Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney made the following
statements to the press.*

"The [US] president spoke in great detail and with great candour about his meetings in Geneva and I am heartened by the productive personal relationships that the president seems to have established with General Secretary Gorbachev, and their agreement as well to meet on a regular basis in the future. The Geneva meeting has established, I think, some simple but powerful truths that success in summitry at this level is predicated upon a number of things, including the strengths and resolve of the United States and its president and the unity and determination of our Alliance, NATO. The new Soviet leadership, I think, understands and respects these realities and because of this a constructive dialogue was initiated in Geneva. The Summit was clearly well prepared and I can tell you that members of the Alliance were well consulted throughout and prior thereto. There are many chapters still to be written, but I think an important prologue was begun at Geneva. As I have indicated, Canada is pleased with the productive, personal relationship established and most of all the expressed determination of the two leaders to meet on a regular basis and deal with the real issues of arms limitation in a nuclear age to which the Government of Canada and all Canadians are deeply committed....

I see a substantial improvement in the situation from where we were. First of all, for six years there have been no meetings. Now we have a two-and-a-half



*Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (right)
with United States President Ronald
Reagan (left) and Lord Carrington, NATO
Secretary-General, at Brussels meeting
on November 21.* PMO

day meeting taking place, breaking free from the agenda, with spontaneous unrehearsed, apparently very cordial and productive personal relations developing. I see that first of all. I see an abundance of important, but not paramount, in terms of arms control, arms limitation agreements undertaken.... I see as well a personal undertaking by Mr. Gorbachev to go to Washington next year for further discussions and President Reagan in 1987 to spend an extended period of time in Moscow. I mean, that to me represents a substantially changed climate and it's within an improved climate that substantial and real progress is possible. So I'm not euphoric. I don't think anyone is. But I think realism suggests that we ought to be happy with the progress that we have known."



SSEA Addresses House of Commons on US-USSR Nuclear Arms Control Negotiations

On January 23, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, made the following statement in the House of Commons on the US-USSR nuclear arms control negotiations.

"For Canadians, no duty is more challenging than to contribute constructively to peace among nations. In a world threatened by the spread of arms, we are one country who, decades ago, chose deliberately not to acquire nuclear weapons. We had the capacity. We made the choice, not as a gesture, but as a practical contribution to the control of arms. That is part of the character of Canada.

One of the first acts of this Government was to reconstitute the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs. On October 31, meeting with that Group, the Prime Minister spelled out six Canadian goals in arms control and disarmament:

1. negotiated radical reductions in nuclear forces and the enhancement of strategic stability;
2. maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime;
3. negotiation of a global chemical weapons ban;
4. support for a comprehensive test ban treaty;
5. prevention of an arms race in outer space; and
6. the building of confidence sufficient to facilitate the reduction of military forces in Europe and elsewhere.

A year ago, in a statement in Parliament, I expressed the Government's satisfaction at the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to resume negotiations in Geneva. The decision to meet again, and to expand the agenda to encompass the prevention

of an arms race in outer space and its termination on earth, was an act of confidence and statesmanship. These negotiations have been underway for nine months now.

As I said last year, we should be under no illusion that the course at Geneva will be an easy one. It will be long and arduous. We are encouraged by the signs of progress, in particular, the tabling last fall of detailed American and Soviet proposals which contained some important common features: a 50 per cent reduction of nuclear arsenals, limits on warheads as well as launchers, and sublimits on ICBM warheads. We hope that, in this International Year of Peace, the experienced negotiators of both sides will be able to enlarge significantly on this common ground. Agreement on an equitable formula for the radical reduction of nuclear forces and on the appropriate relationship between offensive and defensive strategies and systems will remain the key challenges.

We welcome the broad-ranging proposal issued last week by General Secretary Gorbachev and its reaffirmation of the Soviet Union's commitment to nuclear disarmament. That is the most recent in a long history of suggestions, by both superpowers, on how to achieve general and complete disarmament. In this context conventional arms, where the Soviet Union has an overwhelming superiority, will also have to find their place. The Soviet Union has the opportunity to address this imbalance in its response to the Western proposal, tabled in Vienna last month, at the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions.

The Soviet Union does not address the issue of missiles deployed in Asia. But we take satisfaction from the fact that Mr. Gorbachev seems to be moving closer to President Reagan's 1981 zero-zero proposal on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The explicit Soviet recognition of the importance of verification in the negotiation of

arms control is gratifying, as is the apparent movement towards long-standing Western positions on the need for on-site inspection. The exact nature of what the Soviets will accept in this regard will have to be determined. We also note potentially constructive references to issues before other arms control forums.

It is, of course, too early to offer more than this tentative assessment of the proposals. They contain some intriguing new elements alongside well-worn positions and some disturbing preconditions that could hamper negotiation. They clearly warrant very serious consideration, but there are also many aspects that require clarification in the ongoing negotiations. The real test of the Soviet Union's commitment to radical and verifiable arms reductions will come when it moves from the stage of public diplomacy to the confidential confines of the negotiating room.

The Geneva Summit and the decision to regularize this high-level contact improve the prospects for progress in arms control. Besides bringing leaders together, regular meetings build in an annual accounting of progress on arms control and encourage leaders to resolve issues which negotiators cannot.

Through the channels open to us, Canada will actively encourage the conduct of serious and constructive negotiations. The House should note the extraordinary degree to which the United States has informed and consulted with its Allies since the Geneva process was resumed. The Prime Minister's personal meetings and conversations with President Reagan provide a continuing avenue of Canadian influence on the Administration's positions on arms control.

In December, in Brussels, I convened a special meeting of Canadian arms control ambassadors to identify specific areas where Canada might contribute to practical progress. One instrument is to press within NATO for more frequent and focused consultation on the state of the various arms control negotiations and their implications for Alliance policies.



We will not, however, be talking only amongst ourselves. This Government is committed to promoting a more active and meaningful dialogue with the countries of the Eastern bloc. In September the Prime Minister wrote to General Secretary Gorbachev outlining Canadian views and priorities with respect to arms control and disarmament. Last month I sent a team of Canadian officials to Moscow for consultations on arms control with the top Soviet experts, Ambassadors Petrovsky and Karpov. Similar consultations are planned with other East European countries this year. We are ensuring that the key players in international security affairs are made directly aware of Canadian views.

What else can Canada do? What special practical contributions can we make to arms control?

This Government's activity will be focused in three directions: 1) encouraging compliance with existing treaties; 2) developing verification mechanisms and 3) building confidence between East and West.

To deviate from a policy of full compliance is to threaten the credibility, and hence the viability, of arms control. Canada firmly supports the regime created by the ABM Treaty and the existing SALT agreements on limiting strategic forces. Our stance towards SDI research is rooted in the need to conform strictly with the provisions of the ABM Treaty. We will continue to urge the parties to these treaties to do nothing to undermine their integrity, but rather work to reinforce their status and authority.

Effective verification provisions can help ensure compliance with arms control treaties as well as facilitate their negotiation. Verification is an area where Canadian expertise and diplomacy come together. At the UN this fall, a Canadian-initiated resolution on verification was unanimously adopted. We are second to none in our activity to develop verification procedures and technology that meet the practical requirements of arms control agreements actually under negotiation or envisaged.

To cite only the most important projects recently completed or underway:

1. the Peace Satellite, or PAXSAT, project examines the technical feasibility of a satellite-based system for monitoring potential arms control agreements covering outer space or conventional forces in Europe;
2. research into seismic technology for detecting low-yield nuclear tests that pose a major obstacle in the way of agreement on a nuclear test ban;
3. the elaboration of operational procedures for effective investigation of incidents of alleged chemical weapons use, the results of which have recently been handed over to the UN Secretary-General;
4. the tabling at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva of a working paper on the nature of the legal regime governing outer space.

We must not forget that the prospects for progress on arms control are clearly linked to an improvement in the general East-West relationship. Confidence can be gradually generated through political



The Secretary of State for External Affairs addressing the House of Commons on January 23.

Canapress

actions that promote East-West consultation and cooperation.

The enhancement of the political dialogue with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe and the inclusion in it of a healthy element of people-to-people contact are major objectives of our Government. This past year has seen an impressive number of high-level visits between Canada and Eastern bloc states. Both the Prime Minister and I visited the Soviet Union, and Mr. Kelleher and Mme Vézina travelled *inter alia* to Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria. We received in Canada the Romanian President, the Premier of the Russian Republic and the Deputy Prime Minister of Hungary.

Canada was host to the Human Rights Experts Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and is playing an active part in the other CSCE-mandated meetings which are working to realize the principles of the Helsinki Final Act. These include the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures, the Bern meeting on human contacts, and the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting which will convene in November to review the whole spectrum of CSCE activity. Last summer I joined the Foreign Ministers of the other CSCE participating states in Helsinki to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Final Act and to reaffirm our commitment to increase the level of security and cooperation in Europe. Canada believes the CSCE can be an important vehicle for advancing our security and humanitarian goals.

So, as the fourth round of Soviet-American nuclear arms talks gets underway in Geneva, this Government will assist, in every way possible, the process of negotiation towards an equitable agreement. By encouraging compliance with the fundamental arms control treaties, by developing practical solutions to verification problems and by supporting an improvement in the East-West political relationship, Canada can make a distinctive and significant contribution to realizing the critical objectives of the Geneva negotiations. That is our goal, our duty, and our Canadian tradition."



Canada Achieves Breakthrough on Verification Question at UN

The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

At its first Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978, the United Nations General Assembly agreed by consensus in paragraph 91 of the Final Document that: "In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements...."

In paragraph 92 of the Final Document, the General Assembly agreed that: "In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered...."

No in-depth examination of the concept of verification has taken place since UNSSOD I. Indeed, it has been argued by some that the question of verification cannot be considered in isolation from specific arms limitation measures.

In recent years, the importance of verification has tended to be minimized by some who have regarded insistence on high levels of verification as a pretext for not engaging in meaningful disarmament negotiations.

The Canadian Government has always regarded verification as a key issue. In 1979, following the adoption of the Final Document, it gave very serious thought to this aspect of the consensus document. Its review of 20 years of arms control and disarmament negotiations confirmed that verification was a central problem which, unfortunately, was often misunderstood.

An arms control agreement is essentially a compromise in which each side bases part or all of its national security on the promises of the other contracting parties rather than on the strength of its

own weaponry. Consequently, reciprocal confidence that all parties will live up to their obligations is essential. Promises of restraint, therefore, have to be accompanied by means to ensure that promises are kept. By confirming that activities which are prohibited by agreements are not taking place and that parties are fulfilling their obligations, verification may help to generate a climate of international confidence. That is indispensable for progress in arms control. In light of these considerations, Canada assigned a high priority to research in the area of verification.

At the second Special Session on Disarmament in 1982, the former Prime Minister of Canada expressed the view that the international community should address itself to verification as one of the most significant factors in disarmament negotiations in the 1980s. As he pointed out at the time, the work on verification should prepare the way for arms control agreements that still lie ahead.

In 1983, the Government gave practical expression to these views when it announced the establishment of a verification research programme with an annual budget of \$1 million. The Canadian programme aims at coming to grips, in very practical ways, with the essential reality of today: the continuing sense of mistrust and the need for an improved climate of confidence, for concrete disarmament commitments and for respect for them.

After unsuccessful attempts in 1980 and 1984 to have the United Nations focus on the question of verification, Canada managed a breakthrough at UNGA 40 when, on December 16, 1985, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus a Canadian-initiated resolution [40/152(0)] entitled *Verification in All its Aspects* which called upon member states:

"to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than 15 April 1986,

their views and suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements, and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification...."

In putting forward this resolution, Canada was joined by ten other co-sponsors: Australia, Belgium, Cameroon, Costa Rica, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Canada's aim was, first, to set out the picture of what governments had agreed to, by consensus, regarding verification. By having the United Nations reaffirm the provisions on verification contained in the Final Document, Canada hoped to clear the air regarding this concept, to gain a degree of common understanding and to enable the United Nations to initiate some useful groundwork on this subject.

In presenting the draft resolution to the First Committee of the General Assembly, Mr. Douglas Roche, Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, outlined the long-standing Canadian interest in verification and addressed some of the main concerns that have been expressed about the concept. In defending the generic approach adopted in the resolution, he recognized the validity of the view that verification provisions had to be agreement-specific, but he pointed out that this did not exclude advance work on verification which would produce a source on verification principles, procedures and techniques from which disarmament negotiators might draw.

"It is obvious that verification provisions will always have to be tailored to the purposes, scope and nature of any specific agreement to which they apply. This was recognized in the UNSSOD I Final Document and it is recognized in our draft resolution.

We believe, however, that work should and can be done, in advance, on certain principles, procedures and techniques."



Mr. Roche gave examples of the work which Canada had done on its own or together with others in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in advance of any specific agreements:

- (a) the seismic data exchange (in the CD framework);
- (b) a manual of procedures for investigating allegations of chemical weapons use;
- (c) a study of the technique of space-to-space remote sensing by satellites;
- (d) a study of the technique of ground-to-space remote sensing by instruments of astronomy.

As he pointed out further, "The proposal made by France at UNSSOD I in 1978 concerning an International Satellite Monitoring Agency, which most members of the UN agreed should be studied further, is another example of the conceptual development of verification techniques in advance of specific agreements."

In concluding his statement, Mr. Roche drew attention to the role of the United Nations in verification:

"The scope of our draft includes the question of the role of the UN in verification which requires some examination by the UN since all Member States have an interest in this aspect of the subject. This, I might add, is a subject in which Canadians concerned with questions of arms control and disarmament expressed considerable interest at a recent meeting that reviewed the activities of the UN in disarmament."

The adoption of the Canadian-initiated resolution reflects the growing awareness within the world community of the importance of verification in facilitating the negotiating process. The new attitude towards verification has been evident in the amount of attention it has received in public statements by world leaders since the adoption of the resolution. The basis for a productive discussion of this central issue at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly in the fall has thus been laid.

Canadian-Initiated Verification Resolution

Co-sponsored by: Australia, Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, Costa Rica, Germany (Federal Republic of), Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Turkey and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Verification in all its aspects

The General Assembly,

Conscious of the urgent need to reach agreements on arms limitation and disarmament measures capable of contributing to the maintenance of peace and security,

Convinced that, if such measures are to be effective, they must be fair and balanced, acceptable to all parties, their substance must be clear and compliance with them must be evident,

Reaffirming its conviction, as expressed in the Final Document adopted by consensus at its first special session devoted to disarmament, that in order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements,

Reiterating its view that:

- (a) Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties;
- (b) The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement;
- (c) Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process;
- (d) Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed,

Recalling also that:

(a) In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered;

(b) Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures that are non-discriminatory and that do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development,

Believing that verification techniques should be developed as an objective means of determining compliance with agreements, and appropriately taken into account in the course of disarmament negotiations,

1. *Calls upon* Member States to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, verifiable and effective arms limitation and disarmament measures;

2. *Invites* all Member States, bearing in mind the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than April 15, 1986, their views and suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements, and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare and submit to the General Assembly at its forty-first session a report containing the views and suggestions of Member States;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-first session the item entitled "Verification in all its aspects" under the item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session: implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the tenth special session."

How Canada and Others Voted at the Fortieth Session of the United Nations

The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

The fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 40), which met from September 17 to December 18, adopted 66 arms control and disarmament (ACD) resolutions (20 of them without a vote). This number represented approximately 25 per cent of the total of 259 resolutions adopted at the session.

Since the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978 when a consensus was reached on a Final Document which set out guidelines relating to arms control and disarmament issues, there have been two noticeable trends:

(a) an increase in the number of ACD resolutions; and

(b) a greater fragmentation of views on

The wide divergence of views regarding the 66 ACD resolutions adopted is evidenced in the voting record of the following countries, which include representatives of the various geographical groups:

	YES	NO	ABSTAIN	ABSENT
Tanzania	63 (95.5%)	0	3 (4.5%)	
Mexico	60 (91%)	0	5 (7.5%)	1 (1.5%)
USSR	59 (89%)	3 (4.5%)	4 (6.5%)	
Greece	57 (86%)	0	9 (14%)	
Sweden	54 (82%)	0	12 (18%)	
Argentina	54 (82%)	0	12 (18%)	
India	48 (73%)	1 (1.5%)	16 (24%)	1 (1.5%)
China	48 (73%)	0	15 (22.5%)	3 (4.5%)
Japan	42 (64%)	8 (12%)	16 (24%)	
Canada	41 (62%)	12 (18%)	13 (20%)	
Federal Republic of Germany	36 (55%)	12 (18%)	18 (27%)	
USA	29 (44%)	27 (41%)	10 (15%)	

(Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania are the countries which issued the six-nation joint appeals to the two superpowers regarding nuclear weapons and outer space.)



Delegates in United Nations First Committee voting on arms control and disarmament resolution.

UN Photo

ACD issues as indicated in the move away from consensus.

In the period from 1978 to 1985, the number of ACD resolutions increased from 41 to 66. At the same time, the number of these resolutions adopted without a vote dropped from 43.9 to 30 per cent. (The 30 per cent represents a slight improvement from the low of 27 per cent reached in 1983 at UNGA 38 and the 28.6 per cent at UNGA 39.)

At the 1985 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) last May, Canada joined others in expressing concern about the implications of these trends during the discussion of the role of the United Nations in disarmament (which will continue at UNDC 1986). In its view, attention had to be paid to the growing demands that arms control and disarmament were making on the General Assembly and its First Committee which dealt with these issues. The First Committee could not



do justice to so many issues in the six or seven weeks available to it. Moreover, not enough time and effort was being devoted to trying to reach common approaches to these issues. The danger inherent in this situation, as Canada saw it, was that "decisions taken by straight majority vote (and these now account for two-thirds of the First Committee's resolutions) without regard to the views of a minority whose support may be essential for their implementation may lose their credibility."

Similar conclusions had been reached earlier by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Writing in the *Disarmament Times* (February 1985), Mr. Jozef Goldblat of the Institute pointed out that UNGA resolutions on arms control and disarmament had made little impact on the course of arms control negotiations partly because their proliferation had reduced their value and partly because, in some cases, resolutions adopted on the same issue contained divergent recommendations.

As Mr. Goldblat pointed out, "All such resolutions ceased to play the main role originally assigned to them, namely, that of serving as a sounding board for ideas and proposals." Of considerable importance as well was the fact that "those voting in favour do not necessarily include all the militarily significant states, that is, states whose consent is indispensable to reach a disarmament agreement. Therefore the important role of the General Assembly, that of providing guidance for arms control talks, is no longer fulfilled either."

Arms Control and Disarmament (ACD) Resolutions at UNGA 40

(Total ACD Resolutions Adopted — 66)

Resolutions marked with an asterisk were co-sponsored by Canada.
Countries in parentheses are lead sponsors.

RESOLUTION NUMBER	RESOLUTION Supported by Canada (41 including 20 adopted without a vote)	VOTE (Yes/No/Abstain) (Without a vote)
40/94B (Finland)	Study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones	WOV
40/82 (Egypt)	Nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East	WOV
40/83 (Pakistan)	Nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	104-3-41
40/89A (Mauritius)	Denuclearization of Africa	148-0-6
40/79 (Mexico)	Treaty of Tlatelolco	139-0-7
*40/152B (UK)	Bilateral nuclear-arms and space arms negotiations	107-0-40
40/18 (Yugoslavia)	Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations	76-0-12
40/81 (New Zealand)	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty	116-4-29
40/152G (Mexico)	Nuclear winter	141-1-10
*40/94G (Canada)	Fissionable material for weapons purposes	145-1-7
40/86 (Pakistan)	International arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	142-0-6
*40/94M (Egypt)	Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	138-0-11
40/91A (Romania)	Reduction of military budgets	WOV
40/91B (Sweden)	Reduction of military budgets	113-13-15
*40/94K (UK)	Objective information on military matters	107-13-16
40/94C (Denmark)	Study on conventional disarmament	WOV
40/84 (Sweden)	Conventional weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects	WOV
40/94A (Peru)	Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	128-0-8
*40/92B (Canada)	Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons	WOV
*40/92C (USA)	Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons	112-16-22
40/87 (Sri Lanka)	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	151-0-2
40/152D (Mexico)	Comprehensive programme of disarmament	WOV
40/150 (Romania)	Economic and social consequences of the armaments race	139-1-7
40/152F (13 initiators)	Report of the Disarmament Commission	WOV
40/152L (Nigeria)	Second Disarmament Decade	WOV
40/94N (Australia)	Disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security	99-0-53



RESOLUTION NUMBER	RESOLUTION	VOTE
40/94D (Australia)	Radiological weapons	WOV
40/94F (Sweden)	Study on the naval arms race	146-1-3
*40/94J (Poland)	Prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and in the sub-soil thereof	WOV
*40/152O (Canada)	Verification in all its aspects	WOV
*40/94L (USA)	Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements	131-0-16
*40/155 (France)	Relationship between disarmament and development	WOV
40/153 (Sri Lanka)	Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	WOV
40/151B (Mexico)	World Disarmament Campaign	139-0-11
40/94E (Sweden)	Study of concepts of security	WOV
40/151G (Mauritius)	UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa	WOV
40/154 (Spain)	World Disarmament Conference	WOV
40/152K (UK)	UN disarmament studies	WOV
40/151H (Nigeria)	UN programme of fellowships on disarmament	148-1-1
40/151I (Yugoslavia)	Third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament	WOV
*40/94O (Cameroon)	Role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament	WOV

NOTE: In addition to the above resolutions the following was also adopted.

DECISION (Sweden)	Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies	WOV
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Opposed by Canada — 12

40/152A (GDR)	Non-use of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war	123-19-7
40/152C (GDR)	Nuclear weapons in all aspects	117-19-11
40/151C (Mexico)	Nuclear-arms freeze	131-10-8
40/151E (India)	Freeze on nuclear weapons	126-12-10
40/151F (India)	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	126-17-6
40/85 (Bulgaria)	Convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	101-19-25
40/94H (USSR)	Nuclear-weapon freeze	120-17-10
40/152H (GDR)	Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon	70-11-65
40/152P (Argentina)	Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament	131-16-6
40/152I (Czechoslovakia)	International cooperation for disarmament	109-19-17
40/152N (Yugoslavia)	Decisions of the tenth special session	135-13-5
40/94I (Bulgaria)	Curbing the naval arms race	71-19-59

Canada abstained — 13

40/80A (Mexico)	Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons	124-3-21
40/89B (Mauritius)	Nuclear capability of South Africa	135-4-14
40/88 (Hungary)	Immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests	120-3-29
40/80B (Mexico)	Cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons	121-3-24
40/93 (Iraq)	Israeli nuclear armament	101-2-47
40/152Q (Argentina)	Prevention of nuclear war	136-3-14
40/90 (Byelorussia)	Weapons of mass destruction	128-1-21
40/92A (GDR)	Prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons	93-15-14
40/151A (Cyprus)	Disarmament and international security	123-1-23
40/152J (Iraq)	Decisions of the tenth special session	128-0-20
40/152M (Yugoslavia)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	133-2-18
40/152E (Mongolia)	Disarmament Week	129-0-22
40/151D (Bulgaria)	World Disarmament Campaign	114-0-34



Consultative Group Discusses Canada's Role in the Multilateral Disarmament Forums

The Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, which includes over 60 representatives of non-governmental organizations, academics and concerned individuals, met at the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa from October 31 to November 2 to discuss Canada's role in the multilateral disarmament forums and ways in which Canada can make a further contribution to international peace and security. This meeting was in keeping with the question posed in the Department of External Affairs Discussion Paper (Green Paper) entitled *Competitiveness and Security* as to whether there are "new practical ideas that Canadians believe we could bring" to discussions in this area.

The Consultative Group meeting was held under the chairmanship of the Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, whose responsibilities include representing Canada in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Canada's Ambassadors to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (Mr. J. Alan Beesley), the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (Mr. Tom Delworth), and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in

Vienna (Mr. Tom Hammond), also participated and led the discussion in their respective areas of responsibility.

The Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, provided the keynote address to the Consultative Group on October 31, the first time the Group had ever been addressed by the Prime Minister. (The full text of his address is found on pp. 10-12.)

During the two days of discussions, members of the Consultative Group, on the whole, recognized that Canada had played a constructive and effective role in these forums. However, there was concern expressed over the pace and rather limited achievements of some of these negotiations. There was considerable support for Canadian efforts to promote the role of verification in the arms control process and the Government's research efforts in this area were applauded. The Group also supported the maintenance of a strict interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and supported Canadian efforts to support the Treaty. A number of proposals for possible action by the Canadian Government were put forth for the Government's consideration. Copies of the final report on the meetings were sent to the Prime Minister, the Secretary

of State for External Affairs and members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence (SCEAND), and were circulated widely in Canada.

A special evening session was held on November 1 dealing with the Geneva bilateral negotiations between the USA and USSR on nuclear and space arms. It featured Ambassador James Goodby, formerly the US representative to the Stockholm Conference, and Mr. Eugueni Goussarov, Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa. Each participant provided the Consultative Group with an outline of his Government's approach to the bilateral negotiations in Geneva. The moderator of the discussion was Mr. John Halstead, former Canadian Ambassador to NATO and Bonn.

Members of the Consultative Group will next meet on a regional basis with Ambassador Roche and departmental officials at meetings to be held across Canada from April 14 to May 2 as part of Canada's International Year of Peace programme. The theme of these meetings will be the relationship between disarmament and development, in light of Canada's participation at the International Conference on that subject to be held in Paris from July 15 to August 2.



Left photo: view of Consultative Group meeting. Right photo: Ambassador Douglas Roche (centre) addressing opening session. At left is Firdaus Kharas, Executive Director of UN Association in Canada. At right is Col. Alex Morrison of Canada's mission to UN.



"In Pursuit of Peace" Theme of PM Address to Consultative Group

"In Pursuit of Peace" was the theme of the following speech made by Brian Mulroney to the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control in Ottawa on October 31.

"We often think of the pursuit of peace in terms of meetings and summits, negotiations and agreements. Yet these are instruments, not goals, means not ends. The desired object of our quest is the careful construction of a framework for enduring security — security for tomorrow, as well as today. And security for all, not simply for some.

In the absence of a stable and secure international environment, all our domestic achievements and pursuits, as well as our aspirations for the future, are put in jeopardy. Just as peace cannot endure without justice and prosperity, so too prosperity is meaningless in the absence of peace. The shadows of our nuclear age are deep and terrible, but we must not allow ourselves to become overwhelmed by them; numbed into fatalistic indifference. For the spectres that man creates, man can also dispel. The pursuit of peace leaves little time for counsels of despair.

Unfortunately, we know that the spectre of war will continue to haunt us until a

just peace is secured for all time, not just our time. Yet fear of the future must not be permitted to take root in the youth of today, who deserve nothing less than the opportunity to live and grow in an atmosphere of hope and security.

So I approach the pursuit of peace with determination, recognizing both the enormity of the task, and the requirement for action. To those who say it can't be done, I say it must be done. To those who say Canada can't do it alone, I say we can do it together. And to those who claim it is none of our business, I say the search for peace is everyone's business.

Shortly after assuming office, I said that Canada would work relentlessly to reduce tensions, to alleviate conflict, and to create the conditions for a general and lasting peace. I added then, and I repeat: 'the exercise of political will is nowhere more important than on this issue, on whose outcome the lives of our children and of humanity depend.'

At this juncture, with the world hoping that the coming weeks will see a triumph of just such political will, it is appropriate to elaborate on this theme. I would be remiss, however, if I did not first congratulate the members of the

Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs for the interest, expertise and responsibility each of you brings to this complex agenda. Certainly the revitalization of the Consultative Group has enriched the quality of opinion and advice available to the Government in considering these critical issues.

I think it is appropriate that the Consultative Group's current meeting is devoted to the multilateral arms control forums where Canada has 'a seat at the table' and thus can have a direct impact on the course of events. In your discussions here I hope you will identify and put forward practical suggestions as to how Canada can contribute to progress in these areas.

Canada is not and shall not be neutral in the struggle between freedom and totalitarianism. We are a member of the Western Alliance and we are members out of choice, not circumstance. It is an Alliance which requires military commitment and political solidarity. Yet it is also an Alliance which relies on consultation and consensus. A healthy allied military effort would not survive in the absence of such consensus. But the right to be heard must constantly be earned. Canada earns that right.

The pursuit of arms control and disarmament has its place beside the defence effort, peacekeeping and conflict resolution. All are essential components of Canada's approach to international peace and security. We must vigorously pursue each of these if we are to maintain Canada's sovereignty and independence. And the world at large should recognize that arms control is a component of, not a substitute for, a healthy national security policy.

A wise and correct approach to security cannot ignore the virtues of arms control, just as arms control cannot ignore the requirements of national security. The search for either at the expense of the other is fruitless. And the search for both is imperative.



Prime Minister Brian Mulroney addressing Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs on October 31.

Let us recall that the Nobel Prize awarded to Lester Pearson for his superb diplomatic efforts in ending the Suez Crisis was also an award to the dedicated Canadian troops who helped make up the United Nations peace-keeping force. Without the forces trained and equipped to provide a buffer between Israeli and Egyptian armies, the United Nations resolution would have been only so much paper.

We must realize that our sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be safeguarded by mere proclamation or protest. In addition to a firm legal position with respect to our sovereignty in the Arctic, we require a military capacity to respond to the threats posed by clandestine incursions into our waters, or probes of our air space. This is not a question of political expedience or choice. It is a question of responsible national policy. At the same time we should remember that, for over 35 years, the defence of Canada has been not only a national but an Alliance obligation.

I am reminded, in this connection, of a great Canadian who personally embodied the four facets of Canada's security policy. As a soldier, a peacekeeper, an arms controller and a diplomat, the late General E.L.M. Burns personified the basic coherence and compatibility of each one of these roles in the conduct of Canada's security policy. In establishing arms control policies, Tommy Burns perhaps summarized it best when he said there had to be a dialogue between the proponents of security through armament, and the proponents of security through disarmament.

No one component can provide all of the answers. The decisions our Government has taken are all directed to the over-arching goal of promoting international peace and security and, through these initiatives, Canada's own peace and security. These decisions have not been easy ones. They involved making some hard choices. We have decided, for instance, that Canada should have the capability to keep open our Arctic waters for the development of that region so that we can effectively patrol all of our Canadian territory all of the time.



Ambassador James Goodby (left) addressing Consultative Group during panel on Geneva negotiations. At right is Eugueni Goussarov. Moderator is John Halstead.

We have decided to strengthen our military presence in Europe as a further contribution to the Alliance's collective defence and deterrence of military aggression. And as we build up NATO's conventional deterrent, we reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons, a goal I am sure we all share.

We also signed an agreement earlier this year with the United States to modernize the early warning radars in Canada, this as part of our commitment to honour our North American defence obligations.

We have decided to participate in the Sinai peacekeeping force to help maintain peace between Egypt and Israel, to create a climate in which the divisions of that part of the world may have some chance of healing.

Finally, as each of you is aware, in January of this year our Government expressed the strong view that the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) research programme was prudent, given similar research already being conducted by the USSR. We continue to be of that view. That being said, we decided in September that we would not participate on a government-to-government basis in the SDI research programme. The Government's research priorities were judged to lie more in the investigation of outer space verification technology than in feasibility studies of space-based weapon systems.

Underlying all these decisions is our unyielding commitment to a strong, independent Canada working in concert with other countries, in the interest of common global security. Within the field of arms control and disarmament, our Government has six specific objectives:

- negotiated radical reductions in nuclear forces and the enhancement of strategic stability;
- maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime;
- negotiation of a global chemical weapons ban;
- support for a comprehensive test ban treaty;
- prevention of an arms race in outer space; and
- the building of confidence sufficient to facilitate the reduction of military forces in Europe and elsewhere.

The resumption of the Geneva negotiations and the successful review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which concluded last month, have advanced the first two objectives. It is imperative that these negotiations lead to deep cuts in nuclear arsenals and that a firm cap be placed on any initial reduction to ensure that future movement will be in a steadily downward direction. In my view, this would be a nuclear 'freeze' that works.



The other four aims are being pursued in related forums: the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the Stockholm Conference and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna. The Canadian delegations at these conferences are seeking, in concert with our Allies, practical and equitable measures to reduce armaments and increase confidence.

I am pleased that our ambassadors who are engaged in the various disarmament negotiations are with us tonight and I am confident their contributions will both enliven and add considerably to your discussions. By way of illustration of this practical approach, Canada will provide to the UN Secretary-General a manual of procedures for investigating allegations of chemical weapons use. We have carried out a series of discussions with non-signatories of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to urge them to accede to this vital agreement.

At the Stockholm Conference we have explored with our NATO Allies new ideas on how the attainment of a substantial result can be facilitated.

Recent progress during the discussions at Stockholm portends concrete results from this important forum. At the Conference on Disarmament, Canada has tabled a study on the existing legal regime pertaining to outer space. This represents the first substantive contribution of any country to the work of the conference.

It is exactly through the cumulative effect of such practical measures that progress in arms control is most surely achieved. This basic stance underlies the Programme of Action Canada will advance throughout the last half of the Second Disarmament Decade. One of the predominant themes in that Programme will be Canada's decision to focus on the vital issue of the verification of compliance with arms control agreements.

Without the knowledge that one's partners in an arms control agreement are actually honouring their obligations, the whole purpose of the agreement and, by extension, the arms control process

itself, is called into disrepute. Verification is not an end in itself. Verification enhances the confidence of the parties.

In so doing, it creates a sense of predictability. And predictability is one of the most important outcomes of effective arms control.

For my own part, I have concentrated on developing channels of communication with leaders from both East and West, to facilitate an exchange of ideas and to convey Canadian concerns and practical suggestions. Last month, I wrote to General Secretary Gorbachev outlining Canadian views and priorities with respect to arms control and disarmament. I have, of course, been in frequent contact with President Reagan on a range of international issues. I was pleased to participate at the meeting which he hosted last week in New York of summit heads of government to discuss the forthcoming Geneva Summit.

It has been six years since the leaders of the USA and USSR have met. That is far too long in a world where superpower tensions cannot be left unattended. It would be preferable to regularize East-West summitry, to have the leaders of the USA and USSR meet, perhaps annually, to discuss problems and areas of common concern.

You can do much to promote the concept — and the reality — of Canada as a state with a vital role to play in building the political, economic and social structures of peace in a world of great change.

Postscript:

Earlier this afternoon I received a message from President Reagan outlining a new American proposal designed to achieve real reductions in nuclear arms. This development is indeed a positive and welcome step.

While it would be clearly inappropriate for me to discuss any of the details of the President's new proposals, I am pleased that this new USA initiative builds upon common ground and thus should provide a basis for serious and substantive negotiations."

Government Provides \$3.2 million to Upgrade Yellowknife Seismic Array

On February 7, the Government released a statement announcing its plans to upgrade the Yellowknife seismic array.

The following is the text of the communiqué.

"The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, announced today that the Government has agreed to provide \$3.2 million during the period 1986-1989 to upgrade the Yellowknife seismic array as a major Canadian contribution to monitoring an eventual comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB).

The achievement of a CTB is a fundamental Canadian objective which Canada promotes multilaterally within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. Canada has played a particularly prominent role in verification, a central issue in which seismic technology is the key. Since 1976, scientists from the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources have participated in the international group of seismic experts in the CD working on technical aspects of a worldwide exchange of seismic data. Canada's leadership is internationally recognized in this area.

Yellowknife is recognized as a unique and sensitive location to monitor global seismic events including underground nuclear tests. Updating and modernization of the Yellowknife seismic array, which consists of a series of short-period and long-period seismometers, will enable Canada to contribute to an international system which will constitute an essential monitoring element of a negotiated CTB using the best technology available."



Canada Makes Second Contribution to Palme Commission

On July 19, 1985, the then Canadian Ambassador to Austria, Mr. Alan W. Sullivan, presented a cheque for \$25 000 to Mr. Jagge Anderson, Administration Officer of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (Palme Commission), on behalf of the Government of Canada.

This was the second such contribution made by the Canadian Government to the Palme Commission. An initial contribution of \$160 000 was made in 1981. These contributions reflect the support of the Canadian Government for the Commission's efforts to enhance public awareness of international security and disarmament issues.

The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, originally set up under the chairmanship of the late Prime Minister Olof Palme of Sweden, was created in 1980 to identify security and disarmament measures that

can contribute to peace in the 1980s and beyond. The membership of the Commission includes representatives of NATO and the Warsaw Pact as well as the neutral and non-aligned countries. Mr. Robert Ford, a former Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union and one of Canada's leading experts on East-West relations, is a member of the Commission.

In 1982, the Commission issued its recommendations in a report called *Common Security — A Program for Disarmament*. The Commission's work is continuing with periodic meetings on specific themes in order to offer an independent political forum for the discussion of disarmament issues and to continue the dialogue undertaken during the initial work of the Commission.

The next meeting of the Palme Commission will be held in Budapest, Hungary, in October 1986 and will focus on European security issues.



Mr. Alan W. Sullivan (left), then Canadian Ambassador to Austria, presenting a cheque for \$25 000 to Mr. Jagge Anderson, Administration Officer of the Palme Commission. Mr. Sullivan is now Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs, Department of External Affairs.

Ambassador Beesley Addresses Conference on Disarmament

On February 4, Mr. J. Alan Beesley, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, made a major statement to the Conference. Following are excerpts from his statement.

"As we began our deliberations here just a year ago, there was a note of cautious expectation in the air. The governments of the USSR and the USA had only recently agreed to resume negotiations on the central arms control and disarmament issues of our time. Moreover, in taking this step, which entailed considerable statesmanship on each side, the two governments set themselves agreed negotiating objectives which are impressive in their scope and comprehensiveness, namely: 'The prevention of an arms race in space and its termination on earth; the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms; and the strengthening of strategic stability.' They stated as an ultimate goal 'the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.' We, and the watching world, saw a glimmer of hope.

Now, little more than a year later, that flame of hope not only remains alive, but burns a little brighter. Negotiators for the two governments completed three rounds of negotiations in Geneva during 1985. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Geneva in November and issued an important Joint Statement, affirming *inter alia* the intent to accelerate the work of their negotiations. The fourth round of negotiations is already underway.

Happily, this process has produced more than rhetoric. Detailed and substantive proposals and counter-proposals have been made, reflecting a readiness on both sides to agree to major reductions in their respective nuclear arsenals as a first step towards implementing the agreed negotiating objectives in their entirety. Thus, in the Canadian view, the good faith and serious intent of each of



the parties to these negotiations have been persuasively demonstrated. We applaud the constructive beginning which has been made in this all-important negotiation. We recognize that the negotiation is likely to be long and arduous and that to expect quick, comprehensive solutions on the many outstanding issues would be unrealistic. We urge the two parties to continue their negotiating efforts with all the determination, skill and patience that the importance of the subject matter demands, as they have pledged to do. Canada, for its part, pledges that in the Conference on Disarmament and all other relevant international fora, we will support, facilitate and attempt to reinforce these crucial bilateral negotiations.

It is a reality of our time that the USA and USSR, by their separate and joint decisions, will determine central aspects of any international framework for preserving global security. But of course, the establishment of a stable basis for enduring international peace and security must not and cannot be a proprietary monopoly of the two superpowers. Their negotiations are of vital concern to all peoples; as Canada's Prime Minister has recently affirmed, peace and security is everybody's business. It is for every responsible government, through its national policies and by constructive participation in international fora such as the Conference on Disarmament where such issues are addressed, to make its own contribution to the collective international effort to come to grips with the complex and seemingly intractable issues involved in creating conditions for stable, enduring international peace and security. The Canadian Government reaffirms its determination to do just that.

In this forum, the seriousness of Canada's commitment to the pursuit of realizable arms control and disarmament measures is well known. Canada's long-standing approach to arms control and disarmament, sometimes criticized as idealistic, is not starry-eyed but directed to the pursuit of practical and achievable goals. We see arms control not as separate from, but intimately bound up with, the legitimate concern of all states for their national security....

I have alluded already to the Canadian Government's generally positive appreciation of the course of the negotiations thus far between the USA and the USSR. While this should be a source of encouragement to us here, it should not prompt us to slacken our efforts but rather to intensify them. It should entitle us to a heightened expectation that in this forum, where our first obligation is to seek out common ground and expand areas of agreement, we will be able to avoid political polemics, invective and recriminatory exchanges, which are out of place in any serious negotiating forum.

As in recent years, the negotiation of a verifiable, comprehensive ban on chemical weapons is a priority item on our agenda. Modest but detectable progress was made on this item during the 1985 session but there is still cause for disappointment in spite of the strenuous efforts of Ambassador Turbanski of Poland, the chairman of the Chemical Weapons Ad Hoc Committee. Known instances of recent chemical weapons use should add to our collective sense of urgency to attain the earliest possible conclusion of such a ban. We note with particular attention the affirmation by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in their Joint Statement of their intent to 'accelerate their efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention' as well as their intention to 'initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons.' It is our understanding that this latter initiative is not intended in any way to divert efforts from the priority need to conclude a comprehensive chemical weapons ban; so too with respect to the statement contained in the proposals most recently made by General Secretary Gorbachev raising the possibility of 'certain interim steps,' possibly involving multilateral agreement on matters relating to the non-transfer of chemical weapons. As others have pointed out, and indeed my delegation has in the past, it will be of limited utility if we get an effective bilateral convention which is not a comprehensive convention in both senses in extending to all the main issues under negotiation and comprising a genuine non-proliferation convention.

Despite the considerable progress which has been made, there remain several difficult issues to be resolved if a chemical weapons ban is to be concluded. Among these, the verification provisions of the treaty will require especially serious and dispassionate effort if agreement is to be achieved. It will be recalled that, in April 1984, almost two years ago, the Vice-President of the United States of America tabled in this forum a draft treaty text which is the most comprehensive proposal yet before us setting out in detail the kind of verification regime his Government prefers and would regard as adequate. Canada has indicated its readiness in principle to accept and apply the kinds of verification provisions contained in the US text. However, while there has been much criticism of these proposals, no delegation has thus far come forward with concrete, substantive alternative comprehensive proposals which would delineate with clarity the area of common ground and the areas of disagreement, thus providing a basis for serious negotiation with a view to arriving at verification provisions which would be acceptable to all.

The Canadian Government noted, and welcomed, the reaffirmation by the US spokesman in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on October 31, 1985, that 'No imbalance in inspection obligations is either desired, intended or contained in any provisions of the United States draft convention banning chemical weapons.' The Canadian Government has also noted with particular care and interest the recent statement by General Secretary Gorbachev that, with reference to declarations of the location of chemical weapons production facilities, the cessation of production, the destruction of production facilities and the destruction of chemical weapons stocks, 'All these measures would be carried out under strict control including international on-site inspections.' We are greatly encouraged by this statement. We hope that during the present session of this Conference the delegation of the USSR will be in a position to further elaborate on its precise meaning. The task of seriously negotiating effective, operable and politically acceptable verification



Ambassador J. Alan Beesley addressing Conference on Disarmament, February 4. Bianco

provisions for a chemical weapons treaty will be difficult and time-consuming. However, it should not be postponed any longer....

Another important item on our agenda is the prevention of an arms race in outer space, a subject on which there is widespread and legitimate public anxiety. Last year, an important step forward was taken when we were able to agree on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee on this item. I pointed out at the time that it was a realistic mandate which takes into account and both complements and accurately reflects the realities concerning the bilateral negotiations already then underway between the USA and the USSR, but does not undermine or undercut or prejudice or in any way interfere with those negotiations. At the same time, I expressed the hope that this mandate would not expire at the end of 1985, bearing in mind the wishes of some delegations who would like something more and something better. The view I then expressed continues to be the view of the Canadian Government. The mandate has enabled us to make a beginning, but it has by no means been exhausted. It was attained only with great difficulty, skill and perseverance. Any attempt to negotiate it or re-negotiate it would almost certainly involve further lengthy discussion at the expense of substantive deliberation, with little prospect of agreement on a new mandate. Moreover, the political

and negotiating context in which the mandate was agreed has not appreciably changed. Indeed, to the extent that the USA and USSR are seriously coming to grips with the negotiating objectives they have set for themselves, including the prevention of an arms race in outer space, our need to ensure that our deliberations are complementary to, and not disruptive of, those negotiations is enhanced. Finally, I would note that, due to regrettable procedural delays, our substantive discussions on this item last year were seriously curtailed and as some delegations have pointed out we were able to have only nine meetings. Nevertheless, those discussions, in the Canadian judgement, got off to a reasonably good start. They were substantive. They were for the most part objective. They went some way towards elucidating the complexities and intricacies — technical, legal and political, and we have heard some of them today — involved in this process. However, they remain incomplete. The importance and difficulty of the subject demand that we discharge our last year's mandate with determination and dispatch before we embark on a new one. The reputation of the Conference would not be enhanced by procedural wrangles on this item....

The question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban remains an especially important item on our agenda. It has, unfortunately, become one of the more contentious issues. The intensity of feel-

ing it generates reflects both the inherent importance of nuclear weaponry as a core element of the strategic policies of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the profound public anxieties arising from an awareness of the massive and relatively indiscriminate destructive power of such weapons. Because the use of such weapons on any significant scale would have serious repercussions not only for combatant states but, almost certainly, for all others as well, the active interest in this item shown by all delegations of this Conference is legitimate and understandable. In these circumstances, there may be a consequential need to take care that the strength of our views and concerns, and the vehemency with which they may be expressed, do not become a hindrance to rational discussion of the central issues involved. Here or elsewhere, polemics will not lead the way to better understanding.

I wish to emphasize that a negotiated, verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban remains a fundamental objective of the Canadian Government. Canada continues to favour a careful, step-by-step approach to a nuclear test ban, both on procedure and substance, although we respect the views of those who differ. The Canadian Government is clearly on record as favouring the re-establishment in the Conference of a subsidiary body to address this subject, and I now reiterate that position. Such a body must have a concrete and realistic mandate which would enable the immediate resumption of substantive work, with a view to negotiation of a treaty. We suggest that priority attention be given to reaching agreement on a programme of work, which might address the issues of scope, as well as verification and compliance, with appropriately structured working groups. We sense among the countries represented in this room a growing recognition of the potential value of a focused approach along these lines. The Canadian delegation would be ready to take an active and constructive part in implementing an agreed work programme. We hope too that, in support of such efforts, there could be general agreement to press ahead with our important work on seismic exchanges...."

Peacekeeping: A Canadian Contribution to Peace

The following article was prepared by the Defence Relations Division of the Department of External Affairs.

Canada has been and continues to be a strong supporter of peacekeeping and a major contributor to peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping may be generally defined as the employment of military, para-military or non-military personnel or forces in an area of political conflict, for the purpose of restoring or maintaining the peace. The purpose of peacekeeping is to enable the parties to disengage and to give them confidence that their differences can be settled by negotiation. Peacekeeping activities range from unarmed missions with a role of observation and reporting only, through roles of investigation, supervision and control, to the interposition of armed military units and formations between the parties.

Peacekeeping has not been confined exclusively to the post-World War II period. Previously there were some very successful international police operations, such as the 1935 peacekeeping force, established by the League of Nations during the Saar plebiscite, which resolved the dispute between France and Germany. On this topic Anthony Eden wrote in his memoirs: "The



Member of Canadian peacekeeping force on duty at observation post in Cyprus.



Canadian peacekeeping troops patrolling "Green Line" in Nicosia, Cyprus. DND Photos

machinery in the SAAR both before and during the plebiscite gave a glimpse of a supranational salvation to a world which was imprisoning itself all the while more closely within the confines of the National State...."

Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the concept of peacekeeping has been perceived by the international community as a practical means of limiting and mediating disputes and avoiding the outbreak of a major conflict.

Since 1947, Canada has participated in a total of 15 UN peacekeeping operations. Canada's preference has been that peacekeeping operations be conducted under UN jurisdiction, and that the UN machinery for doing so be strengthened. Recognizing, however, that this is not always possible, in particular where great power interests are involved, Canada has participated in peacekeeping-type missions outside UN auspices: the 1954 and 1973 Control Commissions in Indo-China and the International Observer Team in Nigeria. A summary of Canadian participation in these operations is contained in the annex.

Canada contributes forces to three current UN peacekeeping operations and has agreed to participate in another peacekeeping mission in the Middle East not under UN auspices, commencing in 1986. These operations are:

(a) *The United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO)* This, the oldest of the UN operations in the Middle East, was permanently established by the Security Council in 1948. Canada has participated in UNTSO since 1954. Its task is to observe and maintain the ceasefire ordered by the Security Council and to assist in the supervision of the application and observance of the General Armistice Agreements between Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Israel. The Canadian participation at present consists of 20 officers, out of a total of 297 members.

(b) *The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)* Created in May 1974 by Security Council Resolution 350 after the Yom Kippur War, its task is to observe and maintain the ceasefire between Israel and Syria by interposing troops between the parties concerned. The force is deployed on the Golan Heights. Canada provides a contingent of approximately 220 personnel, whose task is to provide logistic, communications and other technical support to the force. UNDOF enjoys the cooperation of both Israel and Syria and has been highly successful in carrying out its mission.

(c) *The United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)* This force was established in 1964 following the outbreak of hostilities between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish



Cypriot communities. Canada has been a major contributor since that time with a current commitment of 515 personnel. Its mandate is to prevent a recurrence of fighting between hostile factions, and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and assist in the return to normal conditions. Although it is regrettable that the parties to the dispute have not yet been able to reach a negotiated settlement, the continued presence of UNFICYP is considered necessary to maintain a peaceful situation in which the search for a political settlement may continue.

(d) *The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)* The MFO, which is based in the Sinai peninsula, was established in 1981 to monitor the provisions of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. The force was established by a protocol to the Treaty and is not under the auspices of the United Nations. In response to requests from Egypt and Israel, Canada has agreed to provide a contingent of up to 140 personnel and nine helicopters to the MFO, commencing on March 31, 1986. Canadian participation in the MFO will contribute to the reinforcement of the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, and reaffirms Canada's commitment to peace and stability in the Middle East.

In addition to the above operations, Canada provides periodic airlift support to the UN Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP), and the Canadian Forces Attaché in the Republic of Korea provides Canadian representation on the UN Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC).

Our military role in international peace-keeping helps to prevent the outbreak or spread of hostilities so that underlying political problems can be settled through negotiation, thus minimizing the possibility of direct great power involvement. However, Canada has never considered peacekeeping to be a sufficient objective in itself. The purpose of peacekeeping is not only to prevent conflict, but also to create the conditions in which the search for solutions to the underlying causes of conflict can take place. For this reason Canada has held the view

ANNEX

CANADIAN ARMED FORCES PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES AND OBSERVER MISSIONS – 1947 ONWARDS

Operation	Location	Dates	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution
United Nations Command Korea (UNCK)	Korea	1950-54	8,000	—
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)	Egypt	1956-67	1,007	—
Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC)	Congo	1960-64	421	—
United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)	West New Guinea (now West Irian)	1962-63	13	—
United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Cyprus	1964-	1,126	515
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)	Egypt (Sinai)	1973-79	1,145	—
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Israel Syria (Golan Heights)	1974-	220	220
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Lebanon	1978 (Apr-Sep)	117	—
United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK)	Korea	1947-48	Unknown	—
United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	Kashmir	1949-79	27	—
United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization Palestine (UNTSO)	Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Syria	1954-	20	20
United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC)	Korea	1953-	2	1
United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	Lebanon	1958-59	77	—
United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM)	Yemen	1963-64	36	—
United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)	India-Pakistan Border	1965-66	112	—
International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC)	Cambodia Laos Vietnam	1954-74	133	—
International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS)	South Vietnam	1973	248	—
Observer Team to Nigeria (OTN)	Nigeria	1968-69	2	—



that considerable emphasis should be placed on the inter-relationship between peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts by all parties concerned.

It has become apparent from many years' experience that certain conditions must exist if a peacekeeping operation is to have a reasonable chance of success. It is very important that the peacekeeping mission be associated with an agreement for a political settlement, or at least an expressed willingness by the parties concerned to seek such a settlement. The parties to the dispute must agree to maintain a ceasefire, and must agree to accept the presence and composition of the peacekeeping mission and respect its mandate. The mission must have a clear and attainable mandate, and must have the necessary freedom of movement and action to carry out its tasks, including adequate authority for self-defence. Peacekeeping forces are not normally strong enough to impose their will militarily on the belligerents, and hence can only operate effectively with the cooperation of the parties concerned. The peacekeeping organization should be responsible to a political authority, preferably the United Nations, capable of supervising the mandate of the mission, receiving reports and exercising some influence over the parties concerned. It is important that a fair and equitable method of financing the operation be agreed.

In addition to these criteria, the desirability of Canadian participation in any peacekeeping operation would of course be influenced by the degree to which it would serve Canadian foreign policy interests and by the ability of the Canadian Forces to provide the required resources.

Together with other nations which have contributed to peacekeeping operations, Canada continues to work to improve the practical implementation of peacekeeping. In particular, through its membership in the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Canada has sought to enhance the ability of the UN to mount and control peacekeeping operations. A continuing effort to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes is one of the foundations of Canadian security policy.

Canadian Views on Disarmament and Development

The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

A major study on *The Relationship between Disarmament and Development* was launched at the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978 and was completed in 1981 by a group of experts, including a Canadian, Mr. Bernard Wood, Director of the North-South Institute in Ottawa.

In 1982, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) supported the recommendations of the experts and decided that the question of reallocation and conversion of resources, through disarmament measures, from military to civilian purposes should be included on the UNGA agenda periodically, beginning with UNGA 40 in 1985. It also recommended that an investigation of the modalities of an international disarmament fund for development should be undertaken. In 1983, at the initiative of France, the United Nations solicited the views of member states on the relationship between disarmament and development and referred the question to the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) for consideration.

At its thirty-ninth session in 1984, the UNGA decided to convene an international conference, after thorough preparation, on disarmament and development. It established a 54-nation Preparatory Committee, of which Canada is a member, to work out the details for the conference.

At its fortieth session in 1985, the UNGA decided that the conference would be held in Paris from July 15 to August 2, 1986.

The substantive agenda covers three main issues:

(a) all aspects of the relationship between disarmament and development;

(b) implications of the level of military expenditures for the world economy and the international economic and social situation, particularly for the developing countries, and remedial measures;

(c) ways and means of releasing additional resources, through disarmament measures, for development purposes, in particular for the benefit of developing countries.

The Preparatory Committee met from July 29 to August 9, 1985, to work out the procedural aspects relating to the conference. Subsequently, meetings from April 1 to April 12 and from June 2 to 13, 1986, were added in order to prepare for the substantive discussion which is to take place at the conference.

In his statement on July 30 to the first Preparatory Committee meeting, the Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, outlined the views of the Canadian Government on this subject in the following way:

"It wishes to see a serious and orderly discussion of the main aspects of the disarmament/development question, including whether a greater measure of security can be attainable through development rather than through arms build-up.

The two-fold objective of the conference, as outlined in UNGA resolution 38/71B, must be constantly borne in mind, namely:

— action on the arms build-up and the resulting risks for world peace and security; action on development.

The basic question is how *disarmament* might offer a way to make a contribution to development. Attention must focus on the question of how military spending both in developed and developing countries has detracted from the development process.

The Canadian Government believes that the conference should involve a



practical, in-depth examination of the question with a view to establishing:

- what resources are tied up in armaments;
- how this spending has affected development;
- what resources might be diverted from military spending;
- what the problems are in doing so and what the benefits are.

Canada believes that the approach must be a global one involving both nuclear and conventional disarmament. It should also involve not only the super-powers but other countries as well, both developed and developing.

It must take full account of the security concerns of states. Security is the touchstone. But security cannot be viewed only in its narrowest military sense. The economic and social well-being of a state are other important aspects of its security.

It must be realistic in its recognition that very few governments, if any, are prepared to commit in advance resources that might eventually be saved through future disarmament measures. The creation of mechanisms in anticipation of such transfers must be approached with realism."



The flags of some UN member states with facade of UN Secretariat building in background.

UN Photo

External Affairs Prepares Handbook to Investigate Alleged Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons



Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations, Stephen Lewis, (centre) and Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, (right) presenting CW handbook to UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar.

UN Photo

On December 6, the Department of External Affairs issued a communiqué concerning a major Canadian initiative at the United Nations regarding procedures for dealing with alleged uses of chemical or biological weapons. The following is the text of that communiqué.

"In a very important step, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, today conveyed to His Excellency Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Secretary-General of the United Nations, the results of an extensive Canadian study on procedures to apply in cases where there are alleged uses of chemical or biological weapons. Ambassador Stephen Lewis, accompanied by Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche, delivered a letter from Mr. Clark to the UN Secretary-General and presented him with a ceremonial copy of a *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons*.

The Handbook is the result of a study by Canadian scientists and officials, concluded under the auspices of the Verification Research Programme of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

The text of the letter from the Secre-

tary of State for External Affairs is as follows:

Excellency,

On September 25, 1985, I had the honour of addressing the 40th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, at which time I stated that Canada had devised its own Programme of Action for the latter half of the Second Disarmament Decade. At that time, I indicated that Canada would present to the United Nations the results of detailed, practical studies it has undertaken related to the investigation of allegations of the use of chemical weapons.

As you know, over the past few years Canada has submitted documentation to the United Nations that has had a bearing on specific allegations. In addition, Canada submitted a study and made a presentation to the Group of Consultant Experts appointed by you under General Assembly resolution 37/98D concerning provisional procedures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical or biological weapons. In accordance with that resolution, Canada also advised you of the names of scientific experts and laboratories upon which you could draw in the event of a requirement to investigate an allegation of the use of chemical or bio-



logical weapons. As you are fully aware, the use of such weapons would constitute a violation of either the 1925 Geneva Protocol or the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, or both. The international community ignores such acts at its peril.

Your initiatives to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons have been greatly appreciated in Canada, and have had our full support. If, regrettably, further investigative initiatives by you become necessary, you can count on Canada's continued support. It is, therefore, with particular pleasure that I am conveying to you, on behalf of the Government of Canada, the formal results of our work in the form of a *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons*.

This document constitutes a manual of procedures which would be useful to UN experts who may be called upon to investigate such an allegation. An impar-

tial investigation would determine, to the extent possible, whether or not there are grounds to support the allegation. It is for this reason, we strongly believe, that a comprehensive and known set of procedures should exist to conduct a timely on-site investigation, a point which has been made many times in the past by the Experts appointed by you. This Handbook identifies procedures, equipment and standard formats which would go a long way to ensuring that the findings of an investigation are as conclusive, as convincing, and as impartial as they can possibly be.

Canada will continue to explore ways in which it might make further practical contributions to the reinforcement of international law prohibiting the use of chemical or biological weapons. We hope that our efforts will stimulate other concerned governments to continue and to increase their own efforts to the same end. Only through the concerted activity of the international community can present and future generations be

spared the scourge of these weapons of mass destruction.

We see this Handbook as the first substantive manifestation of what we had in mind in putting forward with other co-sponsors resolution L.62/Rev.1 on 'Verification in All its Aspects,' which was adopted without a vote in the First Committee on November 22, 1985. We see procedures such as these being relevant to the on-going negotiations and eventual agreement on a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. While awaiting such agreement, we see this Handbook as a contribution to the role of your office and the United Nations in ensuring that allegations of the use of chemical or biological weapons be investigated in a timely and effective manner.

We would certainly be pleased to be associated with any follow-on action which might be prompted by this Handbook.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration."

Canada and USA Renew NORAD Agreement



Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan at signing of NORAD agreement. PMO

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and US President Ronald Reagan signed a five-year extension of the NORAD agreement during their Summit meeting in Washington, March 18-19. The two leaders noted that "the extension of the NORAD agreement is fully consistent with the provisions of the ABM treaty and is in full accordance with other US and Canadian treaty obligations." Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan also discussed the Geneva arms control negotiations and underlined the importance of making progress in these negotiations. During their discussions they also underlined the importance of full compliance with existing arms control obligations.

The NORAD agreement, first signed in May 1958, provides for joint Canada-US arrangements in regard to North American air defence, aerospace surveillance and early warning of ballistic missile attack. The term NORAD stands for North American Aerospace Defence Command.

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This is the first in a series of supplements to the *Disarmament Bulletin* that have been prepared by the Department of External Affairs in order to provide a more detailed presentation of Canada's efforts to promote arms control and disarmament.

Cette publication existe également en français.

Canada at the Stockholm Conference



General view of an opening session of the Stockholm Conference.

Reportagebild

The Stockholm Conference, or, as it is formally titled, the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, is a creation of the ongoing 35-state Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Participants include Canada, the United States and all the European States with the exception of Albania. The first undertaking of the CSCE was the negotiation of the Helsinki Final Act (signed in 1975) which set out a series of principles that were to govern the relations between the participating States. Subsequent CSCE meetings have reviewed the implementation of the Final Act and explored means for improving the level of security and cooperation in Europe. Proceeding on the basis of a mandate carefully worked out at the last CSCE Follow-Up Meeting which concluded in Madrid in September 1983, the Stockholm Conference is "to undertake,

in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations."

The first stage of the Conference, which like all CSCE meetings operates on a consensus basis, is specifically devoted "to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe." These confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs for short) are an elaboration of the modest confidence-building measures (CBMs) contained in the Helsinki Final Act. As such, they are seen as "second generation" measures and part of a novel and still largely undefined approach to East-



West arms control and disarmament. Since no short standard definition of CBMs exists, we will reproduce here a functional description of CBMs elaborated by a Canadian researcher in order to capture their essence:

1. CBMs are a variety of arms control measure entailing
2. deliberate state actions
3. that can be unilateral but which are more often either bilateral or multilateral
4. that attempt to reduce or eliminate misperceptions about specific military threats or concerns (very often having to do with surprise attack)
5. by communicating adequately verifiable evidence of acceptable reliability to the effect that those concerns are groundless
6. often (but not always) by demonstrating that military and political intentions are not aggressive
7. and/or by providing early warning indicators to create confidence that surprise would be difficult to achieve
8. and/or by restricting the opportunities available for the use of military forces by adopting restrictions on the activities and deployments of those forces (or crucial components of them) within sensitive areas.

While the mandate of the Stockholm Conference stipulates that the CSBMs are to be militarily significant, politically binding, adequately verifiable and applicable to the whole of Europe, the exact nature of these measures is left up to the Conference to determine. Since its January 1984 opening, which occurred at the foreign minister level as urged by Canada, the Stockholm Conference has been engaged in the complicated process of trying to arrive at a mutually agreed understanding of what form these CSBMs should take. This negotiating process is intended to reconcile the divergent views of participants as to the appropriate nature of the CSBMs the Conference is to adopt, and in particular

those approaches to confidence-building held by the West and the East.

The Western approach to confidence-building emphasizes the need for better mutual understanding of the normal military activity of participating States through imparting a greater degree of openness and regularity to this activity, with a view to reducing the risk of military conflict caused by surprise, misperception and mistrust. The East, on the other hand, has favoured the adoption of broad political undertakings which in its view create a necessary climate or background of confidence which can then facilitate the acceptance of more practical "military/technical" measures — as the East describes the "concrete measures" approach to confidence-building. To put it another way, the West favours a gradual building up of confidence through a series of concrete steps, whereas the East prefers an initial declaration that confidence exists and its subsequent reinforcement with subordinate and limited specific measures. The Neutral and Non-Aligned (NNA) States, while generally in harmony with the Western approach, tend to pursue individual national security interests.

After its formal opening on January 17, 1984, the Conference devoted its first year of discussions to a general debate in plenary outlining the different approaches to confidence-building espoused by the various participants. Proposals reflecting these approaches were tabled by the major groupings of States during the course of the year. The NATO countries were first to table a comprehensive proposal in January, followed by the NNA in March and the Warsaw Pact (WPO) States in May.

After considerable preliminary negotiations the Conference finally agreed in December 1984 to establish two subsidiary working groups: working group 'B' dealing with measures of observation and notification (i.e., those CBMs already present in the Final Act) and working group 'A' examining all other proposed measures (i.e., CBMs which are not now included in the Final Act). This working structure facilitated a more detailed examination of the original

proposals during the course of 1985 and was further refined in October on the basis of an informal agreement. This agreement (in typically qualified CSCE language) specified "those topics which might figure in the subsequent process of drafting language on a set of mutually complementary CSBMs, in accordance with the mandate, for possible inclusion in a concluding document." As a result, working group 'A' meets three times a week to discuss: 1) non-use of force; 2) information exchange, compliance and verification, and development of means of communications and consultations, in the context of a notification system comprising a set of mutually complementary CSBMs; and 3) constraining measures and annual forecasts of military activity; while working group 'B' continues to meet twice a week to discuss observation and notification of military activity.

Although it might appear merely a procedural arrangement, the October agreement was highly significant, as it fixed, for the first time, the type of measures that should figure in any eventual final agreement. By means of the October arrangement, the Soviet Union agreed to set aside all of its initial political-declaratory measures (such as an agreement on no-first-use of nuclear weapons or the establishment of a chemical weapons free zone with the exception of an agreement on the non-use of force (NUF)), while the West agreed in return to negotiate some reaffirmation of the NUF principle. It is by such subtle and informal (the October agreement is not officially recorded in the Conference's documents) understandings that the Stockholm Conference moves forward to its elusive goal — a significant agreement on European military security affairs that at the same time is agreeable to all 35 participating States.

Another noteworthy development in the Conference's deliberations was the December 1985 agreement on a complete work programme for 1986 which sets September 19, 1986, as an adjournment date. This act of the Conference sets a time limit of sorts for completing the negotiations prior to the convening of the next CSCE Follow-up Conference in Vienna in November 1986 which is to



COMPARISON OF PRINCIPAL PROPOSALS TABLED TO DATE* AT STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE

MEASURE	ALLIED	NNA	SOVIET BLOC
Annual Forecasts	Of all notifiable military activities.	Similar to Allied but with additional information.	All notifiable activities, limited information.
Notification (Land)			
Threshold	Division or majority of combat elements of division or 6 000 men.	Division plus equipment threshold and numerical threshold.	20 000 troops.
Pre-notification time	45 days.	42 days.	30 days.
Information	Detailed, calls for an exchange of information relevant to the notification of out-of-garrison activities.	More details, mostly in the context of prior notification and observation.	Less detailed, only in the context of prior notification and observation.
Notification (Mobilization)	Involving 20 000 troops or more.	None.	None.
Notification (Naval)	Only when functionally linked to land activity. No threshold set.	Not included but not explicitly ruled out.	Whenever at least 30 combat ships and 100 military aircraft are involved in manoeuvre.
Notification (Air)	Only when functionally linked to land activity. No threshold set.	Not included but not explicitly ruled out.	Whenever 200 or more aircraft involved in a manoeuvre.
Notification (Amphibious)	When three or more battalions or 3 000 amphibious troops carry out a landing.	Three or more battalions.	7 000 troops.
Constraint Measures	None.	A complex proposal that imposes constraints on the scale, number and duration of exercises with varying thresholds.	Ban on exercises involving over 40 000 men.
Observation	Universal right to observe all phases of notifiable activity.	Universal right to observe all notifiable activity from point when threshold reached.	Universal right to observe all notifiable activity.
Communication	Dedicated Telex Lines.	Dedicated Telex Lines.	Not specified.
Verification	NTMs and Challenge On-site Inspections (two per State per year).	Observation at short notice in exceptional cases. Receiving State has right to refuse.	NTMs.
Consultation	None.	<i>Ad Hoc</i> meetings plus regular meetings to review implementation.	Urgent consultations if risk of use of force.
Non-Use of Force	Will reaffirm in context of CSBMs. Partial text tabled.	Political declaration based on Final Act.	NUF Treaty that tries to "develop" the principle.

review the progress achieved at the Stockholm Conference as required by the mandate. The existence of an adjournment date distinguishes the Stockholm Conference from other open-ended arms control forums and could facilitate the process of coming to terms on a final agreement.

The negotiations at Stockholm have now advanced to the point where the outline of a final agreement is relatively clear. It will contain improved notification measures of military activity with lowered thresholds and increased advance notice, mandatory observation, enhanced information and verification procedures and a reaffirmation of the NUF principle. The principal proposals tabled to date reveal significant areas of convergence, although some major differences on the scope of certain measures still remain. The table on page 3 attempts to set out in comparative form the main elements of the current proposals of the NATO, NNA and WPO groupings of States.

While this chart provides a basic representation of the negotiating matrix at the Conference, it is more difficult to convey the politico-military positions which lie behind these respective proposals and the degree of their intercompatibility. The major points of conflict between the three groupings have involved the scope of notification, information, verification, constraints and non-use of force. A brief discussion of each of these issues follows.

On notification, the WPO has sought to include independent air and naval as well as land activities which NATO has resisted, arguing that the mandate provides for the notification of air and naval activities only when they are part of activities taking place on land. In his January 15 statement on arms control, the Soviet leader Mr. Gorbachev suggested that the problem of the notification of naval activities should be postponed to a future stage of the Conference, with the notification of land and air activities to be decided upon during the current stage. Most of the NNA, while not rejecting the NATO view that only land activities (which represent the

most threatening form of military activity for European security) should be notified at this stage, has not pronounced on the matter. In light of the NNA disposition plus the fact that air activities pose serious verification problems, it would seem that a notification regime restricted to land activities is the most probable outcome for this stage of the Stockholm Conference.

On information, NATO has argued that the exchange of information about each State's combat force structure in the zone is necessary in order to establish an independent standard of information. The information exchanged would be a valuable contribution to confidence-building in its own right. It would also simplify and assist materially in the verification of the notification measures, particularly the proposal to notify divisions out-of-garrison. The WPO, while not rejecting the principle of information, does not accept an exchange of information on combat force structure in the zone and has focused its attention on information in the context of notification which would only provide information on

forces actually participating in military activities at the time.

On verification, the WPO has generally insisted on the adequacy of National Technical Means (e.g., reconnaissance satellites) coupled with consultation to verify any CSBM agreement. NATO has insisted on the need for mandatory on-site inspection to verify compliance with the agreed CSBMs. NATO has not proposed any consultative measures of its own, because of concerns that such consultations could be used by a State to prevaricate and impede verification.

The NNA has proposed a measure providing for observation upon request and at short notice in exceptional circumstances. It would not, however, be mandatory for a State to grant such a request. The NNA also favours consultations both *ad hoc* and at fixed intervals to discuss implementation. Verification will form part of any agreement reached at Stockholm, but it is as yet not clear what verification provisions will be finally agreed to.



The Canadian Delegation to the Stockholm Conference. At lower right is Mr. Tom Delworth, Head of Delegation. Behind him is Col. C. Namiesniowski, Military Advisor. At lower left is Mr. Chris Anstis, Deputy Head of Delegation. Behind him is Mr. Robert Vanier, Delegation Secretary.



With respect to constraints (i.e., measures that actually constrain or limit military activities through geographical restrictions or ceilings on the manpower and/or equipment committed to such activities), both the NNA and the WPO have proposed measures that would put a cap on the size of military exercises. NATO has resisted the notion of constraints primarily because the prevailing asymmetries of the European military situation would tend to render any constraint measure more disadvantageous to it. While NATO is not a *demandeur* on constraints, it can accept constraints in principle and is ready to consider any constraint proposal which equitably affects all participating States.

With respect to the non-use of force principle, NATO believes that this obligation is already clear and concrete in international law and that the question should not be one of improving its formulation but rather its observance. The WPO remains convinced that the politico-military situation in Europe has deteriorated to the point where an NUF agreement is essential. Such an agreement in the words of one WPO delegate "would be a welcome signal about the underlying political intentions of the participating States and would help to establish clear and elaborate standards for the international conduct of States." The NNA, in its proposal of November 15, tabled an NUF text that may represent a compromise formulation containing, as it does, references to collateral issues (such as human rights and peaceful settlement of disputes) that in the NATO view are vital complements to the obligation not to threaten or use force. In the context of a meaningful set of CSBMs, NATO will likely agree to a reaffirmation of the NUF principle along the lines of the NNA text, although agreement on the exact formulation may elude negotiators until the end of the Conference.

Canada has long been an exponent of confidence-building as a means of reducing tensions in East-West relations and facilitating the negotiation of arms control agreements. One of the Government's six priority objectives in the field of arms control and disarmament



The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, addressing press conference following meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels on December 12, 1985. Canada has advocated within NATO that a high priority be attached to a successful outcome of the Stockholm Conference. Mr. Clark spoke to this effect at the Brussels meeting.

is "the building of confidence sufficient to facilitate the reduction of military forces in Europe and elsewhere." Canada was closely involved in the formulation of the mandate for the Stockholm Conference and the subsequent development of the package of CSBMs put forward by NATO at Stockholm.

Canada is playing a prominent role among its Allies on the questions of NUF and verification and we are members of the sub-groups within the NATO caucus that have the primary responsibility for negotiating these issues in the relevant Conference's working groups. The Canadian Delegation has been both active and innovative in its efforts to bring this first stage of the Conference to a successful conclusion. Canada believes that agreement at Stockholm on a substantial set of CSBMs will be of as much political as military significance, and would make a major contribution to the further development of the Helsinki process to promote cooperation and security in Europe.

Additional Reading

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Larabee, F. Stephen, and Stobbe, Dietrich (eds.), *Confidence Building Measures in Europe*, East-West Monograph No. 1, New York: Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1983

Macintosh, James, *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: a Canadian Perspective*, Arms Control and Disarmament Studies No. 1, Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1985

Spencer, Robert (ed.), *Canada and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985

ANNEX

Canadian Statements at the Stockholm Conference

Following is a selection of major statements made by members of the Canadian Delegation to the Stockholm Conference. These statements reflect Canada's positions on the various issues before the Conference.

Statement of January 25, 1984, on Verification

"Few would contest the proposition that the question of conventional arms in Europe must be approached from the premise that if the danger of conflict is to be lessened, a more stable balance of forces at the lowest level possible must be established between the two military alliances. The trend unfortunately has been in the other direction; not down, but upwards. The problem we are faced with today is how to assure States that their security can be maintained without increasing military potentials to an even more dangerous level, especially in central Europe. The key to this agonizing problem is to be found, I suggest, in the political intentions of governments and even more important in the degree of frankness and openness with which they make those intentions known. Mechanisms are needed which will lead to greater openness in military affairs among the participating States so that political intentions become easily discernible — and less readily misunderstood.

With these basic concerns in mind my Delegation joined a group of friends on January 24 in tabling a package of mutually complementary, confidence- and security-building measures which have been deliberately designed to reduce the risk of surprise attack, diminish the threat of armed conflict in Europe which could result from misunderstanding and miscalculation, and inhibit the use of force for the purpose of political intimidation. In other words, our proposal is aimed at increasing the

sense of security to a point where the tangible reduction of arms could become a policy option that might actually be chosen by the States concerned.

The proposals which we have co-sponsored are based on a mandate agreed at Madrid by participating States calling for measures which are militarily significant, applicable from the Atlantic to the Urals, politically binding and verifiable according to content. Taken together this set of interdependent measures would, if agreed to and implemented in good faith, take us a long step forward towards the creation of a new basis on which we could all approach the problem of actual arms reductions with confidence — and in the confident expectation that something might actually be achieved. Canada regards the challenge as urgent.

Canada believes that the provisions for confidence-building measures in the Final Act were a novel and ambitious

beginning. But we also learned after almost nine years' experience that those measures are not adequate to confirm the intentions of some governments. The fact that it has not been possible to verify whether States have, or have not, complied with these measures raises questions about motives and has demonstrated a major flaw in the regime of CSBMs in the Final Act: they are voluntary and they are not verifiable.

Based on this experience it is obvious that if CSBMs are to be significant, they have to be mandatory; they must be verifiable in including provisions for ensuring that any State participating in the system will permit action which would clarify doubts about compliance.

The precise mandate which has been given to us for the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is intended to overcome these deficiencies. We agreed on a mandate at Madrid which gives us a very precise compass by which to chart our course; if we follow it closely it will facilitate the development and application of measures that, in being militarily significant and verifiable, could carry us forward



Delegates to the Stockholm Conference during recent working group session. Seated at immediate left are members of Canadian Delegation to the Conference. Reportagebild



towards genuine arms control. The set of CSBMs which was tabled on January 24 has been compiled with these considerations in mind.

Canada realizes we have set ourselves ambitious goals and we do not underestimate the inherent difficulties in achieving them.

Conflicting interests exist in an international climate marked by mistrust and ideological confrontation. We shall need concrete and verifiable CSBMs if we are to overcome this mistrust and to reduce tensions.

In these circumstances exhortations for trust and confidence in the abstract sound hollow and unreal; the problem of security must be attacked on a more concrete basis. How to find some accommodation so that States perceive themselves as less threatened and more secure? The CSBMs to be agreed at this Conference will therefore have to involve verification of credible evidence that military activities by any State do not constitute a threat to the security, sovereignty or political stability of any State or States.

The establishment of a verification mechanism as part of a mandatory CSBM regime is necessary if confidence is to take root and flourish. Confidence can only be based on specific moves that can be verified and evaluated and indeed predicted.

As in the case of all negotiated security arrangements, the establishment of a viable verification process, as part of a mandatory CSBM regime, is essential if the security of the participating States is to be enhanced in a real way. The verification mechanism which we adopt must help us to decide, as a political judgement, whether or not military activities are in conformity with the agreed CSBMs or whether by exceeding agreed parameters they have other purposes and objectives.

Some governments in the past have misinterpreted the idea of verification as a gathering of intelligence which would eventually be used to their military

disadvantage. These arguments do not really stand up under close analysis. Indeed, such an interpretation invalidates the basic premise of CSBMs, but I expect that it will be advanced during the course of the discussions to come. And because it does invalidate the basis for CSBMs, it must be faced early on. The essential difference between intelligence gathering and verification is the form and purpose of the respective activities. On the one hand, intelligence is covert, generally unilateral and frequently merely quantitative. On the other hand, to be effective, verification would have to be overt, multilateral and cooperative, operating in accordance with agreed rules. Verification differs from intelligence in the emphasis it places on intentions, something which raw intelligence gathering is not normally able to provide.

Adequate means of verification have to be implicit in each CSBM. In other words, the CSBMs must be clear in terms of parameters and purpose so that in a crisis situation there would be no doubt whether the CSBM had been implemented or not.

Verification provides a mechanism for clarifying misunderstanding. It is really at the heart of the confidence- and security-building process. To perform this function, verification must involve continuous collection and analysis of data, it must command the authority for, and control the means of, clarification, and it must be capable of carrying out a credible inspection.

Let me comment briefly on these three requirements. First, the continuous collection and analysis of data. This function is vital to the whole process. It consists of gathering and analyzing data dealing with activities defined by CSBMs and on a continuous basis, by a combination of whatever sources of information are agreed upon as being appropriate. In the context of CSBMs, analysis should show whether a violation had occurred or not, so that a decision could be taken whether and how to take the matter up with a violator. The results of such analysis could require additional information, or trigger off an inspection.

A request for clarification would be intended to provide an opportunity for rapidly answering genuine concerns which could arise from misunderstanding, factual errors or abnormalities in relation to the provisions of a CSBM agreement. An inspection might or might not be required in the process of verification, but should such a requirement exist it would be essential to avoid delays which may have significant consequences for the security of States.

Inspection would involve the right to conduct, on demand, at any time, and without delay, within a specified period of time and by agreed means, an unobstructed survey of forces and military activities in order to confirm or deny suspected non-compliance with the terms of an agreed CSBM. Modalities for inspection would establish a process that in itself would form a real deterrent to non-compliance. Therefore, refusal of inspection, or an inadequate response to it, would be recognized as an act of political significance in itself.

Mr. Chairman, it is not my intention today to discuss in detail the CSBM verification mechanisms that could flow from our negotiations here, but I did wish to share with other Delegations some general thoughts on these problems, and by so doing to suggest the magnitude of the task before us.

Verification means could clearly take several forms.

But if they are to enhance security and stability in Europe and increase the extent to which intentions become more transparent, the verification techniques discussed here will have to cut new ground.

I fully recognize that the goals we have set ourselves are very ambitious, and that the inherent difficulties that will face us as we endeavour to pursue these goals will likely mean that we will have to progress step by step. But let progress be deliberate and purposeful. Because the task is urgent. And because so many hopes and expectations are focused on our endeavours."



Statement of May 11, 1984, on CSBM Proposals and Non-Use of Force

"As this second session of our Conference begins, it is time to get down to concrete work. I doubt that any Delegation here would disagree. But how to do it?

Briefly, let me restate the objectives of this Conference as seen by my Government — and indeed, we hope, by all other participants. We are trying to adopt confidence- and security-building measures whereby States can demonstrate that their routine, military activities need not be interpreted by other States as being potentially hostile. This demands that a new and wider degree of openness be imparted to military affairs in order to make them more predictable.

Another way of expressing these notions, in a nutshell, is to say that we must develop concrete measures which will give effect and expression to the principle of the non-use of force. What changes in military affairs could make this pledge credible? A reply to this question should be based on an examination of the proposals on the table before us. This is the first step in getting down to concrete work.

Since SC.1* was first on the table, let us look at it first. The measures it contains would enhance trust and security in the following ways:

1. Exchanges of information about military forces would provide a common framework for the other measures and for understanding the significance of the activities of particular units.
2. An annual review of military activities would create a pattern of normal, non-aggressive military behaviour.
3. The advance notice of important military activities in the zone of application would make them more predictable, thus reducing the possibility of misinterpreting the intentions behind such activities by clarifying whether they are routine or possibly threatening.

4. Observation of military activities could confirm that they were routine and unthreatening but, if necessary, they could also defuse tensions at critical moments or warn that something threatening might be going on.

5. Measures of compliance and verification would involve the usual requirement not to interfere in National Technical Means and a requirement for monitoring compliance.

6. Communications between the participating States concerning the regime of CSBMs could be enhanced through appropriate arrangements.

These CSBMs will not transform East-West relations overnight. But they are practical and realistic steps to increase confidence that military forces in peacetime are intended only for defence and not attack. They would be concrete and solid contributions to security and stability. Even if they would not immediately modify the serious imbalance of conventional forces in Europe today, they would at least make this imbalance less menacing in the perception of the participating States.

What about SC.2?*** Notably, it emphasizes that the measures we adopt here should conform to the criteria in the mandate of the Conference; and it envisages building on the experience gained in implementing the confidence-building measures in the Final Act.

The 12 measures in SC.3*** are also in line with the mandate of the Conference, aiming, in part, at making military activities in Europe more predictable. It too envisages building on the experience of implementing the measures in the Final Act. Although it does not specify parameters, SC.3 — and, by the way, SC.2 as well — envisages an approach primarily based on organizational levels rather than simply counting the number of troops. This is of course

significant for the process of verification and, remarkably, all of the 12 measures would require adequate forms of verification.

Now we come to SC.4 tabled by the Soviet Union a few days ago. It is a disappointment. In deploring what are adduced as attempts to upset the existing military and strategic balance, the proposal calls for, and I quote, '...a radical turn in the policies of States ...'. But the suggestions it then puts forward are radical only because most of them do not belong here.

This Conference, grouping together nuclear and non-nuclear participating States, is not an appropriate forum in which to discuss nuclear issues. They are global and the complexity of trying to discuss them here would soon render this negotiation sterile. The zone of application of CSBMs can in no way relate to nuclear arms because many of those situated outside Europe could also strike the continent. The Atlantic to the Urals can only be considered as constituting limits in terms of surprise attack or the use of force for political intimidation by conventional troops.

Proposals to create nuclear-free zones in various parts of Europe also violate the principle of an integral zone of application of CSBMs and would result in some kind of division of Europe, 'partitioned' arbitrarily into some form of sub-zones. They would not increase security because the zones would still be under threat from outside. A zone in Europe free from battlefield nuclear weapons, many of which are fitted for dual-capable delivery systems, involves complicated questions of verification and would require procedures for on-site inspection which are unlikely to be agreed upon. The kind of redistribution of weapons envisaged in this suggestion would not be a real substitute for reduction of them.

The issue of chemical weapons is best left in the hands of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where the

*proposal by Romania

***initial NNA proposal

*NATO proposal



United States has recently made a comprehensive proposal, although it is distressing that the Soviet Union, which holds the major stock of chemical weapons in Europe, has rejected it. The key difficulty in dealing with chemical weapons is, of course, verification, not the zone. Similarly, we are convinced that the question of military budgets should be tackled at the United Nations in line with Sweden's proposals for a technical reporting system.

Putting aside then these inappropriate and misplaced elements, what is left in proposal SC.4? Like the other proposals on the table, it calls for the negotiation of confidence-building measures which would be more significant in nature and broader in scope than those in the Final

Act based on the experience in implementing these Helsinki-type measures. While I do not intend today to comment on these specific measures, I can commend the intention of expanding on the confidence-building measures in the Final Act.

The last remaining proposal in SC.4 calls for the conclusion of a treaty on the non-use of military force and the maintenance of peaceful relations as proposed by the Warsaw Treaty member States. This is characterized as — and I quote — 'a major confidence-building measure.' Is it?

The commitment not to use force is already enshrined in the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. At

the NATO Summit in Bonn in 1982, Western leaders pledged that their weapons would never be used except in response to attack. Last December, NATO Foreign Ministers renewed this pledge in the Brussels declaration.

Still, the Warsaw Pact persists in proposing some kind of non-aggression treaty as it did following the meeting of its Foreign Ministers in Prague in January 1983. The Canadian Government concluded that the proposal was unlikely to lead to the successful negotiation of meaningful and verifiable arms control agreements. However, since the proposal has been advanced again, we will look at it again. In this assessment, our guideline will be whether it could lead to a reduction in the current level of East-West tension and to the successful negotiation of meaningful and verifiable arms control agreements.

Certainly non-aggression is a valid principle, and the aim of this Conference, as spelled out in the mandate, is to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations. The mandate directs us to accomplish this by undertaking new, effective and concrete actions.

The proposal for a treaty on the non-use of military force is not new — it is a relic out of the museum of diplomatic failures. It is not concrete — it is simply a renewed declaration. It is questionable whether it would be effective — it only has to be breached once.

What *would* be effective is a series of CSBMs which, provided with adequate forms of verification, would constitute means of observing preparations for aggression before the principle was breached.

We have before us on the table, Mr. Chairman, four proposals which in varying degrees include elements of what I might call disincentives to aggression which could break out due to misperception of intentions or miscalculation of results. In this sense, the areas of congruence among the proposals are considerable.



A commitment to regularly notify and invite observation of routine military exercises will help demonstrate their non-hostile intent.

Canadian Forces Photo



Again, how should we get down to concrete work? We should quickly structure this Conference in such a way that we can focus on these areas of congruence. We must get on with our task of giving effect and expression to our duty to refrain from the threat or use of force in our mutual relations.

Mr. Chairman, mutual confidence is built on predictability. It cannot be created by waving a magic wand. It cannot be declared. It has to be built. This is the only way to persuade each other that our respective military forces

are there for the legitimate protection of our national security and the maintenance of peace and that they do not threaten anyone's sovereignty. It will only be when such conditions of mutual confidence are achieved by concrete effort that stability in European politics can become a reality. It is only then that conditions for reducing forces can become a viable proposal leading to a process of improvement in relations between States which could go beyond this Conference and evolve into meaningful agreements. I believe these are the essential expectations of the people of all our countries."

Statement of September 27, 1984, on Openness and the Conference Mandate

"We seem to be having a problem getting going. Our work is proving to be at least as difficult as some had feared it might be — and in light of our discussions so far, I suspect that this would have been the case even if the international situation were more relaxed than it is, in fact, today.

We are dealing with competing approaches to confidence-building. They reflect profound differences in ideology and in military doctrine. But, both approaches aim at reducing the chances of war breaking out in Europe.

This is the essential point of common interest. It is surely the ringing message of our mandate. It comes through strong and clear. No one here has questioned it.

Why then do some Delegations seem prepared to pick away at other aspects of the mandate? Such attempts threaten to unravel the whole fabric by quarrelling with specific provisions of it.

The two competing approaches to confidence-building are clearly demonstrated in the proposals before us. What I would judge to be a majority of participating States opt for measures which, in effect, would communicate, between and among members,

credible evidence of the absence of feared threats. While such measures would, in certain respects, only publicly express what is already known through other information sources, they have a profound political and psychological importance because they can be implemented only at the express wish and with the determination of the States involved. These measures, when accepted, would carry with them a political commitment of intent that would make it easier to recognize normal patterns of military activity, thus enabling States to discern significant deviations which could indicate possible threats.

A minority of our negotiating partners seems to favour a less specific, a less concrete approach to confidence-building. They see it as a wide process — a process which, in being essentially declaratory, is much more difficult to quantify, to measure and actually see. In this scheme of things, we would know that a solemn undertaking had been broken only when it had been broken — which is, of course, tragically too late.

We note, however, that all of the participating States recognize the importance of political will. What differs are our views on how to apply it.

The essence of the first approach to confidence-building is the communication of information in order to clarify intentions through more openness in military affairs. The second approach amounts to declarations of benevolent intent.

There is nothing new in this. The two approaches long pre-date the current period of difficult East-West relations.

During the negotiation of the Final Act, at a time, a decade ago, of more relaxed East-West relations, the notion of transparency in military affairs was often decried as espionage — decried in such bitter terms that the negotiations seemed to be on the verge of collapse. But there was no attempt then, nor is there any now, to force the word 'transparency' down anyone's throat.

We use the word now as we did then to describe an antidote to secrecy and secretiveness. In our context here, secrecy and confidence are incompatible, and secretiveness for its own sake and as a habit of mind is the arch-enemy of those who seek to create more stable relationships among us.

But it is the concept, not the word, that matters. As our French colleague said the other day, we are not obliging those who do not like it to inscribe the word 'transparency' in our concluding document. Let us, to use the expression wisely chosen by the Ambassador of Belgium, 'demystify', let us demystify this notion once and for all. What we mean by transparency is that military information — which is already available through the press in some countries and by other means — should become the subject of regular and cooperative exchanges between and among governments.

If we can be clear about this notion and its desirability, and its usefulness in terms of confidence-building, we can use another word to describe it. For instance, we could talk about 'openness'.

Whatever word we use, we agreed upon the idea in negotiating the Final Act. The Final Act prescribes that 'clear



and timely information' about military activities is necessary in order to reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculations to which they could give rise. The Final Act specifies measures intended to implement this prescription. Surely we do not have to go over old ground once again, in order to convince ourselves of the validity of this concept and the wisdom of attempting to develop this type of measure further.

This question is all the more pertinent when we recall the negotiation of our mandate at Madrid. Again, the two approaches to confidence-building were in full competition during a period of rising East-West tension. But at least the wisdom of the Final Act, which I have noted, was generally respected. As a result, a compromise between two approaches to confidence-building finally emerged, again around consensus on the need to aim at reducing the chances of war breaking out in Europe.

We all agreed at Madrid — and I emphasize all — we all agreed to seek to give effect and expression to refraining from the threat or use of force. But now some Delegations seem to champion that cause as if it belonged to them and was not shared among all of us. This is not a negotiation in which the non-use of force is being pitted against some other objective. Every Delegation here is already committed to that principle, and we should all be seeking ways to implement it in specific activities. The question is how: dynamically, by giving effect to it through new and concrete measures? or statically, by reaffirming an intention?

In the view of my Delegation, this is what the negotiation is about; and it is about Europe, only Europe. To expand the scope of the negotiations will defeat our efforts. We have agreed that we are dealing with the territory of Europe, and the concentration of military power there. We are not dealing with Chinese soldiers in their millions, or Cuban soldiers, wherever they may be just now, or even Soviet troops in the Asian part of the Soviet Union. We are dealing with soldiers who march on European soil.

Even though Canada is not part of the European land mass, our commitment to a stable and secure Europe involves approximately 50 per cent of Canada's land forces. In applicable circumstances their activities would be notified, they would be observed, and they would be inspected, in order to verify that their intentions were not threatening.

We have agreed that the CSBMs will apply to the military activities of the participating States in the adjoining sea area and air space wherever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe. I would stress this conjunction: 'as well as'.

It means that two conditions must be met. On Tuesday, it was argued here — if I understood the line of reasoning correctly — that activities in the adjoining sea area and air space — they were in fact called independent sea and air activities — which affect security in Europe should be notified so long as they meet that one condition. To exclude the other condition, that such sea and air activities must constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe, would mean a selective application of the conditions which any one party could employ — perhaps perversely — in deciding for itself what should be notified by others. This is not an interpretation of the mandate that my Delegation could support. The tendency to go over old ground, to reopen issues already resolved at Madrid, came out in another recent statement here, alleging that some Delegations were obstructing negotiations by refusing to proceed to practical consideration of nuclear issues.

But who is being impractical and who is obstructing negotiations? Why are these issues persistently pressed on us here? Of course, they are of the utmost importance, and of course they must be dealt with. So must problems of international debt. But surely we are not to believe that we have a duty to deal with nuclear arms, many of which could strike Europe from outside the continent, in a forum grouping together nuclear and non-nuclear participating States. Our negotiations would quickly become

sterile if we tried to grapple with the complexity of nuclear weapons and we believe that the drafters of the mandate were wise enough to reach such a conclusion.

This assessment became apparent at Madrid where proposals to deal with nuclear issues at this Conference did not achieve consensus. In fact, they received little support. This is why the mandate refers to 'other relevant negotiations on security and disarmament affecting Europe.' The impact of injecting these issues into our negotiations is to distract the attention of this Conference away from the kind of practical results that we could achieve here. Even issues such as notification of military activities, which all Delegations seem willing to tackle, will need long and detailed negotiation as the Swiss Delegation recently demonstrated so clearly — without first having to work our way through problems which, while crying out for solution, are not the real reason for our meeting here in Stockholm.

To argue that we are duty bound to discuss a subject on the grounds that it is not specifically excluded from our mandate would be to make a pointless nonsense of every effort to organize the work of any meeting according to an agenda, a work plan that seems likely to be helpful in producing results, rather than making those results impossible or unattainable.

With these concerns in mind, we must at this point in our proceedings ask ourselves frankly, and with openness: can the two competing approaches to confidence-building be reconciled?

My answer is yes — yes if an 'organic fusion' means welding together a set of measures which would make it more difficult to threaten or to use force. It matters less what we put into the negotiating crucible than assuring ourselves as we go along that the resulting 'organic fusion' will be 'a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe'."



Statement of December 7, 1984, on the Zone of Application and Information

"My Delegation draws much satisfaction from the positive atmosphere which has marked the fourth session of our Conference. This atmosphere has undoubtedly contributed to the good progress we have at least been able to make in achieving a satisfactory solution to the problem of a working structure. Let us now make good use of it. To the Finnish Delegation for their wise and careful work in helping to bring this about, we are all grateful. And let us also bear in mind that it was a Swedish initiative some months ago that started this ball rolling on its long and difficult course. And we must all, I think, acknowledge the contribution made by the Delegation of Sweden.

I urged a moment ago that we make a determined effort to put to immediate and effective use the working arrangements we have adopted. It is quite clear that we have a long way to go before we reach a meeting of minds on what it is we should be looking to achieve in our detailed work; I must confess that some of the lines of analysis enunciated in our general debate in recent weeks have caused me to scratch my head in puzzlement. Expressions such as 'geographical asymmetry' and 'seeking unilateral advantage' are not very auspicious portents for our future work, as we begin a new day of discussion.

It is alleged that our Conference must deal with security in national, regional and global dimensions. It has been stated that the regional aspect involves an inherent geographical asymmetry because one of the two major partners here is a European country, while the other is not. What does that mean? The fact is that one is geographically a North American country, while the other is geographically not only a European, but also an Asian country as well. So, yes indeed, from the narrowest geographical point of view, there is an obvious asymmetry in this situation. What all this boils down to is that the two are not the same — which we all knew from the beginning.

How should we take these obvious geographic realities into account, keeping in mind two things: first, this Conference is not about geography, and we are not called upon to deal with the impossible problem of counteracting the spread and dispersion over the face of the globe of the countries we represent; and second, the mandate of this Conference is based on the concepts of equality of right balance and reciprocity, as well as equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating States? This issue is not new. Our negotiators grappled with the problem for years at Madrid. The solution which emerged was a mandate which makes it clear that this Conference is about military activities taking place in the whole of Europe; that is, a geographical entity stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural mountains.

The extension of the zone of application of confidence- and security-building measures beyond the limitations in the Final Act to the Ural mountains was in recognition of the facts of geography. It was not a concession, and it is not really accurate to attempt to portray it as such. Although the Madrid meeting was haunted for months by cries from some quarters for some mysterious 'corresponding step' in return for this extension, we can be thankful that good sense prevailed since the mandate does not, in my reading, reflect this argument in any way. Any so-called corresponding step in return for the logical geographic extension to the outer boundary of Europe, in the East, could only mean, I think, an extension beyond Europe to the West. In other words, a move out of Europe: that is, out of the zone. But it has been long accepted that the CSCE, of which the Stockholm Conference is a part, is about Europe, not the Atlantic Ocean, not Asia, not Africa, and not the whole world.

Any attempt to question this most basic premise of the CSCE would drag us down into a quagmire of unresolvable controversy. Does anyone in this room

really want that to happen? Or do we want to address ourselves to the concrete issues of confidence-building? The principles of the Final Act, as well as its various provisions, relate to activities in Europe. Similarly, the chapter in the Helsinki Final Act on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament, from which the Stockholm Conference draws its inspiration, deals with military activities in Europe. This has never before been questioned. Any other interpretation of the Final Act would involve what could only be described as an asymmetry among its various parts.

Some participating States have implied informally that informal discussions in Madrid led to some kind of implicit 'understanding' of the mandate. Everyone is free, of course, to have his own 'understanding' or interpretation of the mandate. But what matters for us here is what the mandate actually says. And it clearly says that the zone covers military activities in Europe, taken as a geographic entity, as well as the adjoining sea area and air space when activities there affect security in Europe and constitute a part of activities taking place in the whole of Europe.

It has been argued that equal respect for the security interests of the participating States requires that their relations should not be asymmetrical in the field of security. It is therefore necessary for us to focus as well on the asymmetry caused by the imbalance of information on military activities.

This is the real asymmetry from which this Conference's work takes off.

To correct it is one of the major basic purposes of the measures contained in proposal SC.1. The authors of this proposal have been accused of seeking unilateral advantage. In fact, their intention is to create a situation of mutual advantage in which the flow of information on military affairs from East to West, and West to East, would be balanced. Or, at any rate, more balanced than it is now.



A number of Delegations have spoken convincingly in this respect. They have clearly demonstrated that it is this asymmetry of information on military activities which induces insecurity. Let me repeat an assertion I have made several times before: secrecy is the enemy of confidence.

We must face up to this state of affairs. As one of our colleagues put it so accurately, we must try to demystify the issue of military information. Of course, it can be argued that in the life of any State many areas of military

activity constitute a kind of 'holy of holies'. There are aspects which any State does not wish to reveal about its military affairs. We all respect these concerns. But a great deal of military information on force postures and out-of-garrison activities could be made available to other States without threatening anyone's security.

The reluctance to recognize this fact constitutes in my view the basic asymmetry here and it results in a unilateral advantage for one side. The Stockholm

Conference presents an opportunity to set this asymmetry right and to change a unilateral advantage to a mutual advantage. If the result of our work were more openness in military affairs, exchanges of information about these matters could become a valuable channel of East-West cooperation. If our efforts are successful, the Stockholm Conference could realize its potential, which we have all recognized: its potential for improving East-West relations and advancing the process of arms control and disarmament."

Statement of January 29, 1985, on Non-Use of Force

"My Delegation welcomes any proposal which would contribute to moving this Conference forward towards its aim of adopting concrete confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce mistrust and misunderstanding among the participating States. We shall study the proposal just presented by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union in this spirit, and with close attention.

I am bound to observe, however, that initiatives like this one, looking to the working-out of treaties on the non-use of force or non-aggression pacts are familiar. History is replete with examples of proposals for the promotion of peaceful relations among nations by renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. One such agreement was signed, in 1928, by 65 States, many of them represented in this hall. It has never been rescinded and therefore remains in effect even today. What a disappointment the Briand-Kellogg pact has been.

It was motivated by laudable political intent. But it was not backed up by concrete CSBMs nor by means of verification. As a declaration of good intentions, it failed to achieve its aims.

My Delegation has more than once expressed its views on proposals of this nature. They are static obligations which are fully enshrined in the United Nations Charter, and already reaffirmed in the

United Nations Declaration on the principles guiding friendly relations among States, and, on a regional European basis, in the Helsinki Final Act.

It is not a restatement or a re-working of the principle of non-use of force that is needed now. What is needed now, as confirmed in the mandate of our Conference, is to give dynamic expression and effect to this principle. We need to reduce the risk of war in Europe by adopting concrete CSBMs which would make military activities more predictable. We need to ensure that a conflict will not

break out because of misperception of intentions. This is the purpose of the proposal submitted by Canada and a number of other Delegations over one year ago.

As the Canadian Government has stated in the past, and as my Delegation has reaffirmed here, we are prepared to study proposals of the kind just presented to us. We shall judge its merits from the point of view of what contribution it could make to achieving the aims of this Conference and to promoting the process of verifiable arms control, and strengthening security in Europe."



Divisional-size movements out-of-garrison would be notified under the NATO and NNA proposals at the Conference.

US DOD



Statement of June 3, 1985, on Non-Use of Force

"More frequently perhaps than on any other subject, I have commented on the principle of refraining from the threat of use of force in the past at this Conference. I had thought that our views were clear. However, the intervention in the plenary on Friday by the Soviet Delegation prompts me to return to this subject at the first subsequent meeting to provide an opportunity to comment on and discuss what appears to be a serious misunderstanding.

In his statement in plenary on May 31, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union quoted me as saying that a simple reaffirmation of this principle would be pointless. That is, indeed, our position — and I believe it to be widely shared.

We have said that we would examine proposals on refraining from the threat or use of force, and we will live up to that commitment. We have said that we do not believe that a treaty in this regard would be appropriate. We will continue to hold to that view. We have said that any language which might be adopted here in regard to this principle must not undermine the principle as expressed in the United Nations Charter and in the Helsinki Final Act. We have said that while a reaffirmation of the principle alone would be pointless, it would have point and purpose if it were combined with concrete CSBMs which would be militarily significant and politically binding. What else does 'organic fusion' mean? What else does our mandate mean?

Refraining from the threat or use of force is a political objective. It must be met through political means. Declaratory policy is one way, a static way. Another way, a dynamic way, is to begin a process of political cooperation by adopting and implementing a set of militarily significant and politically binding measures, which would make it more difficult to threaten, or to use force.

This is the position of the Canadian Delegation. In practical terms, we believe that the Conference should focus now on measures which will form the basis of political cooperation aimed at giving expression and effect to the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force.

Meanwhile, the Canadian Delegation awaits further suggestions on this issue which we will examine with an open mind."

Statement of June 13, 1985, on Compliance and Verification: On-Site Inspections

"The theme of our debate today, as it has emerged, is the need for clear and timely information and verification of compliance with CSBMs through on-site inspections. The two issues are obviously related. A number of Delegations, representing a wide sample of views at the Conference, have intervened this morning on these subjects. It is notable that Delegations representing yet another view of our work here have remained silent. This is disquieting because, as previous speakers have demonstrated, the need for clear and timely information and verification is firmly linked to this Conference through the Madrid mandate.

Earlier this week in Group A/B, the United States, in one of a series of recent interventions on verification by Delegations from all sides, spoke about the 'tool' of verification, particularly on-site inspections. I should like today to share some views with colleagues about how on-site inspection is also firmly linked to the Conference through the Madrid mandate.

The 35 participating States have acknowledged the principle of verification. The mandate states, *inter alia*, that CSBMs will '... be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.'

The proposals of the participating States confirmed this principle. As part of the negotiation of the agreement on CSBMs, it remains to decide what the principle means, in practical terms, and how to apply it.

The mandate directs that verification should be 'adequate'. On the one hand, verification should provide a means for each participating State to assure itself, through clear and timely information, that military activities conform with the terms of CSBMs. On the other hand, verification should not be so intrusive that it encroaches upon military secrets.

The mandate further states that verification should correspond to the content of the CSBMs. On the basis of

the proposals already on the table, the broad content of the measures likely to be adopted is emerging. The capacity to verify them will soon have to be established before the detailed content of the measures can be worked out. The CSBMs and the means to verify them should thus be negotiated *pari passu*. In this way, there is more possibility of reaching a final agreement by avoiding subsequent renegotiation over questions of verification which could risk reopening issues.

In accordance with the mandate, verification should be effected on the basis of 'reciprocity', in conformity with 'equal respect for the security interests of all the CSCE participating States.'

The mandate also calls for '... a set of mutually complementary CSBMs....' Each measure in the set should reinforce the effect of the other.

Finally, means of verification should be an integral part of the agreement



on CSBMs. This means that a measure aimed at determining whether a military activity is, or is not, in compliance with the agreement would itself be a CSBM. By having the means to verify that violations were unintended or had not occurred, confidence would be enhanced as States realized through their cooperative interaction that their suspicions were unwarranted. Suspicion is inherent in relations among States. But verification of compliance with CSBMs would serve to convert mutual suspicion into mutual confidence that security is not at risk. Adequate verification would also alert States to possible violations.

Verification has another intrinsic function. In calculating the risk to threatening or using force, States would have to take into account that their actions would more likely be discovered in the preparatory stage before a *fait accompli* was possible. They would be more reluctant to risk detection and the danger of jeopardizing the agreement and political relations among the signatories to it.

In summary, the mandate establishes the criteria for defining, in practical terms, what is meant by the principle of verification: adequacy to establish with a reasonable degree of certainty compliance with the regime of CSBMs,

without overly intruding on security interests; correlation of forms of verification to the content of the CSBMs; in other words, the integration of means of verification into the set of mutually complementary CSBMs; and, finally, reciprocity in accordance with respect for the security interests of all the CSCE participating States.

Measure 5 of proposal SC.1/Amplified, aimed at verifying whether notifiable activities are non-threatening and are duly announced, is designed to meet these criteria.

It is adequate because participating States would be able to examine whether a military activity complies with the CSBMs. This examination could be undertaken, to a certain extent, in a number of ways, including National Technical Means, which, as specified in Measure 5, should be unimpeded by the participating States. Such means can indicate to a degree whether activities are taking place. But they are limited in capability by climate, orbital constraints and evasive measures. Moreover, only a few of the participating States possess advanced National Technical Means.

A further method of examination is necessary, which would provide closer insight into military activities and which

would be mutually applicable. Inspections, as further proposed in Measure 5, would meet this requirement. Since each participating State could conduct only a limited number of inspections each year, they would not be automatic. But if requested, they should be permitted in order to verify whether or not a perceived activity complied with the regime of CSBMs.

Inspections would be reciprocal. As Measure 5 specifies: 'Each participating State will be permitted to inspect a military activity or a possible military activity within the Zone for the purpose of monitoring compliance with agreed CSBMs.' However, in accordance with the principle of sovereignty, inspections would not encroach on sensitive military interests. Measure 5 stipulates that: 'The receiving State will not be required to permit inspections of restricted areas.' In addition, the modalities suggested in Measure 5 call for inspections to be kept short, the number of inspections and inspectors to be kept low and the suggested provisions for exemptions are comprehensive. Such a system of inspections would not intrude on sensitive military interests. Rather, inspections should be seen as a kind of audit conducted by any enterprise from time to time to ensure that affairs are being properly managed. But just as refusal to permit an audit would alert management to a possible misdemeanour, a State refusing to permit an inspection would alert other States to possible non-compliance.

Inspections would correspond to the content of the CSBMs. They would verify whether an activity complied with the information supplied under the measure on notification. Inspectors could confirm whether an activity was, or was not, occurring. They would also be able to ascertain, in the short term, more detailed information than could be obtained by other measures. Inspections would complement other measures in providing evidence whereby compliance could be adequately monitored.

Inspections under Measure 5 would be an integral part of the agreement because in providing each State with



Allied proposals at Stockholm are designed to impart greater predictability and openness to military activity in Europe

US DOD



assurance that the other States are complying with it, they complete the confidence-building process. They constitute an element in a mutually complementary set of CSBMs which corroborate each other.

Under such a regime of CSBMs the exchange of information on military forces in the zone would establish a basis of judgement of military potentials. It would be complemented by annual forecasts of how these potentials would be deployed out-of-garrison in the future. This information would be further complemented by the details furnished under the notification measure about the more immediate deployment of these military potentials. Observation would provide the routine basis for assuring the non-threatening character of this activity. But there could be cases where the observers questioned the conformity of the information notified with the activity they witnessed. There might also be cases where military activity occurred which should have been notified, but was not. Inspections would permit the participating States to clarify the nature of such activity.

The question has been asked: how can you verify verification? In a mutually complementary set of CSBMs, each measure reinforces the other and partly serves to verify the other. The confidence-building effect of each measure lies both in its immediate function and in its place in forming an aggregate of

verification. Measure 5 further assures a self-verifying mechanism. Initial monitoring through National Technical Means, including the monitoring of mass media, would indicate whether a notifiable activity was taking place. If this led to suspicions about lack of compliance with the CSBMs, an inspection could verify whether these concerns were justified. Further monitoring might to a degree corroborate the findings of the inspection. On the basis of what I have called an aggregate of verification, clarifications could, if necessary, be sought through communications among the participating States.

In summary, the principle of verification has been recognized by the participating States. The principle of on-site inspections has also been widely recognized. The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, the 'Palme Commission', which includes among the commissioners Giorgi Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada in Moscow, stated: '...on-site inspections should not be ruled out in principle.' The Madrid mandate provides guidelines for defining what the principle of verification means in practical terms and how to apply it. Measure 5 of our proposal SC.1/Amplified is an *adequate* form of verification which would *correspond* to the content of a set of mutually complementary CSBMs, and as a confidence- and security-building measure itself would form an *integral* part of the agreement."

Statement of July 5, 1985, on Confidence-Building and Its Political Significance

"Eighteen months ago this Conference began its work in a spirit of hope and urgency. We had gone through a difficult period, a period of harsh words and of tension: a period of threatening political and military horizons. Against an ominous background our Foreign Ministers launched, in this hall, a badly needed process of mutual dialogue on questions of security.

We started out with high hopes.

But I am afraid that the political promise of this Conference may be fading. It is adding little to the East-West dialogue. If the experience of the work of a year and a half is any indicator, we may be well on the way towards a non-achievement; we may have doomed our selves to add little to East-West cooperation. Bargains, of course, come at the end; but we have yet to begin any preliminary trading of a significant sort.

On the one side of the negotiating table is a detailed and comprehensive programme for cooperation in military affairs. The response of many of our partners has been mostly tactical.

As long as this imbalance persists, it is difficult to see how we should go about generating a negotiating dynamic — and certainly the distinction between 'formal' and 'informal', or one type of meeting or another, will not matter very much.

Let us recall that we are here to contribute to a process. It is a political process aimed at building mutual confidence. Without that confidence, measures of arms control and disarmament will not take root — assuming, even, that they might be negotiated. The confidence we seek needs cooperation.

Our ultimate objective is to stimulate the process we began in Helsinki. But so far, we seem to have been talking



Notifiable military exercises would be subject to observation under a Conference agreement.

Canadian Forces Photo



View of Kulturhuset in downtown Stockholm, site of the Stockholm Conference. Flags of Conference participants can be observed on roof of building.

past each other. The prospects for agreeing on meaningful cooperative action do not seem bright. We have failed to set up a basic negotiating equation, or what others have called a negotiating framework — and, without it, and in fairly short order — we shall never be able to come to grips with the myriad of details facing us in the critical area of military affairs; without a basic decision soon we shall never be able to come to grips with these specific problems in the time remaining to us.

The policy — indeed the philosophy — underlying the measures which my Delegation has co-sponsored is clear. We seek a programme of cooperative action based on informing and verifying, in other words, a coherent system, a compendium of information and verification measures. We believe that only in this way can confidence be built. Confidence rests on deeds, not words.

At the very outset of this Conference, we gave our objectives a preliminary concrete formulation by proposing measures through which the participating States could inform each other of their intentions and verify them with a view to building mutual confidence. We have spelled out this policy in further detail through a series of working documents. We later consolidated these documents in the form of an amplification of our

original proposal in order to give a clearer and more precise impression of our approach to confidence-building, thus to facilitate negotiations. During recent weeks, we have gone one step further towards this end by illustrating how the participating States could exchange information in annual calendars, how military activities could be effectively observed and how they could be verified by on-site inspection.

In recent weeks our policy of seeking to build confidence through concrete measures seems to have elicited a response from some of our partners. After months of emphasis on unverifiable declarations of good intent, some sketchy concrete measures have finally been tabled, presumably in accordance with proposal SC.4*, which envisages the elaboration of additional confidence-building measures, more significant and broader in scope than those in the Final Act. We are continuing to study these proposals, although in some cases they contain parameters that are hardly more significant than those in the Final Act; certainly not significant enough to warrant the considerable effort this Conference, in its totality, represents. In other cases, these newly presented measures seem to seek unilateral advantage, and in still other

* proposal by the Soviet Union

cases, they would involve military activity outside Europe, which would only lead this Conference into an endless and fruitless debate.

My Delegation has repeated often that we do not believe that words alone will inspire confidence; we do not believe that static declarations of good intentions are enough. But in an attempt to define a negotiating equation, we have recognized that it would be appropriate to reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or the use of force. It could be a reflection of the very barriers to these actions which we seek to establish through measures of information and verification.

We have thus tried to set the stage for a balanced and meaningful negotiation. But we have seen little sign that some of our partners are willing to take a corresponding step in meeting us half way. The possibility of the out-of-garrison concept serving as a comprehensive definition of ground-force activities which should be notified has not won general acceptance. Similarly, we have yet to come to grips with the need to define the threshold for notification in structural terms which could be effectively identified, observed and verified. While a broad consensus seems fortunately to be emerging in acknowledging the fundamental importance of contributing to the building of confidence through information and verification, a detailed discussion of how this principle should be applied has eluded us. This is all very discouraging.

The sixth session has focused on concrete measures, and that is all to the good as far as it goes. But it has not redressed the negotiating equation which remains lopsided with a clear policy and a clearly articulated objective on one side, and on the other, a clever and carefully orchestrated display of tactics. This is what discourages me.

We have been given a chance at Stockholm to make the revitalization of the process of *détente* a practical possibility: to show that it can be done. Let us not throw this chance away by playing the tactical game too long."



Statement of October 18, 1985, on the State of the Negotiations

"As we approach a pause in our work, it is not inappropriate that we should stand back for a moment to survey what we have done, what we have not done, and what we may be about to do, if we can believe our own words about the political importance of this Conference in the total system of East-West relationships in all their complexity.

Almost two years ago, our Foreign Ministers assembled in this hall in an international atmosphere of apprehension and uncertainty. Surveying the sombre horizons of the moment, the Foreign Minister of Canada remarked: 'Never has a Conference been more urgently required than this one. And never have expectations and hopes been greater for a successful outcome.' Fortunately the gloomy horizons of those dark days of January 1984 have brightened somewhat. But our task has not changed in the slightest; nor has our time frame. Are we making the best use of the time and the political impulses we have been given? With about a year to go, if we are to come to a satisfactory result here by the autumn of next year, my Delegation views the working mode inaugurated this week with a sense of relief.

We sense relief that the procedural agreement finally adopted at this session marks a watershed at the Conference, which has already taken too long to get down to exchanging ideas in concrete form. The agreement could further our task of achieving the concrete result defined by our mandate, which enjoins us to devise measures that will increase confidence and security.

But has this breakthrough we have now made been accompanied by a renewal of our sense of urgency corresponding to the importance of our mandated tasks — because the time remaining to us is so short?

The procedural agreement is not a panacea. It will not guarantee that we

make progress. We now have to seize the opportunity which is long overdue to get down to the concrete exchange of ideas in specific terms that will lead quickly to drafting; to move the process of discussion to the process of forming text even if in fragmentary and preliminary form. We have to translate impressions of flexibility into concrete terms that can be written down even if it will be subject to review in broader context. We have to clear away the remaining underbrush in order to lay down roads leading in the direction that has been chartered over the past almost two years.

Although this is not always self-evident to the media — and it is not easy to explain it to them and others — we have in fact accomplished a lot in clarifying concepts, some of which are highly complex. I believe we have understood each other's positions pretty well, and as a result we have been able to begin looking beyond our own respective positions in search of common interests.

We have found some. For instance, my Delegation has repeatedly referred to CSBMs as 'disincentives to aggression'; other Delegations have called them 'operational barriers to the use of force'; recently, it was suggested that the CSBMs are 'safety fuses'. These expressions are different, but I think the meaning is the same. The job now is to abandon the metaphors and elegantly turned phrases, and begin drafting the details in order to grasp and commit to text the common ground implicit in our different approaches.

We had thought, too, that by now we had established enough confidence between and among us to realize that military affairs can and must be demystified, that secrecy is the enemy of confidence, and that transparency is not the same as espionage. We had thought there had been a wider acceptance of the view that information on military affairs should become the subject of regular and cooperative and open exchanges among governments.

Most recently, we have noted that apparent and gratifying convergence of view that has emerged on the notion of annual forecasts — although much discussion still seems necessary on the circumstances in which this concept is to be applied.

Although my Delegation, along with others, continues to doubt the value of codifying purely declaratory policies, we have agreed that in supplementing concrete CSBMs there will be a role for a reaffirmation of the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force. While recognizing that other critical factors involved in the threat or use of force are being dealt with in appropriate forums, we have agreed to focus on a major problem at Stockholm: the threat posed by conventional forces in Europe, as defined in the mandate of the Conference.

We have all agreed that it would be useful to conduct at least one week of informal, exploratory talks before the end of this session. The resulting experience has not relieved, but rather enlightened, our sense of urgency. On the one hand, some Delegations say that conditions are ripe for beginning to draft a reaffirmation of the principle of refraining from the threat or use of force. On the other hand, they say that consideration cannot be given to measures of information and verification until the content of the measures of notification is determined. And that content is in dispute because the same Delegations continue to interpret the mandate in a way that extends the zone of application of CSBMs to include activities that fall outside of it. Such a line of argument can surely have no other effect than to delay us — or even bring us to a standstill.

Our main achievement over these long months of discussion has been to identify an adequate basis — and I believe we may now have done so — for designing a set of CSBMs which would reduce the risk of military conflict in Europe. We must now spare no effort — and impose on ourselves no artificial time limits for those efforts — to ensure that a substantial result at Stockholm is achieved prior to the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting."



MANDATE

Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe

The participating States,

Recalling the provisions of the Final Act according to which they recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament,

Have agreed to convene a Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

The aim of the Conference is, as a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, with the participation of all the States signatories of the Final Act, to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations.

Thus the Conference will begin a process of which the first stage will be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe.

The first stage of the Conference will be held in Stockholm commencing on 17 January 1984.

On the basis of equality of rights, balance and reciprocity, equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating States, and of their respective obligations concerning confidence- and security-building measures and disarmament in Europe, these confidence- and security-building measures will cover the whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area* and air space. They will be of military significance and politically binding and will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content.

As far as the adjoining sea area* and air space is concerned, the measures will be applicable to the military activities of all the participating States taking place there whenever these activities affect security in Europe as well as constitute a part of activities taking place within the whole of Europe as referred to above, which they will agree to notify. Necessary specifications will be made through the negotiations on the confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference.

*In this context, the notion of adjoining sea area is understood to refer also to ocean areas adjoining Europe.



Nothing in the definition of the zone given above will diminish obligations already undertaken under the Final Act. The confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed upon at the Conference will also be applicable in all areas covered by any of the provisions in the Final Act relating to confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

The provisions established by the negotiators will come into force in the forms and according to the procedure to be agreed upon by the Conference.

Taking into account the above-mentioned aim of the Conference, the next follow-up meeting of the participating States of the CSCE, to be held in Vienna, commencing on 4 November 1986, will assess the progress achieved during the first stage of the Conference.

Taking into account the relevant provisions of the Final Act, and having reviewed the results achieved by the first stage of the Conference, and also in the light of other relevant negotiations on security and disarmament affecting Europe, a future CSCE follow-up meeting will consider ways and appropriate means for the participating States to continue their efforts for security and disarmament in Europe, including the question of supplementing the present mandate for the next stage of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

A preparatory meeting, charged with establishing the agenda, time-table and other organizational modalities for the first stage of the Conference, will be held in Helsinki, commencing on 25 October 1983. Its duration shall not exceed three weeks.

The rules of procedure, the working methods and the scale of distribution for the expenses valid for the CSCE will, *mutatis mutandis*, be applied to the Conference and to the preparatory meeting referred to in the preceding paragraph. The services of a technical secretariat will be provided by the host country.

(Madrid, 6 September 1983)

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Disarmament Bulletin

A review of national and international disarmament and arms control activities

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Cette publication existe également en français.

SSEA Addresses Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Halifax

Canada hosted the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Halifax on May 29 and 30. At the Halifax meeting, the members of the Alliance undertook a thorough review of all aspects of the East-West relationship. The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, made the opening address to the Council. Following is the text of his address.

"On behalf of the Canadian people and the Canadian Government, I extend to you all a warm welcome to Canada and to Halifax.

It is a great honour for Canada to host the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Council. This organization



Mr. Clark addressing NATO meeting in Halifax on May 29. Halifax Herald

means much to Canadians. We were present at the creation, indeed played no small part in its genesis. And we have been with NATO at every step along the way.

During the long years of its existence, the Atlantic Alliance has known great moments, made historic decisions, weathered stormy periods, and resolved difficult crises. Today, the Alliance finds itself on the threshold of what could be a new era in East-West relations.

The disappointments of *détente* are behind us, the tensions of the first years of this decade have eased, and there is hope for a better tomorrow. But it is hope tinged with scepticism and tempered by experience.

As we embark on our deliberations, let it be clear that the Alliance has gathered to give hope a firmer foundation, to disprove the sceptics, and to pursue the noble cause of reconciliation between East and West without neglecting the firmness that prudence demands.

When Allies meet, it is customary to celebrate the role the Alliance has played in preserving the peace in Europe and North America. This is not an empty boast. Would that the rest of the world could say as much.

Let us never tire of declaring that our freedom, our rights, our system of social justice, our economic development, our democratic way of life, represent the product of our common values. And that we owe their preservation to the Atlantic Alliance.



NATO is not only a defensive alliance, of course. It is the primordial instrument of Western political consultation, more so today even than at the time of the Ottawa Declaration that NATO issued 12 years ago.

In this respect, let us pay tribute to the accomplishments of the Secretary-General. Thanks to his tireless efforts to encourage frank and effective consultations among Allies, and to the sensitivity and wisdom he has shown in chairing Alliance discussions, NATO's recent record on consultations has been enviable.

We will be meeting today and tomorrow in a less formal way that reflects the Secretary-General's considerable efforts to improve the quality of political discussions among Foreign Ministers. Our agenda will permit more time than ever before for those issues, current and prospective, that concern Allies the most.

Of all the issues before us, the most important is the effective management of the West's relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The most urgent issue is that of arms control and disarmament. International terrorism and conflict in the Third World should also command some attention.

There exists today a renewed desire for cooperation between East and West that cannot fail to promote peace, if properly cultivated. But the peace that we have enjoyed for nearly 40 years continues to depend on our having a sizeable deterrent force in being.

It is a paradox we have had to deal with ever since the Alliance was formed: only by maintaining forces sufficient to counter those of our adversaries have we been able to ensure our defence.

But the most important phase of our work lies ahead of us: ensuring our security at a reduced level of armaments.

In the realm of arms control and disarmament, we are in a period that is both uncertain and expectant.

No one is pleased with the current military situation. Weapons continue to accumulate. They are more and more sophisticated. And the stakes are so high, and the negotiations so complex, that progress must inevitably be very slow.

When we add to this Mr. Gorbachev's repeated indulgence in what I will charitably call Soviet 'kite flying,' you will agree that the way ahead is anything but clear.

But public opinion expects early results, and it is imperative that we try to meet those expectations. We need to get the message across that the Geneva negotiations are vital to international security, and that we have gone into them determined to see them through to a successful conclusion.

In this connection, I should like to thank the United States publicly for the quality of the information it has supplied to Allies on the Geneva negotiations. To those professional critics who are quick to condemn what they see as a lack of consultation within the Alliance, let me say that at no time has the United States failed to keep its Allies posted on the course of the negotiations.

We are convinced there is common ground between East and West. And the West's proposals have been designed to identify that common ground with increasing precision.

We invite the countries of the Soviet bloc to examine our proposals carefully. We are aware of the Soviet proposals, but we are firmly convinced that the USSR can do better and offer more.

It is of fundamental importance that parties to arms control agreements comply fully with the terms of those agreements. Regrettably, the Soviet record of compliance has raised so many questions that the United States itself now no longer feels compelled to abide by the SALT II agreement. That is a profoundly disturbing development, and one we hoped could have been avoided. Let us hope the Soviet record improves and that President Reagan's May 27 announcement is not the final word on the issue.

All of us, East and West alike, bear a responsibility for the welfare of our planet. The Chernobyl accident afforded ample proof of how ecological disaster can transcend international boundaries.

Our sympathies go out to the people affected by this catastrophe. I trust the Soviet Union will accept our invitation to work more closely with the rest of the world in making nuclear power safer.

Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not say a few words about international terrorism.

In the late 1970s, there were some 500 terrorist incidents a year; by 1985, the figure had risen to over 800. The great majority were cases involving members of the Alliance; a good number were directed against the Alliance itself.

As we remember and regret those instances in our own countries when the bomb has replaced the ballot, we must also recognize the international dimension of terrorism.

Our own responses to terrorism, and the way these responses affect relationships within the Alliance, are as important as terrorism itself. The last thing we want is to see international terrorism succeed, where the Soviet Union has failed, in dividing us.

Let us therefore build upon the foundation of cooperation already laid, both within the Alliance and in other forums, to combat terrorism effectively.

Between East and West, much still needs to be accomplished. But a significant first major step has been taken on the road to reconciliation. We very much look forward to the next meeting between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev.

There are enough areas in which East and West are talking for substantial progress to be made, if the political will exists.

And most of all if we remain united and determined. Here in Halifax, let us reaffirm our solidarity, and work together



to ensure every new idea and proposal for international peace and security is accorded a full, sympathetic and urgent hearing.

When we chose Halifax to host the meeting of the Atlantic Council, the charm of the city and of this part of the country were certainly not the least of our reasons.

But we wished also to signify how deeply rooted in Europe Canadians remain, and how great an affinity we continue to feel for the Atlantic Community.

This Atlantic port, closer to the shores of Europe than to our own West Coast, symbolizes the enduring link between the Old World and the New. Since the days of Leif Eriksen, John Cabot and Jacques Cartier, Europeans have come to these shores, and to this harbour, in search of safe haven and fortune.

And more recently, Halifax anchored the lifeline which sustained allied forces in Europe in two world wars. From this point, too, Canadians sailed to Murmansk, or died en route, maintaining the 'northern connection' with the Soviet Union.

In brief, when we welcome you in Halifax, we are asserting the community of interest we share with you; we also hope to remind you of the important contribution made to the Alliance by Canada.

Our military presence in Europe, and the commitment we have made to the reinforcement of Europe in time of crisis, are unique for a people so geographically remote from Europe, who also have security interests in the North and in Asia.

But a long time ago, Canadians judged that our common civilization made the security of Europe indistinguishable from that of North America. And ever since, Canadian defence policy has had two priorities — holding the line in Europe, and defending the North American continent.

We all have a duty to fulfil, each in our own way. We all place a high premium on peace. We must all do our part to see it is maintained."

NATO Issues Statements on East-West Relations and Conventional Arms Control at Halifax Meeting

At the conclusion of the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in Halifax, the Council issued two statements, one dealing with NATO's approach to East-West relations and the other with conventional arms control. Following is the text of those statements.

"At Halifax, we have reviewed all aspects of East-West relations. We conclude that obstacles to agreement, however serious, should not prevent both sides from building on areas of common interest. We remain ready to co-operate where common ground exists. We will continue our efforts to narrow differences elsewhere.

We remain united in our resolve to maintain adequate forces and to seek a more constructive relationship with the countries of the East. However, the conventional imbalance in Europe and the sustained build-up and modernization of all categories of Soviet military power continue to be of concern. In order to preserve peace and to prevent any kind

of war, we will maintain the Alliance's strategy of deterrence.

We are determined to pursue our efforts for progress in arms control and disarmament. We aim at a lower and more balanced level of armaments. We support US efforts to achieve deep reductions in Soviet and US nuclear forces. We seek a treaty totally eliminating chemical weapons. Reductions in conventional forces are also crucial in order to correct the present conventional imbalance between the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. Beyond this, we aim at conventional stability throughout Europe. We have today made a separate statement on conventional arms control.

In all negotiating fora in which they are engaged, the participating Allies have presented detailed proposals directed at enhancing stability and security. We now await an equally constructive response at the negotiating table from the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact. Public statements alone are not enough.



NATO representatives at a reception in Halifax prior to opening of Foreign Ministers meeting. Left to right: Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs; Lord Carrington, NATO Secretary-General; Sir Geoffrey Howe, British Foreign Secretary; and Vahit Halefoglu, Foreign Minister of Turkey.

Canapress



Adequate verification measures are the key to progress in all the present negotiations and essential for building trust and openness. Any agreement should enhance confidence of compliance and strengthen the existing treaty regime. We are prepared to accept comprehensive verification measures, on a fully reciprocal basis, including systematic on-site inspections.

But the development of peaceful and realistic East-West relations requires more than arms control. The human dimension remains crucial: this embraces respect for human rights and encouragement of individual contacts. Moreover, a more co-operative East-West relationship, including political dialogue, trade, and cultural exchanges, in which all states participate on equal terms, is needed.

We reaffirm the importance each of us attaches to the CSCE process in all its aspects. At Stockholm we are pressing for agreement on a substantial set of confidence and security building measures by September 1986. We are determined to further the CSCE process at the Vienna CSCE Follow-up meeting in November, which should be opened at a political level.

We underline the importance of the continued observance of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin and, particularly in view of the current situation, of maintaining freedom of circulation in the city.

Terrorism is a serious concern to us all. It poses an intolerable threat to our citizens and to the conduct of normal international relations. We are resolved to work together to eradicate this scourge. We urge closer international co-operation in this effort.

The purpose of our Alliance is to enable our peoples to live in peace and freedom, free from any threat to their security. We seek a productive East-West dialogue. This will enhance stability in our relations with the members of the Warsaw Pact. We call upon the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries to join us in this endeavour.

Halifax Statement on Conventional Arms Control

— Within the Alliance, we cherish the ideal that all the peoples of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, should live in peace, freedom and security. To achieve that ideal, bold new steps are required in the field of conventional arms control.

— Our objective is the strengthening of stability and security in the whole of Europe, through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels.

— To work urgently towards the achievement of this objective, we have decided to set up a high level task force on conventional arms control.

— It will build on the Western proposals at the CDE conference in Stockholm and at the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, in both of which participating Allied countries are determined to achieve early agreement.

— It will take account of Mr. Gorbachev's statement of 18th April expressing, in particular, Soviet readiness to pursue conventional force reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals.

— An interim report will be presented to the Council in October and a final report will be discussed at our next meeting in December.

— Our aim is a radical improvement in East-West relations in which more confidence, greater openness, and increased security will benefit all."

SSEA Reiterates Canadian Support for Compliance with SALT II Treaty

On May 27, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, issued the following statement on SALT II compliance.

"As I said in the House in January, Canada strongly supports the arms control regime established by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) agreements and believes nothing should be done to undercut their authority.

We take very seriously the USA charges of Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements. We have raised these charges with the USSR on several occasions including in correspondence from the Prime Minister to the General Secretary and have pressed the USSR to respond to them satisfactorily.

We welcomed the President's decision even in the absence of a satisfactory Soviet response to dismantle a Poseidon submarine last June and his plan to

scrap two Poseidons when the next Trident submarine goes to sea.

We are, however, very concerned about the implications of the President's stated intention to exceed SALT II limits late this year.

Unfortunately, the President's decision runs the risk of diverting attention from the existing problem of the Soviet arms control compliance record.

It is our fervent hope that in the time remaining before the end of the year the USSR and the USA will reach an understanding on means to ensure continued respect for the limits of the SALT II accord, until such time as a new agreement sharply reducing their nuclear arms is negotiated.

Our views on the importance of the USA abiding by the provisions of the SALT II agreement have been conveyed to the USA Government."



Canada Assumes Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament

Canada assumed the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva at the beginning of August, the concluding month of the 1986 session of the CD. On August 5, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference, Mr. J. Alan Beesley, delivered a message to the CD from the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Following is the text of the message from Mr. Clark.

"Canada feels particularly honoured to be entrusted with the presidency of the Conference on Disarmament during its important closing, report-writing and inter-sessional period. We shall endeavour to fulfil our responsibilities in a manner which fully reflects the high value Canada attaches to the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

In an era when the awesome realities of existing and emerging weapons technologies are a cause for concern to the peoples of all countries and continents, the task of devising effective agreed arms control and disarmament measures cannot simply be left to those who possess the largest arsenals. The Conference on Disarmament, which is the sole

multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, therefore performs an indispensable political and institutional role.

The fact that Canada's presidency occurs during the concluding month of this year's session gives me an opportunity to put forward some reflections on the current international situation in relation to arms control and disarmament, and on the recent work of the Conference on Disarmament in that context.

The attention of the world, understandably, is focussed on the negotiations of the USA and the USSR being conducted, literally, just down the road from the Conference on Disarmament. This attention often takes the form of an impatient clamour for quick results. Such expressions of impatience are politically and humanly understandable. However, we would do well to keep in mind the magnitude and complexity of the agreed objectives which the negotiating parties have set for themselves: no less than 'the prevention of an arms race in space and its termination on earth; the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms; and the strengthening of strategic stability, leading ultimately to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.'

It must also be borne in mind that the issues under negotiation involve vital security interests not only of the negotiating parties themselves but of all the members of the Conference on Disarmament and indeed all the peoples of the world. Viewed in this light, while many may have hoped for more rapid progress, there are no grounds for discouragement at this time; there are in fact hopeful signs. Available evidence strongly suggests that both parties are approaching their task with a seriousness and commitment that bodes well for eventual substantive results. It is particularly encouraging when concrete, substantive proposals are put forward at the negotiating table, as has recently been the case, rather than first being announced in public. I am sure that all members of the Conference on Disarmament would agree on the importance of conducting ourselves in ways which are supportive of continuing, serious pursuit of those all-important negotiations, while not abdicating our individual and collective responsibility to advance our own work with a sense of real urgency.

The arms control negotiations and discussions of the Conference on Disarmament may understandably attract fewer headlines than the bilaterals, but this should not be taken as an indication of their unimportance. It has been your task to address some of the most politically sensitive and technically difficult issues which governments confront in this area. Just as important, in its role as a sounding board as well as a negotiating forum, the Conference on Disarmament helps in registering emerging issues of concern among political leaders and in defining areas for new negotiated measures. Your work can thus also contribute invaluable to establishing the tone and texture of the broader arms control and disarmament process. Your current session has been characterized by a most welcome lessening of polemics; there appears to be an increasing trend towards thoughtful, substantive statements, coupled with the submission of practical working papers. I applaud this new spirit, and this new approach.



Mr. J. Alan Beesley (centre), Canada's Ambassador to the CD, Mr. Arsène Després (left), Counsellor with the Canadian Delegation to the CD, and Mr. Miljan Komatina (right), Personal Representative of the Secretary General, during recent session of CD.

L. Bianco



As for the Conference on Disarmament's priorities, the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction is a central task of the arms control and disarmament process. Your efforts to negotiate a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons therefore is rightly a priority item on your work agenda. Official confirmation by the United Nations Secretary-General of repeated chemical weapons use in the Gulf war, which Canada resolutely condemns, as well as reports of efforts by other countries to acquire a chemical weapons capability, must add to our collective sense of urgency to achieve progress on this item. Canada does not favour diverting efforts from the negotiation of a comprehensive ban in order to address the proliferation problem separately. Nevertheless, out of concern for the problem, Canada recently increased to 14 the number of chemicals subject to export controls and, in consultation with several other countries, we are implementing a warning list procedure for a longer list of chemicals.

In the effort to negotiate a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, there were several welcome developments during the current session of the Conference on Disarmament. The USA delegation made an important clarification of its thinking on how a treaty might apply to differing social systems. The USSR delegation made new and positive substantive proposals relating to certain aspects of verification of a treaty, which my Government hopes will soon be supplemented by further proposals dealing with other aspects or verification. The Canadian Government hopes also that the important recent UK initiative will facilitate a convergence of views on the sensitive and vital issue of challenge inspections. Under energetic and notably competent chairmanship, the *ad hoc* committee has made further progress towards resolving some of the more difficult technical issues. The Canadian delegation submitted two working papers as a contribution to the collective effort. The holding by the Netherlands of a workshop relating to verification of non-production, as well as the broad attendance at that workshop, was gratifying and encouraging. It is important that the momentum thus generated be

maintained, including through inter-sessional work to the extent practicable.

The issue of a ban on nuclear tests has properly continued to occupy a prominent place in the CD agenda. The negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban remains a fundamental objective of the Canadian Government. We were therefore disappointed at the failure to agree on a mandate for a subsidiary body on this item, which would have permitted practical work in preparing the ground for the negotiation of such a ban. This session, nevertheless, was not without positive developments. We have noted carefully, and welcome, the recent Soviet statement indicating a forthcoming approach on technical and institutional matters relating to the establishment and operation of a global seismic monitoring network. We are also pleased that the USSR and the USA are holding expert-level discussions on nuclear test issues. Australia's call for a decision to establish an international seismic network is wholly consistent with Canada's longstanding concern to develop means for reliably verifying a test ban. The Conference on Disarmament is aware that we are upgrading a seismic array in our own northern territory and have commissioned other related research, and that we will be conducting a technical workshop in Ottawa this autumn, at which we hope CD members will be widely represented. In the Canadian view, a gradual incremental step-by-step approach will be required if a comprehensive test ban is to become a reality. We intend to pursue vigorously our efforts to this end in the Conference on Disarmament and in other forums.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is a high priority for Canada, and this CD agenda item warrants special effort and attention. As was the case last year, Canada submitted a substantive working paper designed to facilitate consideration of existing relevant international law and the possible need for it to be supplemented by additional negotiated measures. We have also commissioned extensive research into the potential for using existing technology for purposes of space-based

verification. We intend in the future to make the results of this research more widely available.

It was a matter of disappointment that a mandate for a subsidiary body on the outer space item was agreed on only halfway through the 1986 session. As a result, for a second consecutive year, only half of the session's time could be devoted to substantive deliberations. Once the mandate was agreed on, the ensuing discussion was on the whole characterized by an impressive sobriety and thoughtfulness. In the Canadian view, the existing mandate is demonstrating its usefulness.

The Conference on Disarmament is also engaged in negotiation aimed at banning radiological weapons, which fortunately are not yet known to exist. My Government recognizes that following the tragic accident at Chernobyl, there are heightened concerns about the potential consequences of attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities. My Government hopes that there can be early agreement on how this issue can most effectively be addressed, so as to avoid prolonged further delay in concluding a radiological weapons ban.

Unfortunately, concrete achievements at the Conference on Disarmament in recent years have been scarce. This may be an indicator not so much of failure as of limits. Delegations at the Conference can achieve no more than what their respective instructions, reflective of perceived national interest and political will, allow. Nevertheless, Canada would join with others in urging a searching re-examination of the methods and procedures whereby the Conference on Disarmament conducts its operations. It would be regrettable, possibly tragic, if opportunities for progress were missed due to institutional inefficiencies or failings.

In conclusion, I am confident Ambassador Beesley can count on the support and cooperation of all delegations in bringing this year's Conference on Disarmament session efficaciously to its conclusion."



Canada's Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and the Head of the Canadian Delegation, Address the Stockholm Conference

On June 10, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. James H. Taylor, addressed the opening plenary of the eleventh session of the Stockholm Conference and outlined how Canada thought the Conference could be brought to a successful conclusion. Excerpts from his statement follow.

"As this negotiation moves into the home stretch, we must focus more precisely the energy of our broader political purpose and direct it with care and determination towards hammering out a full solid agreement.

And broader political purpose there most certainly is. We seek a new generation of confidence- and security-building measures which will inject vitality into the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the arms control process. After investing two and a half years in this enterprise, it would surely constitute a failure — and a disappointment — if we produced only a marginal embellishment of the measures in the Final Act.

We are beginning a process. It will clearly not be possible in this phase of the Conference to solve all the problems of confidence-building in all its aspects. The subject is as vast as its concrete manifestations are essential to the underpinning of peace.

But it is crucial that this Conference produce a result which is substantial enough to justify the effort to date, and to make it worthwhile to continue. This means that effort must now be concentrated — and quickly — on negotiating a set of measures covering the activity of land and combined forces which — no one can seriously doubt — poses the highest risk of war in Europe....

The Soviet Union has recently stated that it is no less interested in effective verification than are the Western States

and it has recognized the potential usefulness of on-site inspection as a means of verification. We await here a confirmation of this interest through positive and specific suggestions for cooperative and reciprocal verification measures accessible to all the participating States.*

Verification measures have both political and military value as a means of ensuring compliance. Since military potentials on each side in Europe are very high, any major lack of compliance would require a considerable military effort which could not go undetected. While minor non-compliance might not jeopardize the other side's military situation, any would-be violator would hesitate, weighing carefully the political consequences of any such action.

A cooperative and reciprocal inspection regime would help to clarify a situation before it could lead to a serious misunderstanding, or miscalculation, or worse, and, recognizing that the real world in which this system will operate is full of ambiguities and uncertainties, here as elsewhere flexibility will be required.

But the essential principle remains: an agreement lacking effective verification is not better than no agreement at all. An agreement that is permissive towards violations, or could give rise to allegations of non-compliance because it lacked effective verification provisions, could be a greater danger than no agreement at all. It could lead to tensions arising from dubious compliance when national security is seen to be at risk. Efforts to control or reduce armaments in Europe must sooner or later involve the full range of political interests of all the participating States. Verification is essentially a cooperative and reciprocal process. Thus, all States assuming

*A Soviet proposal allowing for a limited number of on-site inspections in each country per year was announced in the Conference on August 19.

obligations under any agreement adopted here should be assured that they can effectively verify compliance with it.

This Conference could take a major step forward in the verification process. Here is a forum where a common political commitment combined with technological expertise and multilateral diplomacy could produce a verification arrangement that will ensure that the agreed measures really do build confidence and security.

Verification is not an end in itself, but it will be of vital importance as a component of the final result here, because it enhances the confidence of the parties and creates a sense of predictability, and that comes close to the heart of our purpose....

Canadian Statement of June 30, Made on Behalf of NATO Caucus

In order to promote the possibility of achieving an agreement prior to the Stockholm Conference's adjournment on September 19, the NATO participating States decided to offer several concessions in the Allied negotiating position. These were outlined on behalf of the NATO caucus by the Head of the Canadian Delegation, Mr. W.T. Delworth, in a statement on June 30. Excerpts from his statement follow.

"This negotiation is still spinning its wheels on the sands of political indecision, and time is passing quickly. We are halfway through this session, which we have all called critical, in the search for mutually acceptable solutions based on the common ground identified so far.

We can no longer afford to repeat old arguments, valid though some of them may be. We need to reassess our respective positions, taking into account the interests and perceptions expressed by others here.

Initiatives now seem called for, to unlock the road ahead towards an agree-



ment which, in accordance with the mandate, will begin a process meaningful for building confidence and security as well as for the CSCE.

In speaking on behalf of the sponsors of SC.1*, the 16 Delegations which together made the first initiative at this Conference, I can say that we have therefore decided that we would be prepared to make moves in the following areas of the negotiation. Notification of ground force activities has often been described as the core of the agreement we have to adopt; the definition of the threshold for ground force activities is a key element of this measure. Three approaches to this problem have been presented: one puts the emphasis on structure; another on manpower; a third one on 'mobility and firepower,' which in practical terms means equipment. An attempt to combine these three approaches was recently made by the NNA States. We think that this is the right way to proceed and we would like to declare our readiness to draft on the basis of the proposal tabled by the Austrian Delegation on June 13. We hope others will take a similarly positive view....

The level of the threshold is an essential issue. Our approach is to emphasize structures, and the number of troops is only one element in this approach. It has been contended that our proposal would result in an excessive number of notifications per year. We do not think that the figures which were mentioned in support of this objection are accurate. But we are ready to consider raising the numerical element of the threshold beyond the figure of 6 000 troops. We seek increased confidence through militarily significant and verifiable confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) which cover the whole of Europe....

Moreover, we are prepared to make another move. Understanding of mobilization practices through notification would contribute significantly to greater

stability and confidence-building. However, we have heard concern expressed on our proposal relating to notification of mobilization activities. Some countries whose defence capabilities almost exclusively rely on the recall of reservists have argued that such a measure would affect their security interests.

We are willing to consider whether we could meet this preoccupation but we would expect similar consideration of our concern in other areas such as constraints where provisions have been advocated which, in turn, would unacceptably affect our security interests....

On observation we continue to believe that agreement to observe all notifiable military activities from their beginning to their end would be a substantial improvement over the provisions contained in the Final Act. But this ambitious aim has raised many logistic and financial objections. It is our view that observation should assist participating States in meeting the overall objectives of the confidence-building process: it must enable the observers to assess the scope and nature of military activity, which of course does not imply that the first man to leave and the last to return to normal peacetime locations should be observed.

Here again we are prepared to look sympathetically at the above-mentioned objections and consider a limitation on the duration of observation both as far as its starting and its ending are concerned. We expect this move to enable everybody both to agree to a low threshold for notification and to facilitate agreement on detailed and specific modalities for the observation regime.

On verification, our inspection proposal meets the mandate criteria and ensures each State equal opportunity to verify compliance with the agreed CSBMs. Objections have been raised, however, emphasizing the burden represented by our proposal. While we would have preferred to leave open the option for each participating State to conduct two inspections a year, we believe it is essential that each participating State should have the option to conduct at least one inspection a year. Central to

our approach to verification is the position that inspections must be an essential and integral part of the result of this Conference. However, we are entitled to carry out every year from two to one as evidence of our willingness to ensure against the abuse of the right to inspect military activities of other participating States....

The time has now come for new efforts to further the drafting process. The points I have just made are intended to serve that purpose. This is not of course the first example of our determination to reach an agreement. May I recall that on the issue of the non-use of force we have also made significant steps, first in agreeing to include this issue on the agenda of the Conference, then in tabling the most comprehensive contribution to date, and more recently in drafting actively on this subject. We have done this even though work in the field of concrete measures was stagnating.

The initiative we are taking represents careful study and sometimes difficult decisions on our part. In making these offers, that is, in showing yet again that we are prepared to be flexible, we must of course make it clear that we do so in the expectation that our other negotiating partners will show matching movements not only on the issues I have mentioned but also on others, such as information which I have not raised today. Nor would we expect our negotiating partners to introduce obstacles to real progress.

The only way to reach a substantive agreement is to follow a give-and-take process. We hope that the initiative taken by us today will create a dynamism leading to such an agreement in the eight weeks left to us before the Conference adjourns on September 19. We shall be prepared to do our part."

The outcome of the Stockholm Conference will be known by the time this issue is released. The results of the Conference and their significance for the future of conventional arms control in Europe will be examined in our next issue.

*NATO proposal



Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification

On April 14, the Canadian Government transmitted to the United Nations a comprehensive study on arms control and disarmament verification prepared in response to the UN resolution 40/152(o) dealing with verification in all its aspects. This resolution, co-sponsored by Canada, signalled a major breakthrough by requesting that Member States submit their views on verification and on the role of the UN in the field of verification.

Following is the text of the letter that accompanied the Canadian report to the United Nations Secretary-General. Copies of the report may be obtained by writing to the Editor.

"Excellency:

I have the honour to refer to United Nations resolution 40/152(o) entitled 'Verification in All Its Aspects,' which was adopted without vote on 16 December 1985 by the United Nations General Assembly during its fortieth session. The resolution called upon Member States of the United Nations, *inter alia*:

...to communicate to the Secretary-General, not later than April 15, 1986, their views and suggestions on verification principles, procedures and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements, and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification....

In accordance with that invitation, I am pleased to convey to you the attached comprehensive study on arms control and disarmament verification conducted by the Government of Canada.

This document provides a detailed analysis of verification, an issue which the Government of Canada believes has become the single most important element in international arms control and disarmament negotiations.

The importance of verification centres on the fact that an arms control agreement is essentially a compromise in which each party bases part or all of its national security on the undertakings of other contracting parties rather than on its own military capabilities. All such agreements touch directly on the most sensitive aspects of national security. Consequently, reciprocal confidence that all parties will adhere to their obligations is essential; the more so when such agreements are negotiated and implemented in a context of political suspicion and mistrust. Verification, in simple terms, is the means by which such confidence is gained.

A starting point for any discussion of verification issues should be acceptance of the proposition that verification serves functions that are essential to the long-term success of the entire arms control and disarmament process. This fact has indeed already been clearly acknowledged by the international community, most notably in the Final Document of UNSSOD I, paragraphs 31, 91 and 92.

There is thus an international consensus that adequate and appropriate verification provisions form an essential element in all arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

The functions to be performed by verification are threefold: deterrence of non-compliance, confidence-building, and treaty assessment. Verification is thus more than a matter of providing for a 'police' function. It should help meet the need to institutionalize in the context of relations among states the kind of accepted rules, procedures and expectations as those that govern the conduct of relations among individuals in all civilized societies. Such rules and procedures do not presume bad faith or malevolent intent on the part of others, but they allow for such a possibility and provide a framework in which unjustified accusations could be authoritatively rebutted, misunderstandings clarified and

resolved, and non-compliance objectively established.

In this connection, it should be emphasized that the verification process does not in itself address the issue of what can or should be done in the event of misconduct. No judicial function is involved. The political management of the consequences of demonstrated non-compliance is perhaps the ultimate, and most difficult and sensitive, problem in the whole arms control and disarmament process. The role of verification in this context is limited to providing, in the most comprehensive and objective way, data relevant to such behaviour. It thus can be valuable in limiting the scope for unjustified allegations and in providing a basis for reasoned and factually-based decisions by the international community in instances where non-compliance is demonstrated.

It has been contended that the emphasis on verification has been used as a pretext for impeding or avoiding progress in the negotiation of agreements. Similarly, it has been said that verification means are also used as a pretext for the gathering of intelligence unrelated to the verification task.

Each of these criticisms reflects, in certain measure, an area of valid concern: about the utility of verification research not linked to specific agreements; about the political motivation which may underlie varying approaches to verification issues; and about the broad implications for the entire arms control and disarmament process of perhaps excessive concern with the perfectability of verification measures.

Nevertheless, Canadian experience and research with respect to verification questions indicate that intensive study of the verification issue can not only allay many of these concerns but also facilitate the arms control and disarmament process. There are many initiatives that can be undertaken to prepare and develop a range of instruments — legal, institutional and technological — that could contribute to the potential for the verification of specific agreements. The work of the Conference on Disarmament's

Group of Scientific Experts is a good example of this point. Its cooperative research into seismological techniques, despite the absence of a specific Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), has advanced considerably the global capability for monitoring an eventual CTBT.

General research into verification techniques also offers the promise that effective verification systems can be made less intrusive and, therefore, more acceptable to parties concerned about the potential intelligence-gathering capabilities of verification systems.

It has also been said that generic research into, and discussion of, verification is not productive. Such a view ignores the fact that the general principles of verification developed at UNSSOD I have applicability, in some degree, to all specific arms limitation issues. It also ignores the possibilities for developing general procedures and techniques which could then be applied in specific arms limitation contexts. For example, various procedures and techniques developed by the IAEA have potential application elsewhere, including a convention on chemical weapons. Attempts to research and relate principles to the procedures and techniques involved in verification can be highly productive both in generating new ideas and solutions to specific problems and in overcoming obstacles in specific negotiations.

A review of the Final Document of UNSSOD I reveals several principles relating to verification. These include 1) adequacy, 2) acceptability, 3) appropriateness, 4) universality, 5) verification methods and procedures in combination, 6) non-discrimination, 7) minimum interference, and 8) non-jeopardizing of economic and social development. It is the task of governments and their negotiators to formulate verification provisions in conformity with these principles.

In the future, although it is expected that much attention will continue to focus on the bilateral arms control process, it is likely that the multilateral dimension will become increasingly

significant. This reflects a number of realities: the need to deal with existing or potential weapons systems for which a large number of countries have a capability (e.g., chemical and biological weapons); the increasingly recognized interest in precluding or controlling weapons deployment in certain specified environments (e.g., the Antarctic, the seabed and outer space); and the growing recognition of the desirability in principle of universal commitments to agreed arms control measures. ('Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among states': UNSSOD I Final Document, paragraph 40.)

In this context, the experience of the USA and USSR in implementing bilateral agreements is of limited value and relevance. Each party to those agreements is to a large extent self-reliant for verification purposes; each party relies on its own personnel and technological resources, which remain under its own direct jurisdiction and control in the collection and interpretation of data. Nevertheless, in addition to the technologies that have been developed, the consul-

tative procedures and collateral measures which the two parties have elaborated (e.g., in relation to the ABM and SALT agreements) could be of considerable instructive value in a multilateral context.

For the resolution of some of the more difficult problems in the verification of multilateral agreements, however, the experience with bilateral agreements offers only partial guidance. At issue are such matters as: equitable sharing of rights, responsibilities and costs; the delegation of executive and operational responsibilities in ways which make the principles of acceptability, universality and non-discrimination operationally meaningful; and the effective coordination of procedures and techniques so as to ensure that the entire verification process is adequate, appropriate and minimally intrusive. Meeting these challenges will require careful and imaginative institution-building and the creative elaboration of new international law.

At the conceptual level, a number of possible approaches can be envisaged. One possible approach, for example, might be for the parties to an agreement to delegate responsibility for data collection and interpretation to a selected group of countries possessing the relevant technological and other resources. In effect, much of the verification service would be obtained from those having the capability to perform it. Such an approach would need to involve a careful elaboration of agreed terms of access to information and agreed decision-making procedures for the purpose of taking action in the light of the interpreted data.

Other approaches posit the notion of an International Verification Organization (IVO), an organization created and maintained specifically for the purpose of monitoring the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. An IVO could have 'general' responsibilities, i.e., be responsible for conducting verification activities in relation to several different agreements. The 1978 proposal for an International Satellite



A view of the UN headquarters in New York at sunset. The buildings are the 39-storey Secretariat (right), the General Assembly (centre), the Council Chambers and Conference Rooms (at the river's edge) and the Dag Hammarskjöld Library (foreground).

UN/Y. Nagata



Monitoring Agency (ISMA), which would rely on a specific type of technology (surveillance satellites), would seem to fall into this category. Or an IVO could be established for the purpose of conducting the entire verification process in relation to only one particular agreement, for example, a chemical weapons convention. It is conceivable that, over time, such agreement-specific IVOs could serve as stepping-stones toward the creation of a general IVO with broader responsibilities. This might, for example, permit more economical use of verification-dedicated resources.

It should be noted that none of the concepts outlined above involves monitoring activities by states in relation to agreements to which they are not themselves parties, nor by any other agent, except as expressly authorized by agreement of the parties. The presumption throughout has been that the principle of acceptability rules out such monitoring activity and that all aspects of the verification process must be expressly accepted by all parties to an agreement.

Fortunately, the international community already has some (all too limited) experience with verifying multilateral arms control agreements which can serve as a base and guide for further pioneering. Of greatest interest as a model of an agreement-specific IVO is the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) system of safeguards which verify the non-proliferation commitments of its member states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The IAEA has, with impressive success, confronted and coped with all the kinds of generic problems that have been cited here. It has done this, moreover, in direct relationship with a technology sector of unique sensitivity from both commercial and military perspectives. The IAEA has undoubtedly had a key role in maintaining a high level of international confidence in the NPT as one of the more successful international security measures of our time. Its organization, procedures and techniques merit careful study.

Finally, the existing and potential role of the United Nations must be seriously

considered and addressed. As pointed out in paragraph 114 of the UNSSOD I Final Document:

'The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. Accordingly, it should play a more active role in this field and, in order to discharge its functions effectively, the United Nations should facilitate and encourage all disarmament measures — unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral — and be kept duly informed through the General Assembly, or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization, of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.'

There is a need to translate principle into practical application. You, Mr. Secretary-General, have demonstrated that initiatives can help bridge the gap between prohibition and verification and, in turn, build a stronger involvement of the United Nations.

Our study has identified a number of other ways in which the United Nations might acquire an enhanced role in the verification process. First, it could give further consideration in the General Assembly or the Disarmament Commission to the essential role that verification plays in the arms limitation process, and therefore, in international security.

Second, the United Nations could examine the possibility that individual nations or groups of nations possessing verification expertise could offer such capabilities to the international community for use in the verification of multilateral agreements.

Third, the United Nations could undertake research and examination of the organizational structures, procedures and techniques which might be devised and further developed for use by IVO-type organizations, utilizing the rich body of documentation generated over the years in the Conference on Disarmament and elsewhere.

Fourth, the United Nations could provide greater assistance, advice and technical expertise to negotiators in the regional arms control and disarmament process with a view to combining international mechanisms with regional measures for verification (e.g., the control system of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which utilizes safeguards from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as the control measures provided by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL)).

Fifth, on a responsive basis, the United Nations might involve itself in the formulation and execution of verification provisions within agreements. Where a need exists, the United Nations should be prepared to help bring together verification expertise and encourage states to develop procedures through which this expertise can be applied in actual agreements.

And finally, given the appropriate flexibility, the United Nations could secure a stronger role in future regional arms limitation agreements. Should one or more arms limitation agreements be developed in any one region for which a space-based remote sensing system could be an appropriate verification technology, it would be both reasonable and cost-effective for this space-based verification capability to be generated by a group of capable nations and provided for use under the auspices of the United Nations or a regionally-based IVO in the context of the agreement(s).

Excellency, with or without legal provisions for verification purposes, nations will strive to collect information on the military activities of other nations which are perceived as relevant to their own national security. Such efforts have always been, and will continue to be, a predictable aspect of national behaviour. Adequately verified arms control and disarmament agreements, however, could provide the means whereby certain of these basic information needs can be met under conditions where interference is minimized, sovereignty is respected and distrust is largely dispelled. Similarly, it is clear that



compliance with any future significant arms limitation treaty will need to be verifiable to a high degree of confidence before nations will accede to the agreement. As the debate concerning allegations of non-compliance has illustrated, when this high degree of confidence in compliance does not exist, both the climate and process of arms limitation are damaged. Verification, which addresses both confidence and compliance, is at the very core of this requirement.

The conclusion to be drawn is that, while the negotiation and implementation of agreed verification measures will always be agreement-specific, there is a vast scope for constructive activities by governments and international bodies in refining and expanding the technological, organizational and institutional options available for verification purposes to governments and their negotiators.

Canada, through a modest verification research programme, is working to improve the verification process. It has committed resources to this end, based on the conviction that a variety of useful work on verification problems can be accomplished outside, and in advance, of negotiations towards specific agreements. To this end, we encourage other Member States to explore with us this vital element in the arms control and disarmament process.

Given the severe financial crisis facing the United Nations, Canada will circulate copies of our comprehensive reply to all member states and interested organizations. In these circumstances Canada would request that only this letter be circulated as a document of the United Nations General Assembly.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,

Stephen H. Lewis
Ambassador and Permanent
Representative
Permanent Mission of Canada
to the United Nations"

Canada's Position on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

Canada has been sympathetic in principle to the concept of nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ) where they are feasible and would promote stability. While we have not considered such zones to be fully satisfactory alternatives to the ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by the countries of the areas concerned, we believe that, in the absence of universal or near-universal adherence to the NPT and provided certain principles are observed, the creation of such zones can make a significant contribution to the objectives of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Canada's position on each NWFZ proposal is determined on a case-by-case basis, but we believe that, to be effective, such zones must apply to a defined geographic area, be based on proposals which emanate from and are agreed to by most countries in the area concerned including the principal military powers of the area, not give military advantage to any state or group of states, contain adequate treaty assurances and means to verify that all countries abide by the commitments involved and not permit countries of the area to have an independent nuclear explosive capability for whatever purpose.

At the United Nations General Assembly, Canada has supported resolutions calling for the establishment of NWFZs in the Middle East, Latin America, Africa and South Asia.

The Government does not support a declaration of nuclear weapon free status for Canada because, while in fact Canada does not possess nuclear weapons, nor are such weapons stationed on Canadian territory, we continue to participate fully in NATO, a defence alliance which deploys a nuclear deterrent. The declaration of a nuclear weapon free zone would be inconsistent with membership in that alliance.

Regarding the proposal for a NWFZ in Central Europe, there are a number of reasons why Canada and most of NATO do not support this idea. The proposal strikes at the very essence of NATO's ability to deter aggression in Central Europe by reserving the right to use nuclear weapons, if need be, against the preponderance of Warsaw Pact conventional forces. Thus a reduction and eventual removal of battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe would only be feasible once conventional parity had been reached. Even then there would be difficulties since nuclear munitions could be more quickly reintroduced in Eastern Europe because of the Warsaw Pact's significantly shorter lines of logistics. Thus, any agreement would be of small military significance, would be difficult to negotiate and to verify and could create an unfounded impression of enhanced security.

The establishment of a Balkan NWFZ would remove US missiles from the region while leaving untouched nuclear weapons stationed on Soviet territory (which is not included in the proposal) within easy striking distance of the area. It should be noted that a political declaration of the Warsaw Pact established a link between the proposal for a denuclearized zone in the Balkans and a similar zone in Northern Europe. Implementation of the proposal would expose NATO's southern flank to the threat of Soviet attack and would not contribute in any substantive way to nuclear arms control or the reduction of tensions in Europe as a whole.

From a Canadian perspective, a Nordic NWFZ cannot be a viable concept unless the Baltic Sea and parts of the Soviet Union were to be included in the geographically defined region. The likelihood of this happening is remote. Furthermore, although there are no nuclear weapons in Norway or Denmark, a formalized Nordic NWFZ commitment, which would include those two NATO countries, would further reduce NATO's options to repel any Warsaw Pact aggression in the region.



House of Commons Holds Debate on Nuclear Arms Free Zone Concept on October 10, 1985

On October 10, 1985, the House of Commons debated a private member's bill urging that Canada be declared a nuclear arms free zone. Following is the text of the intervention by Mr. Gerry Weiner, then Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Mr. Weiner is now Minister of State for Immigration.

"Last March 18 the House had a full debate on Bill C-218, an Act to declare Canada a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Today we are asked to debate the question of declaring Canada a nuclear arms free zone which would prohibit the deployment, testing, construction and transportation of nuclear weapons and associated equipment through and within Canada and the export of goods and materials for use in the construction and deployment of nuclear arms. From my point of view, there is no difference in substance between a nuclear weapons free zone and a nuclear arms free zone. This being the case, although the Government position on this matter has not changed between March 18 and today, this is a good opportunity to repeat certain aspects of our policy on nuclear weapons free or nuclear arms free zones.

On June 30, 1984, Canada removed the last remaining nuclear-tipped Genie air-to-air missiles which were to be used in wartime in an air defence role by Canadian CF-101 Voodoo interceptors. The air defence role has now been taken over by CF-18 aircraft which can do the same job using conventional weapons systems only. There are no nuclear weapons stationed on Canadian soil which is not the case, however, for at least eight of 16 members of NATO. Overflight of American aircraft with nuclear weapons, or port visits by nuclear-powered war ships, some of which may bear nuclear weapons, were they to occur, would do so only with the express permission of the Canadian

Government. The same consultations and permission would be required for the deployment of any other nuclear weapons within Canadian territory.

Thus, while in some respects Canada may be regarded as a *de facto* nuclear weapons free zone following the withdrawal of the last nuclear capable aircraft from service with the Canadian Armed Forces, we continue to participate fully in the defence alliance, NATO, which employs a nuclear deterrent. Accordingly, possible comparisons with the practices of other countries which are not members of NATO are not particularly valid.

Canada is a member of the North Atlantic Alliance and has now been for more than 36 years. We joined the Alliance because we believed in the concept of collective security — a united effort to deter aggression or to counter it should conflict occur. There were many advantages to such an Alliance. However, the most telling advantages were then, and continue to be, the united strength which accrued to the Alliance enabling it to resist undue external political and military pressure to reduce the cost of defence by dispersing the burden of armaments among the member states.

Similarly, NATO has enabled the West to speak with a unified voice on critical issues of international security and to pursue the progressive development of east-west relations in a coherent fashion. It is an invaluable forum for nations such as Canada to express their views and to exert a constructive and moderating influence on the policy directions taken by the western powers in their relations *vis-à-vis* the East Bloc.

However, while Canada enjoys the collective security and influence given by membership in NATO, Canada also recognizes the need to share the burden of this collective security. It should be

noted here that no NATO country has declared itself unilaterally a nuclear weapons free zone. As a point of clarification, Iceland has not declared itself a nuclear weapons free zone as has been erroneously reported in some news media. The Icelandic Parliament, in its resolution of last May, simply reiterated its old policy that no nuclear weapons be situated in Iceland without the prior consent of Icelandic authorities. The Icelandic Parliament has also envisaged that its Foreign Affairs Committee explore possible participation and further discussions of a nuclear weapons free zone in northern Europe encompassing an area from Greenland to the Ural Mountains.

The proposal to make Canada a nuclear arms free zone might have the effect of prohibiting the testing of the cruise missile in Canada. The decision by the previous Government to allow the United States to test unarmed air launched cruise missiles in Canada was seen as consistent with that Government's support for NATO's two-track policy which led to the deployment of ground-launched cruise and Pershing II missiles in several NATO European countries. This Government decided to allow the United States to continue with its testing program because it believes that the cruise missile is an essential element in the global balance of deterrence and is part of the western response to the modernization by the Soviet Union of its offensive and defensive nuclear systems during the 1970s. This Soviet modernization continues into the 1980s.

It must also be remembered that NATO has had to rely on nuclear weapons to overcome the potential threat present in the great preponderance of Warsaw Pact conventional forces. It would not be in NATO's interest to give up the option of the



possible use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent should the Warsaw Pact forces ever contemplate an attack on the West. At the same time, however, it should be noted that NATO upholds the United Nations Charter which lays down that all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means and that there be no use of force — any force — against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.

The proposal would also prohibit the construction of any components of nuclear weapons in Canada. Regarding Canadian co-operation in the production of US cruise missiles, Litton Systems Canada Limited was awarded the sub-contract by the US Department of Defence through its parent company in the United States, Litton Industries, to produce a portion of the inertial guidance system for the cruise missile. Litton's participation in a small part of the cruise missile vehicle program should not be taken as a change in Canadian policies instituted at the end of the 1960s to divest our armed forces of a nuclear weapon capability. It is, however, consistent with joint defence efforts with our NATO allies who rely in part on the maintenance of a credible nuclear deterrent in the face of the growing military threat from hostile forces.

The proposal before us today also calls for the Government to encourage cities, provinces and states throughout the world also to become nuclear weapons free zones. While someone else will speak on the question of regional nuclear weapons free zones, I would like to comment on the question of Canadian cities and provinces declaring themselves nuclear weapon free zones. We recognize that there is an important symbolic value in the declaration of a nuclear weapons free zone as an expression of the desire of mankind to be free from the threat of nuclear war. However, any responsible Government must look at the real implications of what a nuclear weapons free zone means from the point of view of security."

Major Canadian Statement at MBFR Negotiations

Negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe, involving 12 members of NATO and the seven Warsaw Pact members, began in Vienna in 1973 as a result of a NATO initiative to reduce the military manpower of East and West in Central Europe to equal, significantly lower levels. NATO participants include all members of the Alliance except Spain, Portugal, France and Iceland; all Warsaw Pact member countries are represented. The agreed goal is the reduction of each side's military manpower in the "zone of reductions" to parity at a level of 700 000 ground force personnel and a maximum of 900 000 air and ground force personnel combined. The zone of reductions consists of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Benelux countries on the Western side, and East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia on the Eastern side. In addition to these reductions, the West seeks certain "associated measures" that could facilitate verification, build confidence and enhance stability.

Following is an excerpt from a major statement made at the MBFR negotiations on May 15, by the Head of the Canadian delegation, Mr. Michael Shenstone.

"Mr. Chairman,

It will surprise no one around this table to hear that the thirty-eighth Round which ended on March 20 was a great disappointment to the West, and one which we did not expect. After the major initiative tabled by the West on December 5, 1985, the sides found themselves for the first time in the long history of these negotiations agreeing to a common framework. In this initiative, the West made a historic move demonstrating its political will to create conditions favourable for reaching an agreement. While many substantive issues remained, we had genuine hope that the East might muster similar political will to match the West's concession and that subsequent work could expand the areas of common ground so as to bring an agreement finally within reach.

These expectations were raised even higher by public statements of Eastern leaders that seemed to augur a new willingness to negotiate effective verification.

As the Round unfolded, however, the West found its Eastern partners reluctant to work on a common agenda for progress. Instead, the East advanced what was described as a further development of its earlier Basic Provisions. Despite the dazzling merits claimed for this package, the East demonstrated an embarrassed reluctance to answer several repeated questions from the West for clarification. When partial answers were eventually extracted from our Eastern colleagues, it became clear why they were embarrassed: to back up the high rhetoric of its advance publicity, the East grudgingly unveiled verification measures that failed to demonstrate even the slightest substantive improvement over its previous inadequate measures. On one specific measure, the application of exit-entry points, the East revealed a position which politeness compels me merely to describe as a backward step.

This development, far from building upon the opportunities created by the West's acceptance of a common framework, only imposed yet another obstacle to progress in Vienna.

The West reviewed this unfortunate turn of events in its closing plenary on the 20th of March. It urged its Eastern colleagues to re-examine their former positions on key subjects such as verification and return to the thirty-ninth Round with constructive proposals that would match the Western move of December 1985. The West expected, of course, that if any progress were to be achieved in the period ahead, Eastern proposals would need to relate to the context of the hard-won convergence onto the common framework for a first-phase, time-limited agreement on initial US and Soviet reductions and a no-increase commitment — an agreement along the lines of the Basic Provisions

The **Disarmament** Bulletin

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The Arms Control and Disarmament Process at the United Nations



An aerial view of New York City and the East River. At lower left overlooking the East River is the United Nations complex.

UN/Y. Nagata

Within the United Nations system, arms control and disarmament (ACD) matters are discussed, in greater or lesser degree, by the following:

- (a) The plenary of the General Assembly
- (b) The First (Political and Security) Committee
- (c) The United Nations Disarmament Commission
- (d) Various *ad hoc* committees and bodies
- (e) Various study groups

Each of these is administratively supported by the United Nations Secretariat, specifically the Department for Disarmament Affairs.

These various UN bodies are *deliberative* in nature. They have no negotiating power and their work concentrates on formulating collective views, expressions of intent, guidelines and declarations. (The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, on the other hand, is a *negotiating* body and while it has a close link with the United Nations system, its characteristics, methodology and results are not the same.)

Plenary

Generally, the plenary of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) limits itself to consideration of, and voting upon, the reports of the First Committee. There is normally very little discussion of the ACD items in the plenary. Exceptionally, there are items such as the International Year of Peace that are not referred to the First Committee which receive full debate in the General Assembly.

This is the second in a series of periodic supplements to the *Disarmament Bulletin* that have been prepared by the Department of External Affairs in order to provide a more detailed presentation of Canada's efforts to promote arms control and disarmament.

Cette publication existe également en français.

First Committee

The agenda of the First Committee (the main UNGA forum for arms control, disarmament and international security matters) contains more items than are considered by any of the other six main committees of the General Assembly. At the forty-first General Assembly, there are expected to be nearly 80 resolutions on ACD and international security topics. In recent years, the number of First Committee resolutions has increased dramatically (from 44 in 1978 to 73 in 1985), leading many delegations to call for a re-structuring of the agenda. This matter has yet to be considered by the UNGA.

The following are some of the main issues of special interest to Canada that will be considered by the First Committee:

(1) *Comprehensive Test Ban*. At UNGA 40, there were three resolutions dealing with various aspects of nuclear test bans, one introduced by New Zealand and two by Mexico. Canada and over 20 other countries abstained on the resolutions introduced by Mexico at UNGA 40 because they were judged to present several practical problems relating to the most appropriate and effective method of achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Canada voted for the resolution on this subject introduced by New Zealand at UNGA 40. It reaffirms the conviction of the General Assembly that all nuclear tests in all environments should be abolished by all countries for all time. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is urged to resume immediately its substantive work relating to a comprehensive test ban, including the issue of scope as well as issues of verification and compliance, with a view to the negotiation of a treaty. This resolution has been introduced in alternate years by New Zealand and Australia.

(2) *Outer Space*. At UNGA 40, a resolution entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" was adopted by a vote of 151 in favour, none against, with two abstentions. Drafted by non-aligned delegations, the final product was a result of agreements reached between all groups at the UN.



Delegates voting in the First Committee, the main UN General Assembly forum for arms control, disarmament and international security questions.

UN photo 165000/Y. Nagata

It called upon the CD to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space and also requested the CD to establish an *ad hoc* committee in 1986 with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. An *ad hoc* committee was established by the CD and the report of its accomplishments will be considered at UNGA 41.

(3) *Chemical Weapons*. Canada and Poland alternate in taking the lead on a resolution which calls on the CD to intensify its negotiation of an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. At UNGA 40, Canada took the lead on this item, which is traditionally uncontentious and is adopted by consensus. Poland will lead at UNGA 41.

(4) *Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes*. This traditional Canadian resolution, which receives a very high vote, will be introduced once again this year.

(5) *Verification*. At UNGA 40, Canada succeeded in having adopted, by consensus, a resolution (40/152o) entitled "Verification in all its Aspects". In reference to the verification resolution, former Canadian diplomat John Holmes, writing in the *Ottawa Citizen* on February 8, 1986, noted: "It was obvious to me, furthermore, that (the Canadian) success was attributed to the respect in which Canada is held as a constructive and independent-minded force in the Assembly." This is the first resolution passed on that subject in the 40 General Assemblies of the UN. It built upon the consensus language of the UNSSOD I Final Document and called "upon member states to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, verifiable and effective arms limitation and disarmament measures." Further, it invited all member states to submit to the Secretary-General "their views and suggestions on Verification principles, procedures and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification." The General Assembly will, at its forty-first session, consider the replies and decide on further action.

United Nations Disarmament Commission

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is another deliberative body, but it devotes attention to only a limited number of ACD items. It meets each year for virtually the entire month of May and is open to attendance by representatives of each of the 159 UN member states. Whereas the First Committee conducts its business by means of voting, the UNDC operates by consensus.

In 1986, the UNDC discussed six issues: the arms race in all its aspects, the reduction of military budgets, the nuclear capability of South Africa, the role of the UN in disarmament, curbing the naval arms race, and confidence-building measures. In comparison with previous years, the 1986 session was exceptionally successful. The main achievements included agreement on a document on confidence-building measures, thus clearing this item off the agenda. There was also substantial progress on a document on the reduction of military budgets (ROMB), with only one paragraph in an otherwise agreed formulation of guiding principles

The First Committee Programme of Work and Timetable follows the same format from year to year, and for UNGA 41 is expected to be as follows:

	Dates	Number of Meetings
General debate on all disarmament agenda items	mid to end of October	20
Statements on specific disarmament agenda items and continuation of general debate, as necessary	end of October to early November	20
Deadline for submission of draft resolutions on disarmament agenda items	end of first week in November	
Consideration of and action upon draft resolutions on disarmament agenda items	to mid-November	20
General debate, consideration of and action (voting) upon draft resolution(s), on Question of Antarctica	end of November	8
Deadline for submission of draft resolution(s) on Antarctica	end of November	
General debate, consideration of and action (voting) upon draft resolutions, on the three international security agenda items	early December	10
Deadline for submission of draft resolutions on international security agenda items	early December	
Voting in General Assembly	early December	



Closing session of the 1985 Disarmament Commission. At the podium are (left to right) Miljan Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament; Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs; Mansur Ahmad (Pakistan); Fehmi Alem, Secretary; and Don Arturo Laclaustra (Spain), Rapporteur.

UN photo 165323/Y. Nagata

for ROMB agreements remaining to be negotiated. Some useful work was also realized on the role of the UN in disarmament. However, little progress was reported on agenda items dealing with nuclear and conventional disarmament, or on the item dealing with South Africa's nuclear capability. The session also witnessed a considerable difference of views on the naval arms race item. In general, the 1986 session was a positive one and it is hoped that this spirit will carry over into the 1987 session.

Ad Hoc Committees and Bodies

Committees which function under a mandate from the General Assembly and in which Canada plays an active, or monitoring, role include:

- (1) *Ad hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean.* This committee meets from four to six weeks per year to deal with preparatory work relating to the convening of an international conference which would be concerned with the



The Secretary of State for External Affairs meeting with UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. In his statement to the 40th General Assembly, Mr. Clark renewed the commitment that successive Canadian governments have made to the United Nations since its creation in 1945.

UN photo 164239/Y. Nagata

implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Canada is one of the 11 Western members of this 48-nation committee.

(2) *Ad hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference.* This committee meets from four to six weeks a year and is charged with maintaining close contact with the nuclear weapon states in order that the committee be made aware of their opinions regarding the holding of a World Disarmament Conference.

(3) *World Disarmament Campaign Pledging Conference.* The World Disarmament Campaign (WDC) was launched in 1982 by unanimous decision of the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II). It has three primary purposes: to inform, to educate, and to generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. At the Third WDC Pledging Conference on October 31, 1985, Canada announced its third contribution of \$100 000 to the objectives of the WDC — which makes Canada one of the leading contributors to the Campaign. Our contributions have

supported the publication of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook and other UN information material as well as research activities undertaken by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The 1985 contribution also included \$10 000 for the International Year of Peace Voluntary Trust Fund.

(4) *Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development.* This committee met for two weeks in 1985 and for four weeks in 1986. The main items to be discussed at the conference itself will be:

(a) Review of the relationship between disarmament and development in all its aspects and dimensions with a view to reaching appropriate conclusions.

(b) Examination of the implications of the level and magnitude of the continuing military expenditures, in particular those of the nuclear weapon states, for the world economy and the international economic and social situation, particularly for developing countries, and elaboration of appropriate recommendations for remedial measures.

(c) Consideration of ways and means of releasing additional resources through disarmament measures, for development purposes, in particular in favour of developing countries.

This conference was originally to be held in Paris from July 15 to August 2, 1986. However, the French Government, as host, expressed the wish that it be postponed until 1987 so that better preparation could be guaranteed and the chances of success improved.

(For further information on the conference, see the article on this subject in this issue of the *Disarmament Bulletin*.)

Study Groups

From time to time the General Assembly calls for studies to be carried out on ACD items. Some studies recently completed or in progress are:

- Naval Arms Race
- Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
- Reduction of Military Budgets
- Deterrence
- Conventional Disarmament
- Military Research and Development
- Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament Matters
- Relationship Between Disarmament and Development

During the period 1979-1984, Canada participated in four UN study groups.

Summary


Canada's role in the arms control process at the United Nations is a significant one. Canada is recognized as having an important role to play in the discussion of these questions and is making a practical contribution to the activities of the UN in this field. In addition, through its chairmanship of the Barton Group (composed of UN representatives of the NATO countries, Australia, Ireland, Japan and New Zealand), named after the former Canadian Ambassador to the UN, Mr. William Barton, Canada is able to facilitate active discussion and exchanges of opinion on arms control and disarmament issues within the UN context.



proposal made on February 14, 1985, by the East.

In his plenary statement presenting that Basic Provisions initiative over a year ago, the Distinguished Representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Mikhailov, placed great importance on the merits of setting aside the comprehensive approach and concentrating on a first-phase agreement. He claimed that the contents of that proposal would permit us speedily to achieve a first-phase agreement. He added that such an action, by demonstrating the readiness of both sides to move forward towards lowering the level of military confrontation, would undoubtedly help to create the necessary confidence and establish a favourable climate and ground for further joint efforts to improve the military-political situation.

While the West saw the need for substantial improvements in several features of those Basic Provisions, most notably in their minimalist verification provisions, it recalled the merits of its own 1979 first-phase proposal. After an in-depth review of these negotiations, the West concluded that a time-limited, first-phase approach did offer a possible way forward. In December 1985, the West thus tabled an initiative which not only accepted the framework embodied in the East's Basic Provisions but, in order to break the deadlock in these negotiations, took the exceptional step of setting aside its legitimate insistence on prior agreement on data. That, Mr. Chairman, according to earlier Eastern claims, was the 'Gordian knot' in need of cutting, following which progress could at last be made in Vienna. Ambassador Mikhailov's closing invocation on February 14, 1985, urged the West to 'treat the new proposal of the Socialist countries in a most attentive and serious way and to give it a timely and constructive reply which would make it possible to reach the first tangible result in the negotiations in Vienna.' This requirement was not only met but exceeded by the West's milestone initiative. In effect, the sides finally agreed on a common itinerary to reach a first tangible result.



Mr. Michael Shenstone, Head of the Canadian delegation to the MBFR talks.

The West still supports the common framework approach so earnestly advocated by the East over the past 15 months. We still consider it the most realistic and practical means of achieving an early first agreement for reductions and limitations on conventional armed forces in Central Europe. The next logical step is to complete the journey we mutually agreed to embark on. If and when we succeed in doing so and the resultant agreement is implemented to the satisfaction of all parties, then the more ambitious phase involving substantial reductions in military manpower to reach parity at lower levels in Central Europe would at last become an attainable goal. However, for the time being, we are at the stage where issues that still divide us must be aired, argued and hopefully reconciled in the search for the final breakthrough to a first-phase agreement.

One of the most important of these issues is the need for a system of verification that will instil sufficient confidence in all parties to this agreement that implementation and compliance occurs, and is seen to occur, in strict conformity with the obligations undertaken. The West has developed and fully explained

its concept of verification. The East has still to demonstrate how its meagre verification measures can satisfy the high standards of effectiveness and reliability required of a viable verification regime. The West was disappointed with the East's failure in the last Round to fulfil the expectations created by the proclamations of its leaders and with its apparent backtracking on certain key points. Nevertheless, we take the optimistic view that such positions may have been developed in haste and may yet be modified to make a positive contribution to our joint efforts here.

During a speech in East Berlin on April 18, 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev outlined some ideas which alluded to untying a supposed knot in our Vienna negotiations, but which seemed to cut across the work of several arms control fora. How these ideas will affect our talks in Vienna, if at all, is not clear at present. But without making any further comment on the implications of the April 18 statement as a whole, we note that the view that European security is a concept going beyond Central Europe is consistent with a long-held NATO position — often expressed at this table — that certain of the Associated Measures proposed by the West should apply beyond Central Europe. We hope, therefore, that the East's resistance to these Associated Measures will now come to an end.

The West is always prepared to consider constructive suggestions to advance these negotiations. However, the West is not aware that our work on the first-phase agreement has exhausted its promising prospects. We hope, therefore, that time will not be wasted in extraneous discussions here which might delay or detract from the progress that these talks deserve, and that our common framework now facilitates....

To our view, the best means of demonstrating the sincerity of the East's commitment to substantial reductions and limitations on conventional armed forces in Central Europe and to reliable verification at every stage is by dealing positively and constructively with the serious Western proposal tabled here in December...."



Disarmament and Development Conference Postponed to 1987

On June 20, the UN General Assembly adopted, without discussion, the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee for the international conference on the relationship between disarmament and development to postpone the conference until 1987. This conference was originally to be held in Paris from July 15 to August 2, 1986. However, the French Government, as host, expressed the wish that the conference be postponed until 1987 so that better preparation could be guaranteed and the chances of success improved.

Canada participated in three meetings of the Preparatory Committee, in July-August 1985 and April and June 1986. These meetings were designed to prepare for the conference and for the substantive discussion that was to take place in Paris on this subject. Although the conference has been delayed, the third preparatory meeting adopted, by consensus, a document containing elements which are to serve as the framework for a Final Document of the conference.

Following are excerpts from the Canadian address to the Preparatory Committee meeting of April 10, made by the Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, which set out Canadian views, many of which are reflected in the consensus document adopted at the third Preparatory Committee meeting. (For further information on Canada's approach to disarmament and development, see the article on this subject in our "Winter 1985 — Spring 1986" issue.)

"We now have to turn our attention to the task of drawing up the broad outlines of the kind of document we think should emerge from the conference.

In proceeding with this next step in our work, we have to bear a number of points in mind. First, the document must represent a consensus. Second, it must stand the test of time since we shall be looking to it to provide guidelines for years to come. This will be an ongoing document that cannot simply reflect the biases of the moment. Third, it must help to maintain the momentum of both the disarmament and development processes where this exists or to encourage such momentum where it is lagging. We must adopt the high road rather than a parochial approach to our subject.

With these points in mind, we believe that the conference should work towards the adoption of a consensus Declaration on the relationship between disarmament and development that reflects longer-term objectives. Such a Declaration need not be long. Indeed, if we are to succeed in achieving consensus on this complex subject, we may have to aim at a Declaration which, while substantively of great significance, is modest in length.

That Declaration should perhaps contain an Introduction consisting of a statement setting out the situation regarding both disarmament and development which has inspired the proposal for this conference at this particular point in time, namely, the disproportion in the amounts currently devoted to armaments and development.

The Introduction might then be followed by the Declaration proper which would set out a conceptual framework. This would contain the common elements in the views expressed by delegations on the relationship between disarmament and development, the conclusions reached about the uncertain impact of military expenditures on the world economy and the various broad alternative approaches on which we can agree.

We see the starting point of the Declaration being the points of consensus which have been reflected in the various statements in our debate.

The common thread in most of those statements, which should find its way into the final document, is the recognition that disarmament and development are two separate and fundamental processes which the international community is dedicated to foster, notwithstanding the much more complex relationship between them than we have recognized in the past.

Our discussion, I believe, has highlighted the importance of security for both these processes.... I believe that there has been general recognition of the fact that security in this context must be viewed in a broad sense to encompass not only military but non-military threats.

If we have interpreted the debate correctly, my delegation believes there has been a heightened concern on the part of delegations about the implications of too tight a conceptual link between disarmament and development. Put in its starkest terms, as it was by several delegations, progress in the transfer of any resources to development should not be held hostage to progress in arms control. That basic thought must, I believe, find its way into the Declaration emerging from the Paris conference.

My delegation believes further that there has been a shift in the thinking about the concept of direct transfers of resources from disarmament to development. Whether or not there is a full consensus on this point remains to be seen in our further discussions; but it is our clear impression that there is a recognition that, however desirable delegations may view them, there is nothing automatic about such transfers. They are subject to the decision of the countries undertaking disarmament measures. While those decisions are based on national interests, they are not taken in isolation but in the context of the total international situation....



The document will...have to be balanced in its analysis of the role of both the developed and the developing countries in the creation of the problems we have examined and in their solution, however large or small that role may be.

On the important action-oriented elements of the Declaration, we do not yet see a consensus on the various proposals that have been put forward. That subject may have to be left to mature until the next Preparatory Committee meeting or the conference itself.

My delegation would hope that serious consideration will be given to the view it has put forward, namely, that not only the direct transfer approach but alternative approaches be examined. We would hope that the Declaration would

reflect the view that measures such as the reduction of national expenditures and deficits, by strengthening donor countries, might be a better way of guaranteeing that more funds will, in the long term, be allocated to development assistance than a simple direct transfer from military expenditures to help developing countries....

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the essence of Canada's approach and appeal is this: the final statement of the Paris conference has the potential for making a significant, long-term contribution to global understanding of how true human security can be enhanced by more rapid progress in both disarmament and development. To make this contribution, the Final Statement must, of course, be a consensus document. In a

consensus around a subject that is by definition complex and controversial, not everyone will be satisfied. But everyone can be helped by a new bridge of understanding. Today's differences can be bridged by a Declaration at Paris that establishes, for the first time, the principles for the global community to follow in implementing the disarmament-development interrelationship.

All of us need more time over the next months to pursue our study of the valuable information already produced. We ought not to leave this Preparatory Meeting with any thought that we have begun the in-depth drafting process; but rather we should disperse, determined to build on the process already started to outline the bridging consensus that we seek."

Canadians Now Part of Sinai Peace Force

At the request of Egypt and Israel, Canada assumed operational responsibilities with the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) on March 31. The Canadian contingent with 136 personnel and nine Twin Huey helicopters is located with the force headquarters at El Gorah, in the northern Sinai, and provides helicopter support to the MFO, including observation and verification, command and control, logistic support, search and rescue, medical evacuation and air traffic control.

The MFO was established in 1981 to monitor security provisions of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Canadian participation in the MFO will contribute to the reinforcement of the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. The treaty between the two countries, based as it is on the principle established in Security Council resolution 242 of exchanging land for peace, stands as an example of what can be achieved in the region when the political will exists. Canada remains committed to assist in the search for peace and stability in the Middle East.



During his official visit to the Middle East in April, Mr. Clark visited Canadians at MFO headquarters in El Gorah. At far right is Canada's Ambassador to Egypt, Mr. Marc Perron.

Denis Drever



Letter to Ms. Margaret Laurence on Question of Possible Tritium Exports from Canada

On June 19, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, released the following text of a letter to Ms. Margaret Laurence.

"Dear Ms. Laurence,

I have read your open letter concerning possible tritium exports from Canada and believe that a number of the misleading allegations therein should be refuted. In my view allegations of that nature do not contribute to the informed and comprehensive discussions desirable on matters of government policy and merely serve to confuse and mislead those exposed to them.

First, you make sweeping statements about past and current nuclear cooperation by Canada without making any effort to point out that Canadian Government policy and activities in this field have evolved significantly, not least of all in response to India's misuse of Canadian nuclear technology in 1974. Thus Canadian nuclear cooperation now only takes place within the framework of a comprehensive non-proliferation policy which requires, as a condition for nuclear cooperation with Canada, that all non-nuclear-weapon states must make a binding international commitment to non-proliferation, either by adhering to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) or by taking an equivalent step, and must accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, current and future. In addition all of Canada's nuclear partners, whether non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon states, must conclude with Canada a nuclear cooperation agreement specific to clearly identified Canadian material, nuclear material, equipment, and technology and incorporating a number of non-proliferation and safeguards provisions. The Canadian Government has learned from its experiences in the field of nuclear cooperation and now has one of the

most stringent policies of all nuclear suppliers. Pursuant to that policy cooperation with India, Pakistan and Taiwan was terminated ten years ago and cooperation with Argentina has been limited to supporting the safe and efficient operation of the Embalse reactor. Canadian cooperation with Romania and South Korea takes place in full accord with the policy outlined above. As this information is widely known, I believe your letter to be deliberately misleading in this regard.

Secondly, Canadian Government officials have responded to numerous enquiries over the past few years, including enquiries from Energy Probe, concerning possible tritium exports from Canada. There has never been any effort by the Government, or by Ontario Hydro in our experience, to deny or avoid any reference to this potential activity. To the contrary, officials have consistently advised that any such exports would take place only within the general framework of Canada's non-proliferation policy as regards nuclear exports. In that context it should be noted that tritium is not identified as a nuclear material in the Statute of the IAEA, and is not subject to IAEA safeguards. The Canadian Government believes that, given the physical nature of tritium and its limited proliferation significance, the application of safeguards to tritium is not appropriate. It should be clear, however, that export licences and permits for tritium will not be issued unless the Government is satisfied that tritium will not be used for nuclear weapon or any other nuclear explosive purposes. Moreover, officials indicated that detailed guidelines covering the evaluation of export applications were being developed for Ministerial consideration. Those guidelines were announced publicly by the Atomic Energy Control Board on March 14, 1986, well in advance of any request by Ontario Hydro to export tritium. The allegations, implicit and explicit, in this context in your letter are thus also unfounded.

Finally, and most importantly, you state in your letter that 'the prime beneficiary of our (tritium) exports is expected to be the US military' and moreover that 'there's nothing to stop the USSR, other nuclear weapons states, and even terrorists from ultimately getting their hands on it.' There is no basis for this statement. As I have already indicated no export licences or permits for tritium will be issued unless the Canadian Government is satisfied that the material will not be used for nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive purposes. The March 1986 guidelines issued by the AECB clearly support this. Moreover it is my understanding that, contrary to your assertion, the USA military are not called upon by law to fill commercial orders for tritium; in fact, tritium is made available to the USA military by the Department of Energy, which also fills commercial requirements. We have been assured by USA officials that their Oak Ridge facility, which manufactures tritium, has ample supplies for all requirements. Once again I find your letter erroneous and misleading.

Your persistent connection of Canadian tritium to weapons is not only incorrect, but misleading. Commercial, medical and research applications of tritium contribute to the safety, health and well-being of both individuals and general populations. Tritium facilitates such safety-related products as instrument dials, exit signs and emergency markers for commercial aircraft and air ambulance guidance. The benefits to modern medicine of radioisotopes in general are well known and the support of fusion research will assist the development of a new energy source which will be of benefit to all mankind.

Ontario Hydro is the subject of a number of statements in your letter with regard to which it is, I believe, best placed to respond. I can assure you, however, that my officials have found Ontario Hydro representatives to be well-informed, open, and cooperative in responding to their enquiries as regards Ontario Hydro's tritium-related activities.

In conclusion, I believe the Canadian Government has responded in a timely



and effective manner to an evolving industrial and technological situation, and to potential commercial opportunities for Canadian companies, by applying to possible tritium exports, in an appropriate way, its nuclear non-proliferation policy as regards nuclear exports. That policy, developed and consistently applied by successive Canadian Governments since 1965, is designed to ensure that Canada's nuclear exports, including tritium, will not be used for nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive purposes.

Yours sincerely,

Joe Clark"

Chemical Weapons Use in the Iran-Iraq War

Following is the text of the Canadian statement on chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war, delivered at the Conference on Disarmament on March 25 by Mr. Arsène Després, Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Canada in Geneva.

"Participants in this forum will be aware that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has reported to the Security Council, on the basis of the findings of an international investigative team which he sent to the area, that the renewed use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war has been confirmed. The President of the Security Council on March 21 issued a statement on behalf of the Council which includes a strong condemnation of this continued use of chemical weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Security Council statement also includes a renewed demand that the provisions of that Protocol be strictly observed. This is the third such confirmation of chemical weapons use in that war. In this instance, the use of chemical weapons by Iraqi forces against Iranian forces has been confirmed. This ought to be cause for dismay on the part of the entire international community.

Mr. President, it is well known that the investigation of allegations of chemical weapons use is a matter in which Canada has taken a particular interest and to which we have devoted considerable effort. During the fortieth UN General Assembly Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, presented to the Secretary-General a handbook on the investigation of allegations of the use of chemical weapons or biological weapons. Precisely for the purpose of assisting in investigations of the kind that has recently been completed, on March 11 that handbook was submitted in this forum as something that would be of use in the future in the context of a verification regime that would be part of a chemical weapons convention as it is being negotiated. Canada lauds the Secretary-General for again taking the initiative to investigate the most recent allegations of chemical weapons use.

Canada, a signatory of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning chemical weapons use, strongly opposes the use of chemical weapons. We call on all signatories to the 1925 Protocol, including both combatants in the Gulf war, to adhere to their legal obligations. We resolutely condemn any action that has been or might be taken in breach of that agreement. In taking this position, the Government of Canada is in no way seeking to take sides between the combatants in that tragic war, which ought to be brought to a negotiated conclusion as soon as possible in accordance with Security Council resolution 582. Our concern is to maintain and strengthen the authority and integrity of international agreements.

We are also concerned at any actions which would have the effect of undermining the efforts in this forum to conclude a comprehensive, verifiable chemical weapons ban and have it universally applied. The evidence of recent chemical weapons use should reinforce our sense of urgency to complete this priority task. We hope the international community will be unanimous in condemning any future use of this kind of weapon, which we have by agreement defined as a weapon of mass destruction which ought not to be used."

Canadian Arms Control and Disarmament Consultations with Japan and China

On March 17, the Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué.

"The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, announced that a Canadian delegation of senior officials departed today for China and Japan to hold bilateral arms control and disarmament consultations. These consultations will encompass a wide range of arms control and disarmament topics with particular focus on issues at the United Nations and the work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva where all three countries are represented at the negotiating table. Canada places great importance on such consultations with these major Pacific states. These consultations are intended to become regular annual events.

The consultations in Tokyo will take place on March 19 and 20. During his visit to Canada last January, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone agreed with Prime Minister Mulroney that their officials hold regular arms control and disarmament consultations, and that the first of these would take place before the Tokyo Economic Summit Meeting in May. Canada views these consultations with Japan, an Economic Summit partner and a non-nuclear power, to be an important element of its bilateral relationship with Japan.

The consultations in Beijing will take place on March 24 and 25. They are part of an agreement to strengthen the consultative process between Canada and China. The arms control and disarmament consultations are particularly important given China's position as one of five nuclear weapon powers and as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council."

SSEA Announces Canadian Programme for the International Year of Peace

On March 6, the Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué on Canada's International Year of Peace Programme.

"The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, today announced the details of Canada's International Year of Peace (IYP) programme.

The Canadian Government's programme of activities includes the following:

— A contribution of \$10 000 to the International Year of Peace Voluntary Trust Fund of the United Nations.

This contribution was announced on October 31, 1985, as part of Canada's overall contribution of \$100 000 to the objectives of the United Nations World Disarmament Campaign. Canada's contribution, one of the largest contributions made to the Voluntary Trust Fund, will support activities undertaken by the United Nations IYP Secretariat during the International Year of Peace.

— A cross-Canada tour from April 14 to May 2 by the Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche.

Mr. Roche will discuss the International Year of Peace and the question of the relationship between disarmament and development with members of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs and with interested Canadians

— The preparation, in book form, of a selection of essays written by distinguished Canadians and dealing with the broad themes of the International Year of Peace from individual perspectives.

This book, prepared in order to encourage reflection on the basic requirements of peace in the contemporary world, as proposed by the United Nations, will be published in the fall of 1986 and presented to the United

Nations as a distinctive Canadian contribution to the International Year of Peace. It will also receive wide distribution in Canada.

— An essay competition for Canadians dealing with the theme 'What is peace and what can I do to achieve it' and a poster competition on the International Year of Peace.



Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, addressing public forum in Saskatoon on April 27.

Saskatoon Star-Phoenix

Winners of the competition will be awarded a trip to the United Nations in New York. This competition is being organized by the United Nations Association in Canada (UNAC) under the terms of a contribution from the Disarmament Fund of the Department of External Affairs. Inquiries should be directed to UNAC at Suite 808 - 63 Sparks Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5A5 (tel: (613) 232-5751).

— The issuing of a commemorative stamp by Canada Post Corporation in the fall of 1986 to mark the International Year of Peace. Further details will be announced by Canada Post in the near future.

— Funding priority, through the Disarmament Fund, to projects directly linked to the objectives of the IYP that meet the criteria of the Fund.

The Disarmament Fund, which totalled over \$500 000 in the 1985-86 fiscal year, will encourage a balanced discussion of arms control and disarmament issues in Canada.

Mr. Clark said the Government of Canada supports the broad objectives of the International Year of Peace, which include stimulating action by the United Nations and Member States in promoting peace and security on the basis of the United Nations Charter; strengthening the United Nations system as the principal international system devoted to the promotion of peace; and focusing attention on the basic requirements of peace in the contemporary world. Canada was a co-sponsor of the International Year of Peace resolution that received the unanimous consent of the UN General Assembly on October 24, 1985. The IYP resolution recognizes the multi-dimensionality of peace in that it encompasses not only the prevention of war but also the enhancement of the quality of life, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the satisfaction of human needs, international development, the protection of the environment and other questions. Mr. Clark said that Canada has always stressed the role of the United Nations and the UN Charter in enhancing international peace and security and will continue to work towards those ends, not just in 1986 but every year.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs said the broad scope of the Government's IYP programme reflects its abiding concern for the enhancement of international peace and security. He said that this continues to be one of the highest priorities of the Canadian Government.

Mr. Clark noted that various government departments are taking into account the themes of the IYP in their activities during 1986."



Proclamation of the International Year of Peace

WHEREAS the General Assembly has decided unanimously to proclaim solemnly the International Year of Peace on 24 October 1985, the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations,

WHEREAS the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations provides a unique opportunity to reaffirm the support for and commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

WHEREAS peace constitutes a universal ideal and the promotion of peace is the primary purpose of the United Nations,

WHEREAS the promotion of international peace and security requires continuing and positive action by States and peoples aimed at the prevention of war, removal of various threats to peace – including the nuclear threat – respect for the principle of non-use of force, the resolution of conflicts and peaceful settlement of disputes, confidence-building measures, disarmament, maintenance of outer space for peaceful uses, development, the promotion and exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms, decolonization in accordance with the principle of self-determination, elimination of racial discrimination and *apartheid*, the enhancement of the quality of life, satisfaction of human needs and protection of the environment,

WHEREAS peoples must live together in peace and practise tolerance, and it has been recognized that education, information, science and culture can contribute to that end,

WHEREAS the International Year of Peace provides a timely impetus for initiating renewed thought and action for the promotion of peace,

WHEREAS the International Year of Peace offers an opportunity to Governments, intergovernmental, non-governmental organizations and others to express in practical terms the common aspiration of all peoples for peace,

WHEREAS the International Year of Peace is not only a celebration or commemoration, but an opportunity to reflect and act creatively and systematically in fulfilling the purposes of the United Nations,

NOW, THEREFORE,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

SOLEMNLY PROCLAIMS 1986 to be the International Year of Peace and calls upon all peoples to join with the United Nations in resolute efforts to safeguard peace and the future of humanity.

Adopted by the General Assembly on 24 October 1985
(Resolution 40/3)



Javier Pérez de Cuéllar
Secretary-General

Jaime de Piniés
President of the fortieth session
of the General Assembly



Signals of Hope: Canada and the International Year of Peace

Following are excerpts from an address on the theme of the International Year of Peace made by the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, in Edmonton on March 10.

"What is meant by the United Nations proclamation declaring 1986 as the International Year of Peace (IYP)? And what does it mean to Canada?

IYP is essentially a challenge to the governments and peoples of the world to focus more clearly on the multi-dimensional nature of peace — conflict resolution, economic and social development, human rights, elimination of racial discrimination, as well as the traditional issues of arms control and disarmament.

Peace can no longer be defined as the absence of war, though the avoidance of nuclear war must be the chief priority.

Peace requires more than a reduction of arms, though disarmament measures are essential.

Peace demands the attaining of true human security so that people everywhere can live free of the threat of war, free of violations of their human rights, free to develop their own lives to attain economic and social progress.

Peace, then, is a multi-splendoured goal.

No one expects that this goal can be achieved by December 31, 1986. That is not the idea behind the International Year of Peace. Rather, IYP highlights the broad international agenda that must be advanced as the world continues to evolve into a global community with increasingly closer relationships among all peoples.

This growing recognition that the planet is a place of common ground, with common vulnerability and common opportunity, is the real message of IYP. It establishes peace as a system of values.

This is clearly an advance in global thinking. And this advance constitutes a signal of hope to a humanity that has for too long been fractured and frustrated in the attaining of enduring human security.

All this is a subject critical to Canada's interests in the modern world as was indicated by Canada's co-sponsorship of the IYP resolution at the United Nations.

It seems as if the world has two political axes — East-West and North-South.

The East-West axis has been characterized by 40 years of tension, of escalating armaments and declining understanding. East-West relations have come to be defined in terms of the nuclear arsenals of overwhelming destructive potential possessed by the two superpowers.

The North-South axis is characterized by decades of deprivation, famine, homelessness and disease. North-South relations have come to be defined in terms of the stark disparities in resources and opportunities which exist between a privileged minority of the world's population, who enjoy great prosperity, and the vast majority afflicted with utter destitution.

The management of these two sets of relationships is the starting point on the route to peace. East-West relations focus on the negotiated limitation and reduction of arms and the building of confidence and trust; North-South relations focus on the sound economic development of the most impoverished nations in the world.

The UN's 1985 *Report on the World Social Situation* reveals how far we have to go to achieve these goals:

— in 1984, global military expenditure was \$800 billion — approximately \$130 for every man, woman and child in the world. This is equivalent to more than the average income of many developing countries;

— in 1980, military spending by developed countries represented more than ten times the amount spent by developing countries on health programmes;

— the cost of a single nuclear submarine equals the annual education budget of 23 developing countries with a total of 160 million school children.

The field of arms control is itself highly complex, technical and, above all, political. It is easy to advocate ridding the world of nuclear weapons; numerous proposals have been put forward since the Baruch Plan of 1946, but it has been very difficult to find a way of negotiating them down to acceptable levels on the basis of equality and equal security.

A significant step was taken in this direction at the November 1985 Summit meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. In their joint declaration, the leaders agreed that 'a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.' As well, they identified several areas in which the USA and USSR had a common interest in progress. These included:

— accelerated work at the nuclear and space talks which began in March 1985;

— the further enhancing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT);

— accelerated global efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable convention banning chemical weapons;

— agreement to work for positive results at the Vienna Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks and the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe.

Establishing and sustaining political dialogue at the highest level in order to build on the common ground between East and West is a step of fundamental importance.



This approach has been a consistent element of Canadian foreign policy. At the conclusion of his visits to many world capitals in 1983, former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau suggested ten principles of a common bond between East and West:

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

These principles, reflected in the Gorbachev-Reagan Summit statement, broaden the perspective of East-West relations and stimulate greater international effort in the search for a durable peace.

In his first speech immediately after assuming office in September 1984, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney reiterated the commitment of the Canadian Govern-



Logo of the International Year of Peace.

ment to work effectively within the world's multilateral forums to reduce tensions, alleviate conflict and create the conditions for a lasting peace. He said:

'There can be no let up in our efforts to reduce the threat of war. No matter how frustrating or difficult, negotiations must be pursued.... The exercise of political will is nowhere more important than on this issue on whose outcome the lives of our children and humanity depend.'

And he added:

'No matter how much we may accomplish here in Canada, I will have failed in my most cherished ambition if under my leadership Canada has not helped reduce the threat of war and enhance the promise of peace.'

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark carried the Government's commitment into the global community when he stated in an address to the thirty-ninth General Assembly of the United Nations:

'Canada, for its part, is determined to continue to play a leading role in the search for peace and disarmament. We believe the nuclear build-up threatens the life of every Canadian, and the existence of human society. Countries like our own must use influence to reverse that build-up and reduce the danger of destruction. That will be a

constant, consistent, dominant priority of Canadian foreign policy.'

Canada has a long, constructive history of active engagement with the most important global issues. This tradition was outlined by Mr. Clark in the foreword to the Government's Green Paper on foreign policy:

'We assisted at San Francisco in the creation of the UN. We were at Bretton Woods when the post-war monetary system was designed. We were at Havana and Geneva as well, where the international trading system was conceived. We have worked diligently ever since to improve international order — Lester Pearson and peacekeeping, Howard Green and the Partial Test Ban Treaty, Paul Martin and membership in the UN for newly independent states, Pierre Trudeau and cooperation between North and South and between East and West.'

Although 1986 is designated by the UN as the International Year of Peace, every year is a year to work for peace and Canada will go on pushing and probing for viable ways to stop the spread of nuclear weapons with the motivation and spirit described in the 1984 Throne Speech:

'Patience and perseverance we will need, for in this endeavor even the smallest progress is worthy of the greatest effort.'

Thus, Canada, along with its Allies, works to influence and assist the bilateral negotiations in positive, constructive ways in order to achieve radical reductions in nuclear weapons. This is done through a great deal of unpublicized effort. Though there is only room for the two superpowers at the Geneva negotiating table, Canada constantly stresses that the conduct of these negotiations will have an impact on every nation on earth. The ongoing negotiations — with their series of offers and counter-offers — indicate the scope and complexity of the extensive systems of nuclear arms possessed by both sides. Though agreement still seems a long way off, most experienced



observers are now reflecting cautious optimism....

The General Assembly's proclamation of the International Year of Peace goes well beyond the more traditional issues of disarmament and the peaceful settlement of disputes. It recognizes that efforts to improve the conditions of life for people around the world and the natural environment can alleviate tensions and thereby make for a more peaceful world.

It is obvious that flagrant inequality between rich and poor is a potential source of instability; that incarceration, torture and murder of persons by their own or alien governments breeds bitterness and violence; that continuing desertification of vast tracts of Africa may force entire communities to move into the territory of others, with serious potential for conflict.

Canada has for many years made substantial efforts to alleviate such problems and we will remain active and persistent in seeking long-term solutions for them.

Canada's development assistance programmes recognize our humanitarian duty to help the world's poor, illiterate and afflicted; they also recognize the benefits for our own economic well-being of a more widely-shared prosperity. We are, therefore, committed to advancing issues of concern to the less-developed countries in a number of ways:

- a better definition of growth and adjustment in developing countries, through discussions under way in the World Bank and the IMF;
- strengthening the international trading system through the promotion of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations;
- participating in the special UN discussions on African development problems;
- strengthening the international economic negotiating machinery of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); and

— improving the definition of international agricultural policies and seeking to make the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme work better.

Canada also helps to protect human rights through our participation in the Commission on Human Rights (currently in session in Geneva), the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly's Third Committee. Work is proceeding to allow Canada to ratify the International Convention Against Torture. We have been especially heartened by recent political developments in Guatemala, Haiti and the Philippines, which point to new policies and better respect for the human rights of the peoples of those countries.

Canada has long striven to persuade the South African authorities of the injustice and short-sightedness of the system of apartheid. Last July, the Government announced a series of measures designed to stiffen the pressure on South Africa and to signal our profound dissatisfaction with its failure to put an end to institutionalized racial discrimination. Prime Minister Mulroney played a key role at the most recent meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government in developing a Commonwealth plan of action. We are using every avenue to urge the South African Government to summon up the courage to dispense with this unjust and backward system. The Anglican Primate of Canada, Reverend Edward Scott, is a member of the Group of Eminent Persons now seeking a more open dialogue with South Africa in an effort to avert a major tragedy.

For more than a decade, Canada has been in the vanguard of international efforts to improve the management of the world's natural environment, but mankind is still witnessing the disastrous results of careless neglect. Acid rain is damaging our forests and the aquatic life in our lakes, the Sahara advances perceptibly into the hitherto fertile lands of the Sahel; cities are defiled by smog and undrinkable water. Efforts to combat environmental damage must be based

on the realistic premise that, though this is a long-term problem, action must start now.

Progress has been registered recently through international collaboration to reduce pollution in the Mediterranean and the signing last July of an international protocol on sulfur dioxide emissions. In 1986, we will continue to combat acid rain and Great Lakes pollution; in the Economic Commission for Europe, discussions are continuing to reduce nitrous oxide emissions from industrial sources, power plants and motor vehicles; in the UN Environmental Programme, negotiations are under way on an international protocol on the protection of the earth's ozone layer. The World Commission on Environment and Development will visit Canada May 22-31 to examine environmental problems and better ways and means of resolving them. Groups and private citizens will have an opportunity to present views to the Commission....

For many Canadians, the IYP proclamation confirmed what we had already known. It has served to remind us that peace without development is not peace, that peace without racial equality and harmony is not peace, that peace without a reasonable quality of life is not peace.

It is, therefore, the fullness of Canada's programmes — from development assistance and active support for human rights to the protection of the environment and the promotion of a better standard of living for people across the country and, indeed, around the world — that constitutes a meaningful contribution to peace.

The spirit, determination and commitment generated by IYP must be carried forward into the years ahead if we are to create a truly peaceful planet.

Canada and Canadians can use IYP as a catalyst in our ongoing work for peace. If we can infuse others with our hope and belief in true human security, we will have accomplished a great deal."



Embossed Stamp to Mark 1986 as the International Year of Peace

The Canada Post Corporation announced on April 10 that an embossed stylized drawing of a dove soaring above Earth will be featured on a stamp to be issued September 16 to mark the United Nations proclamation of 1986 as the International Year of Peace. The Honourable Judge René J. Marin, Chairman of the Board of Canada Post

Corporation, noted that the proclamation "offers not only an occasion for celebration or commemoration, but an opportunity to reflect and act creatively and systematically in fulfilling the purposes of the United Nations."

The stamp design, by Montreal graphic artist Carole Jeghers, shows a white

dovelike bird soaring in outer space, its wings extended towards Earth as if about to embrace the planet.

Ashton-Potter Limited, of Toronto, will print 14 million 34-cent stamps in five-colour lithography plus embossing.

Ambassador for Disarmament Undertakes Cross-Canada Tour

On April 8, the Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué.

"The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, today announced the details of a cross-Canada tour to be undertaken from April 14 to May 2 by the Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, as part of Canada's International Year of Peace (IYP) programme previously announced by Mr. Clark on March 6.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs announced that Mr. Roche will visit every province in Canada to discuss the question of the relationship between disarmament and development and the International Year of Peace with members of the non-governmental Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs and with interested Canadians. These consultations are part of Canada's preparations for an international conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, to be held in Paris from July 15 to August 2. Mr. Clark said this major tour will provide the opportunity for a productive exchange of views on these issues between the Government of Canada and interested Canadians.

During the tour, the Ambassador for Disarmament will also speak on the themes of the International Year of Peace at a series of public meetings...."

Royal Canadian Mint Launches \$100 IYP Gold Coin

Mr. Robert J. Huot, Vice-President of Marketing at the Royal Canadian Mint, launched on August 7 the eleventh issue of the Canadian \$100 Gold Commemorative Coin Programme at the American Numismatic Association Annual Conference. The coin commemorates the International Year of Peace and will be available from August 15 to November 30.

The International Year of Peace highlights the broad international agenda that must be advanced as the world continues to evolve into a global community with increasingly close relationships among all people. The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, said that he was "particularly pleased that the Royal Canadian Mint has chosen to commemorate the International Year of Peace with the issue of a new \$100 Gold Coin."

Designed by internationally acclaimed Toronto artist Dora de Pédery-Hunt, the

coin depicts a branch of maple leaves intertwined with a branch of olive leaves, symbols of Canada and peace. The words "Peace" — "Paix" form a circle and are superimposed on the design.

The obverse bears Arnold Machin's effigy of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.

The 22 karat gold coin contains one half troy ounce of pure gold. It has a diameter of 27 mm, a thickness of 2.15 mm and weighs 16.965 g.

The mintage has been limited to 100 000 coins worldwide and its selling price has been established at \$325 (CAN) or \$245 (US).

Mail orders should be addressed to the Royal Canadian Mint, P.O. Box 476, Station A, Ottawa, Ontario, K1N 9H3 and will be accepted until November 30, 1986, or until mintage is depleted, whichever comes first. The coin may also be purchased from coin dealers.





Canada Contributes \$100 000 to World Disarmament Campaign



Canadian officials recently presented three cheques totalling \$100 000 to the United Nations that constitute Canada's 1985 contribution to the objectives of the World Disarmament Campaign. This contribution was announced by the Secretary of State for External Affairs on October 31, 1985, and is Canada's third contribution of \$100 000 each to the Campaign. In upper photo, Mr. Jan Martenson (*left*), UN Under-Secretary-General, Department for Disarmament Affairs, is presented with a \$50 000 cheque on May 15 by Mr. H. David Peel, Director General, International Security and Arms Control Bureau, Department of External Affairs. This contribution will assist publication of the UN *Disarmament Yearbook*. In middle photo, Mr. H. Thierry (*left*), Deputy Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, is presented with a \$40 000 cheque on April 9 by Mr. J. Alan Beesley, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament. This contribution will assist UNIDIR's research in the field of verification. At bottom, Mr. V.A. Ustinov (*left*), UN Under-Secretary-General, Political and Security Council Affairs, is presented with a \$10 000 cheque by Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Stephen Lewis, on February 21. This contribution, earmarked for the Voluntary Trust Fund for the International Year of Peace (IYP), will assist activities undertaken by the UN during the IYP.



Logo of the
World Disarmament Campaign



List of Arms Control and Disarmament-Related International Agreements to which Canada is a Signatory or Party

BACKGROUNDER

1. 1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement (United Kingdom-United States)
Signed and in force 29 April 1817

Negotiated after the end of the War of 1812, this agreement resulted in the reduction, limitation and equalization of naval forces on the Great Lakes. It is the earliest disarmament agreement of the modern era. It had considerable influence on the improvement of relations between Canada and the United States and the eventual creation of a disarmed border.
2. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare
Signed: 17 June 1925
Ratified: 6 May 1930
In force for Canada: 6 May 1930
3. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water
Signed: 8 August 1963
Ratified: 28 January 1964
In force for Canada: 28 January 1964
4. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and the Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
Signed: 27 January 1967
Ratified: 10 October 1967
In force for Canada: 10 October 1967
5. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Signed: 23 July 1968
Ratified: 8 January 1969
In force for Canada: 5 March 1970
6. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof
Signed: 11 February 1971
Ratified: 17 May 1972
In force for Canada: 18 May 1972
7. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
Signed: 10 April 1972
Ratified: 18 September 1972
In force for Canada: 26 March 1975
8. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
Signed: 18 May 1977
Ratified: 11 June 1981
In force for Canada: 11 June 1981
9. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
Signed: 22 September 1980
Ratified: 21 March 1986

This Convention will not come into force until ratified by 21 countries.

Related documents

Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament, included in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Signed: 1 August 1975



Leaving its Alliances is No Choice for Canada

Following is the text of an article written by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, and published in the Montreal Gazette on April 3.

"Gwynne Dyer (Columns, March 15) argues Canada should leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North American Aerospace Defence Command to make 'nuclear war ... less likely to happen.' He believes we could become a Canadian Finland.

Both his assumptions are wrong.

Leaving the Western alliance would make nuclear war more likely. The Soviets might be emboldened by a break in the West. NATO would feel weakened, and some of its members might be driven to hawkish demonstrations of strength.

The atmosphere that led to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit could be shattered, and the road closed again to negotiated arms control.

Second, Canada could never be Finland. The Finns are an estimable people, shaped by their own nature and history. But their nature and history are different from ours.

We are proud of our role as an international peacekeeper, a moderate and reasonable country. But moderation is a means, not an end. Our purpose is to enlarge freedom. We prefer to do that by advocating peaceful settlement of disputes, by fighting poverty and famine, and by promoting respect for human rights.

But we have also always been prepared to defend our values, by force of arms if necessary. The determination and gallantry of Canadians in two world wars and in Korea are as much a part of our history as diplomacy and development. There is nothing neutral in Canada's nature or tradition.

Geography is not the paramount reason we belong in NATO or NORAD.

Freedom is. Those alliances, with all their imperfections, defend a system of free societies and — by maintaining strength in the face of Soviet strength — help keep the peace.

It demeans Canadians, and misreads our history, to suggest that we stay in NATO because leaving it would displease the United States. We are in NATO because we belong there, just as we belong in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, and in the fields of Asia and Africa teaching agricultural reform.

Indeed, Canada played a key role in the invention of NATO, which both asserts our commitment to freedom and provides the means for ensuring a collective Western approach to fulfilling that commitment. Through NATO, we and others can — and do — influence American policy.

Parenthetically, commentators who regard NATO as a Canadian burden rather than a Canadian invention nurture the notion that Canada is a country without identity or accomplishment.

There is no doubt that an uncontrolled arms race would threaten humanity. All countries have an obligation to reduce that risk, and a country such as Canada can have more influence than many others. We can best exercise that influence by being true to ourselves.

Part of our strength is our reputation for working consistently and constructively where we have expertise or standing — on verification, banning chemical weapons, nuclear non-proliferation, and other issues. Part of our credibility is that we do not pretend to be neutral. Part of our authority is that we do not grandstand.

When events move slowly, and fear and frustration increase, the temptation grows to make dramatic gestures. Regularly, as foreign minister, I am invited to embrace some dramatic extreme in Canada's name, so 'our voice will be heard.'

International events rarely respond to 'voices.' Change is almost always undramatic, a product of steadiness, not surprise. Indeed, dramatic departures are often counterproductive. Dyer suggests that Canada's quitting NATO would inspire Poland to leave the Warsaw Pact. Almost certainly, the opposite would happen. The disarray we would cause in NATO would undoubtedly inspire the Soviet Union to insist on even greater solidarity within the Warsaw Pact.

What is more curious about Dyer's proposal is its timing. Two years ago the world was worried by both an increase in arms and a decrease in contacts. Now, at least there is contact, between Soviet and American leaders, negotiators and populations. The movement has been substantial on both sides. There is the real possibility of progress in reducing overall numbers of arms. The two leaders have agreed to meet regularly, and are appearing on one another's televisions. While progress will, inevitably, be slow, there is more hope now than for several years.

These negotiations are happening, in part, because the Soviet Union was left with no doubt about Western solidarity. Attempts failed to divide NATO over Afghanistan, over missile deployment in Europe, or over the US strategic defence initiative (SDI, or Star Wars). Jeopardizing the unit that led to Geneva could jeopardize Geneva itself.

Indeed, the resumption of negotiations between the superpowers makes NATO and NORAD even more important. While only two countries are at the table, all the world's people are affected by the results.

NATO provides Canada, and other allies, with direct access to the details of the negotiations, and influence on the negotiations. In the past we have proposed specific initiatives the Americans could consider raising at the table and have seen our proposals accepted. Surely we would wish to be able to do so again."

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The Arms Control and Disarmament Process at the United Nations



An aerial view of New York City and the East River. At lower left overlooking the East River is the United Nations complex.

UN/Y. Nagata

Within the United Nations system, arms control and disarmament (ACD) matters are discussed, in greater or lesser degree, by the following:

- (a) The plenary of the General Assembly
- (b) The First (Political and Security) Committee
- (c) The United Nations Disarmament Commission
- (d) Various *ad hoc* committees and bodies
- (e) Various study groups

Each of these is administratively supported by the United Nations Secretariat, specifically the Department for Disarmament Affairs.

These various UN bodies are *deliberative* in nature. They have no negotiating power and their work concentrates on formulating collective views, expressions of intent, guidelines and declarations. (The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, on the other hand, is a *negotiating* body and while it has a close link with the United Nations system, its characteristics, methodology and results are not the same.)

Plenary

Generally, the plenary of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) limits itself to consideration of, and voting upon, the reports of the First Committee. There is normally very little discussion of the ACD items in the plenary. Exceptionally, there are items such as the International Year of Peace that are not referred to the First Committee which receive full debate in the General Assembly.

This is the second in a series of periodic supplements to the *Disarmament Bulletin* that have been prepared by the Department of External Affairs in order to provide a more detailed presentation of Canada's efforts to promote arms control and disarmament.

Cette publication existe également en français.



First Committee

The agenda of the First Committee (the main UNGA forum for arms control, disarmament and international security matters) contains more items than are considered by any of the other six main committees of the General Assembly. At the forty-first General Assembly, there are expected to be nearly 80 resolutions on ACD and international security topics. In recent years, the number of First Committee resolutions has increased dramatically (from 44 in 1978 to 73 in 1985), leading many delegations to call for a re-structuring of the agenda. This matter has yet to be considered by the UNGA.

The following are some of the main issues of special interest to Canada that will be considered by the First Committee:

(1) *Comprehensive Test Ban.* At UNGA 40, there were three resolutions dealing with various aspects of nuclear test bans, one introduced by New Zealand and two by Mexico. Canada and over 20 other countries abstained on the resolutions introduced by Mexico at UNGA 40 because they were judged to present several practical problems relating to the most appropriate and effective method of achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Canada voted for the resolution on this subject introduced by New Zealand at UNGA 40. It reaffirms the conviction of the General Assembly that all nuclear tests in all environments should be abolished by all countries for all time. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is urged to resume immediately its substantive work relating to a comprehensive test ban, including the issue of scope as well as issues of verification and compliance, with a view to the negotiation of a treaty. This resolution has been introduced in alternate years by New Zealand and Australia.

(2) *Outer Space.* At UNGA 40, a resolution entitled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" was adopted by a vote of 151 in favour, none against, with two abstentions. Drafted by non-aligned delegations, the final product was a result of agreements reached between all groups at the UN.



Delegates voting in the First Committee, the main UN General Assembly forum for arms control, disarmament and international security questions.

UN photo 165000/Y. Nagata

It called upon the CD to consider as a matter of priority the question of preventing an arms race in outer space and also requested the CD to establish an *ad hoc* committee in 1986 with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. An *ad hoc* committee was established by the CD and the report of its accomplishments will be considered at UNGA 41.

(3) *Chemical Weapons.* Canada and Poland alternate in taking the lead on a resolution which calls on the CD to intensify its negotiation of an agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. At UNGA 40, Canada took the lead on this item, which is traditionally uncontentious and is adopted by consensus. Poland will lead at UNGA 41.

(4) *Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes.* This traditional Canadian resolution, which receives a very high vote, will be introduced once again this year.

(5) *Verification.* At UNGA 40, Canada succeeded in having adopted, by consensus, a resolution (40/152o) entitled "Verification in all its Aspects". In reference to the verification resolution, former Canadian diplomat John Holmes, writing in the *Ottawa Citizen* on February 8, 1986, noted: "It was obvious to me, furthermore, that (the Canadian) success was attributed to the respect in which Canada is held as a constructive and independent-minded force in the Assembly." This is the first resolution passed on that subject in the 40 General Assemblies of the UN. It built upon the consensus language of the UNSSOD I Final Document and called "upon member states to increase their efforts towards achieving agreements on balanced, mutually acceptable, verifiable and effective arms limitation and disarmament measures." Further, it invited all member states to submit to the Secretary-General "their views and suggestions on Verification principles, procedures and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification." The General Assembly will, at its forty-first session, consider the replies and decide on further action.



United Nations Disarmament Commission

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) is another deliberative body, but it devotes attention to only a limited number of ACD items. It meets each year for virtually the entire month of May and is open to attendance by representatives of each of the 159 UN member states. Whereas the First Committee conducts its business by means of voting, the UNDC operates by consensus.

In 1986, the UNDC discussed six issues: the arms race in all its aspects, the reduction of military budgets, the nuclear capability of South Africa, the role of the UN in disarmament, curbing the naval arms race, and confidence-building measures. In comparison with previous years, the 1986 session was exceptionally successful. The main achievements included agreement on a document on confidence-building measures, thus clearing this item off the agenda. There was also substantial progress on a document on the reduction of military budgets (ROMB), with only one paragraph in an otherwise agreed formulation of guiding principles

The First Committee Programme of Work and Timetable follows the same format from year to year, and for UNGA 41 is expected to be as follows:

	Dates	Number of Meetings
General debate on all disarmament agenda items	mid to end of October	20
Statements on specific disarmament agenda items and continuation of general debate, as necessary	end of October to early November	20
Deadline for submission of draft resolutions on disarmament agenda items	end of first week in November	
Consideration of and action upon draft resolutions on disarmament agenda items	to mid-November	20
General debate, consideration of and action (voting) upon draft resolution(s), on Question of Antarctica	end of November	8
Deadline for submission of draft resolution(s) on Antarctica	end of November	
General debate, consideration of and action (voting) upon draft resolutions, on the three international security agenda items	early December	10
Deadline for submission of draft resolutions on international security agenda items	early December	
Voting in General Assembly	early December	



Closing session of the 1985 Disarmament Commission. At the podium are (left to right) Miljan Komatina, Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament; Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs; Mansur Ahmad (Pakistan); Fehmi Alem, Secretary; and Don Arturo Laclaustra (Spain), Rapporteur.

UN photo 165323/Y. Nagata

for ROMB agreements remaining to be negotiated. Some useful work was also realized on the role of the UN in disarmament. However, little progress was reported on agenda items dealing with nuclear and conventional disarmament, or on the item dealing with South Africa's nuclear capability. The session also witnessed a considerable difference of views on the naval arms race item. In general, the 1986 session was a positive one and it is hoped that this spirit will carry over into the 1987 session.

Ad Hoc Committees and Bodies

Committees which function under a mandate from the General Assembly and in which Canada plays an active, or monitoring, role include:

- (1) *Ad hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean.* This committee meets from four to six weeks per year to deal with preparatory work relating to the convening of an international conference which would be concerned with the



The Secretary of State for External Affairs meeting with UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar. In his statement to the 40th General Assembly, Mr. Clark renewed the commitment that successive Canadian governments have made to the United Nations since its creation in 1945.

UN photo 164239/Y. Nagata

implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Canada is one of the 11 Western members of this 48-nation committee.

(2) *Ad hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference.* This committee meets from four to six weeks a year and is charged with maintaining close contact with the nuclear weapon states in order that the committee be made aware of their opinions regarding the holding of a World Disarmament Conference.

(3) *World Disarmament Campaign Pledging Conference.* The World Disarmament Campaign (WDC) was launched in 1982 by unanimous decision of the Second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II). It has three primary purposes: to inform, to educate, and to generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the United Nations in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. At the Third WDC Pledging Conference on October 31, 1985, Canada announced its third contribution of \$100 000 to the objectives of the WDC — which makes Canada one of the leading contributors to the Campaign. Our contributions have

supported the publication of the United Nations Disarmament Yearbook and other UN information material as well as research activities undertaken by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The 1985 contribution also included \$10 000 for the International Year of Peace Voluntary Trust Fund.

(4) *Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development.* This committee met for two weeks in 1985 and for four weeks in 1986. The main items to be discussed at the conference itself will be:

(a) Review of the relationship between disarmament and development in all its aspects and dimensions with a view to reaching appropriate conclusions.

(b) Examination of the implications of the level and magnitude of the continuing military expenditures, in particular those of the nuclear weapon states, for the world economy and the international economic and social situation, particularly for developing countries, and elaboration of appropriate recommendations for remedial measures.

(c) Consideration of ways and means of releasing additional resources through disarmament measures, for development purposes, in particular in favour of developing countries.

This conference was originally to be held in Paris from July 15 to August 2, 1986. However, the French Government, as host, expressed the wish that it be postponed until 1987 so that better preparation could be guaranteed and the chances of success improved.

(For further information on the conference, see the article on this subject in this issue of the *Disarmament Bulletin*.)

Study Groups

From time to time the General Assembly calls for studies to be carried out on ACD items. Some studies recently completed or in progress are:

- Naval Arms Race
- Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
- Reduction of Military Budgets
- Deterrence
- Conventional Disarmament
- Military Research and Development
- Unilateral Nuclear Disarmament Matters
- Relationship Between Disarmament and Development

During the period 1979-1984, Canada participated in four UN study groups.

Summary

Canada's role in the arms control process at the United Nations is a significant one. Canada is recognized as having an important role to play in the discussion of these questions and is making a practical contribution to the activities of the UN in this field. In addition, through its chairmanship of the Barton Group (composed of UN representatives of the NATO countries, Australia, Ireland, Japan and New Zealand), named after the former Canadian Ambassador to the UN, Mr. William Barton, Canada is able to facilitate active discussion and exchanges of opinion on arms control and disarmament issues within the UN context.

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A review of national and international disarmament and arms control activities

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The *Disarmament Bulletin* is published periodically by the Department of External Affairs. It is intended to be a source of information on arms control and disarmament issues to a broad spectrum of Canadians. If you wish to be placed on our mailing list, or need additional copies, please write to: The Editor, *The Disarmament Bulletin*, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Dept. of External Affairs, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G2.

Cette publication existe également en français.

Canada Believes Hopes for Progress in East-West Relations Strengthened by Reykjavik Summit

On October 21, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, addressed the House of Commons on the subject of the US-USSR Summit Meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland. Following is the text of his address.



Mr. Clark addressing the House of Commons.

"Over our Thanksgiving weekend, the eyes of the world were focused on Reykjavik. There, the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union met to reinvigorate the summit process begun last year in Geneva and to narrow some of the many differences which divide them. Their goal was to give the process impetus, and they succeeded.

Arms control and security are the central international issues of our time and the manner of their resolution will shape the global outlook for decades to come.

It is still too early to provide a final assessment of this latest meeting. The task now in Washington and in Moscow is to ensure that the progress which appears to have been made is not wasted. All governments share in this responsibility and we in Canada must do our part.

Today, as a contribution to our own discussion and debate within this House, and in the country at large, I would like to make some brief observations about the nature of the Reykjavik meeting in the broad context of East-West relations.

First, it would be well to remember that Reykjavik was but one staging point in the difficult and unending process of managing the relations between East and West. During the meeting, both

sides moved more than anyone had thought possible. Immediately after the meeting, both sides reflected their disappointment that the breakthrough that was so close did not occur. Now reflecting on that progress, both sides agree that the proposals made in Iceland are still on the table and in negotiation.

This process of building East-West relations has been proceeding with renewed intensity since January 1985. Reykjavik was designed not to conclude new agreements but to lay the ground for them. Whether history will judge it a success depends entirely on the use that is made of the progress in Iceland.

The most notable aspect of the Reykjavik meeting is the extent to which the sides were able to reach understandings on the whole range of nuclear weapons and testing. They agreed provisionally to reduce by 50 per cent within five years



the main components of their strategic nuclear arsenals — land-based missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers. At one point in their discussion, they also agreed to eliminate ballistic missiles completely in ten years.

On intermediate-range nuclear weapons, there was similar provisional agreement on their complete elimination from Europe within five years, with the USSR and USA each retaining only 100 warheads in Soviet Asia and the continental USA respectively. The USA and Soviet Union also agreed on the need to negotiate reductions in short-range nuclear arsenals.

There was mutual acceptance of a step-by-step process for reducing nuclear tests, leading eventually to a complete cessation of tests once nuclear weapons had been abolished. There was a broad convergence of view on the verification procedures to be applied to the various measures.

The fact that such detailed discussions occurred and resulted in such wide-ranging tentative agreement attests to the seriousness and dedication with which the two sides have been approaching their task. The main significance lies in the demonstration that major, negotiated reductions in nuclear arsenals need not be an impossible dream.

At Reykjavik three lessons were reinforced. The first two are: both sides are serious; and arms control is possible. But the third lesson is that arms control will not come easily. It is a deliberate and difficult process.

The more sobering element of reality as it has emerged from Reykjavik lies in the fact that the two sides remain far apart in their views on the future role of strategic defences. This is not a question of saying yes or no to the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) but of finding a way of managing the research on defensive weapons in which both sides are engaged.

A key issue between the two governments is whether research is limited to

the laboratory under the existing Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. That is a treaty with two signing parties — the United States and the Soviet Union. Its text does not refer directly to research, although the private negotiating record of either side may mention research. The agreement on what precisely is intended in that treaty is for these two governments who are the parties to the agreement to work out.

It is important to note that this is a different issue from the debate we have seen in recent months over what is allowed by agreed statement 'D' of the ABM treaty referring to ABM systems based on other physical principles. Our interest is to ensure strict adherence to that treaty, and continued respect by both sides for the integrity of this fundamental arms control agreement.

The situation today in no way represents a step backward from the situation as it existed prior to the Reykjavik meeting. Technological, political and legal uncertainties and disagreements have always characterized the debate on strategic defence. Even in this area, however, there has in our judgement been some movement towards better mutual understanding, in that the legitimacy of research related to strategic defence is now accepted by both

sides. In a treaty that refers explicitly only to 'development, testing and deployment,' the issue has become, in effect, what are the limits on permissible research?

Mr. Speaker, we ought not to allow ourselves to focus exclusively on nuclear and strategic arms questions as if they constituted the totality of East-West relations. True, these issues have inescapably become the central element of this relationship, but they should not be seen in isolation from the broader context. There are other areas of arms control, most notably in relation to chemical weapons, where there is ground for cautious optimism. Further, we understand that on human rights questions and on a range of bilateral matters, progress continues to be made. Mr. Speaker, I should add that I was encouraged by my own talks on human rights with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, when he visited Ottawa. Our discussion was frank and more open than I believe has been the case before. Canada believes progress here and on regional issues is essential to enable us to establish trust in each other's intentions. This process of building trust is far from finished.

Peace and security require patience and persistence. Emotional swings be-



US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev meeting across the table, with only their interpreters present, during Reykjavik Summit. Canapress



tween exaggerated expectations and gloomy foreboding do not facilitate the necessarily careful and painstaking way in which difficult policy choices must be tackled.

As both the Prime Minister and I have made clear, the USA and USSR have made remarkable progress on the central arms control and disarmament issues over the past months. They are still seriously engaged in the task of seeking compromise on remaining areas of disagreement.

We are encouraged by the public undertakings of both the President and the General Secretary to build on the progress which was achieved at Reykjavik. The resumption last Wednesday in Geneva of the nuclear and space negotiations can only be regarded as more good news.

The superpowers have succeeded in bringing a major arms control agreement tantalizingly close.

We can't stop here. We must move ahead. Arms control is a fragile process. Its environment must be protected. It is therefore doubly important that all actions be resisted which might be seen as weakening or unravelling the existing international framework on which East-West relations and arms control are built.

Much attention has been focused on SDI and the ABM treaty. The Geneva negotiations will need to resolve the differences that continue to exist here. Progress in other areas should not be held hostage to the resolution of these difficulties. Our European allies are especially concerned with intermediate nuclear forces. Canada would like to see an agreement in this area as well as in the area of strategic weapons, which threaten us directly.

Canada believes firmly in the value of the confidential negotiating forum. It is, in the end, irreplaceable. But it can be aided through techniques such as special envoys and, as we have just seen, by summits. We would urge both superpowers to continue to use all these techniques, and not rely on negotiating in public.

If a summit in Washington this fall is now unlikely, setting a date for early next year could help maintain the impetus of the process.

Canada is involved in East-West relations as a member of the NATO Alliance. That Alliance is the foundation of our security. What happens at the negotiating table between the USSR and the USA has a direct bearing on our own security. We are at the same time a nation dedicated to peace. Canadians have always worked for peace and international understanding. We have not, and will not, hesitate to make our views known: publicly when that is appropriate, privately on a permanent basis.

But Canada's role is not simply to give advice. Many of the persisting obstacles to negotiating progress arise directly from a lack of trust. The priority attention Canada has given to verification issues in particular attacks this question directly. Arms control agreements alone do not produce security; confidence in compliance produces security. Verification justifies that confidence. Such an approach enhances the credibility of our counsel.

Canada's participation as a Western country in the process of building East-West relations will continue. The visits to Canada in the last month of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and the Czechoslovak Prime Minister were part of this process. And early next month I will travel to Vienna for the opening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Follow-Up Meeting which deals with East-West relations from the human rights, security, economic and human contact dimensions. It provides us with another opportunity to move the process ahead in an integrated comprehensive manner.

Our hopes for real progress in East-West relations were strengthened by the developments at Reykjavik. Canada has been in touch with both sides, before and since the meeting in Iceland. We will continue to use all our resources to help the United States and the Soviet Union build on what they began."

Canada Views USA Decision on SALT II with Serious Concern

On November 28, the Department of External Affairs issued the following statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark.

"The United States took action today that places the number of US strategic nuclear delivery vehicles in excess of a specific limit of the SALT II agreement. President Reagan had announced last May that the USA would no longer be bound by the unratified SALT II agreement and would no longer, as it proceeded with its modernization programme, dismantle older systems to stay within SALT II limits.

The Government viewed with serious concern the Administration's announced intention in the spring and deplores the implementation of that decision today. Our views have repeatedly been conveyed to the US Administration. We have most recently made our case in a letter from the Prime Minister to the President this week, and in my discussions with Secretary of State George Shultz last week. The Government recognizes that SALT II is not a perfect agreement and acknowledges that the USSR has not satisfactorily responded to charges of its own non-compliance with provisions of SALT II. At the same time, we believe that even an imperfect regime of restraint on the strategic arms race is better than no restraint at all. We have taken note of stated US intentions to exercise restraint and not to exceed the levels of Soviet strategic delivery vehicles. I call on both sides to exercise restraint.

Our hope remains that the USA and USSR will agree, in the Geneva negotiations, on a new arms control accord that will radically reduce, and not merely put a cap on, the level of their strategic arsenals. Until such an accord is attained, however, we consider the interests of nuclear arms control and strategic stability are best served by both the USA and USSR continuing to abide by the provisions of the SALT II agreement."

SSEA Outlines Canadian Arms Control Priorities to United Nations General Assembly

On September 24, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, addressed the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. Following is an excerpt from that address.

"In this International Year of Peace, we will be judged more than usual by our achievements in arms control and disarmament. All members of the international community will join Canada in applauding the new dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. President Reagan has told us of letters he has exchanged with General Secretary Gorbachev containing new arms control proposals. We welcome this direct open engagement of the two leaders in the negotiating process. The talks last weekend between US Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze have also contributed to an improved atmosphere in superpower relations. We can all hope this will lead to progress at the nuclear arms control and space negotiations which the two superpowers have reconvened in Geneva. We are encouraged by recent signs of flexibility in the positions of both sides in their efforts to achieve the agreed goal of radical reductions in nuclear weapons — reductions which will strengthen the strategic balance and improve international security.

The current focus of attention on nuclear arms reductions should not, however, detract from the necessity of similar progress in the field of conventional arms control. The results of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe have also added to the sense of momentum towards greater security and cooperation in East-West relations. Stockholm represents the signal accomplishment of bringing new openness and predictability to the conduct of military affairs in Europe. The establishment of agreed procedures for



Mr. Clark addressing the United Nations General Assembly on September 24.

air and ground on-site inspections is a landmark achievement which could serve as a productive precedent for other arms control negotiations. Canada, with our record of promoting constructive verification solutions, derives special satisfaction from having contributed to this outcome. It should facilitate the movement to the negotiation of more extensive measures of military restraint and reductions.

These signs of hope should spur the UN to tackle the broad range of important arms control questions before it. Progress on one issue can unlock progress on others.

Canada will strive for a ban on chemical weapons. We will continue to work to ensure that outer space is developed for peaceful purposes. We will be seeking to play an active role in strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Canada will again be supporting a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This is a fundamental goal and one towards which concrete steps can and should be

taken now. Canada welcomes President Reagan's undertaking that the USA is prepared first to move forward on ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions and then to take subsequent measures to further limit and ultimately end nuclear testing.

We urge all nations to cooperate and indeed participate in the development of the verification techniques needed to provide the confidence necessary to ratify these agreements, and which will enable us to plan the subsequent steps which we must take in all areas of arms control. For verification is not just a question of technical capacity but of the political will to reach agreement on the application of technologies and techniques.

In this spirit and in cooperation with others, Canada will continue to work vigorously towards real progress on verification...."



Canadian Negotiator Describes Stockholm Conference Agreement as 'Immensely Important for Canada, its Allies and Whole of Europe'

The following article was written by Mr. Tom Delworth. Mr. Delworth was Head of the Canadian delegation to the Stockholm Conference.

Working against time in the negotiation of the last minute details, the Stockholm Conference came to an end on September 22, presenting to the world a remarkable document on confidence- and security-building in Europe. Impressed by the imaginative and in many respects pioneering features of the Stockholm outcome, the international media reported that a page of history had just been written in Stockholm. That is probably true, but only history will show whether that particular page represents the beginning of a new chapter or whether it will be just another page in the old.

Metaphors aside, the outcome of the three-year negotiation which began with a Preparatory Conference meeting in Helsinki in October 1983, leading on to the main Conference's beginning in Stockholm in January 1984, is immensely important for Canada and for Canada's Allies, and indeed for the whole of Europe. The reasons for this importance are not however as widely understood and appreciated as they deserve to be.

The balance sheet reflected in the Stockholm Document is positive, indeed surprisingly so when it is recalled that the Conference began its work in the very inauspicious circumstances of late 1983. It can be argued that the Stockholm Conference was in itself a kind of confidence-building measure in that it both contributed to a better East-West atmosphere while benefitting in turn from the process of improvement.

The concept of confidence-building measures is not new. In one way or another this notion has appeared in a number of international negotiations and agreements, most notably the Helsinki

Final Act of 1975. What is new from Stockholm is, in the first instance, the detailed development of the very general confidence-building measures outlined in the Helsinki Final Act and making such activities mandatory rather than optional: Stockholm changed the verb from "may" to "will." In other words the Stockholm outcome is marked by a very significant and detailed elaboration of confidence-building measures, and of the ways in which they are to be implemented. But above all, there are two features of the Stockholm Document which can be regarded as little short of revolutionary. In the first place, the zone of application for the detailed confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) runs from the Atlantic right up to the Urals in the heart of the Soviet Union, which means that a much larger and more significant part of the Soviet Union's territory will be subject to the operation of CSBMs. More

than that, the Stockholm Document prescribes a regime of on-site inspection as a means of verification which obliges participating states within the zone of application to open their territory for inspection on demand and without the right of refusal. The implications of these two factors combined give grounds for hope that progress *can* be made in abandoning the rigid positions of the past in moving towards more cooperative attitudes and activities in matters of security.

It has been argued that the West's basic objective at Stockholm was to reduce the automatic secrecy barricades that have traditionally marked the Soviet Union's approach to confidence-building; put in other terms, this means that any measure or measures that would lower the threshold of suspicion and mistrust would, if carefully managed, nourish a healthier atmosphere of confidence and trust within the network of military inter-relationships within Europe. Western negotiators at the Conference again and again demanded the "de-mystification of military affairs," which is a shorthand way of saying that the West was urging



Mr. Tom Delworth (left), Head of the Canadian delegation to the Stockholm Conference, exchanging views with Mr. James H. Taylor (right), Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, during Mr. Taylor's visit to the Stockholm Conference in June 1986. In second row are Mr. Chris Anstis (left), Deputy Head of delegation, and Col. C. Namiesniowski (right), Military Advisor. In third row is Mr. Robert Vanier (left), Delegation Secretary.

Pressens Bild/Rolf Hamilton

the Soviet Union to adopt a more open attitude to many aspects of military information; such information should be regarded as a more matter-of-fact, straightforward, everyday area of interest rather than as an emanation of highly sensitive national policy.

From the beginning of the Conference there were two very different conceptions evident in the approaches adopted by the West and the East. The Soviet Union and its allies attempted to promote what might be called a declaratory conception of security, favouring high-level governmental statements and declarations outlining certain goals and prescribing certain forms of activity, but in terms that would be neither specific nor verifiable. For its part, the West (and this view was very largely shared by the Neutral and Non-Aligned group of nations) argued that confidence and trust must be built rather than declared; openness in military affairs, the West contended, would only come about as a consequence of specific cooperative actions undertaken by all participating states together or in smaller groups. Thus, in the very early days of the Conference, the Alliance presented a package of concrete measures which dealt in specific terms with the modalities for such activities as notification, observation and verification, among others. It is this action-oriented rather than declaration-oriented approach that is so clearly reflected in the Stockholm negotiation's outcome.

Any negotiation represents, of course, a bargain between two or more partners, and it is wise to bear this in mind in looking at the Stockholm results.

Despite the presentation of proposals for measures of an essentially declaratory nature, the Soviets and their allies entered into the Stockholm negotiations quite probably with very minimal specific demands. From the collection of declaratory proposals proposed by Eastern negotiators in the early stages of the Conference, only one found expression in the final outcome. This was the principle of the non-use of force. In actual fact, the section on the non-use of force in the Stockholm Docu-

ment is a very long way from the treaty which the East had originally proposed and which it will probably continue to put forward in other forums in the future. Some contend that the inclusion of this section in the Stockholm Document gives a semblance of legitimacy to the East's political and declaratory approach to security. Even if this is minimally true, it should be borne in mind that the non-use of force principle is a central feature of the West's view of international relations, and that the language in the Stockholm Document is Western rather than Eastern in spirit and in manner of presentation. It is clear beyond doubt that no governmental decisions will be taken nor policies adopted on the basis of this non-use of force text which are not consistent with Western interests as a whole.

Rather than winning general acceptance for their specific ideas — which they almost certainly knew would not be the case — what the Soviets and their allies were seeking at Stockholm was a move towards the establishment, on a more or less regular basis, of a forum for the constant or at least regular review of the security situation in Europe in a way that would give the Soviet Union a major voice. The establishment of an essentially political rather than military pan-European security conference has been a long-standing objective of Soviet foreign policy. Whether this goal will be fully satisfied in the future remains to be seen, but clearly it would have been impossible for Moscow even to seek to pursue it further if the Stockholm Conference had resulted in a failure or an outcome which had not been consistent with Western interests or demands.

For their part, the Allies achieved much substantive satisfaction at Stockholm; the Stockholm Document is an immensely detailed prescription for concrete activities and measures aimed at promoting confidence and greater security as an essential first step towards more stringent arms control and even eventual reductions. The Stockholm result comes close in very many respects to the initial package of measures the West tabled in January

1984 and the result could, if the measures are honestly implemented, induce more openness and predictability in military activities in Europe. This could in turn help to reduce one advantage that the East has traditionally enjoyed: secrecy. The problem of asymmetry has bedevilled almost all arms control, disarmament and security negotiations since World War II. Information that is readily accessible in the media in the West is generally regarded as highly classified in Eastern Europe. The programme of activities agreed to at Stockholm should go some distance towards reducing this asymmetry even though it may not eliminate it.

But this is only a first step towards a larger and more important objective. In all realism it must be noted that while an atmosphere of confidence is an absolutely necessary prerequisite for arms control, the results of Stockholm *per se* will hardly affect other advantages enjoyed by the East: more troops and more tanks, the advantages of geography and a military doctrine based on the concept of offence.

In assessing the basic components of the Stockholm Document and the balance of advantages inherent in the outcome, it must be emphasized that the whole complex bargain exists at the moment on paper; the ultimate success or failure of the negotiation will depend on how scrupulously the measures themselves are implemented — and this is a process that will take time.

Two questions come to mind immediately: how will the East's implementation of these undertakings be monitored, and, on the other side of the same coin, how will we ourselves in the West organize our own implementation activities? We, like the East, have undertaken some biting new commitments. If the process of confidence-building is recognized as a mutual and reciprocal one, it will be important that we establish a high level of credibility in our willingness to implement the Stockholm provisions accurately. At the same time, the conclusion cannot be avoided that it will be a much more exacting task to monitor the East's implementation of the



Stockholm Document's provisions than their compliance with the more minimal and permissive provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.

In whatever we in the West do, it will be important to remind ourselves continually that the essential value of the Stockholm Document lies in its collective political commitment to achieve a high degree of confidence and trust in our collective interrelationships and that it is not in any real sense a new means of information gathering.

In this connection, on-site inspection as a means of verification is of course a special case. It would be a gross mistake for any party to abuse the as yet frail and nascent inspection regime by asking for an exorbitant number of inspections or in any other way placing excessive demands on this new system. Verification activities must be reliable, accurate and credible, but they must also be realistic in their defining of objectives.

It will also be necessary to be mindful of the interests of many of the members of the Neutral and Non-Aligned group, who, like the members of the two military alliances, have essential security interests at stake in the way in which the results of the Stockholm Conference are implemented.

From a Western point of view, and indeed more specifically from a Canadian point of view, the positive outcome of the Stockholm negotiation was in very large part attributable to the effective coordination of effort between and among the NATO allies — not at the expense of others but in consultation with them, and in measured, unpolemical negotiation. This lesson should stand us in good stead for the challenges of the future.

Because Stockholm was only a beginning.

The Military Implications of the Stockholm Document and its Application to the Canadian Armed Forces

The following article was written by Colonel C.A. Namiesniowski of the Department of National Defence. Colonel Namiesniowski was Military Advisor to the Canadian delegation at the Stockholm Conference.

It is difficult to draw a clear line in arms control negotiations between political and military issues. The recently completed Stockholm Conference is no exception. Stockholm dealt with military issues which have the potential to attenuate the degree of mistrust which exists in Europe and pave the way for a future political and strategic order in Europe. While this may well be a logical extrapolation of the Stockholm success, realists seek a more practical result in hoping for full compliance with the newly agreed Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) by all participating states which by establishing normal patterns of military activities would exert pressure for stability in Europe. The latter perception is defensible on the basis of "balance and reciprocity"¹ and would not place at risk the security of any state.

Stockholm produced five militarily significant CSBMs, all of which are obligatory. They include measures of notification, observation, an annual calendar, constraining provisions and compliance and verification. These CSBMs are politically binding, apply to the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals as well as the adjoining sea area and air space, and involve 35 participating states — Canada, the USA and all the states of Europe except Albania. The measures are designed to clarify intentions and improve transparency of military activities. The agreement comes into effect on January 1, 1987.

The detailed features of the individual measures are as follows:

Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities

The threshold for the notification of certain military activities is 13 000 troops or 300 battle tanks (having armament of 90 mm or more). Notification will be given in writing, in an agreed format, to all other participating states at least 42 days in advance of any of the following military activities when the threshold is met or exceeded:

1. Land forces engaged in the same exercise activity under a single operational command, independently or in combination with any possible air or naval component;
2. Information on participation of air forces in the land activity will be included if it is visualized that 200 or more air sorties will be flown by fixed-wing aircraft in support of the land force activity;
3. Amphibious landings or parachute drops if they involve 3 000 or more troops will be notified separately;
4. Transfers of troops at notifiable thresholds from outside the zone into the zone or within the zone will be notified if they engage in one of the military activities described above. Concentrations of transferred troops to participate in a notifiable activity or to be concentrated at agreed thresholds or above will also be notified.
5. Alert activities, while an exception to prior notification, will nevertheless be notified at the time the troops involved commence such activities above the agreed thresholds.

Observation of Certain Military Activities

An improved and mandatory observation regime for all notifiable military activities has been agreed at a separate threshold of 17 000 troops. There is also a separate, lower, observation threshold of 5 000 for amphibious landing or parachute assault.

¹ Madrid Mandate, September 6, 1983.

The observation measure requires that two observers be invited from each participating state. While observers will be guided, the inviting state is obliged to provide general detail on the observation programme in the invitation and provision exists for the invited state to make requests with regard to the observation programme. There is an obligation also that the inviting state will provide daily briefings on the general situation of the activity being observed with the help of maps including geographic orientation. The mandatory nature of observation and the comprehensiveness of observation modalities which have been agreed have moved this measure substantially beyond any previous measure such as that contained in the Helsinki Final Act. It is in fact virtually a new measure.

Annual Calendars

A completely new idea in confidence-building is an exchange by November 15 of the preceding year of annual calendars containing a forecast of notifiable military activities for the next year. As required in the prior notification measure, although in less detail, information will be provided in an agreed form. Subsequent detailed prior notification 42 days in advance of an activity already forecast in the annual calendar will serve as confirmation of the calendar forecast and will contribute to the perception of the routine nature of the activity.

Constraining Provisions

As part of the information provided in the annual calendar, a constraining provision has been agreed which requires a participating state to notify in writing all other participating states two years in advance of its intention to conduct a notifiable military activity above a threshold of 40 000 troops. Participating states are enjoined not to carry out notifiable military activities involving more than 40 000 troops unless they have been included in the annual calendar not later than November 15 each year. States were further urged that if military activities subject to prior notification are carried out in addition to those contained in the calendar they should be as few as possible. Again this is a new measure.

Compliance and Verification

A verification package has been agreed which incorporates a challenge on-site inspection provision with no right of refusal. It provides for on-site inspection to be carried out on the ground, from the air or both if the state believes that the provisions of agreed CSBMs are not being complied with. A request for inspection must be answered in 24 hours or less and an inspection can commence 36 hours after the request is given. The inspection will be completed in 48 hours. Four inspectors comprise

the provisions of the Stockholm Document, the principle of on-site inspection has wider application and has the greatest potential to advance the concept of "openness" in the conduct of military affairs.

While inspection requests cannot be refused or prevented through the use of restricted areas, national sensitive points and other restricted, military defence installations, including certain equipment, will not be subject to inspection. Further, an undertaking exists that the extent of



The Stockholm Document provides for prior notification of certain military activities.

Canadian Forces Photo

an inspection team. The measure provides that no state is obliged to accept more than three inspections per calendar year on its territory within the zone of application for CSBMs and no state is compelled to accept more than one inspection per calendar year from the same participating state. The on-site inspection measure is considered a breakthrough in an area where hitherto there has been an impasse; of course, it still remains to be tried. While the application will be specifically directed to

restricted areas should be as limited as possible and areas where notifiable military activity can take place will not be declared restricted.

The measure requires that the inspecting state will provide the receiving state with information *inter alia* on the reasons for the request, the location of the area, preferred points of entry, whether inspection will be from the ground, from the air or both simultaneously, whether a fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter or both will



be used, etc. Vehicles and aircraft for inspection will be chosen by mutual agreement. Flight planning is the responsibility of the inspecting state which is also responsible for filing the flight plan with the competent air traffic authority of the inspected state. Provision exists for deviation from the approved flight plan under certain conditions and, in cases when the inspected state provides the aircraft, one member of the inspection team may observe data on the navigational equipment of the aircraft and have access to maps and charts used by the flight crew.

Implications for Canada

The direct impact for Canadian Forces stationed in or transferred to Europe under national command would be small because normally, Canadian peacetime military activity is conducted well below agreed thresholds required for notification and observation. Notwithstanding, participation in multinational exercises which could reach notification and observation thresholds will require the Canadian Forces to provide the same detailed information as called for by the Stockholm Document. Therefore, no matter how small or seemingly insignificant the Canadian military activity might be, allied countries on whose territories Canadian troops are exercising will have to be sent the same accurate detail as found in the annual calendars and prior notification in time for them to advise all other participating states if agreed thresholds are met.

An example of the type of information required for the calendar submission includes *inter alia* such information as: the type of military activity and its designation, the general characteristics and purpose, area of activity defined by geographic features and/or geographic coordinates, planned duration and start date, numbers and types of forces engaged and level of command.

The format for the content of prior notification is much more comprehensive and consists of 48 separate pieces of information which are divided into four section headings: general information; information on different types of notifiable military activities; the envisaged area and time frame of the

activity; and other information. It includes *inter alia* details on various equipment numbers, area and nature of the activity as well as firm timings.

Canadian military staffs, therefore, will have to provide this information in time to allied states concerned for them to include Canadian data in the submission of annual calendars and prior notification, if cumulative totals and all other conditions have been met. This will require both forward planning and coordination.

At present observation thresholds, it is unlikely that Canada will have to invite observers to national exercises. It is to be expected, however, that we would be subject to any observer programme for a multinational exercise conducted at or above the agreed threshold which included Canadian participation. Canada also has an obligation in the spirit of the Stockholm Document to respond to invitations to observe notifiable activities of other participating states; therefore all the agreed observation modalities are equally applicable to Canada, both as an observing and observed nation, which will require an allocation of resources to meet this obligation.

Like all other participating states, Canada could be included in a challenge on-site inspection while on the territory of an allied state located in the zone of application. Moreover, like all other participating states, Canada has the right to conduct challenge on-site inspections in accordance with the provisions of the compliance and verification measure. This will require the development of adequate arrangements to ensure that the provision of this measure can be met at short notice with the necessary manpower and equipment.

In summary, notwithstanding that by herself Canada is not likely to trigger any of the agreed thresholds, she will, nevertheless, have to observe all the provisions of the Stockholm Document. This obligation will require the Canadian Forces to provide timely detail for annual calendars and prior notification of certain military activities in the agreed format and to comply with the observation and verification provisions.

'Arms Control and Disarmament and Defence' Theme of Consultative Group Meeting

The following executive summary of the October 2-4 meeting of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs was prepared by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament as part of a contract with the Department of External Affairs. Copies of the full report prepared by the Centre are available by writing to the Editor.

The Consultative Group meeting was held under the Chairmanship of the Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, whose responsibilities include representing Canada in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

Canada's Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Perrin Beatty, addressed the opening session of the meeting on October 2. (The full text of his statement follows the executive summary.) Mr. Beatty's address was responded to by a panel that included Professor Albert Legault of Laval University and Ernie Regehr, Research Director of Project Ploughshares. Other speakers at the meeting were Professor Cynthia Cannizzo of the University of Calgary, Professor Douglas Ross of the University of British Columbia and Mr. Robert Reford, President of the United Nations Association in Canada.

The Consultative Group was created in 1979 in response to the recommendation of the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978. It meets periodically with the Ambassador for Disarmament and with officials of



the Department of External Affairs and other interested Departments to exchange views on matters of mutual interest relevant to Canada's policies on disarmament and arms control. The next meeting of the full Consultative Group will take place in October 1987.

"On October 2-4, 1986, the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs met in Ottawa to discuss the interrelationship of arms control and disarmament and defence and, in particular, to explore opportunities for Canada to enhance Canadian and international security through the improved coordination of these objectives. This theme, developed by the Consultative Group's Steering Committee, responded both to an expressed desire within the Consultative Group to examine the interrelationship between arms control and defence matters — especially in the bilateral Canada-US context — and to the view expressed in the report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations that: 'arms control and disarmament policy, on the one hand, and defence policy, on the other, should move in tandem.'

Approximately 50 individuals, representing a wide range of organizations and perspectives, took part in the meeting, along with some 20 government officials.

The Group looked at the interrelationship of arms control and disarmament and defence for Canada in three contexts: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD), and the United Nations (UN).

Many participants felt that membership in NATO facilitates the pursuit of Canadian arms control objectives, although others discerned tension between Canada's alliance role and its arms control efforts. The Group was divided over the issue of whether or not Canada should increase spending on its NATO



Mr. Douglas Roche, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament. Mr. Roche is Chairman of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs.

contribution as a means of enhancing its influence on arms control issues and of protecting Canadian sovereignty, especially in the North.

Considerable interest was expressed in alternatives to the present structure of NORAD. A proposal to make NORAD a NATO command received strong support. The Group also evinced appreciable interest in establishing a Canadian air defence and early warning system, although there was some concern about the costs involved. It was noted that the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) is likely to have implications for NORAD that Canada should be prepared to deal with.

Many participants felt that Canada should continue to play a strong and active role in the fora for arms control and disarmament provided by the UN. There were, however, many suggestions for reform at the UN.

The Group strongly urged the Canadian government to continue its distinguished efforts to achieve a com-

prehensive test ban (CTB). Many participants felt that a step-by-step approach is the most useful route to a CTB and, in this context, there was considerable (although by no means unanimous) feeling that the government should encourage a positive American response to the Soviet testing moratorium.

Many participants suggested that, as a Pacific country, Canada should pay more attention to defence and arms control matters in that region. The proposal that Canada encourage regionally-based restrictions on the production and distribution of conventional arms also received support.

The meeting included a special session dealing with the subject of public education on global security which featured a presentation by Mr. Roger Mollander, President of the Roosevelt Centre in Washington, D.C. Mr. Mollander suggested that, in grappling with contemporary problems of global security, it is useful to keep in mind long-term objectives. In addition, by taking a longer view, people can avoid the contention that characterizes much of the current debate on short-term problems and arrive at some agreement on a common goal. This, as a consequence, will make the near-term issues more susceptible to solution. There was considerable interest in Mr. Mollander's suggestion that simulation games can be useful tools in public education on nuclear issues.

In the opinion of most participants, this meeting of the Consultative Group had been a worthwhile endeavour and had gone farther than previous meetings in reconciling the tensions between the strategic studies community and the peace and disarmament community. Suggestions that the focus of future Consultative Group meetings be more specific and that the size of discussion groups be decreased received appreciable support. Several substantive issues for future consideration by the Consultative Group were proposed."



National Defence and Arms Control: Canadian Priorities that Share a Common Logic and a Similar Purpose

On October 2, the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Perrin Beatty, addressed the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs on the theme of "The Interrelationship between Arms Control and Disarmament and Defence." Following is the text of his address.

"I have been Minister of National Defence for only three months. In that time, I have been very much aware of the task ahead as I prepare to put before Cabinet guideposts for the direction which Canadian defence policy should take in the years ahead.

Your group provides an important forum and I am happy to have this opportunity to outline my thinking on the relationship between arms control and defence. I regret that my schedule will not permit me to stay with you for the remainder of the afternoon but Bob Fowler and his team will stay and I will look forward to hearing your views from him. I am committed to consulting widely before introducing a White Paper and my office will be seeking further opportunities for us to exchange views on major defence and security policy issues.

The report of the Special Joint Committee last June recommended that the Government should engage the public in a continuing dialogue on security policy, beginning by making public its own views and the arguments behind them. I wholeheartedly agree and can think of no more important body with which to take up that dialogue than the Consultative Group.

For many Canadians, the fading memories of global conflict instill a sense that great wars are the stuff of history, of ancestral achievement and sacrifice. We learn to approach war as we would other subjects in a curriculum, and the study of conflict assumes its place on our library shelves, and in our minds, beside chemistry, English literature and engineering.

Our movie screens reflect a different approach. War becomes a subject of celluloid fantasy, taking place in exotic places, conducted by men and women of uncommon courage and beauty. With a few honourable exceptions, the causes of conflict are left unclear, and the effects on individuals and societies drift into the background, too complex, too disturbing, too bothersome to weigh on the minds of the moviemaker or moviegoer.

Perhaps all this is inevitable, a by-product of our 'long nuclear peace,' as *The Economist* magazine recently labelled the post-war period. It is not surprising that, for most Canadians, war is a subject of study or fantasy, since for most it is not within our experience.

But there is, possibly, an additional aspect to this phenomenon. Perhaps our minds have become numbed by the repeated cataloguing of the instruments of war which modern man has invented with such ingenuity.

We have become reluctant voyeurs, fixated by the endless march of technology, and the engineered elegance of ever more discriminating means of destruction.

Yet this is a fascination tinged with dread. For, while conflict is a distant memory for most Canadians, we know that history provides us with few examples of perpetual peace. And we also know that the gleaming weapons which are testimony to the technological genius of man may also be the instruments of his destruction.

Thus, it is not just a lack of familiarity which influences our approach to these questions. It is also fear, not simply of the unknown, but also of the unprecedented. I do not need to tell this group that never before in the history of man has the risk been so great that world conflict could be final and nearly instantaneous in its consequences. This potential for finality leads some to approach the question of security with a clinical —



The Honourable Perrin Beatty, Minister of National Defence.

even cynical — detachment inappropriate to the issues at hand. And it is a very different reaction which leads others to treat the same questions with an emotionalism bereft of logic, to cry in the darkness that reality must change simply because they wish it were different.

But reality does not provide solace to either the logician or the romantic. Nuclear weapons can never be disinvited. There is, however, legitimate concern that current international structures may not be able to prevent their use. Our talent for invention may not be matched by our capacity for control.

We live in a paradox. The very characteristics of nuclear weapons, which have undeniably helped to preserve our long post-war peace, compel us to search for additional mechanisms of control, of confidence-building and cooperation.

Perhaps it is the novelty of this condition and our growing estrangement from the past which causes old lessons to be discarded and new untested insights to occupy their place.



Much of the new wisdom is to be welcomed. It is clear, for example, that the terms 'National Security' and 'Mutual Security' have lost their separate meanings. The search for either at the expense of the other is futile.

Certainly, the old Roman maxim 'if you wish peace, prepare for war' is a far less adequate guide for action than it was in its time. In the nuclear age, something more sophisticated needs to be added, whether it be labelled arms control, disarmament, confidence-building or conflict resolution. As the Prime Minister said before this Group last year, 'the world at large should recognize that arms control is a component of, not a substitute for, a healthy national security policy.'

It is not surprising that people are generally reluctant and slow to recognize the new circumstances. After all, we have given governments the responsibility of protecting our physical well-being. Such responsibility requires neither blithe experimentation nor neglect of the lessons of history. Given the stakes, no one would wish his government to approach security with a gambler's abandon, playing the odds — double or nothing.

In the rush to invent new ways to order our affairs, we must neither turn our backs on the past, nor confuse what we seek to create with what we must learn to control. Proponents of a strong national defence often consider supporters of arms control to be misguided idealists at best, or at worst, the enemy within. Equally, advocates of arms control sometimes regard those who spend and offer their lives to preserve and protect our freedom as hangers-on from another time, yearning for battle and fearful that peace might break out at any moment.

Our country, and indeed our world, cannot afford to perpetuate either of these simplistic fantasies.

Surely, a prudent defence policy must provide a measure of physical protection and order so as to permit the pursuit of additional, and more durable, means of ensuring our security. While change

per se does not require order, predictable, desirable and controllable change certainly does.

You will recall the often brilliant and compelling essays of Jonathan Schell, which first appeared a couple of years ago in *The New Yorker*. He concluded that the only way out of the terrible dilemmas posed by nuclear weapons is the transformation of politics, the creation of a world government which would relieve us of the burden of our own invention.

Some of you may agree with him and perhaps history will judge him correct. But for those who must cope with today's problems, today's challenges and today's world, Mr. Schell's prescription is of little immediate assistance.

The world, for all its interdependence, remains a society of nation states. Each is, at least in part, an expression of its people's wish to be safe and protected in order not simply to survive (or, indeed, prevail) but also to pursue other ends. In some cases, those ends are aggressive and threaten the security and sometimes the very existence of other states. Such threats are not simply the stuff of bad dreams or paranoid personalities. They are real and palpable: the enormous number of tanks and ships and guns and aircraft of the Warsaw Pact exist and cannot be wished away.

Against such threats, those few states which choose not to provide for their own protection must accept the implications and the price of protection supplied by others. Indeed, far from challenging the legitimacy of national defence, the fact that some states choose to abandon their defences is an implicit acknowledgement of the vital importance of the defence efforts and sacrifice of others.

Such a decision presents a moral, and not simply a practical, choice. It is conceivable, for example, that Canada could abandon its efforts at national defence. We face little likelihood of invasion, and certainly none that we could successfully resist by ourselves or which could be viewed with equanimity by the United States.

We also benefit from the protection of others. But does this reality relieve us of doing our fair share to maintain the peace, to provide for our security, to achieve stability and order in the international system, and to preserve social justice and the democratic way of life?

We Canadians must accept the costs, risks and responsibilities which are part and parcel of the security system on which we rely so heavily. Rather than simply exploit the contributions of others, surely we must recognize that security is not a right to be enjoyed, but a status to be earned, involving an obligation to be fulfilled. If our efforts to provide for our own defence are inadequate, others, if only to protect themselves, will assume the task in our stead, and do it in a manner over which we will have little control.

Some Canadians insist that we ought to maintain a prudent national defence, but that Canada should do so in isolation, shunning alliances of our own making. They suggest that we should withdraw from Europe, that we should close our ports to the foreign vessels which guarantee our security, that we should deny our allies the facilities provided by our vast territory and open skies for military training.

Such arguments are most often made in an effort to cleanse Canada of any connection, however remote, with the nuclear deterrent on which we rely, as if ending all such reliance would increase the safety of Canadians or the possibility of our surviving global war. We cannot afford to insulate ourselves from reality; we live in a world where nuclear weapons exist, and we are willing members of an alliance which faces an opponent with vast conventional and nuclear forces so near the East-West divide. We cannot allow ourselves to slip into a false and selfish posture. To do so would affront reality, our own proud heritage, and our friends and allies. Our security will continue to depend for the foreseeable future on the collective strength and the collective influence of our alliances.

Some who argue for military isolationism state that nothing in our alliance



obligations requires us to continue cooperative arrangements. But, while ending such cooperation would not violate the letter of our obligations, it would certainly deeply offend the spirit. I cannot understand a logic which says, on the one hand, that the world is so interdependent and dangerous that we must cooperate in arms control and disarmament, yet asserts, on the other, that Canada should eliminate interdependence and dismantle cooperative arrangements in our national defence.

Surely these activities are two sides of the same coin. Our capacity as a country, and as an alliance, to conduct effective arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and its allies rests on a confidence in our own strength and security, which is in turn based on shared values and true partnership.

It is in these terms that Canada approaches national defence and arms control: not as two solitudes, but as priorities which share a common logic and a similar purpose. Within tight budgetary confines and following a long and sorry period of neglect, we are beginning the slow process of rebuilding our military capability. Not so we may fight wars, but so that we can do our part to ensure that we never have to fight one again.

And to the same end, we are energetically pursuing arms control measures in the various international fora where Canada has a seat at the table. Canada also has a keen interest in the progress of those negotiations at which we are not directly represented, the talks between Washington and Moscow on nuclear and space arms. Both privately and in public, the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and I have each maintained a frank and useful dialogue with our American counterparts. The Soviets too have been kept fully informed of our concerns. These efforts will continue. While we are not the custodians of these weapons, we are the custodians of the aspirations of Canadians and of our children's future.

The time is ripe for progress. The United States is blessed with a strong, vigorous and popular president who has rebuilt

America's strength to the point where significant and mutually beneficial arms control agreements are both possible and desirable. The Soviet leadership, for its part, has shown unprecedented willingness to discard the posturing of the past and put forward serious proposals.

For too many years, arms control posturing has been little more than a cynical element in a campaign to sow dissension within our alliance, to score propaganda points in the battle for Western opinion. It is essential that arms control proposals be practical and responsive to the security concerns of both sides. For too long, the inevitable imperfections of particular proposals have served as an excuse to block progress on all.

Ambassador for Disarmament Delivers Canadian Statement to UN First Committee

Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, made a major address to the United Nations First Committee on October 16, outlining Canada's approach to arms control and disarmament and to the agenda of the Committee, which deals mainly with arms control and international security questions. Following is an excerpt from that statement.

"Last weekend the United States and the Soviet Union brought an historic disarmament agreement tantalizingly close to achievement. Since then, both superpowers have informed the world that they will persist in this effort and build on the progress achieved at Reykjavik. The negotiators have already resumed their meetings in Geneva.

These are the highly significant developments that have produced a renewed atmosphere of hope as the First Committee begins its deliberations. For, as Prime Minister Brian Mulroney told the Canadian Parliament, the elements are in place for an ongoing civilized dialogue at Geneva and, hopefully, one which will result in

As Minister of National Defence, I can assure you that those who are responsible for the security of Canada judge agreed and reliable measures of arms control and disarmament together with our defence efforts to be fundamental to the security of the nation and the mutual security of all. I trust that, for your part, you agree that we have the same goals — and that it is the appropriate balance between defensive measures and arms control and disarmament measures that offers our best hope for a future in which freedom, security and prosperity prevail.

Thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to many more like it in the future."

General Secretary Gorbachev coming to the United States as agreed upon. The Prime Minister added:

'There are stumbling blocks on both sides. That is what negotiations are all about, sitting down with open minds, knowing the objections on both sides and trying to effect an honourable compromise.'

The Canadian Government hopes that people of goodwill will achieve a substantive accord, which could be signed at an early summit. Arms control, however, is a fragile process. Its environment must be protected. It is therefore doubly important that all actions be resisted which might be seen as weakening or unravelling the existing international framework on which East-West relations and arms control are built. Compliance with existing agreements is essential.

It is a reality of our time that the USA and the USSR will determine the major aspects of any international framework for global security. But security is everyone's business. All of us have a stake in international security and all of

us have a responsibility to play a constructive role in the arms control process.

Canada will press on with constructive work in every multilateral forum that, one day, must achieve the basis for a world community freed from the weapons of mass destruction. Iceland showed that the complete elimination of ballistic missiles in ten years is now seriously discussed at the highest levels. The full implementation of this historic opportunity is our task. Iceland was a moment on the journey, but the journey goes on.

When President Reagan addressed the General Assembly before the Reykjavik meeting, he spoke of hope, of a future without weapons of mass destruction. He reaffirmed his country's commitment to peace, to a more stable superpower relationship, and to substantial progress on arms control and disarmament. The President expressed his Government's willingness to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions once agreement is reached on improved verification procedures. He offered to consider other limits on nuclear testing in parallel with arms reductions. It is our hope that the Soviet Union might find it possible to build on this realistic and welcome approach as a firm foundation for real progress.

When Foreign Minister Shevardnadze came to New York earlier in this session, he too gave us reason for optimism. He spoke of relations with the United States as holding promise — of encouraging outlines of meaningful agreements between his country and the United States of America. When we later welcomed him in Ottawa, Mr. Shevardnadze once again repeated his country's commitment to more stable East-West ties, and to progress on arms control.

But in this atmosphere of expectation, two notes of caution are in order: first, any sense of new momentum can only lead to lasting, effective results if it is backed up by patience, quiet negotiation and due attention to adequate verification, which over the long term will assure confidence in compliance.

And second, our hopes and expectations surrounding the superpower talks

and the bilateral nuclear and space negotiations in Geneva, as important as they are, should not be allowed to distract attention from the necessity for complementary progress in conventional and multilateral arms control forums.

* * *

In this context, we are all much encouraged by the successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe. The results of this Conference bring new openness and predictability to the conduct of military affairs in Europe. The establishment of agreed procedures for air and ground on-site inspections is a landmark achievement — one which will provide an effective basis for other arms control negotiations.

More broadly still, the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) has had a relatively productive session. The guidelines for confidence-building measures which the UNDC will report to the General Assembly, like the Stockholm Conference Document, should provide a useful basis for future negotiations. They could be drawn on to ensure those elements of confidence, compliance and verification which will be essential components of all effective arms control agreements.

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has also had a more productive session; if it has still not reached agreement on a global chemical weapons ban, detailed negotiations are intensifying and there have been welcome signs that the Soviet Union is prepared to move forward on verification. We have particularly noted the proposal of the United Kingdom on challenge inspection, which we hope will provide a basis for practical progress on one of the most difficult issues associated with a global chemical weapons ban.

But the sense of positive accomplishment does not extend to other issues on the Conference on Disarmament agenda. We are frankly disappointed that progress on a comprehensive nuclear test ban has been so slow. We were particularly discouraged at the failure to agree on a practical mandate for a sub-

sidary body to work constructively towards an agreed test ban. We note and welcome that the Soviet Union has taken a more forthcoming approach on technical matters relating to the establishment of a global seismic monitoring network. The Australian proposal for an international seismic network is both consistent with Canada's concern for a reliably verifiable test ban, and an encouraging step towards the objective of a comprehensive test ban. Expert-level talks between Soviet and US scientists on nuclear testing are a welcome development — one which all of us hope can provide yet another step towards our common goal.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space is a high priority for Canada. It was thus disappointing that the mandate for the subsidiary body on outer space was agreed so late in the last CD session. Once the mandate was agreed, discussion was both sober and thoughtful. The existing mandate is clearly demonstrating its usefulness.

Canada played an active part in the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons. We are heartened by the Conference Final Declaration — by its strong reaffirmation of the principles of the Convention and its restatement of the common interest all share in strengthening the Convention's authority and effectiveness through promoting confidence and cooperation.

This activity shows that the world community is not indifferent or impotent in building a safer world. There is still much to do in the international arena and Canada pledges, once again, to do everything in our power to strengthen the international machinery of peace. This worldwide activity must reinforce the efforts of the superpowers to find bilateral agreements. Although 86 per cent of the people of the world do not live in the United States or the Soviet Union, we are all caught up in the fallout from this relationship of the two great superpowers who together possess 95 per cent of the more than



50 000 nuclear weapons in the world. Their relationship, as is obvious, affects everyone. It is in the interests of everyone to help improve the entire East-West relationship and, as the UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, said in his acceptance speech last Friday, to 'demand of the governments of states which possess nuclear weapons that they reflect upon their responsibility to their peoples and to the planet itself and pursue policies that will lead to the elimination of these weapons.' It used to be said that history will be the judge of one's actions. But, in what we are discussing here, there will be no history to write in a non-future for human life if the means to destroy the human race, now in the possession of the two superpowers, should ever be unleashed.

The role of the United Nations in disarmament is to construct a viable framework of multilateral progress so as to enhance the prospect of major bilateral agreements. More attention should be paid in this Committee to consensus resolutions with as much substance as possible, rather than merely increasing the number of resolutions. At the 1976 session, there were 23 resolutions, eight of them consensus. Ten years later, in 1985, there were 66 resolutions, 20 by consensus. The growth of non-consensus resolutions, many of which cancel one another and split apart the Committee, is a dubious achievement and a complete puzzlement to the outside world. Let us not forget that the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament, which remains the yardstick by which we measure progress, was a consensus agreement. Important advice has been offered by last year's Chairman, Ambassador Alatas of Indonesia, to form a small working group to attempt rationalization of the Committee's work.

What is needed to reinvigorate the concept of collective security, including arms control, is not a new structure or set of principles; we have a perfectly adequate framework for peace already in place in the form of the UN and its Charter. What needs to be done is to use it effectively...."



First Committee meeting in plenary during its 1986 session.

UN Photo 168935

Canadian-Sponsored Verification Resolution Adopted at United Nations

The Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué on November 14.

"The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, today announced that again this year, a Canadian-sponsored resolution on the role of verification in arms control agreements was adopted by consensus in the United Nations First Committee, which deals with arms control and disarmament and international security questions. The success of the Canadian-initiated resolution follows upon that of 1985, when Canada successfully promoted the first-ever United Nations resolution recognizing the importance of verification of compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements.

Mr. Clark said that the 1986 resolution, entitled 'Verification in all its aspects,' attracted even greater support among UN member states this year, with twice the number of co-sponsors as previously, including representatives from the Western states, Eastern Europe and the neutral and non-aligned nations.

Mr. Clark emphasized that the resolution will give further impetus to the con-

sideration of verification by the United Nations, by referring the subject to the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), a deliberative body that meets annually at the United Nations to consider a limited number of arms control and disarmament items. The UNDC is expected to draw up principles, provisions and techniques to encourage the inclusion of adequate verification provisions in arms control and disarmament agreements, and to consider ways in which United Nations member states may play a larger role in the field.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs noted that Canada's success with the verification resolution is in keeping with the Government's emphasis on the role of verification contained in the Canadian Programme of Action for the remaining half of the Disarmament Decade, which focuses on practical solutions to arms control and disarmament problems. As part of this Programme, the Government provides \$1 million annually to the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs. He said that the verification resolution also reflects the strong support of the international community for Canada's continuing efforts in this critical area."



Canada Pleased with Outcome of First Committee Deliberations at UNGA 41

The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

At the United Nations, subjects relating to arms control and disarmament (ACD) are assigned to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly (UNGA). This is one of seven regularly constituted UNGA committees. The UNGA meets in New York from September to December every year. Since the UNGA is a deliberative rather than a negotiating forum, its principal function with respect to arms control and disarmament is to articulate the views of and convey advice from the community of nations. It does not have the power to compel member states to take specific actions. Nevertheless, the moral weight and public relations value of UNGA resolutions and decisions can often have a significant influence on international behaviour. Notwithstanding that the UNGA in plenary session gives final approval to all resolutions, the substantive consideration takes place in committee. It is therefore the developments within the First Committee that are most relevant.

Canada was pleased with the outcome of the First Committee's deliberations at UNGA 41, as the session was largely characterized by a businesslike atmosphere and spirit of compromise. This was manifested in a certain moderation of unproductive rhetoric and apparent efforts to steer a middle course. For example, a resolution sponsored by the Non-Aligned Members (NAM), calling for the cessation of all nuclear tests, moved closer in tone and approach to the more pragmatic Western resolution on the "Urgent need for a comprehensive test ban treaty."

The Canadian delegation played a particularly active role at the 1986 session. Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, was elected Vice-Chairman of the First Committee and was also a member of a special group established to rationalize the work of the Committee. In addition, as Head of the Canadian delegation, Ambassador Roche chaired the Barton Group — an

informal group of delegates to the First Committee which meets periodically to discuss developments. The group was named for its first chairman, former Canadian Ambassador to the UN William H. Barton, and includes the 16 NATO members, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Ireland.

Canada acted as lead sponsor for resolutions on "Verification in all its aspects" and the "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes" (FIZZ). Canada regards verification as a crucial requirement for meaningful progress in arms control and disarmament and devotes considerable effort and resources to the improvement of verification techniques and to the strengthening of international support for the concept. As a result of extensive Canadian lobbying and the willingness of several interested delegations to compromise, the Canadian verification resolution was adopted by consensus with, for the first time, two East bloc delegations agreeing to co-sponsor. The resolution provides *inter alia* that the subject of verification will be included for in-depth study on the agenda of the UN Disarmament Commission. As in past years, Canada's resolution on fissionable material was adopted by a large majority (120-1 (France)) with six abstentions.

Significant progress was made at UNGA 41 with respect to the achievement of an increasingly practical and realistic approach to a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). The realization of an effective CTBT remains a fundamental Canadian arms control objective. Canada resumed co-sponsorship of a resolution on the subject which *inter alia* urges the Conference on Disarmament to commence practical work on a CTBT, with the cooperation of the nuclear weapon states. It was adopted in the First Committee by a solid margin of 117-1 (France) with 16 abstentions. The USA moved from a negative vote the previous year to an abstention. A competing NAM resolution on the subject, although more moderate in tone than similar NAM resolutions in previous ses-

sions, failed to secure the same level of support. Canada also took particular interest in the resolutions relating to chemical weapons and to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The "traditional" resolution on chemical weapons, for which Canada and Poland alternate as lead sponsors (Poland had the lead this year), again achieved consensus, with a useful change to incorporate the question of "use" in the operative paragraph referring to the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament. On outer space, Canada was pleased that a modified NAM resolution was adopted in committee by a large majority, with no negative vote (130-0-1(USA)).

UNGA 41 voting statistics reveal some interesting facts. Sixty-seven arms control and disarmament resolutions were adopted by the First Committee, an increase of only one over 1985. Canada believes that a reduction in the number of resolutions would enhance the impact of the Committee's decisions, and is thus encouraged that the high proliferation rate of past years was held in check.

Canada supported 45 resolutions, that is 67 per cent of the total number adopted by the Committee, and co-sponsored 12 of these. This is the highest proportion of resolutions supported by Canada in recent years. By the same token, Canada opposed a smaller proportion (9) at UNGA 41 while the rate of Canadian abstentions (13) declined marginally. With regard to those resolutions which came to a vote, Canada's voting pattern was closest to that of the Benelux states (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg), West Germany, and Italy as well as Iceland, Japan and New Zealand.

The Canadian Government will turn its attention next to the implementation of the relevant arms control and disarmament resolutions within the Conference on Disarmament and the UN Disarmament Commission, hoping to build on the progress achieved at UNGA 41.

The **Disarmament** Bulletin

Supplement

Canada at the Conference on Disarmament

Historical Background

Throughout the years since the creation of the United Nations, Canada has been a member of the various United Nations and other bodies dealing with disarmament questions, including the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors going back to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, created as a result of an initiative in 1959 by France, the UK, the USA and the USSR. In 1961, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) endorsed the establishment of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), which added eight non-aligned states to the original five "Western European and other" and five Eastern European states of the Ten-Nation Committee. The ENDC, which first convened in Geneva in March 1962, was created to undertake negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It adopted a step-by-step approach on the basis of an agreed US-USSR Joint Statement of Principles.

The ENDC was enlarged in 1969 by eight members and again in 1975 by five, to 31. Known as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) after 1969, it met in Geneva each year.

At the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978, the CCD's name was changed to the Committee on Disarmament (CD) and its membership was set at the five

This is the third in a series of periodic supplements to the *Disarmament Bulletin* that have been prepared by the Department of External Affairs in order to provide a more detailed presentation of Canada's efforts to promote arms control and disarmament.

Cette publication existe également en français.



The Conference on Disarmament meets at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, the European office of the United Nations. Before the Second World War, the Palais des Nations was the headquarters of the League of Nations and the scene of a number of historic events.

UN Photo 1365

nuclear-weapon states (China, France, USSR, United Kingdom, USA) and 35 other states. This membership is divided into three general groups and China: ten Western, eight socialist or Eastern and 21 neutral and non-aligned.

In 1983 the Committee accepted in principle a limited expansion in its membership, by not more than four states, subject to agreement on the selection of new members and taking into account the necessity of maintaining balance. So far, no agreement has been reached on the new members. In 1983 the Committee decided to change its name to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) beginning with its 1984 session. The Conference meets twice yearly in Geneva, in spring (February-April) and summer (June-August) sessions. It remains the only ongoing global forum

for multilateral negotiations in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The basic methods of operation of the CD were established by the UNGA at UNSSOD I in 1978. At the beginning of each annual session, the CD adopts its agenda, taking into account, among other things, the recommendations made to it by the UN General Assembly (it is not, strictly speaking, a UN organization) as well as proposals presented to it by its own members. It conducts its work in plenary meetings as well as under any additional arrangements agreed to by the member states. Whenever it deems it advisable, including when it appears that there is a basis to negotiate a draft treaty or other draft texts, the CD establishes subsidiary bodies, such as *ad hoc* working groups and committees. Agreement on the specific mandates of

such subsidiary bodies is usually required each year.

Decisions in the CD are taken by consensus, even on procedural issues. Thus, when it comes to establishing a subsidiary body, consensus must be reached on its mandate. For a variety of reasons, usually based on political rather than legal or practical considerations, such consensus is frequently elusive.

A number of important multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements were negotiated in the predecessor bodies to the CD during the decades of the 60s and 70s. Among these is the 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, commonly known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Efforts to negotiate this treaty began in 1955 in the United Nations sub-committee of five made up of the USA, the United Kingdom, Canada, France and the USSR. The work continued in the Geneva Conference of Experts (of which Canada was also a member) and in other forums including the ENDC in Geneva, and was concluded in Moscow in 1963. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), concluded in 1968, was also negotiated in the ENDC. The Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1970, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and the Environmental Modification Convention of 1976 were all negotiated

in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the immediate predecessor to the Conference on Disarmament.¹

Canada's Role in the Conference on Disarmament

Canada has consistently played a prominent role in the CD. Canada aims at a constructive and practical approach which seeks to define areas of common ground and expand them. This approach calls for a willingness to accept sensible accommodations of interest — not compromises on matters of principle but genuine reconciliations and accommodations. Over the years, Canada has introduced numerous working papers and other working documents in areas of priority to Canada which have been widely recognized as making important contributions to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Many of these papers have focused on the crucial question of verification. These contributions have helped achieve progress in several important areas of work in the CD, such as outer space, a comprehensive

test ban, chemical weapons and a radiological weapons ban.

The 1986 Session

In accordance with the principle of rotation, Canada's Ambassador J. Alan Beesley had the honour and responsibility of being president of the CD during the critical report-writing period in August, as well as through the following inter-session period (until February 3, 1987).

The following is a brief outline of developments in 1986 on the key issues before the CD, and of Canadian input on these issues.

A. Nuclear Test Ban (NTB)

The test ban issue continued to occupy a prominent place on the CD agenda but there was failure to reach consensus on the establishment of a subsidiary body under this item because of disagreement between those who wished to begin negotiations immediately and those who preferred first to achieve further progress on verification and compliance, as well as broad agreement on the scope of a treaty. Nevertheless, important progress was achieved by the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) in developing practical means of verification of a test ban through seismic means. Canada has played a leading role in the GSE and has presented a number of working papers. A workshop held in Ottawa in October 1986, hosted by the Canadian Government, brought together communications experts from 17 countries to study problems relating to the exchange of waveform data under an eventual test ban agreement. Soviet statements during the 1986 session indicated a more forthcoming approach on technical and institutional matters related to the establishment and operation of a global seismic monitoring network. Expert level discussions between the USSR and the USA on nuclear test issues, as well as indications that both countries may be ready to consider a step-by-step approach to nuclear test limitation, provide some basis for hope that further progress may be possible.

In February 1986 the Canadian Government announced its intention to upgrade the seismic array in Yellowknife as a further contribution to laying the ground for adequate verification of a nuclear test ban treaty.

Canada's approach to a comprehensive test ban (CTB) is encapsulated in

¹The role of the UN in disarmament efforts is discussed in detail in an article by Canada's Ambassador to the CD, J. Alan Beesley, entitled "Disarmament and the United Nations at Forty," *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations* 8, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 20-35.



The Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament meeting in Washington in 1960. The Canadian representative, the late General E.L.M. Burns, is seated second from left. After serving as Commander of the UN Emergency Force in the Sinai from 1956 to 1959, General Burns was appointed Special Advisor to the Government on Disarmament. He later represented Canada at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Public Archives Canada PA 113018



Mr. J. Alan Beesley (centre), Canada's Ambassador to the CD, Mr. Arsène Després (left), Counsellor with the Canadian delegation to the CD, and Mr. Miljan Komatina (right), Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General, during recent session of CD. L. Bianco

the August 1986 message of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the CD: "In the Canadian view, a gradual incremental step-by-step approach will be required if a comprehensive test ban is to become a reality. We intend to pursue vigorously our efforts to this end in the Conference on Disarmament and in other forums."

B. Chemical Weapons (CW)

Despite the fact that discussions in the CD on this issue began more than 10 years ago, formal negotiations on a CW ban began only in 1984, on the basis of a framework developed the previous year under Canadian chairmanship of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons. The increasing danger of proliferation of chemical weapons, and evidence that these weapons have been repeatedly used in the Iran-Iraq conflict, underscore the pressing need for a CW treaty. A CW convention would prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, possession and use of CW. It would be a genuine disarmament treaty and not simply an arms control agreement. Such a convention would include provisions for the destruction of all existing CW stockpiles and production facilities within 10 years of the treaty's coming into

force. It would include the establishment of an international agency to administer the treaty. The most sensitive and difficult issues for negotiation relate to the verification provisions of the treaty; even on these questions, however, there has recently been some progress in narrowing the differences among the participants in the negotiations.

Under United Kingdom chairmanship of the *Ad Hoc* Committee in 1986, considerable progress was achieved on provisions relating to the declaration, monitoring and destruction of CW production facilities (including on-site inspection), and on provisions to monitor the chemical industry to ensure that its production is not diverted for CW purposes. Drafting of verification measures for the destruction of CW stockpiles is also proceeding at a good pace. Considerable work remains to be done on the important question of challenge inspections. Other areas where there is as yet insufficient agreement include declarations and monitoring of CW stockpiles prior to their destruction.

During the 1986 session the USA delegation made important clarifications as to how a treaty might apply to countries with different social systems. The

USA also tabled detailed information on the nature and locations of its own CW stockpiles. The USSR tabled substantive proposals relating to certain aspects of the verification of a treaty, particularly in relation to the destruction of production facilities. An important UK proposal may facilitate a convergence of views on the sensitive and vital issue of challenge inspections.

Canada submitted two working papers as a contribution to the negotiations: a practical *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons*; and a proposed computer-adaptable method for the classification and listing of chemicals. To assist the Committee in its task, Canada also made available to CD members a cross-indexed compendium of all CW-related statements and papers for the years 1983-1985, which updated an earlier Canadian compilation for the years prior to 1983. These contributions were well received by delegations from all groups.

The CW negotiations now appear to be entering a final phase and in order to permit accelerated progress towards agreement, the time allotted to the negotiations has been increased through intersessional work. In cooperation with the Department of National Defence and the University of Saskatchewan, Canada deploys scientific experts at each CD session to strengthen the Canadian contribution to the negotiations.

C. Outer Space

For the second year in a row an *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space was established. The agreed mandate, while not providing for the initiation of formal negotiations, has permitted useful, substantive work in elucidating relevant aspects of international law with a view to assessing the possible need for supplementary measures. The complexity of the subject became progressively more apparent to many delegations and underlined the need to proceed with care in any effort to formulate new legal or other measures.

Canada has made major contributions to the work of the Outer Space Committee through its working papers. In 1985 a broad survey of existing international law relevant to arms control and outer space was tabled by Canada and served as the basis for much of the

committee discussions. The Canadian delegation introduced another substantive working document in 1986 on terminology relevant to arms control and outer space that was also well received by members of the Committee. In addition the Canadian delegation has submitted two compilations of statements and working papers, to provide delegations with ready reference to CD material. Such practical contributions greatly facilitate the work of the CD, as has been recognized repeatedly by its members.

D. Other Issues

The *Ad Hoc* Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CPD) met regularly in 1986 and is now closer to meeting its objective of an agreed programme. The *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons (RW) reviewed the various outstanding issues relating to a treaty in this area, but considerable differences of view on whether or not attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities should be included in a treaty banning RW have slowed down the pace of negotiations.

On nuclear issues on the CD agenda other than the nuclear test ban, some progress was recorded in allowing the question of the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race to be discussed in informal sessions of the Conference in the absence of a subsidiary body dedicated to this issue. As for the agenda item dealing with the Prevention of Nuclear War (PNW) the CD was not able to reach agreement on an organizational framework or mandate that would have allowed this crucial question to be given in-depth consideration. Many delegations consider that as far as the above two nuclear issues are concerned, it is necessary for the two major nuclear powers to arrive at agreements for significant reductions in their nuclear arsenals before work can begin on determining areas of meaningful multilateral negotiations.

The subject of verification is an area where Canada has devoted considerable resources. Canada is convinced that practical work on verification will contribute to progress in the arms control and disarmament process. To assist members of the CD in their discussion, Canada made available a large compilation of statements made in the CD on this critical subject. This compendium was much in demand by delegations.

Conclusion

The CD attracts fewer headlines than the bilateral talks on nuclear and space arms also taking place in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union, or even the disarmament resolutions passed in the United Nations General Assembly. This should not be taken as an indication that the CD is unimportant. As the Secretary of State for External Affairs stated in his message to the CD in August 1986: "In an era when the awesome realities of existing and emerging weapons technologies are a cause for concern to the peoples of all countries and continents, the task of devising effective, agreed arms control and disarmament measures cannot simply be left to those who possess the largest arsenals. The Conference on Disarmament, which is the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, therefore performs an indispensable political and institutional role."

Although the Conference on Disarmament has redoubled its efforts in recent years (to the extent that the number of its meetings has increased sixfold since 1977) it has not, despite some progress, yet proved possible to achieve new agreements in important areas such as a comprehensive nuclear test ban, outer space and chemical weapons.

The work of the Conference does not proceed in a vacuum. The prospects for progress on disarmament are heavily influenced by the international climate and

in particular by the relationships between East and West and between North and South. The atmosphere of hope generated by the resumption of the US-USSR bilateral arms negotiations doubtless facilitated the considerable progress achieved during the 1985 and 1986 CD sessions in the chemical weapons negotiations, as well as the work done in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

Canada intends to continue to work actively to maintain and enhance the relevance of the CD to the international arms control and disarmament process. The CD can make an invaluable contribution to this process not only through the negotiation of specific agreements but also by directing political support to other important negotiations (e.g., between the USA and USSR), by working on legal and technical problems relevant to possible future negotiations (e.g., on verification), and by identifying emerging issues which the international community will need to address (e.g., the military uses of outer space).

Progress towards fulfilment of the CD's mandate has been disappointingly slow during recent years. However, to tread water while awaiting an improvement in the international climate, and in particular in the relations between the super-powers, would be fraught with danger. The Conference on Disarmament cannot, therefore, be content merely to reflect the international climate. It must help lead the way by improving it.



A general view of the Conference on Disarmament in plenary session. UN Photo 163792



Arms Control and Disarmament (ACD) Resolutions at UNGA 41

(Total ACD Resolutions Adopted — 67)

Resolutions marked with an asterisk were co-sponsored by Canada.
Countries in parentheses were lead sponsors.

RESOLUTION NUMBER	RESOLUTION Supported by Canada (47 including 23 without a vote)	VOTE (Yes/No/Abstain) (Without a vote)
*41/9 (Costa Rica)	International Year of Peace	WOV
41/45 (Mexico)	Treaty of Tlatelolco	145-0-7
*41/47 (Australia)	Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty	137-1-15
41/48 (Egypt)	Nuclear weapon-free zone in the Middle East	WOV
41/49 (Pakistan)	Nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia	107-3-41
41/50 (Sweden)	Conventional weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects	WOV
41/52 (Pakistan)	International arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	149-0-4
41/53 (Sri Lanka)	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	154-0-1
41/55A (Benin)	Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa	150-0-5
41/57 (Romania)	Reduction of military budgets	WOV
*41/58D (Poland)	Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons	WOV
*41/58A (Austria)	Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons	WOV
*41/58C (USA)	Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons	137-0-14
41/59N (Australia)	Notification of nuclear tests	130-1-22
41/59F (China)	General and complete disarmament	WOV
41/59H (Sweden)	Comprehensive study on the military use of research and development	137-1-17
*41/59J (USA)	General and complete disarmament	WOV
41/59M (Peru)	Regional conventional disarmament	137-0-7
41/59E (France)	Confidence-building measures and conventional disarmament	129-0-21
41/59C (Denmark)	Conventional disarmament	WOV
41/59G (China)	Conventional disarmament	150-0-2
41/59A (Australia)	Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	WOV
41/59K (Australia)	Naval armaments and disarmament	153-1-1
*41/59L (Canada)	Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes	148-1-6
*41/59B (UK)	Objective information on military matters	116-0-26
*41/59O (Cameroon)	Review of the role of the UN in the field of disarmament	WOV
41/60C (FRG)	Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures	155-0-0
41/60J (Mexico)	UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America	WOV
41/60B (Mexico)	World disarmament campaign	144-0-9
41/60D (Benin)	UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa	WOV
41/60H (Nigeria)	UN fellowships on disarmament	154-1-0
41/60G (Yugoslavia)	Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament	WOV
41/86L (Sweden)	Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Europe	WOV
41/86I (Romania)	Economic and social consequences of the arms race	138-1-11
41/86E (Australia)	Report of the UN Disarmament Commission	WOV
*41/86P (Netherlands)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	101-0-50
41/86R (India)	Study on deterrence	WOV
*41/86A (UK)	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	88-0-56
41/86N (Yugoslavia)	Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament	140-0-13
41/86C (UK)	UN disarmament studies	WOV
*41/86Q (Canada)	Verification in all its aspects	WOV
41/86H (Mexico)	Nuclear winter	140-1-10



RESOLUTION NUMBER	RESOLUTION Supported by Canada (47 including 23 without a vote)	VOTE (Yes/No/Abstain) (Without a vote)
41/87 (Sri Lanka)	Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	WOV
41/61 (Sri Lanka)	World Disarmament Conference	WOV
41/88 (Chairman)	Disarmament and development	WOV
41/89 (Malta)	Strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region	WOV
41/11 (Brazil)	Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic	124-1-8

NOTE: In addition to the above resolutions the following was also adopted.

DECISION (Mexico)	Comprehensive Program of Disarmament	WOV
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Opposed by Canada — 9

41/51 (Bulgaria)	Assurance of non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	106-18-25
41/59D (Czechoslovakia)	Role of UN agencies in arms limitation and disarmament	117-16-19
41/60I (Mexico)	Freeze on nuclear weapons	139-12-4
41/60E (India)	Freeze on nuclear weapons	136-12-5
41/60F (India)	Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons	132-17-4
41/86K (Czechoslovakia)	International cooperation for disarmament	118-19-9
41/86B (GDR)	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	118-17-10
41/86F (Argentina)	Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament	130-15-5
41/86O (Yugoslavia)	Recommendations and Decisions of the 10th Special Session of the General Assembly	135-13-5

Canada Abstained — 20

41/10 (Mongolia)	Right of peoples to peace	104-0-33
41/46A (Mexico)	Cessation of all nuclear test explosions	135-3-14
41/46B (Mexico)	Cessation of all nuclear test explosions	127-3-21
41/54 (Hungary)	Cessation of nuclear weapon tests	123-3-26
41/55B (Benin)	Nuclear capacity of South Africa	139-4-13
41/56 (Byelorussia)	Weapons of mass destruction	128-1-25
41/58B (GDR)	Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons	100-11-43
41/59I (Iraq)	Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	111-3-38
41/60A (Bulgaria)	World disarmament campaign	114-3-36
41/86J (Iraq)	Recommendations and Decisions of the 10th Special Session of the General Assembly	128-0-18
41/86M (Yugoslavia)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	133-3-17
41/86D (Mongolia)	Disarmament Week	123-1-23
41/86G (Argentina)	Prevention of nuclear war	134-3-14
41/88A (Malaysia)	Question of Antarctica	94-0-12
41/88B (Malaysia)	Question of Antarctica	96-0-12
41/88C (Malaysia)	Question of Antarctica	119-0-8
41/90 (Romania)	Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security	126-1-24
41/91 (GDR)	Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security	117-1-33
41/92 (USSR)	Comprehensive system of international peace and security	102-2-46
41/93 (Iraq)	Israeli nuclear armament	95-2-56



The 'Canadian Commitment to Arms Control' Theme of Edmonton Address

Canada's commitment to arms control and disarmament was the theme of an address to the Edmonton Conference, "The True North Strong and Free?", made by Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs, on November 8. Following are excerpts from that address.

"In arms control, as in any journey, setting your destination is the first, and often the easiest, part. Our goals must be long-range, because I do not believe it is realistic to expect to get there quickly. This is a judgement based on experience and not a statement of policy. Too often when we, the practitioners, urge patience the advocates say this is only because we want it this way. The goal of arms controllers must be to make themselves obsolete — good arms controllers want to do this sooner rather than later.

The failure to put arms control in its proper context can seriously undermine the arms control process.

An arms control agreement that is a disappointment, in that it does not contribute to security in the manner expected, risks becoming a negative factor in East-West relations, and thus in our security. Disappointment and distrust both lead to disenchantment with the arms control process and pessimism about the possibility of progress.

In considering what we hope to achieve in the arms control process it is important to remind ourselves that arms are the result or symptom of international distrust, and not the primary cause. Arms control may limit, and may perhaps even eliminate, some of the symptoms of international distrust but it does not address the core issue.

We must see arms control as what it really is — a tool in the management of East-West competition, a support for our security; it is not an end in itself.

The arms control process is at the heart of the process of reducing tensions, increasing confidence and thus building security. And while we often say that increased confidence is necessary for us to reach arms control agreements we must not fall into the trap of assuming that arms control agreements by themselves can be equated with an absence of distrust. Arms control and arms control agreements, if they are respected, can control and channel the competition; but they do not eliminate it.

Indeed an interesting question is to ask ourselves what the world would be like if some sweeping arms control proposals, such as those discussed in Reykjavik, are agreed to. Some say it would lead to rapid progress in other areas, others say lowering the level of nuclear arms would make the 'rocks' or basic problems more evident — factors such as the conventional imbalance, the Middle East, southern Africa, human rights, would loom larger. I'm not sure what the answer is but both possibilities require serious contemplation.

If the arms control process itself, therefore, is to be evaluated prudently, it is equally important to examine various arms control proposals critically.

It is important to take into account a broad range of factors. The first is that the East-West rivalry has global dimensions. This means that solutions in both international relations and in arms control have to be broadly based and must have wide applicability.

The second is that there is a deep interrelationship among weapon systems. The more radical the arms control proposal, the broader its implication for other weapons. Progress in one area of nuclear weapons changes the significance of the remaining weapons; progress across the whole range of nuclear weapons changes the significance of chemical and conventional weapons.

Finally, weapon systems and weapons exist for different reasons. These include economics, technological capability, geography, tactical and strategic decisions, international politics and on occasion domestic politics. This means that different weapon systems have different values to different countries. It may therefore be impractical to focus exclusively on particular systems. We have seen this in the US focus on Soviet land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and the Soviet attention to cruise missiles.

A responsible approach to arms control — and Canada's approach to arms control is a responsible one — must therefore be a cautious one; arms control proposals that do not do what they purport to do, that are easily circumvented, or that do not take into account the complex interrelationships I just mentioned, have to be avoided as unhelpful or misleading, and perhaps as dangerous.

The complexity and interrelationships involved in arms control account for the slow pace in negotiations, and also for our disdain for arms control by declaration. Declaratory proposals and quick-fixes proliferate in public debates, but experience has shown us that no meaningful arms control measures have been achieved and sustained outside the negotiating framework.

This brings us to the question of the international context of Canada's role in arms control. At this Conference and to an ever-increasing number of Canadians, the sense of Canada as sitting as sort of a no-man's land between the two super-powers is a powerful image. In the age of strategic and cruise missiles this concept has urgent meaning. As neighbours of the USA, and as partners in a democratic value system, we inevitably share the threat to the USA and the West. Geography, the power and effect of nuclear weapons, and the manner in which they are used, make it impossible for people who live huddled to the US border to avoid the threat — to suggest we can is wishful thinking. Our commitment to democratic values augments the



threat and diminishes our ability to avoid it. We sit between the superpowers only in the geographic sense.

The threat to Canada is what gives us the right to be concerned about arms control, but it is a right we share with all mankind and the harsh fact of political life is that, by itself, it does not buy us a very significant role in the arms control process. For, however vividly we may understand that in major nuclear war Canada will be a battlefield, this is not a concept that is well understood outside of Canada.

Other nations, including our European allies, tend, for the most part, to regard us as living basically out of harm's way, far away from the front line which they see as being in Europe. The superpowers, who worry about escalation arising from confrontation in Central Europe, from instability in the Middle East or problems in Central America, also have problems seeing Canada in this manner.

In today's nuclear terms the concept of living out of harm's way is not real. It is however a political perception we must live with, and one which we must overcome, if we are to play an effective role in international politics and arms control.

This perceptual problem exists to an even greater degree when we consider conventional war. Few nations in the world can be said to have as few direct threats to their national security as Canada. But because the danger is that conventional war very quickly will lead to nuclear war which threatens us, we have a real stake in resolving conventional arms control problems and insist on being at the table when these issues are discussed.

But mistaken perceptions are only one of the impediments to the role we can play. There are other factors that limit our voice. The most direct is that our military power is not what needs to be controlled. We have no nuclear weapons and our conventional forces are very small. This is not a situation we can do very much about; we are not about to undertake a massive rearmament campaign just so we can participate better in arms control.

Canada goes into arms control negotiations with another disadvantage. We are as I said earlier a principal power. Located elsewhere we would be known as a regional power. But we are a regional power without a region. Thus, despite our economic power and size we do not go to international forums carrying with us the weight of several clients or able to express the views of our region.

Canada has found over the years that it must consciously work hard to overcome these limitations. We have done it in a number of ways. The most important are:

- activist bilateral diplomacy;
- through multilateralism in alliances and organizations, NATO primarily, but also the UN and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); and
- finally through competence, pragmatism and responsibility.

We do carry out a large part of our arms control activity through and in the course of our bilateral foreign policy relations. We have found that lots of relations with the US or even good relations with the US do not always give us the voice we believe we should have in security affairs. But we work at it. We have learned that it is not simply a question of telling the US what we want, but also of being able to tell them how we think we should get there.

History, geography and our shared values with the USA have brought us certain advantages, but changing governments and the surprisingly personalized nature of policymaking in these areas mean that our involvement in arms control must be an ongoing process. It is therefore a constant focus of Canadian policy and of Canada's relations with the USA and its other major allies.

In bilateral terms our dialogue with the Soviet Union is far less intense; it does not approach the daily dialogue with countries such as the USA and UK. It nevertheless is real and growing. But we do not focus only on the superpowers.

We are aware for example that there is a limit to how far the superpowers would cut their arsenals without the French and Chinese cutting theirs. Our bilateral relations with potential new nuclear powers are of vital importance too if we are to prevent the proliferation that could damage the already fragile arms control process.

While bilateralism is one approach it is not enough. Canadian bilateral diplomacy alone brings us no seats at the negotiating table; we must therefore make creative use of our participation in alliances and multilateral organizations. In these organizations, by building alliances and coalitions and by working with like-minded nations we help build a stronger voice for Canada....

In seeking to develop our expertise Canada has had to choose where to focus its attention. We have chosen to develop our expertise on verification as a practical contribution to resolving arms control negotiation problems. Verification has often been dismissed as a political smokescreen, a problem which doesn't exist, or as an issue that has already been resolved by modern technology. I wish that were true. Verification continues to pose a series of technical problems. These technical problems are getting larger rather than smaller, as the numbers of weapons proliferate, as the types of weapons change, and as they are made smaller, faster and more and more to resemble conventional weapons.

Canadian work on verification cannot solve the problem of political will. It can however help resolve the technological problems that continue to exist. And this will help build confidence and in turn generate political will.

If I may then be allowed a few comments in summary, I would stress three points. We are committed to arms control, we are actively pursuing it and finally it is a difficult process. This is not, and must not be seen as, a call to pessimism. What we need is patience and perseverance: strength in our efforts, and a true commitment to our freedom and our values."



Canada Hosts International Workshop on Seismic Data Exchange

The following article is based on a report prepared by the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources.

Data communications experts from 17 countries met in Ottawa on October 6-8, 1986, to discuss the problems involved in the rapid exchange of digital seismic waveform data. This workshop, jointly hosted by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of External Affairs and the Geophysics Division of the Geological Survey of Canada (Energy, Mines and Resources), was conducted in support of the activities of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) of the Conference on Disarmament, which meets twice a year in Geneva.

Agreed arrangements for the international exchange of seismic data would be needed to verify a complete ban on nuclear testing. The mandate of the GSE, established in 1976, is to define the characteristics of a system that would provide such data exchange with a reliability and speed acceptable to all parties to a comprehensive test ban treaty. This would include the establishment of international data centres that would collect and analyze such data. The United States, the Soviet Union, Sweden and Australia have offered to operate such data centres. The centres would not attempt to determine the character (earthquake or explosion) of a particular seismic event, but would provide its time and location together with other information required for such characterization, including event depth, spectral content and waveform complexity. This information would be made freely available to interested states who could then draw their own conclusions.

The data to be exchanged under this proposed international monitoring system fall into two distinct categories. The first, known as parameter or level I data, is provided by the country on whose territory the recording station is located from the original continuous data trace and consists of basic measurements such as the amplitude of signals



Group photo of participants from seventeen countries who attended workshop on seismic data exchange hosted by the Canadian Government.

detected. It may be either in analogue (e.g., paper) or digital form. The second is known as waveform, or level II data, which consists of the continuous data trace itself. The GSE has focused primarily on the relatively simple exchange of level I data, which consists essentially of telex-type messages. The medium chosen by the GSE for such exchanges has been the Global Telecommunications System (GTS) of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), primarily because it reaches most countries in the world. The GSE has conducted a number of experiments using the GTS. Canada, along with more than 30 other countries, took part in the most recent of these in 1984.

The exchange of the more useful level II data has proved more problematic. For example, the volume of such data is very large and is not readily handled by a telex-based system such as the GTS. While level I data are more readily transmitted, they suffer from a major theoretical disadvantage in that they represent an interpretation by a given country of its own level II data, which

may or may not be accurate. Hence it would be preferable if the original level II data were available through the data centres for analysis by any party. Until recently, the insistence by the Soviet Union that limits be established on the provision of level II data (only a few times each year in response to specific requests) has given rise to much disagreement within the GSE and impeded progress. However, in July 1986, the Soviet Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament stated that the USSR wished to promote the exchange of level II data on a large scale by satellite and other means. This apparent change in the Soviet position may give new life to the work of the GSE.

In February 1986, Canada offered to host the above-mentioned workshop for members of the GSE on the technical problems of level II data exchange. This proposal was received favourably by Western delegations, although it did not invoke much initial enthusiasm from the Eastern bloc representatives. (Soviet interest, however, increased after the Soviet statement in July 1986.)

Thirty communications experts from the following 17 countries attended: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the USSR, the UK and the USA. The first-time participation of Eastern bloc countries in such a workshop was encouraging. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, and the Minister for Mines, the Honourable Gerald Merrithew, both paid a visit to the workshop and discussed the issues with participants.

The workshop focused on the problems of rapid computer-to-computer exchange of digital waveform data. The most effective way of establishing and using such connections is by the international packet-switched data networks now available in most countries. It was acknowledged that special provision had to be made for those countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, which do not yet have access to such networks.

Working groups focused on the topics of message formats, means of communications, and the communications protocols required for the use of such means across national boundaries. An impressive demonstration of computer-to-computer linkages showed the establishment of links from Ottawa to computers in Australia, Finland, West

Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the USA.

General agreement was reached on the format for waveform messages; several outstanding problems relating to the use of packet-switched networks were resolved; and the internationally approved protocol for computer linkage

was strongly recommended. The results of the workshop will be presented as a Canadian working paper at the next meeting of the GSE in March 1987. It is expected that the workshop's conclusions will be accepted within the GSE, thereby accelerating its work.

Upgrading the Yellowknife Seismic Array

The following article is based on a report prepared by the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources.

The seismic array located just west of Yellowknife, NWT, is being completely modernized. A major impetus for this large-scale project is the recognition by the Canadian Government of the importance of contributing to the development of a global seismic network which could be used to assist in verifying an eventual comprehensive test ban. The upgrading of the Yellowknife seismic array will cost nearly \$4 million and is expected to be completed early in 1989. The modernization of the array will be carried out by the Geophysics Division of the Geological Survey of Canada, Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, which has operated the facility for almost 25 years.

The Yellowknife array was installed in 1963 and, aside from the addition in 1974 of analogue radio telemetry between the outstations and the control centre and automatic computer processing, has remained essentially unchanged. Most seismic observatories consist of seismometers at a single site, but the array has 18 outstations, each equipped with a seismometer, spread out at intervals of 2.5 km along two lines 20 km in length, oriented north-south and east-west. The array control centre, located outside the Yellowknife airport, receives data from all these instruments by radio. Using a computer, the direction and distance of a seismic source, whether explosion or earthquake, can be determined from the

sequence in which signals from the source arrive at the individual seismometers. In addition, by adding up the output of all the instruments after an appropriate time delay (a process called beamforming), smaller signals can be detected by the array than would be possible from a single seismometer, since the uncorrelated background noise tends to cancel out while the correlated signals reinforce each other.



The Yellowknife seismograph array is within 10 000 km of all principal underground testing sites.

Yellowknife was chosen as the site of the array for several reasons: it is far from oceans, which are a major source of background noise; the rock beneath it is unusually uniform; and its remoteness minimizes the most important secondary source of noise, namely human activity in the form of traffic, trains and industrial machinery. The array has proven very sensitive and detects many thousands of

earthquakes (and several tens of underground nuclear explosions) each year. The data produced by the array have been widely used by researchers in Canada, the US and Europe in continuing efforts to devise methods to detect smaller and smaller events and to characterize them accurately as either earthquakes or explosions — both essential prerequisites for a verifiable ban on nuclear testing.

Over the years, the array equipment has become somewhat antiquated. The data from the array accumulate on tape at the Yellowknife control centre and are sent to Ottawa at intervals of about two weeks. This delay would not be acceptable in a (test ban) treaty environment. The modernization therefore includes replacement of the existing seismometers and the addition of a four-element array (with a spacing of about 10 km) of new "broad band" seismometers. Data from these sites will be relayed by digital radio telemetry to a new control centre, from which the data will be sent by a dedicated satellite link in "real time" to Ottawa. Since the project was funded in July 1986, new equipment has been ordered, tunnel vaults about 15 metres long have been blasted into cliff faces for the broad-band sites, detailed design documents for both hardware and software have been completed, and work has begun on many of the high-technology components of the system.



Canada in Full Compliance with Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons and provides for their destruction. The Convention was negotiated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and was opened for signature in April 1972. Canada deposited its instrument of ratification in September 1972. It entered into force in March 1975. More than 100 states now adhere to the Convention, including all permanent members of the UN Security Council.

The Convention lacks effective verification provisions. In part, this may reflect the belief, widely held at the time it was concluded, that the development or use of such weapons was not a practicable possibility for the foreseeable future. However, advances in biotechnological research in the intervening years have prompted concerns about what many see as an increased potential for the development of biological or toxin weapons. Several allegations of breaches of the Convention have in fact been made. This has caused the international community to give increased attention to ways of strengthening confidence that all parties are in full compliance with the terms of the Convention.

A small step was taken at the First Review Conference in 1980, where it was agreed that in seeking to resolve any problem relating to the objectives and application of the Convention, any State Party has a right to request an expert-level consultative meeting open to all States Parties.

At the Second Review Conference, held in Geneva September 8-26, not only was this right reaffirmed but important additional progress was made through agreement on a variety of measures to strengthen confidence in the effective application of the Convention. The Conference agreed, *inter alia*, to exchange data and information on certain research centres and laboratories and on outbreaks of infectious diseases,

to encourage the publication of biological research related to the Convention and to promote contacts among scientists engaged in such research. An *ad hoc* meeting of experts is to be held in Geneva in April 1987 to work out modalities for the implementation of these measures.

Canada's main objectives at the Second Review Conference were: to register unambiguously our continuing concerns relating to unresolved uncertainties about compliance; to affirm Canada's full compliance with all the provisions of the Convention; to promote dispassionate discussion of ongoing biotechnological research and its potential implications for the application of the Convention; and to foster consensus on a Conference final document which would incorporate agreed measures to strengthen the effective application of the Convention. Canada considers these objectives to have been met.

Following is the text of the Canadian statement to the Second Review Conference on Biological and Toxin Weapons, made on September 9 by the Head of the Canadian delegation to the Conference, Mr. Arsène Després, Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Canada in Geneva.

"The Canadian delegation welcomes the opportunity to participate in this Second Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. As has frequently been observed, this Convention has a quality of uniqueness in being the first multilateral agreement concluded with the purpose of effectively eliminating permanently from the earth an entire category of weapons. The strict adherence of all parties to all the terms and obligations of the Convention is thus a matter of singular importance. So, too, is the need for universality of adherence to the Convention and the norms which it embodies.

We should also not lose sight of the fact that when the Convention was concluded, as reflected in its preamble and in Article IX, it was seen as an important step towards the effective prohibition of chemical weapons. The negotiations to that end in the recently completed session of the Conference on Disarmament give cause for cautious hope that the prospects for the attainment of this objective have improved. It would be appropriate for the Conference to urge that the serious pursuit of those negotiations be intensified. Just as important, we must take care to conduct ourselves in this Conference in ways which are supportive of and in no way undermine or prejudice that negotiating effort.

As seen by the Canadian delegation, our task here will be twofold: to examine dispassionately the operation of the Convention since its entering into force; and to consider ways in which the effectiveness of its application might be strengthened so as to increase the level of assurance that all parties are adhering rigorously to their obligations. It is a truism that all areas of arms control and disarmament involve a kind of race between the ceaseless advances of science and technology and the ability of policymakers and lawmakers to ensure that such advances are used to strengthen rather than to undermine international peace and security. In the field of biotechnology, this tension between scientific and technical advance — which can be of inestimable value for enhancing the health, comfort and security of peoples everywhere — and the potential for misuse for non-peaceful purposes, is especially acute. Since the time when the Convention entered into force, even since the First Review Conference, there have been major advances in numerous aspects of biotechnology. The material put before us by the Depository governments makes this clear. Much of this technological progress, even when it results from perfectly legitimate, peaceful research programmes could, with distressingly little effort, be redirected towards illegitimate purposes of the kind prohibited by the Convention which we are reviewing. Indeed, such is the state of biotechnology that there is room for legitimate doubt that the Convention to

which we all parties can ever be verifiable to the standards of adequacy which many of us would normally require to be incorporated into any significant arms control and disarmament agreement.

There is another regrettable fact which must be taken into account during the course of our deliberations here. In contrast to the situation which prevailed at the time when the First Review Conference convened, there have in the intervening period been several allegations of serious breaches of the Convention. This is cause for major concern. Canada accepts that these allegations have not been made frivolously nor in the absence of disturbing evidence. The seriousness of the Canadian Government's concerns about these allegations is attested by our having conducted several investigations relating to allegations of toxin weapons use in South-east Asia. These investigations have formed the basis of three separate submissions to the United Nations Secretary-General. These investigations do not, in themselves, definitively confirm the use of toxin weapons in that region. However, neither do they refute the validity of the allegations nor in any way allay our sense of concern. On the basis of Canadian investigations, anomalous epidemiological phenomena in Southeast Asia in the early 1980s remain inadequately explained. The most salient point which Canada's investigative effort in that region underlines is the absolute necessity of full, prompt, unqualified cooperation on the part of all directly concerned parties if uncertainties about compliance are to be satisfactorily resolved. In the case of our own investigative activities, as in the case of a team of experts sent to the area by the UN Secretary-General in 1981, such cooperation was not forthcoming. We note that uncertainties relating to other alleged breaches of the Convention have similarly not been resolved. This is an unsatisfactory and unacceptable situation.

In the face of this situation, involving widespread doubts about the possibility of ever being able to devise adequate and practicable verification provisions, as well as persisting unresolved uncertainties relating to allegations of non-compliance, it would be all too easy to lapse into a

despairing, do-nothing attitude. However, such a defeatist approach would only undermine the established norm against biological weapons. This Convention, which remains a legally binding instrument for all States Parties, is the strongest embodiment of that norm. The Canadian Government considers that it should be the task of this Conference to seek to strengthen the application of the Convention in realistic and operationally practicable ways. We hope this Conference will be able to reach agreement on a selection of measures to this end, which could be set out in politically binding form in the Final Document of this Conference, to be adopted by consensus. In particular, Canada would urge the desirability of building on the achievement of the First Review Conference by reiterating the right under Article V of any State Party to request the convening of a consultative meeting open to all States Parties at the expert level, and by stating the corresponding obligation of all directly concerned States Parties to respond positively to such a request through participation in the consultative meeting and by extending full cooperation in resolving any compliance-related questions. The Canadian delegation is also ready to give constructive and positive consideration to other proposed measures which could strengthen confidence that the norm against biological weapons is being respected and raise the level of assurance that the legal obligations embodied in the Convention are in reality being adhered to by all States Parties.

In conclusion, Mr. President, the Canadian delegation reaffirms before this body that Canada has never possessed biological weapons and continues in every respect to be in full compliance with all its obligations under the Convention. In the hope that it might encourage greater forthcomingness on the part of all States Parties with regard to the freer exchange of information concerning biotechnology research and development in our respective countries, the Canadian delegation is filing with the Conference Secretariat, with the request that it become an official Conference document, a paper setting out the general nature and magnitude of biotechnology activities in Canada and the extent of governmental involvement therein."

Canada Celebrates International Day of Peace

On September 15, the Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué.

"The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, today announced the details of a special ceremony to commemorate the International Day of Peace that will take place in the rotunda of the Centre Block on Parliament Hill at noon on September 16.

Mr. Clark said that this ceremony is being held in recognition of the UN-declared International Day of Peace, which falls on the third Tuesday in September of each year. This Day holds



Senator Lowell Murray receiving IYP stamp kit from the Honourable René Marin.

DND Photo

special significance in 1986, which has been declared the International Year of Peace (IYP) by the United Nations.

Mr. Clark announced that Senator Lowell Murray, Government Senate Leader and Minister of State for Federal-Provincial Relations, will represent the Government of Canada at the ceremony. Mr. Clark noted that special projects undertaken by various government departments to mark the International Year of Peace will be displayed in the rotunda beginning at noon on September 16.



These projects form part of Canada's IYP programme previously announced by Mr. Clark on March 6.

During the ceremony, the Honourable René J. Marin, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Canada Post Corporation, will unveil a special embossed stamp commemorating the IYP. The Master of the Mint, Mr. Maurice Lafontaine, will present a special \$100 IYP gold coin issued by the Mint in August. Mr. Douglas Roche, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament and Chairman of the

Canadian Government's IYP Committee, will also address the ceremony, as will General Paul Manson, Chief of the Defence Staff of the Department of National Defence.

Mr. Clark also noted that the Dominion Carillonneur will play the Peace Tower carillon in recognition of the International Day of Peace as part of the privately-inspired 'Peal for Peace' project that will see bells ringing in a number of Canadian communities on September 16.

Mr. Clark said that the September 16 ceremony reflects the continued commitment of the Canadian Government to the pursuit of international peace and security and its support for the objectives of the International Year of Peace as outlined in the IYP resolution, co-sponsored by Canada, that received the unanimous consent of the United Nations General Assembly on October 24, 1985. He emphasized that Canada would continue to work towards the achievement of these goals, not just in 1986 but every year."

International Year of Peace: Poster/Essay Competition a Resounding Success

As part of Canada's International Year of Peace programme the federal Government sponsored a national essay competition entitled "What is peace and what can I do to achieve it" and a national poster competition on the themes of the International Year of Peace. The undertaking was organized by the United Nations Association in Canada, through a contribution from the Disarmament Fund of the Department of External Affairs.

Each competition was divided into three age categories — 12 and under, 13 to 17, and 18 and over. In total, more than 800 essays and 1 800 posters were received.

Judges of the essay finalists were Cathy Lowinger of the Children's Book Centre in Toronto, former Canadian Ambassador Yvon Beaulne, and Professor Albert Legault of the Department of Political Science at Laval University in Quebec City. Judges of the poster finalists were Canadian artist André Masson, Ottawa photographer John Evans, and John Sadler, interim director of the Ottawa School of Art.

Winners of the poster competition:
Age group: 12 and under
Sonya Hatt, St. Stephen, New Brunswick;
Alison Rust, Gloucester, Ontario

13 to 17
Natasha Dastoor, Brossard, Quebec;
Kari McMillan, Woodstock, Ontario

18 and over
Roger Alexandre,
Saint-Jean-sur-le-Richelieu, Quebec;
Cathy Schmidt,
Vancouver, British Columbia

Winners of the essay competition:

Age Group: 12 and under
Nicholas Matthew Kot,
Weyburn, Saskatchewan;
Cushing Thompson,
Rollingdam, New Brunswick

13 to 17
Leanne Penney,
Springdale, Newfoundland;
Claude Pigeon,
Squatec, Quebec

18 and over
Diana Dainty, Kanata, Ontario;
Serge Meyer, Montreal, Quebec



Winners of International Year of Peace poster/essay competition meeting with Mr. Clark during their visit to the United Nations on September 24.

Members of Consultative Group Attend First Committee Sessions

The following article is based on a report prepared by the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations.

From October 12 to 17, nine members of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs visited the United Nations in order to deepen their knowledge and understanding of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. The First Committee is the principal UN General Assembly forum dealing with arms control, disarmament and international security questions. The programme in New York was designed to give the participants a better understanding of the operation of the First Committee, upon which they could draw during the course of their future work.

The participants were briefed on the arms control and disarmament activities of the Permanent Mission of Canada, the responsibilities of the Ambassador for Disarmament, overall UN organization, and the First Committee agenda. They were addressed by UN representatives of Poland, Cameroon, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and by UN secretariat officials. The participants attended a number of meetings of the First Committee, where they were able to see firsthand how the arms control and disarmament process works in the First Committee. In the First Committee, the group heard the main Canadian intervention, delivered on October 16, by Mr. Douglas Roche, the Ambassador for Disarmament. There were also opportunities to make bilateral contacts, to attend sessions of the UN General Assembly and other committee meetings, and to meet non-governmental representatives at the UN.

During the course of their visit to the United Nations, the intricacies of multilateral diplomacy and the complexities of trying to obtain agreement on texts of draft resolutions became apparent to the participants, as was the fact that "reasonableness of position" is not always defined in the same manner



Ambassador Douglas Roche and members of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs during their visit to the United Nations in October.

by all countries. Against this background, the participants probed — and prodded — the depths of Canadian arms control policies and did not hesitate to advance their own suggestions for appropriate Canadian policies.

Administrative arrangements for the Consultative Group programme were coordinated by Mr. Firdaus Kharas, Executive Director of the United Nations Association in Canada, who also served as the programme conducting officer.

Participants in the Consultative Group programme were:

Professor Cynthia Cannizzo
Strategic Studies Program
University of Calgary
Calgary, Alberta

Professor Michel Fortmann
Professor of Political Science
Université de Montréal
Montreal, Quebec

Ms. Ellen Gould
Project Ploughshares
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan

Mrs. Joanne Harris
Educators for Peace
Torbay, Newfoundland

Mrs. Margaret Hoddinott
Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies
Rexdale, Ontario

Mr. Peter Ross
Canadian Student Pugwash
Ottawa, Ontario

Ms. Jill Lightwood
Island Peace Group
Charlottetown, PEI

Professor Denis Stairs
Professor of Political Science
Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia

Ish Theilheimer
Operation Dismantle
Ottawa, Ontario



SSEA Tables Government Response to Report of Special Committee on Canada's International Relations

On December 4, the Secretary of State for External Affairs tabled in the House of Commons the Government's response to the Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Canada's International Relations. Following are excerpts from the Government's response to the arms control recommendations of the Report.

“Conclusion/Recommendation

16. We recommend that Canada intensify its efforts, multilaterally within NATO, the United Nations and in disarmament forums and bilaterally with the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries, to win acceptance for a comprehensive set of arms control measures. These measures, which have been enunciated by the government, are as follows:

Response

The government welcomes the committee's support for its six arms control and disarmament objectives and intends to pursue them energetically through all appropriate diplomatic channels.

Conclusion/Recommendation

16a. A mutually agreed and verifiable radical reduction of nuclear forces and associated measures to enhance strategic stability. The latter should include, in particular, reaffirmation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, interpreted strictly as prohibiting all but basic research on defensive systems.

Response

The government believes that the first priority of the international community should be to bring about a mutually agreed and verifiable radical reduction in nuclear forces of the superpowers. The government will continue to press both the United States and the Soviet Union to maintain the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty until an updated treaty is in place.

Conclusion/Recommendation

16b. The maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime.

Response

The government welcomes the committee's support for the importance Canada attaches to the maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. The emergence of new nuclear suppliers and new technologies has increased the urgency of finding a means of curtailing proliferation. At both the political and technical levels, Canada has sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons from one country to another — 'horizontal proliferation' — while seeking equally to curtail the accumulation of more, and more advanced, weapons in the hands of the nuclear powers — 'vertical proliferation'....

Conclusion/Recommendation

16d. The achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty that will be mutually verifiable.

Response

The negotiation of an adequately verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty remains a fundamental Canadian policy objective. In the meantime, Canada is presenting proposals in various bodies designed to lead to such a treaty and is developing the necessary techniques of verification....

Conclusion/Recommendation

19. Decisions about defence policy, including the military decisions in which Canada participates as a NATO member, should not be taken without due regard to their consequences for arms control. Arms control and disarmament policy, on the one hand, and defence policy on the other, should move in tandem.

Response

The government's ongoing examination of defence policy is taking full account of its policy on arms control and disarmament. Both are essential components of Canadian security policy and neither can be pursued without taking into account the other.

Conclusion/Recommendation

20. We have concluded that the government's capacity for formulating policy on arms control and disarmament needs improvement. We are not in a position to specify the manner in which this capacity could be improved, but one essential requirement would be a new policy development mechanism designed to reconcile the views received from the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence. We also believe that foreign policy is conducted in a more coordinated and energetic manner if it is exposed regularly to public examination. For this reason, the new mechanism should be directed to report periodically to Parliament.

Response

While policy on these issues is ultimately coordinated in the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Defence Policy, the government recognizes the need for close dialogue with Parliament. Henceforth, should Parliamentarians so desire, External Affairs and National Defence could make periodic joint presentations to joint meetings of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade and the Standing Committee on National Defence. By this means and the use of existing mechanisms for interdepartmental liaison the objectives of the committee's recommendation would be met. Provision is already made for public participation in policy development in these areas, among other ways through the work of the Ambassador for Disarmament and the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control, and in the availability of ministers in Parliament. In the last analysis it is the responsibility of ministers to ensure the proper consideration of national security policy and defend that policy in Parliament.”



The Canadian Commitment to NATO

The following letter to the Editor, written by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, was published in The Globe and Mail on December 4.

"You have confused the relationship between security and arms control in your editorial Risky Violations (December 1).

Canada is a member of NATO and will continue to shoulder its share of the burden of collective defence. The Government's undertaking to allow air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) testing is a contribution we make to the viability of NATO's nuclear deterrent. As long as there are nuclear weapons we must rely on that deterrent. Testing unarmed cruise missiles in Canada is a small contribution compared to that of our European allies, who have deployed armed cruise missiles on their territory.

As a member of NATO and a partner in North American defence, we are unquestionably a US ally. But we are not unquestioningly a US ally. On November 28, I questioned the wisdom of the US decision to no longer abide by SALT II limits. We have repeatedly expressed that view to the US Administration, most recently in a letter last week from Prime Minister Brian Mulroney to President Ronald Reagan, and two weeks ago in my discussion with US Secretary of State George Shultz in Ottawa. SALT II is not perfect, but even imperfect restraint is better than no restraint. Our position on this point has been consistent, clear and unequivocal.

It is untrue to say that testing of ALCM guidance systems entails 'co-operation in order to subvert SALT II.' Testing assures the effectiveness of a weapon; it does not determine how many weapons of that type there should be. ALCM testing in Canada no more made it possible for the US to equip its 131st B-52 bomber with cruise missiles than to equip the first B-52.

The important point is that negotiations on limiting the number of cruise missiles are under way in Geneva. This Government strongly supports those negotiations. We are looking for the superpowers to agree on a new arms control accord. In the interim, cruise missile

testing contributes to Alliance unity and demonstrates to the Soviet Union that attempts to drive wedges into the Alliance will not work. This is one reason they returned to the negotiating table in Geneva, and why they are now beginning to negotiate seriously."

Following is an excerpt from an address made by the Minister of National Defence to the Empire Club in Toronto on January 15.

"Deterring aggression, or intimidation through threat of aggression, requires forces with sufficiently credible capabilities to dissuade a potential enemy. The massive Warsaw Pact conventional and nuclear capabilities in Europe pose a real threat to the democratic values enjoyed by our European partners. Canada shares with its allies in the West a commitment to these values. Preserving them cannot be taken for granted. They must be actively defended.

Canada could not survive as the sort of country we all wish it to be if democracy among our traditional allies were lost. A threat to the other Western democracies threatens us here in Canada as well.

We are not in NATO and in Europe today simply out of a spirit of altruism. We are there because our interests as a nation require us to be there and because the loss of a free Europe would be a grave blow to our ability to maintain our democratic freedoms here in Canada. There can be no doubt that the defence of Western Europe continues to be critical to the defence of the Canada we wish to preserve.

The direct threat to Canadian territory is posed currently by Soviet long-range nuclear missile, bomber and submarine forces based in the Soviet Union. Since our geography uniquely situates us between the two nuclear superpowers, we could not remain unaffected by Soviet

aggression against the United States. Opting out is not possible, nor would it be consistent with our proud history, our beliefs and our responsibilities as a democratic and sovereign nation.

Bearing in mind our geographic location, I do not believe that a neutral cordon around Canada would make us safer or improve the global situation by the example it would set. Even if we could afford it, the cost for Canada of going it alone would be very much greater, with no assurance that we would be any more secure. Arguably, we could end up being much less so. In any case how could we hope to enforce Canadian neutrality or even verify that it was being respected?

To opt out would be to give up the collective development of all security measures, which includes arms control, in the North Atlantic Alliance. A disarmed or neutral Canada would not have become part of the process of security and cooperation building in Europe begun with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. We could not then have contributed to the success of the Stockholm Conference, nor have a seat at the table of the current Vienna meeting continuing the Helsinki process. We could not have become participants in European conventional arms control negotiations, and could not be part of allied consultations on nuclear arms control.

Would the declaration of Canada as a nuclear weapons-free zone make Canadians safer? Unfortunately, such a unilateral act does not provide the security its advocates suggest. A nation of nuclear-free zones is not a nuclear weapons-safe nation. Such a declaration would not by itself eliminate a single nuclear weapon or reduce the differences which divide East and West. Indeed, as the *Toronto Sun* observed, 'it serves more to comfort our enemies and confound our allies.' I do not believe that any worthy aim would be achieved by divorcing Canada from weapons and policies which, despite our action, would continue to provide security to Canadians. Along with all our NATO partners, we have rejected this course as illusory...."

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Disarmament Bulletin

Supplement

Canada at the Conference on Disarmament

Historical Background

Throughout the years since the creation of the United Nations, Canada has been a member of the various United Nations and other bodies dealing with disarmament questions, including the Conference on Disarmament and its predecessors going back to the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, created as a result of an initiative in 1959 by France, the UK, the USA and the USSR. In 1961, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) endorsed the establishment of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), which added eight non-aligned states to the original five "Western European and other" and five Eastern European states of the Ten-Nation Committee. The ENDC, which first convened in Geneva in March 1962, was created to undertake negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. It adopted a step-by-step approach on the basis of an agreed US-USSR Joint Statement of Principles.

The ENDC was enlarged in 1969 by eight members and again in 1975 by five, to 31. Known as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) after 1969, it met in Geneva each year.

At the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978, the CCD's name was changed to the Committee on Disarmament (CD) and its membership was set at the five

This is the third in a series of periodic supplements to the *Disarmament Bulletin* that have been prepared by the Department of External Affairs in order to provide a more detailed presentation of Canada's efforts to promote arms control and disarmament.

Cette publication existe également en français.



The Conference on Disarmament meets at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, the European office of the United Nations. Before the Second World War, the Palais des Nations was the headquarters of the League of Nations and the scene of a number of historic events.

UN Photo 1365

nuclear-weapon states (China, France, USSR, United Kingdom, USA) and 35 other states. This membership is divided into three general groups and China: ten Western, eight socialist or Eastern and 21 neutral and non-aligned.

In 1983 the Committee accepted in principle a limited expansion in its membership, by not more than four states, subject to agreement on the selection of new members and taking into account the necessity of maintaining balance. So far, no agreement has been reached on the new members. In 1983 the Committee decided to change its name to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) beginning with its 1984 session. The Conference meets twice yearly in Geneva, in spring (February-April) and summer (June-August) sessions. It remains the only ongoing global forum

for multilateral negotiations in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The basic methods of operation of the CD were established by the UNGA at UNSSOD I in 1978. At the beginning of each annual session, the CD adopts its agenda, taking into account, among other things, the recommendations made to it by the UN General Assembly (it is not, strictly speaking, a UN organization) as well as proposals presented to it by its own members. It conducts its work in plenary meetings as well as under any additional arrangements agreed to by the member states. Whenever it deems it advisable, including when it appears that there is a basis to negotiate a draft treaty or other draft texts, the CD establishes subsidiary bodies, such as *ad hoc* working groups and committees. Agreement on the specific mandates of



such subsidiary bodies is usually required each year.

Decisions in the CD are taken by consensus, even on procedural issues. Thus, when it comes to establishing a subsidiary body, consensus must be reached on its mandate. For a variety of reasons, usually based on political rather than legal or practical considerations, such consensus is frequently elusive.

A number of important multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements were negotiated in the predecessor bodies to the CD during the decades of the 60s and 70s. Among these is the 1963 treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, commonly known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Efforts to negotiate this treaty began in 1955 in the United Nations sub-committee of five made up of the USA, the United Kingdom, Canada, France and the USSR. The work continued in the Geneva Conference of Experts (of which Canada was also a member) and in other forums including the ENDC in Geneva, and was concluded in Moscow in 1963. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), concluded in 1968, was also negotiated in the ENDC. The Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1970, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 and the Environmental Modification Convention of 1976 were all negotiated

in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the immediate predecessor to the Conference on Disarmament.¹

Canada's Role in the Conference on Disarmament

Canada has consistently played a prominent role in the CD. Canada aims at a constructive and practical approach which seeks to define areas of common ground and expand them. This approach calls for a willingness to accept sensible accommodations of interest — not compromises on matters of principle but genuine reconciliations and accommodations. Over the years, Canada has introduced numerous working papers and other working documents in areas of priority to Canada which have been widely recognized as making important contributions to the work of the Conference on Disarmament. Many of these papers have focused on the crucial question of verification. These contributions have helped achieve progress in several important areas of work in the CD, such as outer space, a comprehen-

¹The role of the UN in disarmament efforts is discussed in detail in an article by Canada's Ambassador to the CD, J. Alan Beesley, entitled "Disarmament and the United Nations at Forty," *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations* 8, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 20-35.

sive test ban, chemical weapons and a radiological weapons ban.

The 1986 Session

In accordance with the principle of rotation, Canada's Ambassador J. Alan Beesley had the honour and responsibility of being president of the CD during the critical report-writing period in August, as well as through the following inter-session period (until February 3, 1987).

The following is a brief outline of developments in 1986 on the key issues before the CD, and of Canadian input on these issues.

A. Nuclear Test Ban (NTB)

The test ban issue continued to occupy a prominent place on the CD agenda but there was failure to reach consensus on the establishment of a subsidiary body under this item because of disagreement between those who wished to begin negotiations immediately and those who preferred first to achieve further progress on verification and compliance, as well as broad agreement on the scope of a treaty. Nevertheless, important progress was achieved by the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) in developing practical means of verification of a test ban through seismic means. Canada has played a leading role in the GSE and has presented a number of working papers. A workshop held in Ottawa in October 1986, hosted by the Canadian Government, brought together communications experts from 17 countries to study problems relating to the exchange of waveform data under an eventual test ban agreement. Soviet statements during the 1986 session indicated a more forthcoming approach on technical and institutional matters related to the establishment and operation of a global seismic monitoring network. Expert level discussions between the USSR and the USA on nuclear test issues, as well as indications that both countries may be ready to consider a step-by-step approach to nuclear test limitation, provide some basis for hope that further progress may be possible.

In February 1986 the Canadian Government announced its intention to upgrade the seismic array in Yellowknife as a further contribution to laying the ground for adequate verification of a nuclear test ban treaty.

Canada's approach to a comprehensive test ban (CTB) is encapsulated in



The Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament meeting in Washington in 1960. The Canadian representative, the late General E.L.M. Burns, is seated second from left. After serving as Commander of the UN Emergency Force in the Sinai from 1956 to 1959, General Burns was appointed Special Advisor to the Government on Disarmament. He later represented Canada at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

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Mr. J. Alan Beesley (centre), Canada's Ambassador to the CD, Mr. Arsène Després (left), Counsellor with the Canadian delegation to the CD, and Mr. Miljan Komatina (right), Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General, during recent session of CD. L. Bianco

the August 1986 message of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the CD: "In the Canadian view, a gradual incremental step-by-step approach will be required if a comprehensive test ban is to become a reality. We intend to pursue vigorously our efforts to this end in the Conference on Disarmament and in other forums."

B. Chemical Weapons (CW)

Despite the fact that discussions in the CD on this issue began more than 10 years ago, formal negotiations on a CW ban began only in 1984, on the basis of a framework developed the previous year under Canadian chairmanship of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons. The increasing danger of proliferation of chemical weapons, and evidence that these weapons have been repeatedly used in the Iran-Iraq conflict, underscore the pressing need for a CW treaty. A CW convention would prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, possession and use of CW. It would be a genuine disarmament treaty and not simply an arms control agreement. Such a convention would include provisions for the destruction of all existing CW stockpiles and production facilities within 10 years of the treaty's coming into

force. It would include the establishment of an international agency to administer the treaty. The most sensitive and difficult issues for negotiation relate to the verification provisions of the treaty; even on these questions, however, there has recently been some progress in narrowing the differences among the participants in the negotiations.

Under United Kingdom chairmanship of the *Ad Hoc* Committee in 1986, considerable progress was achieved on provisions relating to the declaration, monitoring and destruction of CW production facilities (including on-site inspection), and on provisions to monitor the chemical industry to ensure that its production is not diverted for CW purposes. Drafting of verification measures for the destruction of CW stockpiles is also proceeding at a good pace. Considerable work remains to be done on the important question of challenge inspections. Other areas where there is as yet insufficient agreement include declarations and monitoring of CW stockpiles prior to their destruction.

During the 1986 session the USA delegation made important clarifications as to how a treaty might apply to countries with different social systems. The

USA also tabled detailed information on the nature and locations of its own CW stockpiles. The USSR tabled substantive proposals relating to certain aspects of the verification of a treaty, particularly in relation to the destruction of production facilities. An important UK proposal may facilitate a convergence of views on the sensitive and vital issue of challenge inspections.

Canada submitted two working papers as a contribution to the negotiations: a practical *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons*; and a proposed computer-adaptable method for the classification and listing of chemicals. To assist the Committee in its task, Canada also made available to CD members a cross-indexed compendium of all CW-related statements and papers for the years 1983-1985, which updated an earlier Canadian compilation for the years prior to 1983. These contributions were well received by delegations from all groups.

The CW negotiations now appear to be entering a final phase and in order to permit accelerated progress towards agreement, the time allotted to the negotiations has been increased through intersessional work. In cooperation with the Department of National Defence and the University of Saskatchewan, Canada deploys scientific experts at each CD session to strengthen the Canadian contribution to the negotiations.

C. Outer Space

For the second year in a row an *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space was established. The agreed mandate, while not providing for the initiation of formal negotiations, has permitted useful, substantive work in elucidating relevant aspects of international law with a view to assessing the possible need for supplementary measures. The complexity of the subject became progressively more apparent to many delegations and underlined the need to proceed with care in any effort to formulate new legal or other measures.

Canada has made major contributions to the work of the Outer Space Committee through its working papers. In 1985 a broad survey of existing international law relevant to arms control and outer space was tabled by Canada and served as the basis for much of the



committee discussions. The Canadian delegation introduced another substantive working document in 1986 on terminology relevant to arms control and outer space that was also well received by members of the Committee. In addition the Canadian delegation has submitted two compilations of statements and working papers, to provide delegations with ready reference to CD material. Such practical contributions greatly facilitate the work of the CD, as has been recognized repeatedly by its members.

D. Other Issues

The *Ad Hoc* Committee on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CPD) met regularly in 1986 and is now closer to meeting its objective of an agreed programme. The *Ad Hoc* Committee on Radiological Weapons (RW) reviewed the various outstanding issues relating to a treaty in this area, but considerable differences of view on whether or not attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities should be included in a treaty banning RW have slowed down the pace of negotiations.

On nuclear issues on the CD agenda other than the nuclear test ban, some progress was recorded in allowing the question of the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race to be discussed in informal sessions of the Conference in the absence of a subsidiary body dedicated to this issue. As for the agenda item dealing with the Prevention of Nuclear War (PNW) the CD was not able to reach agreement on an organizational framework or mandate that would have allowed this crucial question to be given in-depth consideration. Many delegations consider that as far as the above two nuclear issues are concerned, it is necessary for the two major nuclear powers to arrive at agreements for significant reductions in their nuclear arsenals before work can begin on determining areas of meaningful multilateral negotiations.

The subject of verification is an area where Canada has devoted considerable resources. Canada is convinced that practical work on verification will contribute to progress in the arms control and disarmament process. To assist members of the CD in their discussion, Canada made available a large compilation of statements made in the CD on this critical subject. This compendium was much in demand by delegations.

Conclusion

The CD attracts fewer headlines than the bilateral talks on nuclear and space arms also taking place in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union, or even the disarmament resolutions passed in the United Nations General Assembly. This should not be taken as an indication that the CD is unimportant. As the Secretary of State for External Affairs stated in his message to the CD in August 1986: "In an era when the awesome realities of existing and emerging weapons technologies are a cause for concern to the peoples of all countries and continents, the task of devising effective, agreed arms control and disarmament measures cannot simply be left to those who possess the largest arsenals. The Conference on Disarmament, which is the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, therefore performs an indispensable political and institutional role."

Although the Conference on Disarmament has redoubled its efforts in recent years (to the extent that the number of its meetings has increased sixfold since 1977) it has not, despite some progress, yet proved possible to achieve new agreements in important areas such as a comprehensive nuclear test ban, outer space and chemical weapons.

The work of the Conference does not proceed in a vacuum. The prospects for progress on disarmament are heavily influenced by the international climate and

in particular by the relationships between East and West and between North and South. The atmosphere of hope generated by the resumption of the US-USSR bilateral arms negotiations doubtless facilitated the considerable progress achieved during the 1985 and 1986 CD sessions in the chemical weapons negotiations, as well as the work done in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

Canada intends to continue to work actively to maintain and enhance the relevance of the CD to the international arms control and disarmament process. The CD can make an invaluable contribution to this process not only through the negotiation of specific agreements but also by directing political support to other important negotiations (e.g., between the USA and USSR), by working on legal and technical problems relevant to possible future negotiations (e.g., on verification), and by identifying emerging issues which the international community will need to address (e.g., the military uses of outer space).

Progress towards fulfilment of the CD's mandate has been disappointingly slow during recent years. However, to tread water while awaiting an improvement in the international climate, and in particular in the relations between the superpowers, would be fraught with danger. The Conference on Disarmament cannot, therefore, be content merely to reflect the international climate. It must help lead the way by improving it.



A general view of the Conference on Disarmament in plenary session. UN Photo 163792

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Disarmament Bulletin

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USA and Soviet Representatives Visit Ottawa to Discuss Arms Control and Disarmament Questions



Prime Minister Brian Mulroney exchanging views with Mr. Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to US President Reagan on arms control, prior to their meeting on Parliament Hill on March 5. Also in the picture are the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs (left), and Mr. Thomas Niles, United States Ambassador to Canada (right).

PMO

On March 5, Mr. Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to US President Reagan on arms control, and Ambassador Viktor Karpov, Director of Arms Control in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, were in Ottawa to discuss the international arms control and disarmament situation with the Canadian Government. Ambassador Karpov, formerly head of the Soviet negotiating team at the bilateral US-USSR talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva, was in Ottawa for the third annual Canada-USSR arms control consultations that took place on March 5-6. The broad agenda of the consultations with Ambassador Karpov included the bilateral US-USSR nuclear and space talks, chemical weapons, conventional arms control and other arms control and disarmament issues, including the United

Nations and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

Mr. Karpov's visit was followed by that of Mr. Alexander A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, who was in Ottawa on May 1. Mr. Bessmertnykh held consultations with the Canadian Government on recent developments in the area of nuclear arms control and the state of play at the bilateral US-USSR nuclear and space talks in Geneva.

The visit of Mr. Nitze took place as part of ongoing Alliance consultations on arms control questions, including the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). These consultations were part of a comprehensive analysis of this issue by

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the US Administration, including discussions with Congress and a further re-examination of the ABM Treaty confidential negotiating record and Senate ratification process. Canada was assured by the USA that no decision to move to a broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty had yet been taken, nor will be taken before this process is completed.

On the occasion of the Nitze visit, the Secretary of State for External Affairs reiterated Canada's commitment to the pursuit of arms control and the maintenance of the existing arms control regime. He said that the Canadian Government has consistently supported the USA in its adherence to the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Any move to a broader interpretation could have significant political and strategic ramifications for international stability and security, and these require close scrutiny and considered analysis. Any unilateral action by either party to the Treaty that could have a negative impact on the current strategic balance would be regarded by Canada with profound concern. Mr. Clark said that Canada continues to fully support the USA negotiating position in Geneva which has sought, as a first step, 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arsenals and an agreement on intermediate-range forces. "We have welcomed in this regard the new Soviet offer to negotiate a separate Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement. We also remain committed to the concept of collective defence and membership in NATO. The Alliance offers a unique forum for timely and useful consultations on such crucial issues which affect Western, and ultimately Canadian, security. We shall continue to participate fully in such discussions which offer the best opportunity and most appropriate means for the expression of Canadian views and opinions."

Canada has also continued its consultations on arms control and disarmament issues with other countries. Formal consultations were recently held with the German Democratic Republic. Informal consultations were held with Japan and New Zealand. Further consultations with Australia, Japan and China are planned for this fall.

NATO Foreign Ministers Support Global Elimination of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Missiles

The Secretary of State for External Affairs was Canada's representative to the semi-annual meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, held in Reykjavik, Iceland, on June 11 and 12, 1987.

The Reykjavik meeting took place at a critical juncture in the arms control and disarmament process. In particular, significant developments in the negotiations between the USA and USSR on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) had substantially raised hopes that an INF agreement was near. Nevertheless, there were concerns expressed in some quarters, most notably among West European nations, about the implications of an INF agreement for Western security and the nuclear and conventional balance of forces.

The Reykjavik communiqué issued by ministers on June 12 reflected these and other issues discussed in Reykjavik. Ministers, among other things, addressed the two major issues currently facing the Alliance, the so-called "double zero option" for the removal of long- and short-range INF missiles, and steps to eliminate the disparities in conventional forces in Europe.

All 16 NATO Foreign Ministers expressed their support for the elimination of INF missiles not only from Europe, but also on a global basis. Furthermore, they also underlined the necessity for progress in obtaining agreements on eliminating chemical weapons and rectifying the conventional imbalance in Europe. Finally, ministers outlined the elements of a coherent and comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament which will guide NATO's future approach to this vital area. Following is the text of the NATO communiqué issued following the Reykjavik meeting.

"1. Our meeting has taken place at a time when developments in East-West relations suggest that real progress may be possible, particularly in the field of arms control. We welcome these developments and will work to ensure that they result in improved security and stability. We note some encouraging signs in Soviet internal and external policies. In assessing Soviet intentions, we agree that the final test will be Soviet conduct across the spectrum from human rights to arms control.

We reaffirm the validity of the complementary principles enunciated in the Harmel Report of 1967. The maintenance of adequate military strength and Alliance cohesion and solidarity remains an essential basis for our policy of dialogue and co-operation — a policy which aims to achieve a progressively more stable and constructive East-West relationship.

2. Serious imbalances in the conventional, chemical and nuclear field, and the persisting build-up of Soviet military power, continue to preoccupy us. We reaffirm that there is no alternative, as far as we can foresee, to the Alliance concept for the prevention of war — the strategy of deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces, each element being indispensable. This strategy will continue to rest on the linkage of free Europe's security to that of North America, since their destinies are inextricably coupled. Thus the US nuclear commitment, the presence of United States nuclear forces in Europe¹ and the deployment of Canadian and United States forces there remain essential.

3. Arms control and disarmament are integral parts of our security policy; we

¹Greece recalls its position on nuclear matters.



seek effectively verifiable arms control agreements which can lead to a more stable and secure balance of forces at lower levels.

4. We reiterate the prime importance we attach to rapid progress towards reductions in the field of strategic nuclear weapons. We thus welcome the fact that the US and the Soviet Union now share the objective of achieving 50 per cent reductions in their strategic arsenals. We strongly endorse the presentation of a US proposal in Geneva to that effect and urge the Soviet Union to respond positively.

We reviewed the current phase of the US-Soviet negotiations in Geneva on defence and space systems which aim to prevent an arms race in space and to strengthen strategic stability. We continue to endorse these efforts.

5. We note the recent progress achieved at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament towards a total ban on

chemical weapons. We remain committed to achieving an early agreement on a comprehensive, worldwide and effectively verifiable treaty embracing the total destruction of existing stockpiles within an agreed timeframe and preventing the future production of such weapons.

6. Recognizing the increasing importance of conventional stability, particularly at a time when significant nuclear reductions appear possible, we reaffirm the initiatives taken in our Halifax Statement and Brussels Declaration aimed at achieving a comprehensive, stable and verifiable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. We recall that negotiations on conventional stability should be accompanied by negotiations between the 35 countries participating in the CSCE, building upon and expanding the confidence and security building measures contained in the Helsinki Final Act and the Stockholm Agreement. We agreed that the two future security negotiations should take

place within the framework of the CSCE process, with the conventional stability negotiations retaining autonomy as regards subject matter, participation and procedures. Building on these agreements we took the decisions necessary to enable the High Level Task Force on Conventional Arms Control, which we established at the Halifax Ministerial, to press ahead with its work on the draft mandates to be tabled in the CSCE meeting and in the Conventional Stability mandate talks currently taking place in Vienna.

7. Having reviewed progress in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on an INF agreement, the Allies concerned call on the Soviet Union to drop its demand to retain a portion of its SS-20 capability and reiterate their wish to see all long-range land-based missiles eliminated in accordance with NATO's long-standing objective.

They support the global and effectively verifiable elimination of all US and Soviet land-based SRINF missiles with a range between 500 and 1 000 km as an integral part of an INF agreement.

They consider that an INF agreement on this basis would be an important element in a coherent and comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament which, while consistent with NATO's doctrine of flexible response, would include:

- a 50 per cent reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the US and the Soviet Union, to be achieved during current Geneva negotiations;
- the global elimination of chemical weapons;
- the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe;
- in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global



Mr. Clark at recent NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting. Canada supports the NATO position that a global INF agreement would be an important element in a coherent and comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament.



elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter range, leading to equal ceilings.

8. We² have directed the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, working in conjunction with the appropriate military authorities, to consider the further development of a comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament. The arms control problems faced by the Alliance raise complex and inter-related issues which must be evaluated together, bearing in mind overall progress in the arms control negotiations enumerated above as well as the requirements of Alliance security and of its strategy of deterrence.

9. In our endeavour to explore all opportunities for an increasingly broad and constructive dialogue which addresses the concerns of people in both East and West, and in the firm conviction that a stable order of peace and security in Europe cannot be built by military means alone, we attach particular importance to the CSCE process. We are therefore determined to make full use of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna.

The full implementation of all provisions agreed in the CSCE process by the 35 participating states, in particular in the field of human rights and contacts, remains the fundamental objective of the Alliance and is essential for the fruitful development of East-West relations in all fields. Recalling our constructive proposals, we shall persist in our efforts to persuade the Eastern countries to live up to their commitments.

We will continue to work for a substantive and timely result of the conference.

10. Those of us participating in the MBFR talks reiterate our desire to

achieve a meaningful agreement which provides for reductions, limitations and effective verification, and call upon the Warsaw Pact participants in these talks to respond positively to the very important proposals made by the West in December 1985 and to adopt a more constructive posture in the negotiations.

11. In Berlin's 750th anniversary year we stress our solidarity with the City, which continues to be an important element in East-West relations. Practical improvements in inner-German relations should in particular be of benefit to Berliners.

12. It is just 40 years since US Secretary of State Marshall delivered his far-sighted speech at Harvard. The fundamental values he expressed, which we all share, and which were subsequently embodied in the Marshall Plan, remain as vital today as they were then.

13. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorism in all its forms. Reaffirming our determination to combat it, we believe that close international co-operation is an essential means of eradicating this scourge.

14. Alliance cohesion is substantially enhanced by the support of freely elected parliamentary representatives and ultimately our publics. We therefore underline the great value of free debate on issues facing the Alliance and welcome the exchanges of views on these issues among the parliamentarians of our countries, including those in the North Atlantic Assembly.

15. We express our gratitude to the government of Iceland, which makes such a vital contribution to the security of the Alliance's northern maritime approaches, for their warm hospitality.

16. The Spring 1988 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session will be held in Spain in June."

Canada Welcomes Willingness of USSR to Conclude Global INF Agreement

On July 23, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney welcomed Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev's reported agreement to the concept of a global ban on long- and short-range Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and expressed hope that this move would soon be incorporated into the Soviet position at the Geneva negotiations.

The Prime Minister noted that Mr. Gorbachev's agreement to a global ban was consistent with the preference of the members of NATO, which have been advocating a global "double zero" INF agreement. The Prime Minister also remarked that a complete ban significantly simplifies the verification task compared with the

previous Soviet position in which 100 warheads on either side were to be retained.

Canada had earlier welcomed the Soviet Union's willingness to conclude a separate INF agreement. On March 9, Mr. Clark said that Canada actively supported the idea that an INF agreement should not depend on agreement being reached on strategic arms or on defensive systems. This support flows from Canada's belief that allowing achievable progress to be consolidated in concrete agreements is the most effective means of moving forward the arms control process and improving East-West relations.

² In this connection France recalled that it had not been a party to the double-track decision of 1979 and that it was not therefore bound by its consequences or implications.



Department of National Defence Releases White Paper on Defence

On June 5, the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Perrin Beatty, tabled in the House of Commons a comprehensive White Paper on Defence that outlined a new defence policy for Canada. This new policy, the first in 16 years, will provide a modern and realistic mandate to the Canadian Armed Forces and commits the Government to giving the Forces "the tools to do the job."

Following is an excerpt from the White Paper dealing with the arms control aspects of Canadian defence policy. Summaries of the White Paper are available free of charge from National Defence Headquarters (Director General Information), 101 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0K2. Copies of the White Paper can be purchased for \$3.00 from the Canadian Government Publishing Centre, Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0S9, or through associated bookstores or other booksellers.

"Arms control, like defence, is one of the pillars of Canadian security policy. They are complementary, and the policies pursued in each area are consistent with the common goal of enhancing security and stability at the lowest level of forces.

Short of the utopian state of an unarmed world, arms control will never be a substitute for adequate defence. Conversely, if we are to succeed in enhancing security, we cannot rely on military force alone.

Canada has articulated the following six specific arms control goals:

- negotiated radical reductions in nuclear forces and the enhancement of strategic stability;
- maintenance and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime;
- negotiation of a global chemical weapons ban;
- support for a comprehensive test ban treaty;
- prevention of an arms race in outer space; and

— the building of confidence sufficient to facilitate the reduction of military forces in Europe and elsewhere.

Unilateral disarmament measures will not enhance Canadian security. Experience has shown that effective arms control can only be achieved through the careful negotiation of balanced and verifiable reductions or limitations. Unless such agreements are complied with fully and in good faith, they will produce neither increased stability nor the confidence necessary for improved East-West relations. That is why verification of arms control agreements is so important. Arms control negotiations require a unique blend of international diplomacy and military-technical expertise. The Department of National Defence works closely with the Department of External Affairs in the formulation of arms control proposals, in the continuing dialogue with our Alliance partners and in those negotiations to which we are party.

Internationally, the Department of National Defence provides this expertise in a broad range of fora. Members of the Department participate in the Canadian delegations to the United Nations, the

Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks. They also played a role in the Stockholm Conference and will do so again in any follow-on negotiation of confidence and security building measures.

The arms control negotiations of most concern to the Department of National Defence are those with the greatest potential to affect East-West relations, the East-West military balance, or the disposition of Canadian Forces.

In the Geneva negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear weapons, we support the current emphasis on deep reductions, concentrating on the most destabilizing systems. We believe that the limitation of long-range, air and sea-launched cruise missiles must also be addressed. In the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, we believe the focus should be on effective confidence and security building measures and on the establishment of a more stable balance of forces so as to reduce the likelihood of war occurring as a result of miscalculation or surprise attack."



General view of the Stockholm Conference in plenary session. Members of the Department of National Defence played an important role in the Stockholm Conference and provide expertise to Canadian delegations participating in a number of international disarmament forums.

Reportagebild



SSEA Addresses Issues of Western Security in the Post-Reykjavik World

On April 28, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, appeared before the House of Commons' Standing Committee on Defence to discuss recent developments in the international security environment. Following is the text of his address.

"At a time like today, when the Government is examining important options in the field of defence, I think it might be useful to review the current international security environment, which informs not only our defence policy but the basic texture of our approach to security in its broadest sense as a key component of our foreign policy. A country's agenda can never be more precise and forward-looking than the principles and environment which dictate it.

More specifically, as you know, Mr. Chairman, this is my first opportunity to address colleagues since my meeting with Secretary of State Shultz and other NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels earlier this month, following Mr. Shultz's visit to Moscow. So let me take liberties with Dickens: I would say that it is not clear if this is the best or the worst of times. Indeed it might, as he found, be both.

The post-Reykjavik world has produced its own new international security environment. The breathtaking sweep of the proposals discussed in Iceland raised the prospect of a much less nuclear world, which in turn has focused attention on the ramifications of such a world for East-West relations and for Western security.

The momentum generated by the Soviet Union's decision on February 28 once again to de-link an Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement from the other aspects of the Geneva negotiations has brought closer to reality the possibility of the first major arms control agreement in ten years, and indeed the first real disarmament agreement since the end of the Second World War.

We may be close to an agreement that would virtually wipe out an entire class of nuclear weapons. Yet we in the Western Alliance appear reluctant to take the plunge. Mr. Gorbachev has asked rhetorically what we are afraid of. The USSR stands to eliminate four times as many intermediate-range warheads under the proposed agreement, and has further even offered to eliminate shorter-range INF missiles, of which the USA has none, and discussed the reduction and elimination of short-range systems. Obviously, the public relations appeal of Mr. Gorbachev's offer is clear.

The West does indeed want arms control. We do want to reduce nuclear weapons, and reduce them significantly. The enhancement of international stability and security, at the lowest possible level of armaments, has been a Canadian foreign policy objective for many years, and one which I might say is shared by all of our allies.

I want to underline the word 'stability.' That word 'stability' is the key at whatever lower level of armaments the new strategic balance is struck.

Canadians have traditionally been interested primarily in strategic nuclear arms for obvious reasons. The potentially catastrophic consequences for our nation of a nuclear exchange between the superpowers has had an overriding influence on thinking in North America. Destruction by strategic nuclear weapons, however unlikely, is the most direct threat to our national security.

Europe, on the other hand, has suffered through two devastating conventional wars. The continent is home to the largest concentration of armed forces in the world. It is the current overwhelming superiority of the Warsaw Pact in almost every aspect of conventional fields since the Second World War that has resulted in the necessity of the Alliance's current dependency on nuclear weapons, and upon strategies such as flexible response.

It is therefore understandable that our Western European allies react cautiously to the possibility of the loss of a portion of their nuclear security. I dare say that we in Canada might embrace a similar reluctance at the thought of an erosion in the credibility of the USA's strategic nuclear deterrent if we thought such an erosion would undermine Canadian security. This is the crux of the problem with regard to the INF question. This particular class is of paramount importance to the Europeans. Whatever we might prefer, Western Europe feels the need for some nuclear weapons to deter the Soviets from using, or threatening to use, their conventional superiority.

The issue is most complex, and one that is not necessarily resolved merely by matching the Soviets system for system and missile for missile. The inter-relationship between the nuclear and conventional balance of forces was brought home strikingly by the Reykjavik Summit. It would not be particularly useful in this context to eliminate all nuclear weapons in one range without having reached conclusions about the security implications for weapons in other ranges.

Imbalances, it is important to remember, in conventional and chemical weapons in Europe become even more troublesome. In the absence of a credible nuclear deterrent there is more concern about the maintenance of adequate conventional forces.

Ironically, and I think this is very important for Canadians to focus upon, in these terms, in these circumstances, nuclear disarmament, or significant movement towards a less nuclear world, is unlikely to reduce defence budgets. It would be naive to assume that it would lead to a reduction of defence budgets. That has implications for Canada as it does for other partners in the Alliance.

Now, it is a daunting alternative to redress the conventional imbalance through negotiation. Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops and weapons are a threat to



the West. However, one must understand the military and political situation in Eastern Europe. The capacity to use force, or to threaten the use of force within that area itself, is a major reason for the current level of Soviet troops deployed there.

It is also a major factor in explaining why the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks have not produced any agreement to reduce the level of conventional forces in Europe despite 14 years of trying.

A further complication on the conventional side is what to count and how to count it. In these terms transparency and adequate verification become paramount. Yet it is precisely in these areas that the East has been less than forthcoming, as the MBFR experience has shown. The Warsaw Pact has steadfastly refused even to provide data that we can regard as accurate on their force levels in the reduction zones.

So there is progress, and there are daunting obstacles. It is the best and the worst of times. The Alliance must make some difficult choices in the weeks and the months ahead. Decisions take time in the West. It is a factor I think that must also be underlined. It is relatively easy to secure agreement in an alliance like the Warsaw Pact. It is not easy or quick to secure agreement in an alliance like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The concerns of all partners have to be fully aired and their interests have to be respected. That is the fundamental difference between the two alliances. That is why there are two alliances. That is what this is all about. One side is free, another side is not.

The free side, because it is free, takes more time and has more difficulty coming to agreement in negotiations. That makes it no less compelling to nations in the alliance of freedom to try to come to agreements.

It is certainly important we underline that these natural forces are at work. Concerning the European experience with conventional war, conventional weapons, the imbalance, the apprehen-

sion of imbalance, when you look out your Eastern window from Western Europe, you see substantial superiority in conventional arms. Within Eastern Europe, there is a multitude of reasons for those arms being there; they all complicate the matter.

The fact it is complicated and the fact Mr. Gorbachev's proposals have a scatergun air about them should not be taken as a sign or an excuse of reluctance by the West to engage in meaningful and significant arms reductions. We simply have to make sure we get

right whatever it is we agree to. Our security and the security of our allies are at stake. Nuclear arms reductions for the sake of nuclear arms reductions alone are not going to resolve our problems, if they simply make the world safer for a war by other means. The enhancement of international security and stability is the bottom line and one to which we intend to adhere.

I will end my introductory remarks there, Mr. Chairman, and will try to deal with questions you might have on this or other matters."

Chemical Weapons are a 'Global Problem Which Must be Addressed on a Global Basis,' Canada Tells CD

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) established an Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons in 1980 to inject new momentum into its ongoing consideration of the issue of a ban on chemical weapons. This Working Group seeks to conclude a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons production and the destruction of all existing stocks of chemical weapons. The use of chemical weapons is banned by the 1925 Geneva Protocol but there is strong evidence that chemical weapons continue to be used. Canada has been active at the CD in the pursuit of a chemical weapons ban and has devoted considerable research efforts to questions relating to the verification of allegations of chemical weapons use. Canada's efforts in this important area were outlined in an address to the CD by Canada's Ambassador to that body, Mr. J. Alan Beesley, on July 9. Following are excerpts from his address.

"The earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive, adequately verifiable ban on chemical weapons remains one of the priority arms control objectives of the Canadian Government. Such a convention should, in our view, provide for the immediate cessation of all chemical

weapons production and for the systematic destruction within a specified period of all existing stocks of chemical weapons. The legitimate concern for security should be addressed in a way which ensures that implementation of the convention will not create any new kinds of imbalance which might undermine the security of any State Party. However, the convention must constitute not just an arms limitation measure but be seen from the outset to be a real disarmament measure, involving the complete elimination of an entire class of a weapon of mass destruction.

The successful conclusion of such a convention would make a direct and lasting contribution to international security. It would, moreover, go a long way towards reviving public confidence in the relevance and efficacy of the multilateral arms control process in general and the authority of this negotiating forum in particular. This would be indispensable to the long-term effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament.

For these reasons, Mr. President, the Government of Canada takes considerable satisfaction from the serious, constructive and business-like approach to the negotiation which characterized our work during the 1986 session and

which has persisted in the present one. Progress, indeed, continues to be made. The presence here this week of a number of industrial experts from several countries, including Canada, indicates the practical emphasis of our current endeavours. I would like to express special appreciation to Ambassador Ekéus for the energetic but sensitive way in which he is presiding over our work. All delegations of the Conference are now working with a seriousness of purpose which augurs well for prospects for continuing significant negotiating progress.

Such progress is all the more urgent when seen against the distressing fact that chemical weapons continue to be used. Moreover, there is strong evidence that an increasing number of countries have acquired or are seeking to acquire a chemical warfare capability. The Canadian Government was dismayed at the most recent report of the United Nations Secretary-General which again confirmed the repeated use of chemical weapons in the Iraq-Iran war. Canada abhors and condemns this use of chemical weapons in clear breach of the legal obligations embodied in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, to which both Iraq and Iran are parties. We again laud the Secretary-General for his initiative in launching an investigation and in bringing its results to the attention of the Security Council. It is a matter of regret that, thus far, no effective means has yet been found, not only to prevent the repeated use of chemical weapons, but to bring an end to that tragic conflict. We again call on all parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol to adhere to their obligations and we urge the combatants in the Gulf war to seek, through negotiations, a termination of hostilities in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 582 and 588.

The implications of this repeated use of chemical weapons, and of the reported interest of a number of countries in acquiring a chemical warfare capability, are alarming in several respects. They reinforce mutual suspicion and insecurity. They undermine the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. They also constitute an all too tangible reminder that the chemical weapons threat is not

confined to one particular region or to one arena of potential conflict. They underscore that chemical weapons are a global problem which must be addressed on a global basis. This should reinforce our sense of urgency and our determination to persevere in the negotiation of an agreement to ban these weapons from the military arsenals of all countries.

It is against this background that the Canadian Government decided that, pending the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, certain practical steps should be taken with a view to limiting the danger of the misuse of chemicals for weapons purposes. Beginning in 1984, and in coordination with a number of other countries, Canada has placed export controls on several chemical compounds considered particularly useful for the manufacture of highly toxic chemical weapons. Canada has recently increased the number of chemical compounds whose export is controlled. The Canadian Government has been pleased to note that a number of other countries have acted similarly and have placed controls on the export of certain chemicals. We consider it would be useful if still more countries were also to do so....

Canada's long-standing interest in the broad issues of verification is by now well known. In the context of chemical weapons, we have devoted special attention, and considerable research effort, to questions relating to the verification of allegations of chemical weapons use. Last year, I tabled in this forum a *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons*, which had earlier been presented to the United Nations Secretary-General. I am pleased to announce that we will be shortly submitting to the Conference on Disarmament a report entitled *Verification: Development of a Portable Trichothecene Sensor Kit for the Detection of T-2 Mycotoxin in Human Blood Samples*. It was conveyed to the UN Secretary-General on May 20, 1987....

Mr. President, there is general agreement that, in addition to providing for the cessation of production of chemical

weapons and for their destruction, the convention we are negotiating should also expressly ban the use of such weapons. The inclusion of such a provision will not only reaffirm the ban on use as set out in the 1925 Geneva Protocol but, by doing so in a context which includes specific provision for the verification of any allegations of use, will significantly strengthen the authority of the Protocol. We must ensure, of course, that nothing in the convention undermines the continuing authority of the 1925 Protocol, a point raised by Ambassador Huslid earlier this week and by France which we regard as a guardian of the 1925 Protocol.

Canada was therefore particularly pleased to join with Norway in preparing a proposed Annex to Article IX entitled 'General Procedures for Verification of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons.' It attempts to set out a practical, workable framework for verifying allegations of use....

The proposed Annex reflects our view that any type of use of chemical weapons would constitute the most serious kind of breach of the convention and that the verification requirement must be of a rigour that reflects the gravity of any such allegation. It takes cognizance of what seems to be an emerging consensus within this forum that the investigation of an alleged use must involve short-notice, on-site inspections. As formulated, the proposed Annex aims to include provisions relating to procedures, techniques and responsibility allocation at appropriate levels of both generality and precision, while allowing for the reality that many procedural and technical details will need to be worked out, by the Technical Secretariat, under the supervision of the Executive Council. The Annex aims to provide the necessary framework and guidance within which the more detailed procedures and techniques can be devised and effectively implemented. We join with the Norwegian delegation in commending it to the attention of the Conference for inclusion in the rolling text of the convention.

Mr. President, earlier in my remarks, I made a generally positive appreciation



of the manner in which our negotiations are now proceeding. I also cited concrete events which underline the importance of our making progress with maximum haste. In concluding, I would like to register a cautionary note. We are embarked on one of the most politically sensitive, legally intricate and technically demanding multilateral arms negotiations ever undertaken. If we are successful, this will be the first time in the history of multilateral arms control that a major disarmament agreement will have been concluded that also involves the creation from scratch of an elaborate, permanent new institution to oversee the implementation of such an agreement. (We might usefully recall that the International Atomic Energy Agency preceded the conclusion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its responsibilities continue to embrace other than arms control questions.) Moreover, the implementation of this agreement will necessarily involve an unprecedented degree of intrusiveness into both military and civilian sectors of our societies. We therefore need to proceed with care and deliberation. Several important issues remain unresolved. On the question of challenge inspections, for example, while some considerable progress has been made, we have not yet been able to reach agreement with the required degree of precision. There also remains much detailed work to be done not only on technical questions but also on matters relating to the establishment, operation and governance of the international authority which will be responsible for overseeing the implementing of the convention.

I emphasize these points not for the purpose of inducing pessimism or despair. We have already achieved much and we should not be daunted by the heavy workload that remains. It is essential, however, that we get it right. No useful purpose can be served, therefore, by the invocation of unrealistic and artificial deadlines. Let us proceed expeditiously, by all means, but let it be with care and deliberation towards the creation of a convention whose authority will be self-reinforcing due to its demonstrable workability and efficacy...."

Canadian Report on Field Equipment Project for Chemical Weapons Investigations Conveyed to UN Secretary-General

On May 20, the Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué.

"The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, today conveyed to His Excellency Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Secretary-General of the United Nations, a research project report concerning the development of equipment for investigating allegations of the use of certain 'novel' chemical warfare agents. The project report is entitled *Verification: Development of a Portable Trichothecene Sensor Kit for the Detection of T-2 Mycotoxin in Human Blood Samples*.

The project was undertaken by the Institut Armand-Frappier, an internationally known biotechnology institute located near Montreal, Quebec."

ANNEX

"The text of the letter from the Secretary of State for External Affairs is as follows:

'Excellency,

On December 4, 1985, I had the honour of conveying to you a *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons*. I am gratified that the Handbook has been welcomed by many members of the international community.

The recent confirmed use of chemical weapons, in violation of international law, underlines the need to add to the body of knowledge which will contribute to the efficacy of a future treaty banning chemical weapons altogether. Such a treaty will, of necessity, make provision for the verification of allegations of the



Presentation of a prototype chemical weapons (CW) kit to the United Nations by Canada on May 20. From left to right: Mr. Douglas Roche, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament; Mr. Ralph Lysyshyn, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs; Mr. Virendra Dayal, Chef du Cabinet to United Nations Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar; and Mr. Stephen Lewis, Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations.



use of these weapons, with a view to deterring their use. In the meantime, no one has been more active than yourself, Excellency, in pursuing these matters, and I can assure you that your efforts have the full support of Canada.

Through the Verification Research Programme of the Canadian Department of External Affairs, we commissioned an internationally known biotechnology institute — Institut Armand-Frappier — to develop a light-weight easily transportable kit for use in the field as a screening assay in the detection, identification and quantification of T-2 mycotoxin in human blood samples. This research project was undertaken as a case study, to develop a better understanding of the technical problems associated with the provision of appropriate sensors to an investigating team. The speedy collection and subsequent analysis of samples pose many problems to an investigating team. These problems are compounded if the allegation relates to a "novel" agent, that is, a chemical substance not previously used for or associated with hostile purposes. There is a need to tap the knowledge and diverse experience that is found among academics and in industry, and to provide scope for these energies to be directed to achieving the goal of meaningful and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements. This is a learning experience, requiring time and patience from all concerned. In Canada, through the Verification Research Programme, we aim to pursue longer term goals related to arms control and disarmament. The attached report, entitled *Verification: Development of a Portable Trichothecene Sensor Kit for the Detection of T-2 Mycotoxin in Human Blood Samples*, documents two years of work which, it is fair to say, still leaves many questions unanswered, even on this very specific problem. Nevertheless, we are pleased with the work that has been done and we would like to share it with other members of the international community who are also concerned with these matters. I would note that such work can also have secondary and useful spin-off effects. For example, we were pleased to learn from Institut Armand-Frappier that the work it has done on this project has been of use in addressing certain problems associated with its work on breast cancer.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.' "

Biological Weapons: Successful Conference Outcome

The Second Review Conference for the 1972 Convention banning biological weapons, held in Geneva in September 1986, agreed on a range of measures aimed at strengthening the authority of the Convention and enhancing confidence in its implementation. These included agreement to exchange data about certain kinds of research and laboratory facilities and to exchange information about unusual infectious disease outbreaks. The Review Conference also agreed that there should be a follow-on *ad hoc* meeting of scientific and technical experts to finalize the modalities for these exchanges of data and information.

The *ad hoc* meeting of experts was held in Geneva from March 31 to April 15, under the authority of the Austrian President of the Review Conference, Ambassador Winfried Lang, with Dr. B. Rybek of Sweden being elected as Chairman. The meeting was successful in elaborating precise procedures, including the drawing up of detailed reporting forms, for implementing the agreed exchanges. The initial exchanges are to be completed by October 15, 1987, and are to be carried out annually thereafter, with the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs acting as a central repository and clearinghouse. The meeting also agreed on steps aimed at encouraging wider publication of the results of biological research of possible relevance to the Convention and increased contacts among scientists engaged in such research.

The Canadian delegation played an active role at the meeting. In particular, it contributed to the better understanding among the experts of the usefulness of adopting for present purposes certain criteria relating to disease outbreaks and containment standards for research facilities which had been previously elaborated and agreed under the auspices of the World Health Organization. Canada's ability in this way to facilitate the positive substantive outcome of the meeting was in large measure attributable to the support provided by Health and Welfare Canada, which assisted throughout the review process and which provided a qualified expert to the delegation.

This final positive outcome of the Second Review Conference confirms the serious intent among the parties to the Biological Weapons Convention to preserve and enhance the authority of this important arms control agreement. It also reflects the kind of cooperative approach to multilateral arms control and disarmament which Canada has long advocated. The decision to use the services of the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs is also in keeping with Canada's view that the UN should gradually acquire a more practical and meaningful role in arms control and disarmament matters.

CW Research Relevant to Field of Breast Cancer

The work performed by the Institut Armand-Frappier on the development of the trichothecene (T-2) kit has also helped it in its research on the development of monoclonal antibodies and their application in the field of breast cancer.

The first objective of this research is the development of a diagnostic kit for the detection of breast-cancer-associated antigens in the serum of breast cancer patients. The technologies developed for the T-2 kit will therefore have an immediate application in this project, e.g., buffers used, concentration, blocking solution, incubation times and temperature, among others.

The second objective is a further development of the institute's research. It will develop antibodies against a polypeptide that seems to be modified in breast cancer cells as compared to normal cells. Because of the relatively simple structure and low molecular weight of the polypeptide, the institute will probably need to conjugate it to a carrier. The hapten-carrier system developed in the T-2 kit project will be valuable in guiding the institute in its choice of the carrier to be used, the immunization protocol to be followed and, furthermore, the purification system to be applied.



NATO Vital to Defence of Europe, North America and Canadian Way of Life, Prime Minister Mulroney Tells NATO Parliamentarians

Founded in 1955, the North Atlantic Assembly is the inter-parliamentary organization of member countries of the NATO Alliance. As such, it is a forum for North American and European parliamentarians to meet to discuss problems of common concern. Its aims are to strengthen cooperation among the countries of the Alliance, to encourage governments to take the Alliance viewpoint into account when framing legislation and to encourage a common feeling of Atlantic solidarity in national parliaments.

The North Atlantic Assembly held its 1987 meeting in Quebec City from May 21 to 25. The Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, addressed the NATO parliamentarians on May 23. Following are excerpts from his address.

"I am honoured to meet today with my fellow parliamentarians from the North Atlantic Assembly.

Our meeting reminds us that the Atlantic Alliance is more than a military one, indeed that it is based on our common Western values and our way of life. Those values we cherish are defined in the preamble of the NATO treaty: 'democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.'

Louis St. Laurent, a great Canadian from this city of Quebec, who as Prime Minister played such an important role in the founding of the Alliance, said at the time: 'This treaty is to be far more than an old-fashioned military alliance. It is based on the common belief of the North Atlantic nations in the values and virtues of our civilization.' All of us remain prepared to defend those tenets of democracy, as were the founders of NATO nearly 40 years ago. Canada remains committed to the Alliance.

We are not now, nor have we ever been, spectators in the struggle be-



Prime Minister Brian Mulroney addressing NATO parliamentarians in Quebec City on May 23.

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tween freedom and tyranny. Our credentials in this regard have been established in two wars on the battlefields of Europe, and in the North Atlantic. We are members of the Western Alliance out of choice, not circumstance.

We face today, as we did 40 years ago, a formidable military threat. But we also face a different Soviet Union under a new and decisive leadership.

We must seize the opportunities for arms reductions without compromising our ability to meet the military threat. In looking to the future we must learn the right lessons from the past. We have seen much disillusionment with *détente*.

Some believe we should discard the old ways, embark on an idealistic search for security without arms. Others believe an improved East-West relationship is illusory, even dangerous, and that arms control is to be avoided at all costs. We are told that our peoples will be lulled into a false sense of security and that a sense of danger is necessary to get the

job done. These opposing viewpoints draw the wrong lessons from the past.

It is not that arms control has failed; it is rather that arms control has been asked to do too much. We should bear in mind that although arms control can contribute to security it is not a substitute for security. Although arms control can assist in improving political relations, it cannot, by itself, remake those relations. But arms control does create precedents, rules of the road which can guide the competition. It does create a framework of predictability. This is why the Government of Canada has consistently expressed the view that the SALT agreements and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty should be adhered to by both sides.

The changes in the strategic relationship which President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev discussed at Reykjavik were radical and unprecedented. We may never achieve that, for we must be realists, and we must maintain the delicate balance between



peace and security. And many still hold to the view that the nuclear deterrent is essential to Western security. But Reykjavik has set a tone for the future.

We should welcome that tone and strive for agreements that go beyond codifying the present to reshaping the future. It is a fact that there has been no new global war in the nuclear era. But we must accept that a new world, both secure and stable, can be achieved by decreasing numbers of nuclear weapons on both sides.

Today, the most urgent issue we have to face is that of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF), and the implications of a possible agreement on what is known as the zero-zero option. The US sees it principally in terms of the ongoing strategic negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The understandable concern in Europe is whether the process of eliminating the nuclear deterrent ultimately risks making Europe a more likely theatre for conventional war. Canadians are supportive of zero-zero, as a matter of logic and consistency, but we are also very sensitive to the European quandary.

But in the end, we should remember that the West were the ones to put all the key proposals on the table. The West introduced the concept of reductions rather than ceilings. We cannot abandon our own agenda item now that we finally have persuaded the Soviets to discuss it seriously. As Secretary Shultz has said: 'We shouldn't be afraid to take yes for an answer to our own proposal.'...

Disillusionment with the past and a search for something better has renewed interest in strategic defences. There is ample precedent for this....

Strategic defences should not be seen as intrinsically good nor as inherently evil. Canada has supported research into strategic defence because knowledge is required in order to make informed and meaningful judgements.

As we look down the road, we must bear in mind the three criteria enunciated by Paul Nitze of cost effectiveness, survivability and affordability. But two additional criteria should also be

applied. First, extreme care must be taken to ensure that defences are not integrated with existing forces in such a way as to create fears of a first strike. And second, we cannot allow strategic defences to undermine the arms control process and existing agreements: the transition should be mutually agreed upon. Without such mutuality, chaos would follow and stability could crumble. Clearly, US-Soviet consensus on strategic defences will be necessary if the logjam of strategic arms control is to be broken at Geneva....

For that matter, let us in the West engage the Soviets in a peaceful competition of ideas, as well as ideals. Let us engage them in the constructive management of important international problems.

We need have no fear of a Soviet Union coming to grips with global economic interdependence. Were it otherwise, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact clients would not be so keen on technological transfers....

We have no illusions about the Soviets, their system, or their aims in the world. But neither should we close our eyes or our minds to the substantial changes occurring in the Soviet Union.

Let us put Mr. Gorbachev's intentions to the test of his deeds. One test of Mr. Gorbachev's readiness to put East-West relations on a better footing will be his willingness to improve adherence to fundamental human rights: the treatment of dissidents, the emigration of Soviet Jewry and family reunification....

Another test will be Soviet acceptance that its international behaviour has a profound impact on the confidence we place in Soviet intentions and their commitment to adhere to international accords. And we await movement on the troubling security issues in Afghanistan, South East Asia and on the future economic and political evolution in Eastern Europe.

But those who are concerned by the activism of Mr. Gorbachev must ask themselves if they preferred the inflexibility, and even the intellectual rigidity, of his predecessors. We must acknowledge that he is trying to let some light in, to bring to the Soviet Union a modicum of creativity and flexibility....

But while Canada would welcome arms reductions in Western Europe, Central Asia and elsewhere, we know that we must remain united and vigilant in the Alliance.

Canada's security policy comprises three interrelated elements:

- a strong commitment to collective defence in NATO and NORAD;

- participating in peacekeeping and other conflict resolution efforts;

- encouraging effective arms control and disarmament.

Collective security remains the foundation of the NATO Alliance, now as 40 years ago. But the means of providing our collective security have changed. We cannot provide for the needs of the coming decades with the equipment and strategies of past decades. For Canada it has meant a revision of our defence policy to take account of the changing threat, our increasing role as a Pacific nation, the growing strategic importance of the Arctic Ocean, and the need to provide effective, sustainable forces to meet our commitments in Europe....

I can assure you that it is the intention of this Government that Canada should continue to play its full part in the North Atlantic Alliance, to consolidate and enhance our role in the Alliance, to maintain and reinforce our participation in the integrated NATO command structure. There is no doubt that the Alliance is evolving.

NATO remains vital to the defence of Europe and North America, and to our way of life. It remains an alliance in the best sense of the word — while each partner acts in its own national interest, with its sovereignty undiminished, all are determined to act in the common interest....

And while we must not shrink from the implications of security, neither must we shrink from the possibilities of peace. Those are our most solemn responsibilities as leaders — for in the end we are talking about the world we shall bequeath to our children."



Canada Hosts Workshop on Arms Control and Outer Space

The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

As part of its contribution to the work of the present session of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Canada invited heads of CD and observer delegations to attend an Outer Space Workshop in Montreal from May 14 to 17, 1987. The workshop was organized with the active cooperation and assistance of the Centre for Research of Air and Space Law of McGill University and of Spar Aerospace Ltd. The purpose of the workshop was to provide an opportunity for an exchange of views on broad legal questions relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, focusing in particular on the current legal regime relevant to outer space. The workshop also provided an occasion to introduce to the members of the CD the results of Canadian research on the use of space-based remote sensing techniques for arms control and disarmament verification (the PAXSAT studies).

In addition to Canadian officials, 39 officials, including 11 ambassadors, representing 35 countries, plus a representative of the CD Secretariat, attended the workshop. The programme consisted of the following elements:

— A presentation of two papers on the outer space legal regime at McGill University and a discussion chaired by Mr. J. Alan Beesley, Canada's Ambassador to the CD.

— A presentation at Spar Aerospace Ltd. on Canadian PAXSAT research, followed by a discussion chaired by Mr. G.A. Branchflower, Vice President, Spar Aerospace Ltd., and a tour of Spar's facility in Ste-Anne-de-Bellevue, Quebec.

— A banquet speech delivered by the Honourable Jean-Guy Hudon, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. (Extracts from this address follow.)

— A round-table discussion of issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, chaired by Ambassador J. Alan Beesley.

The discussions at the workshop concentrated mainly on legal questions

related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space and on verification. Among the issues discussed were the following:

- Whether there is a need to agree immediately on a comprehensive legal regime concerning arms control in outer space or whether such a regime should evolve in an incremental manner.
- The role of custom and state practice in the development of space law.
- The impact of technological change on the development of space law.
- The definition of key concepts including "weaponization," "peaceful uses" and "aggression."
- Whether there is a need to establish a technical or a legal-oriented group of experts to assist the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the CD in its deliberations.
- The separate roles of, and relationship between, the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the CD.
- The critical need for verification and different methods that might be used to verify arms control undertakings with regard to outer space. The focus of this discussion

was on the Canadian presentation of its PAXSAT research into the feasibility of using civilian space-based remote sensing technology for arms control.

The workshop was not intended to produce definitive conclusions concerning the issues discussed. Rather, the participants were able to engage in a serious and productive exchange of views, in a less formal setting, covering a broad range of topics relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In addition, the participants were able to learn of some of the findings of Canadian research into the feasibility of applying civilian space-based remote sensing technology to arms control verification. The general view expressed by participants was that the workshop was a valuable and useful exercise. It confirmed the value of Canada's Verification Research Programme in bringing together private industry representatives, academics and government officials as a means of making practical, realistic contributions to international deliberations and negotiations on arms control and disarmament.



Group photo of participants from 35 countries including 11 ambassadors who took part in the workshop on outer space and arms control sponsored by the Department of External Affairs in Montreal from May 14 to 17. Participants are gathered in front of the Spar Aerospace Ltd. facility in Ste-Anne-de-Bellevue, Quebec. Spar made a substantive contribution to the workshop and plays an important part in Canada's Verification Research Programme.

Future Use of Outer Space One of Most Difficult Issues on Arms Control Agenda

Following are excerpts from an address given on May 15 by the Honourable Jean-Guy Hudon, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the participants at the Outer Space Workshop.

"I would first of all like to welcome you to Montreal and to Quebec, *la belle province*. To those of you who are in this city, and perhaps in Canada, for the first time, I hope you enjoy your stay with us and will be able to return again to enjoy our hospitality.

I bring you greetings from the Government of Canada and particularly from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, who is travelling in the United States on official business and could not be here with us.

I am pleased that so many delegations from the Conference on Disarmament (CD), observer delegations to the CD, other official representatives of countries at the CD, and technical experts in this area, could attend our deliberations this weekend. Your positive response to the Canadian Government's invitation attests to the willingness of your governments to consider further the critical issue of how best to prevent an arms race in outer space.

The Government of Canada welcomes your interest and shares your concerns....

One could say without exaggeration that the whole question of the future use of outer space is among the most difficult issues on the arms control and disarmament agenda, and is one that must be dealt with in a serious and constructive fashion by all governments. The first Sputnik launch in 1957 created an international awareness of outer space as a theatre of exploration, research and discovery as man has sought to push out beyond the confines of his own planet. We have since wit-



The Honourable Jean-Guy Hudon, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

nessed many remarkable achievements in space research and exploration, such as the United States mission to the moon in 1969, which was, in the words of the US astronaut Neil Armstrong, a 'small step for man, a giant leap for mankind,' and the Soviet-led, international effort, known as the Venus-Halley or Vega project, that studied the famous Halley's Comet in 1986.

We have also seen major advances in the peaceful use of space, for telecommunications purposes, telephone and television transmission, sophisticated mapping for agricultural and other purposes linked to international development. Search and rescue operations are also a good example of East-West cooperation in space, through the COSPAS-SARSAT system.

Canada's own achievements in space are quite considerable. In September 1962, with the launch of Alouette 1, we became the third country, after the USSR and the USA, to launch a satellite in space.

In 1972, Canada became the first country to operate a domestic telecom-

munications satellite system using a satellite in geostationary orbit. This was the first of three 'Anik A' satellites.

In August 1982, we launched our first commercial satellite built by a Canadian private contractor, Spar Aerospace of Montreal, which is of course involved in our activities this weekend. Later that same year, the *Canadarm*, or remote manipulator system, was declared operational after being tested successfully on several space shuttle missions.

And in October 1984, Marc Garneau became the first Canadian in space when he was a crew member aboard the space shuttle *Challenger*. At the present time, the Government of Canada is creating a National Space Agency.

The widely cited Canadian thinker Marshall McLuhan spoke of technological advances having transformed the world into a global village. In this global village we live in, these peaceful uses of outer space have helped us create a sense of community that is tangible and real. This understanding that we are neighbours provides an important impetus to all our arms control and disarmament efforts.

Here in Montreal this weekend, and in the Conference on Disarmament, our particular focus is to find ways to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Your efforts at the Conference on Disarmament to deal with the outer space issue come at a critical time in the international political and strategic environment. The unrelenting forward march of the application of science and technology to military ends, along with the constantly shifting political dynamics of the international scene, are forcing the outer space issue to the forefront of the deliberations of the international community, both in the bilateral and multilateral forums. This trend is also reflected, here in Canada, in a heightening of public awareness of the outer space issue.



In light of these developments, we were particularly encouraged by the decision of the governments of the United States and the USSR in January 1985 to make 'the prevention of an arms race in space and its termination on earth' one of the agreed objectives of their bilateral negotiations in Geneva. This agreement demonstrates the recognition by the superpowers of the importance and urgency of dealing with the outer space issue, a concern that is shared equally by the Canadian Government. In October 1985, Prime Minister Mulroney identified the prevention of an arms race in outer space as one of Canada's six specific objectives in the arms control and disarmament field.

In the same year the CD agreed to establish, for the first time, a subsidiary body to examine the outer space issue in the multilateral context. While there is considerable multilateral experience in promoting peaceful cooperation in outer space, the multilateral approach to arms control in this environment is still at a pioneering stage. Moreover, it is an area in which technology continues to push ahead inexorably. Given the complexity of the issues and the need to ensure that any actions taken on agreements concluded do indeed contribute to strengthening international security in the long term, Canada hopes the CD will pursue its task with energy and with deliberation. The existing mandate would seem to provide ample scope for much additional useful work.

I would also like to reiterate the Canadian Government's view, recently made to the CD by our Ambassador to that body, Mr. J. Alan Beesley, that the bilateral efforts by the US and USSR to prevent an arms race in outer space are not and must not be at cross-purposes with the multilateral efforts of the CD. The mandate of the CD's *Ad Hoc* Committee both complements and accurately reflects the realities concerning the bilateral USA-USSR negotiations in Geneva. We urge the USA and USSR to continue to seek agreed ways to use outer space for national security purposes in a manner consistent with international security and stability for all peoples. At the same time, arms control in relation to outer space has always

had an important multilateral dimension, and we believe this dimension is gaining in importance. Indeed, we believe this 'two track' approach to the issue to be a complementary one, of crucial importance to the international consideration of an issue vital to all mankind.

I think it is fair to say that Canada has been second to none in making substantive contributions to the deliberations of the CD on this subject. We have sought to expand the existing pool of knowledge in this area through the preparation of three working papers on the outer space issue that have been tabled in the CD. These deal with the stabilizing and destabilizing characteristics of arms control agreements in outer space, with international law relevant to arms control in outer space, and with terminology relevant to outer space. These papers are not meant to reflect a particularly Canadian Government viewpoint but rather to build upon the pool of information in this area and to outline the issues in a comprehensive fashion. As our Prime Minister has stated, Canada's priorities in the area of outer space as in other areas of arms control and

disarmament were judged to lie in the investigation of outer space verification technology. It is in this area that we in Canada have devoted considerable resources through the efforts of the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs...."

Award to Publication

What Peace Means to Me, a book of essays on peace produced by the Department of External Affairs in 1986 as part of Canada's International Year of Peace programme, has been awarded second prize in the four-colour publications category in the annual competition sponsored by the Information Services Institute (ISI). Those on *The Disarmament Bulletin* mailing list were sent a copy of *What Peace Means to Me* in December 1986. This is the third disarmament-related publication of the Department of External Affairs to receive an award from the ISI. *The Disarmament Bulletin* and the *Disarmament Fund Report* were similarly recognized in 1986.



Mr. Stephen Lewis, Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations (right), and Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, UN Secretary-General, during the presentation of the various elements of Canada's International Year of Peace (IYP) programme to the United Nations on December 12, 1986. On April 3, Canada received a commemorative medal from the UN for its IYP programme.

Canada Chairs Working Group on Verification at UNDC

The following article was prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), in its present form, was established by the General Assembly at its 1978 Special Session. The UNDC is a deliberative body that devotes its attention to a limited number of arms control and disarmament items each year for three to four weeks in May. All members of the UN are invited to participate. It operates by consensus.

The UNDC met from May 4 to 27, 1987, to discuss seven items: the arms race, the reduction of military budgets, South Africa's nuclear capability, the role of the UN in the field of disarmament, curbing the naval arms race, conventional disarmament, and verification, of which the last two were included in the agenda for the first time.

From Canada's viewpoint the results of the UNDC session were mixed. Verification proved the only area where the UNDC was able to achieve significant progress and reach agreement on a substantive report (A/CN.10/1987/CRP.9). It was regretted that progress was not achieved on other major items before the Commission.

The General Assembly, at its forty-first session in 1986, requested the UNDC to consider and report on the subject of "verification in all its aspects, including principles, provisions and techniques to promote the inclusion of adequate verification in arms limitation and disarmament agreements and the role of the United Nations and its Member States in the field of verification." This resolution was initiated by Canada and was eventually adopted by consensus as resolution 41/86 Q of December 4, 1986.

Canada played a very active role in this year's UNDC deliberations, with Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, chairing the working group on verification. The working group held eight meetings during which nine working papers were tabled, including a submission prepared by the Chairman entitled: "Verification In All Its Aspects: Principles, Provisions and Techniques: Draft Conclusions Submitted by the Chairman of Working Group IV." The latter was intended as a comprehensive and detailed overview of the subject which sought to expand on the principles laid down in the Final Document of the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978. The paper received high praise from many delegations for its balanced and comprehensive approach, and portions of it were incorporated in the final report of the working group.

In addition to taking a lead role in the working group, the Canadian delegation distributed a three-volume document entitled *Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals (Third Edition)*, prepared by the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs. The report compiles some 700 summaries of research reports, government statements and academic papers on the subject of arms control and disarmament verification and is intended to assist members of the United Nations in their consideration of the topic and to provide an international reference tool. Canada also circulated a descriptive brochure on its PAXSAT research.

The deliberations of the verification working group proved useful and productive. Elaborating upon the basic principles outlined in the Final Document of UNSSOD I, the report of the working group developed an illustrative, non-exhaustive list of ten principles on verification. It also reflected agreement in principle that a compilation of possible methods, procedures and techniques could be useful in facilitating future consideration of verification. In addition, the working group agreed that the UN has an important role to play in the context of the verification of compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements. This role should include drawing upon the experience of the UN in providing assistance, advice and technical expertise to negotiators of arms control agreements. The working group also agreed that the UN should examine the possibility of compiling and managing a verification database.

The report of the working group concluded by recommending to the General Assembly that the UNDC should continue its consideration of verification "as a matter of critical importance in the negotiation and implementation of arms limitation and disarmament, with a view to elaboration of concrete recommendations and proposals...." Canadian efforts on verification in the UN and in other forums seek to heighten international awareness of the central importance of verification in moving the process of arms control and disarmament ahead. In this era of sophisticated weaponry, it is unlikely that significant multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements will be concluded without adequate and effective verification. The deliberations of the UNDC have contributed to this movement forward.



Session of the Working Group on Verification during 1987 session of the UNDC. At left is Mr. Douglas Roche, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament. At right is Mr. Michel Couthures, Secretary to the Working Group. Seated behind Mr. Roche is Mr. Alan Crawford, a member of the Canadian delegation to the UNDC.



Canada to Take Part in Disarmament and Development Conference

The following article provides an overview of the background to the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, to be held at the United Nations in New York, August 24-September 11, 1987. A follow-up article outlining Canada's views on the outcome of the conference will appear in the next issue of the Bulletin.

The notion that "disarmament and development" constitute two elements of a larger and very complex relationship was first articulated at the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978. Pursuant to a recommendation by the Special Session, the UN Secretary-General commissioned a study on the subject which was undertaken by an international group of experts headed by Mrs. Inga Thorsson of Sweden and released in 1981. The "Thorsson Report," as it is known, constitutes a comprehensive study of the disarmament/development relationship. A popular version of the Thorsson Report, entitled *Safe and Sound: Disarmament and Development in the Eighties* and written by Clyde Sanger, was published in Canada with the support of the Department of External Affairs. The Thorsson Report concluded that the arms race and development are in a competitive relationship, both in terms of resources and also in the dimension of attitudes and perceptions.

A subsequent report undertaken by a "panel of eminent personalities" convened by the UN Secretary-General, was released in May 1986.

Among its noteworthy observations, the following deserve special mention:

— "Acknowledgement of the role of informed public opinion in promoting the objectives of disarmament, development and security...."

— "Promotion of regional initiatives for resolving conflicts and conflict situations which also feed and are fed by increasing claims on human, natural and material resources for military purposes...."

— "Strengthening of the role of the United Nations in promoting an inter-

related perspective on the issues of disarmament and development within the overall objective of promoting international peace and security. In such a perspective equal emphasis should be placed on the positive results of disarmament as well as the requirements of security."

The UN General Assembly originally decided to convene an "International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development" in Paris in July 1986. It was postponed, however, when France withdrew its offer to host the conference. Nevertheless preparations proceeded and the conference was re-scheduled to be held in New York this year. Canada plans to be represented by a strong delegation that will include parliamentarians and non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives as observers.

Disarmament and development constitute major priorities for the Canadian Government. They are distinct and separate processes which are interrelated through security. Each contributes to security and benefits from enhanced security. Canada's major objective for the conference will be to secure agreement on a consensus final document which defines the disarmament/development relationship in those terms and affirms the commitment by *all* countries to pursue disarmament and development objectives.

Change of Editor

Following this issue the editorship of *The Disarmament Bulletin* will change hands. Mr. Neil Reeder, Editor of the *Bulletin* since it resumed publication in the spring of 1985, is moving to another assignment in External Affairs and will be replaced by Mr. Paul Bennett.

We hope our readers find our publication of interest and we welcome your comments on it. If you know of others who might benefit from receiving the *Bulletin* please let us know.

Canada Tables Report in CD on Seismic Workshop

In our last issue, we reported on a successful workshop, sponsored by the Department of External Affairs and involving data communications experts from 17 countries, that took place in Ottawa from October 6 to 8, 1986. Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Mr. J. Alan Beesley, tabled a report on the Ottawa workshop in the CD on April 30. Following are excerpts from his address.

"In order to expedite the work of the Group of Scientific Experts, Canada conducted in Ottawa in October of last year a workshop for seismic experts to discuss questions relating to the exchange of level 2 waveform data with a view to resolving some of the questions concerning the exchange of such data.

I am pleased today to table document CD/753 of April 28, to which are annexed the proceedings of the Ottawa workshop. As the document indicates, the workshop, which was attended by 43 representatives from 17 countries, produced specific technical recommendations on the methods, protocols and formats for seismic waveform exchange. These have already been tabled by the Canadian delegation in the Group of Scientific Experts, the key forum for co-ordination of international efforts to develop an effective global seismic monitoring network — I would like to repeat that: an effective global seismic monitoring network — as recommendations for seismic waveform exchange in that eventual system. I hope that these proceedings will be of interest to all members of the CD. I would like to take the opportunity of thanking those delegations who have expressed appreciation to the Government of Canada for hosting this workshop, but I would be remiss if I did not, on behalf of the Canadian Government, express our gratitude to the participants who helped to make the workshop a success....

I hope that the working paper I have today tabled will not only provide further evidence of the substantive role which the Conference on Disarmament can play in achieving a comprehensive test ban, but will also give encouragement to the CD to establish an *ad hoc* committee as soon as possible in order to let us get on with the job expected of us...."



UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Visits Ottawa

On April 13, the Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué.

"The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, announced today that Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations, will be visiting Ottawa on April 13-14.

During his visit Mr. Akashi will discuss United Nations activities in the field of arms control and disarmament with the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament and officials of the departments of External Affairs and National Defence. He will also meet with representatives from non-governmental organizations and the media.

After serving as Under-Secretary-General for Public Information for the United Nations since 1979, Mr. Akashi assumed his current position on March 1, 1987, as head of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. He is expected to outline his views on the present and future role of the United Nations in the field of arms control and disarmament with special reference to preparations for a third Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament and the upcoming International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. Discussions will also address ongoing United Nations activities under his jurisdiction, including the World Disarmament Campaign, the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and the work of the First Committee on political and security issues of the United Nations General Assembly.

The visit will provide occasion for a reaffirmation of the commitment of the Canadian Government to United Nations disarmament activities. Canada is a major contributor of funds in this area and on April 3 was presented with a United Nations commemorative medal for its contribution to the International Year of Peace in 1986."

Canada Makes Further Contribution to UN World Disarmament Campaign



Mr. Serge Sur (left), Acting Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, is presented with cheques totalling \$38 000 by Mr. J. Alan Beesley, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament. The Canadian contribution will assist UNIDIR's research in the field of verification and brings Canada's total contribution to \$108 000, making Canada one of the largest single donors to UNIDIR.



Mr. Yasushi Akashi (left), United Nations Under-Secretary-General, Department for Disarmament Affairs, is presented with a \$25 000 cheque by LCol. W.A. Morrison, Counsellor at the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations. This contribution will assist publication of the United Nations' Disarmament Yearbook.



Canadian Participation in Multilateral Arms Control Forums, 1945-1987

BACKGROUNDER

- **January 1946:** The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was established under the UN Security Council, composed of the members of the Security Council plus Canada when not a member of the Security Council.
- **February 1947:** The Commission for Conventional Armament (CCA) was established under the Security Council, composed of the members of the Security Council plus Canada.
- **January 1952:** The AEC and CCA were dissolved and replaced by a single Disarmament Commission (DC) under the Security Council, composed of the members of the Security Council plus Canada. In 1957, the DC's size was increased by 14 members and, in 1959, it was further increased to include all members of the UN. The DC did not meet after 1965. At UNSSOD I the UN General Assembly re-established the DC as a deliberative body and it now meets for about three weeks each year.
- **April 1954:** The DC established a Five-Power Sub-Committee composed of Canada, France, the UK, the USA and the USSR. This sub-committee met in private and periodically reported to the DC and the United Nations General Assembly.
- **July 1958:** A conference was held involving experts from four Western and four Eastern bloc countries on methods of detecting nuclear tests.
- **November 1958:** A conference was held involving Experts on Prevention of Surprise Attack, composed of representatives from five Western and five Eastern bloc countries.
- **September 1959:** The Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee (TNDC) (five Western and five Eastern bloc countries) was established. The TNDC was not a UN body although a personal representative of the UN Secretary-General attended. The Conference of the TNDC met from March to June 1960.
- **December 1961:** The establishment of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC) was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly. The Conference of the ENDC opened on March 15, 1962. Like the TNDC, the ENDC was not a UN body.
- **August 1969:** The ENDC was enlarged to 26 members and changed its name to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD).
- **July 1973:** The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opened in Helsinki. Its participants included all the states of Europe (except Albania) plus Canada and the United States. It concluded on August 1, 1975, with agreement on a "Final Act."
- **October 1973:** The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks opened in Vienna between seven NATO and four Warsaw Pact countries. The discussions concern conventional arms limitations within an area of Central Europe.
- **May 1975:** The First Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty met in Geneva. Canada also participated in the negotiations of the late 1960s which led to the conclusion of this Treaty in July 1968.
- **June 1977:** The Review Conference of the Seabed Treaty met in Geneva. Canada also participated in the negotiations of the early 1970s which led to the conclusion of this Treaty in February 1971.
- **October 1977:** The first Follow-Up Meeting to review the implementation of the CSCE Final Act opened in Belgrade.
- **May 1978:** The United Nations General Assembly began a Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I). On July 1, it adopted a "Final Document."
- **January 1979:** Pursuant to the recommendation of UNSSOD I, the CCD was expanded to 40 members and changed its name to the Committee on Disarmament (CD).
- **March 1980:** The First Review Conference of the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention met in Geneva. Canada also participated in the negotiations of the early 1970s which led to the conclusion of this Treaty in April 1972.
- **August 1980:** The Second Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty met in Geneva.
- **November 1980:** The second Follow-up Meeting to review the implementation of the CSCE Final Act opened in Madrid.
- **June 1982:** The United Nations General Assembly began a second Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II).
- **January 1984:** The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE) opened in Stockholm pursuant to the agreement worked out at the Madrid CSCE Follow-up Meeting. The first phase of the CCSBMDE concluded with the adoption of the "Document of the Stockholm Conference" on September 19, 1986.
- **February 1984:** The Committee on Disarmament was redesignated as the Conference on Disarmament (CD) with no change of membership.
- **September 1984:** The Review Conference of the Environmental Modification Treaty met in Geneva. Canada also participated in the negotiations of the mid-1970s which led to the conclusion of this Treaty in May 1977.
- **August 1985:** The Third Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty met in Geneva.
- **September 1986:** The Second Review Conference of the Biological Weapons and Toxin Convention met in Geneva.
- **November 1986:** The third Follow-up Meeting to review the implementation of the CSCE Final Act opened in Vienna.
- **February 1987:** Members of the Warsaw Pact met with members of NATO for exploratory talks regarding conventional arms limitations in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. NATO members tabled a draft mandate for new negotiations on July 28.



They Gave Us Peace

Sixty-six thousand Canadians were killed in the First World War and 40 000 in the Second World War. Three thousand of the Canadian casualties in the First World War came on April 9, 1917, in the battle of Vimy Ridge in north-western France, a battle that claimed 10 600 Allied lives. Vimy Ridge was the arena for some of the fiercest battles of the First World War and is considered by many to be the most important battle in Canadian military history.

The Government of Canada holds an annual ceremony at the Vimy Memorial in honour of the Canadians killed during the First World War. This ceremony held special significance on April 9, the seventieth anniversary of the battle of Vimy Ridge. On that occasion, the Honourable George Hees, Minister of Veterans Affairs, made a special address to an audience that included Canadian veterans who had fought at Vimy. Following is the text of Mr. Hees' address, a tribute to those Canadians who fought and died so that succeeding generations could live in peace.

"For Canada this is a very emotional day at a place that holds a very special position in our history and in our hearts.

Every year we cross the Atlantic to France so we can hold ceremonies of remembrance in the shadow of this great memorial. This year we are indeed privileged to meet on the seventieth anniversary of one of the most notable days in our development as a nation — that Easter Monday when the Canadian Corps scaled the heights of military achievement.

This is a time for both pride and grief. The pride continues to flow from the knowledge that Canada's volunteer army won a memorable victory. The grief has also lasted down the decades as we remember the terrible number of lives forfeited in the Great War of 1914-18.

If ever a conflict deserved to be 'the war to end all wars' it was this one.



The Honourable George Hees, Minister of Veterans Affairs, addressing the April 9 proceedings that marked the seventieth anniversary of the battle of Vimy Ridge.
Veterans Affairs

Both the Allies and their enemies lost tens of thousands of men battling across no man's land. Victory and defeat seemed to be measured in terms of casualty lists. Today, let us remember all those who were the victims of such carnage and pray that nations have the patience and resolve to fight for peace.

The names on this memorial reflect how grievously Canada suffered. From a land vast in area but small in numbers, one-tenth of our population put on uniforms. Nearly one in ten of all who served never returned home. A generation of pioneers was decimated through the loss of so many of its bravest and best.

They died at Ypres, on the Somme and all along the Western Front as the war bogged down into a grim and costly stalemate.

Then came Vimy to lift the gloom. For the first time all four divisions of the Canadian Corps came together. For their baptism of unity they were asked to achieve the seemingly impossible — to take this ridge and hold on.

We have been fortunate to have many splendid accounts of the battle itself. They tell of a meticulously trained army, inspiringly led, and with each soldier given a specific objective and personal role in the overall battle plan.

On April 9, 1917, all the planning and rehearsal paid off. Victory was swift and stunning. Disciplined teamwork and individual initiative won the day.

On this ridge, on this day, a nation was forged by men from one coast of Canada to the other.

It was indeed an all-Canadian victory, which demonstrated to the world what Canadians could achieve. Canada was welcomed at the peace table as a sovereign entity.

The considerate people of France understood the significance of Vimy to their friends across the sea. These precious acres are ours to use in perpetuity and we are forever grateful, just as we are grateful to the many French citizens who attend our ceremonies each year.

Here, this morning, we are especially blessed by the presence of a number of our true nation-builders, the survivors of Vimy. They are an honour guard representing all those who inspired a nation — the soldiers who slogged through so many bloody campaigns, our 'aces' who showed that the aeroplane had its place in warfare, and the men and women who gave birth to the Royal Canadian Navy.

Shortly after the First World War, a plaque was placed in the Memorial Chamber of our Parliament. It read: 'They are too near to be great but our children shall understand when and how our fate was changed and by whose hand.'

Our children, grandchildren and great grandchildren have understood, and do understand. And so, I am sure, will all future generations. The legacy of Vimy is ageless and Canadians will always return here not just to honour the past but to draw renewed confidence for the future."

The **Disarmament** Bulletin

Supplement

Canada's Role in Verification

Introduction

The achievement of significant arms control and disarmament agreements is a responsibility of the entire world community. While Canada alone cannot force other countries to agree to arms control and disarmament agreements, nevertheless, Canada can hope to contribute to progress towards reaching such agreements, and the greater peace and security they represent, by practical, realistic actions on its part.

The subject of verification of compliance with obligations undertaken pursuant to arms control and disarmament agreements is particularly relevant today. Adequate and effective measures of verification are the primary mechanisms whereby compliance with such undertakings is ascertained and demonstrated. It has been acknowledged, most recently at the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1987 session, that verification is a critically important element in the negotiation and implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements. Faith in good intentions alone cannot serve as the basis for concluding agreements dealing with vital national security matters; verification provides an objective means of determining ongoing compliance.

It was the recognition of the critical importance played by verification in the achievement and implementation of arms control agreements, combined with Canada's commitment to pragmatic

This is the fourth in a series of periodic supplements to *The Disarmament Bulletin* that have been prepared by the Department of External Affairs in order to provide a more detailed presentation of Canada's efforts to promote arms control and disarmament.

Cette publication existe également en français.



The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, speaking to some of the participants from 17 countries who attended the workshop on seismic data exchange hosted by the Canadian Government in Ottawa in October 1986. Agreed arrangements for the international exchange of seismic data would be needed to verify a complete ban on nuclear weapons testing.

steps to achieve progress in arms control and disarmament, that led to the establishment of the Verification Research Programme within the Department of External Affairs.

Canada and the Issue of Verification

Since World War II, Canada has been a prominent participant in most of the multilateral arms control process. Indeed, apart from the major powers, few countries can claim as long or as important an involvement in this process as can Canada. This background of sustained involvement has provided a unique opportunity to contribute to the multilateral arms control process and has permitted Canada to acquire con-

siderable experience in, and understanding of, this process.

In 1979, following a reassessment of Canada's participation in the arms control and disarmament process, verification was recognized as the most significant factor in international disarmament and arms control negotiations in the decade of the 1980s. The need for a deeper understanding of verification was evident: this area was one in which much misunderstanding existed and to which relatively little research was being directed. Moreover, while the necessity of some sort of verification in arms control and disarmament agreements had long been recognized, this issue was discussed, almost without exception, on an *ad hoc* basis and provisions relating



to verification were developed specifically to meet certain sensitivities and security criteria within individual negotiating packages. It was decided, therefore, to redirect some of the resources of the Department of External Affairs towards a programme which would serve to broaden specialist and public understanding of the verification issue as well as advance negotiations on these matters.

As a result, an initial modest cooperative programme was developed between the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment of the Department of National Defence and the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs. The aim was to study arms control verification in a general conceptual manner as well as to support specific negotiations. It was an attempt, through the establishment of a generally accepted approach and the development of a common lexicon, to introduce a degree of leadership and coordination, while at the same time leaving the field open to contributions from other nations in areas of their own expertise.

On February 20, 1984, formal approval was given for the establishment of the Verification Research Unit within the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of the Department of External Affairs. This permitted the Verification Research Programme (first funded in October 1983) to begin operations as personnel became available for the Verification Research Unit. Much of the initial groundwork necessary to establish a research capability as an integral contribution to the verification issue had already been accomplished within the narrower mandate and limited resources of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division.

Objectives and Mandate

At the heart of Canada's Programme of Action for the latter half of the disarmament decade of the 1980s is the Verification Research Programme of the Department of External Affairs. Innovative in concept and focused on the multilateral arms control process in application, the Programme is currently funded at approximately \$1 million per annum. It provides a natural framework within which Canadian expertise from government, the business sector and the academic community can combine to address the issue of arms control verification.

The Programme has succeeded in initiating projects involving researchers from a dozen Canadian universities and research institutes as well as from a number of commercial firms. In addition, the Programme has drawn upon the extensive expertise within the federal government through a system of *ad hoc* interdepartmental technical advisory groups established to assist with major projects.

The central aim of the Verification Research Programme is to contribute to the process of achieving verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements which will serve to improve the security of Canada and its allies. To achieve this central aim the Programme focuses on certain Canadian arms control priorities in the multilateral arms control and disarmament field. These include:

- A comprehensive convention to ban chemical weapons.
- A comprehensive nuclear test ban.
- A treaty to prevent an arms race in outer space.
- The pursuit of arms control and military confidence-building in Europe.
- The conduct of generic research into verification.

To achieve its objectives, the Programme provides for a modest in-house research capability, in addition to projects contracted out to universities and commercial firms. The Verification Research Unit develops initiatives in support of ongoing negotiations and activities that currently involve Canadian delegations at five international forums:

- The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.
- The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Follow-Up Meeting in Vienna.
- The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna.
- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels.
- The United Nations in New York.

Results of the research work carried out under the Programme are tailored primarily to the requirements of these Canadian missions involved in multi-

lateral arms control and disarmament discussions. Through these missions and through other contacts with foreign governments, Canadian verification research contributes pragmatically to progress in specific negotiations. In addition, many of the results of the Programme's activities are made available to universities and research institutes in Canada and abroad. Through the dissemination of its work and findings, as well as its other activities, the Programme promotes a greater understanding of the issue of verification within the international community and encourages further research into and consideration of this vital subject.

Projects and Activities

To date, well over a hundred projects relating to a wide variety of subjects have been identified as part of the Verification Research Programme. These projects have generally taken several forms:

- Research studies for application to problems in international negotiations.
- Research studies to amass and analyze what has been said and written on the subject of verification.
- Specialized technical training programmes.
- Hosting of and participation in international meetings of experts on specific topics.
- Liaison with national and international bodies outside of Canada engaged in verification issues.
- Public presentation of verification issues.

The following sections briefly highlight some of the more recent activities of the Canadian Government in the area of verification.

Chemical Weapons

On December 4, 1985, Canada presented to the United Nations Secretary-General a *Handbook for the Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons*. The Handbook, which was tabled in the Conference on Disarmament in April 1986, is a result of a study by Canadian scientists and officials and represents a practical contribution to the investigation of




allegations of non-compliance with existing agreements relating to chemical weapons (CW), and to the negotiation at the CD of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

In May of this year Canada made available to the international community further results from its ongoing research into the verification of CW use in the form of a report entitled *Verification: Development of a Portable Trichothecene Sensor Kit for the Detection of T-2 Mycotoxin in Human Blood Samples*. This report describes a project undertaken as a case study to better understand the technical problems involved in developing appropriate sensors for a team investigating allegations of the use of a "novel" CW agent. An operational sensor kit would be used to screen blood samples in order to reduce the number of samples which must be sent to laboratories for more detailed testing. Canada will shortly be making available the results of further research relating to procedures for investigating CW use.

In July of this year, Canada, together with Norway, submitted to the Conference on Disarmament a proposed Annex to Article IX of the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons (CD/766 of July 1, 1987). Entitled "General Procedures for Verification of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons," this draft Annex aims at providing a practical, workable framework for verifying allegations of CW use within which more detailed procedures and techniques can be devised and effectively implemented by the Technical Secretariat under the direction of the international authority which is to be established to oversee implementation of the convention.

Nuclear Test Ban

To sharpen the Canadian capability to monitor underground nuclear tests, an interdepartmental programme has been undertaken wherein the Verification Research Programme has provided funding to the Earth Physics Branch of Energy, Mines and Resources Canada for additional personnel and hardware. This has permitted, among other things, the recent upgrading of the Earth Physics Branch's analytical capability in Ottawa as well as the development of a dedicated work station for seismic verification.



Several publications produced by the Verification Research Unit (left) and the published proceedings from a number of conferences at Canadian universities undertaken in cooperation with the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of External Affairs (right).

As an adjunct to this interdepartmental programme, the Canadian Government approved in February 1986 a \$3.2 million upgrading and modernization of the Yellowknife seismic array, an internationally recognized facility. When the modernization is completed in 1989, the array will constitute a world-class facility which could serve as a prototype for international stations developed to participate in an international seismic data network.

In October 1985, a two-year research grant was awarded to the University of Toronto to examine the effectiveness of using regional seismic data, and in particular high-frequency seismic waves, to discriminate between earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions, including those conducted in decoupled situations. The initial results of this project suggest that the University of Toronto researchers have achieved significant progress in two areas vital to a verifiable nuclear test ban: improved accuracy for estimating explosive yield size and a new method for differentiating small nuclear explosions from small earthquakes.

As a major contribution to the work of the Conference on Disarmament's Group of Scientific Experts, the Verification

Research Programme funded a workshop on the exchange of seismic waveform data, held in Ottawa in October 1986. While a significant event in terms of its subject matter alone, this workshop was also important because of the participation of representatives from 17 countries, including, for the first time at such a meeting, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Outside the Canadian Government's Verification Research Programme, Canada has developed an extensive programme aimed at developing and improving the verification mechanisms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In support of the objective of the International Atomic Energy Agency to develop an improved system of safeguards suited to the Canadian CANDU reactor, Canada established the Canadian Safeguards Research and Development Programme in 1978 which is designed to assist the Agency in the development of safeguards systems for CANDU reactors. The Programme has received a five-year budget of approximately \$11 million and work under this auspices is already well advanced.



Outer Space

The Verification Research Programme has addressed the question of arms control and outer space from two directions. Beginning in 1983 the Programme sponsored general research into the legal aspects of this subject through contracts with the Institute and Centre for Research of Air and Space Law (ICRASL) at McGill University. This support of a centre of Canadian expertise provided the necessary background research to produce several working papers for the Conference on Disarmament that dealt with the current outer space legal regime and terminology relevant to the subject. The ICRASL has also held several symposiums and a series of lectures involving authoritative legal experts from around the world on questions relating to arms control and outer space, in which the issue of verification played a prominent part.

The second set of projects aimed at the subject of outer space drew upon expertise from the private sector through contracts with Spar Aerospace of Montreal. Spar, in turn, called upon the expertise of a number of sub-contractors from both the industrial and academic sectors of Canada. The aim of the first such project, which is called PAXSAT "A", was to determine whether a space-based observation system could help verify an outer space arms control regime.

These two areas of inquiry in relation to the question of arms control and outer space recently came together in a workshop held in Montreal in May 1987 to which Canada invited the heads of Conference on Disarmament and observer delegations. In addition to Canadian officials, it was attended by representatives from 35 other countries as well as a representative of the CD Secretariat. This Outer Space Workshop combined discussions on broad legal questions relating to arms control and outer space with an examination of its verification aspects, including Canadian PAXSAT research. It was, in the words of the then President of the CD, Mr. M. Vejvoda, the Czechoslovak Ambassador to the CD, "a lively and very useful gathering."

Conventional Weapons

The focus of Canadian efforts in this regard has been on agreements relating to the balance of conventional forces in Europe. The Verification Research Programme has sponsored work on the topic of confidence- and security-building measures, the most prominent example of which is a study by James Macintosh of York University. Entitled *Confidence- (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective*, this work has been welcomed as one of the most comprehensive and thorough discussions of the subject. Further studies have concerned the nature of the verification regime that would be appropriate for monitoring agreements involving confidence- and security-building measures as well as agreements dealing with more substantial arms control and disarmament measures.

The Programme has also sponsored research into the application of space-based remote sensors for verifying agreements on ground-based conventional forces. This project, known as PAXSAT "B", was undertaken with Spar Aerospace as prime contractor and with several other industrial and research organizations as sub-contractors. Some of the initial results of Canada's PAXSAT research have been presented to other governments through bilateral consultations and in several international forums. Further work on developing the PAXSAT concept is continuing.

Generic Research

One of the central themes of the Canadian Verification Research Programme is the recognition that verification can be usefully studied in a general way outside the context of a specific agreement or negotiation. A major element in this generic research effort has been to amass and review what has been said and reported on this issue by governments, international bodies and academics. As a result, it is fair to say that a unique database on the subject of verification has been developed within the Verification Research Unit. To underline Canada's commitment to realizing progress in discussions and in research into verification, in May 1987 Canada made available in the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) a

three-volume document compiling almost 700 summaries of research reports, government statements and academic papers on the subject of verification.

The Programme's generic research has been instrumental in providing a foundation for significant political initiatives. A prime example of this has been the comprehensive study of April 1986 which was produced in response to the Canadian-initiated United Nations General Assembly Resolution 40152(o) — "Verification In All Its Aspects." This analysis was the most detailed response to be submitted to the Secretary-General on this subject. At the 1987 session of the UNDC, Canada, acting as chairman of the Working Group on Verification, produced a detailed and comprehensive paper which similarly drew upon the foundation provided by the Verification Research Unit's extensive generic research. This paper made an indispensable contribution to the success of the Working Group in reaching agreement on several verification principles. These documents exemplify the uses to which a thoroughly prepared database, generated by background research, can be put.

Conclusion

Canada's Verification Research Programme has been addressing directly and in detail a subject which the United Nations Disarmament Commission recently recognized as "a matter of critical importance in the negotiation and implementation of arms limitation and disarmament." As Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, stated before the House of Commons on October 21, 1986:

Many of the persisting obstacles to negotiating progress arise directly from a lack of trust. The priority attention Canada has given to verification issues in particular attacks this question directly. Arms control agreements alone do not produce security; confidence in compliance produces security. Verification justifies that confidence.

(Editor's Note: More details about the Verification Research Programme can be found in a brochure entitled Verification Research, copies of which can be obtained by contacting the Editor.)

The **Disarmament** Bulletin



A review of national and international disarmament and arms control activities

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Prime Minister Comments on Historic Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Agreement



Oval Office Deliberation — President Reagan (left) and General Secretary Gorbachev discuss issues of current interest to their countries during a private conference in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington. This was one of several meetings between the two leaders attended only by their interpreters.

US Information Agency

Following the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement on December 8, 1987, the Prime Minister issued the following press release.

"On Tuesday, December 8, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed an historic agreement to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles. I am sure that all Canadians applaud this treaty as a pragmatic step towards a better and safer world. It is a celebration of common sense over adversity.

The agreement requires the complete dismantling and destruction of thousands of nuclear weapons. For the first time in

the nuclear age, a whole class of super-power weapons will not be merely limited, but eliminated completely.

President Reagan can justifiably claim great success. It was he who provided the vision in his zero option proposal of 1981. It was he who held firm against those who wanted to freeze these weapons at levels still threatening to the West. It is he who has had the courage to distinguish between firmness and intransigence.

However, we must not hesitate to give Mr. Gorbachev his full share of the credit. It took a new kind of Soviet leader to undo his predecessors' decision to introduce those missiles in the



first place. And it has taken a new Soviet leader to realize that a more stable world is possible through mutual reductions in military might.

We welcome the new spirit as well as the tangible achievements.

The agreement introduces the most stringent verification measures yet seen. For the first time, American and Soviet inspectors will be stationed on each other's territory. Measures like these are essential, not only to ensure compliance but to build trust. This precedent will be extremely valuable for future arms-reduction accords.

The fear that removing these missiles might somehow split Europe from North America is unfounded. The links were strong before the missiles were introduced. They will remain strong after they are removed. The presence of American and Canadian forces in Europe is compelling evidence of the North American commitment to Europe.

Security is indivisible. The elimination of intermediate-range weapons benefits all Western countries. But the weapons that directly threaten Canada — destabilizing intercontinental missiles, as well as nuclear-armed submarines and bombers — are not affected by this agreement. We therefore especially welcome the progress that has been made on strategic weapons at this Summit. Canada hopes that the INF Treaty will now provide the momentum for reducing the huge number of nuclear weapons that remain, and lead to an agreement in Moscow next spring. This would meet the fundamental Canadian priority — stable security at much lower levels of armaments.

The INF Treaty tells us much about the meaning and importance of collective security. In 1979, the Western Alliance decided to deploy a limited number of these missiles. At the same time, we offered to negotiate reductions with the USSR.

Some West European governments came under strong public pressure not to provide bases for these missiles. Our

West European allies held firm. When they saw that the Alliance could not be divided, the Soviets returned to the table they left in 1983. The Treaty just signed is a clear vindication of NATO's policy of combining deterrence and dialogue. We abandon either element at our peril.

Change and Continuity in East-West Relations

The Treaty is welcome for what it accomplishes. It is also welcome for what it tells us about East-West relations. Only a few years ago, such an agreement seemed far in the future — hopelessly idealistic.

So much has changed since then. What was once the stuff of dreams is beginning to come within our grasp: significant arms reductions; the resolution of regional conflicts; progress on human rights.

But we must not delude ourselves about the daunting obstacles that remain. Nor should we forget how we arrived at this point.

The need for Western cohesion remains as necessary as ever. Antagonism between East and West will not evaporate overnight. Though we hope the walls will become lower, Europe remains divided. The Soviet military forces remain well in excess of what anyone in the West would consider reasonable and sufficient. *Glasnost*, welcome as it may be, will not be able to transform quickly a Soviet Union that has roots in centuries of Russian authoritarianism as well as Marxist dictatorship.

The need for consistency and prudence therefore remains. Freedom will continue to need a strong defence. Neither Western Europe nor North America nor both together can maintain an effective and stable military balance between East and West by conventional means alone. Thus the West as a whole will continue to rely upon nuclear deterrence until our security can be guaranteed in other ways.

It also means we must seek, through negotiations, to do away with the current imbalance in conventional forces and scrap chemical arms entirely.

That elements of the past endure should not, however, blind us to what is new and positive.

In the Soviet Union Mr. Gorbachev is courageously trying to arrest social decay, to turn around the economy and improve the standard of living. If this means that ordinary Soviet citizens will have greater initiative and self-expression, this evolution is decidedly in our interest, as well as their own. We should not hesitate to encourage a Soviet leader who is trying to loosen the shackles of the past, repudiating some of the errors and excesses of the past.

Externally, the Soviet leaders are coming to recognize the price of going it alone and the challenge of interdependence. The Soviet Union will never be secure by making other countries feel insecure.

Some steps have been taken. Mr. Gorbachev seems to recognize the advantages of collective action through international organizations. This is welcome. Of course, there are issues of confidence which depend on Soviet action.

Soviet troops have brought death and destruction to Afghanistan for eight years. Up to now, Soviet leaders have ignored the demands of the international community for a total and immediate withdrawal. To comply now, to allow the Afghan people by themselves to determine their future, would greatly bolster confidence in Soviet intentions.

In the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, dissidents have been released, divided families allowed to reunite, emigrants allowed to leave. We certainly welcome those developments. But there are still far too many people who are penalized for seeking to exercise rights guaranteed them in international human rights accords. We ask only that Soviet and East European leaders keep the human rights promises they freely made in those accords.

Mr. Gorbachev's interest in the world economy is understandable. He cannot ignore the information revolution, global



technological developments or the impact of currency fluctuations and commodity prices. Closer integration of the Soviet Union into the world economy is also in the West's long-term interest. It is well to remember, however, that it is the global economy that is open and the Soviet economy that is closed. We call upon the Soviet Union to adjust its economic practices so that it may take advantage of the many opportunities that are open to it in Canada and elsewhere.

The Canadian Contribution

I believe there are five essential principles by which Canada should be guided as we enter this new and path-breaking phase of East-West relations.

First, we must do everything possible to promote greater communication between the peoples of East and West. Through visits, through cooperation in the Arctic and in cultural exchanges, through trade, we can do much to break down the walls of distrust and suspicion.

Second, we must continue to make a full and effective contribution to collective defence, alongside our friends and allies. Working together and maintaining a strong deterrent, in conjunction with dialogue, has brought us this far; it can take us even farther. Canada is doing its part, as the Defence White Paper shows.

Third, I reaffirm our goal of vigorously promoting progress in arms control and disarmament. The objectives in the nuclear, space, chemical and conventional field that I set out in 1985 are as valid today as they were then. We will continue to work in every forum available to us — in NATO, in the Conference on Disarmament, in conventional arms talks — to achieve this purpose. We may not be at every negotiating table, but our commitment and expertise will be brought to bear wherever they can contribute effectively.

The goal in all these areas is stability; stability at lower levels of arms, and stability in the relationship between offence and defence.

An enduring security structure, however, requires a broader basis of confidence than we have had in the past.

Canada's fourth principle, therefore, is to encourage a more constructive Soviet role internationally. We welcome a world in which the Soviet Union is a committed, responsible partner, whether in political or economic matters. We encourage this, and look to the Soviet Union to match its words with action.

Fifth, we will continue to stress the human side of East-West relations. Canadians believe deeply that families wishing to be reunited should be permitted to do so. We believe in religious freedom, the right to emigrate and the right to dissent. We will continue to raise our voice on these matters at the Vienna Meeting on European Security and Cooperation. And we will not cease until we are satisfied that international standards are being met.

Canada rejoices in the agreement signed in Washington on Tuesday. We salute the leaders who had the courage to take this step. We commit ourselves to work to reduce barriers between East and West, to create a safer, saner world for ourselves and those who will come after, and to establish habits of cooperation instead of confrontation.

But a world which must contend with pressing economic, social and environmental problems will not wait forever for us to succeed. The Treaty signed on Tuesday in Washington shows that with hard work, resolve, and common sense and purpose, we can prevail.

It is a grand beginning, but a beginning nonetheless. Let us get on with the challenge ahead."

SSEA Declares INF Agreement an Historic Achievement

On December 8, 1987, the Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué.

"The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, today expressed his great pleasure at the signing of the historic agreement between the USA and the USSR to eliminate all ground-based Soviet and American intermediate-range nuclear missiles globally. Mr. Clark said: 'This agreement is an unprecedented breakthrough in efforts to reverse the nuclear arms spiral and engage in actual reductions in nuclear arms rather than just their limitation. The intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) accord will result in the complete elimination of an entire category of nuclear missiles and is therefore the first nuclear disarmament agreement in modern history.'

The terms of the INF treaty, particularly its verification provisions, are significant and extremely important. For the first time, the Soviet Union has agreed to the establishment of a permanent monitoring site on Soviet territory manned by USA

personnel. The associated inspection regime is a rigorous one involving, in the beginning, up to 20 challenge inspections per year. The concept of a prior exchange of agreed data has also been accepted and satisfactorily implemented. Finally, the need for asymmetrical reductions to common levels has been recognized as the USSR will eliminate four times more warheads than the USA. All of these measures have been Western priorities in arms control for many years and have important implications for other arms control and disarmament negotiations.

'The outcome of the INF negotiations has reaffirmed the validity of NATO's December, 1979, 'double-track' decision. It underlines the important role Alliance unity and solidarity have played throughout. The difficult decisions taken over the past eight years on the issue of INF have had a direct bearing on the successful outcome of these negotiations. Canada is satisfied with the results and looks forward with anticipation to similarly successful conclusions to other arms control negotiations currently underway.' "

SSEA Applauds New Vitality in Arms Control Process

On September 22, 1987, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, spoke to the 42nd Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Following are excerpts from his address.

"A year ago, the atmosphere in this assembly was heavy with a sense of crisis. The financial shortfall of the United Nations, serious in itself, was also a symptom of a deeper worry about the very existence of this organization.

Canada — and other friends of the United Nations — used this podium to call for reform. I am pleased today to note that substantial reform has begun. That is both a tribute to the men and women who make this organization work, and testimony to the recognition, by most nations, that a strong United Nations is essential to world peace. We are especially impressed with the United Nations resolve to extend reform beyond the institutions in New York, to United Nations economic and social institutions throughout the world.

For our part, Canada made a point of paying our 1987 assessment fully and as early as possible. We hope other nations will quickly pay their current and past assessments. Those who call for internal reform have a particular obligation and opportunity to encourage it, once it begins. That good example would increase the pressure upon other powers, whose contributions are consistently delinquent.

During the past year this real internal reform has been matched by solid progress on many of the major issues of concern to the United Nations. Sometimes that progress occurred outside this multilateral organization — as, for example, in the historic breakthrough on an arms agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and in the steady pressure against apartheid mounted by the Commonwealth, and in the initiative towards peace launched by the five presidents of Central America. But in many other cases, the world's movement forward was rooted here. Those cases are worth enumerating.



Mr. Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

In the ongoing war between Iran and Iraq, Security Council Resolution 598 reflects welcome political will and unanimity in the Security Council, and the Secretary-General is to be commended for his patient, persistent mediation. The Secretary-General's mission was not as successful as we all had hoped and the speech this morning by the President of Iran can only be characterized as destructive and deeply disappointing. Therefore the Security Council should be reconvened to take the next step. Canada would fully support implementation of the axiomatic second half of Resolution 598, the application of sanctions.

At UNCTAD VII, the consensus statement on trade, debt and commodities may presage a new era of cooperation between developed and developing countries. UNCTAD VII was an example of an international conference for whose outcome the prognosis was uniformly gloomy. The doubters were wrong. The UN scored a major success.

The special session on Africa is beginning to yield concrete results, albeit there is a long, long way yet to go. The international community clearly now

recognizes that the majority of African countries are making great efforts to turn their economies around. But the international community must equally recognize that the debt situation for many African countries is desperate, and must be addressed in new and innovative ways or the entire recovery programme may collapse. In that context, I welcome the Secretary-General's appointment of the advisory panel on resource flows. We anxiously await its report. As most members of this assembly know, Canada is so concerned about this issue that at the Francophone Summit we announced the cancellation of all official debt which we have held in francophone Africa. Next month, we will do the same at the Commonwealth Conference for anglophone Africa.

The Brundtland Commission has produced a blunt and clear report on the urgency of protecting our resources and environment. In that spirit, in Montreal last week, nations signed an ozone treaty, controlling the emissions of chlorofluoro-carbons. Dr. Mostafa Tolba, Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme, called it 'the first truly global treaty that offers protection to every single human being on the planet.' Our government believes that Montreal treaty will serve as a model for future international agreements on the environment.

The Conference on Disarmament and Development, just concluded, yielded a remarkable consensus document, holding disarmament and development as essential to national security. It graphically demonstrated the capacity of this organization to find agreement in the most complex fields.

The World Health Organization is recognized as a crucial resource for gathering the statistics and planning necessary as countries struggle to master the worldwide AIDS epidemic.

Within its own doors, the United Nations has made social strides in another field — the equality rights of women. In 41 years there had not been even one woman permanently appointed as an Under-Secretary-General. Now there are three, and we take particular



satisfaction that the first woman appointed is an outstanding Canadian, Madame Thérèse Paquet-Sévigny, Under-Secretary-General of the Department of Public Information.

There have been other accomplishments in this past year — the successful Vienna Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking; the coming into force of the Convention Against Torture; the International Maritime Organization Draft Convention on Maritime Security; and the progress on verification at the UN Disarmament Commission with which Canada is proud to be associated. They are proof of the worth and vitality of this United Nations, and clear evidence of the benefits to be derived by continuing to confront the world's problems together.

The great purpose of the United Nations is to extend the reach of peace and justice in the world. Sometimes, as in the war between Iran and Iraq, its role becomes most acute when all other efforts have failed. In other cases, it can encourage regional initiatives that may lead to peace where peace is threatened, or focus international attention upon injustice that must end. I want to speak today of one initiative we must encourage, and one injustice we must end.

The initiative is in Central America, where the presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua have joined together in a genuine effort by all parties to settle their differences peacefully. The surprisingly positive outcome of the Guatemala Summit was the result of many factors. They include the foundations laid by Contadora and the Contadora Support Groups; the preparatory work of the Central American countries; and the concessions made at the Summit by each of the five presidents. That achievement was applauded by us all. But it was only the first of many steps along a difficult road.

Canadian aid to the region has been steadily increasing, as has our funding and acceptance of refugees. We have expressed our view that the root problem in Central America is poverty,

not ideology; that the real need is development assistance, not military activity; and that intervention by outside powers will only aggravate the tensions. We have supported the Contadora process, and have made available to Contadora the expertise Canadians have acquired in the techniques of peacekeeping.

...Canada supports the initiatives of the Central American presidents. We are prepared to provide our expertise mechanisms which, once peace is possible, can help it endure. The disputes must be resolved by those actually involved in the conflict, but Canada is prepared to contribute to that process in any direct and practical way open to us.

Mr. President, the injustice which I referred to earlier and which I now want to address is apartheid. Canada's position is clear and on the record. We have acted upon all of the sanctions recommended by the Nassau Conference of the Commonwealth Heads of Government. We have imposed a ban both on new investment in South Africa and reinvestment of profits. We have banned the promotion of tourism and ended air links. We have banned the importation of coal, iron and steel. Furthermore we have made it clear that, if other measures fail, we are prepared to end our economic and diplomatic relations with South Africa. We are helping the victims of apartheid, with scholarships, legal aid, and other assistance. We contribute substantially to the development of the Front Line states, both bilaterally and through the Southern African Development Coordination Conference. We apply our influence, wherever it is effective, to build the pressures against apartheid.

...The Prime Minister of Canada met with the leaders of Zimbabwe and Zambia and Botswana in Victoria Falls in February, and I visited Southern Africa six weeks ago, a visit which included a meeting in Pretoria with the South African Foreign Minister. Oliver Tambo visited Ottawa a month ago and met with our Prime Minister and other Canadian leaders. In early September it was our honour to host the second Summit of La Francophonie, in Quebec City, and

next month, in Vancouver, we host the Heads of Government of the Commonwealth, the international family to which South Africa once belonged.

...It is Canada's view that the sanctions imposed upon South Africa have been effective. Specifically, in the first six months of 1987, Canada reduced its imports from South Africa by 51 per cent. But the impact is not only economic, it is also psychological. While the government of South Africa has reacted by limiting liberty even more, growing numbers of individual South Africans have reached out for reform, in meetings in Lusaka and Dakar, and in the private contacts we must multiply.

...The instability in Southern Africa is both an ally and a product of apartheid. One of the most wrenching conversations I have had was with Canadian aid workers in Mozambique, who fear that the projects they build to help people will become targets of terrorists, and put at risk the very lives they are working to improve. An essential part of the challenge in Southern Africa is thus to bring more stability to the Front Line states.

...Mr. President, I began by talking about the atmosphere of crisis which was so pervasive as we met last year. Today, we must all surely take satisfaction from the atmosphere of hope that surrounds us. Hope, because both globally and regionally there is recognition that a peaceful and secure world is of universal benefit and worthy of relentless pursuit. Hope, because the social and economic evils that beset us are being addressed in a meaningful way. And, finally, hope because this organization of ours, the United Nations, is reasserting its capacity to play the central role it was designed to play, in dealing with the ills that still plague the international community. The UN agenda stretches before us: Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Cyprus, peace in the Middle East between Israel and the Arab states, an end to terrorism, and the relentless human struggle to eradicate hunger and injustice. Somehow, Mr. President, it feels as though we are closer this year than last to tackling that agenda."

Members of Consultative Group Attend First Committee



Members of the Consultative Group on a trip to New York. First row left to right: Lt. Gen. Reg Lane, Ms Janet Sawyer, Ms Judith Meinert, Ambassador Roche, Ms Valerie Klassen, Dr. Terry Carson. Second row left to right: Mr. Fergus Watt, Mr. Alec Morrison, Permanent Mission to New York, Dr. David Leyton-Brown, Mr. Rankin MacSween, Prof. Jean-Guy Vaillancourt, Ms Beverley Delong and Mr. Paul Bennett, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs.

Ten members of the Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs participated in an Orientation Programme at the First Committee of the General Assembly from October 11 to 17, 1987. This is the second year in which the Department of External Affairs has undertaken this programme. Its aim is to enable committed and interested members of the Consultative Group to be more fully involved and informed about the multi-faceted work for arms control and disarmament undertaken by Canada in the United Nations, and in particular the First Committee, which deals with security and international affairs.

The purpose of the programme was therefore twofold: first, to assist in the education and dissemination of information among those involved directly in the

programme and indirectly to the organizations/communities with which the participants are associated; and second, to enhance and strengthen the Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs.

The participants were briefed on the arms control and disarmament activities of the Permanent Mission of Canada and of First Committee operating procedures. They met separately with UN representatives of Czechoslovakia, the USSR, the USA, the United Kingdom and Indonesia and with various UN secretariat officials. Participants also attended a number of First Committee meetings, in order to see first-hand how business is conducted in that forum. The group was present to hear the main Canadian intervention on October 13 by Douglas Roche, Ambassador for Disarmament.

There were also opportunities to attend sessions of the General Assembly, and to meet non-governmental representatives.

During the course of the week, a number of participants were struck by the lengthy and complex processes of the First Committee, and by the significant role which Canada appeared to play in arms control and disarmament.

UN Recognizes 'Peace Messengers'

On September 15, 1987, the International Day of Peace, the United Nations formally recognized the work of some 100 organizations and institutions around the world which had made significant and concrete contributions to the 1986 International Year of Peace. The United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, presented those being honoured with "Peace Messenger Awards" in a ceremony at the United Nations Peace bell, while simultaneous events took place in Geneva and Vienna. Ten Canadian groups were honoured for their contributions with this prestigious award: Children for Peace, College Saint Maurice, the International Council for Adult Education, the International Organization for Psychophysiology, Peacefund Canada, the Peace Research Institute-Dundas, People in Equal Participation, Inc., Saskatoon Mothers for Peace, the United Nations Association in Canada and the International Political Science Association. Unfortunately, representatives of only three of the Canadian winners were able to participate in the New York ceremonies.

Following the awards presentation, recipients toured an exhibition of material emanating from the International Year of Peace. Canadian exhibits included the Saskatoon Mothers' quilt, posters and essays, the International Year of Peace postage stamp, and a copy of the award-winning *What Peace Means To Me*, copies of which are still available in English and French by writing to the Editor.



Conference on Disarmament and Development Poses Challenge to Participants

At the request of the General Assembly, an International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development was held from August 24 to September 11, 1987, in New York. One hundred and fifty states including Canada participated in the conference. The USA did not attend.

Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark headed a strong Canadian delegation which included Members of Parliament, government officials and representatives of Canadian non-governmental organizations. Mr. Clark was honoured to deliver the opening speech of the conference, in which he stressed the importance of both disarmament and development as fundamental Canadian policy objectives. He set forth Canada's views on the relationship between the two processes and expectations for the conference.

At the outset, it became evident that the wide range of approaches to the subject posed a serious challenge to participants to resolve differences and work to achieve consensus. Some emphasized, as a priority focus of the conference, the need to augment de-

velopment assistance to Third World countries, including through the disarmament process. Others went so far as to make development efforts an express objective of further disarmament measures. Canada and many others took the position that disarmament and development are distinct and mutually supportive processes, related in that each contributes to security and benefits from enhanced security.

Despite some rocky moments, the conference succeeded in reaching agreement on a consensus final document and was widely heralded as a success. Having established a moderate approach in its opening statement, Canada played an active role throughout.

The conference established that disarmament and development form two distinct elements of a larger and very complex relationship. Although they are separate processes and should be pursued independently, regardless of the pace of progress in the other, each contributes to the benefits from security, which constitutes the essence of the relationship. Security was defined as including not only a military dimension,

"but also political, economic, social, humanitarian and human rights and ecological aspects."

The conference also adopted an Action Programme based on the following three objectives:

- (a) "fostering an interrelated perspective on disarmament, development and security as constituting a triad of peace";
- (b) "promoting multilateralism as providing the international framework for shaping the relationship between disarmament, development and security based on interdependence among nations and mutuality of interests"; and
- (c) "strengthening the central role of the United Nations in the interrelated fields of disarmament and development."

In Canada's view, among the major accomplishments of the conference was the achievement of broad recognition that genuine "security" includes much more than limited military calculations, and the pledge by all 150 participants to pursue both disarmament and development objectives and to adopt appropriate measures for that purpose.

SSEA Addresses Conference on Disarmament and Development

On August 24, 1987, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, addressed the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development in New York. Following are excerpts from his address.

"We are not discussing a theoretical problem. Ten days ago, I was briefly in Mozambique where I met, among others, Canadians involved in non-governmental organizations operating clinics and other projects in that country. They face every day the prospect that the projects on which they are working — development projects of the finest kind — will be bombed or attacked. They face the dilemma that projects launched to help

people in need in fact make those people targets of attack. I am not here arguing that arms create that conflict; but, certainly, when a clinic becomes a target, arms are the enemy of development.

Let me begin my remarks by noting, as Canada usually does, that the test of this conference will be what we do, not what we say. There is rhetoric enough on the evil of arms and the need for development. What we must seek to achieve here is practical cooperation, not mutual recrimination. The work of the preparatory meetings has been encouraging, but that atmosphere must continue if we are to protect the principle which Canada assumes all participants share — namely, that less

money must be spent on arms, and more money must be spent on development. The relevant question is how do we make progress, not whom do we blame.

Our purpose is to increase real security, for individual nations, and for the world. Progress towards development, and progress towards disarmament, can both contribute to that security, but their relationship is not simple. This conference can be most useful if it probes beneath the assumption that there can be an automatic transfer of funds from arms to development. We must understand why governments spend on arms — and understand also that there is simply no evidence —

no reason to believe — that governments are likely to disarm, at the expense of what they consider their security, in order to divert funds to development. If we are serious, the reality we must recognize is that the level of a nation's security is the main criterion against which efforts for disarmament must be measured, not the level of economic gain. Security is the touchstone, and again, the reality is that each nation will judge its own security on its own terms.

I mean security in its broadest sense — not just military strength. The sense of economic and social well-being is an important factor in a nation's overall security. Seen in this light, development can make a major contribution to overcoming non-military threats. It can contribute to the establishment of a stable international system that will, in its turn, reduce the relative importance of military strength as an instrument of security.

It is fitting that, at the request of the General Assembly, this conference is being held under UN auspices. It was, of course, the United Nations that pioneered the study of the linkage between disarmament and development. The three-year study by 27 experts, headed by Inga Thorsson, inspired this conference. The Canadian Government commissioned a popular version of that study, entitled *Safe and Sound: Disarmament and Development in the Eighties*.

From the time of its establishment in the devastating wake of the Second World War, the United Nations has been dedicated to four key principles:

- freedom from the scourge of war;
- faith in fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person;
- respect for international obligations; and
- the promotion of social progress and better living standards.

Our success in upholding these principles depends in large measure on the

degree of commitment of individual member states to the disarmament and development processes. Indeed, our success in pursuing these objectives can mean the difference between a decent quality of life and deprivation, poverty or even death.

Canadians hope that this conference will rekindle the flagging political will upon which real progress depends.

Our goal should be to issue a consensus statement at the end. It will be a lost opportunity if we do not unite to state clearly that the security of everyone will be strengthened by both disarmament and development. Neither process can be held hostage to the other, but progress in one can facilitate progress in the other.

It is not surprising that world attention is focused on global military expenditures. It now amounts to \$1 trillion per year, or nearly 6 per cent of gross world output. Rather than disarmament, arsenals of conventional weapons have proliferated. Efforts to reduce stocks of nuclear weapons have seen very little success. There is documented evidence of the repeated use of chemical weapons, in breach of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The armaments industry and trade in arms absorb vast quantities of resources, which would be better devoted to civilian use. Even allowing the preoccupation of governments with the security of their citizens, the level of arms expenditure frequently exceeds reasonable security requirements.

There is, of course, the promise of a significant reduction in nuclear arms as a result of the initiatives of the United States and the Soviet Union and the negotiations at Geneva. Obviously, arms control is everybody's business. But the two superpowers have the power to make the changes we can only recommend, and we should welcome the seriousness with which both those nations appear to be approaching the Geneva negotiations.

Concerning development, all of us are aware of the world's enormous economic problems — slow growth, trade disputes, contraction of financial

flows to developing countries, increased debt burdens, and the almost impossible plight of the poorest nations. These problems are made worse by looming scarcities of raw materials, declining prospects for economic growth, and the long-term price we pay for degrading our environment. In human terms, that means hunger, illiteracy, high unemployment and inadequate housing and social services.

Genuine progress in development is occurring, involving some countries more than others, but nowhere is it enough. Nonetheless, as we make our assessments, it is worth noting which of the countries with stronger economies contribute most to international economic development, and which contribute least. I am speaking, of course, of development assistance, not military aid.

Of course, some of the most important progress in international development has come as the result of multilateral actions, including through the agencies and efforts of the United Nations. That has been especially true when UN efforts have focused on practical, constructive and clearly defined activities.

Through its child survival strategy, UNICEF has reduced infant mortality worldwide. The UN commissioner for refugees has provided legal protection and material assistance to millions of people fleeing war and persecution. The United Nations Development Programme has helped nations build viable economies by supporting 8 500 projects in 150 countries. Smallpox has been eliminated through the work of the World Health Organization. The UN has also provided an essential forum for debate on global development issues, most recently at the successful Special Session on Africa.

Those achievements were the result of careful planning, the setting of realistic goals and reliance on practical measures. The lesson for this conference is clear when we turn to disarmament, where the record of the United Nations — and of its member states — has been less impressive. Twenty years ago, the UN's performance in this field



offered prospects for real progress. More recently, the focus of attention here on nuclear weapons has often been at the expense of interest in other problems of arms control — problems that might be easier to solve. Nuclear weapons issues dominate the resolutions of the First Committee, yet global levels of conventional arms are high and rising, and that is a problem which many member states could help resolve by their own action.

As a first step now, we should attach higher priority to the development of confidence-building measures, which are a prerequisite to any major arms limitation agreement. In Europe, where the confrontation between East and West is most direct, the Stockholm Conference has made a valuable contribution to increased security. In Central America, there appears to be a prospect of agreement because the countries involved have worked together in a spirit of cooperation and taken actions which contribute to mutual confidence. These examples differ in form, but demonstrate that small, steady, practical steps can create the confidence that leads to progress. We should increase our efforts to promote such cooperation at the regional level.

Canada is strongly committed to both development and disarmament as fundamental policy objectives. In allocating resources at home, the Canadian Government seeks to achieve an equitable balance between a healthy economy driven by a vigorous private sector, and the fulfilment of basic human needs for all. Programmes such as universal subsidized medical care, child support and unemployment insurance are examples of solidly established Canadian benefits.

Canadians have, by tradition, a strong sense of obligation to help improve economic and social conditions in less fortunate parts of the world. From a modest contribution to the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme in 1949, Canada's development assistance programmes have expanded to cover all continents and a broad range of international institutions. To date, Canada has provided a total of

\$24 billion in official development assistance. The major portion of that has been directed at the poorest countries and people.

The Canadian development assistance effort extends well beyond the provision of grants. Efforts to seek a more open trading environment and acceptable arrangements on international debt constitute an integral element of Canada's relations with the developing world. Finally, Canadians in the private sector, from individuals and non-profit organizations to businesses, all contribute in various ways to development in the Third World. Since 1980, Canada has disbursed more than \$100 million under its industrial cooperation programme which focuses on joint ventures in, and the transfer of technology to, the Third World, particularly its private sector.

The control and reduction of armaments — both conventional and nuclear weapons — constitute a major Canadian foreign policy objective. We participate in all multilateral forums where arms control issues are considered and engage in a wide range of bilateral consultations and discussions. We have established specific priorities in the pursuit of this important goal. A major priority is the development of confidence-building measures such as the improvement of the technology and methodology of verification of arms limitations or reductions.

Mr. President, I strongly urge my fellow delegations at this conference to work towards the adoption of a consensus document. We agree on the goals, though not yet on the means. To dwell on our differences is to doom this conference. The four preparatory meetings — particularly the 19 elements and 10-point action programme agreed to at the third preparatory meeting — show that a fair and reasonable balance of views can be reached. To compromise on details is to protect the principle that more money must be spent on development, less on arms.

We need the commitment of *all* states if we are to make progress. We should examine the potential developmental benefits of disarmament measures.

These can include redirecting spending to social purposes; reducing public debts; stimulating economic growth, trade and private investment; and increasing official development assistance.

We should emphasize the importance of cooperation at the regional level, and the necessity of supporting existing global and regional institutions which promote cooperation. The conference document should support current arms control and disarmament negotiations, and acknowledge the necessity of confidence-building measures in that context.

Finally, the protection of individual rights and freedoms is so basic to both disarmament and development that it is often overlooked. The individual has a key role to play in these processes, but must be provided freedom and opportunity to become involved. In this context, I welcome the attendance of so many non-governmental observers here. My delegation will follow closely their contributions to the conference.

...If we are to succeed, the United Nations must deal effectively with the distortions that scar human life on this planet, distortions that mean that one person in six lives in abject poverty, while arms expenditures rise.

This contrast is highlighted frequently by respected studies such as those on world military and social expenditures produced by Ruth Leger Sivard and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, among others. It is highlighted even more starkly by the poverty and suffering I have encountered during visits to development projects in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.

One useful purpose of this conference could be to return the global spotlight to the costs of the continuing arms race. But spotlights aren't enough. We need practical solutions to enable us to devote fewer resources to weapons and more to development. Security in the interdependent world of today demands both disarmament and development."

Arms Control and Disarmament (ACD) Resolutions at UNGA 42

(TOTAL ACD RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED — 71)

Resolutions marked with an asterisk were co-sponsored by Canada.

Countries in parentheses were lead sponsors.

RESOLUTION NUMBER	RESOLUTION Supported by Canada (46 including 28 without a vote)	VOTE (Yes/No/Abstain) (Without a vote—WOV)
42/13 (Costa Rica)	International Year of Peace	WOV
42/16 (Brazil)	Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic	122-1-8
42/25 (Mexico)	Treaty of Tlatelolco	147-0-7
42/27 (New Zealand)*	Urgent need for a comprehensive test ban treaty	143-2-8
42/28 (Egypt)	Nuclear weapon-free zone in Middle East	WOV
42/29 (Pakistan)	Nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia	114-3-36
42/30 (Sweden)	Conventional weapons deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects	WOV
42/31 (Bulgaria)	Strengthening of security of non-nuclear weapon states against use or threat of nuclear weapons	112-18-20
42/32 (Pakistan)	Assure non-nuclear weapon states against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	151-0-3
42/33 (Sri Lanka)	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	154-1-0 141-1-11
42/34(a) (Madagascar)	Denuclearization of Africa—Implementation of the Declaration	151-0-4
42/36 (Romania)	Reduction of military budgets	WOV
42/37(a) (Canada)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	WOV
42/37(b) (Austria)	Convention on biological and toxin weapons	WOV
42/37(c) (Australia)	1925 Geneva Protocol and Chemical Weapons Convention	WOV
42/38 (Cameroon)*	Review of role of United Nations in field of disarmament	WOV
42/38(a) (United Kingdom)*	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	115-0-39
42/38(b) (Japan)	Stockpiling of radiological weapons	WOV
42/38(c) (Australia)	Notification of nuclear tests	147-1-8
42/38(d) (Zimbabwe)	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	143-0-13
42/38(e) (Denmark)	Conventional disarmament	WOV
42/38(g) (China)	Conventional disarmament	WOV
42/38(h) (China)	Nuclear disarmament	WOV
42/38(i) (United Kingdom)*	Objective information on military matters	133-0-12
42/38(k) (Sweden)	Naval armaments	154-1-2
42/38(l) (Canada)*	Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes	149-1-6
42/38(m) (USA)	Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements	WOV
42/38(n) (Peru)	Conventional disarmament on regional scale	154-0-0
42/39(d) (Nepal)	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia	WOV
42/39(e) (Belgium)*	Regional disarmament	WOV
42/39(f) (FRG)*	Guidelines for confidence-building measures	WOV
42/39(i) (Nigeria)	United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament	156-1-0
42/39(j) (Madagascar)	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa	WOV
42/39(k) (Peru)	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Latin America	WOV
42/40 (Yugoslavia)	Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament	WOV
42/41 (Sri Lanka)	World Disarmament Conference	WOV



RESOLUTION NUMBER	RESOLUTION Supported by Canada (46 including 28 without a vote)	VOTE (Yes/No/Abstain) (Without a vote—WOV)
42/42(f) (Canada)*	Verification in all its aspects	WOV
42/42(g) (Bulgaria)*	Report of Disarmament Commission	WOV
42/42(i) (Mexico)	Comprehensive programme of disarmament	WOV
42/42(j) (United Kingdom)	United Nations disarmament studies	WOV
42/42(k) (Netherlands)*	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	127-0-28
42/42(n) (Cameroon)*	Rationalization of work of First Committee	134-0-20
42/43 (Sri Lanka)	Indian Ocean Zone of Peace	WOV
42/45 (France)*	Relationship between disarmament and development	WOV
42/90 (Malta)	Strengthening of security cooperation in Mediterranean	WOV

NOTE: In addition to the above resolutions, the following was also adopted:

(Chairman)	General and complete disarmament	WOV (decision)
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Opposed by Canada — 7

42/39(b) (India)	Freeze on nuclear weapons	139-12-4
42/39(c) (India)	Convention of prohibition of use of nuclear weapons	135-17-4
42/39(h) (Mexico)	Implementation of nuclear freeze	140-13-2
42/42(a) (GDR)	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	125-17-12
42/42(c) (Argentina)	Cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament	137-13-7
42/42(e) (Czechoslovakia)	International cooperation for disarmament	118-18-14
42/42(m) (Yugoslavia)	Decision of First United Nations Special Session Devoted to Disarmament	142-12-3

Canada Abstained — 18

42/26(a) (Mexico)	Cessation of all nuclear test explosions	137-3-14
42/26(b) (Mexico)	Cessation of all nuclear test explosions	128-3-22
42/35 (Byelorussia)	Prohibition of development of new types of weapons of mass destruction	135-1-18
42/38(f) (Iraq)	Stockpiling of radiological weapons	119-2-32
42/38(j) (Czechoslovakia)	Implementation of United Nations resolutions on disarmament	128-2-24
42/39(a) (Cyprus)	Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament — review	129-1-23
42/39(g) (Mexico)	World Disarmament Campaign	146-1-9
42/42(b) (Iraq)	First Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament — decisions	137-1-14
42/42(d) (Argentina)	Prevention of nuclear war	140-3-14
42/42(h) (Mongolia)	Disarmament Week	133-0-21
42/42(l) (Yugoslavia)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	135-5-15
42/44 (Iraq)	Israeli nuclear armament	97-2-52
42/46(a) (Zambia)	Question of Antarctica	122-0-9
42/46(b) (Malaysia)	Question of Antarctica	100-0-10
42/91 (Poland)	Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace	128-0-24
42/92 (Yugoslavia)	Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of Security	131-1-23
42/93 (Poland)	Comprehensive system of international peace and security	76-12-63
42/34(b) (Madagascar)	Nuclear capability of South Africa	140-4-13

Urgent Need for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

The following are excerpts from an intervention made by the Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, at the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on November 4, 1987, in New York.

"The realization of a negotiated and verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) has long been, and remains, a fundamental Canadian arms control and disarmament objective.

I believe there are new grounds for hope that genuine progress towards this important objective can be made. The most significant is the decision announced on September 18 by the United States and the Soviet Union to begin full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing by the end of this year. This is welcome news for all of us. This body should offer strong encouragement and support. A first step is provided in the draft resolution contained in document L.77 which welcomes the US-Soviet joint statement. I am pleased to announce today that Canada will co-sponsor this resolution, which is entitled 'Urgent Need for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.'

In pursuing the objective of a halt to all nuclear testing by all countries in all environments for all time, the superpowers have a special responsibility. As the producers and guardians of the overwhelming proportion of the world's nuclear explosive potential, they have a key role to play in showing others the lead. Canada fervently hopes that they will exercise fully and creatively that lead both in their bilateral negotiations and within the appropriate multilateral forums.

A comprehensive test ban treaty can never be achieved, however, without the full support and cooperation of all the nuclear weapon states. Therefore, while negotiations between the superpowers are of crucial importance, the importance of efforts at the multilateral level must not be underestimated.



Mr. Douglas Roche, Ambassador for Disarmament

This is why this resolution, which Canada considers one of the most important on the agenda before us, focuses particularly on the role of the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The resolution urges the CD to 'initiate substantive work on all aspects of a nuclear test ban treaty at the beginning of its 1988 session.' In Canada's view, this appeal stands at the heart of the resolution. It is time for the members of the CD to rise above differences over how a mandate for the establishment of an *ad hoc* committee in the CD should be defined so that discussions on the substance of the nuclear test ban question can finally get underway. Attempts to impose an approach to this issue which remains unacceptable to key nuclear weapon states will obviously not bear results. However, when the price is a continuing failure even to begin to address the subject, one is tempted to question the tactics of the advocates of this approach.

...It remains Canada's view that progress towards a more secure, less heavily armed world can only be achieved through measured and balanced steps which are mutually satisfactory to the parties concerned. This approach applies just as much to

the process of negotiating reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals as it does to the cessation of all nuclear testing. Experience has shown that declarations and rhetoric cannot hasten the arms control and disarmament process and may indeed retard it.

Based upon this rationale, Canada supports a step-by-step approach to the realization of an eventual comprehensive test ban treaty. A meaningful start within the Conference on Disarmament would be the consideration of the questions of scope, compliance and verification. We should not lose sight of the fact that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is not an end in itself, but is rather a means to the ultimate goal which is the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. I would submit that the primary purpose of the reduction and cessation of nuclear testing should be to enhance confidence in the global arms control and disarmament process. Engaging in prolonged disputes concerning how this process could best begin will not enhance the process of confidence-building.

Mr. Chairman, the draft resolution contained in L.77 also refers to the progress made by the CD *Ad Hoc* Group of Scientific Experts towards the development of an international seismic monitoring network. An operational network of this kind will be required to verify an eventual CTBT.

Canada is very pleased at the steady progress which has been made by this important group whose work can truly be characterized as the most positive continuing contribution to the quest for a halt to nuclear testing in recent years. As I noted in my statement to this Committee on October 13, we welcome the selection of Dr. Peter Basham of Canada as coordinator for a major global text as part of the development of an International Seismic Data Exchange.

...We urge a very strong vote for this resolution which is a realistic step to the goal of a safer, more secure world. The time has come for us to move, as a world community, towards the cessation of all nuclear tests."



Third UN Special Session on Disarmament

The United Nations General Assembly decided to hold a Third Special Session devoted to Disarmament (UNSSOD III) from May 31 to June 25, 1988, at the UN headquarters in New York. As was the case with the First and Second Special Sessions on Disarmament, in 1978 and 1982, respectively, UNSSOD III will be a high-profile international event attended by a number of Heads of State and Government and many Foreign Ministers.

Canada attaches high priority to a successful UNSSOD III in line with its commitment to the multilateral dimension of the arms control and disarmament process, including, in particular, the role of the United Nations. In pursuing its major objectives in this field, Canada takes the view that the UN can and should enhance and complement ongoing efforts in other arms control and disarmament forums including at the bilateral level.

Canada participated in four international preparatory meetings for UNSSOD III where an exchange of views took place and an agenda for the Special Session was established. Canada considers the agenda to be reasonably concise, well-balanced and forward-looking; in sum, a good starting point for UNSSOD III. Participants were, however, unable to reach agreement on more detailed directions for the Special Session.

The main tasks set out for the Special Session include:

- (a) a review and appraisal of the present international situation;
- (b) assessment of the implementation of the decisions of UNSSOD I and UNSSOD II;
- (c) consideration and adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament;
- (d) assessment of developments and trends, including qualitative and quantitative aspects relevant to the disarmament process;

(e) consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament; and

(f) the relationship between disarmament and development.

Canada conveyed its views to the UN Secretary-General last year concerning the desired areas of focus of UNSSOD III. These include *inter alia*: encouragement of the continuation of meaningful negotiations between the superpowers concerning the limitation and radical reduction of nuclear weapons and the enhancement of strategic stability; recognition of the importance of confidence-building measures in creating the climate necessary for the successful conclusion of arms control and disarmament agreements; the importance of compliance and transparency in the development and implementation of meaningful arms control agreements, and of the essential role of effective verification in that regard; enhanced efforts in the area of nuclear disarmament including the achievement of a cessation of nuclear testing; strengthening of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime; reduction of levels of conventional armaments with special emphasis on the importance of regional approaches; the need to conclude a multilateral convention on chemical weapons; the prevention of an arms race in outer space; and the importance of disarmament and development as distinct processes which both benefit from and contribute to security.

...Throughout the preparatory meetings and in consultations with other governments, Canada has endeavoured to develop a pragmatic and realistic approach to UNSSOD III which emphasizes the importance of searching for common ground. An important stage of the Canadian preparations involved a special meeting of the Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs on April 14-16, 1988. The meeting focused on UNSSOD III and the Canadian approach. Members of the Consultative Group were able to examine in considerable detail, over the course of two full days, the key agenda items for UNSSOD III and to formulate

their own priorities and preferences concerning Canadian objectives. These suggestions and proposals received from the Consultative Group will be among the key inputs during the final stages of deciding Canada's policy priorities for UNSSOD III.

Canada takes the view that UNSSOD III will succeed if it avoids focusing on perceived past failures and instead emphasizes constructive consideration of measures which might make concrete contributions to the arms control and disarmament process. A successful outcome should reinforce the validity of the practical, step-by-step approach to this process, without which the prospects for real progress could be dim.

Positive Developments After Stockholm

The provisions of the Final Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which was to become officially known by the unwieldy title of the CCSBMDE, came into effect on January 1, 1987. The Document was the result of negotiations among the 35 nations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) which resulted in a series of provisions designed to enhance the transparency of and increase confidence in the conduct of military activities in Europe. Among other things, the implementation of these provisions during their first year has resulted in Canadian observers attending Soviet military exercises, Polish observers having access to American exercises in the Federal Republic of Germany, and British personnel conducting an on-site challenge inspection in the German Democratic Republic.

The Stockholm Conference itself was established by the Madrid Follow-Up Meeting of the CSCE as a full-fledged diplomatic conference with a specific negotiating mandate and unlimited duration. The Stockholm Conference in fact met for two years, from January 1984



until September 1986. The aim of the CCSBMDE as set down in its mandate was "to undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations." The Stockholm Conference was to initiate a process "devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe."

A series of specific measures resulted from the Stockholm process aimed at improving the confidence of participating states in the nature of military activities conducted by other signatories, establishing predictability in military affairs, enhancing transparency and reducing the possibility of surprise attack. Among the measures negotiated were the following:

- agreement to provide prior notification to other members of the CSCE of military activities involving at least 13 000 troops or 300 battle tanks. Prior notification is to be made in writing 42 or more days in advance of the activity.
- agreement to circulate annual calendars of military activity subject to prior notification by November 15 of every year.

— provision to invite observers from every participating state to military activities involving 17 000 troops (or, in the case of amphibious or parachute activity, 5 000 troops) conducted in the area of application in Europe. Each CSCE participant may send up to two observers to each observable activity.

— provision for on-site challenge inspection by any participating state. This provision can be exercised by any state suspecting military activity that has not been notified, or activity suspected to be at the observable threshold for which no invitations have been issued. Within 36 hours of the issuance of an inspection request, the inspectors are to be permitted entry to the territory of the receiving state. No more than three inspections are allowed in a single country within any one year.

To date, there have been over 20 observations and approximately 10 challenge inspections undertaken under the terms of the agreement. Canada has sent observers to every observable military exercise held thus far, and intends to continue this practice. (While Canada is outside the zone of application for the agreement, which only includes the territory of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, Canada can, as a signatory to the Stockholm Document, participate fully in observations and inspections.) On the other hand, Canadian military activities in Europe are similarly subject to the provisions of the

Stockholm Document. In a Soviet inspection of a military exercise conducted in Norway this year, for example, Canadian troops were among those inspected.

Our early experience with the implementation of the agreement demonstrates that the provisions of the document have been largely honoured by all 35 participating states in both letter and spirit. The agreement has arguably been extremely useful in enhancing stability and security in Europe by increasing the confidence of the participating countries in one another's military intentions. At the current CSCE Follow-Up Meeting taking place in Vienna, the implementation of the Stockholm Document is being reviewed and discussions are also underway to establish two new negotiations on conventional security in Europe. While one of these would consider ways and means of enhancing stability in Europe at lower levels of conventional armaments, the other would consider new confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) — in other words, continuing the work on CSBMs begun at Stockholm.

In the meantime, the implementation of the accords achieved at the Stockholm Conference must be regarded as an encouraging development by those concerned about conventional security and stability in Europe.

Conventional Arms Control: Stabilizing the Balance in Europe

With the recent intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) agreement eliminating an entire class of nuclear missiles, recognition of the importance of conventional forces within NATO's deterrent triad has in recent years increasingly focused attention on the imbalance between NATO and Warsaw Pact force levels and capabilities.

One avenue towards reducing the imbalance which NATO has taken has been to build up and to modernize forces so as to improve overall conven-

tional capability. The Long-Term Defence Plan and the three per cent increase pledge are both evidence of NATO's resolve since the late 1970s to improve the conventional balance. Unfortunately, the Warsaw Pact did not stand still: it has not only maintained its conventional superiority in terms of quantity, but it has also managed to narrow the gap in quality, and has thereby enhanced its overall advantage.

The Harmel Report of 1967 recognized the need to address Warsaw Pact con-

ventional superiority, and recommended a "two track" approach to achieving enhanced stability: first, maintenance, as necessary, of a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, and, second, implementation of a policy of détente, which included arms control. The two tracks were to be complementary — not mutually exclusive.

When assessing the balance, force levels must be considered in light of *all* relevant factors — geography, terrain, peacetime deployment of forces,



preparedness, levels of transparency and confidence, warning and reaction capability (e.g., the ability to detect and successfully resist surprise attack), force-to-force and force-to-space ratios, and so on. The process of conventional arms control is therefore highly complex, in that it must take into account and interrelate a great many diverse factors and considerations.

In recent years there have been two major conventional arms control forums. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks ran into numerous difficulties from the very outset in 1973. These difficulties involved, among others, issues such as differences over prior agreement on data, refusal by the East to accept intrusive verification, disagreement on definition of what factors constitute a fair balance of forces, the concept of asymmetrical reductions, and failure to agree on what types of forces would be involved. Nonetheless, the process itself has been seen as a useful instrument in the management of East-West relations at the conventional force level.

The Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament (CCSBMDE) (more widely known as the CDE), conducted under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), was successful not only as a process, but also in reaching an agreement (contained in the Stockholm Document). The gradualist approach (as adopted in Stockholm) for such a highly complex and important undertaking as conventional arms control proved in practice to be the more sensible. This approach proceeded on the premise that the building of confidence should precede any negotiations aimed at constraining military activities or at reducing the numbers of forces deployed. In the MBFR talks there has been no attempt to build initial confidence so as to create a less confrontational climate which might then be more conducive to further discussions on more substantive aspects such as troop and armament reductions.

Encouraged by the progress then being made at the Stockholm negotiations as well as in Geneva at the USA-USSR

bilateral talks on nuclear and space defence questions, the NATO Foreign Ministers, at their meeting in Halifax in May 1986, created the High Level Task Force (HLTF) to study wider options for the Alliance for future conventional arms control negotiations with the East. The HLTF was tasked to report to the North Atlantic Council on the feasibility of negotiating force levels and deployments on a greater scale than was being done in the MBFR talks, taking into consideration a zone extending from the Atlantic to the Urals. The Warsaw Pact followed up with a proposal of its own — the "Budapest Appeal" of June 11 — which called for large-scale reductions of forces in a similar zone.

The HLTF began in June 1986 to work in earnest on its ambitious and highly complex task. After much painstaking internal research and considerable discussion among the Allies, the HLTF produced its first report, which resulted in the Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control.

The Brussels Declaration contained the main elements of what has become the essence of the new Western approach to conventional arms control. It invited the Warsaw Pact to enter into discussions with NATO concerning a mandate for a new conventional arms control negotiation which would apply to the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The situation in Europe was described as being "marked by asymmetries and disparities..." which were detrimental to Western security and which were "...a source of potential instability." The relevant factors were listed as:

- the armaments, equipment types, deployments, numbers, mobility and readiness of the armed forces involved;
- the information, predictability and confidence about them; and
- consideration of geography.

Recognizing the enormous complexities involved in dealing effectively with such factors so as to enhance security at the conventional level, the HLTF agreed upon a set of objectives as the basis for the Alliance position for future conventional arms control:

- the establishment of a stable and secure level of forces, geared to the elimination of disparities;
- a negotiating process which proceeds step-by-step, and which guarantees the undiminished security of all concerned at each stage;
- focus on the elimination of the capability for surprise attack or for the initiation of large-scale offensive action;
- further measures to build confidence and to improve openness and calculability about military behaviour;
- the application of the measures involved to the whole of Europe, but in a way which takes account of and seeks to redress regional imbalances and to exclude circumvention;
- an effective verification regime (in which detailed exchanges of information and on-site inspection will play a vital part) to ensure compliance with the provisions of any agreement, and to guarantee that limitations on force capabilities are not exceeded.

It was decided that the best way to achieve NATO's objectives would be to propose two *distinct* negotiations. One of these forums would build upon and expand the results of the Stockholm Conference on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) among the 35 members of the CSCE. The other, recognizing that the forces of the two Alliances were the most immediately involved in the essential security relationship in Europe, would focus on eliminating the existing disparities and, eventually, on establishing conventional stability at lower levels between the 23 countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. During the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting at Reykjavik in June 1987, it was decided that the stability talks among the 23 could be conducted within the *framework* of the CSCE process, but that these negotiations would retain autonomy as regards subject matter, participation and procedures.

Following the publication of the Brussels Declaration, representatives of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact began to



meet in Vienna in late January 1987 to discuss formulation of a mandate for the proposed "conventional stability" negotiations. Subsequently, in the summer of 1987, Western representatives tabled one draft mandate for the confidence- and security-building measures negotiations at the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting, and another for the "stability" talks at a session of the weekly "breakfast meetings" of the Warsaw Pact and NATO nations. The HLTF, as the coordinating body for NATO's conventional arms control policy, has continued its work in Brussels to develop and to refine the Western position while the East-West discussions on the mandates for the two distinct negotiations continue in Vienna.

While no prediction can be made with certainty, it now appears to be reasonably assured that the mandates for these new negotiations are likely to be agreed upon, and that the actual negotiations will be started in the months ahead. Much, of course, will depend on the timetable of the CSCE Follow-Up Meeting, which is also discussing other aspects of the East-West relationship. If the new negotiations proceed as expected, the transition into a new era for conventional arms control will have been marked; in these negotiations is the potential to chart the nature of the European security relationship for the remainder of this century and well into the next. As this article has, however, indicated, immense problems must be overcome, and it is unlikely that quick or easy solutions will be found.

In addressing the stability of the conventional balance in Europe, the negotiations will inevitably focus primarily on ground forces, for it is essentially the land forces of the Warsaw Pact (the Soviet Army in particular) which pose the most serious threat to NATO. The elimination of disparities and stabilization of this balance will require considerable effort; it is not simply a question of reducing forces. As was indicated earlier, force-to-force and force-to-space relationships, geography and reinforcement rates are but some of the issues that must be examined and resolved.

Throughout this process it will be necessary for all of the NATO allies to maintain the integrity of their forces. Canada's pledge in the recent White Paper to consolidate the ground force commitment and provide a division in

the critical Central Region will contribute positively to NATO's aims of enhancing stability. The physical presence of Canadian troops in Europe also affords Canada an active part in the arms control negotiation process.

Development of Chemical Weapons Ban Intricate and Vexing

The Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament (CCACD) organized an important Conference on Implementing a Global Chemical Weapons Convention from October 7 to 9, 1987, in Ottawa. The conference provided a timely opportunity for academics and researchers, representatives of industry and labour, as well as officials and diplomats, to come together to assess progress to date in the chemical weapons negotiations, to discuss important outstanding issues which remain to be addressed, and to consider the road ahead.

The following are excerpts from the address by Mr. James Taylor, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

"I am honoured to be present here this evening among such a distinguished gathering of experts from many countries. I am pleased, on behalf of Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, to welcome you to our capital and wish you well in your deliberations.

I would also like to take the opportunity to commend the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences for having jointly taken such a timely initiative by convening this conference. I express, for us all, a special word of thanks to John Lamb and his staff at the Centre, in particular Miss Jan Glyde, for their tireless work in putting the administrative arrangements into place so smoothly. The Canadian Government welcomes and encourages meetings such as this one and the Department of External Affairs is pleased to have been able to assist in its realization.

The arms control and disarmament process is one of vexing complication and intricacy. Headlong technological developments proceed without let-up, heedless and independent of the painstaking efforts of official negotiators and their political leaders. The existing body of international law provides an all-too-tenuous foundation upon which the international community must build — shoring up those portions which seem in danger of crumbling, adding to and adapting existing parts of the legal structure and sometimes carrying out extensive renovations in response to new and previously unforeseen needs. All of this must be achieved in a politically charged context. This cannot be otherwise since the matters with which you deal touch directly on the security interests of states and are legitimately the object of sustained attention and concern on the part of political leaders and the publics to whom they are responsible.

In these circumstances, if their collective efforts are to be successful and efficacious, governments cannot rely on their own resources. The erudition and expertise of scientific and legal specialists must be brought to bear in the negotiating process itself. Just as important, especially in those societies in which public debate is an essential part of the policy formulation process, adequate understanding of the issues and problems involved, both by experts and wider publics, can be achieved only through free and frequent discourse across national boundaries. Your meeting is an example of this necessary process.


It is pertinent to recall on this occasion that chemical weapons (CW) have a special place in the Canadian collective memory, since Canadian troops in

Europe were among the first victims of chemical weapons use during World War I. However I am not an expert on chemical weapons nor on the intricacies of the negotiations aimed at a comprehensive, verifiable ban on such weapons. Faced with the diverse expertise which you represent, it would be presumptuous for me to offer advice or evaluative comment on any particular details of that negotiation. What I would prefer to do is to locate the chemical weapons negotiation in the broader arms control and disarmament context at its present juncture. From this I will attempt to sketch out, with a tentativeness befitting my profession, some inferences about the significance of the CW negotiation, some of which may have implications for the manner in which that negotiation might best proceed.

From the perspective of those with an interest in arms control, your meeting occurs at a more than usually auspicious moment. I refer of course to the recent announcement by the USA and USSR of their agreement in principle to ban intermediate-range nuclear missiles globally, as well as their agreement to enter into negotiations relating to nuclear tests. It has already become almost trite to observe the historic significance of the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) agreement as the first which would eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons and which would for the first time call for reductions in nuclear arsenals, rather than merely limit the build-up of such arsenals. It is similarly being widely observed that since the INF agreement would effect only a proportionally small reduction in the nuclear arsenals of the two countries, and would not touch their central strategic arsenals, the significance of the agreement is primarily political rather than military.

Such observations are no doubt true. However the political significance of the recently announced agreements relating both to INF and nuclear tests should not, in the Canadian view, be construed in any narrow sense. We ought to recall that for most of the past decade the prospects for new arms control agreements were bleak in the extreme, with the nadir occurring in late 1983 and early 1984 when all East-West arms con-

trol negotiations and talks were for a period suspended. Since that time, and sometimes with painful slowness, not only have all previously existing channels for East-West discussion and negotiation been reactivated, they are visibly being used to good effect. I would note, for example, that the old, sterile debate about capabilities versus intent may now be behind us. There now seems broad acceptance that both matter and that each ought to be addressed not through simple, declaratory approaches but by concrete, verifiable measures, if mutual confidence is to be sustained.



Rear Admiral (retired) Robert H. Falls, President of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, addresses the Chemical Weapons Convention in Ottawa.

Arms control has traditionally largely confined itself to the issue of military capability, leaving the question of intent to largely declaratory political gestures. Herein lies the great significance of the agreement in Stockholm in 1986 on specific measures, subject to agreed verification procedures, designed to increase mutual assurance about the benign military intent of parties to the agreement. The notably efficient and effective way in which challenge inspections of conventional military exercises were recently conducted on the territories of the USSR and of the German Democratic Republic respectively is a most welcome development. So, too, are recent formulations by official spokesmen of the USSR which speak in terms of a 'sufficiency' of military force. More than at any time in recent years, parties on all sides of the East-West divide seem to accept that security is a matter of mutuality. Neither side can feel secure unless both do.

Another important development of recent years, I think, has been a growing awareness on all sides of a significant interrelationship among various kinds of arms control measures. To some considerable extent, this may be a positive by-product of the intense INF debate and related controversies of the past few years. Already, the pending INF agreement has triggered vigorous discussion about the most desirable combination of conventional and nuclear military forces which ought to be retained in order to preserve and strengthen stability in the European theatre, a debate which will predictably continue for some time. This increased awareness of the interrelationship between conventional and nuclear forces, particularly at the theatre level, has doubtless been one of the factors which has given impetus to the efforts to formulate a mandate for negotiations among members of the two major alliances, within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) framework, on conventional force levels in Europe. At the strategic level, the USA and USSR have recognized, in their own agreed negotiating mandate, the importance of giving attention to the balance between offensive and defensive forces. If we are successful, over the coming period, in moving towards significantly reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, those interrelationships among different kinds of force deployments, and related arms control measures, will acquire yet greater importance.

Given the centrality of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the USA and the USSR to the global configuration of military force, it is natural that international attention should have focused on the bilateral negotiations between those two powers. However, it has long been Canada's view that we are entering a period in which multilateral arms control agreements will be increasingly significant and necessary. We must recognize this and so must the superpowers. Of course several such agreements already exist, among which the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty are among the most important. Foreseeable areas of potential new negotiations towards multilateral agreements, in addition to the chemical weapons negotiations, include conventional forces (particularly in Europe),



outer space, and a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In such areas, multilateral agreements will be necessary because existing and potential military capabilities in the respective areas go much beyond the East-West context and include states from all areas of the globe. Such negotiations will give enhanced salience to such multilateral negotiating forums as the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, which in recent years seems to have suffered a weakening of its earlier sense of purposefulness. They will also bring about a different dynamic in international relations, one which will be much more complicated than that of the USA-USSR or East-West relationship.

Finally, I cannot conclude this brief evaluative survey without mentioning that favourite Canadian theme — verification. There now seem to be few who would contest the conclusion, based largely on our experience with arms control agreements concluded in the 1970s, that necessary political support for the arms control process is impossible to achieve in the absence of adequate verification provisions. Agreements which are not effectively verifiable by agreed methods can undermine reciprocal confidence more than they strengthen it. This is now widely accepted. It also seems to be increasingly accepted that effective verification provisions will in most instances require a degree of intrusiveness, involving a certain delegation of sovereignty of a type to which states are not yet well accustomed. In a complementary way, there seems also to be growing recognition that concrete verification measures need to be carefully tailored to the purposes, scope and nature of the specific agreement and that there should be safeguards against the potential abuse of such provisions for intelligence or other purposes not related to the agreement. What is perhaps not yet fully understood is that the effectiveness of verification, and the related enhanced confidence in compliance, will depend to a considerable extent on the parties adopting a cooperative, rather than a contestatory, approach to the implementation of agreed verification measures.

All of the main factors which I have mentioned in this hasty excursion through recent arms control history, I believe, have a direct relevance to the CW negotiations which are your primary focus of interest. Certainly, if what I discerned as a major adjustment in the broad political approach by the two leading military powers to arms control as a key element of their security relationship is correct, this has huge implications for the negotiations. The notable progress which has been made in the CW negotiations in the past two years has both reflected and contributed to this gradual improvement in the East-West atmosphere. In this connection, I am greatly encouraged that some of you are in this room fresh from having visited a major chemical weapons facility in the Soviet Union. The invitation for this visit was comparable to the 1983 USA invitation to CD members to visit a major chemical weapons facility in America. This is heartening.

As statements of several political leaders have already made clear, chemical weapons in the East-West setting are seen as acquiring increased significance in the context of moves towards reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, particularly within Europe. This makes your endeavours all the more relevant and is likely to result in increased political attention to your work. This may not at all moments seem a blessing to the negotiators but should nevertheless be welcomed as a sign of the growing seriousness with which prospective agreement is being addressed.

In a more broadly generic way, the successful negotiation of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable global ban on chemical weapons would be a pioneering achievement in the area of multilateral arms control. Unless I am mistaken, this would be the first time the international community would have negotiated a multilateral agreement, banning an entire class of weaponry, which incorporated detailed and elaborate verification provisions touching extensively on activities in civilian industry, and involving the establishment from scratch of a new treaty-administering authority to oversee its implementation in perpetuity. This, we all agree, poses

formidable challenges. It is a matter for encouragement that the negotiators are now giving increasing attention to issues relating to the structure, resources and decision-making procedures of the international authority. In the event of success, the results of the negotiation will without doubt in many respects serve as an important model for future multilateral agreements in other arms control areas. This, in addition to the inherent need for an effective ban on chemical weapons, makes it especially important that the negotiators address the thorny and intricate scientific, legal, institutional and financial issues with particular care and meticulousness. We must make haste, but with deliberation and without arbitrary deadlines.

Finally, while I have alluded to the significance of CW in the East-West context, it perhaps needs to be emphasized that the successful conclusion of a treaty is of importance not solely, perhaps not even mainly, in that limited context. Chemical weapons pose a global problem. CW capabilities and arsenals are not confined to the East-West context. In other areas of the world, CW capabilities exist and may have a proportionately greater military significance there. Currently, the repeated deplorable use of chemical weapons by Iraq, as officially confirmed by the UN Secretary-General, illustrates this disturbing reality. We must hope that countries from all regions recognize a common interest in the earliest possible conclusion and implementation of an effective ban, and will make their proportionate contribution to the final stages of the negotiation.

I began the substantive portion of my remarks by mentioning the corpus of existing international law. This includes, of course, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which outlaws the use of chemical weapons. The near-universal abhorrence of these weapons is reflected in the fact that the Protocol is now widely regarded as embodying customary international law. The conclusion of a comprehensive ban on such weapons would be rightly regarded as a long overdue completion and implementation of that law. Such an achievement could scarcely be overpraised."



Ambassador Marchand Addresses Conference on Disarmament

The following are excerpts from the speech by the Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. de Montigny Marchand, to the Conference on March 10, in Geneva.

"In my initial plenary statement, I wish first to comment on recent and ongoing developments in the field of international security and arms control and disarmament outside this Conference, beginning with the bilateral negotiating process between the two main nuclear powers. Secondly, I want to address the three principal items on our agenda: the Negotiations on a Chemical Weapons Ban, Nuclear Test Ban and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. And finally, I also want to say a few words on our preparations for the Third Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD III). Mr. President, throughout my remarks I shall emphasize what Canada considers a fundamentally important element which must characterize both the bilateral process and our multilateral work, that is, effective verification achieved through efficient, agreed implementation mechanisms. This is essential to maintain confidence in compliance.

The Conference on Disarmament begins its work this year amidst more auspicious circumstances than have prevailed for many years. The treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) signed by President Reagan and by General Secretary Gorbachev in Washington in December marks an historic achievement. It is the first agreement ever to provide for real reductions in nuclear weapons on a global basis and thereby constitutes an important first step in the reduction of nuclear arms. Canada's understanding of the significance of this agreement was succinctly expressed by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney:

'The treaty is welcome for what it accomplishes. It is also welcome for what it tells us about East-West relations. Only a few years ago, such agreement seemed far in the future — hopelessly idealistic.

So much has changed since then. What was once the stuff of dreams is beginning to come within our grasp: significant arms reductions; the resolution of regional conflicts; progress on human rights.'

The evident seriousness with which the USA and the USSR are pursuing additional arms control agreements is a further reason for encouragement. In particular, the priority attention now being given to the negotiation of a major reduction in strategic nuclear weapons deserves our full support. The successful conclusion of such an agreement would be a key contribution to the central objective of the arms control process — enhanced security at much lower levels of armaments.

The verification regime of the INF Treaty represents a breakthrough in efforts to provide effective verification provisions in a disarmament agreement. It includes not only prior exchanges of data but baseline inspections of facilities, challenge inspections and the establishment of permanent monitoring stations manned by each side at production

facilities on the territories of the other. These precedents will be extremely valuable for future agreements.

Indeed, Mr. President, this treaty, as well as the negotiations on substantially reducing strategic nuclear arms, constitutes an encouragement, an example and a precedent for our work in the Conference on Disarmament, particularly in the chemical weapons (CW) negotiations. The bilateral negotiations have illustrated a central truth of effective arms control: that meticulously detailed and often intrusive verification provisions are a necessary and central element of viable, politically sustainable arms control and disarmament agreements.

Our work on a draft convention banning chemical weapons has progressed during the last year and during the intersessional period, thanks to the untiring efforts of the chairman Ambassador Ekéus and his assistants Mr. Nieuwenhuys, Mr. Macedo and Dr. Krutzsch. This work is now continuing under the able leadership of Ambassador Sujka to whom I pledge my full cooperation and that of my delegation.



Members of the Canadian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in discussion with Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. From left to right: Mr. Arsène Després, Canadian Counsellor, Ambassador de Montigny Marchand and Mr. Dhanapala.

L. Bianco



Notwithstanding the progress we have achieved, it is clear to my government that, while the end is in sight, we are not quite there yet. As Soviet Deputy Minister Petrovsky told this body on February 18, 'serious, major issues are still outstanding.' Some of us, conscious of the enormous strides taken and impatient to end the race, have suggested that these problems can be speedily resolved. I respectfully suggest that such an expectation, implicitly if not explicitly, belies the importance and difficulty of the remaining issues. As our Japanese colleague suggested on February 16, the danger of the marathon runner deciding to make a last desperate spurt towards his goal is that he risks running out of breath or stumbling into pitfalls. While the moment to begin our final sprint is not yet here, this is not to say that we cannot increase the measured pace Ambassador Yamada refers to — we can and we must; but we should make haste carefully.

With respect to the major issues referred to by Soviet Deputy Minister Petrovsky, it is evident that several of them turn on the central issue of effective verification.

First and foremost among the outstanding verification issues is the question of the non-production of chemical weapons — the Article VI issues. These involve some of the most complex and difficult decisions of the entire treaty negotiation process. Assuming that we have an effective regime developed for destroying existing CW stocks and CW production facilities (i.e., for Articles III through V), how can we achieve an optimally reliable verification regime for non-production, with minimal intrusion or interruption in the legitimate commercial activities of our chemical industries?

In the view of the Canadian Government, the problems raised here should not be insuperable. Several valuable and illuminating suggestions for filling gaps and resolving issues, like that most recently submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany on *ad hoc* checks, have been advanced and warrant our careful consideration. Moreover, as suggested at the Pugwash Conference last

month, equipment and procedures that would go a considerable way to realizing our goals exist already or could be designed and developed within a reasonable time. It is encouraging to note that the industry itself is now actively engaged with our problems and positively inclined to helping us solve them.

A second major area of direct relevance to verification is Article VIII and our efforts to develop an organizational structure to ensure the effective and efficient implementation of the Convention, as well as its timely adaptation in the light of experience and new technological and scientific developments. It is the International Inspectorate, with its verification tasks, which will carry the greatest responsibility for ensuring that the Convention is, and is seen to be, effectively implemented. With this in mind, my government intends to submit in the near future working papers dealing with the personnel and other resource requirements of the International Inspectorate.

Effectiveness of verification is also a relevant consideration for a third major area of concern, the Challenge Inspection provisions of Article IX. We seem agreed that a challenge inspection is to be a rare event; a last resort when all other avenues are exhausted. This underlines the importance of putting in place as complete and as comprehensive *routine* inspection procedures as possible. Insofar as the conduct of a challenge inspection itself is concerned, I suggest that the most essential requirements are that the inspectors have the fullest access and information possible that they need, and the indisputable technical competence, to allow them to conduct a thorough inspection and issue a definitive report. If this requirement can be met, then many of the concerns and issues currently preoccupying us in terms of procedures for handling inspection reports might well diminish or disappear.

A further major issue related to these considerations is the question of exchanges of data prior to the coming into force of the Convention. Clearly, some such exchanges will be essential,

not only as confidence-building steps, but to assist in making realistic assessments of the extent of verification required and the size of the machinery needed to implement it. The information already provided by some states has been useful in this regard. In particular, we welcome the attention that both the USA and the USSR have given to this issue. Here, I might note our interest in the proposals submitted by Deputy Minister Petrovsky on February 18; they contain some useful suggestions which we hope will be further clarified and built upon in the weeks to come.

Mr. President, the negotiation of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable global ban on chemical weapons would be a pioneering achievement in the area of multilateral arms control. This would be the first time the international community has negotiated a multilateral agreement, banning an entire class of weaponry, incorporating detailed and elaborate verification provisions touching extensively on activities in civilian industry, and involving the establishment from scratch of a new treaty-administering authority to oversee its implementation in perpetuity. This, we all agree, poses formidable challenges. Our shared sense of urgency in this work can only be strengthened by continued reports, verified by the UN Secretary-General, of repeated chemical weapons use and by disturbing reports of the proliferation of chemical weapons capabilities. Canada was therefore gratified to note that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in their Joint Summit Statement on December 10, 1987, 'reaffirmed the need for intensified negotiations towards conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention.'

I turn now to Item I on our agenda, Nuclear Test Ban. A comprehensive test ban (CTB) remains a fundamental Canadian policy objective. It is of special interest to participants in this forum that the major nuclear powers have also launched a process of negotiations relating to nuclear tests. The planned exchange of on-site observations of nuclear tests on their respective territories augurs well and will, we hope, pave the way for the earliest ratification,



as a first step, of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. This is the kind of step-by-step process which Canada has long considered as providing the most realistic path to progress in controlling, and eventually eliminating, nuclear tests. We earnestly hope that these negotiations will proceed as soon as possible to the second phase in this process, that is, further limitations on nuclear testing.

I agree with the points made by Ambassador Yamada of Japan that it is particularly important to see this development between the United States and the Soviet Union as presenting an opportunity for our work in this multilateral forum, rather than detracting from it. I also fully support his view that it is equally important for the two major nuclear powers to become constructively engaged in the multilateral process in order that progress in this area may be achieved.

In the search for ways to move forward on the CTB issue, we must rise above differences over how a mandate for the establishment of an *Ad Hoc* Committee should be defined so that discussions on the substance of the nuclear test ban question can finally get underway. Attempts to impose an approach which remains unacceptable to key nuclear weapons states are obviously doomed to failure. We must also give careful consideration to how we can best structure our work so as to support and complement the USA-USSR negotiation process.

Mr. President, one area of work on which we can all agree is the development of an international seismic network for the verification of an eventual CTB. The steady progress which has been made by the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) is truly reason for satisfaction. We expect the GSE to continue this important work this year through further preparations leading to the international data exchange experiment for which a member of my delegation, Dr. Peter Basham, has been chosen as the coordinator.

Our discussion under the agenda item entitled 'Prevention of an Arms Race in

Outer Space' reflects our widespread appreciation of the fact that we are being confronted with what could potentially be a completely new battlefield. Often, however, our appreciation of that novelty is paradoxically both too much and too little. Too much in the sense that the desire of some to close the barn door of militarization before the horse escapes neglects the fact that for 30 years military-related activities have been carried on in outer space. This is not a fact that can be wished away. Nor, I would maintain, given the stabilizing role of many of these activities, should it be wished away. At the same time our appreciation of the novelty is too little. Too often our discussions reflect neither the innovative and evolving aspects of the legal regime in outer space, the elements of which are gradually being put in place, nor the incredible rapidity of changes in space technology.

I do not think I am overstating the case, Mr. Chairman, if I suggest that unless we all come to grips with the reality of the existing situation in outer space and the revolutionary nature of the task before us, the work of this Conference on the prevention of an arms race in outer space will not be truly consummated.

Mr. Chairman, when one looks at the actual practical work of the committee, it is clear that we are in somewhat of a hiatus. We do seem to be tramping over some already trodden ground. Yet our discussions of the legal issues, of verification and compliance and of definitions and terminology, to cite only a few, have by no means exhausted the current mandate.

We might try to give new impetus to our work in the committee by taking to heart some of the lessons we are learning in our discussions under other agenda items. I am thinking in particular of CW, where it has become evident that there are a whole range of issues that did not receive adequate attention from the Conference as a whole until the pace of the work forced everyone to focus on them. In the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Outer Space we should make an effort to avoid a similar situation.

Here too, we can try to enrich our work through interaction with the bilateral discussion between the two major space powers. A first order of priority of the Canadian delegation is to ensure that we do nothing to set back or interfere with the work that is being done in the bilateral space talks. We hope that the two major space powers might see advantage in promoting discussion in this forum of some of the practical and legal problems brought to light in the bilateral talks.

Mr. President, in the last several years, members of this Conference have put much work into enlarging our understanding of the issues involved in a treaty or treaties on radiological weapons. Under the able chairmanship of my British colleague, Ambassador Solesby, we are making another effort this year to move forward on this issue.

Mr. Chairman, I do hope that we will make progress on this question. If in fact, despite the efforts of all concerned, we are not able to make any progress, I think our report to UNSSOD III should then reflect both that fact itself and the conclusions to be drawn from it regarding the agenda of our conference in the years to come.

Mr. President, an important event of this year will be the Third United Nations Special Session devoted to Disarmament. This, of course, will have significant implications for our work programme. Most specifically, it will be our responsibility to prepare a report on our work, to be put before the Special Session. Our report should be concise, factual and free from polemics. Important and useful work has been done in several areas. Moreover, as Foreign Minister Varkonyi of Hungary aptly observed in his recent statement here, this Conference reflects the international political climate and, even during a relatively unproductive period, serves as an important forum for dialogue. My delegation also agrees with Minister Varkonyi that we need to give more serious attention to how we might improve our own procedures. His suggestions in that regard merit careful study.



Finally, I feel I must register the fact that the outcome of the Preparatory Committee process for the Special Session was a disappointment but not a disaster. As we approach the Special Session itself we must change our mindset to make this Conference a success which will provide impetus to multilateral arms control and disarmament. To press unrealistically for the setting of comprehensive and detailed negotiating priorities and targets in ways which are unacceptable to many would be a recipe for failure. No participant should be expected to subscribe to commitments inconsistent with its own policies and objectives. In addition, all participants must recognize the need for flexibility and constructive give-and-take as a contribution to the legitimate efforts of the international community to debate and discuss security and arms control issues of vital concern to it, and register those concerns in a collective way. We must avoid making of the Special Session a stage for acrimonious and futile exchanges. Instead it must be a cooperative endeavour to define realistic, forward-looking priorities for the multilateral arms control agenda.

...In this and other multilateral arms control forums, care must be taken to ensure that our efforts are supportive of and do not undermine the vitally important bilateral negotiating process between the USA and USSR. In this sense, we subscribe to the concept of 'constructive parallelism' as outlined by Foreign Minister Genscher at the opening of our session.

Mr. President, I wish to conclude on an optimistic note. Arms control and disarmament are a central element of the international political agenda and, as the old adage has it, politics is 'the art of the possible.' Rhetoric has its role but it is important that our words and aspirations retain a close relationship with reality. Otherwise we risk futility and ridicule. To be realistic does not preclude being an optimist and, as I stated at the beginning of this speech, more may now be truly possible than we not long ago dared hope. Let us get on with the job."

Cooperation Crucial to Northern Development

The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, participated in the recent Norway-Canada Conference on Circumpolar Issues in Tromsø, Norway. Here are excerpts from his speech.

"The Canadian Government recently conducted a thorough review of Canada's international relations, the first for 16 years. This time we were determined to open up the debate on foreign policy to all Canadians. From St. John's in the East to Victoria in the West to Yellowknife in the North, Canadians came forward with their views and concerns. They touched on every aspect of our foreign policy. They told us in no uncertain terms that Canadians remain as internationalist, as global in their world view, as ever. Maybe more so.

One of the areas stressed in that review was the North. In hearings before the Parliamentary Committee an Inuit leader, Mark Gordon, argued forcefully that one of the problems with the North is that too often northern policies are developed in isolation by southerners in capital cities in temperate zones. It is striking for me, and I expect for most of the Canadians in the room, that we are meeting here in Tromsø — that Tromsø is near the 70th parallel, well north of the Arctic Circle, indeed north of mainland Canada.

It is true that in Canada the majority of our population lives close to our border with the United States. But that fact does not diminish Canadians' sense of the North. Although the High Arctic may be more real to those who live there than to others, the North and the Arctic are a singular influence in the self-image of all Canadians. In the evocative words of a famous Canadian folk-song:

'Mon pays, ce n'est pas un pays, c'est l'hiver.'

It is fitting that Norwegians and Canadians are meeting here this week. As we were reminded so memorably last night, 500 years before Columbus was

even born, Norsemen were exploring and settling in Canada-to-be.

Other countries came to settle the Americas. Through accidents of history Canadians came to speak English and French and not Norwegian! But Nordic peoples continued to fish and explore in Canada's North. They came more frequently in the late 19th century as the search for a northwest passage intensified. A Norwegian, Amundsen, finally found it. Larsen, the first Canadian to navigate that passage, was Norwegian born. Many islands and waterways are named after Norwegian explorers such as Nansen and Sverdrup. In fact we are probably lucky that today Norway lays no claim to the northern half of Canada!

Norwegians joined in the massive flood of immigration to Canada between the 1880s and 1930. They have adapted to Canadian society with ease, while retaining elements of their distinctive culture and their language.

Norwegians contributed so much to Canadian society because our societies and our values are strikingly similar. I think our common northern environment is a key factor: we each developed the difficult parts of our respective continents.

Canadians and Norwegians have common attitudes towards the individual and towards the individual's relationships with family, nature, God and one's fellow man. That is not simply a coincidence. It is a product of our common geography. Harsh climate and the challenge of survival breed an attitude of sharing, of cooperation, of responsibility.

We are both democratic societies, but more importantly, we believe in the same type of democracy. We believe passionately in freedom and in justice. We believe that collectively society has a duty to ensure the rights of minorities, to protect the weak and to maintain high standards of health, welfare, education and safety. In northern climates government must provide services, strengthen the economy and protect the environment.



As northern societies, we are both geographically remote: most of Canada from the heartland of North America, Norway from the European heartland. Politically and militarily we are neither the largest nor the smallest of states. We are both especially dependent on the international economic and political order. These realities have made both of us strong defenders of collective and international institutions such as NATO, the OECD and the UN system. In a world of superpowers and giant economic blocs, nations like Canada and Norway understand and can support each other.

This symposium has had sessions on resource development, historical trends, defence, legal issues and indigenous peoples. I want to address some northern issues of particular concern to Canada and my government. These are issues where we seek Norwegian understanding, experience and wisdom — issues on which we can cooperate in the broader international community.

A northern dimension to our foreign policy is not new for Canada. In 1882 Canada was a participant in the first International Polar Year. Since then international cooperation in northern regions has been a special Canadian concern.

Our government's response to the joint parliamentary review of international relations focused on four broad themes of a 'comprehensive northern foreign policy.' These themes are:

- affirming Canadian sovereignty;
- modernizing Canada's northern defences;
- preparing for the commercial use of the Northwest Passage; and
- promoting enhanced circumpolar cooperation.

The overwhelming Canadian challenge is geography, a vast, unique realm of land and water and ice.

The waters within the Arctic archipelago are not like warm waters which are used for international navigation. Our waters are in fact frozen most

of the year — navigation as on the high seas is impossible. The shoreline is where open water meets solid ice, not where water meets land.

Indeed, Canadian Inuit live on this ice for part of the year: for them it is home. So whether *terra firma* or *aqua firma*, Canada claims sovereignty over this entire area. In 1985 our government established straight baselines around the perimeter of the Arctic archipelago. This defines the outer limits of Canada's historic internal waters.

To open our Arctic waters we are building the world's largest icebreaker — a class 8 vessel. That ship will be used to keep open waterways and ports that are now closed part of the year. It will facilitate commerce and the development of our northern resource potential.

We are improving the entire infrastructure that is needed for the control and development of the North. We are developing the means to provide basic information on weather, tides, currents and ice conditions. We are developing aids to navigation and communications. We are evolving regulations for shipping, development and the protection of the environment. We are discussing with the United States an agreement whereby they would acknowledge the need to seek Canadian consent prior to passage by an American icebreaker through Canadian northern waters. Major efforts to protect the northern environment go back to 1970 when we passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act.

All of these measures are essential for safe navigation in the Arctic. They are consistent with the Government's pledge to facilitate shipping in our internal archipelagic waters subject to our sovereignty, security and environmental requirements and the welfare of the inhabitants of the North.

We have also done extensive work in oil and gas exploration and development. Last summer we shipped oil from the Arctic. Lower oil prices have curtailed but not stopped that work. Our research and development in northern resources is a continuing investment in the future.

When I say we are taking these measures, I mean the federal and the territorial governments, because the governance of our North is a partnership of national and local governments. Indeed, one of the most significant developments in Canada's North is the deliberate and gradual devolution of power and responsibility from Ottawa to northern governments. Our government has also accelerated negotiations of aboriginal land claims — a complex process of fundamental importance to our northern peoples.

Another trend of enormous importance is growing circumpolar cooperation between countries north of the Arctic Circle.

- in the 1960s we played a leading role in the formation of the International Permafrost Conference
- in 1971 we participated in the Canadian-Scandinavian workshop on caribou and reindeer
- in 1976 we reached agreement on the conservation of polar bears
- in 1983 Canada and Denmark reached agreement on environmental cooperation
- in 1984 Canada and the USSR agreed on exchanges in Arctic sciences
- in the 1980s we supported the development of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference
- and most recently Canada and Norway have intensified our commitment to cooperation in the field of science and technology.

So Canada has been actively involved in northern initiatives for a long time and my government is committed to intensifying its relations with Arctic neighbours.

We wish to see peaceful cooperation among Arctic Rim countries developed further. We were therefore encouraged when General Secretary Gorbachev stated at Murmansk on October 1 that the Soviet Union wished to increase its bilateral and multilateral cooperation in



the Arctic. We have noted his suggestion of cooperation on energy, science and the environment among other areas.

We are pleased that he indicated the Soviet Union's interest in the creation of an Arctic Sciences Council, towards which Canada, Norway and other countries have been working. I understand you have been discussing this proposal and the concept of an Arctic Basin Council.

We have noted his interest in the development of cultural links among Arctic peoples. In circumpolar relations few things are as important as contacts between the Inuit, the Arctic native peoples of Canada, Greenland, the United States and the Soviet Union. It is our hope that the Soviet Union will agree, for the first time, to attend the next Inuit Circumpolar Conference in 1989 and the Inuit Youth Camp in 1988, which Canada will host.

So we welcome Mr. Gorbachev's interest in the North. But we need — and have asked for — clarification on what it means in practice. And we will continue to pursue our own goals and interests in the Arctic.

The Murmansk speech also brings us to the issue of peace and security. The world watched last night the scene in Washington as General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan signed an agreement for the first-ever reductions in nuclear weapons. This historic disarmament agreement is solid proof of an improvement in East-West relations.

Peace and security are vital issues as well in the world's North. It is just since the 1950s that the Arctic has become a focus of military activity, and thus of more strategic concern for all of us.

Canada and Norway share membership in NATO. We both know that collective defence is necessary to deter aggression and to protect our way of life.

NATO has given us an unprecedented generation of peace. The Alliance is indispensable for defence and for encouraging arms control and disarmament. While the dynamics of East-West

relations may change, while relationships may change even within the West, Canada's commitment to NATO has increased.

Each Alliance partner must strive to maximize the efficiency and effectiveness of its contribution. Shortly after its election Prime Minister Mulroney's Government launched a review of Canada's defence policy. We found there was a serious gap between our commitments and our capabilities. We are taking steps to close that gap. We found our reserves were inadequate, our equipment out of date. These problems are being addressed.

We also found that our commitments were too numerous, scattered, and inefficient. We could certainly deploy troops in northern Norway. However, a recent exercise demonstrated that sustaining them would not be militarily feasible. The attempt to do so would also weaken substantially our forces in Central Europe.

You are well aware of the resulting decisions. In Europe, Canada's efforts are now to be concentrated on the Central Front. That will make our Alliance contribution more effective. And that will strengthen the Alliance — and the ultimate security of Norway — as a whole.

Of course Canada will continue to commit a battalion group to the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force for the protection of the northern flank.

In the Atlantic we are upgrading substantially the naval and air resources essential to maintaining sea lines of communication from North America to Western Europe through the acquisition of nuclear-propelled submarines and of modern surface vessels.

In our North we are replacing our outdated northern radar network by a modern North Warning System. Our air fields are being upgraded. More aircraft are being deployed, the number of surveillance flights increased. More military exercises are being held in the North. Surveillance systems are being developed to detect potentially hostile submarines.

The nuclear submarines we are acquiring for Atlantic and Pacific operations will also be used to detect and counter hostile naval activity in the Arctic, especially under ice where no other method of exercising control is effective.

In his Murmansk speech, Mr. Gorbachev proposed:

1. creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Northern Europe;
2. limitation of military activity in the waters of the Baltic, North, Norwegian and Greenland seas;
3. examination of a total ban on naval activity in mutually agreed zones.

Canada is interested in developing realistic policies aimed at enhancing the security and stability of the Arctic region but we have serious reservations about these proposals. Our installations in the North, which I described earlier, are all defensive. Proposals to demilitarize our North would imply that we abandon our defences.

Similarly, proposals to declare the North a nuclear-weapon-free zone or to restrict naval movements in areas such as the Norwegian Sea overlook the fact that the nuclear-weapons threat is global, not regional. Both East and West have massive nuclear forces capable of mutual annihilation — weapons on land, sea and air, all over the globe.

Some may be in the Arctic. Some may pass over the Arctic. But the threat relates to the East-West rivalry, not the Arctic. Declaring the Arctic a nuclear-weapon-free zone or restricting certain naval movements there would do nothing to reduce the threat from these weapons. It would be destabilizing for other regions.

Mr. Gorbachev appears to focus exclusively on the Western Arctic without discussing the Barents Sea or other waters adjacent to the USSR. He does not offer any detail as to how a ban of naval activity would be verified or enforced. Obviously, it would be inappropriate to discuss the Western Arctic and not the Soviet archipelago.



Finally, Mr. Gorbachev's words do not reflect the actions of his government. Unlike Canada or the Nordic countries, the Soviet Union has an enormous concentration of military forces and weapons in the Arctic region.

In Canada's view, the best prospects for progress towards enhanced security in the Arctic lie in a balanced, step-by-step approach to arms control and disarmament. Our security in the Arctic is a direct function both of the solidarity and cohesion of the Alliance, the climate of East-West relations and progress towards balanced reductions of nuclear weapons.

The North is deeply embedded in the consciousness of Canadians. The North conveys images of breathtaking beauty and of climatic extremes. We have contradictory impressions of vast natural resources locked in an incredibly fragile environment. We seek both modernization in the North and the preservation of traditional ways of life. We seek to protect the precious ecology and beauty of the North, while making it accessible to those from the South.

Throughout our history we have also had northern dreams, often dashed on

this harsh environment. I hope that we have drawn some lessons from our experience. I would like to suggest a few.

The first lesson is the crucial importance of cooperation. Only seven countries have territory north of the Arctic Circle. Only five of them border on the Arctic Ocean. While the North may be important to all of them, the vast majority of the populations of all these countries lies far to the south of the Arctic Circle.

If there is to be progress in meeting the challenges of the North, there must be a sharing of information, ideas, experience and technology by the few countries concerned. Canada and Norway are especially qualified to take the lead in sharing. Indeed, this seminar is of particular importance to developing that cooperation. Canada would consider hosting a further meeting of northern countries in 1988 or 1989.

Second, we should exploit improvements in East-West relations to pursue peaceful cooperation among all Arctic nations. The Soviet Union occupies 50

per cent of the Arctic shoreline. Although it is ahead of us in some areas of development, it has much to learn from us in other areas. We share problems such as the environment that demand cooperation.

...The third lesson is that we must all learn from the Inuit and the Saami, the people who have lived for many centuries in the North. And we can learn lessons that are relevant far beyond the northern environment. Let me quote Robert Williamson, a Canadian anthropologist who has devoted his life to the study of the North.

'In the Canadian Arctic . . . I found peace. It was the Inuit people there, and their values. They lived interdependently . . . They knew that their survival depended on harmony and cooperation. They had found ways of minimizing suspicion, channelling stress positively, and withdrawing with integrity from potential conflict.'

These are lessons we all must learn. In the North and in the whole world. Thank you."

Consultative Group Discusses 'Peace and Security in the Arctic'

The Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs met on October 1-3, 1987, in Cornwall to discuss Arctic peace and security issues. The meeting was held under the chairmanship of the Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche. The Consultative Group was created in 1979 in response to the recommendation of the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978. It meets periodically with the Ambassador for Disarmament and with officials of the departments of External Affairs and National Defence to exchange views on matters of mutual interest relevant to Canada's policies on disarmament and arms control.

Mr. Bob Hicks, M.P., the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, P.C., M.P., and Mr. Derek Blackburn, M.P., representing each major political party, participated in a post-dinner panel discussion on October 1. Among the 20 other meeting speakers were prominent members of non-governmental organizations and the academic and government communities.

The following excerpts from the executive summary of the October meeting of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs were prepared by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament as part of a contract with the Department of External Affairs. Copies of the full report

prepared by the Centre are available by writing to the Editor.

As Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche pointed out in his opening remarks, the Group was dealing with a vital and timely topic. With the continued dispute over the control of archipelagic waters, the possibility of large-scale resource exploration in the Arctic, and the prospect of increased military activity in the region, it is essential that Canada develop an Arctic policy that ensures Canadian sovereignty, protects the northern environment, and contributes to international peace and security.

The Consultative Group arrived at no consensus on the specific features a peace and security policy for the Canadian Arctic should assume. The Group

evinced, however, a general concern that the Canadian Government at present does not appear to have a policy framework adequate to deal with the growing number of issues affecting the Canadian Arctic, and a strong feeling that the Government should develop a comprehensive security policy for the Arctic.

It was generally agreed that this policy should include a defence/deterrent component and a diplomatic/reassurance component. As regards the former, a number of participants felt that Canada should concentrate its military involvement in the Arctic on activities which provide peacetime surveillance and promote crisis stability, and should resist involvement in programmes which assume nuclear war-fighting. As regards the latter, there was a strong sentiment that Canada should explore arms control and disarmament measures that would reduce the need for a Canadian or other military presence in the Arctic.

Participants offered differing assessments of the strategic importance of the Canadian Arctic, and of the threats to Canada in the region. The potential for increased superpower military activity in the North was noted, as was the fact that Canada has little control over the factors influencing the Arctic's strategic significance. Nevertheless, participants observed that how Canada governs the use of its Arctic territory will affect both Canadian and international security. The Group emphasized that Canada's Arctic policy should strive to minimize superpower competition in the North, and to enhance strategic stability.

Towards these ends, the Group agreed that Canada should provide a system of surveillance, monitoring, and early warning of attack in its Arctic airspace. There was much discussion as to whether Canada should limit its activities to peacetime surveillance and a limited capability for interception or should pursue a capability for comprehensive air defence. Participants generally concluded that Canada should avoid participation in the US Strategic Defence and Air Defence Initiatives. The merits and demerits of Canadian acquisition of

space-based radar were debated. The Group also examined the option of moving to a unilateral or multilateral air surveillance system, as opposed to maintaining the present NORAD framework. The negotiation of strict limits or a ban on air-and-sea-launched cruise missiles was proposed as an arms control alternative for dealing with the air-breathing threat in the North.

The Consultative Group affirmed the importance of being able to monitor intrusions into Canada's waters as a means of contributing to both Canadian security and sovereignty. However, many participants expressed reservations about the use of nuclear-powered attack submarines for maritime surveillance. Passive sonar devices, non-nuclear-powered submarines, and underwater mines were suggested as alternatives....

The Group urged the Canadian Government to explore the possibility of increasing collaboration with other circumpolar states on matters of common concern. It was suggested that Canada could seek cooperation bilaterally or through a circumpolar forum. The pros and cons of a full or partial Arctic nuclear-weapon-free zone were debated. As a more feasible option in the near-term, the Group proposed that Canada examine potential confidence-building measures for the Arctic that would reduce the risk of crisis and war.

Some concern was expressed during the meeting about the divergence in opinion between representatives of the strategic studies community and representatives of the peace and disarmament community. Several participants opined, however, that the value of the Consultative Group lies in its position as a unique forum in which individuals of different backgrounds and interests can exchange ideas and seek out common ground. The quality of presentations and discourse at this year's meeting was lauded. It was suggested, however, that certain sectors of society should be more fully represented at future meetings.

Canadian Industry Tackles Verification Problem

Over the past several decades Canada has acquired considerable experience in addressing security issues in several multilateral forums, including those dealing specifically with Europe. As the prospect of a multilateral agreement concerning conventional forces in Europe has increased, so has the desire on the part of the Government to see Canadian industry ready to play a part in any verification arrangements. An industry round table in February 1988, on multilateral arms control verification for conventional forces, was the first step in this process.

The exercise was sponsored by the Department of External Affairs through its Verification Research Programme. First established in October 1983, the Programme focuses its efforts on verification issues related to multilateral arms control agreements.

A Hypothetical Arms Control Agreement

The round table was designed to provide senior industry representatives with a hands-on introduction to the technological and operational requirements of a verification system. To give them a general idea of the complexity of verification issues, they were given a hypothetical agreement: its provisions and the figures used represented an approximation of what might happen in reality. The agreement incorporated confidence-building measures similar to those discussed at the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE) and force reduction measures such as those discussed at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations and other associated measures in central Europe.

Measures in the hypothetical agreement were designed to reduce surprise attack, unintentional war and intimidation by increasing the predictability of military activities and imposing constraints on military forces. They required such obligations as:



- circulation of information about military establishments;
- advance notification of military activities (exercises and movements);
- reduction of threatening components in existing military forces.

The main targets for verification of compliance were personnel, heavy equipment and certain military facilities. A verification system for the agreement would have to detect or monitor certain minimum combinations of personnel and/or equipment.

Designing the Components of a Verification System

The round table was basically a simulation exercise covering two working sessions, one on each day. The first day's task was to determine the technological and operational requirements for a verification system for the hypothetical agreement.

After a brief orientation the participants were given a presentation by Mr. Bobby Wolfe, Programme Director at E-Systems, Greenville Division. E-Systems is an international electronics and aircraft systems company based in Texas. It was responsible for designing and implementing a major portion of the system established in the Sinai to verify the disengagement process between Egypt and Israel following the October War in 1973. Mr. Wolfe presented a concrete example of how an agreement involving conventional forces was verified and highlighted particular problems encountered as well as the solutions adopted.

Having been told the elements to look for, working groups were asked to consider which of the following verification approaches might be applicable.

1. On-Site Challenge Inspection

This approach requires that an inspection team be transported at short notice (12-36 hours) to a particular area to carry out an inspection.

2. Entry/Exit Points

These are agreed points through which all troop movements take place. In order to limit the possibility that troops

will filter back to their original positions, Entry/Exit monitoring can be matched with information from remote sensor fields or overhead reconnaissance. This approach requires means by which data can be gathered, stored and communicated; the staff also requires communications, living facilities and security.

3. Observer/Liaison Missions

This is potentially the cheapest form of verification and, depending on the amount of freedom given the liaison officers, it can be the most effective.

4. Portal Monitoring

This method is a compromise between on-site inspection and remote sensing. Inspectors are not allowed inside a base or factory but are allowed to check what goes in and what comes out. It poses more severe technological challenges than some other methodologies. Portal monitoring requires tamper-resistant enclosures and alarms, security fences and portal systems, as well as communications and security.

5. *In Situ* Remote Sensing

This is a method utilizing various types of sensors which are located close to the site being monitored, but distant from the monitoring personnel. Technologies in this area relate to:

- area motion sensors
- intruder alarms
- imaging sensors
- traffic monitors

The emphasis in these applications is on reliable, tamper-resistant designs.

6. Airborne/Space-Based Remote Sensing

This method constitutes the central part of the current verification mechanisms used by the superpowers. In the event that a multilateral agreement was reached which demanded the creation of a third (i.e., non-superpower) overhead reconnaissance system, significant opportunities would exist for developing the relevant technologies, including remote sensing aircraft and/or satellites, discrimination and detection systems, image processing systems, data storage and retrieval systems and communications networks.

Special worksheets were designed for the session so that groups could flesh out the technological requirements of each verification approach they decided would be appropriate for their observations. Groups were asked to fill in details regarding: sensor technology required, other necessary equipment, data handling requirements, data processing requirements, Canadian capabilities, possible constraints, potential countermeasures and cost implications.

The first day's activities concluded with a dinner address by Mr. James H. Taylor, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, who briefly reviewed recent progress in arms control emphasizing important developments with respect to verification.

The second day's task was to take the individual elements of the verification system that had been considered on the previous day, and put them all together in one system.

Each group was asked to proceed according to the following series of steps:

- develop an overall verification system (information flow);
- map out the corresponding organizational structure (block diagram);
- estimate the types and numbers of personnel required;
- estimate the types and numbers of equipment/facilities required;
- estimate the costs required to:
 - a) put the system in place
 - b) maintain and operate the system
- identify particular problem areas.

In order to allow groups to make concrete cost estimates, quantitative estimates of verification activities for the West were provided. These estimates were ballpark figures intended to give participants a rough feel for the magnitude of the problem.



The objective of the round table was not to produce accurate conclusions about a future arms control verification system for an agreement to control conventional weapons in Europe. Rather, the central aim was to sensitize Canadian industry representatives to the complexities of the verification issue and to identify potential markets for Canadian technology. As they worked through the simulation exercise, however, the groups identified some points which are of general interest.

1. A basic verification system including ground-, air-, and space-based components would probably not be cheap.

A first rough estimate was in the order of \$1.5 billion including \$1 billion for a specialized satellite system.

2. Installing adequate systems integration for the system would likely push up the price.

Participants felt that a more thorough study of systems integration issues would be desirable. Most felt that the cost implications of doing the job well would be considerable.

3. Any verification system would probably have to be implemented progressively in stages, simply because different elements of the system would require different periods for development.

For example, it was suggested that the implementation might run as follows: ground-based systems (1-3 years), air-based systems (5 years), space-based systems (10 years). As a consequence, the overall system would have to be phased in over time.

4. Arms control measures would probably have to be phased in as well, and be coordinated with the progressive implementation of a verification system.

5. People and technology must both be used in a verification system.

People are often the most reliable sensors. Moreover, the presence of human observers and inspectors helps

to build confidence. Nonetheless, technology provides an essential background monitoring and archival function.

6. Canada is capable of providing much of the required technological and operational services for a multilateral verification system in Europe.

However, other Western countries have many of the same capabilities as Canada.

The Next Step

Most industry participants saw a need for the Canadian Government to become actively involved in further measures to stimulate industry activity in this area. Two types of study were suggested:

How to Verify It, According to One Newspaper

The Canadian Government's Verification Research Programme has received considerable attention recently. The following article by Jeffrey Simpson appeared in the Toronto Globe and Mail on February 25, 1988.

"Let's assume that both superpowers could agree to reduce their arsenals of nuclear weapons. The question would then become how each could verify the other's compliance with the treaty.

That issue — verification — has been among the knottiest in arms control. Just this week, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze admitted that the problems of verification are the most difficult in the negotiations to reduce long-range ballistic missiles.

For decades, the Soviets resisted on-site inspections, describing them as legalized espionage. But the arrival of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev changed all that. The proposed treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe provides for teams of observers to verify the dismantling of

1. an in-depth feasibility study covering essentially the same ground as the round table, but in much more detail;

2. a practical field trial designed to test the different elements of a verification system and to determine how to operate it effectively.

The participants felt that the round table was very successful as an awareness-raising exercise. The majority of industry participants felt that they had learned a great deal about verification, and expressed their intention to remain involved with the field. For their part, government participants learned more about Canadian industrial capabilities, and established much-needed contacts with the private sector.

missile installations and the destruction of the weapons.

Canada, which has no nuclear weapons of its own and is only a small player in the Western military alliances, has nonetheless become exceedingly active in promoting new techniques for verification. It is a suitable role for the country, one aggressively pursued by Canadian diplomats in a variety of international forums.

Any superpower agreement would be monitored by the United States and the Soviet Union, relying on their own satellites, sensors, intelligence and on-site inspections. But what about conventional force reductions in Europe, whose negotiation would involve many countries, including Canada?

Here the problems of verification become mind-boggling. We are talking not just about one weapons family — missiles — but about a variety of military means including troops, tanks, planes, helicopters and artillery.

This week in Toronto, some of the best minds in Canadian industry and the



External Affairs Department sat down to think about how a verification system might work and whether Canadian companies might get contracts to supply some of the monitoring technology. It certainly wasn't a headline-grabbing conference, but it did show that the Canadian government is serious about making a contribution in this all-important field.

As one participant noted, the problems with any verification system are cost, technical challenges and political will. The cost of a verification system of conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals would run above \$1-billion. You would need a mixture of satellites, satellite-receiving stations, planes, sensors, checkpoints, on-site inspectors and computers. Mind you, the price tag looks puny compared with the cost of any large weapons system.

The thorniest difficulty is deciding where verification stops and espionage begins. Monitoring compliance would almost certainly require sensors placed near airports to track take-offs, inspectors at key locations, periodic airplane sorties and perhaps a limited number of inspections on demand. Some of these problems bedevilled the unsuccessful negotiations to reduce conventional forces in Europe, talks which may soon be rekindled in another form.

It would take between five and 10 years for both sides to set up their verification systems after negotiating a treaty, a process that itself could take years. So thinking about verification problems and challenges is really to dream about the twenty-first century, unless an early and unexpected breakthrough emerges.

Still, it's an eminently worthwhile area for Canada to concentrate its efforts, by sponsoring resolutions at the United Nations, financing research by academic specialists, organizing conferences with Canadian industry and trying in the process to carve out a niche for this country. It's unspectacular but necessary work, a foreign policy initiative that represents an excellent investment."

Beyond the Summit: The Future of Disarmament

The following are excerpts from the address given by Mr. Douglas Roche, Ambassador for Disarmament, on the cross-Canada speaking tour, December 1-16, 1987.

"...Clearly, the agreement to eliminate all medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles (INF) is a breakthrough in rebuilding East-West relations. For the first time an entire class of weapons will be destroyed. Although the agreement will eliminate only 3 per cent of the world's nuclear arsenal, its political significance is enormous. The bilateral negotiating process has, in fact, achieved a concrete result.

And there is more on the horizon. The two superpower leaders are preparing another summit for 1988 in Moscow at which they hope to sign a treaty eliminating 50 per cent of the present huge stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons. An historical process of disarmament is actually underway. These achievements represent a success for those countries, like Canada, that have been pressing both superpowers hard for radical reductions in nuclear weapons.

Of course, any outburst of euphoria is premature. Global problems involving regional wars, massive poverty, environmental destruction and the population explosion are immense. But it would be equally wrong to underestimate the magnitude of this moment that the world is passing through. The air is filled with change.

...Mr. Gorbachev continues to demonstrate a desire for reforms in a more open Soviet Union. His economic reforms and foreign policy initiatives go well beyond style. Whether he can deliver a 'new' Soviet Union, given unresolved questions of the Soviet satellite states, Afghanistan and human rights, is a valid question. Nonetheless, the changes that have taken place are for the most part of the type that the West has demanded for many years. It is important not only to acknowledge these changes but also to respond in ways that could induce further change.

...As a practical expression of this improved spirit, we have seen, throughout 1987, these developments:

— Substantial progress at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in the negotiations for a Chemical Weapons Treaty that would ban the production of all chemical weapons.

— Preparations at the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Vienna for a new forum to negotiate conventional force reductions in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, involving all members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

— The successful application of the Stockholm confidence-building agreement in which NATO and Warsaw Pact observers conducted 16 unprecedented on-site inspections of each other's military exercises.

...All these advances confirm the overarching fact of our time: peace is a multi-agenda process involving economic and social development as well as arms control measures, the protection of human rights as well as an end to racial discrimination. The agenda for the 21st century is already delineated. The issues that claim humanity's full attention are evident: the threat of nuclear annihilation, regional wars using conventional weapons, the gap between the developing and the industrial worlds, the danger of over-population, the despoilation of the global environment.

...A key to moving the world to a high stage of civilization is to understand the full meaning of security in the modern age.

Nations arm because they feel their security to be threatened, and each nation will judge its own security on its own terms. Only when the threat to security is lessened is real disarmament possible. But the paradox of our time is that the inflated arms race itself becomes a threat to security. Moreover, we now see that the huge suffering caused by under-development is itself a growing non-military threat to security. Working constructively on all aspects of



security — military, political, economic, social, humanitarian, human rights — creates conditions conducive to disarmament; it also provides the environment conducive to the pursuit of successful development. Thus our purpose must be to increase real security — for individual nations and for the world — by finding politically possible ways to spend less money on arms and more on development.

The Reykjavik Summit — and its extensions at Washington and Moscow — focuses the attention of the world on the new possibilities for creative thinking to resolve the problems of conflict and deprivation that still afflict large areas of the world. A basis has been laid for what the Palme Commission calls 'extraordinary progress.'

'An opportunity exists for the 1980s to witness what only seemed to be a dream but which now can become real: concrete accomplishments in disarmament, stability and peace.'

...Canada's approach to the comprehensive issue of peace and security is multi-dimensional — ranging from our strengthening of the United Nations system (where we are the fourth-largest overall contributor) to External Affairs Minister Joe Clark's personal tour of Central America last week to lend Canadian support to the regional peace plan. In addition:

— Canada has boosted aid to \$900 million to famine-stricken Africa, written off \$600 million of African debt, and now provides bilateral development assistance in grants, rather than loans.

— The fight against apartheid through sanctions against South Africa has been stepped up: we have imposed a ban both on new investment in South Africa and re-investment of profits; in the first six months of 1987, Canada reduced its imports from South Africa by 51 per cent; the importation of coal, iron and steel has been banned along with the promotion of tourism....

— Canada is among the most active supporters of multilateral institutions as

reflected in our hosting this fall of the Heads-of-Government meetings of La Francophonie and the Commonwealth. The next meeting of the Economic Summit will be in Toronto in 1988.

...One of my dominant impressions gained during more than three years representing Canada on disarmament questions at the United Nations is how much our country is respected. A strong legacy as a non-colonial nation, multi-cultural, open, loyal to our allies, cooperative, and genuinely involved in strengthening the international system enables Canada's voice to be heard. We have become an influential nation — carrying with this new status the responsibility of an even more prominent role in the difficult years ahead.

This gathering strength in international relations makes possible a stronger projection of Canada's security policy. This security policy is multi-dimensional.

...Canadian security policy must respond to an international environment dominated by the rivalry between East and West. These two groups of nations, each led by a superpower, are in conflict, a conflict of ideas and values. They are divided on how politics should be conducted, society ordered, and economics structured. They are divided on the value of personal freedom, on the importance of the rule of law, and on the proper relationship of the individual to the society. In this conflict, Canada is not neutral. Our values and our determination to defend freedom and democracy align us in the most fundamental way with other Western nations. Thus, Canada is a dedicated member of NATO, whose importance lies not only in countering the military threat from the Warsaw Pact but also in its political support for democratic institutions and for improved East-West political relations. Neither NATO's nuclear nor conventional arms will ever be used except in response to aggression.

As a result of its membership, Canada has been able to make a serious and constructive input to the important arms control negotiating efforts in Geneva,

Stockholm and Vienna. And we are working on ways for NATO to better project the positive qualities of its collective and cooperative security arrangements. Without the continuing direct opportunity to act and react, our influence on such events would be dramatically reduced.

Accordingly, Canada has commitments to its defence partners, which are expressed in the recent Defence White Paper. As Mr. Clark noted, Canada intends 'to modernize our capacity to meet our Alliance and Atlantic commitments.'

...The White Paper states that a strong national defence is a major component — but only one component — of Canada's international security policy. Arms control and disarmament and the peaceful resolution of disputes are equally important. Thus, the White Paper is not a surrogate Foreign Policy White Paper. All these activities should be seen as mutually supportive, and all of them enable Canada to play a role in the changing international community in putting into place the building blocks of peace.

Canada has six such 'blocks':

— Radical reductions in nuclear arms is the core of our disarmament policy. That is why the Reagan-Gorbachev summit process, leading to the dismantling of not only all intermediate- and shorter-range but also 50 per cent of strategic missiles is greeted with enthusiasm. The Canadian Government has consistently pressed both superpowers to achieve this.

— The realization of a negotiated and verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty has long been, and remains, a fundamental Canadian objective. Canada wants a halt to all nuclear testing by all countries in all environments for all time. At the United Nations this fall, the Government again co-sponsored a resolution urging the Conference on Disarmament to 'initiate substantive work on all aspects of a nuclear test ban treaty at the beginning of its 1988 session.'...



— The maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime is critical both to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries and ensuring the safe transfer of technology and materials for the development of nuclear power systems. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Canada worked to uphold at the 1985 review, now numbers 131 states, making it the largest multilateral arms treaty in the world.

— At the Conference on Disarmament, Canada actively participates in the multilateral negotiations now leading to a chemical weapons ban. In fact, Canada chaired the *ad hoc* group that launched the current process. As a nation whose soldiers have suffered the toxic effect of these nefarious weapons, Canada has a special interest in ridding the world of them. We have presented to the UN a mechanism for detecting their use in current wars.

— The prevention of an arms race in outer space is another key objective. Canada has contributed to the Conference on Disarmament's deliberations on this subject in several ways: the first substantive working paper dealing with possible stabilizing and destabilizing space-based military systems; an extensive survey of international law to provide a data base concerning its applicability to outer space; an Outer Space Workshop in Montreal to examine ways to strengthen the legal regime for outer space.

— Confidence-building measures are important not only in their own right but also because they improve the East-West negotiating atmosphere. Canada was a member of the 35-nation conference in Stockholm on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe and actively aided the implementation of the agreement, which provides a system of greater military transparency in Europe. Another important aspect of 'confidence-building' is the promotion of East-West exchanges, both official and unofficial. There are a number of specific exchange agreements between Canada and the Soviet Union (e.g., Arctic scientists) as well as with other East European countries (medical exchanges with Poland, sports exchanges with the German Democratic Republic)....

On the basis of all these policies, Canada is able to make practical contributions to international security.

We do this by, first of all, urging compliance with existing treaties on the grounds that deviation threatens the credibility and viability of further arms control. Thus we have protested against the US breakout of SALT II. And the Government has consistently urged that the traditional or restrictive interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty should be maintained, which would prevent the deployment of space-based defence systems. We have also voiced our concern about the USSR radar at Krasnoyarsk, and the Soviet encryption of telemetry which makes it very difficult for the West to determine if they are adhering to treaties.

A second contribution is through building support for confidence-building measures such as openness, transparency and verification.

Through Canada's extensive work in verification, we have become recognized at the United Nations as a world leader in this subject, which is now seen to be of critical importance in the negotiation and implementation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements. In 1983, Canada launched a verification research programme, with a \$1 million annual budget, which concentrates on verification techniques for seismic monitoring, chemical weapons use, and the feasibility of space-based satellite sensing. This latter is an exciting, far-seeing programme.

...This technical work has made possible diplomatic initiatives at the UN that have led to increasing support for a Canadian-sponsored consensus resolution on verification; the first ever substantive discussion on verification was held last May at the UN Disarmament Commission, where Canada chaired a Working Group. This group developed, again by consensus, an illustrative list of 10 principles that advanced the international community's understanding of how to apply verification. For example, the agreement on the necessity of on-site inspections has a direct bearing on the INF

agreement and a Chemical Weapons Treaty. This activity has led UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar to suggest that advancement of verification be highlighted at the UN's Third Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD III) in 1988.

...It is becoming more apparent to me that new intellectual inroads are being made by the peace movement. One example is provided by Beyond War, a non-partisan educational movement, which recently conducted an unprecedented project involving American and Soviet scientists and scholars. The two teams, meeting in each other's countries, produced a book, *Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking*, published jointly in English and Russian in the United States and the Soviet Union. Making the point that war is no longer an available means towards any desirable end, the book explores the prospects for peaceful resolution of international differences. In Canada, a new book, *How We Work for Peace*, is a wide-ranging description of Canadian community activities, compiled by Christine Peringer of the Peace Research Institute, Dundas, whose long work for peace was recently cited by the UN.

During the past few years, the peace movement, now numbering more than 2 000 local, regional and national groups across Canada, has both widened its activity and deepened its grasp of the terrible complexities of the disarmament subject. A number of leading organizations — embracing physicians, scientists, psychologists, educators, lawyers, among others — have projected a vibrant, intellectually-based concern for peace....

The imaginative work of peace groups, which is multiplying throughout the world, is slowly breaking down the mistrust and hatreds of the past. Competing ideologies cannot be quickly reconciled, any more than competing religions or cultures can. There is no quick or facile solution to the problems of world peace, but succeeding enlightened generations will be able to move forward together. This human movement is essential to sustain public policies that move beyond war...."



Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund Fiscal Year 1987-88

CONTRIBUTIONS:

1.	<i>Science for Peace Toronto</i> —public lectures in peace studies	\$1,500.00
2.	<i>University of Manitoba</i> —lecture series "Conflict and Peace"	\$2,200.00
3.	<i>Kootenay Centre for a Sustainable Future</i> —summer school on global issues	\$1,500.00
4.	<i>Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament</i> —conference on chemical weapons	\$10,000.00
5.	<i>Canadian Pugwash Group</i> —travel to 37th Pugwash conference	\$1,000.00
6.	<i>Disarmament Times</i> —publication costs	\$3,000.00
7.	<i>United Nations Association in Canada</i> —briefing papers on arms control and disarmament	\$6,309.00
8.	<i>Canadian Student Pugwash</i> —travel to 37th Pugwash conference	\$1,000.00
9.	<i>Institute and Centre of Air and Space Law</i> —lecture and seminar series	\$6,000.00
10.	<i>University of Calgary</i> —media research	\$16,000.00
11.	<i>Association of Canadian Community Colleges</i> —curriculum guide	\$3,000.00
12.	<i>Project Ploughshares</i> —hiring of two researchers	\$12,000.00
13.	<i>Canadian Council for International Cooperation</i> —travel to Conference on Disarmament and Development	\$500.00
14.	<i>Group of 78</i> —travel to Conference on Disarmament and Development	\$500.00
15.	<i>Hans Sinn</i> —travel to European Nuclear Disarmament conference	\$1,500.00
16.	<i>Niagara Peace Movement</i> —information booth	\$900.00
17.	<i>Club des Relations Internationales</i> —colloquium	\$1,000.00
18.	<i>Clergy and Laity Concerned</i> —cablevision broadcast	\$1,000.00
19.	<i>World Without War Research and Education Network</i> —organization, compiling and printing catalogue of audio visual material	\$2,500.00
20.	<i>Quaker Peacemakers</i> —Canada-USSR exchange	\$2,500.00
21.	<i>McGill-ICASL</i> —lecture series	\$6,000.00
22.	<i>Defence Research and Education Limited</i> —conference	\$5,000.00
23.	<i>Strategic Studies Programme—University of Calgary</i> —production of video	\$5,000.00
24.	<i>Conference of Defence Associations</i> —publication of seminar	\$3,000.00
25.	<i>Albert Legault</i> —translation of book	\$11,000.00
26.	<i>Canadian Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War</i> —congress	\$10,000.00
27.	<i>World Federalists of Canada</i> —conference	\$2,000.00
28.	<i>Group of 78</i> —publication of conference proceedings	\$1,000.00
29.	<i>CIIA—Markland Group</i> workshop	\$2,000.00
30.	<i>Clifford Brown</i> —video project—Central America	\$250.00
31.	<i>Project Ploughshares—UNSSOD III</i> project	\$12,000.00
TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS		\$131,159.00

GRANTS:

1.	<i>Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament</i> —conference on chemical weapons	\$5,000.00
2.	<i>United Nations Association in Canada</i> —briefing papers on arms control and disarmament	\$8,000.00
3.	<i>Institute and Centre of Air and Space Law McGill</i> —purchase of publications	\$4,000.00
4.	<i>World Disarmament Campaign</i> —yearbook	\$25,000.00
5.	<i>UNIDIR</i> —annual contribution	\$25,000.00
6.	<i>Group of 78</i> —trip to UNSSOD III preparatory committee	\$500.00
7.	<i>Voice of Women</i> —conference on disarmament orientation	\$9,510.00
8.	<i>Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament</i> —conference on chemical weapons	\$10,000.00
TOTAL OF GRANTS		\$87,010.00

TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND GRANTS

\$218,169.00

The **Disarmament** Bulletin

A review of national and international disarmament and arms control activities

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UN Convenes Third Special Session on Disarmament



Representatives of Non-Governmental Organizations presenting petition in support of UNSSOD III.

UN Photo 171795/Saw Lwin

The Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (UNSSOD III) was held May 31-June 25, 1988 in New York. After four weeks of deliberations, the participating states were unable to reach agreement on a concluding document. Why was this so? Should the four-week conference be considered a failure? An attempt to answer these questions and a brief analysis of the Special Session are included in the following report.

Preparations

The Canadian Government engaged in extensive preparations for UNSSOD III. Following the disappointing failure of the UNSSOD III Preparatory Committee to reach agreement on a document on which the Special Session could build, Canada made *démarches* in some 45

countries in all regions urging governments to make special efforts to bring the Special Session to a successful conclusion. In particular, Canada stressed the importance of developing a co-operative approach, maintaining flexibility, seeking common ground and avoiding polarization.

The Government also convened a meeting of the 50-member Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control in Ottawa last April on the subject. The group put forward a broad range of policy recommendations, many of which had already been or were subsequently adopted as part of the Government's position for UNSSOD III. (See the Spring 1988 edition of *The Disarmament Bulletin* for more details concerning UNSSOD III preparations.)

Proceedings

UNSSOD III commenced in grand style with higher-level representation than at either UNSSOD I in 1978 or UNSSOD II in 1982. Statements were delivered by UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, 23 Heads of State and Government and 55 Foreign Ministers, including the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark.

The Canadian Delegation, headed by Mr. Clark, included 15 Parliamentarians as observers and 20 non-government individuals as special advisers. Canada was one of only eight countries to include NGO representatives on its delegation. Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Mr. Douglas Roche, acted as Deputy Head of the Delegation. Other Delegation members included Stephen Lewis, Canada's Permanent Representative to the UN in New York and de Montigny Marchand, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament and Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva.

The statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA), delivered on June 13, placed major emphasis on recent concrete achievements in arms control and disarmament (ACD) and the need for UNSSOD III to complement and enhance that progress. Mr. Clark noted that the UN has an important role to play, but will only advance the ACD process if efforts are focussed on practical approaches and the issues capable of mustering consensus. Canadian ACD priorities include step-by-step progress toward the realization of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), negotiation of a convention banning chemical weapons, the achievement of deep reductions in nuclear-weapons arsenals, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the recognition of the central role of verification and confidence-building measures in the ACD process. In the latter regard, the SSEA drew specific attention to a joint Canada/Netherlands proposal for a UN Experts Study on a UN role in verification.

Recent progress in ACD in the USA/USSR context, especially the

ratification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement at the Moscow Summit, which concluded on June 2, was welcomed by virtually all speakers and had a pervasive and positive impact on the atmosphere of the Special Session. Nevertheless, some fundamental differences of approach became evident virtually from the outset.

The most significant areas of disagreement included: (a) the overall orientation — most Western states favoured a pragmatic, step-by-step approach to ACD issues, while some of the Non-Aligned, and to a lesser extent the Socialist states, preferred a more political, declaratory emphasis; (b) a general tendency among the Non-Aligned to place the onus for progress on the nuclear-weapon states, and the superpowers, in particular; and (c) different approaches to the role of the UN in the broad ACD process, with some countries seeking a broader UN role, and others placing more emphasis on negotiating efforts at the bilateral and regional levels.

These differences translated into significant disagreements on specific issues such as: whether the UNSSOD I Final Document of 1978 remained valid and should be reaffirmed in all its aspects, or whether it should rather be seen as a valued historical point of reference subject to modification in the light of new realities; the importance that should be attached to nuclear as opposed to conventional disarmament; the nature of the relationship between disarmament, development and security; the need to bring weapons-related research and development and the qualitative development of weapons under more effective policy direction; the utility of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace; support for the NPT; the pace and manner of progress toward the realization of a CTBT; and consideration of the naval arms race and prevention of an arms race in outer space issues.

Following the two-week Plenary debate, a Committee of the Whole (COW) was convened which established three working groups to consider the substantive agenda items, as follows:

Working Group I

- Review and appraisal of the present international situation

- Assessment of the decisions of UNSSOD I and II

Working Group II

- Assessment of developments and trends, including qualitative and quantitative aspects

Working Group III

- Disarmament machinery

- UN information and educational activities

In the week allowed for their work, none of the working groups succeeded in adopting agreed reports. Non-consensus "Chairman's Papers," together with lists of proposed amendments, were, however, forwarded to the COW Chairman to assist him in preparing a draft concluding document for the Special Session.

Following extensive consultations, the COW Chairman released his paper with only four days remaining. Despite some specific difficulties, Canada was generally pleased with its balanced and pragmatic tone. The COW did not meet again until the last day of the Special Session in an atmosphere of growing concern regarding the prospects for success. In the interim period, the Chairman held informal consultations with a group of selected countries (including Canada). Both during the informal consultations and in the COW, major areas of disagreement remained in the face of numerous and often conflicting proposed amendments.

When, by the evening of June 25, differences remained on numerous sections of the revised "Chairman's Paper," the Chairman adjourned the COW and called together a small group of "Friends of the Chair," including Canada, for further consultations. These continued until almost 3:00 a.m., June 26.

With the clock running out, it was clear to all participants that this informal meeting offered the last opportunity to salvage the Special Session. Despite the general fatigue, a sense of urgency and drama prevailed. The Chairman iden-

tified the major outstanding issues (outer space, new technologies, nuclear disarmament, naval arms race, conventional disarmament, the verification study, nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, disarmament and development, and non-proliferation) and wondered whether, in four hours, existing differences could be bridged. By 2:30 a.m., however, despite considerable progress, major differences remained and the Chairman was obliged to finally admit defeat and call a halt. The Chairman's group had not had time to overcome its differences on the "Assessment" and "Disarmament Machinery" sections of the draft paper and still failed to agree on several substantive elements of the section dealing with "Future Development and Trends."

The final Plenary session concluded at 7:30 a.m., June 26 with exhausted delegates expressing their disappointment. The concluding statements of several countries, however, reflected a desire to focus on positive aspects of the Special Session and avoid recrimination. In his final statement, the President of UNSSOD III acknowledged that points of disagreement had been reduced and areas of agreement broadened.

Assessment

Canada shared the broad sense of disappointment in the wake of almost a month of concentrated effort. One could, nevertheless, derive some comfort from a number of developments. Despite the existence of major differences of approach, a much more positive atmosphere prevailed at UNSSOD III than had been the case at UNSSOD II. Furthermore, there was increasing recognition among the Non-Aligned of their responsibility in the ACD process, particularly in relation to conventional arms, and a general avoidance of unhelpful ideological rhetoric.

In view of these encouraging trends, why did the Special Session end in failure?

There are several reasons. The first, and perhaps most obvious, is that the fundamental differences of approach to ACD noted above remained so entrenched as to preclude a meaningful consensus on key ACD issues, despite

the improved atmosphere. Such differences have long been apparent in UN General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee voting and within the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In addition, there seemed to be little sense of purpose or urgency at UNSSOD III. Despite the active presence of many articulate NGO representatives, there was little discernible public pressure, as reflected by the lack of media interest. Even when the clock was evidently running out, many delegations preferred to reiterate national positions rather than focus on overcoming substantive differences. Despite last-minute efforts, the strength of purpose required to forge consensus simply failed to materialize.

The Canadian Delegation at the Special Session was active throughout. The Government's extensive pre-UNSSOD III preparations facilitated the submission of substantive Canadian position papers, subsequently published as official conference documents, on the three major agenda items.

In addition, Canada played a particularly active role in the COW, its three working groups and during the informal consultations with the COW Chairman. Canada was a leading member of the small group which negotiated language on the verification study, having earlier submitted a joint paper on the subject with the Netherlands. Canada also submitted papers recommending a "UN orientation programme for NGOs in the field of Disarmament," on the subject of "UN information and educational activities" and, jointly with Australia and New Zealand, on the "Advancement of women in the disarmament process."

Looking ahead, a major objective for Canada will be to seek broader support for pragmatic and realistic approaches to ACD, building upon the UNSSOD III experience. Of more immediate concern will be to ensure that such approaches become a predominant feature of the deliberations of the First Committee which Canada expects to chair at UNGA 43. A major Canadian objective will be to translate the progress achieved on verification at UNSSOD III into a concrete UNGA resolution calling for UN experts study on the subject. ■

Carleton Verification Symposium

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA) of Carleton University hosted its Fifth Annual International Symposium on Arms Control Verification March 23-26, 1988 in Ottawa. In co-operation with the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of External Affairs, NPSIA has sponsored a unique series of symposiums, each of which has focussed on a different aspect of the verification process. Last year, in conjunction with the School of Journalism at Carleton University, NPSIA successfully hosted a symposium which considered the role of the media in verification.

This year, Professor Brian Mandell undertook a retrospective examination of the 1973 Sinai war in an attempt to apply that experience in developing a verification model. Using his recently published study *The Sinai Experience: Lessons on Multimethod Arms Control Verification and Risk Management* as a guide, some 30 academics and arms control specialists from within government and from independent institutes undertook the identification of elements following the war which might be applied in a setting designed to prevent a future war.

The keynote address by Ambassador James Goodby, now with the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, set the stage. He described the problems likely to be encountered in the proposed conventional arms reduction talks, the mandate for which is currently under discussion in Vienna. Academics, researchers and other experts from Canada, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Holland and the United States presented papers identifying significant issue areas to be addressed. This Canadian-sponsored symposium is one of the first to focus almost exclusively on the way ahead in term of future multilateral negotiations on conventional arms reductions in Europe, which are likely to commence in late 1988 or early 1989. The results of the symposium and its predecessors are available from the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at a price of \$6.00 per issue. ■

Statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark to UNSSOD III

The following are excerpts of the address given by the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (UNSSOD III).

"...Six years ago, at the outset of the Second Special Session on Disarmament, the President of that Assembly could correctly observe that nothing had been achieved in the field of disarmament and arms control since the First Special Session.

This year, we meet in circumstances which are vastly different. The past six years have recorded progress and achievements that will have major implications for arms control and disarmament. The measure of success of this Special Session will be the extent to which our deliberations sustain further the spirit so essential to continued progress and achievement in international disarmament. We must, therefore, reaffirm our dedication to the success of arms control and disarmament, and pledge ourselves to advance ideas which will keep hope and progress alive.

Our efforts here can only be aided by the outcome of the recent meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev.

That Summit clearly demonstrated the degree of progress which has been made in East-West relations. It was the fourth such meeting between the two leaders in just over two-and-half years, an unprecedented pace for discussion and negotiation.

I was struck by how many observers of the Summit referred to the new agreements signed in Moscow on verification and testing as 'minor' arms control measures. When we gathered in previous Special Sessions, the very notion of 'minor' arms control agreements would indeed have sounded strange. We have come to have high expectations of this process.

It is in the vital Soviet-American relationship that much of the progress has been made since the last Special Ses-



Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark addresses UNSSOD III, June 13, 1988.

UN Photo 171694/Y. Nagata

sion. Intensive negotiations between those two states in the last several years have brought new and historic achievements, most notably in the landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement signed in Washington last December and the agreement in principle to reduce strategic nuclear arms by 50 percent. Those accomplishments present this Special Session with both the opportunity and the stimulus to pursue other avenues leading to greater international security and stability.

The multilateral arms control process has also had significant success in the context of East-West relations. The Stockholm Agreement, which came into effect in January 1987, has brought greater openness and predictability about military activities in Europe. Anticipated new negotiations on conventional stability covering the whole of Europe between all members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact offer us the opportunity for more progress.

There has also been some movement forward in non-East-West forums, but it has been much less spectacular. The Conference on Disarmament has made some progress on negotiations on a global convention to ban chemical weapons, but the repeated reports about the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf

War only demonstrates how far we are from an effective agreement and the urgency of our obligations. There was also progress in last year's successful Disarmament and Development Conference, the endorsement of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the Third Review Conference of the Treaty, the inclusion of conventional disarmament on the agenda of the United Nations and the consensus report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) on verification.

In this Special Session, it is important that we take realism as our guide and apply what we have learned from our successes, and from our failures. We have learned that arms control and disarmament cannot be viewed as ends in themselves. Both have value only if they contribute to security and well-being. Most countries accept the desirability of constraining or banning weapons systems. But, we cannot aspire to the reductions we seek, or the agreements necessary to sustain them, unless all states take advantage of opportunities to support those objectives.

Experience has shown that successful arms control and disarmament agreements share a number of essential qualities. The first and most obvious is

enhanced security. Arms control agreements must maintain and enhance the security of all those involved in the negotiation.

There are other essential qualities as well.

One is mutual benefit. Realism in arms control demands that a successful negotiation offer something for all parties.

Negotiations must also be substantive. We must not spend our time negotiating the non-essential or the frivolous. A proliferation of arms control forums is not likely to lead to more arms control agreements unless they have clear and substantive mandates.

Arms control agreements must also be crafted to ensure that the benefits of limits on weapons are not undone by redeployment or by qualitative improvements to remaining weapons.

A fifth, and related criterion, is non-transferability of the threat. Arms control agreements will achieve little and are unlikely to succeed if they remove the threat from one region by increasing it in another.

Finally, an arms control agreement must be verifiable. The agreement must include not only thorough verification provisions, but the substance of the agreement must be such that compliance can be effectively demonstrated.

These essential qualities are demanding.

Nonetheless, our experience clearly shows that while the negotiation of agreements will not be easy, it is not impossible. An effective disarmament and arms control *régime* can meet these criteria only through measured and individual steps which see every contentious aspect settled. The issues on which we seek agreement vary much too widely and are too complex to allow us to behave otherwise.

Canada sees confidence-building as essential to arms control and disarmament. We regard the concepts of openness, transparency and predictability as imperative. The establishment of agreed procedures for inspections at the

Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe in September 1986 is an accomplishment which stands as a precedent and model for other arms control negotiations, at bilateral or regional levels.

The principles essential to the success of confidence-building measures should be promoted on every occasion. In this regard, we urge members of the United Nations to comply with the General Assembly recommendation on reporting annual military expenditures. Only 20 or so countries regularly comply with this recommendation. It is a small step, but we cannot hope to take larger steps without more members of this Assembly giving effect to our own recommendations.

Indeed, one of the happy consequences of the Reagan-Gorbachev summits is to broaden the responsibility for arms control. For some time, the focus of arms control discussions was to encourage the superpowers to act. Now the superpowers are acting, and the question becomes whether other states are prepared to demonstrate themselves the leadership we have asked of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is no longer enough to advocate action by others. Whether the issue is chemical weapons or adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or fidelity to the recommendations of the General Assembly, the new climate involves new obligations for all of us.

Ultimately, neither arms control nor disarmament can succeed without a general will to make them succeed. The issue is fundamentally political, and this Special Session is one assembly in which political will can be cultivated and demonstrated. Increasing trust, good relations and arms reductions go together: they are mutually reinforcing.

It is not enough that the established framework of international institutions and laws must remain in place; they must as well be respected in practice by members of the United Nations.

The strength of this institution is not the responsibility of any one group of nations; it is the responsibility of all its

members. We must work in support of the UN and not undermine it. We cannot ask it to do the impossible. We have to set realistic goals, and we have to give it the means to achieve these goals.

In that context, the frequent calls we have heard at this Special Session for a new fund to transfer the resources saved from disarmament to development is an example of a failure to learn from past experiences. Last year, the Disarmament and Development Conference issued a final document stressing the multi-dimensional nature of security. The participants rejected both a direct linkage between disarmament and development and the creation of a fund. Nations like Canada already have mechanisms for providing funds to development, as does the United Nations itself, and in many developing countries there are ample existing claims upon any resources made available through disarmament.

Just as arms control and enhanced security are not a monopoly of the superpowers, neither is disarmament limited to nuclear arms alone. The terrible consequences of military actions in the decades since the Second World War have been caused by conventional, and lately, chemical weapons. We must face this issue squarely.

No conflict or arms build-up, however small or isolated, is irrelevant or can be ignored, as any of them can undermine the security of all of us.

Canada is determined to play a leading role in moving the agenda forward. Our commitment and contribution to the cause of arms control and disarmament is well established. We will use the influence we have, and make available the expertise we hold, to help reduce the danger of conflict and to reverse the build-up of arms.

Our first goal at this Special Session, therefore, should be to endorse continued adherence to a well-founded and realistic approach to arms control and disarmament.

This requires that we set clear, realistic goals, and that we choose and adhere to priorities. In arms control and disarmament, priorities must be established no less than in other areas if we are to

have specific landmarks against which to measure progress. This lesson is especially true for the United Nations and for its arms control activities.

This Special Session will help to keep alive the spirit of progress and achievement if it can identify and isolate those areas which command consensus and where we can agree we should concentrate our efforts. Canada has listened with interest and attention to the statements of the Special Session. We believe that a measure of agreement does exist on certain issues where Canada considers it would be worthwhile to concentrate our attention in the future.

First, deep and verifiable reductions in the arsenals of nuclear weapons must remain as the highest priority in international disarmament.

The achievements of a comprehensive test ban treaty remains a fundamental and enduring objective for Canada. The Special Session should recognize the successful efforts already made in Soviet/American negotiations in this area and endorse this full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiating procedure.

No measure demonstrates the commitment of a nation to nuclear disarmament more effectively than adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Beginning last week and throughout this Session, officials of the Canadian Government on my instructions, will be calling on the governments of all non-signatories of this Treaty strongly urging any nation that has not done so to accede to this essential arms control treaty. I hope that this Special Session will issue a similar call. It is no longer possible to argue, as some have, that the superpowers must first reduce their own nuclear arsenals. If that was a condition preordained, it has been met.

The focus of attention on nuclear arms should not, however, be allowed to deflect attention from the need for progress in arms reduction in the field of conventional arms. This question must be addressed with no less urgency than that attached to nuclear questions. It is

in this area that regional approaches to arms control and disarmament may well provide the best returns.

The negotiation of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons and eliminating their stockpiles must be regarded as a matter of paramount importance. This Session should unequivocally condemn their use. While progress has been accomplished, greater efforts must be made to conclude an effectively verifiable comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

Until such an agreement is reached, every step must be taken to prevent the transfer to other states of chemical weapons, and to follow the example of those countries which have moved to control the export of highly toxic chemicals and to institute a 'Warning List' procedure for others.

The prevention of an arms race in space remains a major goal of Canadian policy and a matter which concerns us all. Canada will continue to work to ensure that outer space is developed for peaceful purposes.

Verification is essential to the arms control and disarmament process. It has been a major preoccupation for Canada, and we are encouraged that so many speakers in this forum share that priority.

To help promote the cause of multilateralism in this field, we and the Netherlands have proposed that an in-depth study be undertaken by a United Nations Group of Experts. Such a report will advance international understanding of verification within the UN framework, and help develop an appropriate role for the organization in this field. I ask that members of the United Nations support this proposal."

Mr. President, in the last six years, we have shown that arms control and disarmament can work, and that it can be made part of the growing fabric of our international relations. Canada stands ready to work with member states in the pursuit of goals agreed by this Special Session. Let us continue to nourish further the cause of arms control and disarmament." □

UNSSOD III Provides Consultative Group Focus

The Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs met April 14-16, 1988 in Ottawa to discuss the Third UN Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (UNSSOD III).

Created in 1979 in response to a recommendation of the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978, the Consultative Group meets periodically with officials of the departments of External Affairs and National Defence to exchange views on matters of mutual interest relevant to Canada's policies on disarmament and arms control.

The meeting was highlighted by presentations by Ambassador Dave McDowell, the Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations, and Mr. Fred Bild, Assistant Deputy Minister, Political and International Security Affairs, Department of External Affairs. Seventy individuals participated in a program which gave considerable emphasis to workshops.

The following executive summary of the meeting was prepared by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament as part of a contract with the Department of External Affairs. Copies of the full report are available by writing to the Editor.

The Third Special Session follows the highly successful UNSSOD I of 1978 and the stillborn UNSSOD II, held four years later. It comes at a time when there has been much progress in superpower bilateral arms control but few advances on the multilateral front, and thus can be viewed as a test of an opportunity to reinvigorate the multilateral disarmament process. This will not be an easy task. The Preparatory Commission for the Special Session has revealed sharp divisions both among and between West, East and the Neutral and Non-Aligned. While an epoch-making final document is not to be expected, the disarmament process and multilateralism will be

fortified if a new international consensus — however imperfect — can be forged on disarmament issues at UNSSOD III. The challenge of Canada's Government and NGOs is to make this happen.

The Consultative Group discussed three major themes, based on the anticipated organization of work at UNSSOD III: a review of past developments and appraisal of the present situation in the disarmament field; new developments and trends affecting the disarmament field; and disarmament machinery and education.

In general, participants recommended that Canada view the Special Session as an opportunity to affirm and renew the multilateral disarmament process and thus should seek consensus there. They strongly advised that the Prime Minister head the Canadian delegation to UNSSOD III, as an indication of the priority this country places on arms control and disarmament.

Participants agreed that recent progress in arms control, such as the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Stockholm agreement on confidence- and security-building measures and the outcome of the UN disarmament conference should be endorsed, but noted this should not obscure the need to shore up other arms control regimes, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and to take further steps toward disarmament. The need for a comprehensive test ban and a chemical weapons ban was emphasized and many suggestions were offered on how UNSSOD III could aid their attainment. Canada was urged to support the application of confidence-building measures in other regions of the world.

Participants expressed much concern about the qualitative dimension of the arms race and recommended that Canada put forward arms control proposals that address technological advances in both nuclear and conventional weaponry. Several participants opposed Canada's apparent abandonment of the strategy of suffocation and called on the Government to reconsider this strategy, particularly the aspect of a ban on flight testing of nuclear weapon



Mr. Fred Bild, Assistant Deputy Minister, Political and International Security Affairs, Department of External Affairs.

delivery systems, as a means of limiting nuclear weapon modernization.

The group emphasized the need for qualitative and quantitative limits on conventional forces. It was recommended that Canada reaffirm the importance of the UN's established matrix for reports on military expenditures, encourage all states to file such reports, and support efforts to establish an international arms trade registry. Participants also recommended that UNSSOD III attempt to set in motion serious efforts toward naval arms limitations.

There was general interest in a multilateral agency for the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements. The group recommended that Canada give special emphasis to exploring the possibilities for an international verification network, perhaps under UN auspices.

Participants opined that the problems facing multilateral disarmament are not due simply to a lack of political will, but also to the need for procedural and organizational reform of disarmament machinery. Canada should strive toward this.

It was recommended that Canada look for ways in which the UN role in war prevention and conflict resolution could be strengthened. It was also suggested that the UN develop and broaden its facilities for the application of innovative confidence-building techniques.

Participants endorsed the Government's intention to help the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) maintain its present status. There was strong support for the idea of an orientation and training program for NGOs implemented by the DDA; participants called on Canada to assist in the establishment of such a program. In addition, most participants thought Canada's support for the World Disarmament Campaign should remain firm. □

Canada Contributes Further to Peacekeeping Operations

Afghanistan and Pakistan

In April 1988, for the 17th time since 1945, Canada responded positively to another request by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to participate in a new peacekeeping operation. On May 2, 1988, five Canadian officers arrived in Islamabad, Pakistan to serve in the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), which will oversee the implementation of agreements relating to Afghanistan, including monitoring the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

This new United Nations operation has been set up in accordance with the terms of the Geneva agreements signed April 14, 1988 by representatives of Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States and the Soviet Union. UNGOMAP consists of 50 military officers under the command of a Finnish officer, Major-General Rauli Helminen. The other contributors to the force are Austria, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal, Poland and Sweden.

Iran-Iraq

On August 9, 1988, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, and the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Perrin Beatty, announced that Canada had agreed to participate in the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) operating between Iran and Iraq. The Force is being established to assist in the implementation of a cease-

fire agreement which represents a vital first step in efforts to end the eight-year Iran-Iraq war.

Canada is contributing a fully self-sustained communications unit which will be responsible for all of the Observer Force's communication requirements along the entire 1,200 kilometre border between Iran and Iraq. In addition to this communications unit, which will comprise close to 500 Canadian Forces personnel, Canada has agreed to provide 15 officers to assist at UNIILOG headquarters and observer positions on the Force.

The Ministers expressed their satisfaction at the announcement by the United Nations Secretary-General of the August 20 cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war and commended both parties for having reached this agreement. They conveyed their appreciation to Mr. Pérez de Cuéllar for his unstinting efforts that have brought the prospect of peace to this region of the Gulf.

Other Operations

Since the Second World War, Canada has participated in 16 forces and observer missions under UN auspices and in four peacekeeping operations outside the United Nations. In addition to UNGOMAP, Canada is actively involved in four peacekeeping operations in Cyprus and the Middle East, three of which are under UN auspices. These operations are:

- a) the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). The mission was established in 1948 to supervise cease-fire and armistice agreements between Israel and surrounding Arab states. The UNTSO headquarters is in Jerusalem. Canada provides 22 officer observers to UNTSO.
- b) the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). The operation was established in 1974 to supervise the areas of separation and limitations between Syrian and Israeli forces on the Golan Heights, and Canada has participated from the outset. The Canadian contingent of 226 personnel, based at Camp Ziouani in Israeli-occupied territory, provides logistics and communication support, a role shared with Poland.

- c) the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Canada has contributed forces to UNFICYP since its inception in 1964. Currently, Canada provides a contingent of 575 officers and other ranks. The role of UNFICYP is to supervise cease-fire agreements between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot forces.

- d) the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). This mission was established in 1981 to monitor security provisions of the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Canada joined in April 1985, providing up to nine helicopters and 140 personnel to form a Rotary Wing Aviation Unit and to fill certain headquarters staff positions.

In assessing potential peacekeeping commitments, Canada has developed a set of prerequisites, which a proposed mission should meet if it is to enjoy a reasonable measure of success. These prerequisites underline Canada's view that peacekeeping is not an end in itself; its purpose is not only to prevent conflict but also to create conditions in which the search for solutions to the underlying causes of conflict take place, the process of "peacemaking." For this reason, Canada has stressed the inter-

dependence of the peacemaking activities of political negotiators and peacekeeping operations, along with the importance of pursuing both with vigour and determination. Some of the more important prerequisites are as follows:

- the peacekeeping endeavour should be associated with an agreement for political settlement;
- the peacekeeping organization should be responsible to a political authority, preferably the United Nations;
- the peacekeeping mission must have a clear mandate which enjoys the support to all parties of the dispute;
- there should be an agreed and equitable method of financing the operation; and
- participation should serve important Canadian foreign policy interests.

Peacekeeping is likely to remain a continuing feature of our international relations, an important aspect of our participation in United Nations activities, and a significant complement to our efforts in the field of arms control and disarmament in the pursuit of peace and security. ■



Canadian soldiers on United Nations peacekeeping duties patrol the "Green Line" in Nicosia, Cyprus.

Canadian Forces Photo

Moscow Summit Furthers Arms Control and Disarmament

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met May 29-June 2, 1988 in Moscow to discuss a wide range of issues, including arms control, human rights and humanitarian concerns, regional issues and bilateral affairs. Canada believes that the breadth of the discussions is an excellent indication of the increasing depth of the US/Soviet relationship and, in particular, welcomes the progress made in arms control. The following are excerpts of the text of the USA/USSR Joint Statement at the conclusion of the Summit.

Arms Control

"The President and the General Secretary, having expressed the commitment of their two countries to build on progress to date in arms control, determined objectives and next steps on a wide range of issues in this area. These will guide the efforts of the two governments in the months ahead as they work with each other and with other states toward equitable, verifiable agreements that strengthen international stability and security.

INF

The President and the General Secretary signed the protocol on the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. The two leaders welcomed the entry into force of this historic agreement, which for the first time will eliminate an entire class of US and Soviet nuclear arms, and which sets new standards for arms control. The leaders are determined to achieve the full implementation of all the provisions and understandings of the Treaty, viewing joint and successful work in this respect as an important precedent for future arms control efforts.

Nuclear and Space Talks

The two leaders noted that a Joint Draft Text of a Treaty on Reduction and



US President Ronald Reagan (left) and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev place their signatures on the instruments of ratification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement at the Kremlin in Moscow. The Treaty was formally agreed to during the Washington Summit in December 1987.

U.S. Information Agency

Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms has been elaborated. Through this process, the sides have been able to record in the Joint Draft Text extensive and significant areas of agreement and also to detail positions on remaining areas of disagreement. While important additional work is required before this Treaty is ready for signature, many key provisions are recorded in the Joint Draft Text and are considered to be agreed, subject to the completion and ratification of the Treaty.

Taking into account a Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the sides have continued negotiations to achieve a separate agreement concerning the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty building on the language of the Washington Summit Joint Statement dated December 10, 1987. Progress was noted in preparing the Joint Draft Text of an associated Protocol. In connection with their obligations under the Protocol, the sides have agreed in particular to use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers for transmission of relevant information. The leaders directed their negotiators to prepare the Joint Draft Text of a separate agreement and to continue work on its associated Protocol.

The Joint Draft Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms reflects the earlier understanding on establishing ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems and 6,000 warheads as well as agreement on subceilings of 4,900 on the aggregate of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) warheads and 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles.

The draft Treaty also records the sides' agreement that, as a result of the reductions, the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level, approximately 50 percent below the existing level and this level will not be exceeded.

During the negotiations, the two sides have also achieved understanding that in future work on the Treaty they will act on the understanding that on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types the counting rule will include the number of warheads referred to in the Joint Statement of December 10, 1987, and the number of warheads which will be attributed to each new type of ballistic missile will be subject to negotiation.

In addition, the sides agreed on a counting rule for heavy bomber armaments according to which heavy bombers equipped only for nuclear gravity bombs and Short-Range Air-Launched Missiles (SRAMs) will count as one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit and one warhead against the 6,000 limit.

The delegations have also prepared Joint Draft Texts of an Inspection Protocol, a Conversion or Elimination Protocol, and a Memorandum of Understanding on data, which are integral parts of the Treaty. These documents build on the verification provisions of the INF Treaty, extending and elaborating them as necessary to meet the more demanding requirements of START. The START verification measures will, as a minimum, include:

A. Data exchanges to include declarations and appropriate notifications on the number and location of weapons systems limited by START, including locations and facilities for production, final assembly, storage, testing, repair, training, deployment, conversion, and elimination of such systems. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated periodically.

B. Baseline inspections to verify the accuracy of these declarations.

C. On-site observation or elimination of strategic systems necessary to meet the agreed limits.

D. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production facilities to confirm the output of weapons to be limited.

E. Short-notice, on-site inspection of:

(i) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;

(ii) locations where systems covered by this Treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and

(iii) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

F. Short-notice inspection, in accordance with agreed upon procedures, of

locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.

G. Prohibition of the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by National Technical Means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

H. Procedures that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type, including on-site inspection.

I. Enhanced observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by National Technical Means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspection party.

The two sides have also begun to exchange data on their strategic forces.

During the course of this meeting in Moscow, the exchanges on START resulted in the achievement of substantial additional common ground, particularly in the areas of Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) and the attempts to develop and agree, if possible, on a solution to the problem of verification of mobile ICBMs. The details of this additional common ground have been recorded in documents exchanged between the sides. The Delegations in Geneva will record these gains in the Joint Draft Text of the START Treaty.

The sides also discussed the question of limiting long-range, nuclear-armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs)....

Ballistic Missile Launch Notifications

The agreement between the US and the USSR on notifications of launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, signed during the Moscow Summit, is a practical new step, reflecting the desire of the sides to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a

result of misinterpretation, miscalculation or accident.

Nuclear Testing

The leaders reaffirmed the commitment of the two sides to conduct in a single forum full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on the issues relating to nuclear testing. In these negotiations, the sides, as the first step, will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the US-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. In implementing the first objective of these negotiations, agreement upon effective verification measures for the US-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, the sides agreed to design and conduct a Joint Verification Experiment at each other's test sites.

The leaders, therefore, noted with satisfaction the signing of the Joint Verification Experiment Agreement, the considerable preparation underway for the Experiment, and the positive cooperation being exhibited in particular by the substantial numbers of personnel now engaged in work at each other's test sites. They also noted the substantial progress on a new Protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and urged continuing constructive negotiations on effective verification measures for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

Expressing their conviction that the progress achieved so far forms a solid basis for continuing progress on issues relating to nuclear testing, the leaders instructed their negotiators to complete expeditiously the preparation of a Protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty and to complete the preparation of a Protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) as soon as possible after the Joint Verification Experiment has

been conducted and analyzed. They confirmed their understanding that verification measures for the TTBT will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached. They also declared their mutual intention to seek ratification of both the 1974 and 1976 Treaties when the corresponding protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty are completed, and to continue negotiations as agreed in the Washington joint summit statement.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The two leaders noted that this year marks the 20th Anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), one of the most important international arms control agreements with over 130 adherents. They reaffirmed their conviction that universal adherence to the NPT is important to international peace and security....

The two leaders also confirmed their support of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and agreed that they would continue efforts to further strengthen it. They reaffirmed the value of their regular consultations on non-proliferation and agreed that they should continue.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

The leaders expressed satisfaction over the activation of the new communications link between the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Moscow and Washington, established in accordance with the US-Soviet agreement of September 15, 1987. It was agreed that the Centers can play an important role in the context of a future treaty on reducing US and Soviet strategic nuclear arms.

Chemical Weapons

The leaders reviewed the status of ongoing multilateral negotiations and bilateral US-Soviet consultations toward a comprehensive, effectively verifiable,

and truly global ban on chemical weapons, encompassing all chemical weapons-capable states. They also expressed concern over the growing problem of chemical weapons proliferation and use.

The leaders reaffirmed the importance of efforts to address, as a matter of continuing urgency, the unique challenges of a chemical weapons (CW) ban and to achieve an effective convention.... The leaders underlined the need for concrete solutions to the problems of ensuring effective verification and undiminished security for all convention participants....

Both sides agreed on the vital importance of greater openness by all states as a way to build confidence and strengthen the foundation for an effective convention. The leaders also emphasized the necessity of close coordination on a multilateral basis in order to ensure the participation of all CW-possessing and CW-capable states in the convention.

Both sides strongly condemned the dangerous spread and illegal use of chemical weapons in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. They stressed the importance of both technical and political solutions to this problem and confirmed their support for international investigations of suspected violations. Noting the initial efforts being made to control the export of chemicals used in manufacturing chemical weapons, the

leaders called on all nations with the capability of producing such chemicals to institute stringent export controls to inhibit the proliferation of chemical weapons.

Conventional Arms Control

The leaders emphasized the importance of strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe. They welcomed progress to date on development of a mandate for new negotiations on armed forces and conventional armaments. They expressed their hope for an early and balanced conclusion to the Vienna Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Follow-Up Meeting....

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

They expressed their commitment to further development of the CSCE process. The US and USSR will continue to work with the other 33 participants to bring the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting to a successful conclusion, through significant results in all the principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.

Ballistic Missile Technology Proliferation

The leaders agreed to bilateral discussions at the level of experts on the problem of proliferation of ballistic missile technology...." ▢

Recent Polls Show Government and Public Share Similar Concerns

A number of recent public opinion polls have been conducted in Canada on a variety of peace, security and arms control issues which reveal that the Canadian Government and public share many similar concerns.

Nowhere is this more clear than in attitudes toward Canadian membership in NATO — the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. On January 15,

1987, the Minister of National Defence stated:

"Canada has fully chosen to combine with other like-minded democracies in collective security arrangements in the unshakable belief that it is through collective defence undertakings that our protection is best assured. We are not in NATO and in Europe today out of a spirit of altruism. We are there because

our interests as a nation require us to be there and because the loss of a free Europe would be a grave blow to our ability to maintain our democratic freedoms here in Canada."

The results of a Gallup Canada, Inc. poll released August 24, 1987 indicated that a majority of Canadians (57%) thought our troops should continue to serve in Europe within the framework of Canada's membership in NATO. Less than half that number (26%) believed the Government should bring these troops back to Canada, while 16% were not sure.¹

Public support for NATO is even more clearly illustrated in a Decima Research and Public Affairs International Poll, where respondents were asked to declare their views on NATO (and not specifically on the stationing of Canadian troops in Europe). In this poll, 83% of Canadians believed we should stay in NATO.² When the question was posed as a statement ("Canada should withdraw from NATO") in a poll conducted by Environics, the extent of public support for NATO declined to 66% (with 11% advocating withdrawal).³

In a Gallup poll released January 25, 1988, it was ascertained that the recent Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement had the backing of 74% of Canadians.⁴ Canada had been encouraging such a treaty for quite some time, and its signing was a vindication of NATO's policy of combining deterrence and dialogue, a policy which Canada firmly supports.

¹ Based on 1,040 personal, in-home interviews with adults, 18 years and over, conducted between August 5-8, 1987. Accurate within a four percentage point margin, 19 in 20 times.

² Based upon 1,500 interviews between September 12-18, 1987. Accurate within a 2.6 percentage point margin, 95 times out of 100.

³ Environics Autumn 1987 Focus Canada Report. Based upon 2,014 interviews between October 1-18, 1987.

⁴ Based on 1,033 personal, in-home interviews with adults, 18 years and over, conducted between January 6-9, 1988. Accurate within a four percentage point margin, 19 in 20 times.

On a more general level, in April 1987, the Department of External Affairs commissioned the Longwoods Research Group Ltd. to undertake a national survey on a variety of topical foreign policy issues. Respondents were asked to describe in their own words what one issue facing the world today was of greatest personal concern to them. While no one issue was mentioned by a majority of Canadians, issues broadly related to war and peace were the most widely cited, being mentioned by 46% of Canadians. This included concerns related to the arms race (16%), nuclear war (12%), wars in general (9%) and world peace (9%). It should be noted that this concern with war and peace intensified from 36% of respondents in 1985.⁵

⁵ Conducted from April 4-27, 1987 in a national random sample of 1,011 qualified respondents during in-home, personal interviews. Considered accurate within 3.1 percentage points, 95 out of 100 times.

The poll also identified 11 specific issues for which it wanted measurements of Canadians' overall attitudes, with a view to determining opinion on what Canadian policy priorities should be. Of all issues, international peace was rated first, with 54% of Canadians according it "a great deal of concern." Arms control ranked fourth at 44%.

These findings appear to be consistent with the priority which the current Government attaches to arms control and disarmament. Indeed, on October 31, 1985, Prime Minister Mulroney stated to the Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs that: "Canada would work relentlessly to reduce tensions, to alleviate conflict, and to create the conditions for a general and lasting peace. The exercise of political will is nowhere more important than on this issue, on whose outcome the lives of our children and of humanity depend." □

Bilateral Arms Control and Disarmament Consultations Since 1987

In accordance with the arms control and disarmament objectives of the Canadian Government as outlined in Prime Minister Mulroney's address to the Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs on October 31, 1985, Canada conducts annual and ad hoc consultations with a variety of nations at the senior officials level. The following is a list of recent consultations:

DATE	COUNTRY	LOCATION
January 15-16, 1987	France	Ottawa
February 9, 1987	German Democratic Republic	East Berlin
March 5-6, 1987	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Ottawa
August 31 – September 1, 1987	People's Republic of China	Ottawa
September 17-18, 1987	Australia	Ottawa
October 20, 1987	Czechoslovakia	Ottawa
January 11, 1988	Japan	Ottawa
March 17-18, 1988	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Moscow
March 21-22, 1988	United Kingdom	London
March 23, 1988	Federal Republic of Germany	Bonn
April 11, 1988	Spain	Madrid
April 13, 1988	Portugal	Lisbon
April 18, 1988	New Zealand	Ottawa

International Meeting of Physicians in Montreal

During the recent 8th Annual Congress of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) in Montreal, Mr. Jean-Guy Hudon, Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, welcomed Congress delegates on behalf of the Canadian Government. Excerpts of his address follow:

"I am honoured to be present here this morning among such a distinguished gathering of individuals from many countries, and it is with pleasure that I welcome you to Montreal on behalf of the Prime Minister and the Government of Canada. I also wish to take this opportunity to commend the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) and the Canadian organizers in particular for their enormous effort and dedication in staging this 8th Annual World Congress — 'Healing our Planet: A Global Prescription.'

Since your last meeting in Moscow, in May 1987, there have been significant developments in the arms control and disarmament field. Clearly, the most important of these has been the Soviet-American Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty to eliminate intermediate-range nuclear missiles. In addition, we have seen substantial progress at the Conference on Disarmament in the negotiations for a Chemical Weapons Treaty. Preparations have also begun in Vienna to create a new forum to negotiate conventional force reductions in Europe. The Stockholm confidence-building agreement has enabled NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to conduct 16 unprecedented on-site inspections of each other's military exercises. There has also been an improvement in the risk reduction operation of the USA and the Soviet Union, which aims at reducing the possibility of accidental nuclear war. And there is also a strong likelihood of a strategic arms agreement in the next year.

Canada believes that in order to usefully contribute to arms control discussions, we need an active and well-informed public, and we have taken a variety of steps to achieve these ends. The Government's participation in this forum, through our Permanent Representative to the United Nations, our



*The Honourable Jean-Guy Hudon,
Parliamentary Secretary to the Secretary
of State for External Affairs.*

Ambassador for Disarmament, and other officials of the Department of External Affairs and members of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security as well as our financial contributions is evidence of both our commitment and our appreciation for the work of the IPPNW, and especially its Canadian branch, in pursuit of this goal....

Canada is committed to playing an active role in the arms control and disarmament process. Firstly, recognizing and respecting the bilateral nature of some of the key negotiations, Canada regularly communicates its views and support to both the USSR and the USA. It is, however, Canada's view that we are entering a period in which multi-lateral arms control agreements will be increasingly significant and necessary. Canada is an active member of all the significant multilateral arms control and disarmament bodies, including the Conference on Disarmament, the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks, and the new mandate negotiations on conventional stability in Europe and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Canada is especially committed to the role of the UN in international peace and security. We are the fourth largest contributor to that organization and are actively involved in seeking to strengthen its role, including the contribution it can make in the arms control and security process....

Canada has stated six main principles in arms control and disarmament:

- i) radical reductions in nuclear arms;
- ii) the realization of a negotiated and verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty, which would halt all nuclear testing by all countries in all environments for all time;
- iii) the maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation treaty, which is critical to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries and to ensuring the safe transfer of technology and materials for the development of nuclear power systems;
- iv) the negotiation of a chemical weapons ban;
- v) the prevention of an arms build-up in outer space and,
- vi) increased confidence-building measures, agreements that promote better communications between nations and improve the East-West negotiating atmosphere.

In its pursuit of arms control, Canada has made a unique contribution in the field of verification, which is the process of ensuring that an arms control agreement is not being violated. In 1983, we launched a verification research program which concentrates among other things on techniques for seismic monitoring, monitoring chemical weapons use, and studying the feasibility of space-based satellite sensing. It should be noted, however, that even the most stringent verification *régime* cannot unequivocally ensure that signatories to an agreement are complying with the letter and spirit of the accord. Successful arms control requires a demonstrated commitment by governments to honour such agreements, if the atmosphere of confidence necessary for further arms control is to be achieved. Thus, we make a special point of encouraging full compliance with existing treaties.

Events of the last year have brought us progress and increased hope. Canada continues to believe that arms control is essential to the search for a more peaceful and secure world. We are confident that with the participation of citizens and groups like the IPPNW we will succeed in building this more secure and peaceful world." □

Ambassador Marchand Addresses CD on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum" of the international community. Constituted in its present form in 1978, it meets in Geneva and has a unique relationship with the United Nations. It is not a subsidiary body of the General Assembly and defines its own rules of procedure and develops its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations made by the General Assembly.

In accordance with the agreement reached at the 1978 Special Session on Disarmament, the Conference works on the basis of consensus. It reports to the General Assembly annually or more often, as may be appropriate. The Secretary-General of the Conference is appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultation with the Conference, and also acts as his personal representative. The budget of the Conference is included in that of the United Nations, and the Conference holds its meetings on United Nations premises and is serviced by United Nations personnel. The work of the Conference is conducted in plenary meetings or under any arrangement agreed upon by its members.

Non-members may submit written proposals or working documents and may, upon invitation, participate in the discussions on substantive items on the agenda. The chairmanship rotates among all members on a monthly basis. The Conference meets annually in Geneva for approximately six months, usually when the Assembly is not in session.

(The above description of the CD was amended from *The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook*. Volume 12: 1987, p. 10).

The following are excerpts of the text of a July 26, 1988 speech to

the Conference on Disarmament by Ambassador de Montigny Marchand.

"In my statement today, I will address Item 5 on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space....

Speaking for the first time in plenary since the Third Special Session on Disarmament, I will not hide my disappointment that the session ended without agreement on a substantive final document. However, like many of you who spoke before me on this subject, rather than pin blame for this situation on one participant or the other, I believe we must, in this forum, build on the common ground which emerged during the deliberations at that session and continue the dialogue in those areas where divergences continue to exist.

The emerging consensus at the Third Special Session on Disarmament confirmed the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space and participants urged the CD to intensify its efforts in this area. The draft document also referred to the significant contribution that a successful outcome to the ongoing negotiations between the USSR and the USA would make to the common objective of preventing such an arms race. The Government of Canada concurs fully with this analysis which recognizes the significance of the task before us and gives proper weight to the importance of the bilateral dimension.

Notwithstanding this latter point, it is clear that the multilateral dimension of arms control in outer space is gaining increasing importance and will continue to do so. This is as it should be, a point that is implicitly recognized in the draft document of the Special Session where it calls upon all states to contribute actively to the objective of the peaceful use of outer space, given 1) the potential for an arms race in outer space; 2) the increase in the number of countries with significant interests and capabilities

in space; and 3) the continuing growth in space activities. The Canadian Government believes that it is appropriate that this dimension should take on and, indeed, that it must take on increasing significance.

Having made this very general point, it is clear that if the multilateral dimension is to take on greater importance, the CD will have to carve out a more substantive role in preventing the development of an arms race in outer space. Our efforts to assume such a role must start from four important considerations:

- 1) we must take very great care to enhance stability and not detract from it;
- 2) our negotiations must complement, in the strictest sense of the word, the negotiations between the two major space powers;
- 3) we must recognize that a very considerable measure of prohibition and protection already exists in outer space and base our efforts on that foundation; and,
- 4) we must not confuse or lose sight of the very useful and practical division of labour that we have established between the CD and UNCOPUOS (United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space).

Establishing our starting point is relatively easy. What comes next is a lot harder. Prevention of an arms race in outer space clearly involves a significant effort in both dealing with space weapons and defining legitimate space activities. Everyone here recognizes the bewildering complexity of the problems regarding both the emplacement of weapons in space and the deployment on earth of weapons capable of attacking objects in space. We are also aware of the difficulty of defining the kinds of military activities that might or might not be legitimately conducted in space.

The fact that the task is difficult and complex does not dictate that we eschew it. It does suggest, however, that we should perhaps focus more narrowly on measures that could provide a starting point in the complicated task of coming to grips with the establishment of an appropriate international regime.

One response to such an approach is to assert that the problem requires a comprehensive solution and not piecemeal or partial treatment. While we would agree that the viability of incremental measures would depend on their compatibility with existing and future ones, any measures must also be susceptible to effective verification of compliance with legal obligations undertaken.

We also believe, as the Australian delegation noted last year, that the degree of success in meeting these ultimate objectives will be strongly dependent on the degree of transparency that states give to their activities. Indeed we must face the fact that unless we can make significant steps in the direction of greater transparency, our chances of negotiating an effective regime for the prevention of an arms race in outer space would not be such as to inspire much confidence.

One obvious area for practical progress in increasing transparency would be multilateral exchanges of data on space objects with military functions. There is clearly potential for progress as far as such objects based in space are concerned through taking advantage of the registration convention. In particular, Article IV(E) thereof stipulates that each state shall furnish to the Secretary-General information on the general function of a space article carried on its registry.

At the outset, it should be noted that the registration convention is not exclusively or even primarily an arms control or disarmament treaty. It should further be noted that the outer space treaty — although also negotiated in the committee on the peaceful uses of outer space — is in part incontestably an arms control measure. Clearly, it is the terms

of an agreement and not its negotiating provenance, which should determine its purpose and functions.

As noted, Article IV of the 1975 convention requires, *inter alia*, that each state furnish information concerning the general function of the space object to be launched. In the past, descriptions furnished to the UN Secretary-General under this heading have tended to be extremely vague. In fact, as both the UK and Canada have pointed out in working papers to the Conference in 1985, not one of the launchings registered has ever been described as having a military function despite the fact that, at a conservative estimate, well over half of all space launches are primarily for military purposes. While we accept the fact that the extent and timeliness of information given concerning military space activities may, by necessity, be limited by considerations of national security (although even this point might deserve some examination), we do not believe that this should extend to a refusal to describe space objects as having military functions. Here again, it is a question of using elements of the existing legal regime in outer space to instil further confidence and effectively promote greater transparency.

What we are suggesting, therefore, is that states party to the registration convention examine the possibility of taking their reporting responsibilities much more seriously and go beyond the requirement to disclose the 'general function of the space objects' to provide more timely and specific information concerning the function of a satellite, including whether the satellite is fulfilling a civilian or military mission or both. What we are in fact suggesting is the strengthening, for arms control purposes, of state practice under the convention.

Assuming that states party to the convention could reach an understanding that in the future they will, systematically, at time of registration, provide information on the military or civilian nature of a space object, then space powers that are not party to the convention could submit the same information

under General Assembly Resolution 1721(XVI) of 1961 which called on all states to provide information on their space objects.

It is perhaps appropriate at this point to appeal to members of the Conference who has launched space objects and are not party to the convention or who are party to the convention but either do not register their space objects or delay several years before doing so, to, as appropriate, either become party to the convention or better observe the spirit of its provisions.

Clearly, the proposal set out above would represent a very small step toward more transparency and openness in outer space. How it could or would be effected would also be a matter for study. Here, perhaps, there is a possibility of taking up a point made by the delegation of the FRG in 1987, with regards to the possibility of joining efforts with other forums having at their disposal the necessary legal expertise.

Strengthening of state practice under the registration convention might even pave the way for eventual establishment of a code of conduct for outer space as advocated by France, the UK and the FRG in the CD in 1985. It could also go some way toward advancing suggestions concerning the legal immunity of satellites. In this connection, we have noted with great interest that Foreign Minister Dumas of France, at the Third Special Session devoted to disarmament, urged that the CD give close examination, *inter alia*, to strengthening the system of notification under the 1975 registration convention and framing a code of good conduct for outer space.

The important point, we believe, is that if this Conference continues to work in the hope that we can, in one fell swoop, put in place a comprehensive agreement for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, then we will never accomplish our work. However, we must start somewhere. The elaboration of modest confidence-building measures would surely constitute a useful beginning...." ▣

Success at May Meeting of United Nations Disarmament Commission

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) met in New York from May 2 to May 20, 1988. This year's session had extra significance in that it immediately preceded the Third Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations General Assembly (UNSSOD III). There were, consequently, added expectations that the UNDC could complete consideration of several items and report the result of its work to UNSSOD III.

Under the effective chairmanship of Ambassador Davidson Hepburn of the Bahamas, the UNDC was able to get down to substantive business very quickly. Among its most notable accomplishments, the Commission agreed upon a set of "Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level." This significant and detailed document sets out an agreed set of guidelines on principles, objectives, characteristics, implementation and development for confidence-building measures. Canada has strongly supported the UNDC's efforts to develop these guidelines, which first began with an initiative by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1982.

One of the most significant successes of UNDC during its 1988 Session was in the area of arms control verification. Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche, for a second year, chaired a working group on the subject which reached consensus on a set of 16 principles relating to verification. This comes as a culmination of several years' effort by Canada which began with the initiation of a General Assembly resolution in 1985. This resolution and those of the two subsequent years, also initiated by Canada, were adopted by consensus.

The overall objective of Canadian efforts on verification at the UNDC was to enhance international understanding of the verification issues, with a view to improving opportunities for negotiating meaningful and adequately verifiable arms control and disarmament (ACD)

agreements, particularly multilateral ones.

At UNDC 87, Canada, as chairman, submitted a detailed and comprehensive paper which outlined draft conclusions for the working group. Most delegations were complimentary of the quality of this submission text. Divergent views were reconciled through careful and patient negotiation, and a shorter report was adopted by consensus. This report incorporated an illustrative, non-exhaustive list of ten verification principles that elaborate upon or add to those found in the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament in 1978.

The 1988 session of the UNDC built upon the success of the previous year's session, with the adoption of a report on May 18 that concluded the UNDC's consideration of verification. This report added six new verification principles to those agreed upon in 1987.

The 1988 report also summarizes the UNDC's discussions on techniques of verification and on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. While there was no consensus for making firm recommendations regarding these latter two topics, the UNDC's deliberations can still be regarded as useful in that the exchange of views on these points resulted in a much better understanding of the issues involved.

The substance of the UNDC's report on verification is particularly noteworthy. As Ambassador Roche said in his concluding remarks at the UNDC: "The sixteen principles that have now been adopted by consensus, as outlined in Part 1 of the report, represent a new consensus by the international community with respect to this very important subject and, moreover, lay a new foundation for all future activities by the United Nations in this area."

The successful conclusion of the UNDC's consideration of verification underlines the appropriateness of Canada's evolutionary approach to verification. Canada's previous efforts in the General Assembly and other international forums, bilateral discussions with

various governments, production of practical yet innovative reports, and other activities in this field, all helped to prepare the foundation for the UNDC's success by sensitizing the international community to the importance of verification. Also crucial to the success of the Commission on this item was the spirit of co-operation and support manifested by the members of the verification working group both in 1987 and 1988. It is this spirit which underlays the new consensus of the international community on this subject.

While the UNDC has advanced consideration of the verification issue significantly, Canada still believes that important work needs to be done on this subject within the context of the United Nations. To this end, Canada and the Netherlands tabled a detailed paper at UNSSOD III which examined the role of the United Nations in verification. The paper concludes with a proposal that the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, undertake a study on the role of the United Nations in verification. In the course of discussions between Canada and other countries at UNSSOD III, a mandate for this study was refined, which received widespread approval during the late hours of the Special Session. However, because of the inability to reach agreement on other points, the Special Session was unable to arrive at a concluding document.

Any role for the United Nations must develop in a step-by-step fashion based on what is realistically feasible in today's political and financial environment. In Canada's view, a Group of Experts study on the role of the United Nations in verification, based on the mandate worked out at UNSSOD III, would be the next logical step for advancing the consideration of verification within the United Nations and the role of the United Nations in this field. This mandate would ensure that the merits and implications of all proposals in this context are considered and assessed. Canada will continue to pursue this proposal at the United Nations. ■

United Nations Convenes Meeting of Verification Experts in USSR

At the 1987 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), the Soviet Union offered to host a United Nations Meeting of Experts on Verification in Dagomys, USSR, commencing on April 12, 1988. Organized within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign (WDC) and financed from the contribution by the USSR to the WDC Trust Fund, responsibility for the form and substance of that meeting was assumed by the United Nations. Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations, as Chairman of the Dagomys meeting, invited some 35 experts from more than 20 countries to participate in the meeting to discuss the conceptual issues and the technical aspects of verification.

Regarding conceptual aspects, the participants focussed on issues such as an overview of the relationship between verification of arms control and disarmament agreements and security, principles of verification, lessons from existing arrangements, institutional aspects and the human factor, and openness, transparency and confidence-building. The technical issues included topics such as multilateral aspects of the verification of underground nuclear explosions, scientific and technological progress in verification techniques, and whether there is a growing gap between advances in weapons systems and verification capabilities. The meeting also addressed verification issues relevant for the future.

Included in the group of experts who took part in these discussions were a number of ambassadors closely related to the arms control and disarmament (ACD) negotiating process in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. The presence of Mr. Lynn M. Hansen and Mr. Oleg A. Grinevsky, respectively USA and USSR representatives to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE), added a particularly positive flavour to the proceedings since that Conference



Delegates at the April 12-15, 1988 United Nations Meeting of Experts on Verification at Dagomys, USSR.

had succeeded in producing the Stockholm Document, thought by many to be a singular achievement in the field of multilateral ACD diplomacy. The successful implementation of the verification procedures included in the Stockholm Document combined with the successful conclusion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiation in Washington on December 8, 1987 contributed significantly to the positive atmosphere of the Dagomys meeting. As Ambassador Tessa Solesby of the United Kingdom remarked, there seems to be no disagreement around the table regarding the significance of verification in the ACD negotiating process.

Canada was represented at the Dagomys meeting by two experts in the concept and technology of verification. Mr. F.R. Cleminson, Head of the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs, was invited by the Under-Secretary-General Akashi to present a paper on the principles of verification in a multilateral context. Dr. Peter Basham, a seismologist with the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, who acts as the senior Canadian representative on the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) in Geneva, participated in the technical discussions

relating to the verification of a Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban (CTB).

The Dagomys meeting permitted both the conceptual problems and the more practical technical considerations of verification inherent within the global setting to be addressed together. This gathering of a relatively small group of specialists in the verification process permitted a more intimate exploration of the role and primary responsibilities of the United Nations deriving from the UN Charter, the UNSSOD I final document, and from provisions of existing agreements to be undertaken. The results of the meeting are likely to be of interest to a broad array of generalists as well as experts in the ACD process.

The most tangible and practical result of the meeting was the collection of the presented papers. These have been reproduced in the summer 1988 edition of *Disarmament*, a periodic review by the United Nations which is intended to serve as a source of information and a forum for ideas concerning the activities of the United Nations with regard to arms limitation and disarmament issues. It can be obtained from the United Nations, Sales Section, New York, N.Y. ■

Canada Accedes to the Antarctic Treaty

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, announced on May 4, 1988 Canada's accession to the Antarctic Treaty.

The Antarctic Treaty System provides a legal regime designed to freeze all territorial claims to Antarctica, preserve the delicate Antarctic environment and its living resources, and

promote the peaceful use and development of Antarctica.

In making the announcement, Mr. Clark said that Canada, as a leading Arctic state and a major player in polar science and technology, was taking its place among countries with a strong interest in Antarctic matters. "Canada wishes to endorse a Treaty that has created the world's sole, effective non-militarized

area," he said. "Canada is acutely aware of the uniqueness of the Antarctica and will, through accession to the Treaty, be better able to work for the protection of its sensitive environment and dependent ecosystems," he continued. Canada will also initiate the steps necessary to accede to the conventions associated with the Treaty.

Canada has supported the Antarctic Treaty System in the past and has spoken out in its favour in the United Nations. ■

Appointments to CIIPS

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, has recently announced the appointment of a new Executive Director and four new Board members of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS).

On August 11, 1988, Mr. Clark announced the appointment of Mr. Bernard Wood as Executive Director and Member of the Board of Directors of CIIPS. The appointment is for a five-year term, commencing February 1, 1989. Mr. Wood is the founding and current Director and Chief Executive Officer of the North-South Institute in Ottawa, established in 1976 as a non-profit policy research organization concerned with the relationships between industrialized and developing countries. In diverse other

capacities, he has rendered valued public service both nationally and internationally, including as Personal Representative of the Prime Minister of Canada to leaders of Commonwealth States preparatory to Heads of Government meetings on Southern Africa from 1985-86.

In announcing this appointment, Mr. Clark expressed his deep appreciation to Mr. Geoffrey Pearson first and current Executive Director, for his imagination, skill and dedication in presiding over and effectively guiding the activities of the Institute in its critically important early years.

Mr. Clark observed that, "Under the capable direction of Mr. Pearson, the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security has already become a well-established and respected institution, which is making a valued contribution to the quality of discussion in Canada on international peace and security issues.... Under the direction of Mr. Wood, already widely respected for his experience with and knowledge of the complexities of the international scene, the Institute will build on its strengths and fully meet the purposes for which it was established by Parliament."

Also recently joining the 17-member Board of Directors for a three-year term were:

Dr. Edward Green, Director of the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica.

Dr. Orest Cochkanoff, Consulting Engineer and former Dean, Faculty of Engineering, Technical University of Nova Scotia, Halifax, Nova Scotia.


Vice-Admiral Harry Porter (retired) CD, marine consultant, Halifax, Nova Scotia.

Ms. Mary Simon, President, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Kuujuaq, Quebec.

The Institute was formally established on August 15, 1984 with the support of all parties, and reports annually to Parliament. The purpose of the Institute is to increase knowledge and understanding of the issues relating to international peace and security from a Canadian perspective, with particular emphasis on arms control, disarmament, defence and conflict resolution. For further information, the Institute can be contacted at 360 Albert Street, Suite 900, Ottawa, Ontario, K1R 7X7, telephone (613) 990-1593. ■



CIIPS Executive Director designate, Mr. Bernard Wood.



Mr. Geoffrey Pearson, current CIIPS Executive Director.

Canadian Participation in Australian NGO Verification Conference

In May 1988, two Australian Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) combined to host a verification conference in Sydney "Checking the Arms Race: Australia's Role in International Verification." Scientists Against Nuclear Arms (SANA) and People for Nuclear Disarmament (PNA), two of the larger and better known Australian NGOs, with financial assistance from a broad range of sponsors, designed the Conference as a means of studying the possible application of Australia's technology for verification purposes in the multilateral aspects of the international arms control and disarmament (ACD) process. More than 150 representatives from across Australia, plus a number of invited guests from the United Kingdom, New Zealand, India, Japan and Canada, undertook three days of discussion and presentations.

The Conference itself as an NGO activity was impressive both by the variety of expertise assembled and by the low-key and even-handed approach which the organizers took to the subjects at hand. The keynote address was delivered by the Australian Minister of Defence, Mr. Kim Beasley. He focussed

mainly on the Australian NGO preoccupation with the Joint Facilities issue. This refers to a number of bases operated jointly by Australia and the United States for the purpose of monitoring certain military activities of other nations. He presented a reasoned case for continuation of the present policy with a fairly convincing rationale of the importance of these facilities to reinforce international security and ACD verification. He particularly underscored the immediate relevancy of this type of facility in the verification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) (and presumably follow-on) treaties.

Four senior representatives from the Australian Department of Defence participated actively in the Conference throughout, as well as one representative each from the ministries of foreign affairs of Australia and New Zealand. They succeeded collectively in highlighting common ground in a number of other ACD issue areas, specifically relating to chemical weapons negotiations which are reaching a final stage in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.

At the invitation of the Conference coordinators, Mr. F.R. Cleminson, Head of the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs, presented a paper focussing on the European and Canadian perception of the role of verification in international arms control and disarmament negotiations. In addition to the Canadian paper prepared for the Conference and reproduced in the main Conference document, Mr. Cleminson provided an audio-visual presentation on the PAXSAT concept, which focusses on the application of space-based remote sensing for verification purposes. A number of NGO participants made a point of complementing Canada for having undertaken this innovative type of research and for having made it readily available.

If any other particular characteristic of the Conference was notable, it was the relative youth of many of the major NGO presenters and the serious research which they had undertaken in developing their presentations. Overall, the Conference illustrated the utility of a multi-disciplinary approach to ACD issues. ▣

Selected Recent Department of External Affairs Publications

General

1. News Release No. 094

"Appointment to the Board of Directors of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security." April 29, 1988.

2. News Release No. 096

"Canada Accedes to the Antarctic Treaty." May 4, 1988.

3. Press Release No. 28

"Statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada to the Third United Nations Special Session Devoted to Disarmament." New York, June 13, 1988.

4. News Release No. 169

"Appointments to the Board of Directors of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security." August 5, 1988.

5. News Release No. 171 (Government of Canada)

"Canadian Participation in the Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)." August 9, 1988.

6. News Release No. 172

"Appointment of Executive Director of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security." August 11, 1988.

Consultative Group

7. Report on the Meeting of October 1-3, 1987, "Peace and Security in the Arctic: Decisions for Canada." Prepared by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, November 12, 1987.

8. Report on the Meeting of April 14-16, 1988, "The Third UN Special Session on Disarmament." Prepared by the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, May 3, 1988.


9. Report of Cross-Canada Tour, December 1-16, 1987, "Beyond the Summit: The Future of Disarmament."

**Arms Control Verification
Studies Series**

10. "A Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification." by F.R. Cleminson and E. Gilman. January 1986.
11. "The Role of Astronomical Instruments in Arms Control Verification." by Chris A. Ruthowski. September 1986.
12. "The Sinai Experience: Lessons in Multimethod Arms Control Verification and Risk Management." by Brian S. Mandell. 1987.

**Arms Control and Disarmament
Studies Series**

13. "Confidence- (and Security-) Building Measures in the Arms Control



Recent Publications of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs.

Process: A Canadian Perspective." by James MacIntosh. August 1985.

Verification Brochures

14. "Seismic Verification." 1986.
15. "The PAXSAT Concept: The Application of Space-Based Remote Sensing for Arms Control Verification." 1987.
16. "Verification Research: Canada's Verification Research Program." 1987.

Others

17. "Verification in All Its Aspects: A Comprehensive Study on Arms Control and Disarmament Verification Pursuant to UNGA Resolution 40/152(o)." April 1986.

All the above publications are available free of charge from the Editor.

Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund to Date — Fiscal Year 1988-89

CONTRIBUTIONS

1. Peace Centre Project, St. John's — library material	\$3,500
2. University of Manitoba — Political Studies Students' Conference	\$4,500
3. Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto — Conference	\$5,000
4. Peace Education Centre, Vancouver — Youth Forum	\$5,000
5. Pacijou — presentation at International Conference	\$3,200
6. Dr. Matthew Speier — attend International Teachers for Peace Congress in Bonn	\$1,300
7. Dr. Peggy Falkenheim — attend Conference on Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region	\$2,000
8. Voice of Women — attend UNSSOD III	\$1,000
9. Group of 78 — participation at UNSSOD III preparatory committee	\$1,200
10. J.A. Boutilier — attendance at ISIS Conference, Malaysia	\$1,800
11. Canadian Federation of University Women — Women, Leadership and Sustainable Development Conference	\$2,000
12. Science for Peace — Peace Studies Lecture Series	\$2,500
13. Project Ploughshares, Calgary — Outreach Program	\$1,000
14. United Nations Association in Canada — Disarmament Week Project	\$10,000
TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS	\$44,000

GRANTS

1. Peacefund Canada — UNSSOD III	\$2,000
2. North American Model United Nations — Toronto	\$1,500
3. Albert Legault — translation	\$7,000
4. Beyond War — Western Canada speaking tour of Alexander Nikitin and Craig Barnes	\$5,680
5. NGO Committee on Disarmament, Inc. — publication of five issues for UNSSOD III	\$3,000
6. Brock University — Sanity, Science and Global Responsibility Conference	\$5,400
7. Radio Centre Ville St-Louis Inc. — programs on peace and disarmament	\$4,600
8. Kornel Buczek — seismic verification	\$4,000
TOTAL OF GRANTS	\$33,180
TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND GRANTS	\$77,180

The Disarmament Bulletin

A review of national and international disarmament and arms control activities

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Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons



The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, speaking at the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons.

For five days in January, the media focussed public attention on the first major international event of the year. More than an ordinary "event," it was about a broken treaty, the repugnance of chemical weapons, deep-rooted fears and, not least, hope for the future. Add varying quantities of East-West and North-South tension, regional antagonisms and distrust, and we had the ingredients for the Paris Conference. It is not surprising that at the working level there was some initial apprehension that greeted President Reagan's September proposal for an international conference to reaffirm the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits the use in war of chemical weapons, particularly since early reactions suggested the agenda might be unrealistically broadened. However, there was also a strong, shared

belief that something had to be done — and soon — to ensure that states in future would not think they could resort with impunity to the use of chemical weapons.

A little more than three months, including the Christmas/New Year holiday period, was all the time available to prepare for the Conference, to take whatever action one could bilaterally and in group consultations to ensure that the Conference would avoid potential pitfalls and not end in disarray. The stakes were high indeed: failure of the Paris Conference would likely threaten the ongoing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and, contrary to the original aim, add further fuel to the notion that chemical weapons were somehow a useful, perhaps even necessary, addition to national arsenals.

To understand what was accomplished at the five-day Paris Conference, it is necessary to understand what was not intended and what fell outside its reach. It is also important to be aware of the peculiar dynamics of multilateral diplomacy which, contrary to what some might have us believe, is not necessarily an exercise in finding the lowest common denominator.

The Paris Conference, although stemming in many respects from the confirmed use of chemical weapons by Iraq in the Gulf War, was not intended to be an international tribunal dwelling on those past actions, however repulsive in themselves. Furthermore, the Conference could not address the structure and process of the United Nations, which many felt should have done more after the first confirmed use of these horrible weapons. Clearly, in only five days it could not seek to strengthen

through amendment the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits the use in war of chemical weapons; as well there were many very good reasons why attention and effort should not be diverted from the negotiations in Geneva of a total abolition of chemical weapons to attempts to improve upon an instrument which only addresses a part of the problem. So then, what could be "done?"

International attention could be focussed on chemical weapons in a way that had not been done since their use in the First World War and the preparations to defend against their possible use in the Second. More than that, by suggesting that participation at the Conference be at the Foreign Minister level, the organizers could be certain that the highest levels of governments and their supporting staffs would be seized with the horrors of the use of chemical weapons, with the dangers posed by their existence and proliferation, and with the important issues still waiting to be negotiated to a conclusion in the Conference on Disarmament on a convention to abolish chemical weapons. As a political event, the Paris Conference was a very substantial success in that many more people are now informed about at least some aspects of the above-mentioned issues. Surely, many would say it must have "done" more than that, and so it did, although such are not the things to capture headlines.

The Conference concluded with a short but significant Final Declaration — a political statement — to which all 149 participating states agreed. Reaching such a consensus is an achievement in itself. To this, however, must be added the fact that the two main objectives of the Conference were achieved:

— the participating states (most of which were parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, but some of which were not) solemnly affirmed their commitments not to use chemical weapons and condemned such use, and, in this regard, they recognized the importance and continuing validity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol; and

— they stressed the necessity and urgency of concluding, at an early date, a Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons, and on their destruction, and called upon all states to become a party to it as soon as it is concluded.

In addition to these, there were two other substantive points in the Final Declaration:

— while awaiting the conclusion and entry into force of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, it was deemed necessary for each state to exercise restraint and to act responsibly in accordance with the purpose of the Final Declaration; and

— the participating states confirmed their full support for the United Nations as a framework and instrument for exercising vigilance with respect to the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, mentioning, in particular, their full support for the Secretary-General in carrying out investigations in the event of alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol.

Such a call for restraint and responsible action could be seen to be addressed to states contemplating the acquisition or production of chemical weapons, while not ignoring that the desired end-result to negotiations in Geneva would also be the destruction of existing stockpiles. It also encompasses actions taken by countries such as Canada to ensure that their industry not contribute to any use of chemical weapons. The expression of support for the United Nations and its Secretary-General was more than a simple *pro forma* nod in that direction and was seen by many as intended to provide advance notice of support for stronger timely action.

Often at such gatherings, as important as what is agreed is what is avoided, and this was certainly the case at the Paris Conference. Some participants would have liked to see the agenda broadened to include, for example, the discussion of nuclear weapons in relation to chemical weapons, particular regional concerns, and a condemnation of particular states. These were all subjects on which such a short conference could only find disagreement and

irresolvable dissension. Although many national speeches addressed such matters in the general debate, moderation prevailed in the Committee of the Whole which was tasked with negotiating a consensus Final Declaration. There have been recent examples of international conferences which ended inconclusively due to the inability to maintain focus, and it is to the credit of all concerned that such an outcome was avoided at this Conference. As it is hoped the above discussion demonstrates, the Final Declaration is definitely not the lowest common denominator upon which some might have insisted.

The Final Declaration will undoubtedly become a new and forceful reference point against which progress in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament will be measured. Looking forward to the conclusion of the negotiations and the opening for signature of a comprehensive prohibition on chemical weapons, the consensus Final Declaration will be a powerful argument in promoting the early accession to and the globality of the convention. Finally, in the tragic event of any future use of chemical weapons, this consensus Final Declaration will be supportive of decisive action by the international community.

These are all important political achievements, and all participating states can derive considerable satisfaction from having contributed in some way to the successful outcome. Certainly, foremost among these would be the French Government and its officials who prepared the way through extensive — some might say exhaustive — consultations beforehand. Nevertheless, there is always the element of the unknown at such gatherings, and these were managed with tremendous skill. The president of the Conference (Mr. Roland Dumas of France) and the president of the Committee of the Whole (Mr. Kalevi Sorsa of Finland) were ably supported in their efforts by competent French officials and support staff. The UNESCO staff too provided sterling support throughout the Conference. The result is that 1989 has gotten off to a good start in the field of multilateral diplomacy, with promising indications in other areas as well. ■

Banning Chemical Weapons for All Times

The following are excerpts from the speech given by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, at the Paris Conference on January 8, 1989.

"In April 1915, Canadian soldiers in Flanders were among the first to suffer the terror, pain and death inflicted by chemical weapons. Of those who recovered from exposure to poison gas, many suffered on for their remaining years. At least three generations of Canadians—parents, the victims themselves, and their children—became acutely aware of the cruel and horrible effects of the use of such weapons. It is a tragic part of Canada's national memory.

No wonder nations in the post-war years sought a treaty which would prevent any further use of such terrible weapons in warfare. The 1925 Geneva Protocol is not a perfect document. It represents a political and legal commitment. It is also a moral guideline. The problem with the Protocol is that obligations have not been fulfilled. The Protocol has been violated on more than one occasion: even more distressing is that these violations were not unanimously denounced throughout the world.

In that sense, the world has slipped back from the high purpose of this Protocol. This meeting is designed to reaffirm that purpose and to help create a confidence and a resolve which our negotiators at Geneva can translate into practical progress on a Convention to ban the production and use of chemical weapons. That is a great challenge by itself, and Canada hopes that, at this Conference, we can concentrate our efforts on the business at hand—the issue of chemical weapons.

This Conference is testimony to the international judgment that chemical warfare is repugnant and it must be abolished. The obligations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol must be reaffirmed and upheld. All violations must be condemned. We commend President Reagan for having proposed a conference of this kind and President Mitterrand for his initiative in convening it so quickly.

Canada's goal is to have all nations ban all chemical weapons—to get rid of them everywhere and for ever. We seek a comprehensive ban that prohibits not only the use but the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. That will not happen overnight. It will require a reliable means of verification, which will let us test each other's word and assess each other's practice. Great progress has been made in the negotiation of a global, comprehensive and verifiable ban. That work must be pursued urgently in the Conference on Disarmament and in bilateral discussions. But this extraordinary meeting can take concrete steps toward that goal.

Specifically, we can condemn the use of chemical weapons, and commit ourselves not to use them.

We can reaffirm the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and call on other States to adhere to it.

We can strengthen the capacity of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to investigate allegations of chemical weapons use.

As a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, Canada has accepted fully its obligations on chemical weapons use. Our policy is clear:

- Canada does not intend at any time to initiate the use of chemical weapons; and
- Canada does not intend to develop, produce, acquire or stockpile such weapons, unless these weapons are used against the military forces or the civil population of Canada or its allies.

What does this mean?

- First, it means that Canada is applying its obligations under the Protocol to parties and non-parties alike.
- Second, we have adopted a firm policy of non-production to help achieve a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.
- Third, Canada has already advised other nations of the destruction of the bulk, useable chemical warfare agents which it had stockpiled during the Second World War.

The 1925 Geneva Protocol also prohibits the use of biological methods of warfare. The Protocol was supplemented by the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons and requires their destruction. Canada moved beyond its obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol well before the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In 1970 Canada declared that it never has had—and does not possess now—any biological or toxin weapons and does not intend to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or use such weapons at any time in the future. That remains Canada's policy and practice today.

Only two countries—the United States and the Soviet Union—have admitted that they produce and possess chemical weapons. Other countries which possess chemical weapons should adopt that spirit of openness.

Treaties are not only pieces of paper which, once signed, simply become historical reference points. They require constant attention and care. In this spirit, Canada's Verification Research Programme has sought to develop ways to investigate allegations of the use of chemical weapons. We have made the results of our work available to other nations. In 1987 Canada, along with Norway, proposed an annex to the future Convention on procedures for verification of allegations of use of chemical weapons. As well, we have fully supported the measure taken by the United Nations Secretary-General to investigate past allegations.

The test of any arms control agreement is how well it is respected. The purpose is to increase everyone's security, and that will happen only if we all have confidence that others will honour the rules we honour. There is agreement here on the urgent need for a ban that works. There has been real progress at Geneva in negotiating a Convention. Now it is time to resolve the important outstanding issues.

Verification of a chemical weapons ban will be complex, expensive and

intrusive. The price of a treaty, in human endeavour, in self-limitations on sovereignty and in resources will be substantial. But experience shows that the cost of failing will be far greater.

In the meantime, there is a need for national self-restraint. It is of great concern to my Government that the spread of chemical weapons has continued and that they have again been used. We considered it a necessary and logical consequence of our policy on chemical weapons to ensure that Canadian industry not contribute, even inadvertently, to any use of chemical weapons. We hope others will do the same.

There is no doubt that there is a collective international desire for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. This is demonstrated each year at the United Nations General Assembly through a consensus resolution which Canada and Poland, among others, sponsor. This issue concerns not only 40 States negotiating a chemical weapons convention in the Conference on Disarmament, but also the world at large.

The Conference on Disarmament certainly derives strength from such a consensus, as it seeks to conclude a treaty of great complexity and unparalleled scope. Clearly, the speed with which today's Conference has been convened and the international response to it are cause for optimism about the future.

Mr. President, the elimination of chemical weapons from the face of the earth is not merely a pragmatic necessity. More than a common sense assessment of our security interests is involved. The issue touches on our sense of ourselves as human beings. We know that, individually and collectively, we are susceptible to insecurities, fears and animosities. This is a reality. Surely, it is the responsibility of governments to seek to limit our capability to inflict abhorrent cruelties and punishments on each other. Chemical weapons use, inevitably involving civilian as well as military victims, only provokes revulsion. Chemical weapons must be banned. We owe our citizens no less. Let us get on with the task." □

Beatty Acts on Barton Report

The Honourable Perrin Beatty, Minister of National Defence, announced January 25, 1989 that he has accepted all 16 recommendations made by William H. Barton in a comprehensive review of research, development and training in chemical and biological (CB) self-defence within the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Forces.

Beatty also announced that he will be inviting representatives of the Soviet Union to Canada to tour our chemical research facility.

The aim of the Barton report, undertaken in July 1988, was to ensure that the Canadian Government's policy of maintaining only a self-defence capability with regard to CB agents is fully respected and that all CB self-defence activities in Canada are conducted in a professional manner, consistent with environmental and health regulations, and posing no threat whatsoever to public health and safety.

The Barton report concluded that all research, development and training activities in CB defence undertaken by DND are for purposes of self-defence, and that this is the only prudent option open consistent with the international obligations undertaken by the government.

The review gives the CB self-defence programme a clean bill of health, but also lists 16 recommendations to improve the management, control and public understanding of the CB self-defence program.

"I have directed that all these recommendations, without exception, be implemented without delay," Mr. Beatty said. "Indeed, most of them have already been acted upon."

Eight recommendations regarding Defence Research Establishment Suffield, including safety procedures and physical security arrangements, are cur-

rently being implemented and most will be in place by spring. Mr. Beatty has announced this will mean all outdoor testing at Suffield will be subject to the provisions of the new Canadian Environmental Protection Act, and DND will continue to comply with the Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process. Full environmental audits will be carried out this summer at the Defence Research Establishments in Suffield and Ottawa.

As well, Mr. Beatty has directed that a large-scale containment facility be constructed at Suffield to further reduce the requirement for outdoor tests using chemical agents.

The Barton report notes that Suffield has, for many years, been a storage site for old chemical agents and that about 18 tons of chemicals are awaiting destruction. A disposal operation which began after World War II has been given new impetus and should take about three years to complete.

Mr. Beatty announced that in the interest of an open disarmament dialogue he will be inviting officials of the Government of the Soviet Union to visit Suffield. The purpose of the visit would be to allow them to view the facilities, observe the chemical agent destruction process Canada has been using and share information on related technical issues.

Canada long ago renounced the possession of chemical weapons and is fully and actively committed to the goal of a global ban on chemical weapons.

"At the Battle of Ypres in 1915, Canadian soldiers were among the first in the world to suffer and die from the use of poison gas in war," said Mr. Beatty. "As a country with forces committed to collective defence as well as international peacekeeping operations, we must ensure that our soldiers and peacekeepers can operate safely and effectively anywhere in the world. We owe them no less." □

University of Calgary Workshop on Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention

One of the key areas of discussion at the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament concerning a comprehensive chemical weapons treaty is how to verify effectively that parties live up to their obligations under an agreement. As was evident at the special Conference on chemical weapons, held in Paris January 7-11, 1989, recent events have heightened concerns about the proliferation of chemical weapons among states which previously did not possess them as well as about the use of these weapons.

Canada has long supported efforts to ban chemical weapons. We have worked hard in Geneva to contribute constructively to the present negotiations that have as their objective a treaty to completely eliminate these weapons.

In support of our delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, a major focus of Canadian research activities under the auspices of the Verification Research Programme is verification of a chemical weapons ban. Recently, the Strategic Studies Programme of the University of Calgary, with the sponsorship of the Verification Research Programme, hosted a workshop in Banff, Alberta on one approach to this complex question. This workshop drew together a small number of experts from the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, Holland and Sweden as well as from Canada.

The University of Calgary meeting sought to identify lessons for verifying a chemical weapons ban that might be learned from the experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA safeguards have been in operation for more than 20 years and represent one of the few working examples of an operating multilateral verification system. While IAEA safeguards apply to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it has been widely believed that the techniques, management and institutional arrangements of Safeguards can provide a valuable model in the context of chemical weapons verification. The pur-



Participants at University of Calgary Workshop on IAEA Safeguards as a Model for Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention, 21-24 October 1988.

pose of the workshop was to focus in detail on these lessons.

The model provided by the IAEA has been an interest of the Verification Research Programme for some time. In 1985, the Programme funded original research by Dr. James Keeley of the University of Calgary on this question. His report, which was recently published as the first issue of the *Arms Control Verification Occasional Papers*, entitled "International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Observations on Lessons for Verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention" formed a central element of the University of Calgary workshop discussions.

The meeting provided an invaluable forum for experts on chemical weapons negotiations to meet with and draw upon the experience of experts on IAEA safeguards. The discussions were wide-ranging as well as very frank. Political, organizational, administrative and technical dimensions of the subject were explored. In general, it was concluded

that the IAEA can provide significant and valuable insights with respect to chemical weapons verification. However, these lessons are, for the most part, ones of general approach not of detailed application. This finding is dictated by the significant differences that are inherent in the nuclear and chemical industries—for example, size, complexity, and so on—which make the transfer of the specifics of IAEA safeguard procedures to the chemical weapons environment very problematical. The workshop discussions, nevertheless, proved very fruitful and will undoubtedly contribute to further understanding of the complex issues surrounding chemical weapons verification, as well as lead to further research in this area. The Department of External Affairs intends to publish the proceedings of this workshop in the form of an occasional paper which will summarize its findings. These proceedings will also be shared with other countries at the Conference on Disarmament. ▣

Prime Minister Mulroney Addresses General Assembly

The following are excerpts from the address by the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, to the 43rd United Nations General Assembly.

"I believe we are on the brink of a new age where the differences that have divided us are becoming less important than the dangers we must face together. It is a new age where concrete acts which make our world more secure must—and can—be matched by tangible commitments to reduce poverty in the developing world and protect our common environment. ...

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Agreement is an historic first step in arms reduction for which we owe a great debt of gratitude to the courage and leadership of President Reagan of the United States and of General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. They have built a foundation, and we can now expand upon it.

We can cut strategic weapons. We can limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We can limit nuclear testing, and every step in this direction takes us closer to a comprehensive test ban. We must redouble our efforts to reach a treaty banning chemical weapons.

In this respect, I welcome President Reagan's proposal for an early meeting of the signatories of the Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We must also control conventional weapons. Let us not forget that it is in conventional wars that people are still dying today. I encourage this Assembly to provoke and provide even more achievements in the field of disarmament. ...

In Afghanistan, the attempt to impose solutions by invasion and occupation has failed and the Soviet Union is withdrawing its forces. The United Nations remains heavily involved in the search for solutions. In the Gulf, no country has been able to impose its will by force. Representatives of the United Nations, including 500 Canadians, now patrol in peace where hundreds of thousands recently died in combat.

Canada's role in these events is consistent with our tradition of more than four decades of peacekeeping, a role we have always willingly assumed. Canada has participated in every UN peacekeeping force since its foundation and we are proud that this contribution, costly and difficult though it has often been, has assisted in bringing stability to explosive regions of the world.

Today a significant portion of our armed forces are either involved in peacekeeping around the world, or training for further duty in the service of peace. The award today of the Nobel Peace Prize for Peacekeeping is a splendid tribute both to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to those courageous men and women who patrol the world's danger spots in the pursuit of a durable peace.

But not everywhere do we see the progress we would wish. The vicious cycle of repression and violence is unbroken in South Africa. We all know the cause: the massive and institutionalized violation of human rights called apartheid. Internationally, pressure is increasing and is having an impact. The entire world finds apartheid repugnant: the whole world must now join forces to bring it to an end. Canada has taken strong measures on its own to rid our civilization of this unique evil, known as apartheid.

We are under no illusions about the effectiveness of our efforts alone and so we have actively pursued objectives in cooperation with other governments, especially in the Commonwealth and la Francophonie. From the outset, we have applied all the sanctions agreed within the Commonwealth; we will continue to do so. And we will seek to broaden their application, increase their effectiveness and encourage others to join in adopting and applying them.

Consistent with our policy of moving systematically and deliberately to increase pressure on South Africa, our Government announced earlier this week specific new measures to tighten the ban on government contracts with South African companies and a further ban on

high technology, together with initiatives designed to add practical support to peaceful efforts to work against apartheid. Because of threats to major development projects in the Front Line States, we intend to provide assistance, in concert with others, to preserve these development initiatives.

The movement in favour of human dignity is now irreversible. There can be no doubt that fundamental change will come to South Africa. The only questions are when and how and at what cost in human life.

We must make sure the answers are soon, and peacefully—and that a framework is preserved that will give rise to a non-racial democratic South Africa. Only then will the children of Mandela know the gifts that freedom brings.

The problems of the Middle East have preoccupied this Assembly since the creation of the United Nations. Peaceful solutions have proved elusive, and in their absence, violence and extremism have increased. But that is an argument for redoubled effort, not for despair.

There is today growing support for a properly structured international conference based on Israel's right to exist and recognition of the rights of Palestinians. Canada believes that such a conference can provide a path toward dialogue and away from a situation that appears to promise little but further suffering. ...

Who would have predicted a year ago that today Soviet forces would be withdrawing from Afghanistan; that Vietnamese forces would begin withdrawing from Cambodia; that UN peacekeepers would be patrolling the Iran-Iraq border; that negotiations on Angola and on the Western Sahara would be starting to bear fruit; that the Secretary-General would be discussing the independence of Namibia with the South African government.

Those who have doubted both the value of multilateralism and the UN surely must be re-assessing their views today. The Secretary-General's recent report on the work of this organization is a document which should inspire the deliberations of this Assembly.

In this dawning hope for peace, the path we should take is clear. It is toward conciliation and not confrontation between East and West. It is toward cooperation and generosity, not recrimination and rigidity, in North-South relations. It is toward negotiation, not warfare, in regional disputes. It is toward implementation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 40 years ago.

We must give hope to those who today find their rights to free expression silenced by gunfire. We must provide sustenance to the flame of liberty in all regions where fundamental rights are being abused. We must reinforce the role of the Security Council in the pursuit of peacemaking and peacekeeping around the world. It can be done, with the help of everyone in this Assembly.

Mr. President, for two generations the arms race, regional disputes and the threat of nuclear annihilation have been a central preoccupation of the United Nations, and so they will remain. But I believe we are at a point in history when we must devote significantly more political energy to problems other than security, problems just as important, but until now accorded a lower priority.

I want to speak specifically about the twin challenges of severe poverty and our endangered environment. I believe we will not have true security until these problems have been successfully resolved.

These issues were high on the agendas of three international summits Canada hosted this past year — la Francophonie, the Commonwealth, and the Economic Summit. At these meetings, I found a growing conviction among national leaders that these problems can be tackled successfully, and before the end of this century. These problems command the same priority in the United Nations.

Poverty undermines security. It compromises equality. It denies hope. Today, it is estimated that at least one billion people live in absolute poverty. They are hungry. They are often sick. They are uneducated. They die young.

At Toronto, the leaders of the major industrialized countries renewed their

commitment to work toward continued growth for the benefit of both industrialized and developing countries.

We are also working toward a trading system which is more open and more beneficial to all nations. It will be strengthened bilaterally, as in the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, the largest commercial agreement in the history of two-way trade.

It can also be strengthened regionally, as in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and in Europe, as it approaches 1992. And it must be strengthened through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and multilateral talks such as the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. Progress in these talks is essential at the GATT mid-term review to be held in Montreal this December.

Increased development assistance, especially to the poorest countries, is another imperative. Canada has just completed a review of its official development assistance (ODA) policy. We have reset our bearings to improve the quality, and increase the quantity of the help we give, to recognize the special role of women in development, and to concentrate on the poorest people in the poorest countries.

That is why Canada has completely written off the ODA debts of a large number of countries. It is surely reasonable that loans given for development purposes should not be allowed to become hindrances to that same development. None of this is altruism. North and South, rich and poor, have an equal stake in a world where wealth must be more equitably shared.

That is why our assistance program is now composed entirely of grants. We have affirmed that Canadian assistance will continue to increase to reach the target of 0.6% of GNP by 1995 and the desired 0.7% target by the year 2000, now less than 12 years away.

Perhaps I could best illustrate the importance we attach to the UN by pointing out that Canada is the fourth largest contributor to the UN system. Most of these contributions are directed at development assistance. But Canadians generally feel more can and should be done.

Africa is a special case. Canada has taken seriously its responsibilities under the UN Program of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD). In 1986-87, Canada disbursed a total of almost one billion dollars in Africa, through all channels, multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental.

Nearly half of all our bilateral assistance will be directed to Africa over the next five years. But poverty in Africa and elsewhere, cannot be ended solely through trade and help from developed countries. It will require sound national economic and development strategies. And the governments of the developing countries have a more direct responsibility to their own people to achieve progress.

Mr. President, I said we must devote the energies freed by greater security to two equally pressing problems. One is poverty. The other is the environment.

The world is facing an environmental crisis of unparalleled magnitude. Nature is sending us an urgent message that we ignore at our peril. The signs of this crisis are all around us—shortages of timber, exhausted soil, desertification, depleted fish stocks, seals dying in the North Sea, beluga whales washing ashore in the St. Lawrence River. Some even maintain that we have reached a point where the survival of mankind is at risk.

Prime Minister Brundtland, Chairman of the World Commission on Environment and Development, has said that the threat to our environmental security is 'second only to nuclear war.' Having lessened the likelihood of global nuclear war, we now face invasion by rising seas, polluted air and encroaching deserts.

There is a growing awareness that the environment, the economy, and human health are inextricably linked. At the same time as we in the North suffer the effects of our industrial society's disregard for the environment, the South suffers from the environmental degradation engendered by poverty, by population growth, and by pressure for immediate economic development.

Destruction of the rainforest in Brazil, deforestation in Sub-Saharan Africa, or the pollution of drinking water in the sprawling cities of the developing world are the consequences of people in poverty seeking the means to survive. Without improved development opportunities, we cannot expect them to do other than search for such fuel, shelter and livelihood, as best as they can.

We must help them to protect these precious resources. We require a new era of economic growth, but we need growth that sustains and expands the resource capital of our planet, not growth that poisons the air we breathe and the water we drink.

An Aboriginal elder, speaking to a Canadian Government Commission, said it best: 'we did not inherit the earth—we only hold it in trust for our children.'

Mr. President, in a world where rivers and winds cannot be contained by laws or borders, it is clear that domestic initiatives by themselves are inadequate. Canadians know this.

Our economy as well as our environment is damaged by acid rain. We have taken important internal measures to address the problem. We have urgently pressed our neighbour to follow suit and to conclude a treaty with us that will reduce the environmental damage from this blight by stated amounts within specific time frames.

But acid rain is not limited to one nation or one continent. It is an international problem, and it demands a viable international solution. The greenhouse effect, the deterioration of the ozone layer and the disposal of toxic wastes are cause for concern the world over. I am encouraged by the strong emphasis given to the environment by others in this year's debate. Strengthened international cooperation is essential, and the UN has a key role to play.

As with security issues, important action has been initiated:

— The signature a year ago in Montreal of the protocol on the protection of the ozone layer is a landmark example of what nations working together can accomplish.

I urge all states which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the protocol without delay.

— The increasingly urgent question of global warming and climate change received serious attention at the International Conference on the Changing Atmosphere in Toronto last June.

Our goal should be an International Framework Convention for the Protection of the Atmosphere by 1992.

We applaud the work of the United Nations Environment Program in developing a global convention on the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes. We hope it will be ready for signature next year.

Mr. President, this powerful momentum must be maintained and strengthened.

Other steps are needed.

Canada is supporting a feasibility study on a World Conservation Bank to work in concert with the World Bank. Canada is asking the World Bank, at its annual meeting in Berlin, to strengthen the integration of environmental concerns into the design and implementation of its projects.

Canada fully supports the holding of an environmental Summit at the Heads of Government level. Canada urges all corporations and international industrial and trade associations to develop, strengthen and vigorously apply environmental codes of conduct.

Obviously, wealthier nations have to offer more assistance and support to help developing countries achieve growth which does not destroy their environment. For that reason the Canadian International Development Agency makes environmental protection one of the criteria for its development projects.

I want to announce today that Canada will establish a Centre which will promote internationally the concept of environmentally sustainable development. This centre will be located in Winnipeg and will work closely with the United Nations Environment Program and other like-minded international institutions and organizations.

Canada strongly supports the call for a UN Conference on sustainable development in 1992.

The global challenges we face are great, but we are proving they can be met and resolved.

Mankind is not destined to destroy itself. War is not inevitable. Poverty can be alleviated. The environment can be preserved. Injustices can be made right.

Mr. President, the UN is not and never will be a perfect institution. But in the last few years the UN has proven that it can make needed reforms and emerge as a stronger and more effective body. We must continue to improve this irreplaceable organization. Our citizens will judge the UN not by its rhetoric but by its actions and its practical successes.

An immunization program that saves children's lives in a developing nation is, in itself, an enduring monument to the profound value of this institution.

Because now as the international political climate improves, the UN can play the role intended in the Charter.

Lester Pearson, a great Canadian statesman who was present at the creation of this Organization, once observed that the United Nations is the 'living symbol of our interdependence, and embodies that emerging sense of international community, going beyond nation and region, which alone can save us in this nuclear age.'

Mr. President, the United Nations reflects the vision of our predecessors and the hope for our children.

The agenda before the United Nations is compelling, and the choices are clear: to manage the irresistible forces of change that swirl around us: to acknowledge the interdependence of our world and of the issues before us: to ensure a more peaceful, more prosperous, more humane world, a world in which the strong nations are just, the rich nations generous — a world in which all nations have legitimate hope for greater economic and social justice, understanding as we must that there is but one earth for us to preserve for our children." □

First Committee Meets With Success

The First Committee of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), which *inter alia* considers disarmament and international security issues, held its 43rd session October 17 to November 30, 1988. The Committee was chaired by Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Douglas Roche. A very positive atmosphere prevailed, which facilitated an unusually productive session. Of the 67 arms control and disarmament resolutions adopted, a record 27 were by consensus.

Mr. Roche visited selected capitals from all five continents in August and September 1988 in preparation for assuming the Chairmanship. Despite some concern expressed at the possible implications for the First Committee of the failure of the UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD III) in June 1988 to reach agreement on a final document, there were high expectations for a positive and productive First Committee Session. Recent international developments, for example, the establishment of UN peacekeeping forces in Iran/Iraq and Afghanistan and the ratification and implementation of the Intermediate-Range (INF) Treaty, were expected to have favourable implications since, as is frequently the case in multilateral arms control and disarmament forums, the atmosphere tends to be responsive to progress.

The atmosphere was businesslike and cooperative. Of 75 resolutions tabled at UNGA 43, 67 were adopted. The slight increase in number over UNGA 42 reflected the addition of new agenda items, for example, the Dumping of Nuclear and Industrial Wastes in Africa, and the Illegal Transfer of Prohibited Weapons. At the same time, a number of successful mergers of competing resolutions were achieved, including in the areas of verification, outer space, arms transfers, nuclear freeze proposals, and objective information on military matters.

The First Committee also recommended that UN studies be conducted on the role of the UN in verification (based on terms of reference developed by Canada, the Netherlands and France), on nuclear weapons (proposed by

Sweden), on arms transfers (proposed by Colombia), and on scientific and technological developments (proposed by India).

Mr. Roche devoted considerable effort in pursuit of Canada's objective of rationalizing and enhancing the effectiveness of the First Committee. The Committee's agenda was revised to allow for a 25 percent increase in the time available to delegations for consultations. Although further proposals to rationalize the substantive agenda did not receive the consensus required for implementation, they are expected to receive further considerations in the future.

The Canadian Delegation, as in past years, played a very active role. Canada's new Ambassador to the United Nations in New York, Yves Fortier, delivered the main Canadian Statement on October 18 (separate article refers), stressing the importance of patience, persistence and realism as the central ingredients of success in arms control and disarmament. More specifically, Canada again acted as lead sponsor of resolutions on verification (see separate article) and the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. A competing Swedish resolution on verification was subsequently merged with the Canadian. We also played a major role in drafting and co-sponsoring resolutions on the urgent need for a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and, with Poland, on chemical weapons. In the international security area, Canada was able to vote in favour of the Soviet resolution calling for a comprehensive approach to strengthening international peace and security in accordance with the UN Charter as a result of several major changes in the text over last year's version, on which Canada abstained.

In his up-beat closing remarks, Mr. Roche indicated that the Committee had helped to improve the international situation and that he would leave the Chair in the knowledge that this process was well underway. ■

Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, announced January 16, 1989 Canada's agreement to participate in the new Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The mandate for this negotiation provides for talks among the 23 states that are members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The talks will be aimed at strengthening security in Europe through the establishment of a stable balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels. Canada was an active participant in the discussions leading to the agreement on this mandate.

Considerable progress has been made in recent years in improving East/West relations, Mr. Clark noted. He expressed the expectation that the new negotiations on conventional forces will focus on those weapons systems which are capable of mounting large-scale offensive operations and of seizing and holding territory, effectively eliminating once and for all the danger of surprise attack in Europe. Europe is today a heavily militarized region, with over five million men and women of the armed forces of two opposing military alliances facing each other.

Mr. Clark noted that the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is expected to begin in Vienna in March of this year, within the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). He emphasized the importance Canada attaches to the negotiation as providing a unique opportunity for furthering the cause of European security. He confirmed that every effort will be made by Canada's delegation to the negotiation to ensure its success. ■

Ambassador Fortier Stresses Hope

The following is the text of the address given by the Canadian Ambassador Yves Fortier to the First Committee of the 43rd United Nations General Assembly on October 18, 1988.

"It is noticeable that the statements being made here, and in the General Assembly itself, exhibit a degree of hopefulness such as has not been heard in this forum for several years. The reasons for this are not hard to find. In the relations between the two leading military powers, bellicose posturing has been displaced by sustained, serious negotiations which have already produced important agreements and hold out the promise of more. In the Gulf region, scene of the longest and deadliest war of this half century, the guns have been silenced and the negotiators have begun their work. In Afghanistan, foreign military forces are being withdrawn and the means for national reconstruction are being mobilized. In other regions long victimized by military conflict or foreign occupation, such as Namibia and Kampuchea, new voices of realism are being heard.

A great poet once referred to hope as 'a strange invention' which seems always to be intermingled with our fears—fears that our hopes cannot be realized. And yet without hope we cannot muster the boldness and daring needed to face down our fears and seek to resolve them. The expressions of renewed hope we are hearing are, I trust, an augury of the growing readiness of peoples and their Governments to address the real problems we confront and seize opportunities for their solution.

Hope that is not grounded on hard experience can be dangerously illusory. What has been achieved thus far remains fragile. Conflict continues in some areas and is scarcely held in check in others. Guns silenced are not guns abandoned. Negotiations alone cannot eliminate deep-seated enmities nor quickly meet long-neglected social and economic needs. Our central task



Canadian Permanent Representative and Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Yves Fortier.

must be to consolidate the gains that have been made and to build on them. We must aim to institutionalize peace. We must try to make peace contagious.

Calls for sweeping transformations of international institutions or prescriptions for the quick negotiations of agreements within a calendar of arbitrary deadlines are not the answer. That is the path of false hope and can lead only to disillusionment. On matters of international security, there can be no quick fixes. The central ingredients of success are patience, persistence and realism.

That, in fact, is the recipe that has begun to bring about what we must hope will be a remarkable and lasting transformation in East-West security relations. Careful, painstaking negotiation between the United States of America and the USSR has resulted in the welcome Treaty on the elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles—the INF Treaty—the first-ever agreement providing for real nuclear arms reductions. Moreover, the negotiating agenda between those two great powers remains encouragingly

crowded: reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals, on which major progress has already been made; the step-by-step limitation of nuclear tests, leading to their eventual elimination; the role of strategic defence in relation to outer space. Canada urges the two countries to persist in those negotiating efforts with a view to concluding, as soon as possible, further verifiable agreements.

Just as important, the members of the two major military alliances, as well as the other countries of Europe, are in unprecedented ways addressing issues relating to the conventional arms balance in Europe. Within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the 1986 Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, with its provisions for advance notifications, observations and international inspections of conventional military activities, is being effectively implemented. Additional confidence-building and security-building measures in Europe are to be negotiated. Further, within the same broad institutional framework, members of the two alliances are on the eve of launching negotiations toward a balance of conventional arms at lower levels in Europe.

None of that progress has occurred quickly or easily. There have been setbacks, and, indeed, many hurdles remain to be overcome. It is the firm view of the Government of Canada, however, that it is only through careful, step-by-step negotiating approaches, such as those that have begun to register significant achievements in the East-West context, that effective and lasting progress in arms control and disarmament can be accomplished.

It is cause for special satisfaction to the Government of Canada that there appears a reawakening within the international community to the effective and practical role the United Nations can play in promoting peace, security and disarmament. Its usefulness, for example, in facilitating the settlement of regional conflicts and in investigating alleged breaches of international treaties has been recently demonstrated. The timely award of the Nobel Peace Prize

to the United Nations peacekeeping forces is symbolic of that new awareness. Canadians took special pride in the award, since over 80,000 citizens of our country have served in United Nations peacekeeping contingents, 78 of whom have given their lives in the course of their peacekeeping duties. As Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, has recently observed, Canada's participation in every peacekeeping action thus far would not have been possible without the unwavering support of the Canadian people to the ideas and the aims of the United Nations Charter.

Canada's commitment to the principles and objectives of the organization, therefore, cannot be in doubt. Successive Canadian Governments, without exception, have advocated strengthening of the United Nations system and its effective use by its membership. We are very gratified indeed that others seem to be rediscovering the capability of the United Nations to play a significant and constructive role. I would like to note particularly the assistance the USSR provided to Canada in carrying out its peacekeeping tasks in Iran and Iraq, that represents one of several welcome new developments in the Soviet Union's approach to the United Nations.

It is precisely of the firmness of Canada's support for the United Nations system and our belief in its central role in building peace and enhancing security that we have always examined carefully and in a positive spirit any proposal for the strengthening of United Nations machinery or for improvements in its procedures and methods. We will continue to do so. However, that same concern for the viability of the United Nations has also prompted us to be cautious about proposals for major restructuring of existing machinery or for the elaboration of supplementary or parallel institutions.

In the Canadian view, the United Nations Charter remains valid in its totality and is not in need of rewriting. Neither do we see any need for a major overhaul of our institutional structures. We are similarly doubtful about the utility or even the wisdom of selecting from among the principles on which United

Nations institutions are now based with a view to bringing about major reorientations in our structures or procedures. What is needed is a sustained political will and determination to put to the best possible use the machinery that is already at our disposal. That applies, *a fortiori*, in the areas of peace, security and arms control.

It must be conceded that in the area of disarmament the recent record of the United Nations, and of the First Committee specifically, has been, at best, mixed. True, there have been some notable achievements. The elaboration by the United Nations Disarmament Commission of agreed sets of principles relating to confidence-building measures and to verification are solid examples. But, on the whole, our record has not been one about which we can boast. The Third Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament did not reach consensus on a concluding final document. Within the First Committee, recent years have witnessed a proliferation of resolutions and a general dispersal of effort.

It might be said that the situation is not one to be deplored but one that simply illustrates the function of this forum as a political seismograph giving voice to and reflecting accurately the diversity and contention that undeniably exist within the international community on the sensitive, difficult issues touching on peace, security and arms control and disarmament. That, of course, is a legitimate and necessary function of this forum. No participant here should ever feel inhibited from expressing governmental views and interests with directness and emphasis.

Nevertheless, it is not our sole function here to register national positions. If we are to have any real influence, if we are to contribute to the reconciliation of divergent views and the setting of priorities for concerted international effort, we must also seek out common ground. In practical terms, that means we must try to reduce the number of our draft resolutions. We must seek consensus on as many draft resolutions as possible. We must be discriminate and realistic about urging particular actions and undertakings of other forums. Only

in that way can we realistically expect to have some influence on deliberations and negotiations elsewhere, such as at the Conference on Disarmament.

I have outlined the broad perspective from which Canada is approaching our deliberations in this Committee this year. Now I would like to remark briefly on the particular subjects and issues to which Canada's delegation will be giving priority attention.

It is now virtually universally accepted that effective verification is an essential element of the arms control and disarmament process. This consensus has been concretely registered in the set of verification principles which were agreed upon in the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) at its past two sessions. Canada hopes and expects that the General Assembly will give its unqualified endorsement to those verification principles at the current session. The Canadian Government also firmly believes that the United Nations can have a significant and positive role in promoting and facilitating effective verification. We have, therefore, examined closely and in a positive spirit various proposals that have been made for a United Nations role in verification. We have consulted closely with the Governments which have put forward such proposals. Our central concern is to ensure that the United Nations can acquire an appropriate role in verification which will strengthen the arms control and disarmament process by facilitating the conclusion and implementation of agreements and will enhance the authority and credibility of the United Nations system. It is our carefully considered view that, pursuant to this objective, an expert study under the authority of the Secretary-General would be the wisest next step. In close cooperation with several other delegations, Canada will be sponsoring a resolution calling for such a study, as well as endorsing the verification principles agreed at the UNDC.

There is at this juncture a perhaps unprecedented global awareness of the abhorrent nature of chemical weapons. The main reason for this is not to be welcomed—the deplorable repeated use of chemical weapons in the Gulf war, as

investigated and reported by the Secretary-General. Canada, like many other nations, has welcomed President Reagan's call for and President Mitterrand's offer to host a conference to reverse the erosion of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons. What these events underline is the urgency of concluding as soon as possible a comprehensive, verifiable global ban on chemical weapons, as it is being negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament.

For many, including the Canadian Government, the progress in these negotiations must seem frustratingly slow. But in our judgment, this is not because of a lack of serious effort and intent on the part of participants in the negotiations. Rather, it reflects the genuinely difficult technical and legal issues involved, particularly in relation to various aspects of the verification provisions of the treaty under negotiation. The Canadian delegation, in close co-operation with the delegation of Poland, will work to ensure that this Committee again registers by consensus its view on the urgency of concluding the negotiations toward a global, verifiable chemical weapons ban.

The conclusion of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing has long been, and remains, a fundamental Canadian objective. The progress being made in this area by the United States and the USSR is welcome and should be energetically pursued. With other delegations, we will again be sponsoring a draft resolution urging steps toward the earliest attainment of this objective.

The Canadian delegation will also be giving special attention to other issues which we regard as of priority concern. One of these is the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This has been under active discussion at the Conference on Disarmament since 1985. Canada has made major contributions to those discussions, which we believe have contributed usefully to clarification of the issues involved. We will continue to do so. Clearly, the negotiations between the USA and the USSR in this area are of crucial importance and should be supported. Continued strict compliance with existing relevant

treaties, including the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, remains critically important. Equally clearly, this is a subject area of legitimate multilateral concern, and decisions on whether additional legal measures may be required are of broad international interest.

For more than three decades, the international arms control and disarmament agenda has been dominated by issues related to nuclear weapons. This dominant concern was clearly recorded in the Final Document of the First Special Session Devoted to Disarmament. This preoccupation was not misplaced and there must be no slackening of efforts to reduce reliance on nuclear arms.

However, tens of millions have been slaughtered by the use of conventional weapons. Moreover, technological advances are resulting in quantum leaps in both the destructive capabilities of non-nuclear weapons and the costs of their development and production. It is especially tragic that countries which can ill afford the diversion of resources from pressing social and economic needs feel compelled to resort to large-scale acquisition of such weaponry. The Canadian delegation is, therefore, eager to engage with other delegations in constructive and dispassionate dialogue on how best to bring the conventional arms race, in both its quantitative and qualitative dimensions, under more effective control. At the heart of such a project is how to reduce the sense of insecurity which leads States to rely increasingly on arms as a basis for security and, equally, how to bring arms-related technological developments under more effective policy direction.

I began my statement with some brief reflections on the ambivalent nature of hope in human affairs. Hope, while subject to deception, is a necessary precondition for any kind of human achievement. Our sense of the present situation is that there is a bit more hope in the air than we have recently been accustomed to. We must build on this and we must build carefully. Peace must become embedded in our institutions and our habits. The United Nations must be the premier forum for this collective endeavour. Let us use it well." ■

Selected Recent Department of External Affairs Publications

1. News Release No. 202

"Disarmament and International Security: Douglas Roche Elected Chairman of UN Committee." September 20, 1988.

2. News Release No. 208

"USA Initiative to Strengthen International Prohibition Against Chemical Weapons Use." September 26, 1988.

3. News Release No. 214

"Clark Gives Canada's Reaction to the 1988 Peace Nobel Prize Award to United Nations Peacekeeping Forces." September 29, 1988.

4. Address by the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, before the UN General Assembly. New York, September 29, 1988.

5. "Sovereignty in an Interdependent World." Notes for Remarks by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at Carleton University, Ottawa, October 18, 1988.

6. News Release No. 227

Appointment to the Board of Directors of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security." October 21, 1988.

7. News Release No. 241 (Government of Canada)

"Publication by Member Countries of the North Atlantic Alliance of the Document 'Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts'." November 25, 1988.

8. News Release No. 001

"Joe Clark Leads Canadian Delegation to Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons." January 3, 1989.

All the above publications are available free of charge from the Editor. ■

Resolutions on Arms Control and Disarmament (ACD) and International Security at UNGA 43

RESOLUTION NUMBER AND LEAD SPONSOR (* = Co-sponsored by Canada)	RESOLUTION Supported by Canada	VOTE (Yes/No/Abstain)
43/23 (Brazil)	Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic	144-1-7
43/62 (Mexico)	Treaty of Tlatelolco	149-0-5
43/64 (Australia)*	Urgent need for a comprehensive test ban treaty	146-2-6
43/65 (Egypt)	Nuclear-weapon-free zone in Middle East	CONSENSUS
43/66 (Pakistan)	Nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	116-3-34
43/67 (Sweden)	Conventional weapons deemed excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects	CONSENSUS
43/69 (Pakistan)	Assure non-nuclear-weapon states against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	152-0-3
43/70 (Sri Lanka)	Prevention of an arms race in Outer Space	154-1-0
43/71 (Tanzania)	Denuclearization of Africa (a) Implementation of the Declaration	151-0-4
43/72 (Byelorussia)	Prohibition of development of new types of weapons of mass destruction	152-0-2
43/73 (Romania)	Reduction of Military Budgets	CONSENSUS
43/74A (Australia)*	1925 Geneva Protocol and Chemical Weapons Convention	CONSENSUS
43/74B (Austria)*	Second Review Conference of the Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons	CONSENSUS
43/74C (Poland)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	CONSENSUS
43/75A (Zimbabwe)	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	141-0-12
43/75B (Zimbabwe)	Relationship between disarmament and development	CONSENSUS
43/75C (UK)	Stockpiling of radiological weapons	CONSENSUS
43/75D (Denmark)	Conventional disarmament	CONSENSUS
43/75E (China)	Nuclear disarmament	CONSENSUS
43/75F (China)	Conventional disarmament	CONSENSUS
43/75G (UK)*	Objective information on military matters	130-0-10
43/75(I) (Colombia)*	International arms transfers	110-1-38
43/75K (Canada)*	Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes	144-1-7
43/75L (Sweden)	Naval armaments	152-1-1
43/75M (Norway)*	Seabed Treaty	CONSENSUS
43/75N (Sweden)	Comprehensive UN Study on Nuclear Weapons	141-1-9
43/75(O) (UK)*	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	103-0-46
43/75P (France)*	Confidence and security-building and conventional disarmament	CONSENSUS
43/75Q (Nigeria)	Dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes	129-1-10
43/75R (Cameroon)*	Review of role of UN in field of disarmament	CONSENSUS
43/75S (Peru)	Conventional disarmament on regional scale	125-0-23
43/76D (Tanzania)	UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa	CONSENSUS
43/76F (Nigeria)	UN programme of fellowships on disarmament	CONSENSUS
43/76G (Nepal)	UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia	CONSENSUS
43/76H (Peru)	UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Latin America	CONSENSUS
43/77B (Yugoslavia)	Third UN Special Session on Disarmament	152-0-2
43/78A (Bahamas)*	Report on Disarmament Commission	CONSENSUS
43/78D (Mexico)	Climatic effects of nuclear war	145-0-9
43/78G (Mongolia)	Disarmament Week	CONSENSUS
43/78H (FRG)*	Guidelines for confidence-building measures	CONSENSUS
43/78(I) (Netherlands)*	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	96-0-53
43/78J (Romania)	Economic and social consequences of the arms race	143-1-9
43/78K (Mexico)	Comprehensive programme of disarmament	CONSENSUS
43/78L (Nigeria)	1990s as Third Disarmament Decade	CONSENSUS
43/79 (Sri Lanka)	Indian Ocean Zone of Peace	CONSENSUS
43/81A (USA)*	Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements	CONSENSUS
43/81B (Sweden)*	Study of Role of UN in Verification	150-1-0
43/82 (UK)*	Non-Proliferation Treaty IV	137-0-11
43/83 (Trinidad)	Liability for illegal transfer of weapons	CONSENSUS
43/85 (Malta)	Strengthening of security/cooperation in Mediterranean	CONSENSUS
43/86 (Cameroon)	Strengthening of regional and international peace and security	CONSENSUS
43/90 (USSR)	Comprehensive system of international peace and security	97-3-45

NOTE: In addition to the above, the following Decision was adopted:

43/422 (Czechoslovakia)	Contribution of the UN Specialized Agencies	CONSENSUS
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RESOLUTION NUMBER AND LEAD SPONSOR (* = Co-sponsored by Canada)	RESOLUTION	VOTE (Yes/No/Abstain)
Opposed by Canada — 5		
43/68 (Bulgaria)	Strengthening of security of non-nuclear-weapon states against use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	117-17-16
43/76B (Mexico)	Freeze on nuclear weapons	135-12-3
43/76E (India)	Convention on prohibition of use of nuclear weapons	133-17-4
43/78B (GDR)	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	126-17-6
43/78E (Argentina)	Cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament	135-13-5
Canada Abstained — 17		
43/22 (Costa Rica)	Right of Peoples to Peace	118-0-29
43/63A (Mexico)	Cessation of all nuclear test explosions	136-4-13
43/63B (Mexico)	Cessation of all nuclear test explosions	127-3-21
43/71 (Tanzania)	Denuclearization of Africa (b) Nuclear capability of South Africa	138-4-12
43/75H (Ukraine)	Implementation of UNGA resolutions on disarmament	131-2-20
43/75J (Iraq)	Stockpiling of radiological weapons	116-2-29
43/75T (Tanzania)	Dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa	141-0-13
43/76A (Cyprus)	Disarmament and International Security	129-1-21
43/76C (Mexico)	World Disarmament Campaign	144-0-10
43/77A (India)	Impact of scientific and technological developments	129-7-14
43/78C (Czechoslovakia)	International cooperation for disarmament	136-1-13
43/78F (Argentina)	Prevention of nuclear war	136-3-14
43/78M (Yugoslavia)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	136-3-14
43/80 (Jordan)	Israeli nuclear armament	99-2-51
43/87 (GDR)	Need for results-oriented political dialogue	127-1-24
43/88 (Poland)	Tenth anniversary of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace	128-0-24
43/89 (Yugoslavia)	Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of Security	128-1-22

Canadian Public Supports Canada's Role in NATO

A recent public opinion poll released by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security has produced some interesting results. Highlights of the survey include:

— Canadians, like their compatriots in Britain and West Germany who were asked some of the identical questions, no longer see the Soviet Union as the greatest threat to world peace: most point to the arms race, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and non-European regional conflicts.

— 80% of those surveyed reject the idea of reducing Canada's role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; only one-third of those surveyed, however, believe in a central tenet of NATO strategy, that the Alliance should use

nuclear weapons first if it begins to lose a conventional war in Europe.

— Asked what the best reason for increasing defence forces would be almost three-quarters of those surveyed gave doing a better job guarding our own territory and sovereignty as the best justification. A quarter of those surveyed offered increased influence in NATO or helping defend Western countries as best reasons.

— 40% of those surveyed think Canada should spend more on defence; a third of those who want to spend more agree that taxes should be raised to pay for it.

— 55% of those surveyed approve or strongly approve of the government's proposed plan to purchase nuclear-powered submarines.

The national public opinion survey was commissioned and funded by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS) and designed by Don Munton and Institute staff. Comprising 51 questions in all, the survey was carried out June through July 1988 by the Longwoods Research Group with a national sample selected randomly to be representative of Canadian households and chosen from a panel of 30,000 households maintained by Market Facts Ltd. A total of 1,005 people responded to the questionnaire which was conducted by mail in both English and French. The response rate was 63%. (The margin of error with samples of this size is approximately $\pm 3\%$, 95 times out of 100. Of the 1,005 respondents to the 1988 survey, 563 were also respondents to the 1987 survey.) ■

Consultative Group members visit United Nations

Ten members of the Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs participated in an Orientation Programme at the First Committee of the General Assembly from November 6-12, 1988. This is the third year in which the Department of External Affairs has undertaken this programme. Its aim is to enable committed and interested members of the Consultative Group to be more fully involved and informed about the multi-faceted work for arms control and disarmament undertaken by Canada in the United Nations, and in particular the First Committee, which deals with security and international affairs.

The purpose of the programme was, therefore, twofold: first, to assist in the education and dissemination of information among those involved directly in the programme and indirectly to the organizations/communities with which the participants are associated; and second, to enhance and strengthen the Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs.

The participants were briefed on the arms control and disarmament activities of the Permanent Mission of Canada and on First Committee operating procedures. They met separately with UN representatives of Romania, the USSR, the USA, the Netherlands and Singapore and with various UN Secretariat officials. Participants also attended a number of First Committee meetings, in order to see first-hand how business is conducted in that forum. The group was present to hear interventions and to observe the voting process. There were also opportunities to attend sessions of the General Assembly and to meet non-governmental representatives.

During the course of the week, a number of participants were struck by the lengthy and complex processes of the First Committee, and by the significant role which Canada appeared to play in arms control and disarmament. ■



Members of the Consultative Group on a trip to New York. From left to right: Dr. Doug Ross, Mr. John Benesh, Ms. Carol Dixon, Ms. Shannon Selin, Mr. Nick Parker, Ms. Annie Bourret, Mr. Paul Bennett (Department of External Affairs), Ms. Leyla Raphaël, Ambassador Douglas Roche, Ms. Trudy Govier, Ms. Janis Alton and Dr. Paul Buteux.

Bilateral Arms Control and Disarmament Consultations Since September 1988

In accordance with the arms control and disarmament objectives of the Canadian Government as outlined in Prime Minister Mulroney's address to the Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs on October 31, 1985, Canada conducts annual and ad hoc consultations with a variety of nations at the senior officials level. The following is a list of recent consultations:

DATE	COUNTRY	LOCATION
September 21, 1988	United States of America	Washington
November 14, 1988	Czechoslovakia	Prague
November 17-18, 1988	Federal Republic of Germany	Bonn
January 21, 1989	Japan	Tokyo
January 24-25, 1989	People's Republic of China	Peking

1988 Nobel Peace Prize Award to United Nations Peacekeeping Forces

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, issued the following statement after the announcement of the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize.

"All Canadians will feel pride and pleasure at the decision of the Nobel Committee to award its Peace Prize to the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces.

No country has been more steadfast or supportive in its commitment to UN peacekeeping than Canada, and it is worth remembering that peacekeeping, as we know it today, was begun on a Canadian initiative more than 30 years ago. We have been participants in every UN peacekeeping action since that time, a record unsurpassed by any other UN member.

This would not have been possible without the unwavering support of the



Cpl. Jeff Docksey, Canada's representative to the Nobel Peace Prize presentation, with a Danish peacekeeper and General Vadset of the Norwegian army. They are outside the University of Oslo's auditorium where the prize was presented.

Photo by Norwegian Defence Headquarters Information Sect.

Canadian people to the ideals and aims of the United Nations Charter.

This award will have a special meaning for more than 80,000 Canadian men and women who have served in UN peacekeeping contingents in almost every quarter of the globe in the last three decades.

This work has often been difficult, even dangerous, and 78 Canadians have given their lives in this duty. At this very hour, Canadians continue to patrol the ramparts of peace in several troubled regions, including Iran/Iraq, Cyprus, the Middle East and Afghanistan/Pakistan.

Today's award recognizes the immeasurable value of the contribution of these brave men and women to the cause of peace." □

NATO Publishes Statistics on Conventional Forces in Europe

On November 25, 1988, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, and the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Perrin Beatty, released for distribution in Canada a collective statistical assessment by the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) concerning the strengths of the armed forces in Europe belonging to the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The document has also been made public at the Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Vienna and at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

Entitled "Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts," this assessment clearly points to an imbalance in conventional weapons systems in Europe, which gives the East a capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action. It was this imbalance which was highlighted by the Heads of State and Government of



Prime Minister Mulroney and the Honourable Perrin Beatty at a recent NATO meeting.

the members of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels in March 1988 and which makes all the more urgent the initiation of new negotiations on conventional arms control within the framework of the CSCE.

It is hoped that this contribution to military transparency on the part of the

members of the North Atlantic Alliance will prompt the countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization similarly to provide figures for their forces. Such a gesture would be a positive move and could facilitate the early stages of new negotiations, in which Canada intends to participate actively. □

European NGOs Hold Verification Workshop

Under the aegis of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), a number of European Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) hosted a unique workshop on Verification in London, England from November 30 to December 2, 1988. Titled "Workshop on Verification of Nuclear and Conventional Arms Reductions," this meeting brought together more than 100 specialists from a dozen European and North American countries. Although technical in their thrust, discussions ranged from an assessment of the experience gained thus far from the implementation of verification provisions of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty to problems likely to be addressed in the development of significant conventional arms agreement in Europe. The co-chairmen of the three-day workshop were Dr. Jurgen Altmann of the PRIF and Dr. Tom Kibble of the Blackett Laboratory, Imperial College, London.

Two Canadians were invited by the hosts to make presentations in areas of particular interest to Canada. Colonel B.A. Goetze, a member of the Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, provided a retrospective view of conventional arms negotiation in Europe based upon his experience in support of a number of previous negotiations. Colonel Goetze recently completed his doctorate in studies relating to arms control in Europe. Mr. F.R. Cleminson of the Department of External Affairs undertook a preliminary assessment of verification methods likely to be evolved as part of a verification model designed to meet the requirements under a new negotiating mandate. That mandate was finally agreed to by the 35 nations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe at their Follow-Up Meeting which concluded in Vienna on January 19, 1989.

The workshop heard from a large number of arms control specialists representing a variety of views from both East and West. To many who took part in the event, the most significant aspect of the three days was the lack of acrimony during discussions on a broad-

based set of significant issues. To a large degree, this apparent agreement can be said to be a product of the new Soviet policy which, by and large, now parallels the Western approach to arms control negotiations in general and verification in particular. Glasnost notwithstanding, however, it will be at the negotiating table that words will have to be translated into definitive deeds.

The organizers of this workshop can be jointly proud of its results. The meeting succeeded in bringing together

governmental, NGO and private sector representatives from East and West in a common dialogue bereft of the histrionics and preconceptions sometimes associated with such ventures. The published results of the workshop will constitute a significant contribution to a deeper understanding of the issues involved in effective verification. This workshop itself serves as a very positive example of the useful role which NGOs can play in the overall process of arms control and disarmament. ■

Clark Addresses Security and Cooperation Conference

The following are excerpts from a speech by The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Follow-up meeting, Vienna, Austria, January 19, 1989.

"...From the beginning of the Vienna Meeting, Canada raised the fundamental issue of compliance with CSCE commitments. Candidly, but factually and fairly, we called attention to shortcomings, because we were convinced that unless there were better compliance, or a demonstrated willingness to improve it, further promises were unlikely to be meaningful. Far from building a climate of confidence, they would have eroded it.

We firmly believed that this Conference should produce real progress on the whole range of issues covered by the Helsinki Final Act. Canada played an active role in all three Baskets in sponsoring and supporting measures that addressed the most serious issues. We pursued these goals patiently, constructively, and at times stubbornly. We were convinced that we would deserve to be judged harshly by future generations if we failed to make the most of the Vienna Meeting. That was a common purpose of the Canadian government and of the non-governmental organizations, here and at home, with whom we were able to work so constructively.

Incrementally, and by hard bargaining, the Vienna Concluding Document took shape. Subjects whose introduction into a CSCE forum would earlier have been denounced as 'confrontational' or 'interference in internal affairs' were considered openly and debated freely. We could begin to see that the opportunity open to us was even greater than we had thought, if we had the will and the patience to exploit it to its fullest extent.

Our efforts have now been rewarded with success. The Vienna Concluding Document is a welcome milestone in East/West relations and in the evolution of Europe. It reflects and builds on recent changes. It makes significant strides in all the areas covered by the Helsinki Final Act. Canada is proud to have played a role in formulating some of its key elements.

When the Vienna Meeting opened, we had just succeeded in the Stockholm Conference in establishing a set of confidence- and security-building measures that carried considerable political and military significance. But what we did not know then was how these measures would work in practice. Since 1986, we have seen gratifying progress in adherence to both the letter and the spirit of Stockholm. We now have the confidence to believe that we can further increase transparency and predictability in military affairs. We wholeheartedly support the establishment of negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures to build upon the work of the Stockholm Conference.

We now also have the confidence to embark on ambitious negotiations touching on conventional armed forces themselves. These negotiations will take place within the framework of the CSCE process, but will be autonomous—a condition we regard as vitally necessary for their efficiency. They will not be easy. Success will depend at all stages on frankness and trust, which in turn depend, in some measure, on developments outside the arms control arena....

I should not leave this subject without referring briefly to a negotiation which will conclude before the commencement of the new negotiation on conventional arms control. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks were a pioneering attempt to arrive at conventional arms control measures in a crucial area of Europe. Much of what has been learned from the successes and failures during the many years of these talks will prove useful in the new negotiations.

Other specific elements of this Concluding Document are very important to Canada. We have achieved firm commitments that will improve the conditions under which business people and entrepreneurs can perform their central role in economic cooperation. We have sharpened our commitment to promote contacts between business people and potential buyers and end users, and to publish useful, detailed, and up-to-date economic information and statistics. These measures will expand the economic dimension of our cooperation and growing interdependence. The Conference on Economic Cooperation, with business people and experts participating, will be an important first step in this process....

We are encouraged that the importance of environmental protection has been recognized. In addition to specific commitments on air and water pollution, hazardous wastes, nuclear safety and other measures Canada supports, we welcome the essential message of this Document: the environment of Europe and the world is a common trust, in which people themselves have a critical stake and role. Governments must cooperate in its protection, but it is

above all the commitment, dedication and sacrifice of aware and concerned citizens that will ensure ultimate success.

We think the progress on tourism is important. Eliminating minimum exchange requirements makes tourism more attractive, and easing contacts between tourists and the local population (including permitting them to stay in private homes) will offer greater human contact and understanding.

In the section on principles, we have adopted a firm statement on terrorism and have made a breakthrough in acceptance of the principle of third party involvement in the peaceful settlement of disputes.

In the field of human rights and humanitarian cooperation, our achievement at Vienna has been remarkable, especially when one looks back to the days of the Ottawa Meeting of Experts. Some of the accomplishments of special interest to Canada are:

- the commitment to respect the right of all citizens to associate together and participate actively in the promotion and protection of human rights and in monitoring their government's performance. We have undertaken not to discriminate against those who exercise these rights, and to ensure that remedies are available to those who claim that their human rights have been violated. We have recognized the role of non-governmental organizations and individuals in promoting human rights.

- the undertaking to ensure freedom of religion and to allow religious communities to have places of worship, institutional structures and funding, and to participate in public dialogue and to have contacts with believers elsewhere. We have recognized the right of anyone to give and receive religious education in the language of his choice, and to obtain, possess, and use religious publications and materials.

- the commitment to protect the human rights of national minorities, to promote their ethnic, cultural, and linguistic identities and their cultural expression, and to allow contacts with counterparts elsewhere.

- we have committed ourselves to ensuring that no one is subject to arbitrary arrest, detention and exile, to improving the treatment of prisoners, and to protecting individuals from abuses of psychiatric practices.

- we have undertaken to respect the right of people to move within and between countries, including an explicit statement of the right of an individual to leave any country, including one's own, and return to one's own country, subject only to exceptional restrictions.

- we have agreed to a range of measures to remove bureaucratic obstacles to family reunification and travel, to publish laws and allow appeals, to respect the wishes of applicants regarding how long they wish to travel and where they want to go, to remove restrictions on the movement of people, to eliminate the punishment of individuals who wish to travel simply because a relative may have breached exit control regulations, to implement tight, clear-cut time limits for decisions on travel, and to resolve outstanding cases within a very short time after the conclusion of the Vienna Meeting.

- we have acknowledged the qualitative difference between the right to leave and practical commitments regarding entry policy.

- we have taken a large step toward preventing State action against an individual wishing to exercise his right to leave through the arbitrary imposition of restrictions based on national security grounds. The Vienna Concluding Document also ensures that long-term refuseniks will have the time since they were last involved in national security work retroactively credited against any limit during which any restriction will be applied.

- we have undertaken to respect the privacy and integrity of postal and telephone communications, to allow people to listen to radio from outside the country, and to receive, publish and disseminate information more freely. Scholars and teachers will be able to have more direct contacts and access to research materials.

— we have taken important new steps to protect the rights and improve the working conditions of journalists, and provide for the freer flow of information and greater access to culture.

Built on this solid achievement in human rights and Basket III, and providing a mechanism for its protection and enforcement, is the Conference on the Human Dimension. We welcome the agreement of all participating States to respond to requests for information and to consult bilaterally on specific cases and situations. We look forward to the meetings in Paris, Copenhagen and Moscow where we can pursue the issues of compliance and of new measures to enhance our achievements, as well as to deal with unresolved cases and situations. This Conference and the ongoing mechanism will keep human rights, human contacts, and related humanitarian issues central to the CSCE process, ensuring that they become a permanent part of the European political landscape....

Two things should be clearly understood. First, by accepting the Moscow meeting, Canada has not signified that problems of human rights and human contacts in the Soviet Union no longer exist. On the contrary, much remains to be done. Indeed, the USSR has undertaken to continue its work over the next two years of making Soviet society more open, democratic, and governed by the rule of law. Reforms are to be securely institutionalized. We welcome these promised undertakings, and will look forward to their fulfilment.

The second point I want to emphasize is that, having discussed this matter with the Soviet Union, having examined all the facts and assessed its performance against criteria we know to be important to the Canadian people, we consented to the Moscow meeting not just as a compromise or as a political gesture. Our consent should be seen as an expression of hope, based on recent improvements, and of confidence that the future will bring even more.

We trust that when our delegations, and the hundreds of groups, individuals, and journalists that traditionally assemble for CSCE meetings, gather in Moscow in 1991, they will find an open and tolerant environment for frank exchange.

There are many, many more provisions on human rights and humanitarian cooperation in the Vienna Concluding Document which take account of the differing interests of our peoples. Canada considers all of them important. Together, they are a great achievement. In most cases they are clear and unequivocal. We recognize that there is still room for improvement, but what is in this document will, if fully implemented by all participating States, lead to great changes in the lives of millions of people, and will have a real impact on European confidence and security. Let me illustrate by one example from our own experience.

On December 7, many communities in Armenia were struck by a devastating earthquake that killed outright some 25,000 people and injured thousands more. At one time, the Government of the Soviet Union and some other participating countries faced with a similar disaster might have said there was no problem, no help was needed. But this time it did not. From all over the world, offers of help came forward spontaneously, inspired by a natural human feeling of sympathy. The Canadian Government responded to the need for assistance....

Mr. Chairman, I do not think anything could better demonstrate what we have been saying for many years—that the ties between people, that grow naturally from common experience and humanity, are one of the keys to a peaceful world. When people know the truth, when they can have contact with each other, they will reach out across barriers, they will forge links far stronger than governments can ever build. When people are barred from travelling, from visiting with families, from having ordinary contacts, from worshipping freely, from speaking a language or practising a culture, their frustrations breed fear, resentment and instability. When arbitrarily imposed and artificial barriers are removed and people, ideas, and information can move without restraint, when freedom becomes a reality, then there will be no limit to the possibilities that will open before us.

Some participating States have learned that lesson in the past two years. But we must also remind ourselves where

these changes have fallen short of expectations and commitments and of what remains to be done. Candor and openness have done much to achieve the success we now enjoy. This is not the moment to abandon them.

In some countries, individuals are still being punished for exercising their right to know and act upon their rights, for criticizing their governments, and for conducting allegedly subversive activity. Indeed, one participating State has, at the very moment of the adoption of this forward-looking Concluding Document, trampled, in Prague, on both its old and its new commitments by taking violent action against groups engaged in the peaceful exercise of their human rights under the Helsinki Final Act and the Vienna Concluding Document.

Another participating State has, in the face of CSCE tradition and procedures, declared that, notwithstanding its action in giving consensus to the whole Concluding Document, it assumed no commitment to implement those provisions which it considered to be 'inadequate.' By taking this approach, the Government of Romania seems to be attempting to treat the Vienna Concluding Document as a menu from which it would choose those items it would abide by and those it would ignore. This is clearly an untenable interpretation. Our CSCE commitments, arrived at by consensus, are indivisible. My Government, therefore, considers that all participating States must comply with all aspects of this document, to which we have all given consensus.

The Governments of these participating States must in coming years decide whether they want to move forward in renewal and reform, or cling to policies and methods that are not only distasteful, but now demonstrably outmoded and counterproductive. Canada will continue to encourage change, to criticize shortcomings, to urge the breaking down of barriers. We have no desire to impose our system or beliefs on anyone, but we are convinced that Europe can be a stable and secure place only when all its people can enjoy freedom and personal dignity, and feel safe from the arbitrary exercise against them of the force of the state...." ▣

Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund Fiscal Year 1988-89

CONTRIBUTIONS

1. Canadian University Press — peace and security room at annual conference	\$1,805.00
2. University of Manitoba — Political Studies Students' Conference	\$4,500.00
3. Centre for International Studies — University of Toronto, Conference	\$5,000.00
4. Peace Education Centre — Vancouver Youth Forum	\$5,000.00
5. Dr. Matthew Speier — attend International Teachers for Peace Congress in Bonn	\$1,300.00
6. Dr. Peggy Falkenheim — attend Conference on Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region, Mongolia	\$2,000.00
7. Voice of Women — attend UNSSOD III	\$1,000.00
8. Group of 78 — participation at UNSSOD III preparatory committee	\$1,200.00
9. J.A. Boutilier — attendance at ISIS Conference, Malaysia	\$1,800.00
10. Canadian Federation of University Women — Women, Leadership & Sustainable Development Conference	\$2,000.00
11. Science for Peace — University College Lectures in Peace Studies	\$2,500.00
12. Project Ploughshares Calgary — Outreach Program	\$1,000.00
13. United Nations Association in Canada — Disarmament Week Project	\$10,000.00
14. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament — Air Defence Initiative project	\$13,000.00
15. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament — Forward Maritime Strategy project	\$8,000.00
16. University of Lethbridge — Beyond the INF Treaty Conference	\$4,000.00
17. Association des Politologues Étudiants de l'Université Laval — Conference: changes in USSR	\$2,000.00
18. Hans Sinn — Attend Conference in Nicaragua	\$1,400.00
19. University of Calgary — Barry Cooper — Media Analysis	\$5,000.00
20. Groupe de Recherche sur la Paix — bibliography and filmography	\$20,000.00
21. Dr. Peggy Falkenheim — Attend Pugwash Meeting, Beijing	\$1,350.00
22. Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development — Canadian Peace Educators Directory	\$11,200.00
23. North American Model United Nations — travel and equipment costs for NAMUN Conference	\$5,000.00
24. Conférence mondiale des religions pour la paix/Canada — transportation costs	\$2,500.00
25. True North Strong & Free Inquiry Society — The Arctic Choices for Peace and Security	\$10,000.00
26. Maxime Faille — air and train fare to attend the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts	\$680.00
27. University of Manitoba — Glasnost, Perestroika and International Security	\$3,500.00
TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS	\$126,735.00

GRANTS

1. Peacefund Canada — UNSSOD III participation	\$2,000.00
2. North American Model United Nations	\$1,500.00
3. Albert Legault — translation of book	\$7,000.00
4. Beyond War — Western Canada speaking tour of Alexander Nikitin and Craig Barnes	\$5,680.00
5. NGO Committee on Disarmament, Inc. — publication of five issues for UNSSOD III	\$3,000.00
6. Brock University — Sanity, Science and Global Responsibility Conference	\$5,400.00
7. Radio Centre Ville St-Louis Inc. — programs on peace and disarmament	\$4,600.00
8. Kornel Buczek — seismic verification	\$4,000.00
9. Niagara Peace Movement — Disarmament Booth	\$1,800.00
10. World Disarmament Campaign	
a) Disarmament Yearbook	\$25,000.00
b) UNIDIR	\$25,000.00
11. Albert Legault — 43 ans d'espoir: le Canada et le désarmement 1945-1988	\$12,500.00
12. Committee on Peace Studies, McMaster University "Non-Violence in Violent Contexts" Conference	\$4,000.00
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The **Disarmament** Bulletin

A review of national and international disarmament and arms control activities



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SSEA Comments on Changes in USSR

The following is the text of a speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Canadian Club in Toronto on May 3, 1989.

"Five months ago Alexander Rabinovich was again denied the right to leave the Soviet Union, because 'he was party to state secrets, having worked a decade ago, in a Soviet communications facility.' Last Sunday, the Rabinoviches were reunited with their family in Canada, because the question had been brought to the direct attention of the highest leadership in the Soviet Union.

That is but one sign of what can only be called a revolution sweeping Soviet society. It is one of the most significant, intriguing, and hopeful trends in the world today, and has profound implications for East-West relations generally, and for Canada's relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact.

The reaction of the West to these developments in the Soviet Union has been mixed;

— we are awed by their pace and scope;

— we are sceptical of their permanence and intent;

— we are apprehensive about both their success and their failure;

— and we are hopeful for ourselves and our children.

Those mixed reactions are understandable, and appropriate.

When frames of reference collapse, when some tried and true concepts are tested, when old limits shatter and new horizons emerge, the intuitive response is often to deny the change or to say



The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark.

that everything has changed. The challenge is to identify what has changed, and what that means for us.

Some scepticism is natural. After all,
— we have seen hopes raised before, only to be dashed;

— we have seen promises made, only to be broken;

— and an earlier generation was promised 'peace in our time' only to return to conflict and recrimination.

But today, I believe we have entered a watershed. We are there partly due to our own persistence and prudence. The unity and the initiatives of the Western Alliance have made it possible and necessary for changes to come within the Soviet Union. But the fact that the changes have come, and are so pervasive and profound, is due to Mikhail Gorbachev, and the reformers he has brought to power. Mr. Gorbachev is

embarked upon a journey of almost unprecedented risk, challenge and promise. He has undertaken to re-make Soviet society — initially from the top down and eventually from the bottom up.

This is an effort of *almost* unimaginable proportions. For *any* leader, *anywhere*. For we are not talking here about tinkering. We are talking about massive, structural change across the board — in all sectors and in all walks of life. And we are talking about changes in attitude and spirit as well as the concrete components of a society.

But this task is even more difficult for a Soviet leader.

The Soviet Union is a society of immense potential wealth — a massive territory, a large population, a storehouse of resources. But it is a society drained of spirit; an economy bereft of initiative; a populace deprived of freedom and driven to conform.

Not only does Mr. Gorbachev have to reform his society; he must teach his people to *want* reform: to replace complacency with initiative; conformity with variety; defeatism with optimism; and collectivism with individualism.

What is Mikhail Gorbachev up to and why?

In my view, he has discovered a simple but profound truth: the Soviet system of the past has not worked, will not work and *cannot* work. It has failed, and failed miserably.

He also realizes that to change it requires more than a slogan, an adjusted 5-year plan, a special Party Congress or plenum.

It requires a revolution.

And so we have *elections*. For the first time, millions of Soviet citizens freely voting for multiple candidates. Real election platforms; candidate debates; differences of view. And the results? Reformers elected. A fired Politburo member, Boris Yeltsin, swept to victory in a landslide. And the old guard rejected in many areas through an extraordinary act: the crossing off of their names by a majority of the voters, even when they were the only candi-

date. A Canadian politician trembles at the thought.

Of course, this is not a Western democracy. The Communist Party still rules. The limits remain severe. The flower has barely shown buds.

But it is a beginning, a spring. And an important beginning at that, for once given the opportunity to express their views, the people are difficult to humble.

The Soviets are also engaged in fundamental *economic reform*. New words are being heard: decentralization; privatization; and the hallmark of capitalism — profit. It is here where the stakes are highest and where the difficulties are greatest. It goes to the heart of the structure of privilege, corruption and complacency which has characterized the Soviet nightmare. It also demands that choices and opportunities not only be made available, but that they be treated as valuable by the worker.

Gorbachev has embarked upon a journey of almost unprecedented risk

This call to initiative, this exhortation to work harder and with pride is where Mr. Gorbachev's greatest vulnerability lies. For there is a quid pro quo. Soviet workers want *evidence* that their new efforts will be rewarded. They have to be *enticed*. Their attitudes will not change overnight, nor will they change because others want them to. They must be *convinced*. And the proof so far has been remarkable largely by its absence.

The dilemma is clear: the Soviet economy will not improve until attitudes and behaviour change. But attitudes and behaviour will not change until the economy improves. That is the most urgent test of Mr. Gorbachev's revolution.

There is another basic change, less publicized, but equally important. Mr. Gorbachev wants to reform the *legal system*. Much of the work is underway, largely quietly and behind closed doors. It is of abiding importance. For it demonstrates that Mr. Gorbachev wants to make his society less arbitrary, less capricious, less cruel. He seeks, in

effect, to make it a society of laws, laws which many of us would still find repugnant, but laws nonetheless — with due process, with rights, with duties and responsibilities. If he fails, he will not gain the confidence of his countrymen that the system has changed. And if he does not safeguard the progress he has made through legal guarantees, his own grip on power becomes more tenuous.

And throughout, history is being re-written. Just as the present is precarious and the future uncertain, the Soviet past — once graven in stone — has been shattered. Old idols have been discredited. Joseph Stalin is now seen as being at the root of the Soviet economic failure. Leonid Brezhnev is now judged to have institutionalized stagnation. Unmentionable events are now documented — whether the bloody purges of the pre-war period or the Stalin-Hitler pact to dismember Poland. Criticism is encouraged. They say in Moscow that the most difficult problem today is 'predicting the past.'

It is in light of this multi-faceted revolution that we must evaluate the new reality in East-West relations. Mr. Gorbachev believes that prosperity and progress at home can only be purchased through peace abroad. That is not simply a question of reducing the stranglehold of the military on scarce resources. It is also a matter of seeking stability and prestige abroad to foster stability and prestige at home. And, eventually, it is a question of trying to benefit from the energy and resources of the Western economic system to help pull the Soviet economy out of its 19th century doldrums.

Throughout the arena of global politics, Mr. Gorbachev has established new rules, new goals, and new attitudes for Soviet foreign policy. The withdrawal from Afghanistan, a more constructive approach to Southern Africa and the Middle East: all testify to a willingness to compromise, to seek realistic solutions, and to back away from the trouble-making and obstruction of the past.

Reform in Eastern Europe is not only being tolerated, but encouraged. Poland and Hungary are moving toward a form of pluralistic democracy, without let or

hindrance from Moscow. And the repressive regimes in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania are criticized by Moscow for their adherence to the old, cruel ways.

A new attitude has been brought to international organizations and multilateral cooperation. Part of the reason the UN system has been reinvigorated is that there is a new Soviet acceptance of its relevance and utility.

And in those areas most fundamental to Western security — arms control and other aspects of the East-West relationship — we have seen a remarkable transformation. Western proposals previously rejected as untenable are now seized by Moscow and advanced as their own.

That happened when Mr. Gorbachev and President Reagan signed this historic agreement which eliminated a whole class of nuclear weapons.

It is reflected in the Soviet Union reversing the previous policy to embrace other Western arms control proposals — on a chemical weapons ban and on asymmetric force reductions in Europe.

Real compromise, real give and take, the beginnings of acceptance of Western concepts of stability and confidence-building: that has become more the rule and less the exception.

Naturally, Mr. Gorbachev still seeks to preserve national advantage and advances some proposals whose primary intent is to cause domestic political problems for Western governments. But there is a fundamental dynamic to the new Soviet attitude which is refreshingly flexible, even reasonable in its tone and content. Rather than strangers playing games according to different rules, using different concepts, and seeking different ends, one now has the sense of a traditional negotiating process between players who accept the rules, share the concepts and know where the areas of compromise lie. One can see this in the new negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, as well as in nuclear arms control.

Now, what should our attitude in the West be to all of this?

And what stake and interests do we as *Canadians* have in this process?

To me, the most fundamental question for the West is this: Is it in our interest to see Mr. Gorbachev succeed? From this, everything else follows.

To me, the unequivocal answer is 'yes.'

Why should we fear a more prosperous and free Soviet society? Are the processes of social and economic development which turned Western societies away from war and toward diplomacy invalid for the USSR and Eastern Europe? Is the Soviet leadership incapable of seeing the advantages of peace, and the costs of war? Just as within the West, the webs of trade and prosperity act as a damper on conflict, is it not possible to envisage a similar fabric between East and West? And should we not strive to bring that to pass?

If we are suspicious of Mr. Gorbachev; if we deride the pace of his reforms or the degree of his success; if we shun opportunities for mutual advantage, then we must ask ourselves some troubling questions.

Canada has much to offer

Would the alternative be better?

Do we wish to see the Old Guard returned?

Despite what we've been saying for years, do we really prefer Stalinist repression, inefficiency and imperialism?

Are we so fearful of change that we seek a retreat to the past?

The answer to all these questions is surely 'no.'

Now, this of course does not mean we slide into escapist dreams or flights of idealism divorced from reality.

We cannot forget, after all, that the Soviet military remains enormous, enjoying tremendous numerical advantages over our own forces in Europe.

Again, the obstacles Mikhail Gorbachev faces internally are major ones. His eventual success cannot be taken for granted.

We must remain prudent, always careful to safeguard our interests and advance our values.

The Soviet Union has no tradition as do we of democratic institutions or individual liberties.

In any negotiations with the Soviets, we must bargain hard.

And we must, above all, continue to be guided by that combination of defence and dialogue which has served the NATO Alliance so well for 40 years, which helped create the incentive for Mr. Gorbachev's reforms.

But it is not a choice between 'our' interest and 'theirs'; between dialogue and silence; between their future and ours.

Canada and the West have a big stake in Mr. Gorbachev's success.

We must encourage his reforms. We must applaud his efforts, while asking for more. We must be patient. We must state our support for his domestic goals clearly and unequivocally. We must help the Soviet citizen develop that sense of self-confidence so central to the success of reform.

How does Canada fit in to all of this?

In one sense, we have no 'special' interest. We are a country like others which seeks peace, strives for stability and searches for new avenues of cooperation. But we also have much that *is* special. We are the next-door neighbour to the Soviet Union, a Northern country, an Arctic nation. We too have a resource-based economy, and skill and experience in developing it. We share environmental concerns and problems. We are a multicultural society that works — and that has direct family connections to the East — one in ten Canadians are from Russian or Eastern European backgrounds. And we have much to offer a Soviet Union which seeks Western know-how and experience as it enters a new economic era.

I believe we must capitalize on this commonality of situation, this mutuality of interest — both out of our narrow national interest and a recognition of the

value of cooperation for a more stable East-West relationship.

The Prime Minister's trip to the Soviet Union this fall will be an important catalyst for this process.

Our relationships with Moscow are already extensive and improving across the board. They range from artistic exchanges through the scientific and environmental communities. There is active Arctic cooperation. The flow of human contacts is quickening and widening. Family reunification cases have been resolved at an unprecedented rate. A little more than two years ago I handed Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze a list of 42 cases we wanted to see resolved. Everyone of them has been resolved.

Peace must be earned

Business contacts with the Soviet Union are thriving. Canadian business leaders have been beating the path to Moscow. They report to me that the opportunities are real and that the Soviets are serious. Ten joint ventures are underway, involving Lavalin, Olympia and York, Abitibi-Price, Fracmaster, Foremost, and others, and more are in the works.

Many of you have personal experience doing business in the Soviet Union. Canadian firms are building the world's largest off-road, all-terrain transporter with a Soviet partner. McDonald's of Canada will soon be serving hamburgers to Muscovites. Other Canadian companies are improving Soviet dairy herds, making tooling for the automotive industry and working in Soviet oilfields. Our geographic similarity gives us a natural opportunity to sell and buy technology and products useful in the resource and agricultural sectors.

The Government of Canada seeks new trade in both directions, with the USSR and with Eastern Europe. We will support it, and we encourage you to go for it.

As some of you will know, doing business with the East requires flexibility, patience and persistence. My Department stands ready to assist you in this process, in making contacts, obtaining data and providing follow-up.

The Prime Minister will take some senior business leaders with him to the USSR. We hope deals will be signed. But we also hope that contacts will be made and that President Gorbachev will appreciate the interest of Canadian business in his country.

I know that the changes gripping the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and East-West relations have triggered mixed emotions among Canadians of Eastern European and Russian ancestry. Many families bear the bitter scars of unbearable experience. These wounds induce a natural scepticism, and sometimes cynicism, about the meaning of perestroika.

"But I also know that there is concern for relatives and friends who remain, a desire that things improve and a hope that they will. We cannot assume that the past will persist indefinitely into the future. Certainly, where real change begins, we should encourage it.

We must steer between the extremes of euphoria and retribution. Change will not be immediate. Set-backs will occur. But we should not react, knee-jerk, to such disappointments by withdrawing into our shells, or refusing to offer our hand.

Nor should we glide into complacency, confident that the world will evolve as it should, toward harmony and prosperity, without effort or vigilance. Peace must be earned; it is not given.

We have to be alert to change. Real change is occurring in the Soviet Union, reaching into other countries, holding the prospect of a transformation in East-West relations. The change is based on the realization that the Soviet system doesn't work, and must be changed. There are many risks ahead, for Mr. Gorbachev and for all of us. We must act with prudence and imagination, conscious of the probability that we are part of a genuine watershed in modern history.

With effort, sincerity — and luck — we may be on the verge of the grandest reconciliation of them all.

I ask that we join together on this remarkable journey of such epic importance to us all." ■

Don't Dismiss Open Skies

The following article by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, appeared in the New York Times on June 5, 1989. This article is reprinted with the permission of the New York Times.

President Bush's call for a new, enlarged "open skies" arrangement displays imagination. The value of this initiative was recognized by the endorsement it received at the NATO summit meeting.

Arms control verification from satellites alone is not adequate to the tasks ahead, Canada therefore supports the call for open skies, which would open all national airspace to surveillance by unarmed aircraft.

Aircraft surveillance would make it harder to hide military movements or noncompliance with arms control agreements.

Aircraft can see more than satellites can. They fly lower. They can get around or below clouds and observe from different angles. Satellites pass in fixed orbits, at predictable times, so suspect activity can be thoroughly hidden; short-notice overflights would complicate this kind of masking significantly, and could make it impossible. Should a satellite see something significant, its ability to take another look is constrained by its orbit time. Open skies could allow an early second look from aircraft.

Open skies would provide the ability to monitor ongoing activities such as weapons destruction, withdrawals or troops movements. Unlike a satellite, which passes in a matter of minutes, an aircraft can circle over an area for hours.

If secrecy breeds suspicion, open skies builds confidence. Nations have no choice about satellite surveillance. They can't stop it, so they accept it.

An open skies agreement would be a positive political act of opening a nation's activities to detailed, intrusive monitoring — a symbolic opening of the doors. It could be a clear, unequivocal gesture that a nation's intentions are not aggressive.

Open skies would let all members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact participate fully in arms control verification and monitoring.

Satellites are inadequate to the verification tasks ahead

The rapid pace of negotiations for the conventional arms control agreement proposed by Mr. Bush and endorsed at the NATO summit meeting adds to the importance of open skies. Since open skies is a straightforward concept, it can be easily and readily available to assist in verification as soon as an agreement is reached.

Only large countries have satellites in the skies. Yet, if we are to have conventional arms control in Europe, it is essential that all parties to the agreement have the ability to assure their publics, on the basis of their own judgments, that these agreements are being adhered to, and that their security is intact.

It is not politically acceptable to rely solely on the good will and judgment of another nation. The US would not do this, and open skies demonstrates that it does not expect its allies to do so.

Open skies would bring glasnost to the public discussion of arms control compliance. The debate over the Krasnoyarsk radar in the Soviet Union went on for years before anyone was able to publish photographs of the installation. For national security reasons, nations don't publish satellite photos.

That rule need not apply to the results of serial surveillance — especially not to photographs taken by low-flying aircraft. The availability of this kind of evidence cannot but enhance the public discussion of the Warsaw Pact's military activity and of arms control compliance.

Monitoring would become more reliable. It would no longer be subject to the vagaries of satellite failure. Under the current system, it can be years before a capability is replaced if a satellite fails before schedule.

The verification of a conventional arms control agreement, especially if defenses are to be greatly reduced, will require

continuous monitoring to prevent a rapid military build-up and to maintain confidence that a surprise attack is not being planned. If we remain subject to significant periods during which our monitoring capability is impaired, our confidence in these agreements will diminish.

By his actions, Mikhail Gorbachev has

demonstrated his commitment to improve East-West relations. He has offered to do more and has put forward a wide array of proposals that will further change the relationship. President Bush has wisely asked him to create the conditions that will enable us to move ahead together without risking the security of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. ■

PM Welcomes Bush Initiative

The Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, recently welcomed the initiative of President George Bush in proposing an agreement on "Open Skies." He also indicated that Canada would be willing to join in an "Open Skies" arrangement that would allow for short notice overflights of Canadian territory by unarmed aircraft. Traditionally, he stated, this concept has symbolized the West's commitment to transparency. It serves as a clear reminder of our interest in both arms control and peaceful cooperation with the East.

The Prime Minister noted, that an "Open Skies" agreement could lead to an important increase in confidence between East and West. It could provide major benefits in the verification of arms control agreements, he said, especially for states which do not possess satellite monitoring capabilities. As well, an "Open Skies" agreement would provide benefits to the superpowers, in that overflights by aircraft would be less predictable than those by satellites.

Aware of USA interest in re-examining "Open Skies," the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, raised this subject with President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker during their recent visit to Washington. At that time, the Prime Minister offered his support, urging the President to put this initiative forward. He stressed to the President that it would be particularly useful if this initiative could include all of the nations, members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Prime Minister Mulroney urged the NATO Allies to join the initiative. In addition, Canada will actively encourage a positive response to this idea on the

part of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact Allies. ■



The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister.

Officials Visit Eastern Bloc

Officials from the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence, headed by Mr. John Noble, Director General, International Security and Arms Control Bureau, travelled to Prague, Czechoslovakia on June 6 and Warsaw, Poland on June 8, 1989 for the purpose of reviewing recent developments in the field of arms control and disarmament.

Such visits, on a reciprocal basis, constitute a routine element in the dialogue in which Canada engages on current arms control and disarmament issues with several Eastern European countries. Canadian officials also hold regularly scheduled consultations in this area with their Soviet and USA counterparts, NATO Allies and with members of the non-aligned nations. ■

Clark Welcomes Soviet SNF Proposals

On May 11, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, welcomed the announcements made in Moscow by Soviet President Gorbachev with respect to unilateral cuts in Soviet short-range nuclear forces (SNF) and further precision concerning proposals for cuts in conventional arms which are currently being negotiated in Vienna.

Mr. Clark noted that the cuts in Soviet theatre and short-range nuclear arms (284 SNF missiles, 166 bombs, and 50 artillery) still leave the Soviet Union with a massive advantage in these weapons. The Soviets have approximately 3,000 SNF missiles on 1,766 SNF missile launchers, at least 5,500 nuclear-capable artillery systems and over 5,000 aircraft capable of delivering theatre nuclear weapons. NATO has only 88 SNF missile launchers and less than 1,000 SNF missiles, less than 3,000 nuclear artillery

and less than 2,600 aircraft capable of delivering theatre nuclear weapons.

Mr. Clark noted that Canada supports the commencement of negotiations on reductions, but not total elimination of SNF missiles and is also prepared to support modernization of NATO's SNF forces. The first step in any such negotiation should be to bring the continuing Soviet asymmetry down to NATO levels.

Mr. Clark indicated that he would want to give the Soviet proposals on conventional cuts further study before commenting in detail. He looks forward to seeing the additional details Mr. Gorbachev has promised to put forward in Vienna. He welcomed the Soviet willingness to reduce their tanks, armoured personnel carriers and artillery systems down to NATO levels, which responds to the proposals put forward by the West at Vienna. ▣

From the beginning of the Vienna Meeting, Canada raised the fundamental issue of compliance with CSCE commitments. Candidly, but factually and fairly, we called attention to shortcomings, because we were convinced that unless there were better compliance, or a demonstrated willingness to improve it, further promises were unlikely to be meaningful. Far from building a climate of confidence, they would have eroded it.

We firmly believed that this Conference should produce real progress on the whole range of issues covered by the Helsinki Final Act. Canada played an active role in all three Baskets in sponsoring and supporting measures that addressed the most serious issues. We pursued these goals patiently, constructively, and at times stubbornly. We were convinced that we would deserve to be judged harshly by future generations if we failed to make the most of the Vienna Meeting. That was a common purpose of the Canadian Government and of the non-governmental organizations, here and at home, with whom we were able to work so constructively.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was a series of conferences and agreements which followed from the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and had as its objectives the enhancement of security and confidence, the breaking down of barriers between East and West, and the facilitation of the freer flow of people, information and ideas. The Vienna Follow-Up Meeting closed on January 19, 1989. The following is the text of a speech by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at the conclusion of the meeting.

"We are gathered here this week to conclude more than two years of successful negotiations on the whole range of interrelated subjects essential to security and cooperation in Europe.

When this Conference began, I said in my opening statement that our task would not be easy, and it has not been.

The problems have at times seemed intractable; the language often bitter; the negotiations tense and at times frustrating. There has been the temptation to gloss over difficult issues, to hide real differences. But only by speaking frankly, by facing our differences directly, could we achieve the real changes our people have a right to expect.

Our world has changed since we began this negotiation, and generally changed for the better. For the first time in history, there is an agreement to abolish a whole class of nuclear weapons. The two superpowers have a better attitude toward one another and toward multilateral institutions like the United Nations. Some regional conflicts have been resolved or are on their way to resolution in the Middle East, in Africa and Asia. Soviet forces are withdrawing from Afghanistan, and Mr. Gorbachev has offered unilateral force reductions in Eastern Europe. Our political environment has become more positive, more hopeful.

Incrementally, and by hard bargaining, the Vienna Concluding Document took shape. Subjects whose introduction into a CSCE forum would earlier have been denounced as 'confrontational' or 'interference in internal affairs' were considered openly and debated freely. We could begin to see that the opportunity open to us was even greater than we had thought, if we had the will and the patience to exploit it to its fullest extent.

Our efforts have now been rewarded with success. The Vienna Concluding Document is a welcome milestone in East-West relations and in the evolution of Europe. It reflects and builds on recent changes. It makes significant strides in all the areas covered by the Helsinki Final Act. Canada is proud to have played a role in formulating some of its key elements.

When the Vienna Meeting opened, we had just succeeded in the Stockholm Conference in establishing a set of confidence- and security-building measures that carried considerable political and military significance. But what we

did not know then was how these measures would work in practice. Since 1986, we have seen gratifying progress in adherence to both the letter and the spirit of Stockholm. We now have the confidence to believe that we can further increase transparency and predictability in military affairs. We wholeheartedly support the establishment of negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures to build upon the work of the Stockholm Conference

We now also have the confidence to embark on ambitious negotiations touching on conventional armed forces themselves. These negotiations will take place within the framework of the CSCE process, but will be autonomous — a condition we regard as vitally necessary for their efficiency. They will not be easy. Success will depend at all stages on frankness and trust, which in turn depend, in some measure, on developments outside the arms control arena.

We wish these negotiations success. Canada will play its full role. We will be second to none in seeking imaginative solutions to complex problems.

I should not leave this subject without referring briefly to a negotiation which will conclude before the commencement of the new negotiation on conventional arms control. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks were a pioneering attempt to arrive at conventional arms control measures in a crucial area of Europe. Much of what has been learned from the successes and failures during the many years of these talks will prove useful in the new negotiations.

Other specific elements of this Concluding Document are very important to Canada. We have achieved firm commitments that will improve the conditions under which business people and entrepreneurs can perform their central role in economic cooperation. We have sharpened our commitment to promote contacts between business people and potential buyers and end users, and to publish useful, detailed, and up-to-date economic information and statistics. These measures will expand the economic dimension of our cooperation and growing interdependence. The Conference on Economic Cooperation, with business people and experts par-

ticipating, will be an important first step in this process.

We are particularly pleased with the agreement to promote direct contacts between scientists and institutions and to respect the human rights of scientists. In science, as elsewhere, it is free movement and contacts that contribute to the spread of knowledge and understanding.

We are encouraged that the importance of environmental protection has been recognized. In addition to specific commitments on air and water pollution, hazardous wastes, nuclear safety and other measures Canada supports, we welcome the essential message of this Document: the environment of Europe and the world is a common trust, in which people themselves have a critical stake and role. Governments must cooperate in its protection, but it is above all the commitment, dedication and sacrifice of aware and concerned citizens that will ensure ultimate success.

We think the progress on tourism is important. Eliminating minimum exchange requirements makes tourism more attractive, and easing contacts between tourists and the local population (including permitting them to stay in private homes) will offer greater human contact and understanding.

In the section on principles, we have adopted a firm statement on terrorism and have made a breakthrough in acceptance of the principle of third party involvement in the peaceful settlement of disputes.

In the field of human rights and humanitarian cooperation, our achievement at Vienna has been remarkable, especially when one looks back to the days of the Ottawa Meeting of Experts. Some of the accomplishments of special interest to Canada are:

- the commitment to respect the right of all citizens to associate together and participate actively in the promotion and protection of human rights and in monitoring their government's performance. We have undertaken not to discriminate against those who exercise these rights, and to ensure that remedies are available to those who claim that their human rights have been violated.

We have recognized the role of non-governmental organizations and individuals in promoting human rights.

- the undertaking to ensure freedom of religion and to allow religious communities to have places of worship, institutional structures and funding, and to participate in public dialogue and to

Protection of movement within and between countries

have contacts with believers elsewhere. We have recognized the right of anyone to give and receive religious education in the language of his choice, and to obtain, possess, and use religious publications and materials.

- the commitment to protect the human rights of national minorities, to promote their ethnic, cultural, and linguistic identities and their cultural expression, and to allow contacts with counterparts elsewhere.

- we have committed ourselves to ensuring that no one is subject to arbitrary arrest, detention and exile, to improving the treatment of prisoners, and to protecting individuals from abuses of psychiatric practices.

- we have undertaken to respect the right of people to move within and between countries, including an explicit statement of the right of an individual to leave any country, including one's own, and return to one's own country, subject only to exceptional restrictions.

- we have agreed to a range of measures to remove bureaucratic obstacles to family reunification and travel, to publish laws and allow appeals, to respect the wishes of applicants regarding how long they wish to travel and where they want to go, to remove restrictions on the movement of people, to eliminate the punishment of individuals who wish to travel simply because a relative may have breached exit control regulations, to implement tight, clear-cut time limits for decisions on travel, and to resolve outstanding cases within a very short time after the conclusion of the Vienna Meeting.

- we have acknowledged the qualitative difference between the right to leave and practical commitments regarding entry policy.

— we have taken a large step toward preventing State action against an individual wishing to exercise his right to leave through the arbitrary imposition of restrictions based on national security grounds. The Vienna Concluding Document also ensures that long-term refuseniks will have the time since they were last involved in national security work retroactively credited against any limit during which any restriction will be applied.

— we have undertaken to respect the privacy and integrity of postal and telephone communications, to allow people to listen to radio from outside the country, and to receive, publish, and disseminate information more freely. Scholars and teachers will be able to have more direct contacts and access to research materials.

— we have taken important new steps to protect the rights and improve the working condition of journalists, and provide for the freer flow of information and greater access to culture.

Importance of Conference on the Human Dimension

Built on this solid achievement in human rights and Basket III, and providing a mechanism for its protection and enforcement, is the Conference on the Human Dimension. We welcome the agreement of all participating States to respond to requests for information and to consult bilaterally on specific cases and situations. We look forward to the meetings in Paris, Copenhagen and Moscow where we can pursue the issues of compliance and of new measures to enhance our achievements, as well as to deal with unresolved cases and situations. This Conference and the ongoing mechanism will keep human rights, human contacts, and related humanitarian issues, central to the CSCE process, ensuring that they become a permanent part of the European political landscape.

A symbolic but important aspect of the Conference on the Human Dimension is that one of its meetings will be held in Moscow. It is a measure of the changes

that have occurred in the Soviet Union during the Vienna meeting that this idea, initially received with skepticism by many participating States, should ultimately have been considered seriously and adopted. It is no secret that the record of compliance of the USSR with its human rights commitments was a subject of scrutiny and criticism by my country and others. It is also no secret that Canada was one of the last to be convinced that such a proposal could be considered. This was not a matter of politics or ideology. It was an issue of principle and practice — one in which Canadians, including the many whose roots lie in Eastern Europe, have a direct and personal interest.

Two things should be clearly understood. First, by accepting the Moscow meeting, Canada has not signified that problems of human rights and human contacts in the Soviet Union no longer exist. On the contrary, much remains to be done. Indeed, the USSR has undertaken to continue its work over the next two years of making Soviet society more open, democratic, and governed by the rule of law. Reforms are to be securely institutionalized. We welcome these promised undertakings, and will look forward to their fulfilment.

The second point I want to emphasize is that, having discussed this matter with the Soviet Union, having examined all the facts and assessed its performance against criteria we know to be important to the Canadian people, we consented to the Moscow meeting not just as a compromise or as a political gesture. Our consent should be seen as an expression of hope, based on recent improvements, and of confidence that the future will bring even more.

We trust that when our delegations, and the hundreds of groups, individuals, and journalists that traditionally assemble for CSCE meetings, gather in Moscow in 1991, they will find an open and tolerant environment for frank exchange.

There are many, many more provisions on human rights and humanitarian cooperation in the Vienna Concluding Document which take account of the differing interests of our peoples. Canada considers all of them important.

Together, they are a great achievement. In most cases they are clear and unequivocal. We recognize that there is still room for improvement, but what is in this Document will, if fully implemented by all participating States, lead to great changes in the lives of millions of people, and will have a real impact on European confidence and security. Let me illustrate by one example from our own experience.

On December 7, many communities in Armenia were struck by a devastating earthquake that killed outright some 25,000 people and injured thousands more. At one time, the Government of the Soviet Union and some other participating countries faced with a similar disaster might have said there was no problem, no help was needed. But this time it did not. From all over the world, offers of help came forward spontaneously, inspired by a natural human feeling of sympathy. The Canadian Government responded to the need for assistance.

But what was most remarkable to me was the response of the Canadian people. Those of Armenian descent rallied in fervent support of their ancestral homeland. Many ordinary Canadians, moved by nothing more than their fellow feeling with those in distress, donated money, clothes and supplies. In Ottawa, during the busy Christmas period, I saw volunteers spending days collecting money. Some of the prejudices of decades fell like autumn leaves. The Red Cross and the Soviet Embassy received funds from thousands of Canadians. Giant Soviet transport planes landed in Montreal to pick up tons of supplies, supplementing deliveries to the Soviet Union by the Canadian Government. In the face of disaster, governments cooperated, and people came together.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think anything could better demonstrate what we have been saying for many years — that the ties between people, that grow naturally from common experience and humanity, are one of the keys to a peaceful world. When people know the truth, when they can have contact with each other, they will reach out across barriers, they will forge links far stronger than govern-

ments can ever build. When people are barred from travelling, from visiting with families, from having ordinary contacts, from worshipping freely, from speaking a language or practising a culture, their frustrations breed fear, resentment and instability. When arbitrarily imposed and artificial barriers are removed and people, ideas, and information can move without restraint, when freedom becomes a reality, then there will be no limit to the possibilities that will open before us.

Some participating States have learned that lesson in the past two years. But we must also remind ourselves where these changes have fallen short of expectations and commitments and of what remains to be done. Candour and openness have done much to achieve the success we now enjoy. This is not the moment to abandon them.

Not all participating States have made the same progress. Even in those participating States where reforms are being implemented, there remain pockets of resistance and all-too-frequent lapses into old ways. In some participating countries, minorities and religious believers continue to be harassed and persecuted, and attempts are made to deny them their rights, indeed their very existence, and to eradicate their cultural and religious identities. The human anguish caused by the forced separation of families due to the harsh restrictions on emigration continues in some countries.

In some countries, individuals are still being punished for exercising their right to know and act upon their rights, for criticizing their governments, and for

Frustrations breed fear, resentment and instability

conducting allegedly subversive activity. Indeed, one participating State has, at the very moment of the adoption of this forward-looking Concluding Document, trampled, in Prague, on both its old and its new commitments by taking violent action against groups engaged in the peaceful exercise of their human rights

under the Helsinki Final Act and the Vienna Concluding Document.

Another participating State has, in the face of CSCE tradition and procedures, declared that, notwithstanding its action in giving consensus to the whole Concluding Document, it assumed no commitment to implement those provisions which it considered to be 'inadequate.' By taking this approach, the Government of Romania seems to be attempting to treat the Vienna Concluding Document as a menu from which it would choose those items it would abide by and those it would ignore. This is clearly an untenable interpretation. Our CSCE commitments, arrived at by consensus, are indivisible. My Government, therefore, considers that all participating states must comply with all aspects of this Document, to which we have all given consensus.

The Governments of these participating States must in coming years decide whether they want to move forward in renewal and reform, or cling to policies and methods that are not only distasteful, but now demonstrably outmoded and counterproductive. Canada will continue to encourage change, to criticize shortcomings, to urge the breaking down of barriers. We have no desire to impose our system or beliefs on anyone, but we are convinced that Europe can be a stable and secure place only when all its people can enjoy freedom and personal dignity, and feel safe from the arbitrary exercise against them of the force of the state.

Before closing, I should like to pay special tribute to the Government of Austria for its exemplary hospitality, the standard of openness set at Vienna, and its determination to encourage progress at key moments during the Vienna Meeting. I join as well with my colleagues in expressing our heartfelt thanks for the tireless efforts of the Executive Secretary, Dr. Liedermann, and his efficient and courteous staff. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the crucial role of our colleagues from the Neutral and Non-Aligned participating states, who provided competent and dedicated co-ordinators, and undertook the difficult and delicate task of

embodying our deliberations in draft Concluding Documents.

Mr. Chairman, the Vienna Follow-up Meeting has given us a new framework, new mechanisms, and new avenues for the building of security and cooperation in Europe on a broad front. It has launched a balanced, varied and useful program of follow-up activity with innovative meetings such as the London Information Forum and the Kraków Cultural Symposium. It has provided us with more accurate yardsticks by which we can measure compliance with CSCE commitments and encourage further change. The opportunities and challenges are indeed momentous. As an active and dedicated member of the CSCE community, Canada will be there to meet them." □

The following are some highlights of the Vienna Concluding Document:

- In military security, two distinct negotiations are being launched:
 - a negotiation based on the achievements of the Stockholm Conference in developing confidence- and security-building measures to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe;
 - within the same CSCE framework, an autonomous negotiation among the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact will seek to eliminate any capability for large-scale aggression and achieve a balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels.
- In human rights and humanitarian cooperation, governments agree to:
 - respect the right of citizens to participate actively in the promotion of human rights; ensure that those exercising rights are not discriminated against; ensure that the remedies are available, including appeal to governmental or judicial organs, and the right to a fair hearing; recognize the role of NGOs and individuals in promoting human rights and allow them information, contacts, and free expression.
 - ensure freedom of religion and prevent discrimination against religious communities and individuals; recognize

the status of religious communities and ensure their right to places of worship, institutional structures, sacred books and publications in the language of choice, and to appoint personnel and secure funding;

- protect the human rights of minorities; promote their identities; allow their cultural expression; and allow contacts with counterparts elsewhere.

- respect freedom of movement within and between countries including the right to leave any country and return to one's own country.

- ensure that no one is subject to arbitrary arrest, exile or detention; protect individuals from abuse of psychiatric practices; improve treatment of prisoners.

- make decisions on applications for travel for family meetings within one month, and for family reunification and marriage within three months; decide on urgent humanitarian cases as soon as possible; allow families to travel together;

- shorten the time of refusal of emigration permission on grounds of access to security; provide regular reviews on appeal; resolve long-term refusenik cases.

- resolve all outstanding applications for exit permission within six months and conduct regular reviews thereafter.

- provide information and consult bilaterally on specific cases and situations; convene a Conference on the Human Dimension, meeting in Paris (1989), Copenhagen (1990), and Moscow (1991), to consider human rights, human contacts, and related humanitarian issues, and to deal with unresolved cases and situations.

- guarantee the freedom and privacy of postal and telephone communications.

- facilitate the freer and wider flow of information;

- convene follow-up meetings including an Information Forum (London, April-May 1989), a Symposium on the European Cultural Heritage (Kraków, 1991), and discussion of the application of third-party involvement in the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.

- In economic and related cooperation, governments agree to:

- improve business contacts and information;

- convene an Economic Conference including business persons (Bonn, 1990) to discuss ways to improve East-West commercial relations.

- improve cooperation in science and technology including direct contacts among scientists and respect for the human rights of scientists.

- strengthen environmental cooperation and promote public awareness and involvement. □

Conclusion of MBFR Talks

On February 7, the Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué:

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, today took note of the final plenary meeting of the Negotiations on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe in Vienna. The decision to conclude these negotiations was taken by the participating states in light of the agreement to open the new Negotiation on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, in March of this year. Canada, a participant in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, will play a full role in the new negotiation.

"The MBFR negotiations, which began in 1973, have provided a valuable multilateral forum for the discussion of proposals aimed at strengthening security in Europe, although there has been insufficient common ground for the conclusion of a treaty. However, the experience which Canada has gained in this pioneering attempt to arrive at conventional arms control measures will serve us well in the new negotiation, as we pursue a stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels," said Mr. Clark. □

MBFR Concluding Western Statement

Concluding Statement made on behalf of the Western Participants by the Head of the Delegation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Ambassador L.W. Veenendaal, on February 2, 1989.

"Today we are meeting for the last time in this splendid hall. The Governments of the States represented around this table have decided to conclude the negotiations on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe, because in another forum agreement has been reached to begin the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. It is of importance to stress that East and West have reached this decision by consensus. Not only have we by common agreement decided to terminate the talks, but we have also come to agree on the modalities and the procedures adopted for this meeting. The joint communiqué we are issuing today bears witness of this agreement in all its aspects.

Our talks come to an end without our having signed an agreement of substance. In the view of the West, this does not diminish the importance of fifteen years of negotiations and serious efforts to reach for a more stable relationship in Europe. I will not try to deliver a final assessment of these negotiations, but I believe that already now some important conclusions can be drawn. Let me use this opportunity today to put together some of our experiences and try to come to something of an evaluation.

Such an evaluation can only be done correctly if one puts the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations in their proper perspective. The decision to convene these talks should of course be understood in the light of the political circumstances which prevailed in the early seventies. In 1967 the West has taken the important initiative of outlining its views on the improvement of East-West relations in

the 'Harmel Report,' called after the then Foreign Minister of Belgium. In the same period, efforts were undertaken to convene the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which finally opened in Helsinki in 1973 involving not only all members of the two Alliances but also the neutral and non-aligned countries in Europe. But the West believed that an improvement of the political situation in Europe should go hand in hand with a lessening of the military confrontation on this continent. And so, Western proposals to discuss force reductions in Central Europe finally led to the convening of our talks here.

The Western participants came to Vienna in 1973 with great expectations, and with the firm resolve to avail themselves of this unique opportunity to contribute to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. But at the same time it was clear that embarking on this venture meant breaking new ground, politically and militarily, conceptually and practically. Our talks were the first multilateral negotiation on conventional arms control in the post-war period and the participants soon discovered the tasks set by the mandate as laid down in the Final Communiqué to be a great challenge. The complex subject matter obviously required a very careful and tenacious approach, which has inevitably been time consuming.

In the course of the negotiations, both sides have developed their respective negotiating positions, both at the conceptual level and in the form of concrete proposals for an agreement. Proposals by one side were followed by counter-proposals from the other side, usually building on the proposals that preceded them. Although this continuing process did not in the end lead to an agreement, it is important to note its value in enabling both sides over the years to gather a wealth of experience and deeper insight in the complex issues of conventional arms control as well as a better understanding of the concerns of the other side.

This, then, is the first and perhaps most important experience we have gathered in MBFR: it has been an irreplaceable learning process which has enabled us to understand better the whole issue and

the security considerations which are at stake. But there has been more to it. In our talks we have proceeded well beyond formal exchanges and have undertaken thorough discussion of the subject matter itself. And in doing this, we have discovered that we were indeed able to move closer to each other. Despite the great political and practical difficulties, many points of convergence have emerged, both at the conceptual level and on concrete issues.

At the point that we have reached now, there is a large measure of agreement between the two sides on a number of general aims and principles, such as the aim of increased stability at lower levels of forces, the commitment to limit forces after reductions, the requirement for effective verification, the need to proceed on a step-by-step basis and to ensure at each stage that the security of participants is not adversely affected, and the need for appropriate

some important problems remain which East and West have not been able to solve. During our negotiations we have identified main areas of particular difficulty being the data problem, the modalities of verification, the geographical factor and the question of the treatment of armaments. These points are well known to all of us. At this moment, it is enough for me to remark that for the West these areas of disagreement touch upon fundamental requirements for its security. It is not a simple matter of negotiators having failed to find some suitable compromise formula. Rather, these problems require a durable solution which does justice to the West's legitimate security requirements, contributes significantly to the strengthening of peace and security, and at the same time increases confidence between the participants. In this sense, the issues we have not been able to resolve here around this table might well prove to have a wider sig-



The site of the recently concluded Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna.

accompanying measures to enhance stability and confidence.

The fact, however, that after fifteen years an agreement has not been reached is ample evidence that notwithstanding substantial common ground

nificance which goes beyond the scope of our negotiations.

Each side will wish to preserve its own judgment as to why and where opportunities have been missed to solve these important problems. As far as the West

is concerned, we have consistently taken the objective of our mandate very seriously and have done much to fill out the framework it provided with concrete proposals. Throughout all these years, and in all our proposals, the guiding principle of our position has been to seek a genuine improvement of the security relationship in Europe reflected in a meaningful agreement that takes into account the requirements of security and stability.

West has sought improvement in European Security

The West has played its full part in filling the conceptual void that existed at the outset of our talks. It has contributed a number of important concepts, which in the course of the negotiations have gradually been adopted by the East in principle, and have thus become common ground. Examples are the concepts of parity expressed in common ceilings, collectivity, strict and effective verification and the need to solve the problem of asymmetries. We have contributed a number of other ideas, such as the necessary link between reductions and ensuing limitations and the need for associated measures designed to promote the general goal of increasing security and stability. We have proposed numerically ambitious reductions, and more modest ones, reductions including armaments and reductions focussing on manpower only. In the course of these fifteen years, we have made a number of different proposals for a possible agreement: a phased approach, a comprehensive agreement and a time-limited first-phase agreement.

Despite these efforts, we did not reach an agreement in this forum. However, the West is optimistic as we prepare for a new beginning in conventional arms control. We welcome the expressed willingness on the part of the East to engage seriously in conventional arms control issues. There is now general recognition that significant disparities exist in the conventional force balance, which need to be eliminated.

Looking back on these fifteen years of negotiations, our conclusion is that, despite the absence of an agreement,

'the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks were a pioneering attempt to arrive at conventional arms control measures in a crucial area of Europe.' This is a quotation from the speech of the Canadian Foreign Minister, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, at the CSCE concluding plenary meeting only two weeks ago. Our talks have made a valuable contribution to an increasing mutual understanding between East and West of each other's positions, to raising public awareness of the importance of the issues involved and to the gradual creation of a better security relationship in Europe. The experience of the process of negotiating on conventional arms control which we have thus gained is of great and lasting value. And finally, our talks have been a useful instrument to maintain the dialogue between East and West on security issues, even during the more difficult periods of our relationship. As such, our talks have formed an element of stability in themselves.

Our talks end here today. But the efforts to bring about greater security and a more stable relationship in Europe must and will go on. The conclusion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty proved that — given political will on both sides — it is possible to find solutions for seemingly intractable problems. At the same time, it has heightened the awareness of governments and publics alike of the vital importance of the conventional aspects of security and has emphasized the need to try to achieve a more equitable conventional force relationship in Europe at lower levels. The general improvement in the East-West climate, as seen most recently in the successful conclusion of the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting, also points to optimism about the prospects for arms control. The Governments of the West remain committed to the process of arms control, which is an integral part of the West's security policy. Our Governments will continue to explore all opportunities consistent with our security requirements, for effective and verifiable arms control agreements. As has been stated by the NATO Heads of State and Government in their Brussels declaration 'The Way Ahead' on 3rd March 1988: 'We seek negotiations not for their own sake but to reach agree-

ments which can significantly reduce the risk of conflict and make a genuine contribution to stability and peace.'

Mr. Chairman, I have already mentioned that our discussions have contributed to a better understanding between East and West. I think this is now the right moment to add that these many years have also given great satisfaction on a personal level, as they have forged so many bonds of friendship and mutual esteem. I am sure these bonds will last, for which we should be most grateful.

It is also the right moment to address a word of thanks to the authorities of the Republic of Austria. The impeccable and hospitable way in which the authorities have contributed to the organization of our talks deserves our gratitude. We are also indebted to our interpreters who have faithfully rendered their services to our talks for so many years." □

New Conventional Talks Underway

On March 9, the Department of External Affairs issued the following communiqué:

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, today announced that Canada, at the opening sessions of the two new negotiations on conventional arms control in Vienna, tabled a series of proposals aimed at enhancing stability in Europe. Canada tabled these proposals on behalf of all the states members of the NATO Alliance.

In the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), Mr. Clark noted that Canada and its Western Allies seek: the establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels; the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability; and the elimination of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action. To achieve these ends, we have proposed: a radical reduction in the overall levels

of those weapons systems most relevant to surprise attack and offensive action (main battle tanks to 40,000; artillery to 33,000; armoured troop carriers to 56,000); a limit on the amounts of these armaments which can be held by any one country (no more than 30 percent of the overall limits); and additional limits on armaments stationed outside a country's national territory in active units (main battle tanks 3,200; artillery 1,700; armoured troop carriers 6,000). We have also proposed an annual exchange of information regarding military holdings and troop levels, and have underlined the need for stabilizing measures and rigorous verification arrangements.

In the Negotiations on Confidence- and

Security-Building Measures (CSBM), Mr. Clark explained we seek to build upon the successful implementation of the Stockholm Document on CSBM in Europe by creating greater transparency about military organization, as well as military activity. To achieve this, we have proposed: an annual exchange of information concerning military organization, manpower, equipment and major weapons deployment programmes, subject to a system of random evaluation; greater information exchange on military activities; improvements to observation/inspection modalities; the lowering of thresholds for observation and for longer notice of larger scale activities; as well as measures designed to improve contacts and communication. To

enhance the free exchange of ideas and further reduce misunderstandings, we have also proposed the holding of a seminar among all 35 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) participating states on military doctrine.

Mr. Clark noted that the proposals put forward by Canada and its Allies in Vienna enjoy the advantage of being realistic. They involve reasonable steps which, if implemented, could result in a new architecture for security, upon which to build a more stable Europe. It is our hope, Mr. Clark added, that these proposals will be received in the spirit of cooperation in which they have been put forward. ▣

West States Position at Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

The following is the position paper recently provided by the delegations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States at the commencement of the Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Objectives

1. The objectives of these negotiations as agreed in the mandate, are:

- the establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels;
- the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security;
- the elimination, as a matter of high priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action.

2. Through the approach outlined below, the Western Delegations will seek to establish a situation in which surprise attack and large-scale offensive action are no longer credible options. We pursue this aim on the basis of equal respect for the security interests of all. Our approach offers a coherent whole and is intended to be applied simultaneously and in its totality in the area of application.

Rationale

3. The rationale for our approach is as follows:

— the present concentration of forces in the area from the Atlantic to the Urals is the highest ever known in peacetime and represents the greatest destructive potential ever assembled. Overall levels of forces, particularly those relevant to surprise attack and offensive action such as tanks, artillery and armoured troop carriers, must, therefore, be radically reduced. It is the substantial disparity in the numbers of these systems, all capable of rapid mobility and high firepower, which most threatens stability in Europe. These systems are also central to the seizing and holding of territory, the prime aim of any aggressor;

— no one country should be permitted to dominate Europe by force of arms; no participant should, therefore, possess more than a fixed proportion of the total holdings of all participants in each category of armaments, commensurate with its needs for self defence;

— addressing the overall number and nationality of forces will not by itself affect the stationing of armaments outside national borders: additional limits will also be needed on forces stationed on other countries' territory;

— we need to focus on both the levels of armaments and state of readiness of forces in those areas where the concentration of such forces is greatest, as well as to prevent redeployment of forces withdrawn from one part of the area of application to another. It will, therefore, be necessary to apply a series of interlocking sub-limits covering forces throughout the area, together with further limits on armaments in active units.

4. The following specific measures within the area of application would fulfil these objectives:

Rule 1: Overall Limit

The overall total of weapons in each of the three categories identified above will at no time exceed:

- main battle tanks 40,000
- artillery pieces 33,000
- armoured troop carriers 56,000

Rule 2: Sufficiency

No one country may retain more than 30 percent of the overall limits in these three categories, that is,

- main battle tanks 12,000
- artillery pieces 10,000
- armoured troop carriers 16,800

Rule 3: Stationed Forces

Among countries belonging to a treaty of Alliance, neither side will station armaments outside national territory in active units exceeding the following levels:

- main battle tanks 3,200
- artillery pieces 1,700
- armoured troop carriers 6,000

Rule 4: Sub-limits

In the areas indicated below, each group of countries belonging to the same treaty of Alliance shall not exceed the following levels:

(1) In the area consisting of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Romania and the Territory of the Soviet Union west of the Urals comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Moscow, Volga, Urals, Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, Trans-Caucasus, North Caucasus military districts:

- main battle tanks 20,000
- artillery 16,500
- armoured troop carriers 28,000 (of which no more than 12,000 AIFVs)

(2) In the area consisting of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and the territory of the Soviet Union west of the Urals comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Moscow, Volga, Urals military districts in active units:

- main battle tanks 11,300
- artillery 9,000
- armoured troop carriers 20,000

(3) In the area consisting of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic

Republic, Hungary, Poland and the territory of the Soviet Union comprising the Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian military districts in active units:

- main battle tanks 10,300
- artillery 7,600
- armoured troop carriers 18,000

(4) In the area consisting of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic and Poland in active units:

- main battle tanks 8,000
- artillery 4,500
- armoured troop carriers 11,000

(5) Rule 4 is to be seen as an integrated whole which will only be applied simultaneously and across the entire area from the Atlantic to the Urals. It will be for the members of each Alliance to decide how they exercise their entitlement under all of these measures.

Rule 5: Information Exchange

Each year, holdings of main battle tanks, armoured troop carriers and artillery pieces will be notified, disaggregated

Verification stressed

down to battalion level. This measure will also apply to personnel in both combat and combat support units. Any change of notified unit structures above battalion level, or any measure resulting in an increase of personnel strength in such units, will be subject to notification, on a basis to be determined in the course of the negotiations.

Measures for Stability, Verification and Non-Circumvention

5. As an integral part of the agreement, there would be a need for:

- stabilizing measures: to buttress the resulting reductions in force levels in the ATTU area. These should include measures of transparency, notification and constraint applied to the deployment, movement, and levels of readiness of conventional armed forces which include conventional armaments and equipment;
- verification arrangements: to include the exchange of detailed data about

forces and deployments, with the right to conduct on-site inspection, as well as other measures designed to provide assurance of compliance with the agreed provisions;

- non-circumvention provisions: *inter alia*, to ensure that the manpower and equipment withdrawn from any one area do not have adverse security implications for any participating state;

- provision for temporarily exceeding the limits set down in Rule 4 for pre-notified exercises.

The Longer Term

6. In the longer term, and in the light of the implementation of the above measures, we would be willing to contemplate further steps to enhance stability and security in Europe, such as:

- further reductions or limitations of conventional armaments and equipment;
- the restructuring of armed forces to enhance defensive capabilities and further to reduce offensive capabilities. ▣

Canada-USSR Talks

Mr. Fred Bild, Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs, visited the Soviet Union from June 12 to 16, 1989 to participate in a United Nations regional conference on arms limitation and disarmament at Dagomys. Mr. Bild, who was requested by the UN Secretary-General to undertake the chairmanship of an 18-month Study on Verification, made a presentation on the study's progress. The study is being undertaken by a representative group of 20 experts on verification who will assess and identify possible roles for the United Nations in the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements.

While in the Soviet Union, Mr. Bild held bilateral consultations on arms control and disarmament with senior officials of the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow.. ▣

Collins Addresses Opening of CFE

The following is the text given by the Honourable Mary Collins, Associate Minister of National Defence, at the new Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe on March 7, 1989 in Vienna.

"It is a great honour for me to be here to speak for the Government of Canada at this landmark meeting. I know that Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, regrettably unable to be here today, would have appreciated as much as I do the gracious hospitality which has been extended to us by Dr. Mock and the Austrian authorities.

We have come together this week, here in Vienna, a city whose history extends both to the East and West, to mark the opening of two new negotiations on military security. The significance of these negotiations cannot be overemphasized.

We are here to help banish the threat of war in Europe and to search for new expressions of peace and security. We are here to establish new traditions of cooperation for future generations of Europeans and North Americans.

Forty-four years after the end of the Second World War, Europe remains a house divided between two military alliances, with over five million men and women still facing one another under arms. Despite the enormous progress made since 1945, Europeans continue to live with the spectre of sudden military attack. The present concentration of armed forces in Europe is the highest ever known in peacetime; its destructive potential is enormous.

Clearly, this is a situation which cannot be allowed to continue. Europe has seen, over the years, more than its share of war, and well understands its horrors. Canadians too understand the horrors of war; over 100,000 Canadian men and women have died in Europe in two World Wars. Such wars must never be allowed to happen again.

On March 9th, our delegations will sit down at two new negotiations, with the goal of lessening the possibility of war. One of these negotiations, dealing with Confidence- and Security-Building



Ms. Mary Collins, Associate Minister of National Defence.

Measures, will attempt to build upon the already considerable results achieved at the Stockholm Conference; the second, a Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, will attempt to establish a balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels in Europe.

The negotiations which we are about to begin promise to be the most significant arms control and disarmament deliberations yet undertaken on a multilateral basis. If successful, they will have implications for negotiations in other areas as well, and will help consolidate the growing political will for a more stable Europe.

Today, all our peoples have grounds for new hope that the peace we now enjoy will continue — but in a more secure and less confrontational world. We are the makers of our own history. Let us harness our collective energy and direct it toward the creation of a more harmonious and stable European security framework.

The work that has gone into preparing these negotiations, both at the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting and in the Mandate Talks, has been protracted and arduous. However, the results are worthy of the

effort. No arms control undertaking has ever started off on a firmer footing than the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, nor has any begun with more clearly stated objectives and guidelines than the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The signs are encouraging. True, a serious imbalance in conventional forces in Europe still exists. Yet, dramatic progress in arms control and disarmament has been made over the past few years, and problems which previously seemed intractable have yielded, or are in the process of yielding, to long-sought solutions.

The successful conclusion of the Stockholm Agreement in 1986 marked a major step forward toward enhanced security in Europe. The soundness of the agreement signed in Stockholm has been amply confirmed in its implementation.

Since January 1987, some 35 observations of military activities have been carried out under its terms. Canadian soldiers are among those who have been inspected and observed, and have themselves participated in observations. These observations have contributed materially to the heightened sense of confidence which now exists; they have helped entrench such important gains as the right to on-site inspection.

The pattern of observations and contacts among military personnel that has been established is unprecedented in both its nature and scope. A great opportunity exists to enhance this new climate for trust and cooperation. We must build carefully and well on this foundation.

All of our efforts, of course, have not been equally fruitful. Last month, for example, we concluded the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks without having reached agreement. The extent of common ground proved to be insufficient. However, even here we gained invaluable experience.

Earlier this year at the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Mr. Clark described the MBFR talks as a

pioneering attempt at conventional arms control: the positions of the two sides converged on a number of issues and the participants gained a clearer picture of what will be necessary to achieve mutually agreeable and verifiable reductions and limitations of forces and armaments in Europe.

Solid progress has also been achieved in other areas of arms control. The 1988 Intermediate-Range Nuclear forces (INF) treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union has been hailed, quite rightly, as an historic achievement. The progress that these two countries have continued to make toward an agreement on major reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals provides grounds for optimism. I was pleased yesterday to hear both Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary Baker renew their commitment to progress in this crucial area.

On another front, we believe that the political momentum developed at the Conference on Chemical Weapons in Paris, in January, will make it easier to conclude a ban on such weapons at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. In this connection, Canada welcomes and supports the proposals relating to chemical weapons announced here yesterday by Secretary of State Baker. We look forward to working with the United States, Australia and others in the implementation of these proposals. For its part, Canada has recently made public details of its Chemical Defence Research Programme, and we have invited representatives of the Soviet Union to visit the single Canadian facility at which this research is carried out.

This progress reflects the determination with which the Western Allies, including Canada, have pursued arms control and disarmament objectives throughout this decade. All too often it is forgotten that the origins of many key arms control proposals are to be found in the West. It was the unswerving determination of the members of the Western Alliance which ultimately resulted in an acceptance of the 'zero option' for INF. It was in Halifax, Canada, in May 1986, that NATO foreign ministers took decisions to prepare for the negotiation of mandates and arms control proposals relating to conventional arms in Europe

that have led to our meeting here today. It was our call for the elimination of asymmetries in conventional forces in Europe to which the member states of the Warsaw Pact responded in declaring a readiness to reduce their forces in Eastern Europe.

Our proposal will seek to promote enhanced stability

Today we face an emerging new dynamic in East/West relations, in part brought about by changes which are taking place in the Soviet Union. Along with glasnost and perestroika has come a new political thinking in the USSR, which has had its impact in the area of arms control as well. Soviet leaders and their Warsaw Treaty partners now espouse a concept of 'reasonable sufficiency' in military doctrine, which suggests a shift to a more defensive posture. There appears to be a growing appreciation that the West's military approach reflects its own perception of its legitimate defensive needs, in the face of Warsaw Pact force levels and deployments.

Eloquent testimony to this change in thinking was provided by President Gorbachev's statement to the UN General Assembly last December, in which he announced his intention to reduce Soviet force levels and to change the Soviet force posture. This was followed by the announcement of further reductions by other Eastern European countries. Mr. Shevardnadze provided further elaboration yesterday. These were welcome announcements and we look forward to their implementation.

These developments augur well for our undertaking here. Yet the challenge before us in these new security negotiations remains a daunting one. We shall surely need great reserves of political will, confidence and determination when confronted with the enormous complexity of the issues involved. Our will for a stronger peace, based on enhanced mutual security, must drive these negotiations forward.

Canada's interest and engagement in these negotiations results from the long

history and rich traditions which we share with the countries of Europe. Our cultural and linguistic ties with the countries of both Eastern and Western Europe reach back over the centuries, and remain strong; commercially, we prosper as good neighbours. The very foundation of our state was linked to our participation in European affairs. In recognition of this shared heritage and of our continuing common security interests, Canadian soldiers remain in Europe today, firm in the fulfilment of our responsibilities as a member of an Alliance committed to the defence of freedom and human rights.

At the start of the new negotiations on Thursday, Canada will join in tabling detailed, concrete proposals as outlined here yesterday by Sir Geoffrey Howe. In the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, we will work to improve and expand the measures agreed upon in Stockholm, seeking greater transparency both of military organizations and of military activities. We will propose measures for an annual exchange of information concerning military organization, as well as measures designed to produce greater openness and predictability regarding military activities. Convinced that contacts at the military level should be extended in order to improve our understanding of each others military thinking, we will propose as well an organized exchange of views on military doctrine.

These Confidence- and Security-Building Measures will be put forward with a view to affecting an increased openness about military matters; they will seek to dispel the suspicion which is a cause of tension between East and West.

In the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, our proposals will seek to promote enhanced stability through a reduction in the capability of states to mount surprise attacks and large-scale offensive actions. To this end, we will propose an overall limit on the total holdings of armaments in Europe which most threaten us, such as tanks, artillery and armoured troops carriers. These weapons systems are capable of rapid mobility and high firepower and are central to the seizing and

holding of territory. They must be reduced and limited, with equal numbers on each side. As well, we will propose limits on the quantity of those armaments held by any one country, both on its own territory and stationed on the territory of others. No one country should be permitted to dominate Europe by force of arms.

A critically important aspect of these negotiations will be agreement on effective verification measures. Acceptance of verification of compliance as an essential element in the arms control and disarmament process has been formally registered through the adoption of consensus resolutions at the UN General Assembly.

Arms control verification has its own distinct and specific characteristics. It is not equivalent to unilateral monitoring by national means. Neither can it be equated to the observation of unilateral measures under conditions determined by one or more countries without benefit of negotiation. Real verification measures must be a product of negotiation. They must be acceptable to, and equally applicable to, all parties to an agreement. International experience with the negotiation and implementation of such verification measures is still scarce. However, in the bilateral area, the INF agreement is pointing the way, and multilaterally, the implementation of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures under the Stockholm Agreement is providing valuable experience.

Here in Vienna, our negotiators must draw on their experiences in both bilateral and multilateral contexts to develop an effective verification régime, capable of providing confidence in compliance. It will not be sufficient to work toward agreement on reduction measures and subsequently to attempt to devise verification provisions. It will be necessary to examine closely the verification implications of all proposals under negotiation to ensure that compliance with agreements reached can be verified.

A meaningful verification régime will have to be built on a variety of techniques. On-site monitoring, surveillance from space and from aircraft and chal-


lenge inspections will probably all have to be used. We were, therefore, much encouraged by Mr. Shevardnadze's statement that in these negotiations there is no verification measure that the USSR would not be ready to consider and accept on the basis of reciprocity.

In Canada, we will devote considerable resources to this aspect of the negotiations; we have in the past shared the results of our research with the international community. We hope that other nations will devote similar efforts to these important issues. In both negotiations, Canada will be active in devising means to ensure the reliable verification of any agreement.

The proposals that Canada and its Allies will put forward are, in our view, realistic. They will require important changes, not just in the deployment of conventional forces but in our thinking about how peace and security can best be preserved and strengthened in Europe. They will require an unprecedented willingness to draw aside the veil of secrecy which often obscures military operations. The proposed changes are possible and workable. They involve reasonable steps which will further reduce mistrust and the risk of miscalculation. We must now get down to the hard work involved in translating these proposals into agreed measures which, as the Foreign Minister of Poland has just said, will strengthen the security of all.

Today, a growing sense of optimism exists about East/West relations. There is a sense that the world has entered one of those special, if infrequent, period in the history of states when political will and imagination can fruitfully be brought to bear on previously intractable problems. Let us seize this opportunity to redeem the reputation of our century for unprecedented destructiveness and bloodshed. Let us devote all the energies and resources at our disposal to building a genuine and stable security framework for Europe and North America in the 21st century. As a Minister of my Government, as a concerned citizen and as a mother, may I say that we owe no less to our ancestors and to our children." ■

Diplomatic Appointment



Mr. David Peel, Canadian Ambassador to the negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in Vienna.

The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, recently announced the following diplomatic appointment:

Mr. David Peel from Truro, Nova Scotia, as Ambassador to the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and to the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe beginning in Vienna in March.

Mr. Peel (BA, 1954; LLB., Dalhousie University, 1957; Doctorate de l'Université de Paris en droit international public, 1959) joined the Department of External Affairs in 1959. He has served abroad as Second Secretary in Ankara from 1961 to 1963; as Second Secretary in Madrid from 1963 to 1966; as First Secretary in Prague from 1966 to 1968; as Counsellor in Moscow from 1972 to 1974; as Ambassador in Prague from 1981 to 1984. In Ottawa, he was Secretary, Visits Panel Eastern European Division from 1968 to 1972; Deputy to the Chairman, Policy Analysis Group from 1974 to 1975; Deputy Director, Legal Advisory Division from 1975 to 1977; Director, Industry, Investment and Competition Policy Division from 1977 to 1981; Director General, Economic Intelligence Bureau from 1984 to 1985. He was Director General, International Security and Arms Control Bureau from 1985 to 1988 and since that time has been Adviser on Conventional Arms Control. He is married to Diana Roberts. They have two children. ■

Western Position Paper on CSBM Issues

The following position paper was provided by the Delegations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

On 9 March 1989, negotiations will open in Vienna among the 35 states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process in order to build upon and expand the results already achieved at the Stockholm Conference with the aim of elaborating and adopting a new set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). The notes below may serve as useful background on the opening.

What are CSBMs?

Confidence- and Security-Building Measures are designed specifically to dispel suspicion and mistrust about military capabilities and intentions. They achieve this through increased openness about military matters: for example, states may provide other states with information about their military exercises, and give the opportunity to watch them.

Historical Background

Confidence-building in Europe began with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The Final Act included a number of relatively modest confidence-building measures which, *inter alia*, encouraged nations voluntarily to notify each other of their plans to conduct certain large military activities.

Voluntary notification was a good start, but did not go far enough. At the Madrid CSCE meeting (1981-83), the Western Allies, therefore, proposed new negotiations to expand upon the measures agreed at Helsinki and to make them mandatory. These negotiations, known as the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) ran from 1984 to 1986. The Conference agreed on a far-reaching programme of interrelated measures, based largely on Western proposals.

These introduced predictability, openness and confidence into the process of training and exercising military forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Among the measures were: the notification of military exercises (at a level below the voluntary Helsinki provisions); invitations to all CSCE states to observe larger exercises; and, most importantly, a system of on-site challenge inspections of military activities as a means of verification. This inspection régime has served as a model for other arms control negotiations.

The CSBM régime agreed at Stockholm has made a substantial contribution in the past two years to increasing the flow of information and introducing predictability and openness to military activities. It has also had a positive effect on the broader East-West political relationship.

Since the Stockholm Agreement came into force in January 1987 more than 35 military activities in 12 countries have been formally observed by representatives of other participating states and 18 challenge inspections — in which one country exercises its right under the Stockholm Document to check that the military activities of another state are consistent with CDE commitments — have been carried out. Inspections have proved their value in building mutual confidence. The increased contacts, especially among military personnel, created by the observation and inspection of exercises have also contributed to better reciprocal understanding. These achievements far exceed what many observers would have believed possible a decade ago.

This has represented an encouraging advance, but again there is more we can do. Further steps are needed toward our goal of reducing tension by clarifying military capabilities and intentions and fostering cooperation. When the new round of CSBM negotiations begins in Vienna in March the Allies will propose a strong, integrated set of measures aimed at propelling forward the process of confidence-building that we launched so successfully in Helsinki, Madrid and Stockholm.

I Transparency About Military Organization

The following measures would create more openness and confidence about the military force disposition of each participating state. This would be achieved by regular exchanges of information on forces on land in the zone and on major weapons deployment programmes. The information exchanged will be subject to evaluation.

Inspections build mutual confidence

Measure 1: Exchange of Military Information

Participating States would exchange information concerning military organization, manpower and equipment in the zone. This would include annual information on:

- land forces command organization in the zone;
- the designation of major ground units, down to and below divisional level;
- the normal peacetime locations of these units;
- the personnel strength of these units;
- the major weapons systems and equipment belonging to these units;
- land-based air units and their aircraft strength.

It would also include immediate notification of:

- the relocation in the zone of major ground units as specified above from one normal peacetime location to another;
- the calling up of a significant number of reservists.

Measure 2: Information Exchange on Major Conventional Weapon Deployment Programmes

Each participating State would inform the others of those major conventional weapon systems and equipment specified in Measure 1 which it intended to introduce into service with its armed forces in the CDE zone in a specified period.

Measure 3: Establishment of a Random Evaluation System

In order to evaluate the information provided under Measures 1 and 2,

participating States would establish a random evaluation system in which:

- they would have the right to conduct a number of pre-announced visits to normal peacetime locations specified under Measure 1;

- these visits, of a limited duration, would be carried out by personnel already accredited to the host State or designated by the visiting State;

- evaluators would be allowed to observe major weapon systems and equipment;

- appropriate arrangements for the evaluation visit would be made by the host state whose representatives would accompany the evaluation teams at all times.

II Transparency and Predictability of Military Activities

These measures would build upon those agreed in Stockholm by refining them in order to enhance openness and produce greater predictability of military activities.

Measure 4: Enhanced Information in the Annual Calendar

Participating States would provide in their annual calendars more information, and in greater detail, about future military activities. This would include the designation, number and type of ground units down to divisional level scheduled to take part in notifiable military activities in the zone.

Measure 5: Enhanced Information in Notification

To improve the notification concerning military activities, participating States would communicate more information, and in greater detail, about the engagement of their armed forces as well as their major weapon systems and equipment in such ground force activities.

Measure 6: Improvements to Observation Modalities

Participating States would facilitate observation by organizing more detailed briefings, providing better maps and allowing more observation equipment to be used. Furthermore, in order to improve the observers' opportunities to assess the scope and scale of the activity, the participating States are

encouraged to provide an aerial survey of the area of the activity. Moreover, the duration of the observation programme should be improved.

Measure 7: Lowering of the Observation Threshold

Participating States will invite observers to notified activities whenever the number of troops engaged meets or exceeds 13,000 or if more than 300 tanks participate in it.

Measure 8: Improvement to Inspection Modalities

Participating States will adopt measures for a substantial improvement of the inspection which include:

- increasing the number of passive inspections;

- shortening the period between the inspection request and access of the inspectors to the specified area;

- permitting, on request by inspectors, an aerial survey before the commencement of the inspection;

- improving the equipment and communications facilities that the inspecting team will be permitted to use;

- improving the briefings to inspectors.

Measure 9: Lowering the Thresholds for Longer Notice of Larger Scale Activities

Participating States will not carry out military activities subject to prior notification involving more than 50,000 troops unless they have been the object of communication stipulated in the Stockholm Document.

III Contacts and Communication

These measures are designed to increase the knowledge about the military capabilities of the participating States by developing communications and military contacts.

Measure 10: Improved Access for Accredited Personnel dealing with Military Matters

In order to implement the principle of greater openness in military matters and to enhance mutual confidence, the

participating States will facilitate the travel arrangements of accredited personnel (AP) dealing with military matters and assist them in obtaining access to government officials. Restrictions on the APs' activities in the CDE zone should be reduced.

Measure 11: Development of Means of Communication

Participating States, while using diplomatic channels for transmitting communications related to agreed measures (calendars, notifications, etc.), are encouraged to consider additional arrangements to ensure the speediest possible exchange of information.

Measure 12: Equal Treatment of Media Representatives

Participating States will be encouraged to permit media representatives to attend observed military activities; if media representatives are invited, the host State would admit such representatives from all participating States and treat them without discrimination.

IV Exchanges of View on Military Policy

Confidence-building is a dynamic process which is enhanced by the free and frank interchange of ideas designed to reduce misunderstanding and misrepresentation of military capabilities. To this end, participating States would in the forthcoming negotiations avail themselves of the following opportunities.

- to discuss issues concerning the implementation of the provisions of the Stockholm Document;

- to discuss, in a seminar setting, military doctrine in relation to the posture and structure of conventional forces in the zone, including *inter alia*:

- exchanging information on their annual military spending;

- exchanging information on the training of their armed forces, including references to military manuals;

- seeking clarification of developments giving rise to uncertainty, such as changes in the number and pattern of notified military activities. ■

True North Strong and Free Addresses Arctic Issues

The following is the speech given by the Honourable Mary Collins, P.C., MP, Associate Minister of National Defence to the True North Strong and Free Arctic Inquiry held on March 18, 1989 in Edmonton, Alberta. The Disarmament Fund of this Department provided financial assistance to the organizer of the Conference, the True North Strong and Free Inquiry Society.

"I am pleased, on behalf of the Government of Canada, to congratulate the True North Strong and Free Society for organizing and promoting this second meeting in its continuing dialogue about Canada, the world and the future.

On a cold and blistery November weekend in 1986, we witnessed an event, unique in contemporary Canadian public policy — the first True North Strong and Free Conference. Five thousand Canadians, from all walks of life and shades of opinion, participated in a public discussion of defence policy and nuclear arms issues. The stuff real democracy is made of.

Your deliberations then, as they do today, touched upon many of the social and political issues that are before Canadians. I am impressed by the broad coverage of Arctic affairs to be offered by the distinguished panel of speakers that you have gathered here for your Conference; and in particular I am pleased to see that my colleague Johan Holst, the Norwegian Minister of National Defence, is with us for the Conference.

My participation in your deliberations today is not pure coincidence or based on the luck of the draw. Over the five years which I spent working in the Arctic, I came to know, and be part of the people of the north, their hopes and dreams, as well as their concerns. I am here not only as a Minister of a Government committed to the preservation and enhancement of life in the north, but also as an individual who seeks to be part of a solution, and not part of the problem.

Having said that, the central issue facing any government is to seek consensus and to find the right balance between the competing interests. Prudence and patience are inextricably

linked to this delicate balancing act, as we seek out solutions on issues that are not always absolute.

Those of us whose nations lie around the Arctic Basin must become more involved in and informed about Arctic affairs if we are to make clear judgments about peace and security. The pace of technological, political and climatic developments which affect the Arctic is also increasing.

New developments in communications, transportation, resource extraction and in military capability have increased the strategic importance of the Arctic. Discoveries about the ozone layer and the greenhouse effect underline the very sensitive environmental role of the Arctic region. These developments are drawing together the northern peoples of the world and focussing attention on common interests and opportunities.

It has been said that this is the age of the Arctic, and it is most appropriate that the focus of this Conference is on the choices for peace and security in that region.

In 1985, the Joint Parliamentary Committee that reviewed Canada's international relations pressed for a northern dimension to Canada's foreign policy. The Government's response to these recommendations, in 1986, focussed on four broad policy themes. They were:

- buttressing our sovereignty over Arctic waters;
- modernizing our northern defences;
- preparing for the commercial use of the Northwest Passage; and
- expanding our circumpolar relations, including contacts among northerners of different nations.

The Government's response also stressed the need for consistency between foreign and domestic policy initiatives to ensure a comprehensive and coherent Arctic policy.

Canada has been and continues to be active in circumpolar cooperation. Recent agreements have been entered into with Denmark on environmental

cooperation and with the Soviet Union for the exchange of Arctic scientists and scientific data.

Additionally, we are supporting the development of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference which will meet this June. We have intensified our cooperation with Norway on northern issues, resulting in a bilateral conference held in Tromsø in 1987, led by our respective foreign ministers.

On the home front, the Government is pursuing a domestic agenda that includes the devolution of provincial-type

We must make every effort to preserve the traditional values of our northern peoples

programs to the governments of the Territories, and moving toward an early settlement of native land claims. In doing so, we must make every effort to preserve the traditional values of our northern peoples as we focus on political and economic change, and as we look for security and prosperity in the north.

Limiting excessive militarization of the Arctic in the interests of strategic stability, within the context of our arms control and disarmament effort is of particular interest to this Government. However, as we pursue these goals, we must temper our idealism with realism. We cannot gamble with our freedom and security — they are too precious.

Over the next two days, we will hear a lot about security, freedom and prosperity — they are, after all, the handmaidens of peace. But they do not exist for nations in an abstract sense — they are highly dependent on:

— the extent to which the rights, values and freedoms of the people and the environment in which they live, are protected;

— the economic and social health of the people, individually and collectively; and

— the degree of military security enjoyed.

A nation cannot ignore these factors, in any of its regions, and consider itself truly secure. The multi-dimensional approach taken by the organizers of this conference recognizes these relationships and I hope will promote a balanced debate on the choices for peace and security.

For my part, let me say a few words about security, defence and arms control. The security of the Arctic is inseparable from that of Canada as a whole. The threat does not originate in the Arctic, and its solution does not lie there. It lies in the resolution of East-West tensions.

We cannot regard the security of our Arctic in isolation from our national security

Let me look for a moment at the East-West relationship, which is unquestionably in a state of flux. Its fundamental nature is changing — we hope for the better.

There is no doubt that the changes we have seen in the Soviet Union — in the field of human rights; in declarations about, and changes in, foreign policy; and in the unilateral commitment to disarmament — are all positive developments. In responding to these changes, we must ask ourselves how far will they go? And how long will they last?

Neither of these questions, of course, have definitive answers. A process that is so volatile can change dramatically in a very short time. Our responses must be crafted to benefit fully from the progress that is made while protecting us from reversals which could result and threaten our security. This is not an easy challenge and it must be met with imagination and prudence.

I have just returned from Vienna, where I represented Canada at the opening of the new Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. I sensed that the assembled Ministers from NATO, the Warsaw Pact and neutral and non-aligned European nations shared an awareness that we have an opportunity now, which we may not

have again, to reduce the level of conventional armed confrontation on the fault line of East-West relations.

The results we achieve through these negotiations will set the tone of the East-West relationship for the next generation. Should we fail to act constructively and with patience and determination, the talks could suffer the paralysis experienced in negotiations of the early eighties. In that event, our security will continue to be threatened by the presence of large imbalances in conventional forces in Europe in favour of the Warsaw Pact.

But never before have the prospects for a mutually beneficial, verifiable agreement been so bright — an agreement that would eliminate the asymmetries in stationed forces and severely reduce the potential for mounting surprise attacks or large-scale offensive operations.

Can you imagine what a different world it would be if the confrontation in Europe was contained and defused? What better impetus for future arms control could there be than a successful completion of a verifiable agreement to this end?

As we stand on the threshold of these negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe, we can also be optimistic that the START talks between the Soviet Union and the United States, aimed at a mutual reduction of fifty per cent in strategic systems, will gain momentum as the year unfolds. There is also hope that good progress will be made toward a treaty to ban chemical warfare.

Indeed, this would appear to be an occasion in the course of East-West relations when the interests of both sides coincide. A shared interest exists in reducing the size of armed forces and siphoning resources from the defence to the civilian sides of the respective economies. We must not let such a chance slip through our fingers. I had the opportunity to convey Canada's desire for progress toward a peaceful, less confrontational world to Mr. Shevardnadze and other foreign ministers in Vienna last week.

Over the next two days, as you explore the choices for peace and secu-

urity in the Arctic, I know that you will approach these issues critically and seriously. And I hope that you will agree with me that peace, security and freedom are not alternatives or add-on options — they are integral parts of a whole. An insecure people are not at peace, and peace without freedom is a hollow condition.

We cannot regard the security of our Arctic in isolation from our national security, and we cannot regard Canadian security in isolation from the security of both East and West.

Peace, security and freedom are the aims of the Government of Canada as surely as they are the aims of the many groups, associations and individuals here today — let us all work together to build a lasting peace and let our legacy to future generations be a true north, truly strong and free." □

North Atlantic Council Declaration

The following is the press communiqué issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, May 29-30, 1989.

NATO's 40 years of Success

As our Alliance celebrates its 40th Anniversary, we measure its achievements with pride. Founded in troubled times to safeguard our security, it has withstood the test of four decades, and has allowed our countries to enjoy in freedom one of the longest periods of peace and prosperity in their history. The Alliance has been a fundamental element of stability and cooperation. These are the fruits of a partnership based on enduring common values and interests, and on unity of purpose.

Our meeting takes place at a juncture of unprecedented change and opportunities. This is a time to look ahead, to chart the course of our Alliance and to set our agenda for the future.

A Time of Change

In our rapidly changing world, where ideas transcend borders ever more easily, the strength and accomplishments of democracy and freedom are increasingly apparent. The inherent inability of oppressive systems to fulfil the aspirations of their citizens has become equally evident.

In the Soviet Union, important changes are underway. We welcome the current reforms that have already led to greater openness, improved respect for human rights, active participation of the individual, and new attitudes in foreign policy. But much remains to be done. We still look forward to the full implementation of the announced change in priorities in the allocation of economic resources from the military to the civilian sector. If sustained, the reforms will strengthen prospects for fundamental improvements in East-West relations.

We also welcome the marked progress in some countries of Eastern Europe toward establishing more democratic institutions, freer elections and greater political pluralism and economic choice. However, we deplore the fact that certain Eastern European governments have chosen to ignore this reforming trend and continue all too frequently to violate human rights and basic freedoms.

Our vision of a just, humane and democratic world has always underpinned the policies of this Alliance. The changes that are now taking place are bringing us closer to the realization of this vision.

We want to overcome the painful division of Europe, which we have never accepted. We want to move beyond the post-war period. Based on today's momentum of increased cooperation and tomorrow's common challenges, we seek to shape a new political order of peace in Europe. We will work as Allies to seize all opportunities to achieve this goal. But ultimate success does not depend on us alone.

Our guiding principles in the pursuit of this course will be the policies of the Harmel Report in their two com-

plementary and mutually reinforcing approaches: adequate military strength and political solidarity and, on that basis, the search for constructive dialogue and cooperation, including arms control, as a means of bringing about a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.

The Alliance's long-term objectives are:

— to ensure that wars and intimidation of any kind in Europe and North America are prevented, and that military

We want to overcome the painful division of Europe

aggression is an option which no government could rationally contemplate or hope successfully to undertake, and by doing so to lay the foundations for a world where military forces exist solely to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of their countries, as has always been the case for the Allies;

— to establish a new pattern of relations between the countries of East and West, in which ideological and military antagonism will be replaced with co-operation, trust and peaceful competition; and in which human rights and political freedoms will be fully guaranteed and enjoyed by all individuals.

Within our larger responsibilities as Heads of State or Government, we are also committed

— to strive for an international community founded on the rule of law, where all nations join together to reduce world tensions, settle disputes peacefully, and search for solutions to those issues of universal concern, including poverty, social injustice and the environment, on which our common fate depends.

Maintaining Our Defence

Peace must be worked for; it can never be taken for granted. The greatly improved East-West political climate offers prospects for a stable and lasting peace, but experience teaches us that we must remain prepared. We can overlook neither the capabilities of the Warsaw Treaty countries for offensive

military action, nor the potential hazards resulting from severe political strain and crisis.

A strong and united Alliance will remain fundamental not only for the security of our countries but also for our policy of supporting political change. It is the basis for further successful negotiations on arms control and on measures to strengthen mutual confidence through improved transparency and predictability. Military security and policies aimed at reducing tensions as well as resolving underlying political differences are not contradictory but complementary. Credible defence based on the principle of the indivisibility of security for all member countries will thus continue to be essential to our common endeavour.

For the foreseeable future, there is no alternative to the Alliance strategy for the prevention of war. This is a strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up-to-date where necessary. We shall ensure the viability and credibility of those forces, while maintaining them at the lowest possible level consistent with our security requirements.

The presence of North American conventional and nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe just as Europe's security is vital to that of North America. Maintenance of this relationship requires that the Allies fulfil their essential commitments in support of the common defence. Each of our countries will accordingly assume its fair share of the risks, roles and responsibilities of the Atlantic partnership. Growing European political unity can lead to a reinforced European component of our common security effort and its efficiency. It will be essential to the success of these efforts to make the most effective use of resources made available for our security. To this end, we will seek to maximize the efficiency of our defence programmes and pursue solutions to issues in the area of economic and trade policies as they effect our defence. We will also continue to protect our technological capabilities by effective export controls on essential strategic goods.

Initiatives on Arms Control

Arms control has always been an integral part of the Alliance's security policy and of its overall approach to East-West relations, firmly embedded in the broader political context in which we seek the improvement of those relations.

The allies have consistently taken the lead in developing the conceptual foundations for arms control, identifying areas in which the negotiating partners share an interest in achieving a mutually satisfactory result while safeguarding the legitimate security interests of all.

High Level Task Force to examine troop reductions

Historic progress has been made in recent years, and we now see prospects for further substantial advances. In our determined effort to reduce the excessive weight of the military factor in the East-West relationship and increasingly to replace confrontation by cooperation, we can now exploit fully the potential of arms control as an agent of change.

We challenge the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to join us in accelerating efforts to sign and implement an agreement which will enhance security and stability in Europe by reducing conventional armed forces. To seize the unique opportunity at hand, we intend to present a proposal that will amplify and expand on the position we tabled at the opening of the CFE negotiations on 9th March.^(*) We will

— register agreement, based on the ceilings already proposed in Vienna, on tanks, armoured troop carriers and artillery pieces held by members of the two Alliances in Europe, with all of the withdrawn equipment to be destroyed. Ceilings on tanks and armoured troop carriers will be based on proposals already tabled in Vienna; definitional

questions on artillery pieces remain to be resolved:

— expand our current proposal to include reductions by each side to equal ceilings at the level 15 percent below current Alliance holdings of helicopters and of all land-based combat aircraft in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone, with all the withdrawn equipment to be destroyed;

— propose a 20 percent cut in combat manpower in US stationed forces, and a resulting ceiling on US and Soviet ground and air force personnel stationed outside of national territory in the Atlantic to the Urals zone at approximately 275,000. This ceiling would require the Soviet Union to reduce its forces in Eastern Europe by some 325,000. United States and Soviet forces withdrawn will be demobilized;

— seek such an agreement within six months to a year and accomplish the reductions by 1992 or 1993. Accordingly, we have directed the Alliance's High Level Task Force on conventional arms control to complete the further elaboration of this proposal, including its verification elements, so that it may be tabled at the beginning of the third round of the CFE negotiations, which opens on 7th September 1989.

We consider as an important initiative President Bush's call for an "open skies" regime intended to improve confidence among states through reconnaissance flights, and to contribute to the transparency of military activity, to arms control and to public awareness. It will be the subject of careful study and wide-ranging consultations.

Consistent with the principles and objectives set out in our Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament which we have adopted at this meeting, we will continue to use arms control as a means to enhance security and stability at the lowest possible level of armed forces, and to strengthen confidence by further appropriate measures. We have already demonstrated our commitment to these objectives: both by negotiations and by unilateral action, resulting since 1979 in reductions of over one-third of the nuclear holdings assigned to SACEUR in Europe.

Toward an Enhanced Partnership

As the Alliance enters its fifth decade, we will meet the challenge of shaping our relationship in a way which corresponds to the new political and economic realities of the 1990s. As we do so, we recognize that the basis of our security and prosperity — and of our hopes for better East-West relations — is and will continue to be the close cohesion between the countries of Europe and of North America, bound together by their common values and democratic institutions as much as by their shared security interests.

Ours is a living and developing partnership. The strength and stability derived from our transatlantic bond provide a firm foundation for the achievement of our long-term vision, as well as of our goals for the immediate future. We recognize that our common tasks transcend the resources of either Europe or North America alone.

We welcome in this regard the evolution of an increasingly strong and coherent European identity, including in the security area. The process we are witnessing today provides an example of progressive integration, leaving centuries-old conflicts far behind. It opens the way to a more mature and balanced transatlantic partnership and constitutes one of the foundations of Europe's future structure.

To ensure the continuing success of our efforts we have agreed to

— strengthen our process of political consultation and, where appropriate, co-ordination, and have instructed the Council in Permanent Session to consider methods for its further improvement;

— expand the scope and intensity of our effort to ensure that our respective approaches to problems affecting our common security are complementary and mutually supportive;

— renew our support for our economically less-favoured partners and to reaffirm our goal of improving the present level of cooperation and assistance;

^(*) France takes this opportunity to recall that, since the mandate for the Vienna negotiations excludes nuclear weapons, it retains complete freedom of judgment and decision regarding the results contributing to the implementation of its independent nuclear deterrent strategy.

— continue to work in the appropriate fora for more commercial, monetary and technological cooperation, and to see to it that no obstacles impede such cooperation.

Overcoming the Division of Europe

Now, more than ever, our efforts to overcome the division of Europe must address its underlying political causes. Therefore, all of us will continue to pursue a comprehensive approach encompassing the many dimensions of the East-West agenda. In keeping with our values, we place primary emphasis on basic freedoms for the people in Eastern Europe. These are also key elements for strengthening the stability and security of all states and for guaranteeing lasting peace on the continent.

The CSCE process encompasses our vision of a peaceful and more constructive relationship among all participating states. We intend to develop it further, in all its dimensions, and to make the fullest use of it.

We recognize progress in the implementation of CSCE commitments

We place primary emphasis on basic freedoms

by some Eastern countries. But we call upon all of them to recognize and implement fully the commitments which all CSCE states have accepted. We will invoke the CSCE mechanisms — as most recently adopted in the Vienna Concluding Document — and the provisions of other international agreements, to bring all Eastern countries to:

— enshrine in law and practice the human rights and freedoms agreed in international covenants and in the CSCE documents, thus fostering progress toward the rule of law;

— tear down the walls that separate us physically and politically, simplify the crossing of borders, increase the number of crossing points and allow the free exchange of persons, information and ideas;

— ensure that people are not prevented by armed force from crossing the

frontiers and boundaries which we share with Eastern countries, in exercise of their right to leave any country, including their own;

— respect in law and practice the right of all the people in each country to determine freely and periodically the nature of the government they wish to have;

— see to it that their peoples can decide through their elected authorities what form of relations they wish to have with other countries;

— grant the genuine economic freedoms that are linked inherently to the rights of the individual;

— develop transparency, especially in military matters, in pursuit of greater mutual understanding and reassurance.

The situation in and around Berlin is an essential element in East-West relations. The Alliance declares its commitment to a free and prosperous Berlin and to achieving improvements for the city especially through the Allied Berlin Initiative. The Wall dividing the city is an unacceptable symbol of the division of Europe. We seek a state of peace in Europe in which the German people regains its unity through free self-determination.

Our Design for Cooperation

We, for our part, have today reaffirmed that the Alliance must and will reintensify its own efforts to overcome the division of Europe and to explore all available avenues of cooperation and dialogue. We support the opening of Eastern societies and encourage reforms that aim at positive political, economic and human rights developments. Tangible steps toward genuine political and economic reform improve possibilities for broad cooperation, while a continuing denial of basic freedoms cannot but have a negative effect. Our approach recognizes that each country is unique and must be treated on its own merits. We also recognize that it is essentially incumbent upon the countries of the East to solve their problems by reforms from within. But we can also play a constructive role within the framework of our Alliance as well as in our respective bilateral relations and in international organizations, as appropriate.

To that end, we have agreed the following joint agenda for the future:

— as opportunities develop, we will expand the scope of our contacts and cooperation to cover a broad range of issues which are important to both East and West. Our goal is a sustained effort geared to specific tasks which will help deepen openness and promote democracy within Eastern countries and thus contribute to the establishment of a more stable peace in Europe;

— we will pursue in particular expanded contacts beyond the realm of government among individuals in East and West. These contacts should include all segments of our societies, but in particular young people, who will carry the responsibility for continuing our common endeavour;

— we will seek expanded economic and trade relations with the Eastern countries on the basis of commercially sound terms, mutual interest and reciprocity. Such relations should also serve as incentives for real economic reform and thus ease the way for increased integration of Eastern countries into the international trading system;

— we intend to demonstrate through increased cooperation that democratic institutions and economic choice create the best possible conditions for economic and social progress. The development of such open systems will facilitate cooperation and, consequently, make its benefits more available;

— an important task of our cooperation will be to explore means to extend Western experience and know-how to Eastern countries in a manner which responds to and promotes positive change. Exchanges in technical and managerial fields, establishment of cooperative training programmes, expansion of educational, scientific and cultural exchanges all offer possibilities which have not yet been exhausted;

— equally important will be to integrate Eastern European countries more fully into efforts to meet the social, environmental and technological challenges of the modern world, where common interest should prevail. In accordance

with our concern for global challenges, we will seek to engage Eastern countries in cooperative strategies in areas such as the environment, terrorism, and drugs. Eastern willingness to participate constructively in dealing with such challenges will help further cooperation in other areas as well;

— East-West understanding can be expanded only if our respective societies gain increased knowledge about one another and communicate effectively. To encourage an increase of Soviet and Eastern studies in universities of our countries and of corresponding studies in Eastern countries, we are prepared to establish a Fellowship/Scholarship programme to promote the study of our democratic institutions, with candidates being invited from Eastern as well as Western Europe and North America.

Global Challenges

Worldwide developments which affect our security interests are legitimate matters for consultation and, where appropriate, co-ordination among us. Our security is to be soon in a context broader than the protection from war alone.

Regional conflicts continue to be of major concern. The coordinated approach of Alliance members recently has helped toward settling some of the world's most dangerous and long-standing disputes. We hope that the Soviet Union will increasingly work with us in positive and practical steps toward diplomatic solutions to those conflicts that continue to preoccupy the international community.

We will seek to contain the newly emerging security threats and destabilizing consequences resulting from the uncontrolled spread and application of modern military technologies.

In the spirit of Article 2 of the Washington Treaty, we will increasingly need to address worldwide problems which have a bearing on our security, particularly environmental degradation, resource conflicts and grave economic disparities. We will seek to do so in the appropriate multilateral fora, in the widest possible cooperation with other States.

We will each further develop our close cooperation with the other industrial democracies akin to us in their objectives and policies.

We will redouble our efforts in a reinvigorated United Nations, strengthening its role in conflict settlement and peace-keeping, and in its larger endeavours for world peace.

Our "Third Dimension"

Convinced of the vital need for international cooperation in science and technology, and of its beneficial effect on global security, we have for several decades maintained Alliance programmes of scientific cooperation. Recognizing the importance of safeguarding the environment we have also cooperated, in the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, on environmental matters.

These activities have demonstrated the broad range of our common pursuits. We intend to give more impact to our programmes with new initiatives in these areas.

The Future of the Alliance

We, the leaders of 16 free and democratic countries, have dedicated ourselves to the goals of the Alliance and are committed to work in unison for their continued fulfilment.

At this time of unprecedented promise in international affairs, we will respond to the hopes that it offers. The Alliance will continue to serve as the cornerstone of our security, peace and freedom. Secure on this foundation, we will reach out to those who are willing to join us in shaping a more stable and peaceful international environment in the service of our societies. ■

Mulroney Comments on NATO Summit

The following are notes prepared for Prime Minister Mulroney's Press Conference following the NATO Summit.

"We came to Brussels to celebrate 40 years of Alliance cooperation — 40 years which have assured our nations peace and prosperity. At the same time, we were able to welcome a man of great experience and wisdom in foreign affairs, the new President of the United States.

We also came to chart the future.

In so doing, we faced two challenges: one, the question of how to make the most of the opportunities presented by the revolution shaking the Soviet Union, and second, the adoption of a framework for all arms control negotiations the Alliance will undertake in the foreseeable future.

Over the last 24 hours, all 16 delegations have demonstrated in their work the qualities that continue to keep this Alliance strong and forward-looking.

We have had to tackle difficult problems, and we have had to reconcile a number of conflicting approaches. By taking into account the particular concerns of some and the welfare of all, we managed once again to come to an agreement. And we did so by reaching a genuine understanding on what we wanted collectively — not by simply papering over the cracks.

Canada played its part in all of this.

As you know, President Bush put before us a far-reaching proposal to advance the conventional force negotiations now taking place in Vienna. The proposal is imaginative and ambitious.

We are challenging the Soviet Union to come to an early agreement on all categories of conventional arms (tanks, artillery, armoured personnel carriers, strike aircraft and helicopters) which the USSR want to negotiate. The United States is also offering to limit, on a reciprocal basis, the number of Soviet and American troops stationed in Europe between the Urals and the Atlantic.

President Bush's proposal was important in its own right; it also was key to helping unblock the short-range nuclear forces (SNF) impasse because it opens the possibility for negotiations on short-range missiles immediately after implementation of a conventional agreement is underway. That could be in the next year or two.

At Canada's suggestion, NATO unanimously endorsed the proposal and agreed to prepare it for formal presentation in Vienna, within 60 to 90 days.

NATO experts responding to Canadian verification initiative

The Summit endorsed President Bush's call for an open skies regime, a proposal Canada had urged upon President Bush some time ago.

It could turn out to be a significant confidence-building measure and play an important role in the verification regime for the Conventional Arms Agreement we hope to reach in the near future.

While we are meeting here, experts from all NATO countries are responding to another Canadian initiative made some months ago. They are meeting in Canada at Collège militaire royal de St-Jean to examine how a conventional agreement could be properly and persuasively verified.

On a non-military and perhaps less dramatic note, the Declaration issued today contains a decision to establish a scholarship fund to enable participants from East and West alike to study democratic institutions. I was very pleased to note that my colleagues welcomed this Canadian proposal, put forward earlier by Ambassador Smith.

Forty years ago, Canada fought hard and successfully to have the Atlantic Treaty recognize the intrinsic value of political and economic, as well as military, security for this Alliance.

At this Summit, we reaffirmed our common purpose, and charted a course for achieving a stable structure of peace and stability. The fact that the SNF issue has been successfully resolved and given the right place in the Alliance's

comprehensive concept is a particularly happy event.

It clears the way for a systematic and reasonable approach to all arms control negotiations the Alliance will undertake in coming years. It will enable us to conduct those negotiations with the assurance that our security is sound as we progress toward our goal of stability at reduced levels of armaments.

In particular, it sets out clearly when negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons can start.

When taken together with the proposals made by President Bush yesterday, this could mean that within a matter of a few years the two super-powers could find themselves with no more than 275,000 troops each in Europe outside the Soviet Union, radically reduced levels of conventional armaments and on the way to cutting SNF to below 88 launchers each.

When one considers that the Soviet Union now has approximately 1,800 such missiles at the ready, one can understand what an achievement it would be simply to bring them down to parity with NATO.

Once we have actually begun those programs of weapon destruction and troop withdrawal, we will be well on the road to a safer and more stable world. We hope it will also be one in which we shall have established significant cooperation with the East bloc on global issues such as the environment. These are some of the objectives toward which we have taken important steps these last two days.

The Alliance has come out of this Summit in robust health. We had some differences; we resolved them to everyone's satisfaction. Every member is a winner because of that.

The Political Declaration lays out a road map for our future relations with Eastern Europe. The approach is clear — we want Mr. Gorbachev's reforms to succeed. We have offered him an opportunity for early agreement on a Conventional Arms Agreement of historic proportions; we have agreed to SNF negotiations; we have challenged

Mr. Gorbachev to match our willingness to open up our territory to aerial inspection.

This was a Summit of celebration and substance. I return to Canada reinforced in my convictions about the importance of the Alliance to Canada and of Canada's role in it." □

NATO a Cornerstone of Canadian Foreign Policy

The following is the statement by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the House of Commons on the occasion of NATO's 40th Anniversary, on April 4, 1989.

"I rise today to pay tribute to the 40th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which has been a cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy for successive Canadian governments. What we celebrate is not only 40 years of uninterrupted peace in Europe, but also the values which brought us together then and which still unite us today.

When he signed the treaty on behalf of Canada, the Right Honourable Lester Pearson stated:

'This treaty, though born out of fear and frustration, must, however, lead to positive social, economic and political achievements which will extend beyond the time of emergency which gave it birth, or the geographic area which it now includes.'

We must keep in mind the situation prevailing at that time: fully armed Soviet troops were still stationed in Europe; the West Berlin blockade was on; a Communist takeover had just crushed Czechoslovakia's nascent democracy; and the nations of Western Europe, barely through with the war, were openly threatened by a similar fate. There is a striking contrast with the prosperous times we are experiencing today, and NATO has been and still is an essential instrument of such progress.

The unity and determination of the Alliance have often been put to the test: recurrent troubles in Eastern Europe, the uprising in Hungary, the Suez Canal crisis, the crushing of Prague's spring-time demonstrations, detente in the Seventies, Afghanistan and the double decision. In every instance, NATO came through stronger and more relevant.

Today NATO provides for the common security of over 600 million people in 16 nations on both sides of the Atlantic. The modern era is marked by conflict, yet Europe, the region with the highest concentration of sophisticated weaponry in the world, is enjoying the longest sustained period of peace and stability since the height of the Holy Roman Empire. That peace was made possible through NATO's persistent commitment to pursue complementary goals: first, to maintain adequate defences to deter aggression; second, to control and limit armaments through carefully negotiated and verifiable agreements; and third, to constantly promote dialogue with the countries of Eastern Europe.

Has the Alliance met the test that Lester Pearson set for it 40 years ago? Has it led to positive social, economic and political achievements? Is it more than just a military alliance? Clearly, the answer is 'yes' to all questions.

It was through NATO in 1972 that we and our Allies set down our objectives for the conference on security and co-operation in Europe. Through that process, we have secured from the Soviet Union, and its East European Allies, real commitments in human rights, economic cooperation and military security. Today, in the East, there is greater respect for the rights of individuals, greater freedom to travel to visit friends or relatives and greater freedom to worship. That progress would not have been made without the tenacity with which the allies pressed the East to extend to their publics the privileges and rights which we take for granted.

We are at an historic juncture now. The two superpowers have agreed to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. Significant progress has been made on a treaty to reduce by approxi-

mately 50 percent the size of their strategic nuclear arsenals. A new sense of purpose has been injected into their efforts to control and ultimately ban chemical weapons. And perhaps most important of all, new negotiations to reduce conventional forces in Europe are under way in Vienna. With imagination and good will on both sides, we have every reason for optimism.

Europe is enjoying the longest sustained period of peace and stability since the height of the Holy Roman Empire

President Gorbachev is claiming credit for much of this success and certainly he deserves a good deal of credit. After all, he is redefining the Soviet Union. However, it is important to remember that President Gorbachev has been responding to ideas and proposals originally made by the West. He has been responding to the unity and to the fidelity to Western values which are at the heart of the success of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Every Canadian of good will celebrates the changes that are appearing in the Soviet Union and in parts of Eastern Europe. They represent the kind of genuine progress toward the social, economic and political achievement that Mr. Pearson described. The challenge is for NATO to continue to bring down the tensions between East and West and to continue to build up confidence and co-operation. That will require the same unity and determination which have allowed the NATO alliance to contribute so strongly to the progress so far.

Some have suggested that Canada should step aside from the responsibilities of membership in this Western alliance. Had we stepped aside before, NATO would not have been able to contribute as constructively to the progress the world sees now. Canada has many means to influence peace in the world. One of those, which has worked for 40 years, and is essential to continued progress in East-West relations, is the NATO alliance whose anniversary we mark today.

NATO has been good for Europe, good for North America and good for Canada. This government is committed to ensuring that Canada continues to play a full and leading role in NATO in helping to shape a new era in East-West relations." ▣

Canada to Host Seismic Workshop

From 9-15 September 1989, Canada will host a workshop of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) associated with the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. Meeting in Edmonton and proceeding to Yellowknife, the GSE will discuss technical matters related to detection of seismic events, satellite data communications, and data base management and processing facilities. In addition to these technical matters, the GSE will discuss other arrangements for the second large-scale experiment of a communications and data processing infrastructure scheduled for 1990 and for which the overall (global) coordinator is the senior Canadian representative to the GSE, Mr. Peter Basham of the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources.

Agreed arrangements for the international exchange of seismic data would be needed to verify a complete ban on nuclear testing. The mandate of the GSE is to define the characteristics of a system that would provide such data exchange with a reliability and speed acceptable to all parties to a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Continuing the well-established cooperation between the Verification Research Unit of the Department of External Affairs and the Geological Survey of Canada of the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, the workshop will also provide a suitable occasion for the opening of the recently upgraded Yellowknife Seismic Array. The presentations will include a detailed summary of some particularly interesting research being conducted at the University of Toronto under sponsorship of the Verification Research Unit and under the scientific supervision of Energy, Mines and Resources. ▣


Crise de crédibilité

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum" of the international community. Constituted in its present form in 1978, it meets in Geneva and has a unique relationship with the United Nations. It is not a subsidiary body of the General Assembly and defines its own rules of procedure and develops its own agenda, taking into account the recommendations made by the General Assembly.

The following are excerpts from the statement by Mr. Fred Bild, Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs, Department of External Affairs, before the Conference on Disarmament, June 20, 1989, Geneva.

"Mr. President. It is time we took stock of the multilateral arms control and disarmament process. It seems to me that we may be approaching a *crise de crédibilité* with our publics in the way disarmament issues are dealt with on an international level. No one doubts the dedication, patience and integrity of the people who study, discuss and negotiate these matters on behalf of their countries. But, in the best tradition of self-criticism, perhaps we should see whether, in the ceaseless round of discussions, meetings, deliberations and negotiations in the various multilateral forums dedicated to disarmament issues, we are not somehow engaged in a faster and faster dance rather than in the process of advancing the dialectic. Instead of attempting to achieve a higher level of unity by reconciling opposites and revealing the truths of the underlying idea, it may seem to the man in the street that the dance just swirls on, frenetically. I don't wish to overtax this metaphor, but it seems somehow an appropriate way of interpreting events of the last while.

Many of the distinguished representatives present here at the Conference on Disarmament will have shared my disappointment at the failure of last year's UNSSOD III to achieve agreement. At what point does the failure to reach



Mr. Fred Bild, Assistant Deputy Minister, Political and International Security Affairs, Department of External Affairs.

agreement at large, highly publicized meetings begin to call the effort itself into question? The paucity of results at most recent meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in the wake of the disappointing outcome of UNSSOD III, cannot help but feed the public's scepticism as to the value of these meetings.

Against this, we have witnessed the gratifying thaw in East-West relations. The superpower relationship seems well poised to reach further accommodation in creating a framework of mutual security. Recent developments in the conventional force reduction negotiations just underway in Vienna have shown dramatically what can be achieved among sovereign states when the spirit of compromise infuses and directs disparate political wills. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) talks will be no Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR). Agreement was forged in a setting where all joined in a quest for a common position from which to address the largest security transition since the end of the Second World War. They are embarking on a venture that seeks to supplant the military confrontation in central Europe with defensive systems restructured into few units with regulated and reduced offensive capabilities.

Although these are early days, the commitment by the NATO countries, led by President Bush's suggestion for an accelerated timetable to get moving in

negotiations with Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) member states gives one hope that disarmament is not the preserve of only the utopian and the idealist. What we are seeing is the effort of the pragmatist to translate noble aspirations into reality. It is the pragmatist who sees the pay-off in disarmament, not just in its promised economic benefits but also in a heightened sense of security — mutual security. The relevance of these comments to the present meeting, Mr. President, is that we are watching in Vienna an unfolding of a multilateral arms control and disarmament process which promises to refute those who argue that only in bilateral arrangements can a country work out a satisfactory security relationship with a potential adversary.

We must also recognize, however, that the quest for disarmament should not be too far in advance of what relevant political conditions can sustain. Until those conditions are dealt with, until, that is, determination is shown by all parties involved to bring their mutual understanding and political accommodation to a level where practical steps toward arms control or actual disarmament can take place, our sights must be lowered somewhat to the level of confidence-building. It is still pertinent to recall the familiar observation that one must learn to walk before one can begin to run.

The achievement of the Stockholm Conference provided a salutary lesson in this regard. The accord reached in September 1986 on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe ushered in an era of greater transparency and openness between military blocs without excluding the neutral and non-aligned states of the region. In so doing, it set the stage for the Conventional Force Reductions we all hope will be the outcome of the CFE negotiations. If these actually manage to bring about the destruction of military equipment before international observers, as proposed, we shall finally have achieved multilateral disarmament without any lessening of security. There is another aspect to the legacy of Stockholm we must not forget: it successfully incorporated short-notice challenge inspection to verify compliance with the provisions of

the Agreement. The acceptance of such powerful verification measures in support of greater transparency in military activities has provided us with a practical, workable recipe for building confidence on a multilateral basis.

Mr. President, verification and transparency are two subjects that have formed a central part of the Canadian Government's approach to multilateral arms control and disarmament. They are central elements in the building of confidence and consensus. It will come as no surprise, I am sure, to the distinguished representatives to this Conference that verification ranks high in our priorities. Canada has endeavoured through its Verification Research Programme to contribute in an effective way to the very foundation of modern arms control. Some of the studies we have initiated have looked at technical problems associated with various methods of verification, while others have sought to clarify the conceptual basis of verification, bearing in mind that much will depend on the type of arms control and disarmament to be verified. Ambassador Marchand's Plenary statement last March illustrated this approach through mention of the projects we have pursued in the past and those we are currently pursuing. I shall not repeat them in detail here.

I should like, however, to add several points on verification as it pertains to multilateral arms control and disarmament. In 1985, attention was initially focussed on this subject in the UN General Assembly through a Canadian initiative which led to the adoption by consensus of a Resolution (40/152 (o)) which crystallized the increasing worldwide awareness of the importance of verification in facilitating the negotiating process. Since then, this awareness has grown and become more sophisticated. For example, the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) during 1987 and 1988 developed a set of general principles of verification. We call them 'the 16 principles.' The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 43 called for a study by the Secretary-General on the role of the UN in verification. This led to the setting up of a Group of Experts from 20 countries who

started their work in February this year. They paid me the honour of electing me Chairman; I, in turn, have pledged to the group that I shall spare no effort in guiding our work to a fruitful conclusion.

The Group's acceptance of the 16 principles as a foundation for its work was a positive development. As one might well expect, the exact nature of our recommendations cannot be determined at this early stage of our work. But progress so far has been good, and I remain optimistic that we shall produce a report that is technically competent, politically realistic and one which will strengthen the multilateral arms control process and the United Nations itself.

Allow me at this point to offer some thoughts on how multilateral verification and the quest for greater transparency and openness surrounding military activi-

Acceptance of 16 principles of verification a positive development

ties can come together to build confidence. Last month, President Bush unveiled a proposal for 'Open Skies.' It would involve, as the name suggests, opening a country's national airspace to short-notice overflights by unarmed aircraft, on the basis of reciprocity. The proposal has been laid out in bilateral terms, involving the territories of the United States and the Soviet Union. President Bush, however, clearly indicated that the proposal could easily be reworked to include member states of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. At the moment, 'Open Skies' is seen as a confidence-building measure independent of any specific arms control or disarmament agreement. It seeks to improve transparency and openness in a way that is accessible to all countries. Highly sophisticated satellite technology would not be required. Nor would any information be gathered that would not be similarly available to other countries, especially in the area of most concern to all: military preparations for surprise attack and offensive action...

Over the past two years, agreement has been reached on vitally important

issues relating to verification, methods and timetables for CW destruction, and declarations in advance of a treaty. The next few steps — hammering out the details — will not by their very nature give the appearance of dramatic progress. But appearances cannot be a substitute for real, if slower and more arduous, headway in completing the draft Convention before us. The key lies in keeping the negotiations free from artificial deadlines and from the inclination to force issues ahead of what consensus can sustain. Progress over the next session will be step-by-step and will depend on appropriate attention to detail. I commend the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Pierre Morel, in facilitating this progress through his well-focussed and practical work programme.

Mr. President, we must not lose sight of the fact that the sixteen verification principles agreed by consensus at the UNDC constitute the cornerstone of an emerging common approach to disarmament. Accordingly, this consensus must be protected and nourished to allow its roots to sink deeply into the multilateral disarmament process. Naturally, these roots, as they develop, will become more intertwined and complex, but this is true of any firmly established system. We should not be dismayed at the prospect of complexity in verification. The question is how we can carry out practically and effectively that which has been agreed to in principle and by all member States of the Conference.

In the modern age, arms control and disarmament have become, to the surprise of some, perhaps, increasingly reliant on short-notice, on-site inspection. The feature is found in the USA/Soviet Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, as well as in the multilateral Stockholm accord on confidence- and security-building measures. Both agreements have been successfully implemented and fully complied with, a result, I would argue, to a large measure attributable to the possibility of such inspections.

Allow me to amplify these remarks by applying them to the draft chemical weapons convention. I find it difficult to

imagine that any future disarmament treaties can be reached without the prospect of potentially intrusive international verification. Should this be alarming or a

No verification measures will come into play without their being carefully tailored to the requirements of the treaty at hand

cause for disquiet? Not at all. We should always bear in mind that no verification measures will come into play without their being carefully tailored to the requirements of the treaty at hand. Moreover, cooperation and consensus over these details will make the intrusiveness of international on-site inspection into a means of assuring all concerned that the treaty is being fully complied with by all parties.

I have heard it suggested that in the case of the CW Convention, requests for challenge inspections would generate political sensitivities and suggestions of guilt. This outlook misconstrues the objective of such inspections. They need not be regarded as provocative, but rather confidence-inspiring. Until such time as experience and technology permit more systematic methods of inspection to carry the full load of verification, I submit that challenge inspections will be *de rigueur* in virtually all disarmament treaties, the CW Convention being one of the more prominent. What we could be encountering is an 'attitudinal' problem, a problem that can be overcome as long as we keep our eyes firmly on the following: first, an essential concern of the Convention is to ensure that international inspectors have access to any facility where clandestine activities might be undertaken; second, the essential obligation is on the challenged state to demonstrate its compliance, and not on the requesting state to prove non-compliance.

As we have all indicated an abiding interest in a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable CW Convention, this objective in regard to verification should be fully embraced, with the obligations willingly, indeed cheerfully, shouldered.

There is thus no reason to shrink back in fear. Since we have already agreed with the UNDC conclusion that the request for inspection not carry with it implications of guilt but rather be considered a normal element of verification, let us put this 'attitudinal' problem behind us and move to a more practical, less anxious understanding of what challenge inspections imply.

By the same token, we should not venerate challenge inspections as the 'be-all and end-all' of CW verification. Careful thought should be given to elaborating a verification régime that would avoid unnecessary recourse to the challenge provision. Indeed, we can also explore other avenues, perhaps by making challenge inspections as 'routine' as possible; by keeping them as multilateral as possible in execution and reporting of findings; and by allowing as much flexibility as possible in solving compliance problems to everybody's satisfaction through other means. These could include, *inter alia*, mutually agreed bilateral measures, fact-finding 'clarification visits' or other means of demonstrating clarification short of invoking the challenge provisions. I have every confidence that, with ingenuity and perseverance the Ad Hoc Committee will find a way to accommodate the concern over intrusive on-site challenge inspection *without* jeopardizing the integrity of the 'mandatory, short-notice' principle.

Let me now turn to the issue of a comprehensive test ban. Ambassador Marchand outlined Canada's position in his March statement. We consider Ambassador Vejvoda's compromise proposal as the one which offers the greatest promise of a basis for consensus. We look forward to hearing from those who have remained silent in that regard.

But let us again step back for a moment and survey the scene as we end the second disarmament decade. Here we are, on the one hand, stalemated in reaching agreement on a mandate which would allow us to discuss the important issue of a nuclear test ban. All of us have indicated, at one time or another, either unreservedly or with qualifications, our belief that a negotiated comprehensive nuclear test

ban is desirable and achievable. Realism, however, suggests that we cannot allow our expectations on a ban to outstrip what is politically feasible or technically achievable. Again, the need for candour brings us to an uncomfortable prospect: that achieving a test ban, even if it could be done overnight, may not prevent the development of nuclear explosive devices and their possible use in a future conflict, regardless of their being untested. Looking this squarely in the eye is indeed disconcerting.

We in Canada can well understand the frustration of many states at the slow progress in achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but we do not think that it is wise to try to resolve this issue through the back door, so to speak. As you all know, there is an active move afoot to amend an existing treaty — the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) — to achieve a CTBT. Those who favour this course should consider carefully the longer term implications of this move for the whole multilateral disarmament process. Forcing arms control and disarmament treaties to be opened-up for radical amendment is a dangerous game, especially if there is no pre-existing consensus for this among the treaty's signatories. The very future of the existing agreement may be placed in jeopardy. Even more disconcerting is the apparent readiness of at least some to tie this call for a PTBT amendment conference to the future continuation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Any such efforts should be firmly resisted. I cannot think of a better example of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. To threaten to bring down the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation régime in the quest for an amendment which, however well intentioned, in reality gives no promise of producing a global, comprehensive and verifiable test ban is, quite simply, irresponsible.

What we *can* do, however, is to remain relentless and single-minded in preparing the ground for a test ban. Until such time as the nuclear powers are persuaded that a ban is in their security interests, pleas for negotiations will fall on stony ground. Yet this is no excuse for being unprepared when circum-

stances change, as I am hopeful they will. The trepidation the nuclear powers and the rest of us will undoubtedly feel in taking tentative steps into the post-nuclear weapons era will largely be assuaged by assurances that no one is cheating. That is why improvement and refinement of our ability to monitor adequately such a ban should remain paramount on the multilateral disarmament agenda. We need to continue energetically experimentation with, and testing of, seismic data exchanges. Only by improving the expertise and coordination with which seismic events can be globally monitored will a level of verification be reached that is comforting and assuring to all. Let us not be caught in a position where the nuclear powers are ready to call a halt to their testing but the required verification instruments are not yet in place.

Mr. President. The prevention of an arms race in outer space is something that we all wish to achieve. The march of technology is relentless: more and more countries are developing know-how and the means to send rockets with satellites, space probes and other scientific instruments into space. Our task is to try and assure our publics that these activities, even ones carried out under military auspices, are for purposes that contribute to, not detract from, international security.

But before a start can be made in this regard, we must know what international security means as it relates to the uses of space. International security, as Ambassador Marchand has recently pointed out, implies not only the absence of weapons as such in outer space, it entails the responsibility of the two major space powers to maintain a stable, controlled relationship between themselves on space issues. This means that all efforts to consider the relationship between international security and outer space are predicated on the enhancement of stability. It is our job to identify measures concerning the use of outer space that can be taken on a multilateral basis and through consensus, and that will enhance stability, admittedly a daunting task. That is all the more reason to ensure that the first step provides a strong building block from which further proposals can proceed.



A general view of the Conference on Disarmament in plenary session.

UN Photo 163792

Let me reiterate the contention already put forward by the Canadian Delegation. Much more attention has to be given to the basic framework involved in the use of space. The current régime on outer space, comprising a number of international agreements and treaties, can be strengthened: we can search for agreement on the definition of key terms, clarify the issue of stability and, in general, thereby set up a solid foundation to guide our work in the coming years. We could make a start, for example, in applying principles of transparency to activities in space by urging more States to sign the Registration Convention and by persuading the parties to the Registration Convention to agree to provide more timely and specific information on the functions of the satellites they launch, including whether specific satellites are intended to fulfil civilian, military or combined functions.

As I am sure you are all aware, Canada is ready and eager to move forward on the negotiation of a treaty banning radiological weapons. We have had a draft before us for many years now. Yet any possibility of advance has been sidetracked by issues which, while important in themselves, are not, in our estimation, fundamental to reaching agreement on banning a new form of weapons of mass destruction. We need not reiterate the arguments that have

brought us to this impasse: rather, let us stand back and put things in their proper perspective. What will this impasse do to all our other endeavours? Will it not undermine the credibility of the multilateral process?

Fortunately, radiological weapons do not at present exist. Simple logic would dictate that now is the time to prevent their future development by agreeing to a comprehensive and effective ban. To some, it may seem a hollow victory that a weapon that does not exist is being prohibited. But look at the other examples of international treaties that have sought, implicitly, if not explicitly, to cut off a potential development before it can take root. We have examples before us: the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Seabed Treaty, the Environmental Modification Treaty.

On a bilateral basis, the ABM Treaty prevents the development, testing and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems and their components, whether based on current or future technological principles. Many states would concur that blocking the unilateral deployment of ABM systems through this Treaty constitutes a cornerstone of nuclear arms control between the superpowers and helps give the whole process its legitimacy. I would argue that a treaty on radiological weapons would contribute in a similar fashion to the legitimacy, as

well as the credibility, of the multilateral disarmament process and should be viewed from this more positive perspective.

Mr. President, it strikes me that the forward strides the USA and USSR are beginning to make bilaterally in arms control and disarmament, and those which we may yet see over the next year in the multilateral process at Vienna, serve both as an encouragement to the work being done here in Geneva and as a strict reminder that the international spotlight may focus even

more directly on the Conference on Disarmament as a result. We have received a taste of this kind of attention over the past year as world concern mounted over the use of chemical weapons. Similarly, international anxiety is bound to keep growing over arms build-ups in numerous regions of the world, over new types of weapons, new areas of deployment (including outer space), and over the renewed use of weapons we had long hoped would never be used again. The world will thus ask this body pointed questions and will expect it to offer meaningful results.

Yet, we must protect the multilateral arms control and disarmament process from excessive demands, remembering the old adage that the best is often the enemy of the good. We cannot ask the arms control process to resolve all the problems, or carry all the burden of existing political differences. Mr. President, let us work assiduously to allow the CD to begin achieving what in principle it ought to be able to achieve: maintenance and enhancement of the credibility of the multilateral disarmament process. We cannot let this credibility slip away." □

Canada Addresses Conference on Disarmament

The following is the text of the Statement by Ambassador de Montigny Marchand before the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on March 7, 1989.

"In this, my initial plenary statement of the current session, I would like to begin by stressing that Canada shares the generally hopeful assessment, already expressed by most preceding speakers, that our session is being held at a particularly propitious time, a period when new, encouraging prospects appear to be opening up in international relations, including in the disarmament field. Here I would begin by recalling the generally positive atmosphere that was attached to the Third Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD III), even though it ended without agreement on a substantive final document. This positive atmosphere was even more perceptible in the First Committee at the United Nations General Assembly 43 (UNGA 43), which Canada had the honour to chair. When the representative of the USSR addressed the final meeting of the First Committee on November 30th on behalf of the group of socialist states, I suspect he spoke for us all when he noted that, as never in the past, the Committee's work had been promoted by a positive international political climate. Whereas the number of resolutions and decisions adopted increased over UNGA 42, so

also had the number of consensus resolutions. The next major development was, of course, the January Paris Conference on the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Final Declaration of which was officially presented to us on February 7th by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Roland Dumas. Most importantly, there was the successful conclusion last month of the Vienna Follow-Up Meeting of the CSCE. This included the major decision to open two new negotiations relating to conventional armed forces in Europe. Little wonder that we should, therefore, be beginning our work for this session with heightened expectations of further progress.

That being noted, however, we should not allow too great a sense of euphoria to blind us to the very difficult outstanding issues that still confront us in relation to each of the eight substantive items on our agenda. When I first spoke in plenary, last year, on March 10th, I emphasized that for Canada a fundamentally important element which must characterize both the bilateral process and our multilateral work is effective verification, to be achieved through efficient, agreed implementation mechanisms. I further suggested that, to maintain confidence in compliance, precise and often intrusive verification provisions are a necessary and central element of viable, politically sustainable

arms control and disarmament agreements. That is still our view, a view which I hope all of us share. If this is so, then all of us must also agree that, particularly in the context of our ongoing work on a Chemical Weapons Convention, we must give intensified effort to resolving outstanding issues to formulate verification measures which will be both practical and effective.

Mr. President, in a few moments time I shall speak further and in greater detail about some of our specific concerns relating to Chemical Weapons, Outer Space and a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. But before doing so, I would like to support our colleagues Ambassador Von Stulpnagel of the Federal Republic of Germany in his plea, delivered on February 16th and Ambassador Rivero of Peru, in his suggestion on February 28th, that we consider focussing our work somewhat more on those aspects of it where lie the best chances of making genuine progress. I realize, of course, that each of the items on our programme of work has its own intrinsic value. Moreover, there is none among those items that does not find particular support among at least some of the countries which participate in our work. Nevertheless, because of their subject matter, in some cases, or because of the views about them held by some countries in other cases, not all are equally amenable to further productive negotiation at this stage. Perhaps we should, therefore, spend more of our collective time and efforts, both of which

are clearly finite and are already stretched almost to the breaking point, on areas such as a Chemical Weapons Convention, where we are slowly but surely progressing and where virtually the entire international community of sovereign states has specifically requested that we redouble our efforts.

We should spend more of our time on areas where we are progressing

For these same reasons, Mr. Chairman, I also share Ambassador Von Stulpnagel's reservations about any possible expansion in the number of items with which we are seized. No doubt there are other subjects of importance to which the Conference on Disarmament could give attention; but not, I would suggest, until we have been successful in disposing of at least some of those already on our plates.

Now, Mr. President, I would like to address in more detail three among our agenda items which are of particular concern to Canada: items 1, 4 and 5. I shall speak only briefly about item 1, a Nuclear Test Ban. It is a subject where the views of all among us have already been clearly stated; moreover, it is one where responsibility for real movement forward lies ultimately with the nuclear weapons states. It is they who must be persuaded that a regime providing for a comprehensive ban on testing can be in their own national security interest. They also must have a key role in determining the possibilities for devising verification measures in which we all can have real confidence. To this end, it is important that the bilateral dialogue and joint experimentation on nuclear test verification between the USA and the USSR continue and that it make progress toward further agreed test limitations. In the meantime, other states which strongly favour a comprehensive test ban, such as Canada, must do what they can to advance this process.

One area, in which we have considered for many years that we could make a national contribution of genuine worth, has been the area of verification. This commitment was re-emphasized by the

Government of Canada in December of 1986 when, in response to one of the recommendations in an earlier joint Canadian House of Commons and Senate Committee Report supporting the need for adequate means of verification as a way of pursuing arms control, the Government confirmed that 'through the work of the Verification Research Unit' of the Department of External Affairs it would be 'advancing practical suggestions for verification procedures.' Many of you will already have seen some of the numerous papers and research documents in various fields that we have already produced and circulated to you.

Of particular relevance to our work in relation to agenda item 1 was our participation in the International Seismic Data Exchange experiment that was conducted late in 1984. We followed that up with a workshop on the exchange of Seismic Waveform Data held in Ottawa in October 1986. Since then we have been devoting part of our resources, along with other Canadian governmental agencies, to upgrading and modernizing the Yellowknife Seismic Array, an internationally recognized facility which, when that modernization programme is completed later this year, will constitute a world-class facility which we hope will serve as a prototype for other international stations to be developed to participate in an International Seismic Data Network.

In one of my plenary statements last year, in which I had also referred to the Yellowknife Seismic Array, I mentioned that, in the autumn of this year Canada would be hosting a technical workshop in Yellowknife. Members of the GSE (Group of Seismological Experts) will be invited to the official opening of the Array at that time. The occasion will include reporting on the discussion of Canadian research on nuclear test ban verification, as well as informal discussions of preparations for the forthcoming large-scale data exchange experiment which is being coordinated by the Canadian representative to the GSE. In fact the Canadian representative will be extending the invitation to participants at its present meeting, scheduled from March 16-17.

Mr. Chairman, before leaving the subject of a Comprehensive Test Ban

(CTB), I would be remiss not to say something, also, about the proposal to convene an amending conference of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), with the objective of somehow finding agreement to convert it into a CTB. Clearly such a conference could be convened (I understand that at least 34 among the required 38 requests have already been received by the depositories). But to what avail? It is evident that amendment of the PTBT as proposed will not obtain the assent of all three of the nuclear states who are original parties to the Treaty, as required for any amendment to come to effect. Moreover, not all among the present nuclear powers are parties to the treaty. For this and other reasons, including difficult issues such as CTB verification which remain to be resolved, we in Canada, therefore, see little benefit in such an exercise. Further, we remain convinced that direct negotiations constitute the only practical means of achieving a comprehensive, genuinely verifiable test ban. We at the Conference on Disarmament might make our best contribution by reaching agreement on a mandate for establishing an ad hoc Committee. There are practical things we could be doing, and Canada would welcome our beginning to work in this area, on the basis of the suggested mandate in CD/863 of August 23rd, 1988, as proposed by our former colleague, Czechoslovakian Ambassador Vejvoda.

Now, Mr. President, let me turn to our agenda item 5, on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. It seems to us that, in our consideration of item 5 we are perhaps too often overly selective in our focus. Given the importance of the use of space for the present and future development of mankind, it is clearly of particular importance for us to give serious thought to one very broad and somewhat imprecise issue—namely, the relationship between international security, on the one hand, and the uses of space, on the other. Both of the two elements that comprise this relationship deserve greater conceptual thought, as does the relationship itself.

International security in this context relates not only to the absence of weapons as such in outer space. The

responsibility of the two major space powers, both to themselves and to the rest of us, is to maintain a stable controlled relationship between themselves. We, in the multilateral area, must not forget this point. That is why this Delegation has emphasized both that we must take great care to ensure that the results of our work will enhance stability, rather than detract from it, and that our negotiations complement the bilateral negotiations that are taking place between the two major space powers.

We must also consider the actual use being made of outer space. Until recently, space activities have been effectively dominated by the two major space powers. They have allocated huge resources and developed revolutionary technologies with the goal of managing their strategic relationship to which I have just referred. That situation is, however, now changing everyday. One of the specific challenges for the multilateral disarmament world will be not only to put technological developments in space to good use but, even more important, to come to a common understanding as to what such 'good use' is.

The point of the foregoing, Mr. President, is to underline our contention that the ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space should give much more attention to the basic framework involved in the use of space: to strengthen the current regime, to agree on the definition of key terms, to clarify the issue of stability and, in general, thereby to set up a solid foundation to guide our work in the coming years. I would further contend that this is one area where multilateral efforts would be particularly appropriate.

This exhortation, that we seek better to set out the essential parameters of our work in this field, is not to say that the ad hoc Committee (once it is established) should not also focus on particular questions. In that regard, we in Canada continue to believe, with respect to the Registration Convention, that it would be a helpful confidence-building measure were the Parties to provide more timely and specific information concerning the functions of the satellites they launch, including whether specific



Map of nuclear test sites. The Yellowknife seismograph array is within 10,000 km of all principal underground nuclear explosion test sites.

satellites are intended to fulfil civilian, military or combined functions.

Mr. President, as a member of the Conference on Disarmament with a special interest in progress in this field, and as, moreover, this year's coordinator for the Western Group, we in the Canadian delegation had hoped that the ad hoc Committee on item 5 could have been established this time with a minimum of procedural wrangling. This has not proved to be so, but my delegation regards the attention being given to this item as hopeful indication of our shared desire to look seriously at what is involved in the prevention of an arms race in outer space and, through our collective work, make some gains in pursuit of that objective.

Before I leave this item, Mr. President, I would like to inform the Conference that our Verification Research Unit has already completed the preparation of a single volume Outer Space compendium covering all the statements made during the course of our 1988 sessions and

including all the working papers that were issued. This document, which we hope will prove a useful working tool and point of reference for our future use, was distributed by the Secretariat on February 28th under cover of CD/891 of February 22nd.

Finally, Mr. President, let me turn to the fourth subject on our agenda, Chemical Weapons. Here too we have papers to distribute, which we hope will also prove useful to you. One is the first issue in a new series which we will be preparing of arms control verification occasional papers. It is entitled 'International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards: Observations on Lessons for Verifying a Chemical Weapons Convention.' Others among these occasional papers will be issued periodically. They are primarily intended for a specialist audience, and they represent the results of selected independent research undertaken for our Verification Research Programme. For this reason, the views expressed in them are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent

those of the Canadian Government. The second set of papers we have to distribute is a three volume compendium on Chemical Weapons covering our 1988 Session. The volumes cover (a) Plenary statements (PV), (b) Plenary Working Papers (WP) and (c) Ad Hoc Committee Papers (CD/CW/WP). I would draw to your attention that several Ad Hoc Committee Papers which were tabled after the close of the 1988 formal session in September 1988 are not included in the third volume. We hope to receive these volumes from Canada any day now and will distribute them to you soon afterwards.

This leads me, Mr. President, to the more substantive remarks on our work on Chemical Weapons with which I would like to conclude this statement. Essentially, they comprise a reiteration of some of our long-standing concerns about difficult aspects of our work that, nevertheless, must be resolved if ever we are to succeed. As I have already stated, probably the single most important task before us, without which we can never hope to find broad support for any convention, is to establish an agreed and effective verification framework. In the words of the Paris Conference Final Declaration, the convention must be 'global and comprehensive and effectively verifiable.' In our view, to be effective, the verification regime must be practical. It must use resources efficiently and at tolerable cost. In this context, you may recall that on March 31st last year Canada circulated CD/823, a working paper which examined factors involved in determining verification inspectorate personnel and resource requirements. We are at present working on a follow-up paper, examining the cost implications of establishing an inspectorate, which we hope to be able to provide to you later this year. Again, our purpose is to advance the process of discussing this crucial aspect of our work on verification in the Chemical Weapons Convention context.

If we are to make further progress, it will be important for us to come to grips with those important problems which still lie ahead that have a political as well as technical dimension. One is Challenge Inspections: here, notwithstanding what

appears to be a general acceptance, at least in principle, of this concept, a number of states still seem to have difficulties in accepting the degree of intrusion which will be needed to make challenge inspection an effective verification measure. Another thorny issue is that of the composition of and the powers to be assigned to the proposed Executive Council. Here we will have to reach agreement among a number of hard choices about the degree of authority this organ will require in order to supervise implementation of the Convention and how to hold it accountable for its actions. How to select its members has also still to be settled. There remain still other problems. Articles X and XI are particularly sensitive, but solutions that fully respect the concerns of the various participants in the negotiations on them ought to be available. It will be a matter of making the necessary choices, keeping in mind that our overall objective is an effective convention. On undiminished security during the transition period, the problem is different: we do not yet have sufficiently clear ideas of what the concerns of some among us about this matter really are. But, if we can resolve related outstanding issues respecting the principles and order of destruction, surely some of those concerns will be

alleviated. Another different but still difficult issue is that of confidentiality. It is of special interest for countries with highly developed chemical industries operating in a highly competitive international environment, and whose legitimate commercial concerns must be taken into account.

There are other aspects of our work on a Chemical Weapons Convention which can best be dealt with by experts. Perhaps the most important issues in this sense relate to definitions and criteria under Article II and to the content and number of the schedules to be required under Article VI. Among those inputs required from legal experts there are two of particular concern to Canada. One is the need for us to consider the meaning of the phrase 'jurisdiction and control,' a phrase that gives rise to issues of extra-territoriality. Canada would prefer that this phrase be deleted from the text and that more specific wording could be found to describe a signatory's obligations. Another relates to Article XII, where for now I will merely recall the Canadian suggestion, made last August, that this separate article may not in fact be required.

Another important point I wish to register relates to suggestions which have been made, here and at the Paris Con-



The Conference on Disarmament meets at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, the European office of the United Nations. Before the Second World War, the Palais des Nations was the headquarters of the League of Nations and the scene of a number of historic events.

UN Photo 1365

ference, to the effect that conclusion of a Convention on chemical weapons should be conditional on progress in nuclear arms control. The Canadian Government emphatically disagrees. A complete ban on chemical weapons is desirable in itself. It is, in the Canadian view, in the interest of countries of all regions. It should not be conditional on progress in other areas.

Mr. President, my list of outstanding 'difficult' issues is by no means exhaustive. Nor is it intended in any way to downplay the importance of others which I have not cited. My purpose has been, rather, to remind us that more than mere good will and the intention to work harder will be required from us if we are to make the sort of progress at this session which both

UNGA 43 and the Paris Conference have called for.

Mr. President, in concluding, I am pleased to be able to tell the Conference that Canada will be joining those member states that have already carried out or plan to carry out test inspections. We will provide the results as soon as they become available." ■

Verification Research Programme Hosts Seminar

On June 1st, 1989, the Verification Research Unit of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs, hosted a one-day seminar for NATO officers and officials, during which Canadian research relevant to the verification of a Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreement was discussed. These officials were also in Canada to attend a meeting of the Verification Working Group of the NATO High Level Task Force on Conventional Force Reductions which Canada hosted at Collège St-Jean, May 28-31, 1989. Held at the National Arts Centre in Ottawa, the seminar enabled the Verification Research Unit to demonstrate some of the expertise which has been generated in Canada since the inception of its Verification Research Programme.

The day began with a briefing from Spar Aerospace on Space-based Remote Sensing as a potential contributor to CFE Verification. The briefing drew heavily upon the PAXSAT "B" project which envisages the use of satellites for a treaty such as the CFE. It was concluded that a space-based verification system holds considerable potential as a contributing element to a multi-layered CFE verification package. Satellite verification platforms were held to be particularly effective because of their ability to cover large areas quickly, and detect anomalies which could then be fully investigated through the use of various other verification techniques. However, it was recognized that current and planned civilian satellites because of their insufficient resolution could only

provide "detection" level data. It would not be until into the next century, however, that such satellites could be used in such multilateral verification.

The next presentation was jointly given by INTERA Technologies and Boeing Canada (de Havilland Division), and concentrated on the potential for the use of aircraft as verification platforms for a CFE agreement. The presenter from INTERA described that company's successful use of airborne sensing techniques to conduct land-use and resource surveys, as well as to measure heat loss from buildings over a wide area using infra-red technology, and he drew general conclusions as to how INTERA's experience might be useful in CFE verification. The presenter from de Havilland discussed the potential aircraft requirements in terms of capabilities and numbers, in order to obtain suitable coverage of the area within which the limitations are expected to occur under a CFE agreement. The de Havilland presentation focussed on the DASH 8-300 series aircraft as representative of the type of airframe most suitable for the CFE verification mission given its durability, low life-cycle cost and operational flexibility.

Following lunch and a tour of the National Arts Centre, the afternoon presentations began. The first of these was by Dr. Marc Kilgour of the Department of Mathematics at Wilfrid Laurier University. Dr. Kilgour has been working on the application of game theory to arms control verification under contract to the Verification Research Programme,

and presented some tentative findings. In his presentation, Dr. Kilgour discussed the optimal allocation of inspections using mathematical modelling techniques, and concluded that an emphasis should be placed upon both the randomness of inspections and the spacing of inspections over the life of the agreement as a means of deterring (and discovering) potential violations.

The final presentation of the day was given by a representative of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), and outlined AECL's experience in verifying so-called Secure Storage Facilities. Such facilities could be important in a CFE agreement since considerable numbers of Treaty Limited Items may be stored in such areas in order to facilitate monitoring their numbers. AECL's experience with secure storage facilities stems from its responsibilities to store and safeguard spent fuel for inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency under terms of Canada's Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations. AECL has developed an extensive range of perimeter security and materials accounting techniques in order to fulfil these obligations, and many of these techniques could be directly relevant to CFE verification procedures.

Seminar participants were pleased with the results of the day's efforts. Several of them voiced their appreciation of the degree to which the Canadian Verification Research Programme has spawned such practical and useful research. Far more of its kind will need to be undertaken, as the challenges of verifying a Conventional Forces Agreement become clearer everyday. ■

Little Progress at UN 1989 Disarmament Commission

The 1989 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) met in New York from May 8 to May 31. Discussions on various arms control and disarmament topics under the Disarmament Commission are open to participation by all 159 member states of the United Nations. The goal of the Disarmament Commission is to draft consensus reports on disarmament issues for the consideration of the UN General Assembly.

Whereas the UN General Assembly can pass non-binding resolutions by a simple majority vote, the UNDC is required to formulate its recommendations with the approval of all participating states. Some of the topics considered again this year have been examined for a decade. That progress on these items was once more absent at the 1989 session was cause for frustration among many delegations. During the closing interventions, several delegations requested that structural changes to the Disarmament Commission be examined to enhance advancement of the disarmament process. The lack of results at the 1989 session was in sharp contrast to 1988 when work on two topics, verification and confidence-building measures, was completed.

This year, the Contact Group working on a compilation of proposals for recommendations on "Nuclear Disarmament" and other priority measures on disarmament achieved agreed texts on two recommendations regarding the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) negotiations and on conventional disarmament. However, 20 of 35 proposals for recommendations that were deliberated remain without agreed texts.

Consideration of the item "Reduction of Military Budgets" remained at an impasse over the voluntary or obligatory submission by States of the UN matrix on military expenditures. Informal discussions were organized by the UNDC Chairman, Ambassador Bagbeni Adeito Nzengeya of Zaire, in an effort to find a compromise but to no avail.

Delegations involved in the debate on "South Africa's Nuclear Capability" agreed some progress was made during review of new text proposals. Advancement on this item is hindered by irreconcilable differences between delegations as to South Africa's actual nuclear capability and whether or not external assistance was available to attain that capability.

The Working Group reviewing the "Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament" managed to incorporate some material from the UNSSOD III Machinery Report in its Chairman's Working Paper. However, this paper is heavily burdened with alternate text proposals.

Examination of the "Naval Armaments and Disarmament" issue continues to be contentious. Discussions on this topic are held under the auspices of the UNDC Chairman as open-ended consultations because a working group cannot be established due to the objections of one delegation. The exchange of views on this topic between interested delegations reflected the considerable divergence of attitudes and opinions on naval disarmament and confidence-building measures.

Vigorous debate characterized the Working Group on Conventional Disarmament. Strong representations by delegations were made to emphasize many of the recommendations under consideration, including international arms transfers and disarmament and development.

Concern over the proceedings of debate on the "Third Disarmament Decade" led to the unexpected recruitment of Canada's head of delegation, Ambassador for Disarmament Douglas Roche, as Chairman of the Contact Group examining this item. Ambassador Roche produced a draft declaration which attempted to address the desire of some delegations for a concise document and others who wanted an all-encompassing arms control and disarmament manifest. Although consensus on the declaration was not forthcoming, the draft was preserved as a Working Paper for future reference. □

Change of Editor

Following this issue, the editorship of the Disarmament Bulletin will change hands. Mr. Paul Bennett, Editor of the Bulletin since July 1987, is being posted to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and will be replaced by Ms. Shannon Selin, former Editor of the Arms Control Chronicle of the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament (CCACD).

We hope our readers find our publication of interest and we welcome your comments on it. If you know of others who might benefit from receiving the Bulletin, please let us know. □

Canadians Inspect Czechoslovak Military Exercise

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, and the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Bill McKnight, announced on June 13, 1989 that Canada has addressed a request to the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to inspect a military exercise. Under the terms of the Document of the Stockholm Conference, agreed to by Canada and by Czechoslovakia in 1986, each participating State has the right to conduct inspections on the territory of any other participating State, within the zone of application for the confidence- and security-building measures described in the document.

Four inspectors from the Canadian Forces will travel to Czechoslovakia on June 14, 1989 to conduct a 48-hour inspection of a military activity notified by Czechoslovakia for June 12-16, 1989. This training activity will be a command and staff exercise. The tactical setting for the field portion of the exercise will be at divisional level with a partial deployment of troops.

Mr. McKnight announced that the inspection team will be led by Colonel Ken C. Mitchell of Montreal, who is the Commanding Officer of three Canadian

Forces Technical Services Agency in Toronto. The team will fly in a Canadian Forces aircraft to Czechoslovakia on Wednesday, June 14, from Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Lahr in the Federal Republic of Germany. There, in accordance with the Stockholm Document, the team will inspect the Czechoslovakian military operations, using host nation vehicles and aircraft.

At the completion of the 48-hour period, the team will return to CFB Lahr, where it will write a report which will be forwarded to all nations who are signatories to the Stockholm Accord.

This inspection constitutes the first time Canada has availed itself of the rights granted under the Stockholm Document. It demonstrates Canada's firm commitment to the confidence- and security-building measures adopted in the Stockholm Document, and our conviction that by their implementation, these measures serve to strengthen confidence in Europe, giving expression to the duty of States to refrain from the use of force.

Numerous inspections by member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact have taken place over the past two and a half years, firmly establishing the principle that on-site inspections can be politically uncontentious and make a positive contribution to the transparency of military activity in Europe.

Under the challenge inspection provision of the Stockholm document, a reply from the receiving state is required within 24 hours of the receipt of an inspection request. Within 36 hours after the issuance of the request, the inspection team will be permitted to enter the territory of the receiving state. The inspection team consists of no more than four inspectors who are allowed 48 hours to complete their task. The receiving state supplies both ground and air transportation, as well as communications facilities to the team during the inspection. Board and lodging are also provided to the team. After the inspection is completed, a report is prepared by the inspecting state that is distributed to all CSCE participating states.

It was agreed by Ministers earlier this year that given Canada's interest and recognized expertise in the field of verification, that this country could contribute

constructively to this on-going confidence-building process by conducting a challenge inspection under the provisions of the Stockholm Document. On June 12th, Canada addressed a request to the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to inspect a military exercise, notified under the terms of the Stockholm Document. The inspection of this military activity is intended to reinforce Canada's commitment to the measures of the Stockholm Document. It is our conviction that by their implementation, these measures

serve to strengthen confidence in Europe, giving expression to the duty of states to refrain from the use of force. It is incumbent upon Canada to continue to play an active role in negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) working to achieve improved openness regarding military forces and their activities. Canada's experience in the field of verification, augmented by this inspection, will allow us to better contribute to the design and implementation of the means to verify future agreements. ■

Departure of Ambassador for Disarmament

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, recently announced the departure of Douglas Roche on the completion of his term as Ambassador for Disarmament. Mr. Roche has served the cause of arms control and disarmament with dedication and effectiveness, Mr. Clark stated, and the Government counts on his continuing advice.

Mr. Roche was appointed to the position of Ambassador for Disarmament in October 1984. In that position, he has served each year as the Head of the Canadian Delegations to the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and to the United Nations Disarmament Commission. A highlight of his term as Ambassador for Disarmament was his successful chairmanship of the First Committee of the 43rd United Nations General Assembly in 1988.

Mr. Roche also served with distinction as Head of the Canadian Delegation to the Third Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, and as Deputy Head of the Canadian Delegations to the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development in 1987 and to the Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament in 1988.

His role as the Government's principal point of contact with Canadian non-government organizations and members of the public interested in issues relating



Mr. Douglas Roche, Ambassador for Disarmament.

to arms control, disarmament, peace and security was pursued with tireless dedication and patience. It was under Mr. Roche's direction that the Consultative Group on Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs became a knowledgeable and effective mechanism for the frank exchange of views between Government officials and interested members of the public.

The nomination of a successor is expected shortly. Meanwhile, the Minister said that Mr. Roche has agreed to remain in the position until the summer, in order to facilitate the transition. ■

Focus

With this issue, the Disarmament Bulletin is launching what we hope will be a regular feature: a column for secondary school students. Your comments and suggestions for future topics are welcome.

Verification

It's found in everyday life. . . at the hockey rink or at the bank. . . in games or in business. Everyone agrees to play fairly and if someone's caught cheating he's penalized. Some games run on the honour system; others have referees. In dealing with banks, when we get our monthly statements we're verifying how much money we have in the bank. Arms control verification works the same way, by establishing agreed ways of checking and monitoring to make sure that a country is actually doing what it says it will.

Canada's commitment to weapons reductions and limitations, leading to eventual disarmament around the world, is well known. Such goals are achieved through negotiations and treaties. But a treaty is only as strong as the faith its parties have in it. If you don't trust your bank, you won't deposit your money in it. In the absence of trust between nations, verification is essential. It's easier to believe in a treaty if you can check to make sure the other side is living up to its terms. By monitoring compliance with their agreements, countries increase their national security, because, if a treaty is adequately verified and everyone is confident of that, it's in their best interests to stick to it.

Whether an agreement is verified adequately is a difficult thing to determine. In a bank, some depositors may insist on seeing their money in the vault but most will settle for monthly statements. In arms control, determining what is adequate verification is one of the main stumbling blocks in negotiations. Some countries may believe that every single violation must be detectable, that the terms of the treaty must be one hundred percent verifiable. Others might be willing to settle for a verification regime which will be good enough to catch violations which are military significant, but

not so sensitive that it can detect every minor violation. The idea here is that a verification mechanism need only catch those violations which pose a threat, because other violations don't really matter to security anyway. Obviously, the task of defining what is a militarily significant violation, as opposed to an insignificant one, is very difficult and has led to many disagreements in the past.

The actual means of verification usually involve a wide range of information-gathering systems. To monitor any given activity several of these systems can be used. The use of several reinforcing verification methods is sometimes referred to as setting up a verification gauntlet. This means that though it may be possible to fool some of the verification methods, it will be very difficult to fool them all consistently.

Verification systems include photo-reconnaissance satellites which can take pictures of things, electronic reconnaissance satellites to intercept messages, infrared detectors on satellites to sense heat emitted from man-made devices and radar which can track movement. If a nuclear blast is involved, seismographs can detect vibrations through the earth. These remote sensors are known as National Technical Means and are the primary method of verification for both the United States and the Soviet Union, because they don't violate each other's sovereignty. These two superpowers are also the only ones with enough sophisticated hardware (and money) to make National Technical Means a viable means of verification.

Other, less technical methods of verification might include on-site inspections, the use of control posts or monitoring government records and various publications. Generally speaking, these methods are much more intrusive because they tend to require actual physical access to a country's military installations. Up to now, the USSR has refused to allow such access. Things have changed in the last few years, however. During the negotiation of the Treaty to Eliminate Missiles of Intermediate or Shorter Range (the so-called INF Treaty), for example, the Soviet government showed that it is now willing to accept a much greater degree of intrusiveness than ever before. This change in Soviet attitudes towards verification is one

of the most encouraging developments in arms control in recent years.

We've talked so far about verification in general. Let's now look at the important role it plays in specific arms control agreements. With regard to nuclear weapons, two of the most familiar agreements are SALT I and SALT II. SALT stands for Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. These treaties set ceilings on the numbers and types of strategic nuclear weapons systems the United States and the Soviet Union can deploy. The National Technical Means of the superpowers are the primary means of verifying the SALT treaties.

Other major treaties refer to nuclear testing. In 1963, the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed, prohibiting nuclear testing everywhere except underground. For this treaty, monitoring the ban is less of a challenge, as any atmospheric and underwater explosions are usually conspicuous. Other treaties that have been negotiated between the Americans and Soviets include the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits underground explosions of more than one hundred and fifty kilotonnes. Since 1977, many countries including Canada have advocated a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, one that would prohibit all nuclear testing, of any magnitude. By far the most effective method of verifying such an underground test ban would be to use seismic sensors. They can determine, with reasonable accuracy, the origin of a seismic event, whether it was an explosion or earthquake, and its size.

The above examples tend to demonstrate the importance of verification as it relates to bilateral arms control treaties. As the name suggests, bilateral arms control agreements are those which are reached between two parties. Another area of arms control is that which takes place in a multilateral setting. Multilateral means that several parties are involved in an arms control treaty and its verification. Multilateral arms control and verification is of special interest to Canada, as it is unlikely that we will be required to enter into any strictly bilateral arms control treaties in the foreseeable future. Let's look at some examples of multilateral arms control and discuss their verification aspects.

In the effort to control the spread of nuclear weapons and stop the arms race, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 1968. Under this treaty, states with nuclear weapons agreed not to transfer the technology necessary to make these weapons. In return, states without nuclear weapons agreed not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire them. Nuclear weapons nations also agreed to work towards reducing the size of their nuclear arsenals. Through its inspection system, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for verification of this treaty. Though it has several functions apart from monitoring the NPT, the IAEA is the primary agency responsible for ensuring that non-nuclear weapon states which have signed the NPT do not attempt to divert nuclear material from peaceful purposes to weapons production. The IAEA has developed several techniques for this purpose, and relies upon its ability to account for fuel and to inspect nuclear facilities to ensure that the amount of spent fuel which comes out of a nuclear reactor is consistent with the amount which went in.

The IAEA and its methods are all examples of what is known as a treaty specific verification regime. A treaty specific verification regime is one in which the authority to inspect a given site devolves from the principles and practices outlined in a specific treaty. Furthermore, the inspecting agency has the authority to look for potential violations of the treaty and no more. It is not empowered to go on general fishing expeditions designed to ferret out information on a wide variety of subjects. Thus far, only treaty specific verification organizations have been established. At present, there is no plan to establish any verification organization which would not be tied to a specific treaty, though this idea has been discussed.

Outer space is another highly sensitive issue. At present, the most important treaty dealing with this area is the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. It forbids the stationing of any nuclear weapon or any other weapon of mass destruction in space or on the moon. The Treaty itself is silent on how the ban on nuclear weapons in orbit will be verified. Current technologies to identify satellites and their purposes include ground-based telescopes

and electronic listening devices. In the future, space-based sensors may also become more frequently used.

Verification has been recognized as the most significant factor in international disarmament and arms control negotiations in the last decade. Over the years, Canada's External Affairs ministers have pledged Canadian expertise to the development of verification procedures. For example, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, has said "in large measure, our survival may depend on the confidence we have in arms control agreements. This confidence must be built on reasonable assurance that the terms of the agreement are being fulfilled. We are committed to providing an intelligent opinion in arms control and disarmament negotiations. Verification is an integral part of those talks. Without it, no meaningful treaties can be negotiated." It comes back to the example of the bank. If we're sure our bank isn't mismanaging our money, we will feel safer leaving it there. We may be giving up a little control over what it's used for when we don't need it, but we know that it's safe. When we all play by the rules, we all can win the game. □

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2. Dr. Jules Dufour — preparation university course	\$1,900.00
3. Voice of Women — UNDC orientation	\$6,050.00
4. Peace Education Centre — Youth for Global Awareness Conference	\$4,000.00
5. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament — BMD study	\$19,760.00
6. Science for Peace — Toronto Chapter — University College Lectures in Peace Studies	\$3,000.00
7. Centre de Ressources sur la Non-Violence — Research on civil non-violent defence and common security	\$7,000.00
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The Disarmament Bulletin



A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

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Modernized Yellowknife Array Opened

On September 11, 1989, the Honourable Jake Epp, Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, officially opened the newly-modernized Yellowknife Geophysical Observatory, commonly known as the Yellowknife Seismological Array.

Considered among the most advanced facilities of its type in the world, the refurbished Array can monitor seismic events occurring up to 10,000 km away — a range that includes all known nuclear test sites, as well as most of the earth's active earthquake zones. The Array thus adds considerably to Canada's ability to monitor compliance with a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB) treaty.

The achievement of a negotiated, effective ban on nuclear testing in all environments for all time has long been a major objective of Canadian arms control and disarmament policy. Toward this end, since the late 1950s Canada has worked with other countries to develop a reliable means of verifying compliance with international agreements banning nuclear explosions.

In 1962, the British Ministry of Defence approached the Canadian Defence Research Board about the possibility of locating a seismic array in Canada. An agreement was reached whereby the UK would supply equipment while Canada would provide a site for the facility as well as the personnel to operate it. The Yellowknife area was selected for the site because of its position with respect to nuclear test sites, its remoteness from coastlines, urban areas and other sources of seismic noise, its good communication facilities and its location on the stable geological platform of the Canadian Shield.

The Array was completed in late 1962. Since that time, Canadian scientists have



The Honourable Jake Epp, Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, opens the modernized Yellowknife Seismological Array.

used it to undertake research into the detection and identification of earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions.

In contrast to a standard seismograph station, which houses one or more seismic detectors (seismometers) at a single location, an array consists of a number of seismometers spread across an area. Computer processing of the recorded data allows the array to be steered like an antenna, not only to enhance detection of seismic signals, but also to estimate independently the locations from which they came.

The Yellowknife Array is composed of 19 seismometers, laid out in the form of a cross and installed in steel vaults anchored in rock, with a distance of 2.5 km between seismometers. Information collected on a seismic occurrence is

transmitted to Energy, Mines and Resources Canada laboratories in Ottawa, where scientists analyze the data, locate the event's epicentre and determine whether it was caused by an earthquake or a nuclear blast.

The \$3.5 million, three-year upgrade program was undertaken jointly by External Affairs and International Trade Canada, which is responsible for formulating arms control policy, and Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, which possesses the seismological expertise needed to operate the Array. The upgrade consisted of replacing all of the Array's seismometers and data collection and control facilities, providing a new control centre building at the Array site, and adding a communication link for transmission of data from Yellowknife to Ottawa via Anik satellite in near real time.

The Array opening coincided with a workshop of the Group of Scientific Experts in Yellowknife (see accompanying article) and provided a forum for researchers from the University of Toronto to unveil the results of their work on regional seismic verification methodologies, performed under contract with Canada's Verification Research Program. ■

Verification: What is it?

"Verification is the establishment of truth or correctness of (something), by examination or demonstration." [*Concise Oxford Dictionary*]

Countries are unlikely to agree to sign treaties that affect their national security unless they have adequate means of assuring that other signatories will, in fact, be living up to the terms of the agreement. Verification is the means by which such assurance is gained. Whether it is through the use of consultative mechanisms, photo-reconnaissance satellites or on-site inspections, the ability to agree upon an effective system of verification can mean the difference between success and failure in the negotiation of an arms control agreement. ■

Group of Scientific Experts Meets in Yellowknife



Participants at the Yellowknife workshop. The all-terrain vehicle is the only means of ground transportation for servicing the Array stations.

Thirty members of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) associated with the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva met in Yellowknife September 11-15, 1989, to attend the opening of and inspect the modernized Yellowknife Seismological Array, to discuss issues related to seismic verification and to review plans for an international seismic data exchange experiment, scheduled to begin in January 1990.

The GSE, whose full title is the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, was established by the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in July 1976. It grew out of earlier, informal meetings between the CD and seismological experts from various countries. The GSE is open to government-appointed experts from all member countries of the CD and, by invitation, to experts from non-member countries. Currently there are participants in the GSE from 27 countries, not all of whom attend regularly. The GSE meets in Geneva twice a year.

Since 1976, the GSE has been defining the technical specifications of a global system for seismic data exchange that would assist all participating countries in their national monitoring requirements for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. The GSE is not designing or developing an international system to monitor compliance with a treaty per se. Rather, its objective is to facilitate verification by any interested state through a cooperative exchange of relevant seismic data.

From October 15 to December 15, 1984, the GSE conducted a data exchange experiment that focused on the exchange and processing of seismic "parameter" data. Parameter data are those data (such as the arrival times and amplitudes of seismic waves) that can readily be extracted from seismic recordings at a seismograph station. Since the volume of these data is not large, they can be transmitted relatively easily and rapidly to other locations around the globe using, for example, telex-based communications systems. Thirty-seven countries participated in the 1984 test, offering data from a total of 75 seismograph stations.

Since 1988, the GSE has been refining the technical specifications of the global system to take advantage of seismic "waveform" data. Waveform data are the original recordings made at a seismograph station of its detected seismic events, which could be earthquakes or nuclear explosions. They are more voluminous than parameter data, thus their transmission to other locations places greater demands on the communications system used. Nonetheless, if waveform data for detected seismic events could be transmitted rapidly to International Data Centres (IDCs) for processing, a much-refined record or "bulletin" of each seismic event could be produced.

Preparations for global data exchange experiment

The experiment currently being planned by the GSE, called GSETT-2, is intended to demonstrate the improvements to the global seismic data exchange system that would come about from the exchange and processing of waveform data. The chief Canadian delegate to the GSE, Dr. Peter Basham, is the overall coordinator of the experiment.

GSETT-2 is being conducted in four phases. Phase 1, which began in August 1988, is a preparatory phase during which the GSE is refining the procedures to be used for the experiment; participating countries are identifying and upgrading appropriate seismograph stations, national data processing facilities and data communications channels; and the four IDC countries (Australia, Sweden, the USA and the USSR) are establishing appropriate computer and inter-IDC communication facilities.

Phase 2, scheduled to begin in January 1990, will involve the exchange and processing of seismic data — both parameter and waveform — one day per week. Outstanding problems will be addressed during the March 1990 GSE session and Phase 2 continued as necessary up to the July/August 1990 GSE session.

Phase 3, which will involve data exchange and processing seven days per

week, is tentatively scheduled for September to December 1990. Phase 4 will involve an evaluation of GSETT-2 and preparation of a report for the Conference on Disarmament.

By the end of August 1989, only 21 countries offering data from 41 seismograph stations had indicated their intention to participate in GSETT-2. The GSE does not consider this a sufficient test of the envisaged global system, particularly because there will be no participating stations in Central and South America, Africa and parts of Asia. Canadian contributions will include seismic data from the Yellowknife Array.

The GSE workshop in Yellowknife was co-sponsored and co-hosted by External Affairs and International Trade Canada and Energy, Mines and Resources Canada. □

Countries Represented on the GSE

Argentina*
Australia*
Austria
Belgium*
Bulgaria*
Canada*
China*
Czechoslovakia*
Denmark
Egypt*
Federal Republic of Germany*
Finland
German Democratic Republic*
Hungary*
Iran*
Italy*
Japan*
Netherlands*
New Zealand
Norway
Poland*
Spain
Sweden*
Switzerland
United Kingdom*
USA*
USSR*

* indicates member of the CD □

Acronyms Used in this Volume

ATC — Armoured Troop Carrier
ATTU — Atlantic to the Urals
AVLB — Armoured Vehicle Launched Assault Bridge
CD — Conference on Disarmament
CFE — Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTB — Comprehensive Test Ban
CTBT — Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CW — Chemical Weapons
DRES — Defence Research Establishment Suffield
GSE — Group of Scientific Experts
GSETT — Global Seismic Exchange Technical Test
IDC — International Data Centre
NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs — Non-Governmental Organizations
NPT — Non-Proliferation Treaty
PTBT — Partial Test Ban Treaty
UN — United Nations
UNDC — United Nations Disarmament Commission
UNGA — United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR — United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF — United Nations Children's Fund
UNSSOD — United Nations Special Session on Disarmament □

For Further Information

"Seismic Verification," Arms Control and Disarmament Division, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, Ottawa, 1986.

"Verification Research: Canada's Verification Research Program," Arms Control and Disarmament Division, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, Ottawa, 1987.

"Yellowknife Seismological Array," Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, Ottawa, 1989. □

Canada's Verification Research Program

The verification of compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements is a major focus of Canada's efforts in the multilateral arms control and disarmament field. The decision to devote Canadian resources to this issue was made early in the 1980s, when verification was a constant source of disagreement and there was a clear need for innovative approaches to the question.

An initial, modest, cooperative program was developed involving the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment of the Department of National Defence and the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of External Affairs and International Trade Canada. The aim of this program was to study arms control verification in a general, conceptual manner as well as to support specific negotiations. It was an attempt to introduce some gentle leadership and coordination into international discussions, while at the same time leaving the field open to contributions from other nations in areas of their expertise.

On June 18, 1982, during a speech to the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD II), the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, then Prime Minister of Canada, identified verification as one of the arms control and disarmament issues that Canada considered to be of greatest importance. He pledged the Canadian government to substantially increase its research on verification.

On February 20, 1984, formal approval was given for the establishment of the Verification Research Unit within the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of External Affairs and International Trade Canada. This permitted the Verification Research Program (first funded in October 1983) to begin its operations.

The general objective of the Verification Research Program is to contribute to the process of achieving verifiable arms

control and disarmament agreements that will increase the security of Canada and its allies. Specifically, the Program seeks to do the following:

- analyze verification issues;
- assess the implications and adequacy of verification proposals;
- investigate ways of improving verification techniques and develop new approaches;
- foster Canadian expertise and capabilities in verification among the academic, commercial and government sectors; and
- contribute to improved understanding of verification issues.

Innovative in concept and focused on the multilateral process in application, this unique Program is currently funded at approximately \$1 million per year. It provides a natural framework within which Canadian expertise from government, the business sector and the academic community can be combined to address questions of arms control verification.

Unique program makes Canada verification leader

The results of the work of the Verification Research Unit, and of researchers under contract with the Verification Research Program, are published and distributed widely within Canada and abroad. In many cases, these publications have become standard reference material. Thanks to the Program, Canada is involved in verification discussions and activities across a wide range of arms control and disarmament issues.

Canada is currently playing a key role in sensitive discussions within NATO and at the negotiations in Vienna with the Warsaw Pact regarding verification of an agreement to reduce conventional forces in Europe. Canada will undoubtedly make a significant contribution to NATO verification operations once an agreement is in place.

Canada is also involved in scientific discussions concerning an international seismic data exchange to verify a ban on underground nuclear explosions. A Canadian scientist has been chosen to be coordinator of the second Global Seismic Exchange Technical Test (GSETT-2), to be conducted in 1990.

Work on CFE, CTB, Outer Space, Open Skies and CW verification

On outer space arms control issues, Canada has explored the use of space-to-space remote sensing for verification (the PAXSAT "A" feasibility study), as well as other methods.

The Program has also conducted background research with respect to the use of aerial inspections for verification, and in the context of the "Open Skies" initiative.

Canada has long been active on issues related to the verification of an eventual Chemical Weapons Convention. Technical papers have been provided to negotiators to clarify such matters as the destruction of chemical warfare agents, procedures for verification of allegations of use of chemical weapons (including novel agents), and the categorization of chemicals produced for commercial purposes but also of concern to the Convention. In addition, Canada has examined organizational matters related to the role and functions of the national authority and international authority to verify the Convention. In all cases, work continues and is shared with others as appropriate.

Since its creation, the Verification Research Program has enabled Canada to make a significant contribution to discussions related to multilateral verification. While the Program has achieved a great deal, much remains to be done, particularly with respect to the detailed work of designing verification provisions for specific agreements. Canada will continue to play a key role in promoting solutions to verification problems. ■

Canada Hosts Workshop of UN Verification Experts



UN Group of Governmental Experts on Verification at the Montreal workshop.

The UN Group of Governmental Experts on Verification gathered for a workshop in Montreal July 24-25, 1989. This Group of Experts, which was set up as a result of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 43/81(b) of December 7, 1988, is not to be confused with the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) associated with the Conference on Disarmament. In Resolution 43/81(b), which was in large part a Canadian initiative, the UN Secretary-General was requested to undertake, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, an in-depth study of the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. In particular, the study is to:

- identify and review existing UN activities in the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements;
- assess the need for improvements in existing activities, and explore and identify possible additional activities, taking into account organizational, technical, operational, legal and financial aspects; and

— provide specific recommendations for future UN action in this context.

Twenty countries were selected to provide experts for the study, including Canada, the USA and the USSR. The experts act in their own capacities, not as representatives of their respective governments. The UN Group of Experts held its first meeting in February 1989 and chose as its Chairman Mr. Fred Bild, who is Assistant Deputy Minister of the Political and International Security Branch of External Affairs and International Trade Canada. This choice reflected Canada's leadership role and high international profile on the issue of verification.

Group is studying the role of the UN in verification

The objectives of the Montreal workshop were to provide, in an informal atmosphere, an opportunity for the Group to explore legal and technical issues relating to verification and to share with them some of the results of relevant Canadian verification research. The

Group attended briefings by Canadian experts on legal aspects of the role of the UN in verification (Dr. Howard Mann and Dr. Lucy Stojak) and on technical aspects of remote sensing from space (Dr. F.J.F. Osborne). In addition, the Group visited Spar Aerospace Ltd.'s satellite production facilities at Ste. Anne-de-Bellevue, Quebec.

The workshop was organized by McGill University's Centre for Research of Air and Space Law at the request of External Affairs and International Trade Canada. It was an excellent example of cooperation among Canada's governmental, academic and private sectors on the subject of arms control verification, and represented a fruition of the continuing efforts of the Government's Verification Research Program to foster expertise in verification in all three sectors.

After the successful conclusion of the workshop, the Group proceeded to New York to complete its second session. It is scheduled to hold two further sessions before submitting its report to the UN General Assembly in 1990. □

Soviets Visit Defence Research Establishment Suffield

A delegation of 10 Soviet scientists and military officers visited Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) July 17-19, 1989, to observe the destruction of chemical agents and share information about technical issues and environmental safety related to the destruction. The delegation was headed by Mr. Sergei Batsanov, the USSR's representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. This was the first Soviet visit to a Canadian military base since the Second World War.

Since 1941 Suffield, located in Alberta about 275 km southeast of Calgary, has been the site of a research program into defence against chemical and biological weapons. During the past 20 years, field testing with chemical agents has been limited to the small quantities required for testing defensive equipment and training Canadian Forces personnel in defensive measures.

In the early 1970s, a clean-up of the chemical munitions and agents remaining on the base as part of wartime reserves was authorized. Destruction began of approximately 700 tons of mustard gas stored in tanks, as well as of small quantities of other chemical warfare agents. Most of this material had been in storage since the Second World War. Unfortunately, a breakdown of equipment and conflicting priorities for resources prevented completion of the operation. In early 1988, the then Minister of National Defence, Mr. Perrin Beatty, became aware of some 16 tons of agents and 150 tons of contaminated material remaining to be disposed of. A report commissioned by Mr. Beatty and authored by Mr. William Barton, then Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, discussed the activities at DRES in the area of chemical and biological defences, and noted the material still awaiting destruction.

With the presentation of the Barton Report at a press conference on January 25, 1989, Mr. Beatty announced that immediate action would be taken to complete the clean-up. At the same time, he issued an invitation to Soviet officials to visit DRES and observe the chemical agent destruction process.

During the July visit, the Soviet delegation received briefings on:

- the DRES Experimental Proving Ground, where the chemical agent disposal and storage sites are located;
- Project Swiftsure, the project to dispose of chemical and hazardous wastes from the Experimental Proving Ground;
- decontamination research and techniques;
- recent developments in the therapy and prophylaxis of organophosphate poisoning; and
- techniques for the verification of chemical agents.

Opportunity for dialogue on concerns relevant to CW Convention

The delegation toured the DRES facilities and observed the techniques and equipment used for the destruction of chemical agents. The Soviets expressed particular interest in techniques of environmental protection and personnel safety during the destruction process. The USSR was then completing construction of a large plant at Chapayevsk in the Shikany military area, about 1,000 km east of Moscow, to destroy an estimated 50,000 tons of chemical agents. Because of environmental safety concerns, it has since announced that the facility will not be used for chemical weapon destruction but rather for training in defensive measures against chemical weapons.

The visit was hosted by the Department of National Defence. It concluded with consultations in Ottawa on July 20 between the Soviet delegation and officials of External Affairs and International Trade Canada.

Destruction process at DRES expected to be completed by end of 1991

The visit provided considerable opportunity for officials from both countries to pursue an open dialogue on technical and other matters, including local safety and environmental concerns, of relevance to the conclusion and implementation of a Chemical Weapons Convention. Canada participates fully in every aspect of the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on reaching a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention banning chemical weapons. The Soviet visit to DRES was intended to contribute to an increased level of openness and exchange of technical information which, it is hoped, will expedite these negotiations.

It should be noted that past Canadian statements relating to the non-possession of chemical weapons were made at a time when "chemical weapons" were generally understood to mean usable chemical-filled munitions. Chemical agents then existing at DRES were neither stored in usable munitions nor were they part of an operational military capability. To date at DRES, the remaining nerve agent containers have already been opened and the contents destroyed. The destruction of remaining mustard gas and contaminated material must await the construction of a new incinerator. The destruction process is expected to be completed by the end of 1991.

Copies of the Barton Report can be obtained by writing National Defence Headquarters (Director General Information), 101 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0K2, or by telephoning (613) 995-2534. ■

Peggy Mason Appointed Ambassador for Disarmament

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, announced on August 28, 1989 the appointment of Ms. Margaret (Peggy) J. Mason as Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament.

Ms. Mason replaces Mr. Douglas Roche, whose completion of term was announced in June. Mr. Roche, who had held the post since October 1984, is presently a visiting professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta.

The Ambassador for Disarmament represents Canada at international meetings concerned with arms control and disarmament, in particular at the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and at the United Nations Disarmament Commission, both in New York. The Ambassador is also the Government's principal point of contact for Canadian non-governmental

organizations and persons interested in arms control and disarmament. As such, she will undertake speaking engagements across the country to discuss Canada's arms control and disarmament policies and the work done in the international forums where she represents Canada. The Ambassador acts as a Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for External Affairs on matters related to arms control and disarmament. In that capacity, she seeks to ensure coherence in Canadian policy as it relates to UN disarmament questions, disarmament and economic development, non-proliferation, the export of military equipment, confidence-building measures, conventional force reductions and limitations on strategic arms.

Born in Windsor, Nova Scotia, Ms. Mason holds a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) degree and a Bachelor of Laws degree from the University of Ottawa. She was admitted to the Ontario Bar in

1977 and practiced law in Ottawa until 1980, at which time she became Legal Advisor and Policy Analyst for the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women. From 1981 to 1984, Ms. Mason served as Policy Advisor to the Right Honourable Joe Clark and to the Honourable Erik Nielsen with responsibilities in the areas of status of women, arms control policy and constitutional and legal issues.

From September 1984 until her appointment as Ambassador for Disarmament, Ms. Mason acted as Policy Advisor to the Right Honourable Joe Clark in his capacity as Secretary of State for External Affairs. She provided policy analysis and advice on issues in the following areas: arms control, defence and international security, East-West relations and East-West human rights. She also dealt with international equality, nuclear energy and selected legal issues.

Ms. Mason is married and has one son. □

An Interview with Peggy Mason

The Editor had a chance to speak with Canada's new Ambassador for Disarmament, Peggy Mason, prior to Ms. Mason's departure for New York to head the Canadian delegation to the First Committee of the United Nations, which opened October 16, 1989. What follows are excerpts from that interview.

Ed = Editor; PM = Peggy Mason

Ed: Is this a unique position? Is Canada the only country that has an Ambassador for Disarmament?

PM: Canada isn't the only country, but it is one of a small number of countries that has an Ambassador for Disarmament that specifically represents the country at the First Committee in New York. For most countries, the same ambassador who represents the country in the fall at the First Committee also represents the country at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, which sits in February-March and also in the summer months, which means they're out of their country



Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament.

for most of the year. In the Canadian case, it was deliberately decided that the Ambassador for Disarmament should be based in Canada and be available to meet

with the Canadian public and interested NGOs [non-governmental organizations]. The Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament position also has a third role, which is that of advisor to the Minister on a range of arms control and disarmament issues, and that function as well requires the Ambassador being in Ottawa for some period of time.

[Editor's note: Mr. de Montigny Marchand is Canada's Ambassador to the Office of the United Nations in Geneva and to the Conference on Disarmament.]

Ed: Of these three components to your position — representing Canada in disarmament discussions at the UN, liaison with the public on arms control and disarmament issues, and advising the Minister — which interests you the most?

PM: I think that the combination of all three is very important. Liaison with the public — finding out what their concerns are and discussing with them the government's policies and priorities — would not be nearly as effective if I were not also plugged into some forum, such as the UN, so that I can speak in light of

the actual experience that I have representing Canada on these issues with other countries. I would also be much less effective, talking to groups and so on, if I did not have a role in the development of policy. So the three aspects of the job complement each other very well.

Because there are such possibilities for progress in arms control and disarmament now, it seems to me critically important that we maximize our opportunities and make as much progress as we can. The three aspects of the job lead to the possibility that this position can be a catalyst for that kind of progress.

Ed: Is arms control and disarmament a new field for you?

PM: My first experience in arms control and disarmament was attending the Stockholm Conference in 1984. This was part of the overall CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] process working on a range of issues, but specifically on trying to develop confidence-building measures between East and West at a time when there was not much progress on arms control and disarmament questions. At the time I was working with Mr. Clark, who had been asked by the then leader of the official opposition, Mr. Mulroney, to do a sort of shadowing of the Trudeau peace initiative. As part of that, Mr. Clark was sent to the Stockholm Conference and, as his advisor, I found myself suddenly literally plunged into arms control and disarmament issues. When Mr. Clark became Foreign Minister, I had the opportunity to continue working in his office and wanted to continue working on arms control and disarmament questions. So my background and training were certainly not in arms control and disarmament, but I've been working in the area now for five and a half years.

Ed: You're about to head off to the First Committee. What are some of the major issues Canada will be dealing with there?

PM: The First Committee, of course, is not a negotiating forum. It is a place where all of the member countries of the UN can speak on arms control and disarmament questions. The goal is to try to develop some common ground, some consensus, so that more progress can be

made in the actual negotiating forums. Canada will be focusing in particular on a resolution that we co-sponsor with Poland on the proposed global convention banning chemical weapons. It will take into account the progress that's been made bilaterally by the United States and the Soviet Union and also multilaterally in the chemical weapon negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament. There have been a number of conferences — the Paris Conference [in January 1989], for example — trying to inject political will into the negotiating process. The Canberra Conference was recently held in Australia in an attempt to get the chemical industry more involved, because they're a vital part of any successful chemical weapons convention. So the resolution will take note of the progress that's been made, but will also try to seek to ensure that the international community strongly supports the need for such a treaty.

Canada can have greatest impact in conventional negotiations

In general, Canada will be bringing a kind of challenge to the First Committee. A great deal of arms control progress is being made bilaterally between the superpowers and also between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. I think one can fairly say that the multilateral side is not keeping pace. What Canada will try to do — as a great believer in the multilateral process and as a country that has never engaged in UN-bashing but has always sought to make the UN more effective — is encourage the First Committee to meet that challenge and really move the multilateral process forward. Frankly, it's a wonderful position to be in: that there has been sufficient progress bilaterally that multilateral institutions have to catch up.

Ed: If one backs away from the First Committee and looks at the whole range of arms control and disarmament issues and negotiations that Canada is involved in, which do you think are the most important? Where should we be concentrating our energy?

PM: You can have an interesting debate about which are more important in a

global sense: the negotiations between the superpowers to radically reduce nuclear weapons or the conventional arms reduction talks between the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. But I think when you get to the other question, which is where should Canada be concentrating, clearly the conventional negotiation is where we can have the greatest impact because, quite simply, we are a part of that negotiation. Canada has been a leader in developing the verification package, which is essential to the overall agreement, and it's also been a leader in bringing along all of the various countries on the NATO side to agree to that package. Canada has to, and is, playing an important role there. It's harder on the strategic side because we're not a party to the negotiation. We have to confine ourselves to influencing the superpowers to adopt positions that are in our best interests, so that means bilateral representations and so on. From the public's point of view it's difficult, because bilateral consultations, in order to be effective, are generally confidential. We're not standing on the street corner shouting.

Ed: Do you plan to become personally involved with some of these issues?

PM: I've already been in Geneva for a preparatory meeting for the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] Review Conference. After the First Committee is over, I hope to have the opportunity to visit Vienna, where the two conventional negotiations are going on, and to engage in some other consultations as well. That should give me a better sense of where I can have the most impact. At this stage there's a lot to deal with, so I still don't have a final sense of where the most productive focus will be. I think that the two conventional negotiations and the NPT have clearly got to be important areas of concentration.

Ed: How about on the public liaison side of your job? Do you have anything in particular planned?

PM: One of the first things I did as Ambassador for Disarmament was hold a meeting of the Steering Committee of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs. The purpose was partly to get acquainted, but also to plan for the next meeting of the full Consulta-

tive Group, which will take place in early January and focus on the upcoming NPT Review Conference. So that will be an important opportunity to meet with the primary advisory body to me, if you will, of the interested public. I'm also expecting to do a fair amount of meeting with and speaking to the public in the January through March period when I won't be tied up with the First Committee or other fixed-date meetings. At this stage I haven't planned a cross-country tour per se. I'd prefer to be more flexible, to look at activities such as conferences and seminars that are going on across Canada and see what I can attend. I'm also very interested in speaking to high school and university students.

Ed: Some NGOs and individuals are disappointed when they do not see their representations to the government, through the Ambassador for Disarmament, translated directly into policy. How would you respond to these concerns?

PM: I think that when there are such a range of views on such a range of issues, organizations and individuals have to accept that they are not going to see their particular agendas translated immediately into government policy. They have to bear in mind the traditional approach of the Canadian government on arms control and disarmament issues, which is a focus on practical, concrete steps such as verification research. They have to put their objectives in that context. Even if at a particular moment it appears that a policy that's being advocated by a particular organization has a majority behind it, that doesn't necessarily mean that the government will respond positively to it. As I said, there are long-standing principles the government brings to the area and, as well, because it's an aspect of security policy, the government is going to tread very carefully before it makes any changes. And of course polling often reveals conflicting values and priorities among the public on these issues, and the government has to reconcile these.

The government must be aware of the range of public opinion, of course. It's also of great benefit to the government to have a kind of public sounding board where policies that are being developed or options that are being looked at can

be tested and refined at an early stage. That's where the Consultative Group is very important.

I think that anyone who's involved in this process should not be discouraged if their goals are not immediately reflected in government policy. Their views are a vital part of the development of policy. Certainly, if a government is really getting out of touch with its public, this will catch up with it sooner or later.

Ed: It's interesting that you should mention polling because one thing polls tend to reveal is a gender gap on peace and security issues. Do you think that you will approach your position differently than your predecessor did by virtue of being a woman?

PM: That's a very interesting question and a difficult one to answer. I've seen the polling too. Over time, or at least over the last five years, there does seem to be a gender gap where, in a ranking of priorities, Canadian women rank peace and security issues higher on average than Canadian men do. That has led some women's organizations to call for more women to be involved in peace and security issues and to call on government to ensure that more women are involved. And there's no question that, at the present time, this is an area overwhelmingly dominated by men. In the First Committee, only three or four of the 150-odd countries represented there are represented by a woman, and at NATO I don't think there's ever been a permanent representative that's been a woman.

I start from the fundamental position that it will only be of benefit to international organizations to be as representative as possible of the peoples of the countries involved there. And certainly, fairly representing the gender of over half of the world's population is, for me, absolutely essential. I have a little more difficulty with the concept that our policy would necessarily be different if more women were involved. The argument I've often heard is that women are more cooperative and less competitive in their approach to issues, therefore our policy would be a less combative and a more cooperative one. That analysis might work with respect to some countries' arms control and disarmament policies,

but I think that Canada's whole approach — constructive internationalism — is essentially a policy of cooperation, of seeking consensus. In that sense, dare I suggest that we already have a feminist or a "feminized" policy? It's a terrible waste of talent and resources not to have women involved in the full range of issues, but whether or not that would mean that we would have a more peaceful policy, I'm not sure.

I have a son who's almost five years old. Obviously I'm very concerned about the world he's going to grow up in, but I would have to say that the men that I work with in arms control and disarmament in the Canadian government who also have children are equally concerned that their sons and daughters not face nuclear annihilation. □

NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee Meets

The second Preparatory Committee for the Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT) met in Geneva September 11-18, 1989. The Canadian delegation was led by the Ambassador for Disarmament, Ms. Peggy Mason.

The Preparatory Committee dealt briefly with administrative matters relating to the upcoming Review Conference, then reviewed 15 background documents dealing with disarmament and nuclear matters prepared for the Review Conference by the Secretariat of the United Nations (10 documents), the International Atomic Energy Agency (3 documents), the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (1) and the South Pacific Forum (1).

The first Preparatory Committee met May 1-5, 1989 in New York. The third, and final, Preparatory Committee will meet in Geneva April 23 to May 4, 1990, with the Fourth NPT Review Conference itself scheduled to take place August 20 to September 14, 1990 in Geneva. □

Clark Addresses General Assembly

The 44th Session of the UN General Assembly opened in New York on September 18, 1989. The following are excerpts from a speech delivered by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the General Assembly on September 26, 1989.

Mr. President, before beginning my main remarks I want to comment on two particular developments of relevance to the United Nations.

The first concerns the application of modern technology to the challenge of peacekeeping. In April of this year, Canada completed a comprehensive study, the purpose of which was to explore the utility of all forms of aerial surveillance to the peacekeeping tasks now before the international community. The conclusion of this study was that these overhead technologies — satellite or airborne — could significantly increase the efficiency of peacekeeping operations and related verification endeavours. This study will be submitted to the UN for its consideration.

I believe this is an important development both symbolically and as an achievement in its own right. It is the sort of pragmatic, concrete work necessary to allow the UN to handle its ever-expanding peacekeeping responsibilities more effectively. It also symbolizes one of the fundamental purposes of this Organization: harmonizing the wonders of modern technology to the tasks of peace-building and not war-making.

The second development on which I would like to comment is the readiness by Canada, if asked, to supplement the United Nations presence in Namibia by sending trained and respected police forces. Canada supported enthusiastically the idea that nations should help meet the urgent requirements for skilled policing in Namibia. We are ready to send members of our national force, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who have played such a decisive and constructive role in our own history.

They were, in effect, Canada's first peacekeepers. In 1874, in one of the actions which made us a transcontinental nation, the North-West Mounted Police marched west, across 100 miles to establish by their presence, the rule of law in the Canadian West. They brought order, not force, and by their conduct, established a respect that endures to this day, and has made them one of the most admired police forces in the world. They would carry to Namibia not only their skills, but their reputation as keepers of the peace.

This would be the first time in Canadian history that the RCMP has undertaken such a role. In order to be ready, their Commissioner asked for 100 volunteers. So far, 2,000 members have responded to that call — from a total force of over 14,000. We believe that Canadian mounties, who more than a century ago brought a universal respect for law and order to our own West, can extend that tradition to Namibia, as that new nation finally comes of age.

This is an unprecedented and challenging period in world affairs.

On the one hand, there is real movement on problems that, not long ago, seemed intractable — that is true in Southern Africa, in Indochina, in parts of the Middle East and, most dramatically, in East-West relations.

At the same time, the sense of crisis becomes more acute. Our climate is changing, bringing drought, or inundation, or threats to our very survival. New diseases develop. New technologies allow proliferation of the most deadly weapons. Terrorism becomes more widespread.

What is common about these problems is that none of them can be solved by one nation acting alone, nor by one group of powerful nations concerting their will.

In the past, we assumed the world could survive man's worst excesses. Now, in an age of suitcase bombs, and the AIDS pandemic, and holes in the ozone,

there is doubt about that elemental ability to survive. Doubt, but not despair — indeed the opposite of despair. What marks this period in world affairs is an activism and a pragmatism which yield surprising results. And they come together here, in this United Nations.

We are entering an era where the words of the UN Charter must cease to be goals to which we aspire; they must become descriptions of our common action. And the term "United Nations" cannot simply be the name of our institution; it must become a statement of our common purpose.

Who today can imagine a nuclear war in which there are winners and losers?

Who can envisage a conventional war in Europe which does not consume the prize?

Who can construct a solution to the debt crisis which does not involve compromise?

Who can foresee a cleaner global environment without international cooperation and joint action?

And who can imagine a resolution of the many crises in the developing world without a reasoned and productive dialogue with the developed world?

In the past, it was the adherents of unilateralism who were known as realists and the advocates of cooperation who were labelled idealists. I submit that the reverse is now the case. Cooperation is now the new realism, and pragmatism is the path to progress.

Much has been accomplished in recent months and years; much more remains to be done.

Within the East-West relationship, there is a new willingness to abandon sterile linkages, and to seek solutions to tractable problems even when other areas remain contentious.

This welcome attitude has invigorated this institution and brought hope to many conflicts and regions of the world. We encourage its continuance.

Arms control is now characterized by real compromise and give and take. Problems which are truly acute are being

addressed first. Areas where technology threatens to overtake politics are being given priority. And the unnecessarily large and undesirably unstable balance in conventional forces is finally being dealt with head-on.

Canada warmly welcomes the significant progress made in recent days by the United States and the Soviet Union on a variety of fundamental issues.

In particular, movement towards the abandonment of the linkage between research on strategic defence and progress on strategic nuclear arms control is a very positive development.

So too is the progress registered on eliminating chemical weapons, including the exchange of data on stocks. We strongly welcome President Bush's offer to reduce stockpiles to less than twenty percent of current levels while efforts continue in Geneva to negotiate a Chemical Weapons Convention.

Canada also endorses the US and Soviet agreement to explore an Open Skies arrangement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Such an arrangement would be daring in its simplicity, yet pathbreaking in its consequences; an agreement that the aircraft of each member of both alliances could enter the airspace of the other alliance subject only to basic air safety regulations. This would increase the assurance of every member that military activities were not becoming preparations for surprise attack.

From the beginning, we have urged the United States to move forward with this visionary proposal, and to make it an alliance-to-alliance arrangement.

An Open Skies agreement would be a compelling symbol of the new East-West relationship. It would build confidence and serve as a useful vehicle for the verification of other agreements, including an eventual agreement on conventional forces in Europe.

We are prepared to go beyond moral support. On Sunday, after consultations among NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Prime Minister Mulroney announced Canada's offer to host an inter-alliance

conference, as early as November, in order to explore the possibilities of a formal agreement on Open Skies.

It is of fundamental importance to deepen and widen East-West relations. A stable structure of peace cannot endure if its only component is concurrence on arms control, no matter how far-reaching that agreement is.

Enduring peace requires understanding, a sense of shared problems and a shared stake in the future. Above all, it demands a sense on each side that the survival of the other is in its own best interest. What is required is agreement not only on the avoidance of war but also on the advantages of peace....

It is for this reason that Canada has strongly supported expanding the field of activity of NATO; that is, pursuing more energetically the Alliance's mandate for political and social dialogue. In this connection, during NATO's most recent summit, a Canadian proposal was adopted to assist young political leaders in learning how to make democracy work. More initiatives of this type are required.

Cooperation is now the new realism

The progress in East-West relations owes much to the refreshing breezes of change sweeping Eastern Europe and the USSR. Ideology is giving way to compromise. Governments are recognizing that the old ways do not work; that new strategies are required; that lessons may be learned abroad; and that cooperation in the economic and social spheres does not constitute an acknowledgement of defeat but is rather a recipe for success.

Canada's support for the changes now underway in the East is unequivocal. There must be no turning back and that requires imagination in the West on how to strengthen this remarkable process of reform and liberalization....

Totalitarianism is fading not because it is regarded by its subjects as wrong; it is being discredited because it doesn't work. It doesn't deliver.

Democracy is not only a set of values; it is also a statement that there is no monopoly on truth, that different groups at different times may have different solutions to different problems. It is the politics of pragmatism. It works. It delivers.

A free market is not simply a particular means of ordering the economy. It is a framework which enables the individual to act on his or her own merits, efforts and capacities. It conforms to human nature. It is the economics of pragmatism. It works. It delivers.

It is for this reason that Canada welcomes the tide of democratization and the shift to the marketplace evident around the globe. On this trend rests the hope for social stability. And such stability is a firm foundation for international peace....

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan; the settlements in Angola and Namibia; the ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq war; and the progress evident in Central America; all are testimony to a new willingness to compromise. They are also testimony to the crucial role played by this organization and its Secretary-General in the search for global order.

Much more needs to be done. There is a difference between the absence of war and the presence of peace. The international community must continue to do everything in its power to ensure that the processes now underway in these troubled regions move from truce to settlement, from stand-off to stand-down....

As some regional conflicts have been brought under control, the unique and important UN instrument of peacekeeping has been brought to bear. At the same time, welcome and pragmatic suggestions are being made to improve operations and funding. Canada supports the Secretary-General's call to provide peacekeeping with a rational and secure funding base. Peacekeeping has become too important to the mission of this Organization to be subject to charity or whim.

One of the central tasks of this Organization has been to weave a new fabric of international law. This it has done assiduously, often without fanfare. The found-

dation is being laid for an international society governed by legal principles and codes of conduct. As with domestic society, stability is not possible without law — and law is powerless without consensus. The integration into domestic law of the rights codified by the UN in its Declaration of Human Rights and the covenants on racial discrimination and the rights of women — this is testimony to a growing international consensus....

We are witnessing today a profound transformation in the substance of international discourse. Issues once thought intractable are now remarkably close to resolution. And issues once considered the province of domestic governments are now the focus of international activity. These are on the international agenda because they are pressing and because no state no matter how powerful or well-intentioned can resolve them on its own.

Thus the environment is emerging as the most important international challenge of the remainder of this century and the next. In a very few years, the environment will be seen as a threat to human existence in the same way nuclear war has been regarded in the past. It is now a challenge to national survival. It is also an area where the distinction between the domestic and the international agenda is collapsing. Pollution knows no borders. In the end, we all share the same air and water; we all suffer from its corruption or its loss.

Let us agree during this Assembly to hold the proposed Conference on the Environment and Development in 1992. Let us move forward towards a Climate Change Convention where Canada has played a lead role in the development of a UN draft. And let us start a realistic dialogue between the developed and developing world on this environmental scourge which threatens all states, rich and poor.

I detect today a new and welcome wind of change in the stale and unproductive state of relations between North and South which marked the 1970s and the first part of this decade. There is a growing recognition that grand, vague visions must give way to pragmatic dialogue, and that attributing blame does little to solve problems.

In fact, without fanfare and grand initiative, a new process of dialogue has already begun between the developed and developing world....

We are witnessing a profound transformation in the substance of international discourse

Canada believes it is useful to encourage intensive consultations leading to a new conversation between the developed and the developing world, a conversation on focused issues, with a view to arriving at joint action for a common cause.

Conversation, not confrontation. We cannot remake the world anew. But we can — and we must — redress the errors of the past — methodically, pragmatically, realistically and collectively.

Discussions on the environment, on drugs, on investment, trade and debt are worthy of early pursuit. The agenda should be balanced, covering issues of interest to both the developed and developing world. We will be pursuing this question actively in the months ahead with our G-7 partners and the developing world. Soviet involvement in this effort would be welcome, giving them the opportunity to further act on their interest in contributing to the international order. It would also reflect the universal nature of this challenge....

The challenge before us today is to alter our traditional behaviour at an unprecedented rate, in the face of a planet showing so many signs of use and abuse.

We know only too well the litany of global horrors before us:

— a burgeoning global population whose size will expand by almost 3.5 billion in thirty-five short years;

— an ailing environment whose forests are dying or disappearing, whose air is being poisoned, and whose oceans and rivers are becoming dump-sites and cesspools;

— 14 million children dying each year from common illness and poor nutrition;

— a generation debilitated by drugs, the world trade in which now exceeds the value of trade in oil and is second only to the arms trade;

— dozens of economies unable to simultaneously pay for past mistakes and develop a successful future;

— and the proliferation of weapons — chemical and nuclear, as well as the spreading technology of weapon delivery systems — creating a time bomb which threatens the relief we now feel at the superpowers' new-found cooperation.

This Organization, like other international assemblies, reflects the world from which it draws its members and its mission.

There have been many successes:

— the quiet but spectacular victories of UNICEF, the UNHCR and the World Health Organization;

— the triumph of peacekeeping — 50,000 participants of which so deservedly received the Nobel Prize;

— the mediation of disputes, so honourably presided over by the present Secretary-General.

But there have also been failures, opportunities lost to dated ideology and the lack of political will. The challenge posed by the future is not to invent new institutions but to make this UN family of institutions work more effectively and humanely.

Mr. President, we are in a new type of race in which we will either all be winners or we will all be losers.

Let us lay to rest the worn out stereotypes of the past. Let us set aside our differences and work forthrightly for a secure global future. Let us consecrate ourselves anew as United Nations.

And let us confront squarely the problems of our era as men and women aware of the challenges before us, mindful of the consequences of failure, and dedicated to solutions that will work, not dreams that will die. □

Canada to Host Open Skies Conference

On September 24, 1989, the Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, welcomed Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's endorsement of US President Bush's "Open Skies" proposal of last May and announced that Canada has offered to host a conference to negotiate an "Open Skies" agreement. The conference is expected to be held in Ottawa early next year. Invitations to attend will be issued to the foreign ministers of all other NATO and Warsaw Pact states. In conveying Canada's offer, the Prime Minister noted that a two-stage conference format would likely be adopted, with Canada hosting the first stage and a Warsaw Pact country the second.

"Open Skies" would allow individual countries of the two military alliances to undertake short-notice surveillance flights of one another's territories using unarmed aircraft. The idea was first proposed by US President Dwight Eisenhower at a summit with Britain, France and the USSR in Geneva in July 1955. It was greeted with enthusiasm by the French and British leaders, but dismissed by Soviet leader Khrushchev as "a bald espionage plot." Canada actively promoted the idea over the next few years, but "Open Skies" could not overcome the atmosphere of mutual East-West suspicion then prevailing.

The concept lay dormant until the spring of 1989 when President Bush directed his staff to undertake a comprehensive review of US arms control policies and potential initiatives. During the course of regular consultations on arms control, Canada became aware that "Open Skies" was under consideration as one of these initiatives. The idea of an "Open Skies" regime was attractive to Canadian officials, who encouraged their US counterparts to consider the proposal sympathetically. Prime Minister

Mulroney mentioned Canada's interest in "Open Skies" to President Bush at a meeting in early May, as did Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark at a meeting with his counterpart, Secretary of State James Baker.

On May 12, President Bush, in an address to the graduating class of Texas A&M University, proposed that an "Open Skies" regime be created as a confidence-building measure. Canada welcomed the President's proposal and pledged its full support in the development of an "Open Skies" regime.

Canadian officials spent the summer quietly encouraging their counterparts in Western and Eastern Europe to consider the "Open Skies" proposal. These efforts by Canada and others were rewarded on September 21 when Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze indicated to Secretary of State Baker during discussions at Jackson Hole, Wyoming that the USSR would participate in an international conference on the subject.

The type of "Open Skies" regime envisaged would open NATO and Warsaw Pact members' territories to aerial surveillance by unarmed, non-

combat aircraft subject only to internationally-accepted civilian flight safety rules. The regime would not be related to a specific treaty, but would rather serve as a general confidence-building measure between East and West. As the Prime Minister stated on September 24: "the scheme's strength is its simplicity.... It will provide greater assurances to individual participating countries that the military activities of their neighbours are not preparations for surprise attack."

The scheme's strength is its simplicity

An "Open Skies" regime would allow states — such as Canada — that do not possess satellite means of observation to exercise an independent capability of monitoring activities of potential concern. It would enable the North American members of NATO to demonstrate their willingness to shoulder some of the burden of intrusiveness that the European allies will incur under a conventional force reduction agreement in Europe. It would also provide an opportunity for Soviet President Gorbachev to re-emphasize his commitment to "glasnost" in a dramatic yet practical fashion. □

Bilateral Arms Control and Disarmament Consultations
February — September 1989

Canada conducts annual and ad hoc arms control and disarmament consultations with a variety of countries at the senior officials' level. Below is a list of consultations during the February-September 1989 period.

DATE	COUNTRY	LOCATION
April 6-7, 1989	USSR	Ottawa
June 6, 1989	Czechoslovakia	Prague
June 8, 1989	Poland	Warsaw
June 12, 1989	France	Ottawa
July 20, 1989	USSR	Ottawa
September 26, 1989	New Zealand	Wellington

Mason Addresses First Committee

The First Committee of the 44th United Nations General Assembly began its deliberations in New York on October 16, 1989. The First Committee, which deals with political and security matters, has an agenda comprising the entire range of arms control and disarmament questions. It prepares recommendations and draft resolutions which are then submitted to the General Assembly for adoption on the basis of a majority vote. The following is the text of the address given by Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Ms. Peggy Mason, to the First Committee on October 20, 1989.

One year ago, in his address to the First Committee, Canada's Ambassador Yves Fortier remarked on the degree of hopefulness being exhibited in this chamber and in the General Assembly. This hopefulness reflected the dramatic improvement in relations between the two leading military powers, the painstaking, but real, progress in negotiations toward arms control agreements, and the amelioration of regional conflicts.

Today, when we look back at what has happened since that time, we have even stronger grounds for the expectation and desire that characterize hope. Progress has continued on many fronts: in the resolution of regional conflicts in Southern Africa, Indochina and Central America; in the general climate of East-West relations; and, most particularly — reflecting and in turn encouraging the East-West improvement — in arms control and disarmament, the province of the First Committee.

Who would have predicted just a few short years ago that the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact would be sitting down in March of this year to begin a new set of negotiations aimed at enhancing stability at lower levels of conventional forces in Europe, encompassing all of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals? And that these negotiations would have an excellent prospect of coming to a successful conclusion within the next year? Who would have predicted, in those early, dark days of the Stockholm

Conference, that the thirty-five states members of the CSCE would soon be negotiating a second round of confidence and security-building measures, building on those eventually agreed at Stockholm, which continue to be so successfully implemented. These two sets of negotiations in Vienna have the potential to bring about a remarkable, positive and, we hope, lasting transformation of East-West security relations.

Multilateral process must not lag behind

On the issue of nuclear weapons, the United States and Soviet Union continue to make significant progress. Canada was particularly encouraged by the movement last month toward abandonment of the linkage between research on strategic defence and progress on strategic nuclear arms control. Canada also welcomes the advances the two countries are making toward ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

In addition, in their bilateral negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union have made strides toward the elimination of chemical weapons, strides that Canada hopes will accelerate progress in the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

In East-West negotiations, including negotiations between the two superpowers, progress over this past year has been sizable and rapid. We should not assume that it has been easy or foreordained. It has been, rather, a reflection of that recipe for success that the Canadian representative suggested in his address to this Committee last year: patience, persistence and realism. It has been the result of pragmatic approaches, of a willingness to be flexible, a willingness to seriously entertain ideas previously thought unthinkable. There is perhaps no better example of this than the readiness now to begin negotiations to create "Open Skies" over the territories of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, an idea that was rejected out-of-hand when it was first put forward by President Eisenhower thirty-four years ago.

The "Open Skies" concept, if agreed to, would have the effect of opening the territory of North America, Europe and the Soviet Union to virtually unrestricted aerial surveillance. It would mark an unprecedented openness in military relations. It would symbolize a nation's commitment to transparency and provide a clear, unequivocal sign that its intentions are not aggressive. An "Open Skies" regime could lead to an important increase in confidence between East and West. It could also contribute to the verification of specific arms control agreements, including an eventual agreement on conventional forces in Europe. Canada is looking forward to hosting the first stage of a conference to address the issues related to "Open Skies."

I referred a moment ago to the essential ingredients for success in arms control: patience, persistence and realism. On the East-West front it appears that this combination has begun to show results. However, on other fronts, the multilateral process — including the work of the UN — often gives the appearance of lagging behind.

Canada was disappointed, like many of you, by the inability last year of UNSSOD III to arrive at a final document. We were also disappointed this year when the UN Disarmament Commission failed to reach agreement on any of its agenda items. In the Conference on Disarmament, we very much regret that it has not yet proved possible to reach agreement on the basis for a mandate that would allow the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on a nuclear test ban. There is much constructive work that can be done there. As East-West negotiations move forward so clearly, some multilateral forums risk acquiring the epithet of "too much talk and too little action."

If it were only a question of uncomplicated labels we could perhaps continue unperturbed. Unfortunately, East-West negotiations do not operate in a vacuum. A secure and peaceful world, at greatly reduced levels of armaments, cannot be realized until all are prepared to participate in the process of achieving it. The multilateral arms control process can work; we see that in the negotiations related to conventional arms control in

Europe. The UN forums should take heed. We must look closely at that recipe for success.

We will have opportunity to do so in the days ahead, here at the First Committee. We are meeting at an auspicious time. The improved East-West negotiating climate has provided a positive momentum across the full range of arms control and disarmament issues. Our record from last year is good. An unprecedented number of resolutions were adopted by consensus. Work was conducted in a businesslike fashion. The atmosphere was cooperative and productive. Let us continue in that mode, so we can go forward to next year's UNDC, to the NPT Review Conference, and to the other items on the multilateral agenda with renewed energy. Our objectives this session must be to build on the progress we made last year, to reflect the progress happening outside this chamber and to arrive at consensus on resolutions that will contribute to future progress.

There are going to be differences of opinion. There is no point in trying to hide them. But we should not view the First Committee as an occasion merely to restate those differences. We should view it as an occasion to explore our differences with a view to narrowing them, with a view to finding common ground, with a view to reaching consensus. But it must be a genuine consensus, not a consensus of convenience. We should not view this as a forum for grand-sounding statements that we are not prepared to put into practice. If we want to keep pace with developments taking place in other forums, we must be pragmatic in seeking common ground.

With this in mind, Canada will be concentrating on a number of areas over the coming weeks.

Progress in the chemical weapons negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament has not been as dramatic as some may have hoped, given the expectations generated at the Paris Conference earlier this year. These expectations must be tempered, however, by recognition that questions of considerable complexity are now before the Ad Hoc Committee. The working groups established by this year's Chairman had many difficult tech-

nical and legal issues to consider, and they responded with extraordinary diligence and perseverance. We hope that a strengthened sense of purpose will be conveyed to the delegates in Geneva as a result of the highly-successful Government-Industry Conference Against Chemical Weapons, recently concluded in Canberra, Australia.

It has been suggested by some that convincing states to adhere to a chemical weapons convention, once concluded, might be a lengthy process. In fact, for many years, states have indicated in this Committee that they not only support a chemical weapons convention, but that they eagerly await its conclusion. Their votes in favour of resolutions calling for this agreement should be regarded as promises to be kept. The Canadian delegation, in close cooperation with the delegation of Poland, will aim to ensure that this Committee again registers by consensus its view on the urgency of concluding the negotiations for a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

The conclusion of a verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty has long been, and remains, a fundamental Canadian objective. The progress being made in this area by the United States and the Soviet Union is welcome and should be energetically pursued. With other delegations, we will again be sponsoring a draft resolution urging steps toward the earliest achievement of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

Because of its strong support for treaty-specific verification measures and in light of the procedures that regulate amendments to the PTBT, Canada did not view the initiative for an amending conference as likely to be either helpful or productive. However, now that the conference is to take place, we will, of course, participate constructively.

The verification of compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements continues to be a major focus of Canada's efforts in the multilateral field. Without provision for assurances that parties will abide by their treaty obligations, countries will be hesitant to sign arms control and disarmament agreements. Verification is the essential means

by which confidence in compliance is created. Canada was particularly pleased, last year, with the strong support given to our verification resolution, which endorsed the verification principles agreed upon by the UNDC and called on the Secretary-General to carry out an experts' study on verification. Canada was honoured to be chosen as chair of the group of experts carrying out the study and is pleased to report that the study is proceeding in an effective manner. We look forward to receiving the group's report at UNGA 45. To avoid prejudging the experts' report, and in view of our continued desire to rationalize the activities of this Committee, we do not think it necessary nor appropriate for us to propose a resolution on verification at this session.

As we enter the final decade of the century, the relative prominence of the United States and the Soviet Union as the two major powers in space is lessening. More and more states are developing the capability to conduct space research and to use outer space for legitimate commercial purposes. Such developments are welcome, as long as they do not contribute in any way to the development of an arms race in outer space. For this reason, the Canadian delegation will pay particular attention to the agenda item dealing with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It is Canada's strong conviction that outer space is an area of legitimate multilateral concern, and that the question of whether additional legal measures may be required in this area is of broad international interest.

Canada continues to believe that a verifiable agreement on the cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes should be negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament at an appropriate stage of its work on the item "Nuclear Weapons in all Aspects." To promote this objective, the Canadian delegation will be introducing, as it has in past years, a resolution calling for such a ban.

The agenda before us is a full one. The way in which we address it — constructively or not — will set the tone for one of the major events on next year's multilateral calendar: the Fourth Review

Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Not only is this treaty the linchpin of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, it is the point on which all arms control and disarmament progress rests. If we allow that agreement to be damaged, we may undermine the entire arms control process. States will be willing to sign agreements limiting conventional or chemical arms only if they

know that parties to those agreements will be inhibited from acquiring nuclear weapons by a strong non-proliferation regime. Commitment to arms control and disarmament must, almost by definition, mean commitment to the NPT.

Canada was an active participant in past Review Conferences and looks forward to working closely with all NPT parties to help ensure the success of the

1990 conference. We believe that its outcome will be of critical importance in setting the stage for the role of the Treaty beyond 1995.

Patience, persistence and realism — the formula that has begun to yield results, must continue to be followed. Only with these ingredients can effective and lasting progress in arms control and disarmament be achieved. ▣

West Presents Expanded Position at CFE

The following is the position paper provided by the delegations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States at the closing of the Second Round of the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in Vienna on July 13, 1989.

Objectives

1. The agreed objectives of this negotiation are:

- the establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels;
- the elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security;
- the elimination, as a matter of high priority, of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action.

2. Through the proposals set out below the Delegations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States seek to establish a situation in which surprise attack and large-scale offensive action are no longer credible options. We pursue this aim on the basis of equal respect for the security interests of all. Our proposals make up a coherent whole and

are intended to be applied simultaneously and in their totality in the area of application, as defined in the mandate.

Rationale

3. The rationale for our proposals is as follows:

- the present concentration of forces in the area from the Atlantic to the Urals is the highest ever known in peacetime and represents the greatest destructive potential ever assembled. Overall levels of forces, particularly those relevant to sur-

prise attack and offensive action such as tanks, artillery and armoured troop carriers, must therefore be radically reduced. It is the substantial disparity in the numbers of these systems, all capable of rapid mobility and high firepower, which most threatens stability in Europe. These systems are also central to the seizing and holding of territory, the prime aim of any aggressor;

- no one country should be permitted to dominate Europe by force of arms: no participant should therefore possess more than a fixed proportion of the total



A CH-136 Kiowa helicopter from Canadian Forces Base Lahr, followed by two Dutch Air Force helicopters, flies past the Hohenzollern castle in southern Germany during a NATO squadron exchange visit.

Canadian Forces Photo by WO Vic Johnson

holdings of all participants in each category of armaments, commensurate with its needs for self defence;

— addressing the overall number and nationality of forces will not by itself affect the stationing of armaments outside national borders: additional limits will also be needed on certain forces stationed on other countries' territory;

— we need to focus on both the levels of armaments and state of readiness of forces in those areas where the concentration of such forces is greatest, as well as to prevent redeployment of ground forces withdrawn from one part of the area of application to another. It will therefore be necessary to apply a series of interlocking sub-limits covering certain forces throughout the area, together with further limits on armaments in active units;

— it was decided at the meeting of Alliance Heads of State and Government in Brussels on 29th/30th May 1989 that aircraft and helicopters should also be reduced because of their relevance to the conventional balance. We envisage appropriate measures of verification and non-circumvention taking account of the particular characteristics of these weapons systems;

— the Summit meeting in Brussels on 20th/30th May 1989 also decided to supplement these provisions with an equal ceiling on US and Soviet ground and air force personnel stationed in Europe outside their national territory. Such a measure reflects the particular responsibilities of the two major powers in the reduction of military confrontation and the building of mutual confidence in Europe on a basis of mutual equality, as well as the fact that these two countries maintain substantial forces outside the zone of application.

Proposals

Chapter I: Limitation on Major Weapons Systems

a. Ground Forces

Our proposals on ground forces have been made public on 6th March in Vienna. Those main battle tanks, artillery pieces and ATCs withdrawn from service in order to achieve compliance with the

rules proposed in March shall be destroyed, in accordance with procedures to be agreed.

b. Air Assets

Rule A: Overall Limit

The overall total of combat aircraft and combat helicopters will at no time exceed:

Combat Aircraft:	11,400
Combat Helicopters:	3,800

Rule B: Sufficiency

No one country may retain more than 30% of the overall limits in these two categories, i.e.

Combat Aircraft:	3,420
Combat Helicopters:	1,140

Rule C: Sub-Limits

Within the area of application delineated under Rule 4(1), each group of countries belonging to the same treaty of alliance shall not exceed the following levels:

Combat Aircraft:	5,700
Combat Helicopters:	1,900

Rule D: Disposition of Reduced Weapons Systems

Those aircraft and helicopters withdrawn from service in order to achieve compliance with Rules A to C above shall be destroyed in accordance with procedures to be agreed.

Chapter II: Limits on US and Soviet Ground and Air Force Personnel Stationed in Europe Outside National Territory

The United States and the Soviet Union shall not station outside their national territory within Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals more than, in each case, 275,000 ground and air force personnel.

United States and Soviet Union personnel withdrawn from service in order to achieve compliance with this limit shall be demobilized.

Chapter III: Measures of Information Exchange, Stabilization, Verification and Non-circumvention

In addition, there will, as an integral part of the agreement, be a need for further measures of information exchange,

stabilization, verification and non-circumvention.

a. Information Exchange

Each year holdings of main battle tanks, armoured troop carriers, artillery pieces, combat aircraft and helicopters will be notified, disaggregated down to battalion/squadron level. This measure will also apply to personnel in both combat and supporting units. Any change of notified unit structures above battalion/squadron level, or any measure resulting in an increase of personnel strength in such units or in aggregate personnel levels, will be subject to notification on a basis to be determined in the course of the negotiations.

b. Stabilizing Measures

We shall shortly present proposals designed to buttress the resulting reductions in force levels in the ATTU area. These will include measures of openness and constraint applied to the deployment, movement, storage and levels of readiness of conventional armed forces, including their armaments and equipment. There will also need to be provision for temporarily exceeding the limits set out in Chapters I and II, inter alia, for pre-notified exercises.

c. Measures of Verification

We shall also propose verification arrangements designed to provide assurance of compliance with the agreed provisions.

d. Non-circumvention Provisions

We will propose provisions which will ensure that actions of the parties do not circumvent the agreement and do not have adverse security implications for any participant.

Chapter IV: The Longer Term

In the longer term, and in the light of the implementation of the above measures, we would be willing to contemplate further steps to enhance stability and security in Europe, such as:

- further reductions or limitations of conventional armaments and equipment;
- the restructuring of armed forces to enhance defensive capabilities and further to reduce offensive capabilities. □

West's Chapter III Position at CFE

The following is the position paper provided by the delegations of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States at the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Vienna on September 21, 1989.

I. Introduction

1. The proposals tabled by the member states of the Atlantic Alliance on 9th March and 13th July are designed to eliminate disparities in key categories of combat equipment relevant to surprise attack and offensive action and thereby to contribute towards the achievement of a more stable and secure balance of forces at lower levels. Full implementation of these proposals will dramatically reduce the capacity to conduct offensive operations. But a numerical parity in conventional forces in Europe, even at lower levels, will not by itself guarantee stability and security. Further measures are necessary to ensure that, insofar as is possible, the arms reductions we propose will in fact result in the lasting stability and security that we seek.

2. The additional measures necessary are:

- Exchange of Information
- Stabilizing Measures
- Verification Provisions
- Measures to prevent circumvention.

II. Exchange of Information

3. There will be an exchange of data on forces, sites and weapon systems as outlined below. Each state will be responsible for its own data; receipt of this data and subsequent notifications will not imply validation or acceptance of the data.

4. Information to be Exchanged

(A) Each participant shall provide the following information about the structure of its land, air and air defence forces in the area of application:

(i) Its land forces command organization, showing the designation and subordination of all combat, combat support

and combat service support formations and units at each level of command down to the level of battalion or equivalent*, indicating whether the unit is active duty or not.

(ii) Its air and air defence forces command organization**, showing the designation and subordination of formations and units at each level of command down to squadron or equivalent.

(B) For each of the above formations and units holding treaty-limited items, each participant shall provide the following information:

(i) The normal peacetime location of its headquarters component and of formations and units at which treaty-limited items are stationed or held, with exact geographical terms or coordinates and peacetime planned/authorized personnel strength.

(ii) The holdings at such locations of the following categories of treaty-limited equipment, specifying numbers and types:

- main battle tanks
- artillery pieces
- armoured troop carriers
- combat aircraft
- combat helicopters

(iii) The locations and holdings of Armoured Vehicle Launched Assault Bridges (AVLB), in active units.

(C) Each participant shall also provide information on the following within the area of application:

(i) The location, including exact geographical terms or coordinates, of storage depots monitored under the stabilizing and verification arrangements of this agreement, and the numbers and types of treaty-limited equipment held at such depots.

(ii) The numbers, types and permanent locations of treaty-limited items not belonging to the formations and units

* This is to include "low strength units" [see Stabilizing Measure 3(D)(1)].

** This is to include naval aviation permanently based on land.

declared under (B)(i) above, and not in monitored storage.

(iii) The location, including exact geographical terms or coordinates, and the number of personnel assigned to low strength units* designated under Stabilizing Measure 3(D).

(iv) The location, including exact geographical terms or coordinates, of other sites where treaty-limited equipment may be present on a regular or periodic basis, such as repair and maintenance depots, training establishments, storage depots other than those subject to monitoring under verification measures of this agreement, and alternative operating airfields, and the numbers of any treaty-limited equipment permanently located at such sites.

(v) The numbers and location, including geographical terms or coordinates of AVLB in monitored storage and in any other sites not covered by 4(B)(iii).

(D) The US and Soviet Union shall provide information on the number and location of their ground and air force personnel stationed on the territory of other participants in the area of application.

(E) Each participant shall also indicate the location of any sites which held equipment of the types subject to limitation under Chapter I after 1st January 1989, and from which such equipment has been withdrawn; each of these sites will have to be declared for (x) years following such withdrawal.

(F) In addition, each participant shall also provide information on the numbers, type and location of any main battle tanks, artillery pieces, armoured troop carriers, combat aircraft and combat helicopters present on the territory of participants in the area of application, not subject to treaty limitation but with a potential for circumvention, e.g., equipment held by paramilitary forces and equipment which is not in service with the armed forces of any participant.

5. Information required by paragraph 4 above shall be communicated in writing through diplomatic channels in accordance with an agreed format.

* As defined in Stabilizing Measure 3(D).

6. Each participant shall provide the stipulated information on its military structure, forces and equipment in the area of application:
- on signature of the Agreement, with information effective as of that date;
 - on coming into force of the Agreement, with information effective as of that date;
 - on 15th December of that year and the 15th December of every year thereafter (with information effective as of the 1st day of January the following year); and
 - immediately after completion of reductions.

7. Notification of Changes in Organizational Structures on Force Levels.

- (A) Each participant shall notify all other participants 42 days in advance of any permanent change in the organizational structure of its existing units in the area of application or the permanent addition of any new unit of at least battalion/squadron or equivalent size to its forces in the area of application.
- (B) Each participant shall notify all other participants of changes of 10 percent or more in the peacetime planned/authorized strength of personnel and of treaty-limited equipment in any of its treaty-limited equipment-holding combat, combat support or combat service support units down to the battalion/squadron or equivalent level in the area of application since the last annual report. All such changes shall be reported in the preceding annual information exchange or as they occur.

III. Stabilizing Measures

Measure 1: Notification of Call-up of Reservists

Any participant intending to call up 40,000 or more reservists in the area of application shall notify all other participants at least 42 days in advance. Such notification shall be in writing in an agreed format and shall include the number of reservists involved, the designation and location of the units affected, and the purpose and intended duration of the call-up.

Measure 2: Notification of Movements

(A) Any participant intending to move ground treaty-limited equipment from one location to another within the area of application shall notify all other participants at least 42 days in advance if such movements will exceed within 14 days the following levels:

Main Battle Tanks	600
Artillery	400
Armoured Troop Carriers	1,200

(B) Notification made in compliance with this Measure shall be in writing, in an agreed format, and shall specify the number of items of treaty-limited equipment to be moved, their normal peacetime locations, the route of their movement to and from the new locations, and the purpose and intended duration of their presence in the new locations.

Measure 3: Monitored Storage

(A) Monitored Storage Requirement

(1) For each group of states belonging to the same treaty of alliance, equipment in active units shall not exceed the following levels in the area of application:

Main Battle Tanks	16,000
Artillery	14,500
Armoured Troop Carriers	25,500

(2) Treaty-limited equipment which is within the total authorized ceilings but in excess of the ceilings for active units stated in paragraph (A)(1) shall be placed either in monitored storage sites as specified in (B) below or in monitored low strength units as specified in (D) below within the area 4.2. Equipment located in area 4.3 shall, however, be placed in monitored storage sites.

(B) Monitored Storage Sites

(1) Only equipment placed in declared, monitored storage as specified in this Section shall be regarded as equipment in storage for compliance with the requirements of paragraph (A)(2) above.

(2) The location of monitored storage sites for treaty-limited equipment shall be declared and communicated to all CFE participants, along with information specifying the quantities of treaty-limited equipment stored at them.

(3) Monitored storage sites declared in accordance with paragraph (B)(2) shall be configured to ensure:

- an effective separation of stored equipment from active equipment;
- ease of monitoring;
- clearly defined boundaries with limited entrance and exit points.

(4) Participants may maintain as much treaty-limited equipment in non-monitored storage sites as they desire, but equipment kept at such sites shall be counted, solely for the purposes of this agreement, as being in active units.

(C) Removal from Monitored Storage

(1) Except as permitted by (C)(4) below, equipment may be removed from monitored storage only when the state intending to remove that equipment has notified all CFE participants at least 42 days prior to removal. Such equipment shall not remain out of storage for more than a period of 42 days.

(2) Equipment removed from monitored storage under (C)(1) by states belonging to the same treaty of alliance shall at no time exceed the following levels:

Main Battle Tanks	600
Artillery	400
Armoured Troop Carriers	1,200

(3) Notification of the intended removal of equipment from monitored storage in compliance with (C)(1) shall specify the location(s) of the site(s) from which the equipment is to be removed and shall provide details on the intended use of the equipment during the period of its removal from storage.

(4) Small [up to 10 percent of the figures in (C)(2) above] amounts may be removed for maintenance or other purpose without being subject to the time limit in (C)(1) and without prior notification except to any observer at the storage site.

(5) Replacement of equipment in monitored storage shall be notified by the state making the replacement at the time it takes place and shall include the disposition of any removed equipment.

(D) Equipment in Monitored Low Strength Units

(1) For the purpose of the agreement, a definition of low strength units shall be agreed among the participants.

(2) The location of such units shall be declared and communicated to all CFE participants, along with information specifying the quantities.

(3) The treaty-limited equipment in such units shall be subject to observation and monitoring to the same level of confidence as that for treaty-limited equipment stored pursuant to (B) above.

(4) Participants may hold as many additional non-monitored low strength units as they desire, but equipment kept at such units shall be counted, solely for the purpose of the agreement, as being in active units.

Measure 4: Limitation and Monitored Storage of Bridging Equipment

(A) For each group of states belonging to the same treaty of alliance, there shall be in active units in the area of application no more than 700 armoured vehicle launched assault bridges.

(B) All armoured vehicle launched assault bridges above the levels specified in (A) above shall be placed in monitored storage, as defined in Measure 3. A maximum of 50 items of such equipment may only be removed from monitored storage in accord with the provisions of Measure 3(C) above.

Measure 5: Constraint on the Size of Military Activities

(A) No participant shall conduct in the area of application any military activity involving more than 40,000 troops or 800 main battle tanks, if organized into a divisional structure or into at least 2 brigades/regiments, not necessarily subordinate to the same division, except as permitted in (B) below.

(B) A participant may conduct one military activity exceeding the limits stated in (A) above within a period of 2 years. Such an activity shall require prior notification to other participants at least 12 months before the activity is to be conducted. The notification shall include the information specified under Paragraph 56 of the Stockholm Document, supplemented by:

(1) The planned area of the military activity, indicated by geographic coordinates, and geographic features if appropriate.

(2) The planned duration of the activity, indicated by projected start and end dates.

(3) The envisaged total number (rounded to the nearest hundred) of troops taking part in the military activity. For activities involving more than the participant, the host state will provide such information for each participant involved.

(4) The planned level and designation of direct operational command under which the activity will take place.

(5) For each participant, the number, type and designation of each ground formation unit down to division or equivalent level whose participation is envisaged.

Air Stabilization Measures

8. The possibility of additional stabilizing measures to deal specifically with combat aircraft and helicopters should be addressed in due course.

IV. Verification Measures

Conceptual Approach

9. The CFE treaty will need to include a verification regime designed to:

- provide confidence that all parties are in compliance with treaty provisions;
- deter violations of treaty provisions;
- enable violations to be detected in a timely fashion.

Such a verification regime must be simple, reliable and as inexpensive as possible, consistent with the needs of effective verification.

10. Implementation of CFE verification provisions and judgements about treaty compliance will be the responsibility of each sovereign state party to the treaty, but treaty provisions should not impede whatever cooperative arrangements allies may choose to make in the exercise of those responsibilities.

11. The three major tasks will be:

- (A) validation of baseline data, relating to the forces to be reduced;
- (B) monitoring of reductions;
- (C) confirmation of compliance with agreed residual force limits and other provisions for the life of the treaty.

Measure 1: Declared Sites

A) All sites declared under the terms of paragraphs 4(B), 4(C) and 4(E) above shall be subject to inspection at short notice, with no right of refusal, and in accordance with the provisions in paragraph 12.

(B) Each state shall be liable to receive on its territory an agreed quota of inspections. The quota will reflect relevant parameters. The quota will be expressed in terms of the number of days' presence on the territory of the receiving state of inspection teams.

(C) The intensity of inspections shall be greater during the initial (x) month period after the entry into force of the treaty in order to facilitate the initial validation of the baseline data. The armed forces of participants will not be required to suspend out-of-garrison training (stand-down) for the entire period of the baseline inspection.

(D) Within the quota in (B) above, the participant sending the inspection teams will be free to decide for how long each team will stay on the territory of the inspected state and which declared sites it will visit during this period, but no team may stay more than (y) days at any one site. While it is understood that the full inspection quota must be capable of being fulfilled, there will be a limit to the number of inspection teams that a participant must receive at any one time, according to (B) above.

(E) Provisions will also be required for the application of the inspection regime to the information provided under paragraph 4(D) above.

Measure 2: Non-declared Sites

Participants shall also have the right to request inspection of other sites on the territory of another participant in the area of application. While there would be a right of delay and ultimately refusal, these should be kept to a minimum. In any case an obligation to attempt in good faith to satisfy the concerns of the party requesting an inspection at an undeclared site will remain. Quotas for such inspections could be based on the same criteria as those for declared sites, but differently weighted. Participants will agree on

detailed modalities to govern such inspections, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 12 below.

Measure 3: Monitored Storage Sites and Monitored Low Strength Units

In addition to the provisions outlined in Measure 1, these sites and units will be subject to appropriate monitoring measures to be agreed.

Measure 4: Monitoring of Reductions

(A) Destruction of treaty-limited equipment that is to be reduced shall be in accordance with procedures to be agreed by the participants. This destruction shall take place at designated sites and shall be completed according to an agreed timetable within a period of (x) years.

(B) All destruction of equipment above agreed ceilings shall be notified in advance and be subject to on-site monitoring without quotas or right of refusal. Treaty-limited equipment shall be considered destroyed when agreed prior notification procedures have been followed, the destruction has been carried out in accordance with agreed procedures, and notification has been received that such destruction has been completed. Participants will agree on the notification, destruction and monitoring procedures to be followed.

(C) Reduction of US and Soviet stationed personnel shall be completed according to an agreed timetable within a period of (x) months and the reductions shall be subject to monitoring by any of the participants.

Measure 5: Monitoring of Stabilizing Measures

Participants shall also have the right to monitor, under appropriate conditions, the call-up of reservists (Stabilizing Measure 1), movements from one location to another (as notified under the terms of Stabilizing Measure 2), and the size of military activities (Stabilizing Measure 5).

Measure 6: Aerial Inspection

A CFE regime will include provisions for aerial inspection. Modalities and quotas require further study. The parties shall consider cooperative measures to enhance aerial inspection.

Measure 7: Possible Special Measures for Verification of Aircraft and Helicopter Limits.

The possibility of additional measures to deal specifically with the verification of combat aircraft and combat helicopters, such as identification by number or perhaps tagging of aircraft and helicopters permanently land based in the area of application, requires further study.

Measure 8: National or Multinational Technical Means

(A) No participant shall interfere with national or multinational technical means of verification, or use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the CFE treaty except cover and concealment practices associated with normal training, maintenance, and operations.

(B) The participants shall consider cooperative measures to enhance national or multinational technical means of verification.

Measure 9: Joint Consultative Group

Participants will establish a Joint Consultative Group in the framework of which they will resolve ambiguities, address questions of compliance as well as promote the treaty's viability.

12. General Considerations

(A) No state shall exercise inspection rights on the territory of other parties who belong to the same treaty of alliance. Each inspection or monitoring team shall be the responsibility of one state. That state may include representatives of other members of the treaty of alliance to which it belongs on its inspection or monitoring team if it chooses. In conducting on-site inspections, the inspecting party should be permitted access, entry and unobstructed survey within the site that is being inspected except at sensitive areas or points.

(B) Each participant shall be entitled to conduct an agreed number of inspections upon the territory of other participants in the area of application. These active quotas are to be determined among the members of the same alliance. Unusual quotas may be transferred to other members of the same alliance, however, no participant will be obliged to accept more than 10 percent of its passive quota of inspections in each calendar year from

the same participant. The number of inspections available for the participants in each alliance should be sufficient for effective verification.

(C) Other details of modalities for verification provisions and the specific rights and duties of inspecting and inspected states will be agreed and contained in an inspection protocol.

V. Non-circumvention

13. Each party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. A party intending to withdraw shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to all other parties three months in advance of its withdrawal. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

14. Each party shall, in particular, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this treaty if a party were to increase its holdings in tanks, artillery pieces, armoured troop carriers, land-based combat aircraft or land-based combat helicopters, as defined in Chapter I, which are outside the scope of the limitations of the treaty, in such proportions as to pose a direct and obvious threat to the balance of forces within the area of application.

VI. Other Issues

15. Measures will also be required for the notification and monitoring, under appropriate circumstances to be worked out, of arrivals of main battle tanks, artillery pieces, armoured troop carriers, land-based combat aircraft and land-based combat helicopters in the area of application, exits being duly taken into account so as to provide necessary assurance that the agreed ceilings under Chapter I will not be exceeded or circumvented.

16. Measures will be required to provide necessary assurance that the agreed ceilings under Chapter I are not exceeded or circumvented through the disposition in the zone of newly produced main battle tanks, artillery, armoured troop carriers, land-based combat aircraft and land-based combat helicopters. □

Government and Industry Discuss CW Ban in Canberra

Government officials from over 65 countries and chemical industry representatives from over 30 countries met in Canberra, Australia, September 18-22, 1989, to discuss the proposed ban on chemical weapons. The purpose of the conference was twofold: to strengthen the government-industry bond in the pursuit of a total ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons (CW); and to draw attention to national and industrial responsibilities until the CW negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva are concluded and a CW Convention enters into force.

The Canadian delegation to the conference was led by Mr. John Noble, Director General of the International Security and Arms Control Bureau of External Affairs and International Trade Canada. The delegation was pleased to include a representative of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of Canada: Mr. Andrew Quinn, Director Materials Management, Merck Frosst Canada Inc. In addition, as a result of regular consultations with the Canadian Chemical Producers' Association, the delegation knew that it had that Association's pledge of support for Canada's efforts toward the conclusion of a CW Convention, and for Canada's willingness to do its part in implementing a Convention.

Although measures to ensure the destruction of existing chemical weapons and their production facilities will affect only a small number of countries, each and every state party to a Convention will be required to demonstrate that its chemical industry is not being used — either directly or indirectly — to circumvent the Convention. Verification of non-production of chemical weapons will have to extend far beyond the 10-year destruction phase into the indefinite future. This verification will have to not only embrace chemicals currently of concern because of their toxicity or potential for use as key precursors to toxic chemicals, but also be able to keep abreast of newly-discovered chemicals and technological developments that could be diverted to prohibited purposes. As a result, the chemical industry will be sub-

jected to scrutiny in a way and to a degree that might be considered extremely burdensome.

Or would it be? One of the messages carried to Canberra by the Canadian and some other Western delegations is that their chemical industries are already highly regulated for health and environmental reasons. They are already subject to data reporting obligations and to inspection. What will be new under a CW Convention is the quantity and level of detailed information that will have to be provided to an international agency. Also new will be the requirement to allow not only national, but also international, inspectors access to certain facilities on a routine basis and to any facility in the event of challenge inspection. While being fully supportive of a CW Convention, the chemical industry has had concerns about the protection of proprietary and other confidential business information, and about the potential disruption of its operations during inspections.

In his address to the conference, Mr. Noble noted that while national obligations to demonstrate compliance with the Convention will be paramount, great efforts are being made to take industry's concerns into account. He took the opportunity to present to all delegations a study prepared under the auspices of Canada's Verification Research Unit concerning the kind of preparations that will be required, at the national level, to meet obligations under the Convention. The study, entitled "Role and Function of a National Authority in the Implementation of a Chemical Weapons Convention," could be useful to other countries in making their preparations.

Mr. Noble also pointed to the reality and danger of chemical weapons proliferation. He told conference participants that Canada has taken interim measures to exercise its national responsibility in ensuring that Canadian industry does not contribute, even inadvertently, to any production of chemical weapons.

Mr. Quinn was invited to address a workshop on the subject of voluntary industry initiatives to facilitate a Conven-

tion. He discussed an initiative called "responsible care," which originated with the chemical industry in Canada and has since been embraced by other countries. According to Mr. Quinn, the essence of "responsible care" is information flow. It involves the creation at the community, regional and national levels of mechanisms for consultation that bring together the public, labour, industry and government. The program involves the direct participation of senior chemical company officers, ensuring that commitment flows from the top down. Particularly relevant, he said, was the wealth of experience deriving from shared concerns about health and occupational safety, protection of the environment, and community/labour/management relations.

Mr. Quinn explained the inspection regime under which his company already operates in Canada, and the kind of information it must immediately be able to provide to national and provincial authorities when inspectors appear. His own view was that the same information could also be made available to international inspectors. He concluded that industry must show leadership in the responsible use of precursors and machinery which could be diverted to the manufacture of chemical weapons.

Such views were typical of the sense of responsibility and expression of cooperation on the part of the chemical industry evident at the conference, which took the tangible form of a consensus "Industry Statement." Expressing unequivocal abhorrence of chemical warfare and a willingness to work actively with governments to achieve and then implement a global ban on chemical weapons, the industry participants made quite clear their opposition to the diversion of their products for the manufacture of chemical weapons.

Industry's offer of assistance, as the diplomats in Geneva seek to conclude negotiations on practical questions associated with treaty implementation, was welcomed wholeheartedly by the officials present at Canberra. As Mr. Noble concluded in his statement: "This dialogue is essential if we are going to fashion a convention that will work in practice, not just look good on paper." □

Focus — On Seismic Verification

Focus is our column for secondary school students. We welcome your comments and suggestions for future topics.

Seismology

Seismology is the science of studying vibrations in the earth's crust. Vibrations occur during earthquakes or during smaller, less noticeable tremors. They also occur during underground explosions of nuclear devices. Any earthquake, tremor or explosion that causes vibrations is called a seismic event.

When a seismic event occurs, shock waves are transmitted through the earth. The waves are of two types: body waves, which travel quickly through the earth's mantle; and surface waves, which travel more slowly through the earth's crust. These waves can be detected and analyzed by equipment located up to 10,000 km away from where the event took place. By comparing the measurements of each series of waves, and the time between when they are received, seismologists can often determine where the event occurred and whether the event was an earthquake or an explosion.

The device used to measure vibrations in the earth's crust is called a seismometer. A seismometer usually takes the form of a metal canister, about 20 cm in diameter and 20 cm high, lined with a coil of wire. Inside the coil, suspended from the top of the canister by a spring, is a permanent magnet that is free to move up and down within the coil. The canister is buried in solid rock and any vibration in the earth will cause it to move up and down. The magnet, however, will tend to stay where it is, and the relative motion will induce a weak electrical current in the coil. This current is amplified and recorded on a moving roll of paper or on magnetic tape. It thus forms the basic measurement of a seismic event.

Nuclear Testing

A treaty called the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), signed in 1963, forbids the countries that signed it to explode nuclear devices in the atmosphere, in

outer space or under water. This means that the only place these countries are allowed to explode nuclear devices is underground. Countries may want to explode nuclear devices for a variety of reasons: to test nuclear weapons; to test the effects of nuclear explosions on other equipment; or to study the nuclear explosion process.

Many countries, including Canada, think that all nuclear explosions should be banned. Since countries would then no longer be able to test nuclear weapons by exploding them, the development of new, more sophisticated kinds of nuclear weapons would be difficult. A ban would also make it hard for countries that do not have nuclear weapons to develop them.

Seismic Verification

Canada has been active with other countries in seeking a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Such a treaty would ban all nuclear explosions in all environments (including underground) for all time. Canada participates in the talks related to a CTBT at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

The ability to effectively verify a CTBT is very important to progress toward one. No country that has nuclear weapons is likely to give up its right to test and improve its nuclear arsenal unless it can be sure that other countries will be living up to a similar commitment.

The verification of a possible future CTBT will have to rely a lot upon seismologists, and their ability to detect and identify underground nuclear explosions. Seismic verification could act as a "trip wire." This means that if seismologists detected what they thought was a nuclear explosion, other means of verification could then be used to see whether or not the event was indeed an explosion.

Problems with Seismic Verification

Although seismic events can be monitored with considerable accuracy, there are still some problems with using seismology to verify a CTBT. For example, countries can try to hide their nuclear explosions by testing nuclear devices in

an area that is prone to earthquakes. Or, they can try to disguise the wave pattern of the nuclear test, so that it blends in with the seismic background noise usually found in the area. If an underground test is carried out in a large enough existing underground cavity, the seismic effects of the test will be muffled and distorted.

In addition, a huge number of seismic events occurs each year — over 10,000. It may not be practical to monitor and analyze all of them, and then re-analyze the ones that look suspicious using additional data from other sources. On the other hand, the attempt to do so could well discourage illegal nuclear testing by providing a good chance that potential treaty offenders would be caught.

Another problem is that nuclear weapon technology is constantly evolving, and one of the most dramatic trends is the movement toward smaller bombs. This means that future nuclear weapon tests will likely involve relatively smaller explosive devices and will therefore be far more difficult for seismologists to detect and pinpoint.

Efforts Continue

Despite all these problems, a lot of international research is underway to see just how effective an international seismic monitoring network might be in verifying a CTBT. Canada is playing a major role.

The most important international forum for the discussion of seismic verification techniques is the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) associated with the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. This is a group of seismological experts from many countries, including Canada. In January 1990, the GSE will begin a large experiment to exchange and process detailed seismic data provided by a number of seismic stations from countries around the world. A Canadian, Dr. Peter Basham of Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, is the global coordinator for the experiment. Canada's newly-modernized seismological array at Yellowknife will provide data for the experiment.

Conclusion

While experiments like the GSE's are crucial to the task of designing a seismic

monitoring network and demonstrating its potential for verifying a CTBT, most authorities agree that a CTBT will ultimately depend upon a genuine desire by all parties to make it work. No matter how effective a seismic verification network may one day be, a country may still be able to test small nuclear devices if it is determined to disguise these tests. The purpose of a seismic verification network would be to discourage such testing by making it very expensive for countries that wanted to violate the treaty to test secretly. Also, the violating country would risk being caught regardless of how it tried to avoid detection. In the end, however, the conclusion of a CTBT will depend essentially on political considerations rather than on purely scientific ones. □

Third Seabed Treaty Review Conference Held

The Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, more commonly known as the Seabed Treaty, took place in Geneva September 19-29, 1989. The Canadian delegation was led by Mr. P. MacKinnon, Counsellor and Consul, Permanent Mission of Canada to the Office of the United Nations at Geneva and to the Conference on Disarmament.

The Seabed Treaty prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor beyond a

12-mile coastal limit. It was negotiated between 1968 and 1970 and entered into force May 18, 1972. Of the five nuclear weapon states, neither France nor China has signed the Treaty. Canada is a party to the Treaty.

Previous review conferences were held in Geneva June 20 — July 1, 1977 and September 12-23, 1983. Following article-by-article consideration of the Treaty, the Third Review Conference adopted a final document which concluded that the Treaty continues to demonstrate its effectiveness. It was decided that a fourth review conference would, in principle, be convened no earlier than 1996. □

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CONTRIBUTIONS

1. Canadian Federation of University Women — student essay contest: "What I am prepared to do for peace"	\$500
2. Dr. Jules Dufour — preparation of a university course on arms control and disarmament	\$1,900
3. Voice of Women — orientation tour of the UN Disarmament Commission	\$6,050
4. Peace Education Centre — Youth for Global Awareness Conference	\$4,000
5. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament — Ballistic Missile Defence study	\$19,760
6. Science for Peace, Toronto Chapter — University College Lectures in Peace Studies	\$3,000
7. Centre de Ressources sur la Non-Violence — research on non-violent civil defence and common security	\$7,000
8. Polish-American Parliamentary Debate Institutes Canada — lecture tour of Poland	\$2,500
9. Inuit Circumpolar Conference — participation in Fifth Inuit Circumpolar General Assembly, Greenland	\$4,000
10. David Cox, Queen's University — peacekeeping workshop	\$18,000
11. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament — conference on Canadian-Soviet Arctic cooperation	\$20,000
12. United Nations Association in Canada, Montreal Branch — UN General Assembly simulation	\$2,000
13. Political Studies Students' Conference, University of Manitoba — "End of the Cold War? Prospects for East-West Security in the 1990s" conference	\$4,500

TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS

\$93,210

GRANTS

1. Dr. Michael Mephram — Language and Ideology: a study of the nature of the peace movement's participation in the arms control and disarmament debate	\$7,000
2. Canadian Student Pugwash — chemical weapons workshop at annual conference	\$9,488
3. William Epstein — participation at Pugwash Symposium, Dublin, May 5-7, 1989	\$320
4. Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies — publication of proceedings of seminar on "Nuclear Strategy in the 90s: Deterrence, Defence and Disarmament"	\$7,500
5. Canadian Peace Alliance — preparation of Canadian Peace Catalogue and Database	\$15,000
6. Project Ploughshares — preparation of manual on common security issues	\$17,000

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A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

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Open Skies:

Canada Hosts Major Negotiation

From February 12 to 28, 1990, Canada will play host to its 15 NATO allies and the seven member-states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) as these two groups negotiate an agreement providing for regular overflight of each others' territory using unarmed surveillance aircraft.

Open Skies, as the concept is called, is not an arms control proposal *per se*. No arms will be limited or reduced as a direct result of an Open Skies agreement. Rather, Open Skies is a confidence-building measure. Its purpose is to increase the openness of the two sides

Agreement will strengthen NATO-WTO cooperation

about their military activities, and thus strengthen the developing atmosphere of cooperation between NATO and the WTO and enhance the feeling of security of all participating states.

Although Open Skies will be negotiated separately from any arms control agreement, the arrangement is likely to contribute significantly to the verification of a range of existing and future arms control agreements. Indeed, Canada believes that Open Skies will be a useful adjunct to the verification methods eventually agreed to in a treaty on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe.

The government favours a broad Open Skies agreement, with as few restrictions as possible. Although the original agreement will be negotiated among the states of NATO and the WTO, nothing should, in principle, preclude other European states from joining Open Skies at some future date.

The Open Skies Conference, to be held in Ottawa,

will be divided into two portions: a ministerial session from February 12 to 14, at which the foreign ministers of all 23 NATO and WTO states will be present; and an official session from February 15 to 28, during which teams of officials from each country will carry out the negotiations. The Conference will be opened by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark will host the ministerial portion of the Conference. The head of the Canadian delegation at the official level will be Mr. John Noble, Director General of the International Security and Arms Control Bureau of External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC).

The Ottawa Conference will be a work-oriented gathering, the purpose of which will be to establish the outlines of an Open Skies regime. The negotiations are expected to be concluded and an agreement signed at a second Open Skies Conference, likely to be held later in 1990 in Budapest, Hungary.

Canada offered to host the first Open Skies conference because of its commitment to improving East-West relations. It has long viewed Open Skies as a valuable proposal which, once implemented, will enhance both Canadian and international security and speed progress in arms control. In addition, Canada's longstanding expertise and credibility in the field of verification, both at NATO and in the UN, made the country a natural leader on the Open Skies issue.

The Ottawa Conference will be the first major East-West gathering of the 1990s, and the first meeting of the NATO and WTO foreign ministers since the dramatic events that swept Europe in the fall of 1989. As such, it will help to set the tone of East-West relations for the coming decade. Canada intends to work vigorously to ensure that the Conference, and its follow-up in Budapest, result in an Open Skies agreement that can form the basis of a new East-West security relationship characterized by openness and

cooperation rather than secrecy and competition.

Why Open Skies?

Canada has been a strong supporter of Open Skies since the idea's inception. Not only will an Open Skies agreement benefit its immediate signatories, it will also contribute to the cause of international peace and security by improving the prospects for East-West stability. The benefits of Open Skies are outlined below.

Independent monitoring: An Open Skies agreement will allow participants that do not have surveillance satellites — including Canada — to independently monitor areas of particular interest or concern. The technology and facilities for aerial surveillance are well within the reach of all members of NATO and the WTO. Open Skies will let these states determine for themselves whether agreements are being adhered to and whether their security is being threatened.

Burden-sharing: An Open Skies agreement will provide an opportunity for Canada and the USA to demonstrate their willingness to shoulder some of the intrusive monitoring that the emerging era of greater political openness and conventional arms control is going to require of their European allies.

Confidence-building: Open Skies will play an extremely significant role in building confidence between the states of East and West in the 1990s. An Open Skies agreement will enable all members of the two alliances to satisfy themselves regarding the peaceful intentions of the other side. It would be virtually impossible to hide plans for a conventional attack from frequent, random reconnaissance flights.

Spur to arms control: Because the decision to participate in Open Skies is, in fact, a decision about a country's

commitment to openness in its military relations, an Open Skies agreement will help to create the political climate necessary for rapid progress in arms control. In addition, although the Open Skies agreement will be negotiated and will stand separately from any arms control agreement, short-notice overflights would help to fulfill the verification requirements of both a strategic nuclear arms agreement and a conventional arms agreement. Open Skies would allow participants to monitor ongoing activities such as weapons destruction, troop withdrawals and troop movements. Overflights would have to be supplemented by on-site inspection, but the result would be a very high confidence in compliance.

Acronyms Used in this Issue

ADM — Assistant Deputy Minister
 CBC — Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
 CD — Conference on Disarmament
 CDE — Conference on Disarmament in Europe
 CFB — Canadian Forces Base
 CFE — Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
 CSBM — Confidence- and Security-Building Measure
 CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
 CTBT — Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
 EAITC — External Affairs and International Trade Canada
 ICAO — International Civil Aviation Organization
 ICO — Open Skies Conference Task Force
 INF — Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
 NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 RCMP — Royal Canadian Mounted Police
 START — Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
 UN — United Nations
 UNGA — United Nations General Assembly
 WTO — Warsaw Treaty Organization

An Open Skies Chronicle


The Birth of Open Skies

The original Open Skies proposal was conceived in 1955 by a group of analysts working for Nelson Rockefeller, then advisor to US President Dwight Eisenhower. Rockefeller had asked his colleagues to think of some bold initiatives that the President could put forth at the four-power (France, UK, USA, USSR) summit to be held in Geneva in July of that year. In June, the group spent five days at the US Marine base at Quantico, near Washington, D.C., and it was here that the idea of mutual, unarmed overflights was first advanced.

Aerial reconnaissance reached its zenith as an effective method of collecting data during World War II. It is therefore not surprising that in the early post-war period, this type of surveillance was seriously considered as a means of verifying possible arms control and disarmament agreements. Indeed, a 1946 plan for the international control of atomic energy suggested aerial surveillance as a means of policing an agreement.

The Quantico panel was attracted by the simplicity of Open Skies, and by the fact that it emphasized the Western value of openness, in contrast to the secretive nature of the Soviet Union. Moreover the plan, if adopted, would have been of tremendous benefit to US security. Satellite reconnaissance systems were not yet in operation and the Americans had little idea of the true state of Soviet military preparations. As this was during the pre-ballistic missile era, the main US interest was to determine the extent of the Soviet long-range bomber capability and identify the staging airfields for intercontinental bomber attack.

Open Skies did not enjoy a smooth passage through the US bureaucracy, however. Opposed by then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (as much because of his desire to remove Rock-



LCol. Jozsef Kovencz of the Hungarian Air Force points out a landmark to Capt. John Latulippe, commander of the Canadian aircraft that flew over Hungary in a test of Open Skies on January 6 (see pp. 7-8).

efeller as a foreign policy advisor as for substantive reasons), the proposal was not on Eisenhower's agenda when he left for Geneva.

As the summit proceeded, it became clear that Eisenhower's performance had not captured the public's imagination. In this context Rockefeller was

"I should address myself for a moment principally to the delegates from the Soviet Union, because our two great countries admittedly possess new and terrible weapons in quantities which do give rise in other parts of the world, or reciprocally, to the fears and dangers of surprise attack.

"I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves — immediately. These steps would include:

"To give to each other a complete blueprint of our military establishments, from beginning to end, from one end of our countries to the other: lay out the establishments and provide the blueprints to each other.

"Next, to provide within our countries facilities for aerial photography to the other country — we to provide you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study; you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations, and by this step to convince the world that we are

Panel attracted by simplicity of idea

able to catch the President's ear with Open Skies. Eisenhower was less receptive to Dulles' objections than he had been in Washington and, after consultations with his staff and British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, he rose on July 21 to make the following statement:

"Gentlemen, since I have been working on this memorandum to present to this conference, I have been searching my heart and mind for something that I could say here that could convince everyone of the great sincerity of the United States in approaching this problem of disarmament.

providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing tensions.

"Likewise we will make more easily attainable a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament, because what I propose, I assure you, would be but a beginning."

The British and French leaders indicated immediately that they would respect and join such an overflight regime. The Soviet delegation promised to study the idea but appeared wary, with Nikita Khrushchev complaining at one point that the concept was "nothing more than a bald espionage plot against the USSR." By the time he left Geneva, Eisenhower was convinced that the Soviets would not accept his proposal.

The Canadian government welcomed

What Canada Said

The following is from a statement issued in September 1957 by then Prime Minister John Diefenbaker in support of Open Skies.

"In order to ensure that all parties to the agreement are carrying out their obligations, and in order to diminish the dangers of surprise attack, the Western Powers have put forward a number of proposals regarding control and inspections.... They would include provisions for aerial and ground inspection designed to assist in guarding against surprise attack. It is our belief that it is of the greatest importance to have in operation such systems of inspection if we are to ensure that under a disarmament treaty the nations will enjoy no less security than their present defences provide. Because of this belief, the Canadian government has agreed, if the Soviet Union will reciprocate, to the inclusion of either the whole or a part of Canada in an equitable system of aerial inspection and will do its utmost to ensure that the system works effectively." ■

Eisenhower's proposal and played a considerable role in advancing the discussions on Open Skies that took place over the next few years. These talks centred on the possibility of establishing various Open Sky zones, and it was in this context that Canada proposed an Arctic zone in August 1957. Eisenhower had been correct in his initial assessment, however; the USSR was not disposed to consider any proposal for overflights sympathetically at that time.

The institution, beginning in 1956, of American high-altitude U-2 photo-reconnaissance flights, and the advent of the ballistic missile age, which effectively began with the launch of the Soviet Sputnik in 1957, also dampened enthusiasm for Open Skies in the US administration. Little was heard of Open Skies during the next 30 years.

Open Skies Reborn

Shortly after taking office in January 1989, US President George Bush asked his advisors to undertake a thorough review of arms control issues with an eye to developing initiatives. During the course of regular arms control consultations with their American counterparts in April, Canadian officials became aware that a renewal of Open Skies was under consideration as one of these initiatives.

Canada was of the view that while Open Skies would be an excellent initiative in a bilateral USA-USSR context, it would be of even greater value if it included the territory of all members of NATO and the WTO, and if those states could also participate in the program of overflights. On May 2 Prime Minister Brian Mulroney wrote to President Bush with Canada's views, and on May 4 he discussed the subject with the President, urging him to put forward the proposal and to enlarge it to include all NATO and WTO states. On May 11, the President phoned the Prime Minister to tell him that he intended to proceed with the initiative, in an expanded form.

The President publicly proposed Open Skies in a speech to the graduating class of Texas A&M University on May 12. He suggested that Eisenhower's original plan be explored again, "but on a broader, more intrusive and radical basis." The President elaborated on his initial statement later that month in Brussels, and the plan was endorsed by NATO leaders in a communique on May 30.

Canadian officials spent the summer quietly encouraging their counterparts in Western and Eastern Europe to consider Open Skies. On September 21, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze indicated to US Secretary of State James Baker, during discussions at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, that the USSR would participate in an international conference on the subject. On September 24, Canada offered to host a conference to negotiate an Open Skies agreement. Invitations to attend were extended to all members of NATO and the WTO.

Throughout the fall of 1989, representatives of the member states of NATO met frequently in Brussels to arrive at a consensus position on the structure of an eventual Open Skies regime. The result of this process is the Basic Elements Paper, issued on December 15, which sets out the unanimous view of the 16 NATO countries as to how an Open Skies regime would work in practice.

The Ottawa Conference will be held February 12 to 28. Representatives of NATO and the WTO will meet in Budapest, Hungary, January 30 to February 1 to discuss organizational and procedural questions related to the Conference and to evaluate the trial Open Skies overflight of Hungary by Canada (see pp. 7-8).

The Ottawa Conference is expected to be followed later in the year by a conference in Budapest to complete the negotiation of an agreement. Thirty-five years after its birth, Open Skies is nearing fruition. ■

Verification Symposium Examines Open Skies Issues

The negotiators of an Open Skies agreement will have a number of complex issues to deal with. These will range from technical issues, concerning the types of aircraft and sensors to be used, to operational and organizational issues, such as the amount of notice required and the frequency and duration of overflights. In addition, legal issues, such as the status of foreign inspectors and the ownership of collected data, and political issues, such as the general objectives and structure of an Open Skies regime, will figure prominently on the agenda.

In order to promote an international discussion of these and other questions related to Open Skies, the Verification Research Unit of EAITC devoted its Sixth Annual Symposium on Arms Control Verification to the subject. The

Political will essential to smooth functioning of agreement

Symposium, held in Ottawa, November 21 to 24, 1989, was organized by York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies on behalf of EAITC.

Approximately 40 people attended the Symposium, including civilian and military officials from Canada, the USA, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Netherlands and Hungary, as well as selected academics and representatives from industry.

Working informally, participants explored the technical, organizational, legal and political issues surrounding Open Skies. They drew the following conclusions:

— in any confidence-building regime,

the most essential ingredient for success is sufficient political will to make the agreement work. While one could spend hours identifying ways in which a state could obstruct or thwart an Open Skies agreement, such discussion should be largely irrelevant. If the political will to sign and abide by an agreement exists, ways will be found to overcome specific problems through consultation. If such a will does not exist, the possibilities for obstruction are infinite;

— an Open Skies agreement should be as simple and flexible as possible. Excessive concern with minutiae should be avoided. To a certain extent, the specific problems associated with running a regime cannot be identified until the regime is in place. Keeping the regime as flexible as possible will allow it to evolve as participants gain an understanding of its day-to-day operations;

— the range and capabilities of commercially-available aircraft and sensors are impressive. Each participating state should be able to mount credible overflights and acquire a large amount of useful information for confidence-building purposes;

— the negotiations would be facilitated if they were restricted to the 23 states of NATO and the WTO in the first instance. It would be desirable to invite other European states to join the regime once it was in operation. Exactly when such an invitation should be issued would depend on the nature of the agreement;

— the international air traffic control system is capable of accepting Open Skies overflights with a minimum of change. To the extent that modifications will be required, they revolve around the need to streamline existing procedures to ensure that overflights can be conducted on a short-notice basis. Persons with technical or organizational expertise in areas relevant to Open Skies should be included in the

negotiations from the start, in order to facilitate discussions;

— partial legal precedents for an Open Skies regime exist in the relevant agreements on international civil aviation as well as in the Intermediate-

International air traffic control system can accept Open Skies with minimum of change

Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the Stockholm Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Because of the need to bring commitments undertaken in an Open Skies regime into line with participating states' domestic law, an Open Skies Treaty would be preferable to an agreement.

A Little Learning...

In arms control and disarmament, as in many other areas, most people's information about government policy and activities comes from the media, usually the print media, often from a single source.

Consider, then, the following headlines, all based on a press conference held by the chief US and Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) negotiators in Geneva on December 8, 1989:

"Arms negotiators, friendly and confident, announce agreements"
[*The New York Times*]

"Nuclear talks end with little progress"
[*The Ottawa Citizen*]

"Negotiators say arms pact within reach"
[*The Globe and Mail*]

Airborne Versus Space-Based Remote Sensing

Some may wonder why airborne surveillance, as proposed in Open Skies, is relevant in the 1990s, given that an effective space-based remote sensing capability now exists. These two types of systems constitute quite different capabilities, however, and should not be seen as mutually exclusive. There are, moreover, a number of advantages to airborne reconnaissance systems, some of which are listed below.

Technical Flexibility

Airborne surveillance offers the following technical advantages:

- the scale of the imagery can be varied by changing, for example, the focal lengths of lenses or the flying height of the aircraft;
- the effective ground resolution of the imagery can be controlled, providing either very high resolution, if re-

available in a period of several hours or several days;

— aircraft and airborne sensors can be repaired and replaced more easily than satellite-based reconnaissance systems;

— airborne reconnaissance systems do not require the same degree of specialization in equipment as do satellite sensors. They can use ordinary commercially-available aircraft and sensors. There are likely to be fewer problems associated with factors such as survivability in a potentially hostile environment.

Political Acceptability

Airborne surveillance offers the following political advantages:

— the capability is within the technical competence of a relatively larger number of countries than is a space-based capability;

— the ability to restrict overflight coverage may make airborne imagery more politically attractive for some states in a multilateral/international context. It would be less difficult to demonstrate that the coverage was restricted to specified areas;

— host-country personnel can be placed onboard an airborne platform to ensure that illicit data collection does not take place;

— civilian technology or non-sensitive military technology can be used since it should not be necessary to operate from excessive stand-off distances, or at the high speeds that might be required for reconnaissance of hostile territory;

— multilateral agreements are made more verifiable and acceptable for all concerned by reducing the requirement for national satellite-based systems.

Reconnaissance Capability

Airborne surveillance offers the following advantages in reconnaissance capability:

— countries without their own satellite systems could develop an airborne reconnaissance capability over which they have control. They could do so independently or cooperatively;

— the possession of such a reconnaissance capability by a number of countries would likely relieve pressures on countries with their own national satellite-based capabilities to make data available;

Airborne coverage cheaper

— an airborne capability working in an Open Skies framework would provide an opportunity for those countries that have a space-based capability to direct their limited satellite-based assets elsewhere.

Cost-Effectiveness

Airborne surveillance offers the following cost advantages:

— states are more likely to be able to build up an indigenous airborne capability than a satellite-based capability;

— airborne coverage is likely to be cheaper than satellite-based coverage when the costs of the infrastructure for satellite construction, launching and control are factored in;

— for example, an airborne capability to meet surveillance requirements in Central Europe is estimated to cost approximately 1/20 the amount of a space-based system.

Aircraft can collect data at specific times or on short-notice

quired, or coarser resolution, possibly limiting sensitivities regarding the intelligence potential of the data;

— sensors can be specifically adjusted to monitor a particular situation, for example, by using particular wavebands in a multispectral scanner;

— aircraft, if stationed locally, can collect coverage at specific times or on short notice (for satellites, this is more difficult or not possible), provided suitable weather conditions prevail;

— real-time data can be provided using a downlink; alternatively, data can be recorded on tape or film and be

In preparation for the Open Skies Conference, Canada conducted a trial Open Skies overflight of Hungary on January 6, 1990. The purpose of the trial was to test the administrative and operational procedures that are expected to be necessary for an Open Skies agreement.

Because Open Skies overflights could follow a wide variety of routes (likely to be quite different from those used by normal civilian aircraft) and might feature considerable variations in altitude, existing civilian air traffic control procedures will have to be modified. Initial studies have shown that these modifications need not be excessive or expensive. They would primarily involve streamlining existing procedures for handling international air traffic so that requests for overflight clearances on complex and unique routes could be dealt with quickly by national authorities.

The need to identify the main technical requirements of a system for processing overflight requests led Canada and Hungary to examine the

*Overflight tests
administrative and
operational procedures for
Open Skies*

possibility of staging a trial overflight. After consultations, it was decided that a Canadian military aircraft would overfly Hungary in early January, with a possible overflight of Canada by Hungary to take place later in the month.

While trying to ensure that the overflight mirrored the procedures that might be agreed to in the Open Skies negotiations, Canada and Hungary recognized that more lessons would be derived if extra time was taken to



LCol. Laszlo Forgacs, Chief Navigator for the Hungarian Air Force, gives a pre-flight briefing to the Canadian crew: from l. to r., Lt. Darryl Klassen, Navigator; Capt. Frank Silver, First Officer; and Capt. John Latulippe, Aircraft Commander. Looking on is Major John Zandbergen, Navigator, from the Directorate of Air Plans, Ottawa.

evaluate each stage of the process as it happened. Thus, the periods devoted to notification and flight planning were slightly longer than those that might be agreed to at the Ottawa Conference. In addition, in an important difference from the likely regime, the Canadian aircraft carried no onboard sensors. It was therefore incapable of collecting any data on Hungarian activities.

A Canadian Forces C-130 Hercules left CFB Lahr in the Federal Republic of Germany for Budapest Airport on January 4. The aircraft flew over Czechoslovakia *en route* to Hungary with the full cooperation of the Czech authorities. Upon landing at Budapest, the aircraft was inspected by Hungarian authorities. They were allowed full access to the aircraft in order to assure themselves that it was not armed. Since the aircraft was not carrying sensors, there was no check to make sure that the sensors conformed to whatever specifications may be agreed to in negotiations. The right of the host country to conduct both inspections is

expected to be a standard feature of an Open Skies agreement.

While the aircraft was being inspected, the Canadian crew filed a flight plan with the Hungarian authorities. The plan called for a flight of approximately three-hours duration that cut across a variety of air routes with considerable altitude changes *en route*. The Hungarian authorities had 24 hours to process the plan. The overflight itself took place the morning of January 6. The plane flew a huge figure eight over Hungary, viewing both Hungarian and Soviet military installations.

Hungarian observers were onboard the C-130 during the flight. The right of host governments to place such host observers is envisaged as a feature of the eventual agreement. The observers had full access to all areas of the aircraft and monitored the aircraft's route to make sure that it was in keeping with the agreed-upon flight plan. Since there were no sensors on the aircraft, the host-observers did not monitor the operation of the sensor suite. It is believed that

host-observers will be permitted to monitor the sensor operations in an Open Skies regime.

After the overflight, the plane returned to Budapest where officials of the two governments discussed the trial and identified areas for further discus-

sion at the Open Skies Conference. Both Hungary and Canada expressed pleasure with the results of the trial flight, which was itself a small exercise in confidence-building between East and West.

In addition to the flight crew and offi-

cials from the Department of National Defence, the Canadian government sent officials from EAITC and Transport Canada to observe the overflight and participate in discussions on its results. The Canadians left Budapest on January 7.

Organizing the Conference: A 'Behind-the-Scenes' Look

Organizing a conference at which the foreign ministers of the 16 NATO and 7 WTO states, between 250 and 500 delegates, and between 500 and 1000 representatives of the Canadian and international media are expected to be present for at least three days is no small matter. This is the job that has fallen to the Open Skies Conference Task Force, or ICO as it is known in the argot of EAITC.

The Task Force is headed by Mr. Bill van Staaldunin of EAITC, who was among the organizers of the three international summits hosted by Canada during 1987 and 1988 (the Francophonie in Quebec City, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Vancouver and the Economic Summit in Toronto). In recruiting the ICO team, he has tried to draw as much as possible on the expertise that was built up during those events.

The Task Force numbers approximately 50 people, drawn from the permanent staff of EAITC and other government departments, as well as from the private sector. In the period immediately prior to the Conference, this staff is expected to grow to a total of 100, to meet the day-to-day demands of the Conference itself.

The Task Force is responsible for all physical preparations for the Conference. These range from arranging ministers' motorcades to making sure that the right flags are displayed in the Conference Centre. To help ensure that no tasks are left undone, ICO has divided itself into four major areas: finance and administration; logistics

and protocol; conference operations; and media services.

The finance and administration unit began its work before the rest of the team, preparing estimates for the cost of the Conference and obtaining Treasury Board approval for the expenditure. The unit looks after the staffing, printing, communication, supply and other needs of the Task Force itself, and is responsible for paying Conference bills as they come in.

Accommodation, transportation, conference accreditation and official hospitality fall under the purview of the logistics and protocol unit. Delegates and media will be responsible for their own hotel costs, but ICO has made block bookings at various hotels around Ottawa to ensure that space will be available for all who require it. ICO will also be providing motorcades for all foreign ministers while they are in Ottawa, as well as a car for each delegation, using vehicles obtained under a special arrangement with General Motors of Canada Ltd. The logistics and protocol unit works closely with the RCMP and the Department of National Defence, which will provide drivers for the vehicles, and with the City of Ottawa in mapping out motorcade routes and arranging for police escort.

The logistics and protocol unit is also responsible for conference accreditation. To ensure that unauthorized individuals do not gain access to the site, colour-coded photo-identification cards have to be provided for everyone who will come into contact with the Con-

ference, from hotel staff to heads of delegations.

As suggested by the second half of its name, this unit also looks after meeting ministers as they arrive in Ottawa, organizing dinners hosted by Canada, arranging food services for delegates if they are held up in meetings and providing the other official courtesies required at a gathering of this nature.

The conference operations unit is responsible for providing a facility for the Conference — in this case the Government Conference Centre — as well as a facility for the numerous media expected. It takes care of equipping these facilities for the Conference — providing furniture, communication links, electronic systems for speakers and interpreters, for example — and makes sure that necessary support services, such as an emergency medical team, will be available during the Conference.

The conference operations unit also looks after the provision of liaison officers for the Conference. These are regular foreign service officers from EAITC who will work with the individual delegations prior to and during the Conference to ensure that all of their conference needs are met.

ICO has to make sure the media will be able to do its job, and this is the task that falls to the media services unit. The old National Gallery in Ottawa, known as the Lorne Building, will be turned into a media centre for the duration of the Conference, complete with studios for radio and television broadcasters as



OPEN SKIES CONFERENCE – CONFÉRENCE CIELS OUVERTS

The Open Skies Conference logo. It depicts the two halves of the globe at a point of convergence, encircled by an ellipse representing the flights of Open Skies.

well as working areas for the print media.

ICO will be offering a host broadcast unit, in this case the CBC, which will provide electronic coverage of the Conference and make the feed available to all other media representatives free of charge. The media services unit is also responsible for notifying the media about the Conference ahead of time, ac-

Inter-departmental cooperation important to Conference preparation

crediting them so they will be able to gain admission to the media centre, and providing briefing rooms and theatres where ICO and national delegations can keep the media informed about what is happening at the Conference.

The Task Force has been working on Conference preparations since mid-October, and even this four-month period has been tight given the range of tasks that fall under ICO's responsibility. The normal planning period for a conference of this scope ranges from six months to one year. Mr. van Staalduinen attributes ICO's ability to cope so ably with the planning challenge to the expertise and skill of his staff, and to the cooperation the Task Force has received from all involved.

An important element of Conference preparation is inter-departmental cooperation. Although the Task Force is part of EAITC, it includes representatives from a number of federal government departments and works closely with many others. As mentioned above, the RCMP and the Department of National Defence are playing a major role in providing security and transportation for the Conference. The Department of Supply and Services is involved in meeting Conference procurement and printing needs. Secretary of State Canada is providing interpreters and translators so that the Conference can be conducted in six official languages: English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish. Transport Canada (responsible for the airports where the foreign ministers will be arriving) and Public Works Canada (owner of the conference and media centres) are also involved in Conference planning. In addition, ICO is in daily contact with the embassies of participating countries and is working closely with the City of Ottawa and the National Capital Commission.

ICO will probably remain in existence for a couple of weeks after the Conference, dismantling facilities, preparing the necessary reports and settling finances. After that, the staff will disband to return to their regular occupations — at least until the next time Canada plays host to a major international gathering. ■

Bild Appointed Conference Secretary General

Mr. Fred Bild, formerly Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for Political and International Security Affairs at EAITC, has been appointed Secretary General of the Open Skies Conference. As Secretary General, Mr. Bild is responsible for the preparations for and operation of the Conference. The Conference Task Force, in charge of physical and logistical preparations, and the Conference Secretariat, in charge of the operation of the meeting itself, both report to Mr. Bild.

Born in 1935, Mr. Bild was educated at Sir George Williams University in Montreal, University College in London, England and the Ecole Nationale d'Administration in Paris. Since entering the foreign service in 1961, Mr. Bild has served overseas in Tokyo, Laos, Paris and as Ambassador to Thailand. ■

Kinsman Appointed Political and International Security ADM

Mr. Jeremy Kinsman has been appointed to the position of Assistant Deputy Minister for Political and International Security Affairs at EAITC. He replaces Mr. Fred Bild, now Secretary General of the Open Skies Conference.

Born in 1942, Mr. Kinsman joined the Department of External Affairs in 1966. He has served overseas in Brussels, Stockholm, Algiers, New York and Washington. Immediately prior to his appointment, he was the Assistant Deputy Minister responsible for Cultural Affairs and Broadcasting at the Department of Communications. ■

How NATO Envisions Open Skies

The following is the text of the Basic Elements Paper on Open Skies, agreed to by the North Atlantic Council meeting in Ministerial Session at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, December 14 to 15, 1989.

I. Introduction

1. On 12th May 1989, President Bush proposed the creation of a so-called Open Skies regime, in which the participants would voluntarily open their airspace on a reciprocal basis, permitting the overflight of their territory in order to strengthen confidence and transparency with respect to their military activities.

This proposal expanded on a concept that had already been proposed during the 1950s but had failed to reach fruition because of the unfavourable international political climate prevailing at the time.

Today, this new initiative has been made in a very different context as openness becomes a central theme of East-West relations and the past few years have been marked by important advances in the areas of confidence-building and arms control.

2. The provisions for notification and observation of military activities specified in the Helsinki Final Act were strengthened and made obligatory by the Stockholm Document concluded by the CDE in 1986.

With respect to arms control, in 1987, the INF Treaty, apart from its immediate goals, represented a very important precedent because of the extent of its verification provisions.

All this leads one to expect today that even more spectacular advances will be achieved in the near future. In particular, a two-pronged effort is under way in Vienna: on the one hand, to deepen the measures for confidence-

building and transparency among the 35 countries of the CSCE, and on the other, to reach an unprecedented agreement between the countries of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization on the elimination of large numbers of conventional arms.

Furthermore, one awaits important developments in other sectors of disarmament such as chemical weapons and the Soviet-American strategic arms negotiations.

3. All of these agreements will naturally require their own verification regimes, often of a highly intrusive nature. Moreover, the specific provisions

'The willingness of a country to be overflown is, in itself, a highly significant political act'

of each verification treaty will be supplemented by the habitual means by which countries verify compliance with agreements (national technical means).

It seems useful, however, particularly in the prevailing context of improved East-West relations, to reflect on other ways of creating a broadly favourable context for confidence-building and disarmament efforts.

In this context, the Open Skies concept has a very special value. The willingness of a country to be overflown is, in itself, a highly significant political act in that it demonstrates its availability to openness; aerial inspection also represents a particularly effective means of verification, along with the general transparency in military activities discussed above.

This double characteristic of an Open Skies regime would make it a valuable complement to current East-West en-

deavours, mainly in the context of the Vienna negotiations, but also in relation to the other disarmament efforts (START, chemical weapons).

It would seem desirable to focus now on the European region, while also including the entire territories of the Soviet Union, the United States and Canada. Accordingly, we will be ready to consider at an appropriate time the wish of any other European country to participate in the Open Skies regime. This element could be complementary to their efforts at confidence-building and conventional arms control and would conform to the objectives of those negotiations.

4. To this end, the Open Skies regime should be based on the following guidelines:

— The commitment of the parties to greater transparency through aerial overflights of their entire national territory, in principle without other limitations than those imposed by flight safety or rules of international law.

— The possibility for the participants to carry out such observation flights on a national basis or jointly with their allies.

— The commitment of all parties to conduct and to receive such observation flights on the basis of national quotas.

— The establishment of agreed procedures designed to ensure both transparency and flight safety.

— The possibility for the parties to employ the result of such overflights to improve openness and transparency of military activities as well as ensuring compliance with current or future arms control measures.

II. Purpose

The basic purpose of Open Skies is to encourage reciprocal openness on the

part of the participating states and to allow the observation of military activities and installations on their territories, thus enhancing confidence and security. Open Skies can serve these ends as a complement both to national technical means of data collection and to information exchange and verification arrangements established by current and future arms control agreements.

III. Participation and Scope

Participation in Open Skies is initially open to all members of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. All territories of the participants in North America and Asia, as well as in Europe, will be included.

IV. Quotas

1. Open Skies "accounting" will be based on quotas which limit the number of overflights. The quotas will be derived from the geographic size of the participating countries. The duration of flights can also be limited in relation to

*Overflight quotas
to be based
on geographic size*

geographic size. For larger countries, the quota should permit several flights a month over their territory. All of the parties will be entitled to participate in such observation flights on a national basis, either individually or jointly in cooperation with their allies.

2. Effective implementation of a quota system requires agreement that a country will not undertake flights over the territory of any other country belonging to the same alliance.

3. Quota totals for participating states should be established in such a manner that there is a rough correspondence between totals for NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and, within that

total, for the USSR and the North American members of NATO.

4. Every participant, regardless of size, would be obligated to accept a quota of at least one overflight per quarter.

5. Smaller nations, that is, those subject to the minimum quota, may group themselves into one unit for the purposes of hosting Open Skies overflights and jointly accept the quota that would apply to the total land mass of the larger unit.

V. Aircraft

The country or countries conducting an observation flight would use unarmed, fixed-wing civilian or military aircraft capable of carrying host-country observers.

VI. Sensors

A wide variety of sensors would be allowed, with one significant limitation — devices used for the collection and recording of signals intelligence would be prohibited. A list of prohibited categories and types of sensors will be agreed among the participating states which will be updated every year.

VII. Technical Cooperation among Allies

Multilateral or bilateral arrangements concerning the sharing of aircraft or sensors, as well as the conduct of joint overflights, will be possible among members of the same alliance.

VIII. Mission Operation

1. Aircraft will begin observation flights from agreed, pre-designated points of entry and terminate at pre-designated points of exit; such entry and exit points for each participating state will be designated by that state and listed in an annex to the agreement.

2. The host country will make available the kind of support equipment, servicing and facilities normally provided to commercial air carriers. Provision

will be made for refuelling stops during the overflight.

3. An observing state will provide 16 hours notification of arrival at a point of entry. However, if the point of entry is on a coast or at a border and no territory of the receiving state will be overflown prior to arrival at the point of entry, this pre-arrival period could be abbreviated.

4. The crew of the observation aircraft shall file a flight plan within six hours of its arrival at the point of entry.

5. After arrival and the filing of a flight plan, a 24 hour pre-flight period will begin. This period is to allow time to determine that there are no flight safety problems associated with the planned flight route and to provide necessary servicing for the aircraft. During this pre-flight period, the aircraft will also be subject to intrusive but non-destructive inspection for prohibited sensors and recorders.

6. Prior to the flight, host-country monitors will be able to board the observation aircraft. During the flight they would ensure that the aircraft is operated in accordance with the flight plan and would monitor operation of the sensors. There would be no restrictions on the movement of the monitors within the aircraft during flight.

7. The flight will be from the agreed point of entry to an agreed point of exit, where the host-country observers would depart the aircraft. The points of entry and exit could be the same. Loitering over a single location will not be permitted. Aircraft will not be limited to commercial air corridors. Observation aircraft may, in principle, only be prohibited from flying through airspace that is publicly announced as closed to other aircraft for valid air safety reasons. Such reasons would include specific hazards posing extreme danger to the aircraft and its occupants. Each country will make arrangements to ensure that public announcements of such hazardous airspace are widely and

promptly disseminated; each country will produce, for an annex to the agreement, a list of where these public announcements can be found. The minimum altitudes for such flights may vary depending upon air safety considerations. The extent of ground control over aircraft will be determined in advance by agreement among the parties on compatible rules such as those recognized by ICAO. In the application of these considerations and procedures, the presumption shall be on behalf of encouraging the greatest degree of openness consistent with air safety.

8. The operation of the Open Skies regime will be without prejudice to states not participating in it.

IX. Mission Results

The members of the same alliance will determine among themselves how information acquired through Open Skies is to be shared. Each party may decide how it wishes to use this information.

X. Transits

A transit flight over a participating state on the way to the participating state over which an observation flight is to be conducted shall not be counted against the quota of the transmitted state, provided the transit flight is conducted exclusively within civilian flight corridors.

XI. Type of Agreement

The Open Skies regime will be established through a multilateral treaty among the parties.

XII. Open Skies Consultative Body

To promote the objectives and implementation of the Open Skies regime, the participating states will establish a body to resolve questions of compliance with the terms of the treaty and to agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the effectiveness of the regime. ■

CFE Update

Spurred by calls for an early agreement by both Western and Eastern leaders, and encouraged by political developments in the USSR and Eastern Europe, the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is proceeding rapidly and in a business-like fashion.

Shortly after the West tabled its Chapter III position on September 21, 1989 (see Fall 1989 *Bulletin*), chief Soviet negotiator Oleg Grinevsky announced that the USSR was moving to assuage Western concerns by raising its proposed ceiling on frontal tactical aircraft to 4,700 (per side) and on com-

meetings on Chapter III paid off quickly, as both sides reached agreement on certain measures related to information exchange. On November 28, the East added to its package of stabilizing measures by proposing ceilings on the number of equipment and personnel permitted in exercises.

The importance of regular high-level political involvement to progress in the CFE negotiation was underscored in December. A series of Heads of Government meetings early in the month, and a NATO Ministerial meeting mid-way through, resulted in a fast pace at the negotiating table. On December 12, the West tabled a new proposal on main battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles that covered a previously-excluded range of light tanks and heavy armoured combat vehicles. The inclusion of these "grey area" vehicles went a long way toward accommodating Eastern concerns, but necessitated an increase in the proposed armoured troop carrier ceiling from 28,000 (per side) to 30,000. This was followed two days later by the tabling of both Eastern and Western draft treaty texts. The texts, which contain many similarities, are now being subjected to serious scrutiny in Round Five, which opened on January 12, 1990.

During 1990, developments in Eastern Europe in particular will continue to put pressure on the negotiators to achieve an agreement by the end of the year. Appreciating the significance of this dynamic, the 23 foreign ministers of NATO and the WTO have agreed to hold a separate discussion on CFE issues when they meet at the Open Skies Conference in Ottawa in February.

Both East and West recognize that it is in the interests of long-term stability in Europe to have a CFE agreement as a major vehicle for political and legal consolidation of the emerging politico-strategic realities on that continent. ■

Negotiation is progressing rapidly

bat helicopters to 1,900. These revised ceilings continued to exclude Soviet air defence interceptors. The Soviet announcement was followed, on October 17, by East-West agreement on a definition of artillery, which would allow for limits on current and future systems.

The third round of negotiations ended on October 19 with the East tabling its own Chapter III (verification, stabilization and information exchange) proposal. Commenting in plenary sessions, Western negotiators expressed the view that there was a great deal of convergence between the Western and Eastern packages and that work on reaching agreement should proceed as quickly as possible in the next round. A Canadian proposal that additional weekly working group meetings be held beginning in Round Four was adopted unanimously.

NATO used the time between rounds to complete drafting work on a proposed treaty text. Though Round Four got off to a slow start, the extra

Progress in First Committee at UNGA 44

The 44th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 44) concluded in New York in December 1989. Issues related to arms control, disarmament and international security were assigned, as usual, to the First Committee of the General Assembly, in which all member states of the UN are entitled to participate. In the First Committee, national delegations make statements about, debate and then vote on resolutions introduced there. Resolutions passed by the Committee are forwarded to the UNGA plenary, where they are officially adopted.


The First Committee is not a negotiating forum, with the power to draft and implement disarmament measures. Rather, it is a deliberative forum, in which countries exchange views on disarmament-related issues. Adopted UNGA resolutions are therefore not binding agreements but, instead, declarations of principle or recommendations of action to be taken. Those

Canada particularly prominent on chemical weapons issue

resolutions that are adopted by consensus can have considerable influence in promoting progress on specific disarmament measures, by making recommendations and arriving at positions that are acceptable to all UN members.

In keeping with the importance that it attaches to the UN system, Canada plays an active role each year in the consideration of disarmament issues at the First Committee. The Canadian delegation to the 1989 session, headed by Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, took the lead on several resolutions and joined in co-sponsoring a number of others.

The Canadian delegation assumed a



The flags of some of the member-states of the United Nations in front of the Secretariat Building at UN Headquarters in New York. United Nations photo

particularly prominent role on the issue of chemical weapons. Three resolutions dealing with different aspects of this subject were adopted by the General Assembly, all of them by consensus and all co-sponsored by Canada. The Canadian delegation drafted one of these resolutions and, in collaboration with Poland, ensured that the concerns of all delegations were incorporated into the text, allowing it to receive unanimous support. The Canadian-Polish resolution urges the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts toward the conclusion of a convention for the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and for the destruction of existing stocks. Canada hopes that this resolution will give impetus to the important goal of ridding the world of all chemical weapons in the near future.

The issue of nuclear testing also attracted considerable attention in the

First Committee. Achieving a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the arms control and disarmament priorities of the Canadian government. Canada was one of a group of six countries, under the leadership of New Zealand, that formulated a resolution entitled "Urgent need for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." Because of fundamental differences among, in particular, the five nuclear-weapon states, it was not possible to arrive at a text that could attract unanimous support. However, support for the resolution among non-nuclear-weapon states was overwhelming. From Canada's perspective, the resolution takes a realistic approach to this difficult issue by acknowledging the progress that has been made and outlining a program of work for the Conference on Disarmament that will lead to further steps toward a CTBT.

As in past years, Canada introduced a resolution entitled "Prohibition on the production of fissionable materials." The resolution emphasizes that the production of such materials for weapons purposes — they are required to detonate nuclear devices — is an important element in any progress toward nuclear disarmament. It requests that the Conference on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage of its work on nuclear testing, pursue consideration of this matter. Like the CTBT resolution, this text was adopted with widespread support.

In addition to its work on the resolutions mentioned above, Canada participated actively in the range of First Committee discussions, which included themes as diverse as the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, conventional disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Over 60 resolutions pertaining to disarmament and international security were adopted at UNGA 44, twenty-three of them by consensus. Canada co-sponsored ten disarmament-

related resolutions and voted in favour of more than 40 of the resolutions adopted.

The Canadian delegation was pleased with the First Committee's work at UNGA 44. The improving international political climate contributed to a business-like and constructive atmosphere. This resulted in movement toward overcoming differences of opinion or approach that have for years hindered progress on many crucial disarmament issues.

However, much remains to be done to invigorate the UN's consideration of dis-

Canada pleased with progress, but much remains to be done to invigorate UN disarmament discussions

armament questions, so that discussions and negotiations at the global multi-lateral level can catch up to the current rapid pace of talks between the superpowers and in the NATO-WTO context. Profound differences remain on many disarmament issues on the UN agenda, and these will only be resolved through patient and serious discussions accompanied by flexibility and realism on the part of all countries.

Canada looks forward to building on the positive atmosphere of UNGA 44's First Committee at the 1990 session. Progress on disarmament matters is, by nature, a complex and slow process. The Canadian government is convinced, however, that there currently exists the potential for the UN to make an unprecedented contribution in the area of disarmament. Canada will continue to do its best to ensure that this potential is lived up to. ■

Recent Statements on Arms Control and Disarmament

On Arctic Arms Control

The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister: "In Moscow, I...raised with Mr. Gorbachev the Arctic arms control proposals he had set forth in his Murmansk speech several years ago. I pointed out to him that Mr. Clark had responded to those proposals on several occasions but that we were quite prepared to discuss with the Soviets any refinements they might have to make to their original ideas. I pointed out, as well, that I continued to believe that current ongoing arms control negotiations between the two superpowers and the two alliances had proven successful and were the best avenues for making progress on these issues. He understands fully our position and agreed that further review of this issue should be pursued by the Secretary of State for External Affairs [Mr. Clark] and [Soviet Foreign Minister] Mr. Shevardnadze." *[Statement to the House of Commons on his visit to the USSR, November 27, 1989]*

On NATO

The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister: "We are entering a new and important era of relationships between East and West. We should be sensitive to all opportunities for change. We should not reject ideas out of hand simply because they have not been tried before or they have been tried and found wanting.... [Mr. Gorbachev said to me] that the most imprudent thing that could be done at this time, given the enormity of the changes in Eastern Europe, would be changes in the structures of the alliances, because at this particular time any such changes could be destabilizing with regard to the efforts that he and others are trying to bring about.... The progress we have made so far, and it has been remarkable in the last number

of years, has been brought about in large measure because of the leadership of President Gorbachev on the one side, but [also because of] the solidarity of NATO on the other. We propose to keep that."

[Question Period, House of Commons, December 6, 1989]

On NATO and CFE

The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs: "[The money that Canada spends to keep troops in Europe] in part [is] an investment that yielded the agreement on one nuclear arms treaty and could yield agreement on other nuclear arms treaties. It could yield an agreement on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe... [O]ur participation in NATO is based very strongly on the view that the solidarity [of NATO] is not a theory; solidarity is a technique that has worked.

"I personally believe that there will be a change in the nature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and that it will begin to put more focus on some of the political activities that have always been part of its mandate, but have taken second place. Regarding troops specifically, we are not anticipating any movement back of troops. This round of CFE negotiations in fact would not affect our troop levels. We have made it clear that we are prepared to be in Europe as long as our allies want us to be there. It may be that if we get into other rounds of conventional force discussions...that may reduce the need on both sides for troops. But we won't be looking upon that as an economy measure. Any efforts that we might take in the future...would be as part of alliance decisions and as a result of negotiations."

[Interview with Don Newman on "This Week in Parliament," December 8, 1989] ■

Resolutions on Arms Control and Disarmament and International Security Adopted at UNGA 44

Resolutions Supported by Canada

RESOLUTIONNUMBER (Lead Sponsor)	RESOLUTION	VOTE(Yes/No/Abstain)
44/104 (Mexico)	Treaty of Tlatelolco	147-0-3
44/107 (NZ)*	Urgent need for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	145-2-6
44/108 (Egypt)	Nuclear-weapon-free zone in Middle East	Consensus
44/109 (Pakistan)	Nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	116-3-32
44/110 (Bulgaria)	Security of non-nuclear weapon states against use of nuclear weapons	131-0-21
44/111 (Pakistan)	Assurances against use of nuclear weapons	151-0-3
44/112 (Egypt)	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	153-1-0
44/113A (Kenya)	Denuclearization of Africa	147-0-4
44/114B (FRG)	Military budgets	127-0-15
44/115A (Canada/Poland)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	Consensus
44/115B (Australia)*	Chemical and biological weapons: measures to uphold authority of Geneva Protocol	Consensus
44/115C (Australia)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	Consensus
44/116B (UK)*	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	91-0-61
44/116C (China)	Conventional disarmament	Consensus
44/116D (China)	Nuclear disarmament	Consensus
44/116E (UK)*	Objective information on military matters	132-0-13
44/116F (Denmark)	Conventional disarmament	Consensus
44/116H (Canada)*	Prohibition on the production of fissionable materials	147-1-6
44/116I (France)	Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe	Consensus
44/116J (Bulgaria)	Conversion of military resources	153-0-1
44/116L (Yugoslavia)	Disarmament and development	Consensus
44/116M (Sweden)	Naval armaments and disarmament	154-1-0
44/116N (Colombia)*	International arms transfers	143-0-12
44/116O (Brazil)	Seabed Treaty Review Conference	Consensus
44/116Q (Cameroon)	Report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission	Consensus
44/116R (Kenya)	Hostile dumping of radioactive material	150-0-4
44/116T (USSR)	Radiological weapons	Consensus
44/116U (FRG)*	Contribution of confidence- and security-building measures	Consensus
44/117B (Belgium)*	Regional disarmament	Consensus
44/117E (Nigeria)	UN program of fellowships for disarmament	Consensus
44/117F (Nepal/Peru/Togo)	UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia, Africa and Latin America	153-1-1
44/118B (GDR)	Science and technology for disarmament	154-0-1
44/119A (Mexico)	Comprehensive program of disarmament	154-0-1
44/119C (Zaire)	Report of the Disarmament Commission	Consensus
44/119F (NZ)	South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty	151-0-4
44/119G (Mongolia)	Disarmament Week	Consensus
44/119H (Nigeria)	Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade	Consensus
44/122 (Chairman)	Compliance with arms control agreements	Consensus
44/123 (Costa Rica)	Education for disarmament	149-0-5
44/125 (Malta)	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean	Consensus

* = resolution co-sponsored by Canada

DRAFTDECISIONS

(Sweden)	Conventional Weapons deemed excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects	Consensus
(Czechoslovakia)	International cooperation for disarmament	Consensus

Resolutions Opposed by Canada

RESOLUTIONNUMBER (Lead Sponsor)	RESOLUTION	VOTE(Yes/No/Abstain)
44/114A (Romania)	Reduction of military budgets	116-10-19
44/117C (India)	Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons	134-17-4
44/117D (Mexico)	Nuclear arms freeze	136-13-5
44/119B (GDR)	Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war	129-17-7
44/119E (GDR)	Cessation of nuclear arms race and prevention of nuclear war	138-11-6

Resolutions on which Canada Abstained

RESOLUTIONNUMBER (Lead Sponsor)	RESOLUTION	VOTE(Yes/No/Abstain)
44/20 (Brazil)	Zone of peace and cooperation in the South Atlantic	146-1-2
44/105 (Mexico)	Cessation of all nuclear test explosions	136-3-13
44/106 (Mexico)	Partial Test Ban Treaty Amending Conference	127-2-22
44/113B (Kenya)	Nuclear capability of South Africa	137-4-10
44/116A (Iraq)	Prohibition of development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	124-2-26
44/116G (USSR)	Implementation of UN General Assembly resolutions	129-1-25
44/116K (Yugoslavia)	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	134-0-18
44/116P (GDR)	Defensive security concepts	131-0-19
44/116S (Peru)	Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	119-1-31
44/117A (Mexico/Sri Lanka)	World Disarmament Campaign	144-0-10
44/118A (India)	Impact of scientific and technological developments	137-3-14
44/119D (Yugoslavia)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	138-8-9
44/120 (Sri Lanka)	Indian Ocean — Zone of Peace	137-4-14
44/121 (Jordan)	Israeli nuclear armament	104-2-43
44/126 (Yugoslavia)	Strengthening of international security	128-1-24

Diplomatic Appointments

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney recently announced the following diplomatic appointments:

Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Permanent Representative and Ambassador to the United Nations and to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, to the post of Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, effective January 1, 1990. Mr. Marchand's public service spans a 30-year career including five years as Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and assignments as Deputy Minister of both Energy, Mines and Resources and Communications.

Mr. Gerald Shannon, Deputy Minister for International Trade and Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the post of Ambassador for Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Chief Negotiator, effective October 18, 1989. Effective January 1, 1990, Mr. Shannon also assumed the responsibilities of Permanent Representative and Ambassador to the United Nations and to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Mr. Shannon is a career diplomat with extensive experience in international trade and finance.

Canadians Observe an Exercise in Armed Neutrality



Canadian observer Colonel Megill speaking to Swiss soldier during exercise.

From November 20 to 23, 1989, two Canadian officials watched as over twenty-five thousand Swiss troops turned the north-eastern corner of Switzerland into an armed fortress as part of a military exercise. The exercise was designed to demonstrate the rapidity with which the Swiss could mobilize and deploy to defend against an attack.

The Canadians — Mr. Gordon Vachon, Senior Verification Research Officer at EAIRC, and Colonel William Megill, Military Adviser with the Canadian delegation to the CFE and CSBM negotiations in Vienna — were invited, along with officials of the other participating states of the CSCE, to observe the exercise in accordance with the Stockholm Document on confidence- and security-building measures, signed in 1986. They were to confirm that the exercise was carried out in conformity with the exercise notification. The Swiss authorities arranged for observers to receive briefings and witness activities at all levels of the corps exercise.

One mechanized and one field division were involved in the exercise, including 150 main battle tanks, 60 heavy artillery pieces, 22 helicopters

and some 250 aircraft sorties for reconnaissance and ground attack. The observers saw elements of all of this, including such rarities as bicycle battalions and fully operational — but empty — hospitals on constant standby, awaiting casualties they hope will never come.

Half of the troops had already completed two weeks of refresher training at various military installations, in the classroom and on the ranges. When the call to mobilize came, these troops were deployed to provide a screen for forces reporting to depots, drawing mechanized equipment and heavy weapons, and moving to pre-arranged defensive positions. Virtually all of the troops were militia. Within hours the defences were taking shape, under pressure from the exercise's invading force. What the observers saw was the partial transition of a corner of Switzerland from a peacetime to a wartime footing.

The observers had an opportunity to gauge the meaning of armed neutrality and the national commitment involved therein. Not only does it mean that every able-bodied male is liable for a period of basic training; it also means that he must attend regular refresher

training over the next thirty years, including participation in mobilization exercises such as the November one. The active regular force is minimal in size, with some 6,000 personnel, but there are over 600,000 militia capable of being mobilized within 24 hours and of being combat-ready in less than 48 hours. Heavy equipment is stockpiled and maintained in depots, while each soldier keeps his own weapon and ammunition at home.

During the exercise, troops and vehicles moved freely through towns and countryside. Vehicles hid among buildings; headquarters and bivouacs were established in factories, warehouses and underground parking lots; units had the use of public buildings; and, wherever they were, the troops had access to hot, fresh rations obtained locally. Nonetheless, there was genuine discomfort, not to mention the disruption of daily lives and the hidden costs to the Swiss economy, all of which the Swiss are willing to accept. The Canadians spoke to the Chief Executive Officer of a large private bank (regimental commander), a Swissair pilot (air operations officer), a civil engineer (cyclist soldier), an architect (bridge demolition guard commander) and many others whose employers had long ago become accustomed to the absences required by such an exercise.

The Swiss exercise succeeded in the following: demonstrating that the mobilization system, properly prepared and regularly exercised, works; demonstrating that the country's military potential was essentially defensive, not offensive, in the way it was configured and deployed; and conveying to all observers the important political message that an attack on Switzerland would be a costly and lengthy undertaking. The exercise also demonstrated to the Canadian observers that defending the national sovereignty of a neutral state carries with it sizeable real costs. ■

Symposium on Space Without Weapons

Over 100 academics and outer space specialists, representing 24 countries, gathered in Montreal, October 25 to 27, 1989, for a symposium on "Space Without Weapons." The symposium was organized by McGill University's Centre for Research in Air and Space Law in association with the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of EAITC.

For the past several years, the Centre for Research in Air and Space Law has been associated with the Arms Control and Disarmament Division in a study of the role of international law with respect to the military use of space. In 1985, the Centre organized a symposium entitled "An Arms Race in Outer Space — Could Treaties Prevent It?" This was followed in 1987 by a symposium on "Space Surveillance for Arms Control and Verification: Options." The October symposium represented another step in the progressive study toward the continuing use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

It is generally recognized that without the military use of outer space in terms of space-based remote sensing for verification purposes, the strategic arms control agreements between the USA and the USSR would not have been possible. In this sense, the military use of space has had a stabilizing effect. How-

ever, the introduction of weapons into space, termed the "weaponization" of space, could have the opposite result. This symposium studied the weaponization issue in its various forms.

Canadians played a key role in the proceedings. Dr. Peter Hughes from the University of Toronto and Dr. Lucy Stojak from McGill University examined the technical and legal aspects of the issue respectively. Dr. F.J.F. Osborne of SPAR Aerospace and Mr. Robin Gubby of Telesat Canada added industry's perspective to the discussion. Representatives from the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the USA and the USSR provided an international dimension. Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Mr. de Montigny Marchand, summarized the proceedings at a closing banquet.

The symposium was particularly timely given that Canada has been confirmed as Chairman of the 1990 Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space at the CD in Geneva. The discussions undertaken at the symposium related directly to the Committee's mandate, which is to prevent an arms race in outer space. Proceedings of the symposium will be made available to CD members early in the CD's 1990 session. ■

Forecast

A list of arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, January through May, 1990.

January: Third session of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Verification, New York

January 11-12: Meeting of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs, Cornwall, Ontario

January 12 - February 22: CFE Round 5, Vienna

January 16: Phase 2 of the Group of Scientific Experts' international seismic data exchange experiment begins

January 16 - February 23: CSBM Negotiation Round 5, Vienna;

January 16 - February 5: CSBM Negotiation seminar on military doctrine, Vienna

February 12-28: Open Skies Conference, Ottawa

Mid-February - mid-April: Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

March 15 - April 26: CFE Round 6, Vienna

March 19 - April 27: CSBM Negotiation Round 6, Vienna

April 23 - May 4: Third NPT Preparatory Committee, Geneva

April 23 - May 11: Open Skies Conference, Budapest (proposed)

May 7 - May 29: United Nations Disarmament Commission, New York

May 17: CFE Round 7 opens, Vienna

May 21: CSBM Negotiation Round 7 opens, Vienna ■

Canada-USSR Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea

On November 20, 1989, in Moscow, Canada and the Soviet Union entered into an Agreement Governing the Prevention of Incidents at Sea Beyond the Territorial Sea. The purpose of the agreement is to ensure the safety of navigation of the ships of their respective armed forces and of the flight of their military aircraft beyond the territorial sea.

Among other things, the parties agree to observe strictly the letter and spirit of the 1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. Ships of the parties operating in proximity to each other are required to remain well clear of each other to avoid risk of collision. The parties also agree that their ships shall not simulate attacks by aiming weapons in the direction of ships and aircraft of the other party, and shall not launch hazardous objects in the direction of ships of the other party. Similarly, they agree that their aircraft shall not simulate attacks nor perform aerobatics over ships of the other party, nor shall they launch hazardous objects in the direction of ships of the other party. The parties agree to exchange, in a timely manner, appropriate information concerning instances of collisions or other incidents at sea between their ships and aircraft.

The actions prohibited by the agreement are also not to be taken against non-military ships and aircraft of the parties.

Focus: On Confidence-Building

Focus is our column for secondary school students.

Canada is about to play host to a major East-West gathering. The 16 states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), of which Canada is one, and the seven states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) will meet in Ottawa from February 12 to 28 to negotiate an Open Skies agreement. The agreement will allow individual states of each alliance to fly over individual states of the other alliance on short-notice, using unarmed surveillance planes. The notice will be long enough to make sure that air safety is not threatened but short enough to prevent the covering up of any major military activities.

The flight of a Soviet military plane over Canada would normally be considered a threat to Canadian security. Indeed, when military planes from one alliance occasionally stray into the airspace of the other alliance, it is usually viewed as a chance to test the



Swiss army vehicles on the move during recent military exercise. Being allowed to watch an exercise like this one gives countries confidence in the intentions of other countries.

reduce wrong impressions and suspicions about the possible use of military force. It thus improves relations between states and makes it much less likely that a war will start by mistake.

Say, for example, that Canada was suspicious about what was happening at a military base in Czechoslovakia. Under an Open Skies agreement, Canada would be able to fly over the base, see what was going on there and decide for itself — based on what it saw — whether its suspicions were justified. Without Open Skies, Canada would have to operate on the basis of suspicions alone.

Just as important as what Open Skies will do to clear up suspicions is what it will say about intentions. If a country were preparing for an attack it would not likely agree to Open Skies, because its preparations would be discovered. Movements and gatherings of troops and weapons can easily be seen from the air. So in signing an Open Skies

agreement, countries will be saying to one another: "Look, you can trust me. My intentions are peaceful and I want you to see this for yourself."

Open Skies will not be the only confidence-building agreement in existence. Last November two Canadians were invited to Switzerland to observe a military exercise there. Switzerland, like Canada, has signed what is known as the Stockholm Document (1986). Under this agreement, countries are required to invite observers from the other signatory countries to watch military exercises above a certain size. Again, this is a way of letting countries see for themselves that the military exercises are just that — exercises — and not preparations for an attack.

NATO and the WTO are in the process of negotiating an agreement on reducing their conventional (i.e., non-nuclear) armed forces in Europe. Canada hopes that agreement on Open Skies will speed this negotiation and others, leading to many arms control agreements throughout the 1990s.

Open Skies will be able to help in the verification of some of these future arms control agreements, that is, with seeing whether or not the other side is living up to its commitments. Right now the United States and the Soviet Union are the only countries in NATO and the WTO that have reconnaissance satellites capable of seeing detailed military activities. Their allies have to rely on them for this information. Under Open Skies, the allies without satellites will be able to see for themselves that arms control agreements are being lived up to and that their security is not being threatened. This should make them more willing to sign agreements.

Building confidence is an important step in the process of limiting arms and building security. An agreement on Open Skies will be such a step. ■

Why Open Skies will not be a threat

opponent's air defences, or to do some spying. In fact, when Open Skies was first proposed by the USA over thirty years ago, the Soviet Union rejected the idea as an espionage plot. What has changed? Why is Canada going to agree to let WTO countries fly over Canadian territory and take detailed photographs whenever they want to? (Remember that the planes will not be carrying weapons, so there will be no danger of Canadians being bombed or shot at.)

Open Skies is what is known as a confidence-building measure. The goal of a confidence-building measure is to

Disarmament Fund Update

Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund, Fiscal Year 1989-90

To January 15, 1990

CONTRIBUTIONS

1. <i>Canadian Federation of University Women</i> — student essay contest: "What I am prepared to do for peace"	\$500
2. <i>Dr. Jules Dufour</i> — preparation of a university course on arms control and disarmament	\$1,900
3. <i>Voice of Women</i> — orientation tour of the UN Disarmament Commission	\$6,050
4. <i>Peace Education Centre</i> — Youth for Global Awareness Conference	\$4,000
5. <i>Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament</i> — Ballistic Missile Defence study	\$19,760
6. <i>Science for Peace, Toronto Chapter</i> — University College Lectures in Peace Studies	\$3,000
7. <i>Centre de Ressources sur la Non-Violence</i> — research on non-violent civil defence and common security	\$7,000
8. <i>Polish-American Parliamentary Debate Institutes Canada</i> — lecture tour of Poland	\$2,500
9. <i>Inuit Circumpolar Conference</i> — participation in Fifth Inuit Circumpolar General Assembly, Greenland	\$4,000
10. <i>David Cox, Queen's University</i> — peacekeeping workshop	\$18,000
11. <i>Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament</i> — conference on Canadian-Soviet Arctic cooperation	\$20,000
12. <i>United Nations Association in Canada, Montreal Branch</i> — UN General Assembly simulation	\$2,000
13. <i>Political Studies Students' Conference, University of Manitoba</i> — "End of the Cold War? Prospects for East-West Security in the 1990s" Conference	\$4,500
14. <i>North American Model United Nations</i> — simulation of the UN	\$6,000
15. <i>Canadian Disarmament Information Service</i> — publication of a special issue of <i>Peace Magazine</i> on common security	\$3,000
16. <i>Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University</i> — conference on naval arms limitations and maritime security	\$12,778
17. <i>Canadian Council for International Cooperation</i> — directory of Canadian women specializing in global issues	\$6,000
18. <i>International Institute for Strategic Studies</i> — program of publications	\$11,308
TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS	\$132,296

GRANTS

1. <i>Dr. Michael Mepham</i> — Language and Ideology: a study of the nature of the peace movement's participation in the arms control and disarmament debate	\$7,000
2. <i>Canadian Student Pugwash</i> — chemical weapons workshop at annual conference	\$9,488
3. <i>William Epstein</i> — participation at Pugwash Symposium, Dublin, Ireland, May 5 to 7, 1989	\$320
4. <i>Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies</i> — publication of proceedings of seminar on "Nuclear Strategy in the 90s: Deterrence, Defence and Disarmament"	\$7,500
5. <i>Canadian Peace Alliance</i> — preparation of Canadian peace catalogue and database	\$15,000
6. <i>Project Ploughshares</i> — preparation of manual on common security issues	\$17,000
7. <i>United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research</i> — research on verification	\$10,000
8. <i>International Institute for Strategic Studies</i> — program of research and publications	\$38,692
TOTAL OF GRANTS	\$105,000

TOTAL OF GRANTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

\$237,296

The Disarmament Bulletin

A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

Number 13 - Spring 1990

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On to Budapest

Ottawa Conference Concludes with Draft Treaty Text



Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark (centre) with American Secretary of State James Baker (right) and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze (left) at the Open Skies Conference held in Ottawa from February 12 to 27, 1990.

"We are exactly where we thought we would be coming out of the Ottawa Conference," said John Noble, head of the Canadian delegation to the Open Skies Conference, at the close of the Conference in Ottawa on February 27. "There are a series of outstanding issues, but none of them are unresolvable provided there's a spirit of give and take on both sides."

The February 12 to 27 meeting between representatives of the 16 members of NATO and seven members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) was the first of a two-stage process to negotiate an Open Skies treaty, which would provide for regular, short-notice overflights of each other's territory using unarmed surveillance aircraft. The second stage of the negotiations will be held in Budapest from April 23 to May 12, 1990.

Foreign ministers from all 23 of the NATO and WTO countries were present in Ottawa for the first two days of the Conference. As this was their first meeting since

the dramatic political changes that swept Eastern Europe in the fall of 1989, it afforded a timely opportunity for high-level discussion of the changing face of Europe and the future development of East-West security relations. As the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, observed in his address to the ministers, "we are meeting not as old adversaries, but as new partners," committed to building a durable peace in Europe.

Ministerial Agreement

By the end of two days, the Conference had produced a ministerial commitment to an Open Skies regime based on maximum openness, agreement on the reunification of East and West Germany, and agreement on large cuts to the number of Soviet and American troops stationed in Central Europe. The ministers also agreed to hold a summit-level meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) later this year.

Officials from the 23 countries remained in Ottawa for two weeks following the ministers' departure to begin negotiations on the Open Skies treaty itself. Work was divided among four groups, dealing respectively with the following items:

- aircraft and sensors, inspection of aircraft and equipment, and the role and status of observers on board aircraft;

- quotas, combined parties (i.e., the right of a country to join together with another country or countries for the purpose of accepting or carrying out observation flights), scope and limitations;

- flight mission, air safety rules and transit;

- legal issues, such as entry-into-

force provisions and air crew immunities.

Canada and its allies tabled a draft treaty text early in the proceedings, which the WTO states agreed to use as the basis of negotiations. On February 24, the Soviet negotiators submitted formal amendments to that text, and by the end of the Conference the two documents had been integrated into a composite text.

Agreement was reached in several areas, including on many of the procedures for carrying out inspections of aircraft. It was also agreed that there should be no signals intelligence equipment onboard aircraft, and that any data obtained during an overflight should stay on the aircraft until the



plane lands, and not be transmitted to the ground, to another aircraft or to a satellite. The negotiators also reached agreement on important legal issues, such as the creation and functions of an Open Skies Consultative Commission to oversee implementation and operation of the eventual Open Skies regime.

Outstanding Issues

Large portions of the composite text remained in brackets, i.e., unagreed, at the close of the Conference. The key outstanding issues are listed below.

1. Whose aircraft should be used to carry out the overflight and who should make this decision?

Canada and its allies insist that the right to decide which aircraft will be used should rest with the country that

wants to overfly, not with the country that is being overflown, because the purpose of Open Skies is to create confidence in the eyes of the people carrying out the overflight. The Soviet Union has suggested that the country being overflown should have the right to decide which aircraft will be used, leaving open the possibility of the overflown country supplying the aircraft and sensors.

2. Should there be restrictions on sensors other than the prohibition on signals intelligence?

The position of the NATO countries is that there should be no such restrictions. The WTO states have suggested that there should be a common sensor package, although there are differences within the WTO on what sensors should be included in that package. As a general rule, the NATO countries are prepared to permit the use of a much more intrusive level of sensor technology than is the Soviet Union.

3. Who should process and have access to the data acquired from overflights?

NATO has suggested that each country process its own data and decide for itself with whom it wants to share, again because the purpose of the exercise is to build confidence on the part of the overflying state. The Soviet Union has suggested that data be processed at a common facility by the overflown and overflying country together, and that the information from this processing should be available to all states participating in the regime.

4. How many overflights should each country be allowed to conduct and required to accept?

The quotas suggested by the Soviet Union are much lower than the numbers NATO countries have put forward.



NATO and WTO foreign ministers listening to chairperson Joe Clark (centre) at the Open Skies Conference.

5. Should there be restrictions other than for air safety?

The NATO countries say no. The Soviet Union has suggested that certain areas of its territory be off-limits to Open Skies overflights.

Canada Pleased with Results

Despite these unresolved issues, the Canadian delegation was pleased with the results of the Ottawa Conference. In clarifying where the parties stand, in identifying the key elements of contention, and in drawing up a bracketed treaty text — a process that usually takes months or even years — the delegates made tangible progress toward the creation of an Open Skies regime. Mr. Noble noted that none of the negotiators expected to leave Ottawa with agreement on all of the major issues. According to him, "the real negotiations start now, on the road to Budapest, and at the Budapest Conference itself, but I remain confident the end result will be a successful treaty of the type that Canada has been proposing since last May."

Noble stated that one of the fascinating things about the Conference was the

extent to which the six other members of the WTO disassociated themselves from many of the positions taken by the Soviet Union in a way that has not been evident during previous arms control negotiations. "It was not a bloc-to-bloc negotiation," he said. "It has been a negotiation among 23 countries."

Noble also emphasized that the basic issues remaining to be resolved are not technical, but political. What is required for success at Budapest is a "new injection of political will," of the sort clearly expressed by all 23 foreign ministers during the opening phase of the Ottawa Conference.

There will be close diplomatic consultations among the parties involved right up to the Budapest Conference, with Canada and Hungary being asked by the other delegations to monitor whether it would be useful to have an inter-sessional meeting. The Budapest Conference will open at the level of officials. If an agreement is reached, the NATO and WTO foreign ministers will assemble in Budapest on May 11 and 12 to sign it.

Open Skies is designed to build confidence between East and West by al-

lowing all members of the two alliances to see that no state is carrying out activities that threaten the security of the others. It will allow countries that do not have surveillance satellites — such as Canada — to monitor for themselves areas of particular interest or concern. Open Skies will also set the climate for further progress in arms control talks. With major agreements on both conventional and nuclear arms expected in the near future, far-reaching confidence-building measures such as Open Skies, which can also help fulfill verification requirements, will play a key role in future security arrangements. ■

Acronyms Used in this Issue

ACD — arms control and disarmament
 CD — Conference on Disarmament
 CFE — Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
 CSBM — Confidence- and Security-Building Measure
 CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
 CTBT — Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
 EAITC — External Affairs and International Trade Canada
 FOFA — follow-on forces attack
 HLTf — High Level Task Force
 IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency
 ICBM — intercontinental ballistic missile
 INF — Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
 NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 NNA — neutral and non-aligned
 PTBT — Partial Test Ban Treaty
 SALT — Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
 SLBM — sea-launched ballistic missile
 UNDC — United Nations Disarmament Commission
 UNGA — United Nations General Assembly
 WTO — Warsaw Treaty Organization ■

Prime Minister Gives Opening Address at Open Skies Conference

The following is the text of the address to the Open Skies Conference delivered by the Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister, on February 12, 1990.

We are living in remarkable years in world history. The Berlin Wall is down, Nelson Mandela is free, and a new age is born.

Throughout Eastern Europe, governments are grappling with the unfamiliar challenges of democracy and economic change. They are trying to accomplish in months what it has taken others decades, and even centuries, to achieve. Fulfilling the dreams of a nation for democratic government and satisfying the expectations of a people for new opportunity and prosperity for themselves and their children are historic tasks. They demand time, patience and a great resolve.

Nobody, as far as I know, has the necessary experience to prescribe a way to certain success for these governments that would make it possible for them to avoid either great national difficulties or considerable individual sacrifice. New national structures and economies are built slowly and with difficulties, but all nations have a stake in the success of the new governments and an interest in responding constructively to their needs.

Canada stands ready to do its part. Fully 15 per cent of Canadians have their origins in Central and Eastern Europe. These Canadians are schooled in the management of government in a bilingual nation and a multicultural society, and they are experienced in the conduct of international business in a free enterprise world. Canada is committed to cooperate in the rebuilding of Eastern Europe.

Canada is also ready to play its part in building a new international order. For almost half a century there has been



Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (left) with Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark at the Open Skies Conference.

half a peace, based on distrust and built on deterrence. Confidence was impossible while basic values were in conflict. But the confrontation of ideologies has at last subsided. We are no longer hostage to the frozen political meteorology of suspicion and animosity. The Cold War is over. And today, in Ottawa, former adversaries work together to ensure that such a long and bitter winter never comes again.

The conditions exist now to make a new start on building a better world. The infernal nuclear legacy of the past

'The Cold War is over'

remains. Unresolved issues and ancient conflicts, forgotten for a while, are exposed now by the sunlight of the perestroika thaw.

But, in recent months, much common ground has also reappeared. These developments raise profound questions about the most effective means of reinforcing political and economic progress in Central and Eastern Europe; about the evolution of the European Community and the unification of Germany; about the risk to stability of dormant

conflicts re-awakening; about the future of our alliances and about the nature of the relationship that will exist between North America and Europe; about what sort of wider world we want to see.

What is needed now is a new concept of security rooted in universal, democratic values. What is also necessary is the genius to give constructive expression to our rediscovered sense of shared purpose.

Newspaper headlines are filled with a new lexicon of diplomatic architecture — expressions such as a common European home, concentric circles, confederation and so on. These ideas reflect the need to create new instruments of cooperation, to breathe new life into existing organizations and to bring greater definition to our common political vision of a new European future.

The new Bank for European Reconstruction and Development is one creative response to these needs. It is needed to complete the unfinished business of European economic reconstruction. It will have a very important role for the spirit of enterprise which is beginning in Eastern Europe. It will also be important for the integra-

tion of the countries of Eastern Europe into the global economy. We are participating actively in this constructive and beneficial initiative and are ready to contribute time, money and expertise to aid its success.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is also a vital piece of that architecture. For almost two decades the CSCE has been an extremely important instrument for countries in both East and West. It has served as the bridge, often the only bridge, from sterile disagreement to fruitful cooperation. It has facilitated in many ways the quite extraordinary changes of the past year. And it is the only institution that comprises all of the countries directly engaged in European security.

A costly lesson of the history of this century is that European security and North American security are indivisible. None of us is secure when any of us feels threatened. We support the call for a summit-level meeting of the CSCE later this year and believe we should begin preparations immediately. We believe that we should all strive to be in a position at that summit to sign an agreement on reducing conventional forces in Europe. Further, we would like to see the CSCE transformed into an institution of ongoing economic, social and political cooperation between the countries of East and West.

In these days of torrential change and telescoped timeframes, stability and predictability in security arrangements are at a premium. For 40 years, NATO has embodied the commitment of North America to European security. NATO, with its trans-Atlantic membership, has a central role to play in facilitating the orderly transition from armed confrontation to more normal and productive political and human relationships.

NATO's arms control agenda is being pursued with the same seriousness of purpose as has been applied to maintaining an appropriate military balance between East and West. And NATO

provides a basis for going beyond arms issues to verification and confidence-building.

Openness is a pre-condition of confidence and, therefore, of stability. An agreement on Open Skies is in concert with these times; it will help to consolidate the dramatic improvement in relations between East and West that has occurred over the past year. By opening our territories to virtually unrestricted surveillance by air, we will be showing the world that we have nothing to hide and less to fear.

In concluding this Open Skies agree-

ment we will make a statement of enlightened political will, capitalizing on the current climate of achievement and building on a record of recent success.

When this idea was first proposed in the fifties, the times were not right. However, a spirit of leadership and catalytic change, which we are in now, have ensured that this concept — a helpful, confidence-building measure — will receive, for the first time, fair and thoughtful consideration today. I invite all present to pursue this agreement with vision and vigour for the future well-being of mankind.

Who Was There

From NATO:

Country

Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Federal Republic of Germany
France
Greece
Iceland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

Foreign Minister

Marc Eyskens
Joe Clark
Otto Moller*
Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Roland Dumas
Antonis Samaras
Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson
Gianni de Michelis
Georges Wohlfart
Hans van den Broek
Kjell Magne Bondevik
Joao de Deus Pinheiro
Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez
Mesut Yilmaz
Douglas Hurd
James A. Baker, III

From the WTO:

Country

Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
German Democratic Republic
Hungary
Poland
Romania
USSR

Foreign Minister

Boyko Dimitrov
Jiri Dienstbier
Oskar Fischer
Gyula Horn
Krzysztof Skubiszewski
Sergiu Celac
Eduard Shevardnadze

* representing the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Quarrels and competition between East and West have had a profoundly negative influence on many areas of the world. Perhaps most significant, the Cold War distorted the functioning of the United Nations, stunted the development of multilateral cooperation and inhibited genuine opportunities for dialogue and progress. The prospect of real peace in Europe at last provides us the opportunity to return to the unfinished business of building a modern and effective multilateral system.

The challenges we face as dynamic societies go well beyond orthodox definitions of national security. The global natural environment is threatened and the international institutions to protect it are clearly inadequate. The scourge of drug abuse is felt around the world, north and south, and yet we have found no satisfactory collective means to curtail it. The burden of debt is a prejudice to the future of middle-income countries around the world. And hunger and disease are too often the

fate of the world's poorest countries mired in economic hopelessness and social despair.

And so this meeting in Ottawa has, in my judgement, two main tasks: first, to concentrate diligently on the work at hand so that an agreement on Open

"The challenges we face go well beyond orthodox definitions of national security"

Skies will be achieved when the delegations reassemble in Budapest; and, more generally, to seize this unprecedented moment in recent history to replace the Cold War and its incalculable costs in economic wealth, misspent human genius and wasted social opportunity, with a new ethic of cooperation based on peace and prosperity and common purpose.

We who are gathered here in this room today bear a heavy responsibility to our nations and to history because the opportunity is given to few people to help shape a new era in world affairs. We carry the hopes and the prayers of people from Vladivostok to Vancouver and from countries far removed from the old East-West axis of conflict.

So let us work together to multiply the gains that we have made in relations between the countries of East and West. Let us dedicate ourselves to building a world that the Cold War made illusory and unreachable for all countries and all peoples. Let us broaden our horizons and open our skies to peace and prosperity for all.

Ladies and gentlemen, the world is watching all of you in high expectation. Grasp the opportunity that is open to you now. On behalf of all Canadians, who are proud of your presence here and grateful for your leadership, I wish you all good luck.

Clark Calls on Ministers to Put Political Will into Practice

The following is the text of the address to the Open Skies Conference delivered by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, on February 13, 1990.

I believe this past day and a half have marked an important beginning in the construction of a new framework for political and security relations among our countries. This has been a unique occasion.

It is the first time that foreign ministers of our countries have gathered together since the dawning of the new age of democracy and freedom in Eastern Europe. We are meeting not as old adversaries, but as new partners in a new task, the task of building a durable peace in Europe.

We also have a new type of challenge before us. That challenge is not so

much to initiate change; it is to channel it, to ensure that it remains permanent and stabilizing in its consequences. In effect, the challenge before us as ministers is to keep up with change.

In breaking new ground, I detect much common ground. That common

"In breaking new ground, I detect much common ground"

ground goes beyond specifics. It relates also to a shared sense of purpose and mission.

Allow me, as Chairman, the luxury of summarizing what I see as the common elements of this shared purpose.

First, I think that all of us accept that we have entered a new era in relations between East and West. It is an era where the terms East and West are themselves beginning to lose meaning.

Second, I detect a consensus that we must act quickly. We must act quickly to consolidate the gains that have been made thus far and to ensure that future change proceeds in a way that enhances our common security rather than detracts from it.

Third, I believe there is agreement that there is an overriding requirement to be guided by the dual goals of stability and predictability. We must act in such a way as to smooth the bumps on the road ahead and to maximize the predictability of change.

Fourth, I also detect a shared belief that a guiding principle of our future



The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs (left), with Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn during talks at the Open Skies Conference held in Ottawa from February 12 to 27. Hungary will host the second stage of Open Skies negotiations in Budapest from April 23 to May 12.

security framework should be the reduction of military forces to the lowest possible level consistent with national security requirements.

Fifth, I believe that there is agreement that we must broaden the definition of security and act upon that broader definition. That broadened definition of security relates to confidence-building, verification and the legitimization of borders and frontiers.

Sixth, I think we all share the view that a new framework for relations in Europe requires the continued clear involvement of North America in the various councils of the continent.

Those are broad issues where I, as Chairman, see little, if any, difference between the 23 ministers sitting around this table. That in itself is grounds for optimism.

There also seems to be a measure of agreement on specific negotiations or institutions that have been the focus of our discussion so far. There is a strong consensus among us regarding the desirability of Open Skies. An Open

Skies agreement will solidify the gains in mutual confidence we have already achieved and allow us to move forward to a new era of confidence-building.

Open Skies will allow each country represented here to see that no one of us is carrying on military activities threatening to the security of the others. It will assist in the verification of future arms control agreements, and it will help to create the climate that encourages signature of those agreements.

Most important, we are agreed in our expressed readiness to come to an early agreement that we can sign in Budapest in May.

How do we put our political will into practice? What sort of aircraft will be used? How many flights will each country be allowed? What are the operational details of an Open Skies regime?

Questions such as these are sometimes called technical questions. We should not let that label mislead us into thinking that they are somehow simple questions with ready solutions or that

political considerations do not intrude on them. Rather, we should regard them as the challenges that they are. We should be prepared to work diligently to come up with solutions. And, should we reach a point where agreement seems difficult, I would urge us to look back on what we have said here, to bear in mind our shared purpose, and to reaffirm our determination to move forward.

I pledge the full support of the Canadian delegation in this endeavour. Canada's unflagging support for Open Skies is well-known to all of you. It stems from our strong interest in verification and from our commitment to East-West confidence-building.

I believe it is fair to say that the approach of all of us to Open Skies is based on four criteria:

- first, simplicity;
- second, cost-effectiveness;
- third, flexibility;
- fourth, equity.

The Open Skies concept is, by its very nature, a very simple one. In building a structure to embody this concept we should not look for complexity where none need exist. We should keep restrictions to a minimum. We should ensure that openness means openness. We should create a regime that, in principle, is subject to no limitations save those imposed by flight safety considerations and rules of international law.

Open Skies should be cost-effective. Open Skies need not be expensive. The technology exists and is well within the reach of all participants. Cost-effectiveness also means we should avoid unnecessary bureaucracy.

We should construct a regime that is as flexible as possible in meeting the varying needs and requirements of the signatory states.

Equity allows all participants to

benefit from the regime. No doubt there are differences as to what equity means and how it can be achieved.

NATO countries have put forward their conception of Open Skies in their Basic Elements Paper. We have just had tabled a paper from Warsaw Treaty countries. We have heard, today and yesterday, from the various foreign ministers of both alliances. Mr. Shevardnadze has introduced the notion of equality, which I take to mean equitable access to benefits. This is a concern that we need to take seriously.

In general, there appears to be a fair amount of common ground in our approaches. It is our task now, as ministers, to identify that common ground in a communique, so that these negotiations will advance quickly, so that Open Skies can become a functioning element of East-West confidence-building as soon as possible.

I am greatly encouraged by the pace with which events have progressed so far. It has been less than a year since President Bush re-launched Open Skies in his speech in Texas, yet here we are ready to commence detailed negotiations on a treaty text with the evident desire to sign an agreement a few months hence. Those of you familiar with the history of arms control negotiations will see this as a record.

I am encouraged also by the rapidity with which Canada's trial overflight of Hungary was put into play. I want to emphasize the outstanding cooperation we received from our Hungarian and our Czech colleagues in conducting the trial. The results of our joint experiment were discussed in detail at the Budapest preparatory meetings for this Conference. I believe this has cleared away a lot of the technical questions that

might otherwise hamper these negotiations. This test of the nuts and bolts of Open Skies demonstrated that if our will to cooperate remains strong, the concept can be made to work.

As we go into our closed session, I believe it is useful to outline the key issues with which we will be dealing:

— whether aircraft will be nationally or collectively operated;

— determining the types of sensors to be allowed onboard Open Skies aircraft;

— determining the number, or quota, of overflights each participating state will be obliged to receive or permitted to carry out. I believe a compromise can readily be found on this issue using a

"We can make the term East-West synonymous with good will and cooperation"

formula that takes into account as its basis the realities of geography, geographic size and population;

— determining the structure and language of an Open Skies treaty text.

In an effort to expedite the negotiation, Canada, in conjunction with its allies, has prepared a draft treaty text that we hope can serve as the basis of discussions over the next two weeks.

Let us move as far as we can towards agreement in Ottawa, so we can reconvene in the spring in Budapest to sign a final treaty text.

Let us make Open Skies our first step onto the uncharted ground of our future security in Europe. We face an

enormous challenge, but we also face unprecedented opportunity. By putting our political will into practice we, together, can make the term "East-West" synonymous not with confrontation and rivalry, as it has been for the last 40 years, but synonymous, instead, with good will and cooperation.

We have also spoken today and yesterday about the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and about the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Some have spoken about the reunification of Germany, which we all acknowledge as a matter for the German people to pursue, and which we welcome, confident that those aspects that are of interest to others will be discussed in the appropriate forums.

The CFE negotiations are tremendously important. We are all greatly encouraged by what we have heard from Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in these past days about the reduction of troops in Europe. All speakers believe that we have the basis for proceeding rapidly to the conclusion of a CFE agreement. Let us do so in time for signature of a treaty at a CSCE summit meeting this year. Then let us move towards further measures to increase conventional stability.

We are all agreed that there should be a summit-level meeting of the CSCE in 1990. The potential of the CSCE is enormous. Mr. Dienstbier spoke of the CSCE as a comprehensive framework for pluralism. It is the one body that has, in its composition and in its mandate, the ability to act as a framework for the construction of a new peace and prosperity in Europe.

How should we prepare for a summit? Some have suggested that we should do it at Copenhagen in June, or at the second Open Skies meeting this spring in Budapest, or at a separate meeting of foreign ministers. Those are questions to be decided.

Moving?

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It is clear that a preparatory meeting will be needed involving not just the 23 nations represented here, but all 35 countries of the CSCE. But we need to discuss here what we believe should be the purpose of the summit itself beyond signing a CFE agreement.

Is it to create the political setting for the 1992 follow-up meeting? Or will it also have a broader agenda, setting in motion a process of activities ranging

"Today we are all politicians, in the best sense of that word"

through economic, social, environmental and humanitarian cooperation, as well as security affairs?

Today we are all politicians, in the best sense of that word. We are responsible to our publics for our actions. We must, therefore, be sensitive to those responsibilities on the part of others. We must be mindful, constantly, of the need to keep our efforts coordinated so that change is not purchased at the price of stability.

Under normal circumstances this would be a recipe for slowness, but we cannot afford delay. We must be present, at the political level, during all phases of this process, to ensure success that is quick and sure.

As we pursue our discussions today in closed session, I am confident that we will continue to apply the same openness to each other and to new ideas as is embodied in the concept of Open Skies itself. ■

Students: see page 18 for Focus

Do arms control and disarmament prevent war?

Open Skies Communiqué

The following is the Communiqué on Open Skies issued on February 13, 1990 by the 16 NATO and seven WTO foreign ministers present at the Open Skies Conference.

At the invitation of the Government of Canada, the Foreign Ministers and senior representatives of the Governments of Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America met in Ottawa February 12-14, 1990 to begin negotiation of "Open Skies." Also present at the Ministerial Session were observers of other CSCE states.¹

The Ministers welcomed the accelerating trend toward openness and the reduction of international tensions. In this context, they noted that although an "Open Skies" regime is neither an arms control nor a verification measure *per se*, its successful implementation would encourage reciprocal openness on the part of participating states. It would strengthen confidence among them, reduce the risk of conflict, and enhance the predictability of military activities of the participating states. Finally, it would contribute to the process of arms reduction and limitation along with verification measures under arms limitation and reduction agreements and existing observation capabilities. The Ministers noted further that the establishment of an "Open Skies" regime may promote greater openness in the future in other spheres.

Believing that an effective "Open Skies" regime would serve to consolidate improved relations among their countries, the Ministers therefore agreed on the following:

— the "Open Skies" regime will be implemented on a reciprocal and equitable basis which will protect the interests of each participating state, and in accordance with which the participating states will be open to aerial observation;

— the regime will ensure the maximum possible openness and minimum restrictions for observation flights;

— each participating state will have the right to conduct, and the obligation to receive, observation flights on the basis of annual quotas which will be determined in negotiations so as to provide for equitable coverage;

— the agreement will have provisions concerning the right to conduct observation flights using unarmed aircraft and equipment capable in all circumstances of fulfilling the goals of the regime;

— the participating states will favourably consider the possible participation in the regime of other countries, primarily the European countries.

The Ministers expressed their gratitude to the Government of Canada for organizing this Conference and welcomed the invitation of the Government of Hungary to a second part of the Conference to conclude the negotiation in Budapest this spring.

1. Those present as observers were Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Monaco, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia.

Turkey reserves her position on the status and representation of Cyprus. ■

Noble Sums Up: Canada Wants Meaningful Regime

The following is the text of the statement to the press made by Mr. John Noble, head of the Canadian delegation to the official portion of the Open Skies Conference, at the close of the Conference in Ottawa on February 27. Mr. Noble is Director General of the International Security and Arms Control Bureau of External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC).

In recent years, a new word has entered the English language. Like so many, it comes from another language. That word is glasnost. The emergence of this word into common usage, and the concepts behind it, represent the fundamental changes that have led to the improvement in East-West relations. Initially, some of us in the West spent a lot of time debating whether the term meant openness or transparency, and that debate seems rather odd now, since glasnost has come to be a much larger concept. It is only when all societies practice glasnost that we can hope to have a world in which we can truly say there is peace.

First, and above all, democratic ideals demand that glasnost exist between a government and its people, but peaceful international relations demand that glasnost also exist among and between governments. We have already noted the effects of glasnost in international relations — improved communications, honesty, openness. Tangible results include the progress we have made in arms control, the democratic elections taking place this year across Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the rapid progress we have made toward the construction of what we call the "new European home."

It was the Canadian conviction that it was possible to put into practice the spirit of glasnost that led us to become such fervent promoters of Open Skies. We believe that the time has come to create a confidence-building regime of a much greater scale than anything tried



Mr. John Noble briefing the press at the close of the Open Skies Conference in Ottawa on February 27.

in the past. The Open Skies regime that we have supported is much more open than what we have accomplished up till now in the framework of the CSCE. This regime would apply to an area three times larger than the territory covered by those CSBMs. Putting into place such a regime would be seen, without a doubt, as a large step forward.

We have an expression in the English language that says "you cannot be a little bit pregnant." Similarly, in international relations, you cannot, in any meaningful sense, be a little bit open. Canada joined with the other nations of NATO in developing and putting forward a regime for Open Skies that is based directly on the understanding that restrictions on openness serve only to undermine confidence and build distrust.

We proposed, therefore, that sensors be capable of operating in all weather, day or night. We proposed that territorial restrictions be limited only to those necessary for air safety. We proposed also that each nation fly its own aircraft, thus taking upon itself, to the largest degree possible, the responsibility for the successful implementation of its overflight. In this way we will

avoid creating situations where the host country can be blamed for failures.

It is a clear principle of openness and confidence-building that the greater the degree of control left to the host country, the greater the perception that the regime is limited and based on distrust. It is by symbolically opening our doors as wide as possible that we will build a regime that fully achieves its potential.

In practical terms, if this negotiation is to succeed, we must have an early commitment by all participants to the following essentials:

(A) no limitations to the territory overflown, except as required by air safety;

(B) a high frequency of overflights to provide full coverage of the territory of the overflown country;

(C) the use of sensors capable of operating in all weather, day or night;

(D) full control over the aircraft and sensors by the overflying country.

Since the opening of this Conference, Canada has sought to demonstrate the kind of flexibility necessary to achieve a meaningful regime. We have listened with care to the concerns put forward by various nations that the principles of equity must be respected.

In his opening speech, the Right Honourable Joe Clark promised to take the concerns about equity expressed by the other foreign ministers seriously. We remain committed to that promise, but I must say that equality in an insignificant regime is hardly a goal worth pursuing. Equity in an Open Skies regime that brings openness to our military activities in the broadest sense will engage the fullest efforts of the Canadian delegation, both in the coming weeks as we prepare for Budapest and at the Budapest negotiation itself. ■

Communiqué on CFE and CSCE

The following is the Communiqué on the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) issued on February 13 by the 16 NATO and seven WTO foreign ministers present at the Open Skies Conference.

The Foreign Ministers and senior representatives of the Governments of Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, meeting in Ottawa at the invitation of the Government of Canada, gathered on the margins of the Open Skies Conference on February 13, 1990 to review progress in the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The Ministers welcomed this meeting as an opportunity to review and assess progress in the negotiations and provide impetus to their successful conclusion. They welcomed in particular an agreement reached in Ottawa between the USA and the USSR on the reduction of their stationed forces in Europe.

Convinced that a CFE agreement would strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels, the Ministers agreed that the negotiation in Vienna should proceed as expeditiously as possible. For this purpose, the Ministers also agreed that negotiators in Vienna should be encouraged to develop solutions designed to overcome remaining obstacles, especially in those areas where new elements have been put forward recently:

- aircraft;
- regional limitations, differentiation and storage;
- helicopters;
- tanks and armoured combat vehicles.

The Ministers recognized that the essential elements for a CFE treaty are now on the table in Vienna, though much remains to be done, in particular to develop an effective verification regime.

The Ministers expressed their willingness to give simultaneously impetus to the CSBM negotiations. They emphasized their shared commitment to achieving a CFE agreement as soon as possible in 1990, and agreed on the principle of holding a CSCE summit meeting this year. They stressed the need for timely and thorough preparation for such a meeting through appropriate consultation among the 35 participating states.

They affirmed their interest in continuing the conventional arms control process, taking into account future requirements for European stability and security in the light of political developments in Europe. ■

Canada and the Future of the CSCE

A new European political architecture is taking shape in which the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will have a prominent place. Canada has played a leading role in the CSCE from its inception. We are deeply committed to playing a creative role in its further development.

The CSCE comprises all the countries of Europe except Albania, plus Canada and the United States. It deals with all the interrelated issues essential to security and cooperation in Europe: confidence-building and disarmament; economic cooperation; environmental protection; science and technology; human rights; human contacts; information; culture; and education.

It has an enviable record of success. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 was a milestone in the era of détente. The Stockholm Document of 1986 established important confidence-building measures that opened the way for serious discussion of conventional arms control in Europe. The Vienna Concluding Document of 1989 contained ground-breaking commitments and follow-up activities that are now advancing the CSCE process in every area.

The Vienna Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures are building on the work of Stockholm. The Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (not a CSCE conference but within the CSCE framework) will make major breakthroughs in reducing levels of forces and armaments.

At the Sofia Meeting on the Protection of the Environment, held in October and November of 1989, participating states agreed to negotiate conventions in important areas of environmental protection.

The Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe, held from

March 19 to April 11, 1990, brought together for the first time officials and business people to consider measures to further trade and industrial cooperation, and to take the first steps toward integration of the countries of Eastern Europe into the global economic system.

The ongoing Conference on the Human Dimension has been an important factor in securing progress in human rights. Its next meeting in Copenhagen will aim to broaden the European consensus on the right to free elections, the rule of law, representative institutions, minority rights, religious freedoms and many other fundamental human rights.

Other CSCE meetings have dealt with, or will address, information, culture and the Mediterranean before the next Main Follow-up Meeting in Helsinki in March 1992.

This is a busy schedule. Yet such has been the pace of events that there is now a general desire among participating states for a special CSCE summit this November to mark the signing of a CFE agreement, assess the impact of rapid changes, consolidate achievements to date and plot a course for the new Europe.

The Right Honourable Joe Clark has expressed Canada's strong support for a CSCE summit. "A leading role for this institution in the design and implementation of a new order in Europe is vital," he said. "For Canada, the CSCE is the most important forum for discussions relating to building a new peace and prosperity in Europe."

The place, date and agenda of the summit will be the subject of intense consultation among the 35 participating states in coming weeks. Canada wishes a summit to begin the process of institutionalizing the CSCE. We envisage a mix of regular activities in all main subject areas, high-level political consultations and enhancement of existing institutions, to draw Europe together and to broaden cooperation among all

participating states. Full and constructive participation by Canada and the United States in this process is essential.

Since 1973 Canada has worked in the CSCE to build security and confidence and to promote the freer movement of people, information and ideas. We now begin the task of creating a new European architecture that will be sound, permanent and secure. ■

CFE Update

Recognizing that the Ottawa Open Skies Conference would provide an opportunity for foreign ministers to exchange views on broader issues of European security, Western CFE negotiators concentrated their efforts in the run-up to the Conference on identifying issues that required resolution at the political level. This process led to a series of Western initiatives in Vienna in early February, including revised proposals on US and Soviet stationed forces, on tanks and armoured combat vehicles, and on combat aircraft and helicopters.

This preparatory work proved useful, as ministers in Ottawa were able to agree on a proposal that would limit US and Soviet forces stationed in the European central zone to 195,000 each. The agreement would also permit the United States to station a further 30,000 troops in Europe outside the central zone.

In addition, the Open Skies Conference launched the "two-plus-four" mechanism for dealing with the process of German unification. This means that CFE negotiators now face the difficult challenge of structuring a treaty capable of taking into account significant changes in Central Europe and a possible realignment of countries within existing alliances.

Partly because negotiators are wrestling with this challenge and partly be-

cause of developments within the Soviet Union, the pace of CFE Round Six, which opened on March 16, has not matched that of previous rounds. Negotiators are confident, however, that the high-level meetings scheduled for this spring and early summer, including the Budapest Open Skies meeting and the Gorbachev-Bush summit in June, will help to ensure that the target of an agreement this year is met.

CFE Organization and Canada's Role

The following paragraphs explain the mechanics of how Canada and its allies develop comprehensive proposals and participate in the CFE negotiation.

Using the objectives outlined in the CFE mandate and taking instructions from their respective capitals, NATO representatives meet twice monthly at the High Level Task Force (HLTF) in Brussels to develop positions that will be tabled in Vienna. The HLTF was established in 1986 to develop initiatives in the area of conventional arms control. Canada is represented at HLTF meetings by a senior EAITC representative.

Reflecting the complexity of the negotiation, the HLTF has established a number of specialized sub-bodies, called teams, to help in the development of proposals. These sub-bodies deal with Verification (Green Team), NATO and WTO Data (Red Team/Blue Team), CSBMs (White Team) and Treaty-Drafting (HLTF Deputies). Canada participates in meetings of each sub-body and is especially active in Green Team work. When the HLTF reaches agreement on a Western position, the position is transmitted to Vienna where it is tabled by Western negotiators.

The CFE negotiation itself is structured to allow East and West to negotiate simultaneously on different aspects of the treaty. Tabling of new proposals usually occurs in the weekly plenary sessions with initial views being

exchanged at that time. Each proposal is then assigned to one of a number of working groups for further detailed examination and negotiation. Depending on the complexity of the proposal, a working group may decide to establish informal "contact groups," which allow representatives of the 23 countries involved in the negotiation to meet and exchange views informally. While working and contact group meetings take place among the 23, Western negotiators also meet several times a week to help coordinate their approaches to CFE.

Canada participates actively in all Western caucus meetings and in all meetings of the 23. Reflecting our expertise in verification, Canada chairs the informal contact group on that subject. The Canadian delegation in Vienna, which is dually accredited to CFE and to the CSBM Negotiations, consists of three officials from EAITC, two military advisers from the Department of National Defence and an Ambassador, who is Head of Delegation for both negotiations. ■

Last UNDC Meeting Under Old Format

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) will hold its annual session from May 7 to 29 at UN Headquarters in New York. The session will be a transitional one because, beginning in 1991, the UNDC will operate under a reformed format intended to improve the effectiveness of the institution.

The 1990 session will address a range of disarmament issues, all of which have been carried over from the 1989 session, with one exception. This is the item entitled "Objective Information on Military Matters," which last fall's UN General Assembly Resolution 44/116E, co-sponsored by Canada, requested be included on the UNDC's 1990 agenda. Items that have been carried over from previous sessions include nuclear disarmament, South Africa's nuclear capability, the UN's role in disarmament, naval arms, conventional arms and the Third Disarmament Decade.

The UNDC reforms coming into effect in 1991 are expected to be based on

a document entitled "Ways and Means to Enhance the Fashioning of the Disarmament Commission." This document was annexed to the 1989 UNGA resolution entitled "Report of the Disarmament Commission" (44/119C), adopted by consensus. Included in it is a recommendation that the UNDC make every effort at its 1990 session to conclude all of its agenda items, with the exception of the single new item.

Canada is a strong supporter of UNDC reform and will play an active role in trying to bring to a satisfactory conclusion as many of the items on this year's agenda as possible, so that the UNDC can begin to examine new issues at its 1991 session. Being a firm advocate of the concept of objective information on military matters, Canada expects to assume an active role in the consideration of this item. However, due to the special effort to conclude older agenda items at the 1990 session, objective information may not receive in-depth consideration at this time. ■

Canada Chairs Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space at CD

Canada is acting as the chair of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space at the Conference on Disarmament's 1990 session. The position of chair rotates annually among a member of each of the Socialist Group, Western Group and Group of 21 (neutral and non-aligned countries). Canada is chairing as the Western Group's candidate.

The CD is the only multilateral body mandated by the UN to negotiate arms control and disarmament issues. It meets twice yearly in Geneva for spring (February-April) and summer (June-August) sessions. The decision to establish an *ad hoc* committee to deal with the issue of arms control and outer space was taken by the CD on March 29, 1985, in conformity with a consensus resolution adopted by the

UN General Assembly during its 39th session on December 12, 1984.

The mandate of the *Ad Hoc* Committee for 1990, agreed by the CD, is to "continue to examine and to identify, through substantive and general consideration, issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space."

In his address to the *Ad Hoc* Committee at its first meeting of the year, on March 13, Canada's Ambassador to the CD, Mr. Gerald Shannon, noted that "Canada has for many years manifested considerable interest in and has contributed significant resources to the work of this Committee. That interest has not waned despite the difficulties that we have had in agreeing on how, in concrete terms, we should prevent an arms race in outer space. The reason why it has not waned, despite such

frustrations, stems from our recognition of the long-term importance of the issues involved."

Mr. Shannon observed that in an immediate perspective, the question of prevention of an arms race in outer space is closely related to strategic stability on earth. He also stressed the longer-term importance of the question, noting that "none of us...can say with any degree of confidence or indeed omniscience what the real political, economic, cultural and intellectual ramifications of our species venturing into space will be...[However,] it is probably impossible to underestimate that importance." He called on the Committee to take a long-term and responsible view of the genuine substantive differences expressed within itself, and to adopt a positive perspective on its work. ■

East, West and European NNA Discuss Military Doctrines

From January 16 to February 5 in Vienna, senior military leaders from the 35 states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) met in Vienna to discuss their countries' respective military doctrines and strategies. The Military Doctrine Seminar, which was the first of its kind, came out of a Western proposal at the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs).

Four broad themes were addressed:

- military strategy against the background of national security policy;*
- military structure and posture;*
- military activities and training;*
- military budgets and planning.*

The seminar was a venture into a relatively unexplored approach to security problems. By providing a forum for dialogue among Eastern, Western and European neutral and non-aligned nations about doctrines and strategies, it attempted to promote understanding of the intentions lying behind military force structures and activities. The seminar was expected to enrich the material under discussion in the CSBM Negotiations.

Canada was represented at the seminar by Mr. David Peel, Canadian Ambassador to the CFE and CSBM Negotiations; General John de Chastelain, Chief of the Defence Staff of the Canadian Forces; Lieutenant-General Richard Evraire, Canadian Military Representative to the Military Committee at NATO Headquarters, Brussels; and Major-General Brian Smith, Commander Canadian Forces Europe, based at Lahr, the Federal Republic of Germany.

The following are Lieutenant-General Evraire's impressions of the seminar.

The Military Doctrine Seminar was a very positive experience that took place in an atmosphere of courtesy, coopera-

tion and openness. Much of the material presented was already well-known, with the possible exception of the rapidly-evolving doctrines of the Eastern Europeans. In these circumstances, the process of exchanging views and positions between NATO and the WTO on important military matters became more important than the actual substance of the presentations.

The WTO presentations tended to place heavy emphasis on the new defensive doctrine of their forces. In many respects, it was obvious that these declared doctrinal changes had not yet been fully implemented in a revised force structure, although numerous

Exchange of views important in light of rapidly-evolving doctrines of the Eastern Europeans

changes were underway. Nonetheless, it was heartening to note that this process of change is being hastened in many Eastern countries by an increased civilian control of the military.

The most interesting portion of the seminar was the presentations by the non-Soviet WTO nations. There was a general lack of clarity in their statements. This was perhaps deliberate, given the rapidity of political change these nations had undergone immediately prior to the seminar, particularly Romania. The clearest statements came from Hungary, addressing the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the redeployment of national forces within their country. Poland was relatively cautious in its statements and the Czechs were preoccupied with the question of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from their territory. The GDR representatives still hewed to a relatively traditional line.

The main concerns of the WTO centred around what they considered to be offensive aspects of NATO's doctrine, which they felt were not in keeping with the Western alliance's stated defensive nature. These included questions on follow-on forces attack (FOFA), naval forces, flexible response, forward defence, rapid deployment forces and the purpose and meaning of deterrence, both conventional and nuclear. In response, NATO provided substantive justification in every case, while admitting that some concepts, such as FOFA, may have to evolve to keep up with changing circumstances.

The neutral and non-aligned (NNA) nations placed heavy emphasis on the defensiveness of every aspect of their military posture. In several cases, they seemed to be promoting their structure and doctrine as models for the future of Europe, ignoring the geostrategic reality of NATO neighbours which makes their neutrality possible. The NNA also attempted to put forth the idea of a set of criteria against which the defensiveness of a national military posture could be evaluated. This proposal did not meet with universal acclaim, as it was felt that any such criteria would not provide an equitable standard for evaluation due to the considerably different security requirements of each nation.

In the case of NATO, while there were considerable differences in style and emphasis, there was also a remarkable degree of solidarity and fundamental consistency among the national presentations. The Western alliance provided solid evidence of its defensive orientation, although it did so by including certain offensive capabilities as an integral part of that defence. NATO's main concerns with the WTO presentations centred around the still-tenuous link between the declared new defensive intentions and a revised force structure, as well as the status of Soviet stationed forces in other WTO nations.

The Military Doctrine Seminar was a valuable exercise in openness but one into which we should not read too much. There remain considerable differences, even in understanding of concepts, between the WTO and NATO, which will not easily be bridged.

One suggestion, advanced by Canada, to develop a glossary of concepts in order to alleviate problems with terminology and translation, may be worth pursuing. As far as further meetings in this vein are concerned, the European

Seminar a valuable exercise in openness

situation should perhaps stabilize to a further degree in order to make such gatherings worthwhile. At the very least, an initial CFE agreement should be successfully completed. Otherwise, there is the risk that this type of seminar will become a forum for polemical debate. ■

PTBT Amendment Conference

A series of informal consultations at UN Headquarters has resulted in agreement on the dates and venue of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) Amendment Conference. The Conference will be held in New York from January 7 to 18, 1991 and will be preceded by an organizational meeting, also in New York, from May 28 to June 8, 1990. The organizational meeting will deal with administrative matters, such as how the Conference will be financed. These dates have been unanimously accepted by states that are party to the Treaty.

The Conference is the result of an initiative by some 40 signatories to convert the PTBT, through an amendment, into a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). While the proposed amendment enjoys broad support among non-

aligned countries, Western countries do not support it.

Canada's opposition to the initiative is based on several concerns.

First, the original parties never intended the PTBT to be used for the purpose of achieving a CTBT. In Canada's view, attempting to do so could undermine the PTBT and result in a loss of confidence in existing disarmament processes, causing some countries to be skeptical of initiatives to negotiate future multilateral arms control treaties out of fear such treaties could be similarly misused.

Second, the declared opposition of some of the PTBT's depositary governments to converting the Treaty into a CTBT means that the initiative has no real chance of success, as each depositary government (namely the

Canada will attend Conference and participate in a constructive manner

United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom) has a right of veto over any amendment. Furthermore, amendment of the PTBT would not place any nuclear testing limitations on those nuclear weapon states that are not party to the Treaty (i.e., France and China).

Despite its opposition to the amendment, Canada will attend the Conference and participate in its deliberations in a constructive manner, as announced by Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, in her October 20, 1989 opening statement to the UN First Committee. Ms. Mason will lead the Canadian delegation to the Conference. While conditions are not conducive to concluding a CTBT there, it is Canada's hope that the results of the meeting will give impetus to ongoing efforts at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva

toward the realization of a CTBT, including, as a first step, the establishment of a mandate for an *ad hoc* committee on a nuclear test ban. ■

Arms Transfer Experts Group Meets

The UN Group of Governmental Experts on International Arms Transfers held its first meeting from January 22 to 26 in New York.

The Group was established as a result of Resolution 43/751, adopted by the UN General Assembly at its 1988 session, which requested the Secretary-General to carry out, with the assistance of governmental experts, a study on "ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms on a universal and non-discriminatory basis." In preparing the study, the Group is to take into consideration the views of UN member states, as well as other relevant information, including information on the problem of illicit arms transfers. The Secretary-General will submit the results to the General Assembly in the fall of 1991.

The Group consists of experts from 19 countries. Canada is represented by Mr. Ernie Regehr, Research Associate and Lecturer at the University of Waterloo's Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies and Research Coordinator for Project Ploughshares. Mr. Regehr has written extensively about the international arms trade.

Discussion at the January meeting focused on determining the scope of the study and on defining key terms in the Group's mandate, such as "arms," "transfers" and "transparency." The Group's next meeting is scheduled to take place in New York in July. ■

Consultative Group Discusses Non-Proliferation Policy Options



Mr. Ben Sanders, Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason, Mr. Don McPhail and Professor Ashok Kapur at the Consultative Group meeting held in Cornwall on January 11 and 12, 1990.

The Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs met in Cornwall, Ontario, on January 11 and 12 to discuss "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Options for Canada." The Consultative Group is a group of approximately 60 Canadians that meets periodically under the chairmanship of the Ambassador for Disarmament to advise the government on its arms control and disarmament policies. Its membership comprises academics, private researchers, former government officials, peace activists and others who are knowledgeable about and interested in arms control and disarmament issues.

The topic for January's consultation was chosen with the upcoming Fourth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in mind. Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason — who will head the Canadian delegation to the Review Conference, which begins on August 20 in Geneva — noted in her opening remarks that the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is one of Canada's highest arms control and disarmament priorities. She asked the Group to identify and evaluate a range of policy op-

tions that Canada might consider pursuing in three areas: safeguards and the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; encouraging universal adherence to the NPT; and adjuncts and alternatives to the NPT.

To set the context for its workshop discussions, the Group heard from three speakers about the NPT itself. Mr. Don McPhail, head of the Canadian delegation to the 1980 NPT Review Conference and now Special Advisor to the Privy Council Office in Ottawa, suggested that while the NPT is an imperfect instrument, it has helped to circumscribe proliferation and remains an essential contributor to international security and stability in the nuclear age. Dr. Ashok Kapur, of the Political Science Department at the University of Waterloo, presented a contrasting perspective, arguing that the NPT has done little to curb the activities of those states determined to develop a nuclear weapon capability and, as such, should not be given much prominence in Canadian policy. Mr. Ben Sanders, New York-based Chairman of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, contended that a world without the NPT is unthinkable.

While the Treaty has not lived up to all expectations, it has served useful purposes and has a bright future if it is effectively defended.

After much deliberation in both workshop and plenary sessions, the Group offered a number of policy options, the majority of which fall into six broad themes.

First, the Group called for greater recognition of the underlying incentives states have for developing nuclear weapons, and for the development and application of policies to reduce those incentives. Proposals for regional security arrangements, nuclear-weapon-free zones and the application of regional confidence-building measures reflected such thinking. So, too, did suggestions for augmented Canadian and UN roles in fostering regional security, particularly through peacekeeping.

Second, the Group felt that Canada should promote the creation of incentives and disincentives to encourage adherence and discourage non-adherence to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Suggestions were widely voiced for the use of current nuclear trade arrangements, development assistance and debt relief as forms of leverage to promote greater compliance with regime principles and practices.

Third, the Group urged Canada to press for more consistent behaviour on the part of states that supply nuclear materials. Many participants argued that Canada should vigorously promote policies aimed at encouraging greater acceptance by suppliers of safeguard requirements over the provision of nuclear material and technology.

Fourth, the Group observed that strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is crucial to the maintenance of the non-proliferation regime. It was suggested that Canada support policies aimed at increasing the

financial and human resources of the IAEA, improving its mandate and authority, and extending the coverage of its safeguard provisions.

Fifth, the Group suggested that Canada do more to encourage accelerated progress in arms control and disarmament. Some urged that particular attention be given to measures aimed at curbing vertical proliferation, so as to ensure fulfilment by nuclear weapon states of the *quid pro quo* the NPT offers for nuclear abstinence by others.

Finally, while many participants were supportive of efforts aimed at promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, others advocated de-emphasizing nuclear power in favour of the study and development of other, potentially safer, energy alternatives. Some suggested that Canada eventually cease all promotion of the uses of nuclear energy and encourage other countries to do the same.

Discussion at the meeting was enhanced by the presence of several experts in the non-proliferation field from Canadian universities, research centres and the Atomic Energy Control Board. Officials from EAIRC, Energy, Mines and Resources Canada and the Department of National Defence also participated in the consultation. ■

Four Views of the NPT

Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason: "Canada attaches the highest importance to maintaining and...strengthening the NPT, including striving toward the goal of universal adherence. The NPT not only represents the best guarantee against the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons; it is also the best guarantee that conventional arms control, chemical weapons control and the control of the nuclear powers' nuclear weapons will proceed apace...[S]tates will be willing to sign other arms control agreements only if they know that parties to those agreements will be inhibited from acquiring nuclear weapons by a strong non-proliferation regime. Commitment to arms control and disarmament must, almost by definition, mean commitment to the NPT."

Mr. Don McPhail: "[T]he NPT is a truly essential treaty for the world in the nuclear age. Without it, proliferation dangers would magnify, and nuclear commerce and cooperation would be less fruitful and less secure. The NPT is a balanced instrument in encouraging both international nuclear cooperation and disarmament. But its overriding value lies in creating legal barriers against horizontal proliferation, a normative presumption in favour of curtailing the further spread of nuclear weapons and broad obligations relating to the application of IAEA safeguards."

Dr. Ashok Kapur: "The most important action that national leaders can take is to relax their position on the nuclear proliferation issue and to put it on the back burner...The NPT is a freak event in modern international relations. Non-proliferation has lasted for a while because non-proliferators were able to create a mirage of future international security and a great world bargain between the nuclear-haves and the have-nots. This approach rested on workable misunderstandings of the 1960s which are no longer available."

Mr. Ben Sanders: "I contend that the NPT has indeed helped to deter the spread of nuclear weapons...[E]ven if the Treaty has not yet met each of its initial purposes as effectively as might have been hoped originally...it has certainly served some of its intended purposes and has come also to operate in ways that might not have been foreseen in the beginning. The NPT is the only multinational instrument now in place pursuing those aims. In the foreseeable future there is no way to replace it by anything more effective and more acceptable to the international community at large without jeopardizing all that has been achieved so far." ■

Canada Marks NPT's Twentieth Anniversary

March 5, 1990 was the twentieth anniversary of the NPT. The Treaty was opened for signature on July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 1970. To mark the occasion, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark strongly affirmed Canada's continuing support for the Treaty. "The NPT remains an agreement of major importance because it provides for legally binding commitments to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and facilitates international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy," stated Mr. Clark. "It also encourages parties to the Treaty to pursue negotiations aimed at reducing stockpiles of nuclear weapons."

Canada, one of the earliest signatories of the NPT, is a major advocate of universal adherence to the Treaty. "I call upon all states that have not done so to formally accede to the NPT," said Mr. Clark. "Strong support by the international community for this important Treaty remains critical, particularly in the current climate of unprecedented change around the world."

Some 141 countries are currently party to the NPT. However, a number of states with advanced nuclear capabilities have declined to sign the Treaty. ■

Focus: On the Relationship Between Arms Control and Disarmament and Peace

Focus is our column for secondary school students. We welcome your comments and suggestions for future topics.

Here at External Affairs and International Trade Canada we frequently receive letters from students asking what we are doing for peace.

When writing back, we describe Canada's involvement in conflict resolution and peacekeeping through the United Nations. We are also sure to mention our research in arms control verification and our extensive participation in arms control and disarmament discussions and negotiations. We assume, like most people, that there is a relationship between arms control and disarmament on the one hand and peace on the other hand. But what, precisely, is that relationship? Do arms control and disarmament prevent wars? If so, how?

Definitions

First, some definitions.

The terms "arms control" and "disarmament" are often used interchangeably but, strictly speaking, they are not the same thing.

Arms control refers to measures that limit the growth of or otherwise regulate weapons, military forces and/or their supporting activities. Such measures can include restrictions on numbers, types, testing or training, stationing, acquisition and use. The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963, which bans nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, is an example of an arms control agreement. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that don't already have them, is another example. The terms "arms limitation" and "arms regulation"

are sometimes used instead of arms control.

Disarmament refers to the actual reduction or elimination of weapons and/or military forces. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987, under which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to get rid of all their nuclear weapons with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km, is an example of a disarmament agreement.

If weapons or equipment have to be dismantled or destroyed, or troops returned to civilian life, it is disarmament. If not, it is arms control.

Relationship

One might think that the relationship between arms control and disarmament — abbreviated as ACD — and peace is straightforward. If countries have no weapons, they cannot make war. But, as we have seen from the definitions, ACD agreements do not always get rid of weapons; they may just limit them. Besides, short of banning all sticks and

arms race between Great Britain and Germany in the years before World War I probably helped to cause that war. If Country A sees Country B building up its military forces, Country A may fear that it will be attacked, and may decide to attack Country B first to prevent this.

What ACD Can Do

ACD can help make war less likely in a number of ways:

1. By increasing certainty about military capabilities and intentions.

Country A may not know for sure that Country B is building up its military forces or by how much. The fears on which it bases its attack may be unfounded. ACD agreements that provide countries with more information about other countries' force levels and military intentions can reduce unnecessary suspicions. Also, by putting limits on both sides' force levels, ACD can make countries more confident about the course of future military developments.

2. By ensuring a stable military balance.


ACD can create situations where countries have roughly equal numbers and kinds of military forces. Countries are less likely to go to war if there's a good chance the war will end in a costly stalemate.

ACD can also limit or reduce weapons that are "destabilizing," that is, weapons that contribute to the danger of surprise attack or of early attack in a crisis situation. It has been suggested, for example, that intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) based in silos on land are more destabilizing than ballistic missiles based on ships or submarines (known as SLBMs), because they are easy targets. In a crisis, a

Do arms control and disarmament prevent wars?

stones, it seems reasonable to assume that countries determined to go to war can find some means to do so regardless of restrictions on weapons. Even the United Nations' concept of "general and complete disarmament" allows countries to keep enough military forces and weapons to maintain internal order. Does this mean that ACD has no relationship to peace?

Not exactly. Weapons are not the sole cause of war, but they can contribute to its likelihood. Increases in military strength can create suspicions and tensions that may lead to war. The naval



US soldiers at a base in Mutlangen, West Germany, dismantle the radar section of a Pershing II missile, being withdrawn under the terms of the INF Treaty. The INF Treaty is an example of a disarmament agreement. US Information Agency photo 88-1219-C

country might be tempted to fire its ICBMs first, fearing if it didn't "use them" it would "lose them." Many people argue that agreements that encourage countries to base their long-range missiles at sea rather than on land contribute to stability. For example, the SALT agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union froze the number of those countries' ICBM and SLBM launchers at existing levels, but permitted an increase in SLBMs if an equal number of ICBMs or older SLBMs were dismantled.

3. By reducing the probability that accident or crisis will lead to war.

ACD agreements that restrict destabilizing weapons will do this. In addition, there are a number of arms control agreements designed to prevent incidents that might lead to crisis or war, and to improve communications between countries in accident or crisis situations. One example is the "accident measures" agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, which provides, among other things, for improvements in both sides' safety procedures to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

Another example is the "hot line" agreement between these same two countries, which makes sure that a quick and reliable communications link exists between the US and Soviet leaders in the event it is needed. Canada and the Soviet Union recently signed an agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea, to prevent accidents involving their navies.

4. By encouraging communication.

There is a lot to be said for just plain talking. Negotiations among countries on almost any important issue tend to make war less likely. The two sides have a chance to understand each other's concerns and motivations more clearly. A sense of cooperation may develop as the two sides move towards the common goal of an agreement. Once an ACD agreement is signed, regular communication and cooperation between the parties is usually needed to make sure that the terms of the agreement are being lived up to.

Conclusion

ACD can thus help to prevent wars, by lessening tensions and uncertainties

Forecast

A list of arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, May through September, 1990.

April 23 - May 4: Third NPT Preparatory Committee, Geneva

April 23 - May 12: Open Skies Conference, Budapest

May 7-29: United Nations Disarmament Commission, New York

May 17: CFE Round 7 opens, Vienna

May 21: CSBM Negotiation Round 7 opens, Vienna

May 28 - June 8: PTBT Amendment Conference Organizational Meeting, New York

June - August: CD summer session, Geneva

August 20 - September 14: Fourth Review Conference of the NPT, Geneva

related to weapons and military forces themselves. However, some types of wars, such as revolutionary struggles, are less easy to control through ACD. Other methods must be used, in addition to ACD, to deal with wars that are more directly the result of conflicting ideas or of rival claims to resources.

Also, not all proposed ACD measures are likely to lead to peace. Measures that are one-sided, or that leave out important military powers or categories of weapons, can increase the likelihood of war. To be effective, ACD measures should be negotiated among all of the countries directly affected. There should also be an agreed way of checking that the other side is in fact doing what it has said it will do. This last concept is known as verification and was discussed in "Focus" in *Bulletin* No. 10.

So, when we are asked what Canada is doing for peace, it is fair to point to our ACD efforts. But it is also important to remember that ACD can only encourage, not guarantee, peace, and that our efforts to deal with other, underlying causes of tension and war are just as important.

Disarmament Fund Update

Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund, Fiscal Year 1989-90

(April 1, 1989 — March 31, 1990)

CONTRIBUTIONS

1. Canadian Federation of University Women — student essay contest: "What I am prepared to do for peace"	\$500
2. Dr. Jules Dufour — preparation of a university course on arms control and disarmament	\$1,900
3. Voice of Women — orientation tour of the UN Disarmament Commission	\$6,050
4. Peace Education Centre — Youth for Global Awareness Conference	\$4,000
5. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament — Ballistic Missile Defence study	\$19,760
6. Science for Peace, Toronto Chapter — University College Lectures in Peace Studies	\$3,000
7. Centre de Ressources sur la Non-Violence — research on non-violent civil defence and common security	\$7,000
8. Polish-American Parliamentary Debate Institutes Canada — lecture tour of Poland	\$2,500
9. Inuit Circumpolar Conference — participation in Fifth Inuit Circumpolar General Assembly, Greenland	\$4,000
10. David Cox, Queen's University — peacekeeping workshop	\$18,000
11. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament — conference on Canadian-Soviet Arctic cooperation	\$20,000
12. United Nations Association in Canada, Montreal Branch — UN General Assembly simulation	\$2,000
13. Political Studies Students' Conference, University of Manitoba — "End of the Cold War? Prospects for East-West Security in the 1990s" Conference	\$4,500
14. North American Model United Nations — simulation of the UN	\$6,000
15. Canadian Disarmament Information Service — publication of a special issue of <i>Peace Magazine</i> on common security	\$3,000
16. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University — conference on naval arms limitations and maritime security	\$12,778
17. Canadian Council for International Cooperation — directory of Canadian women specializing in global issues	\$6,000
18. International Institute for Strategic Studies — program of publications	\$11,308
19. Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies — seminar on "International Security in a Changing Global Order"	\$1,104
TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS	\$133,400

GRANTS

1. Dr. Michael Mephram — Language and Ideology: a study of the nature of the peace movement's participation in the arms control and disarmament debate	\$7,000
2. Canadian Student Pugwash — chemical weapons workshop at annual conference	\$9,488
3. William Epstein — participation at Pugwash Symposium, Dublin, Ireland, May 5 to 7, 1989	\$320
4. Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies — publication of proceedings of seminar on "Nuclear Strategy in the 90s: Deterrence, Defence and Disarmament"	\$7,500
5. Canadian Peace Alliance — preparation of Canadian peace catalogue and database	\$15,000
6. Project Ploughshares — preparation of manual on common security issues	\$17,000
7. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research — research on verification	\$10,000
8. International Institute for Strategic Studies — program of research and publications	\$38,692
TOTAL OF GRANTS	\$105,000

TOTAL OF GRANTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

\$238,400

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
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Government
Publications

Disarmament Bulletin

A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

Number 14 - Fall 1990



NPT Review Conference: Much Progress, But No Final Document



The NPT Review Conference in plenary session.

Eighty-four of the 142 parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) met in Geneva from August 20 to September 14 to review the Treaty's operation.

The NPT, which is the centrepiece of global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five declared nuclear-weapon states (the United States, the

Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China) provides for review conferences at five-year intervals, if so desired by the parties. This was the fourth review conference to be held since the NPT entered into force in 1970. Fifteen states attended the Conference as observers, including France and China, the two nuclear-weapon states not party to the NPT.

Although best known for its first two articles, designed to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, the NPT is a multi-faceted treaty that also includes provisions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear trade and disarmament. All of these aspects were considered by the parties present in Geneva.

While the Conference achieved significant and positive results in most areas, it was regrettably unable to produce a final document. The sticking point was Article VI of the Treaty, which calls on parties to pursue negotiations in good faith aimed at ending the arms race and moving to nuclear and general disarmament. On this, the issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty was the most controversial.

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External Affairs and
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Canada

From a Canadian perspective, the Review Conference was highly successful in its consideration of issues related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear trade and safeguards. Canada played an active role in the elaboration of language on full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply that received broad support.

In addition, Canada launched an initiative at the Conference regarding the extension of export controls on nuclear materials to include tritium — a material necessary for the detonation of nuclear devices but currently not subject to international export controls. The Conference agreed on language calling for “early consultations among states to ensure that their supply and export controls are appropriately coordinated,” in reference to tritium and other materials and equipment. Canada intends to pursue efforts to conclude international tritium export control guidelines in the near future.

In another welcome development, parties called for an examination of ways to widen the application of safeguards in nuclear-weapon states, and for a clearer separation of those states’ peaceful and military nuclear facilities. Agreed language also included a call on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to make fuller use of the inspection rights at its disposal, particularly its right to use a form of challenge inspection to clarify questions of compliance.

The Review Conference achieved constructive, consensus language on almost all issues related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It reaffirmed the goals of Article IV of the NPT, particularly that of encouraging NPT parties to engage in the fullest possible transfer of nuclear technology and nuclear items for peaceful purposes. The report of the Conference committee dealing with peaceful uses recognized the special needs of developing countries in this regard, and reaffirmed the desirability of giving preference to NPT parties in transfers of peaceful nuclear technology.

As had been anticipated by many observers, consideration of the disarmament

aspect of the NPT (Article VI) proved to be the most difficult. Canada played an active role in all Article VI deliberations. The Canadian delegation advocated a balanced review of developments in disarmament since 1985. This would have entailed acknowledging the important — and unprecedented — progress towards nuclear disarmament, as well as the significant positive developments in negotiations concerning non-nuclear weapons and forces. At the same time, Canada recognized that much remains to be done to fully realize the disarmament goals set out in Article VI.

The final days of the Conference saw marathon negotiations in an effort to find consensus language on Article VI questions. Although much common ground was found, differences of view — particularly on the question of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) — proved to be insurmountable. The President of the Conference made a last attempt to achieve a final document by proposing text that summarized the differences. This initiative was unsuccessful, as one delegation (Mexico) objected to adoption of the President’s proposed compromise.

The Review Conference’s inability to agree on a final document was a disappointment to Canada and many other countries. However, in Canada’s view, the agreed language on full-scope safeguards, tritium controls and other matters represents a strong commitment by NPT parties to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Canada will continue its initiatives in these areas.

In the disarmament area, differences of approach reflected divergent views among states on such key questions as how to proceed to the goal of a CTBT. Canada believes that while NPT parties should respect one another’s approaches, they should not allow their differences to obscure the fact that a strong NPT is in the security interests of the entire international community. Every effort should be made to ensure that this vital treaty continues to be strengthened. ■

Canada’s Opening Statement to NPT Review Conference

The following are excerpts from the statement delivered by Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, to the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT in Geneva on August 24.

Canada comes to this important Review Conference confident that together we will reinforce the credibility and strength of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and inject new impetus into our collective search for a world characterized by peace and international security without nuclear weapons. We believe that developments in international relations since our last review conference, including in the areas of arms control and disarmament, provide a positive background conducive to achieving a successful outcome to this meeting...

The NPT is the linchpin of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. It serves as an effective barrier to the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons and, at the same time, sets a framework for nuclear and general disarmament. In addition, it reinforces the verification role of IAEA safeguards and contributes to peaceful international nuclear cooperation and commerce. The NPT is thus a vital instrument for international peace, security and economic well-being in the modern world.

Canada has played an important role in the areas of non-proliferation, safeguards and nuclear cooperation. It is therefore natural that Canada’s goal at this Review Conference must be to reaffirm the Treaty’s accomplishments in these areas and urge firmer commitments to appropriate goals where necessary — both to attract stronger support for the Treaty and, if possible, wider adherence to it by those countries that may not have fully appreciated its benefits. As a firm and strong supporter of the NPT, Canada wishes to work actively with other states at this Review

Conference to reinforce and improve these elements of the NPT.

Canada also attaches great importance to the disarmament dimension of the NPT. As a country that participates actively in all of the principal multilateral arms control and disarmament fora, we look forward to joining other delegations, in the days ahead, in examining progress that has been made since the last review conference toward fulfilling the disarmament goals enshrined in the NPT.

The NPT has played a central role in curtailing horizontal proliferation by the legal obligations in the first two articles. It is no small accomplishment that there are no nuclear-weapon states beyond the five recognized in the NPT. However, the nuclear activities of some so-called threshold states not party to the NPT give cause for concern. Canada encourages these states, at a minimum, to conform with the NPT obligations that the vast majority of countries have freely accepted. There is legitimate anxiety that risks of insecurity and war increase in proportion to the number of states possessing nuclear weapons, particularly if they are in areas of chronic tension. The security interests of regions like the Middle East and South Asia are ill-served by even the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear-weapon states party to the Treaty undertake, in Article I, to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons or in any way contributing to the development of such weapons by any non-nuclear-weapon state. Article II commits the non-nuclear-weapon states adherent to the Treaty to neither receive nor develop nuclear weapons. These all-important obligations enhance regional and international security and allow countries to reinforce their internally-determined national commitment to non-proliferation by adherence to an international treaty.

The fact that over 140 states have made this commitment to nuclear non-proliferation is immensely important to international security, and is a tribute to the world community in our collective efforts to ensure that nuclear energy is

used only for the benefit of humanity and our planet. Canada greatly appreciates the accession of several states to the NPT since the last review conference in 1985...

Canada calls on all states that remain outside the NPT to accede to what has come to be regarded as the most important treaty of the nuclear era. We are particularly optimistic that South Africa will soon accede to the NPT and that other non-parties in Southern Africa will do likewise. Each new party increases the influence of the NPT and universal adherence should remain our ultimate goal. In urging states not party to the NPT to accede, Canada holds out its own example unabashedly; despite having the technology and capability to do so from the earliest days of the nuclear era, Canada declined to develop a capability to produce nuclear weapons and has adhered firmly to this principle ever since.

Strong as the non-proliferation commitments established by Articles I and II of the NPT may be, they are not foolproof. Non-proliferation, above all, is an act of national policy, commitment and even morality that is only partially verifiable by IAEA safeguards and other means.

It is equally true that the political commitments to horizontal non-proliferation in the NPT would be less convincing without the obligations in Article III. These relate to verification of the non-explosive use of nuclear energy through a system of IAEA full-scope safeguards for non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT. All parties must ensure IAEA safeguards apply to the export to any non-nuclear-weapon state of proliferation-relevant nuclear materials and equipment. Article III does not preclude the possibility of nuclear-weapon states entering into voluntary agreements with the IAEA to apply safeguards to some or all of their peaceful nuclear activities. Such voluntary offers add to the equity of the application of IAEA safeguards under the NPT

regime, and we welcome the extension by the USSR of its voluntary offer as announced earlier this week. The Review Conference should examine ways for safeguards to be extended in nuclear-weapon states, on a cost-effective basis.

As a uniquely-successful international security verification system, IAEA safeguards are based on the timely detection of diversion of safeguarded materials for production of explosive devices or purposes unknown. That there has been no report of diversions of nuclear materials by an NPT party provides confidence that IAEA safeguards are operating effectively in preventing proliferation...

Canada, by its example, is an unreserved supporter of NPT-type IAEA safeguards: in assuring the system's full-

The NPT is a vital instrument for international peace, security and economic well-being in the modern world.

scope application within Canada; in requiring IAEA safeguards on all Canadian nuclear exports; and in establishing a Canadian safeguards support program. While the Review Conference is not the forum to review in detail the budgetary and other challenges confronting safeguards, we think it must reiterate the importance of safeguards in the NPT context and make constructive suggestions, if possible, to strengthen the safeguards system.

The essential credibility and future relevance of the NPT rests on this basic non-proliferation/IAEA safeguards verification framework. Past review conferences have tended to confirm, often without extensive debate or analysis, that state parties have complied with Articles I through III of the NPT. At this Review Conference, we should be concentrating more attention not only on recognizing that all NPT parties must comply, but on urging them to do everything possible in word and deed to be seen to be complying with these essential NPT commitments.



From left to right: Dr. Hans Blix, Director General of the IAEA; Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, UN; Mr. Oswaldo de Rivero, President of the NPT Review Conference; Mr. Jan Martenson, Director General of the UN Office at Geneva; Mr. Arpad Prandler, Secretary-General of the NPT Review Conference.

What more can be done to enhance the NPT's commitment to horizontal non-proliferation, given the lack of specific provisions in the Treaty to ensure enforcement? Above all, this depends on the good intentions of the state parties. But there is room for more confidence-building measures. Fuller explanations should be given when questions are raised about compliance with the NPT. State parties should refrain from any action or statement that might bring into question their commitments to non-proliferation and should take actions to clarify and restore confidence when accusations have been made. One such method is to invite the IAEA to conduct specific inspections when special uncertainties arise... Enhancing the credibility of compliance with the NPT can help lower levels of suspicion and raise the security of concerned states. With respect to transactions of items not under safeguards that might nonetheless be useful in nuclear explosive programs, greater transparency and openness by recipients, as well as vigilance by suppliers, should be encouraged. Canada has a suggestion on tritium in this regard.

With respect to Article III, the obligation to conclude an INFCIRC 153-type safeguards agreement within 18 months of NPT adherence is clear. All NPT par-

ties should make every effort to respect this obligation. We have a special concern in this regard, however, that North Korea, a party with considerable nuclear activity, has not yet concluded its safeguards agreement. This is a particularly clear example of non-compliance which we hope can be resolved soon.

Finding ways to improve the credibility of compliance of all state parties with the NPT is the responsibility of all participants in the Review Conference. Canada hopes this matter can be examined in some greater detail in the weeks ahead.

A basic premise of the NPT is to facilitate international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As addressed in Article IV, nothing in the NPT is to affect the right of parties to develop peaceful nuclear energy without discrimination — provided this is done in accordance with Articles I and II of the Treaty. NPT parties are called on to participate in nuclear exchanges of equipment, materials and information "with due consideration for the needs of the developing world." One of the purposes of this Review is to determine to what extent the goals of Article IV have been fulfilled, and the constraints — financial, political or technical — that may impede peaceful inter-

national nuclear cooperation under this article.

It is self-evident to a nuclear-supplier country like Canada that, without the confidence-building, non-proliferation basis of the NPT, there would be much less peaceful international nuclear commerce than is the case now. The NPT provides an essential assurance that such commerce will not contribute to the development of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Without the NPT, international access to and provision of nuclear materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes could be greatly reduced.

In the assessment of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the role of Article IV, we are fortunate to have at our disposal the extensive IAEA background paper which summarizes the varied peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in many cases their particular applicability in developing countries. Certainly, there is room for greater efforts to make nuclear technology more available to developing countries — and we would expect this Review Conference to make some recommendations in this regard.

But we must recognize that despite some of the advantages of nuclear energy, including its contribution to sustainable development, it will take some time yet for significant nuclear industry to emerge in most countries. Acquiring nuclear power capability is a particularly daunting challenge to developing countries for financial and technical reasons. It is a view shared by Canada, however, that a series of environmental, economic and energy-related factors may ultimately cause an increase in demand for nuclear power; if and when that occurs, the NPT in general and Article IV in particular will help to promote and facilitate this development.

In the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, extensive international cooperation takes place through the IAEA. Of particular importance for the implementation of Article IV, is the fact that the vast majority of disbursements (about 80%) from the IAEA's Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund

(TACF) and contributions (well over 95%) to the TACF come from NPT parties. Their collective participation in this preeminent IAEA multi-lateral fund to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is surely an excellent example of NPT parties fulfilling their obligations under Article IV.

Mutually-beneficial bilateral nuclear cooperation is engaged in by many parties to the NPT. But no NPT state is obligated to enter into nuclear cooperation with each and every other state party, nor is it likely to be in a position to do so. Nonetheless, the NPT provides a solid non-proliferation framework to facilitate the development of bilateral cooperation between NPT parties when mutually agreeable.

Canada, as a major exporter of nuclear items, has played and will continue to play a significant role in international nuclear cooperation with a wide variety of countries, both developed and developing. Canada will submit to the conference, as was requested in 1985, a paper on its extensive bilateral nuclear cooperation activities. These include uranium exports, provision of CANDU power and research reactors, nuclear technology transfer and related training and education.

Canada enjoys the full range of nuclear cooperation activities with 28 states through bilateral agreements. All of these states except France, a nuclear-weapon state, are parties to the NPT. Canada makes NPT or equivalent status, as well as full-scope NPT-type safeguards, prerequisites for bilateral nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear-weapon states.

Canada believes that there is no satisfactory alternative to the NPT-based international non-proliferation regime. For Canada, membership in the NPT or an equivalent binding commitment is a minimum requirement for significant bilateral nuclear cooperation. Receiving the benefits of membership in the NPT club without paying the dues for membership is, for Canada, unacceptable. We are one of the strongest proponents of making NPT adherence and NPT-type safeguards essential conditions of nuclear supply and we shall be so ad-

vocating at this Review Conference. We are encouraged by the number of nuclear supplier states that have indicated support for this policy.

In addition, continuing to clarify the list of materials and equipment that trigger safeguards under Article III and calling on all NPT parties to respect these safeguard obligations would be in direct support of the provisions of Articles III and IV, and the international non-proliferation regime in general.

Some parties to the NPT object to the non-proliferation assurances additional to the NPT often required by suppliers. These requirements, while a matter of national policy, respond to nuclear non-proliferation concerns, including the need to implement fallback safeguards in the event that the IAEA is unable to apply safeguards; to take particular precautions with high enrichment and reprocessing and to have some control over the retransfer of items to third parties. The reasons for bilateral non-proliferation frameworks going beyond, but remaining anchored in, the NPT are more valid than ever.

It is within this more comprehensive non-proliferation regime — buttressed in the NPT but supported by bilateral elements — that Canada believes that assurances of supply, as well as demand, for nuclear commerce can continue to grow and to make contributions to world prosperity. I should add that this potential value does not extend, in our view, to the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, as provided for in Article V, which remain in doubt.

One of the fundamental elements of the NPT is the Article VI provision in which parties undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith towards ending the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear as well as general and complete disarmament. The goals envisaged in this Article, despite efforts undertaken, appeared for many years to remain dis-

tant and elusive ones as international tensions provoked the build-up, rather than reduction, of arms.

However, much has changed in the international climate since the last review conference. In the East-West context particularly, the era of suspicion, distrust and tension has been replaced by one of increased cooperation in which states are demonstrating a revitalized commitment to resolve problems by peaceful means. The area of arms control and disarmament is one where this most welcome change is evident.

Since 1985, progress of an unprecedented nature has been made towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race. This progress is facilitated by the NPT and represents a significant advance towards fulfilling the Article VI goals. The INF Treaty, concluded in 1987, is now being implemented and represents a noteworthy achievement. Building on the success of the INF Treaty, representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union have persevered in their negotiations and, at the recent Washington Summit, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev reached agreement in principle on a START Treaty. The signing of this Treaty will result in substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers. Both the INF and START treaties require actual cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the signatory states. Their importance in this regard must not be underestimated. Furthermore, these landmark treaties represent precedents upon which additional deep cuts in nuclear arsenals may be negotiated. Canada welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have committed themselves to negotiating a START II Treaty and pursuing a dialogue on enhancing strategic stability after the implementation of START I.

The members of NATO have also called for the opening of new

No Summer Issue

Due to the temporary reassignment of our editor to another project, there was no Summer 1990 issue of *The Disarmament Bulletin*. We hope to resume regular quarterly publication with this, the Fall, issue.

negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces upon the signing of a CFE agreement. This is consistent with the announcement by President Bush in May to cancel the United States' land-based SNF modernization programs and represents another significant indication that the superpowers have indeed embarked on the path of nuclear disarmament.

Efforts to progress towards a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing have been frustrated by differences of view on how to proceed towards this goal, to which my delegation attaches great im-

portance. However, even on this difficult issue, I believe there is justification for optimism. After a long hiatus, the Conference on Disarmament has this summer established an ad hoc committee on the item entitled "Nuclear Test Ban," which has opened the door for substantive work on this issue. Canada actively participated in the recent meetings of this ad hoc committee and looks forward to the continuation of this body's work in next year's session of the CD.

It is our solemn duty to continue to build towards a world where the power of the atom will only be used to benefit humanity.

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Equally encouraging is the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have concluded verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties which can now be ratified. Canada looks forward to the early resumption of bilateral superpower negotiations on further restrictions on nuclear testing. The Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference, which will be held in January, will provide an additional opportunity for focused discussions on issues related to a CTBT.

The momentum that has characterized the bilateral nuclear negotiations has also been present in efforts to reduce and control levels of conventional forces in Europe. As a participant in

the CFE Negotiation in Vienna, Canada has joined the other states represented in that forum in a determined effort to conclude an agreement this year that would drastically lower the current level of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. Prospects are indeed excellent that a CFE agreement will be concluded before year's end. This will be reinforced, of course, by the continued observation of the terms of the Stockholm Document, and the application of further confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed in the CSBM negotiations now taking place in Vienna.

There have been equally welcome developments recently in efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate

chemical weapons. We regard the bilateral US-USSR agreement on chemical weapons destruction, signed on June 1, as a major accomplishment and one that should give encouragement to the entire international community in our collective efforts to conclude and implement a worldwide ban on all such weapons.

The great progress that is underway in the East-West context has contributed to an equally welcome reduction of tensions in several parts of the world marred by regional conflicts in recent years. Unfortunately however, as we are all acutely aware, there are regions where tensions continue to be high and, as a result, where the states concerned have yet to embark on the path towards the goals enshrined in Article VI. It is Canada's hope that the disarmament process that is unfolding in the East-West context will continue unabated, and that it will be echoed in other regions characterized by high levels of armament.

While the NPT is the basis of the international non-proliferation regime, it acknowledges, in Article VII, the right of groups of states to conclude regional treaties to assure against the presence

of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. Canada does not consider such arrangements to be a fully satisfactory alternative to ratification of the NPT. However, we do regard such initiatives as useful contributions to the goals of non-proliferation, provided they command the support of the countries in the relevant area and promote regional and international stability. Such zones may be of particular importance in regions that include states that have not yet joined the NPT.

In anticipation of this Conference, numerous ideas have been proposed intended to strengthen various aspects of the NPT. We note in particular the useful working paper submitted by Egypt, which considers a range of relevant issues, and the proposal of Nigeria concerning negative security assurances. My delegation welcomes the constructive spirit in which these and other ideas have been introduced to our discussions and looks forward to considering them in the work of the appropriate committees.

Canada intends to work closely and in a spirit of cooperation with all delegations over the next three weeks in a thorough evaluation of the NPT. My delegation hopes we can agree on a consensus final document that acknowledges the important achievements of this Treaty and identifies areas where there exists the possibility of further strengthening the positive influence of the NPT.

A positive outcome of this Review Conference will establish an excellent basis for consideration in 1995 of extension of the NPT. Canada firmly believes that our goal should be the indefinite extension of this vital Treaty at the 1995 conference.

In this era of rapid change and renewed hope, the world will be looking to us to make a strong and unequivocal statement reaffirming our collective commitment to the goals enshrined in the NPT. It is our solemn duty to ensure that these expectations are met and in so doing that we continue to build towards a world where the power of the atom will only be used to benefit humanity.

Open Skies: No Treaty at Budapest

The second round of Open Skies negotiations between the 23 members of NATO and the WTO ended in Budapest on May 10 without a treaty being signed. Such a treaty would provide for regular, short-notice overflights of each other's territory using unarmed surveillance aircraft. The negotiations are presently suspended until an agreement on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) is completed and signed later this year.

Although some progress was made, including on the type of sensors to be used and on the number of flights to be conducted, many of the issues that remained unresolved at the close of the Open Skies Conference in Ottawa in February were still without agreement at the end of the Budapest meeting.

In particular, the Soviet Union continued to insist that the country being overflown should have the right to decide which aircraft will be used, leaving open the possibility of the overflown country supplying an aircraft from its own fleet. Canada and its allies believe that since the purpose of Open Skies is to build confidence on the part of the country carrying out the overflight, the

The Soviets also wanted to restrict both the number and duration of annual overflights of Soviet territory to a bare minimum. In addition, they continued to suggest that they would declare some military and civilian areas out-of-bounds to overflights, thus reducing the openness achieved through Open Skies.

In contrast, Canada and its allies continued to favour an Open Skies regime that is open to the maximum extent possible, without any limitations other than those required for flight safety. Issues on which NATO countries held firm at Budapest include:

- keeping overflight restrictions to the absolute minimum consistent with civilian flight safety regulations;
- allowing sophisticated all-weather sensors;
- raising the number of overflight quotas to a significant level.

The two sides explored fully the practical implications of each other's positions during the three weeks of talks in Budapest. A clear picture of the remaining differences now exists as a basis for political leaders to decide whether they wish to proceed with the negotiations.

Canada has worked actively to promote the Open Skies concept and facilitate the negotiation of an agree-

ment. Despite the present suspension of negotiations, Canada will continue to explore ways of breaking the logjam that has developed between the Western side and the Soviet Union on some of the key issues.

Although Canada believes that the present Soviet intransigence will have to soften if a third round of negotiations is to take place, it also recognizes that a Western willingness to compromise will have to be shown if the negotiations are to succeed. Once a CFE agreement is signed, Canada hopes that both sides will give full attention to resolving the differences that now prevent agreement on Open Skies. ■

Open Skies: Canada's Closing Statement

The following is the text of the remarks to the closing plenary of the Budapest Open Skies Conference delivered by Mr. John Noble, head of the Canadian delegation, on May 10.

As we come to the end of the first phase of the Budapest portion of the Open Skies Conference, we must acknowledge that we have not succeeded in the ambitious task we set for ourselves in Ottawa.

But we should not minimize what we have accomplished here. Most delegations have shown some flexibility on the question of sensors — we all now agree on the need for sensors that would enable all-weather 24-hour a day coverage.

Differences on the technical capabilities of the sensors have been narrowed considerably. Indications have been given about access to sensor systems with comparable technology, and of employing only those sensor technologies to which other nations are granted access.

Some progress has been made on the quota issue. The technical aspects of the regime have been developed as have the legal aspects.

I believe that we could have done much more had there been a willingness by all participants to accept a basic principle of the Ottawa ministerial communiqué — the right to conduct and the obligation to receive overflights.

We have been limited in our potential at this session by continuing fundamental political differences on certain key issues. Once those political differences become unstuck, as I remain confident that they will, the technical solutions will follow very quickly.

It will be incumbent on all of us to rethink the basic issues that have divided this Conference since Ottawa and not to forget the very clear solutions to those problems suggested informally

Third round possible after CFE agreement.

overflying state should choose the aircraft to be used.

The Soviet Union also maintained its view that data resulting from each overflight should be available to all participants in the Open Skies regime. NATO countries have argued that each country should process its own data and decide for itself with whom it wants to share.

On the issue of permitted sensors, the Soviets adhered to a position that would reduce the remote-sensing capability of Open Skies aircraft below that considered by NATO countries to be sufficient for confidence-building on a 24-hour/all-weather basis. The Soviet position was not shared by all WTO states.

by the distinguished representatives of Czechoslovakia and Hungary in Ottawa.

My delegation has worked, and will continue to work, towards an agreement based on these ideas and on the principles I enunciated in my closing remarks in Ottawa.

I also want to look at Open Skies in a wider context. The original Open Skies proposal by President Eisenhower in 1955 represented an attempt to break with past suspicion and mistrust and to take advantage of a possible new opening in East-West relations. The new Open Skies proposal by President Bush is more ambitious in its scope and participation than the original concept, but it represents relatively less of a leap forward than the 1955 proposal.

Unlike 1955, satellites now cross the skies of all our countries, unimpeded by any rules or regulations on sensors, quotas, flight plans or territorial restrictions. The principle of on-site inspection has been accepted in the Stockholm Document and reinforced in the INF Treaty. The distinguished Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, told ministers assembled to launch the CFE in March 1989 that

the Soviet Union was prepared to accept any intrusive verification measure on a reciprocal basis. We are engaged in an active negotiation to reduce conventional armaments in Europe to parity at levels below those of NATO's current force structure. We are prepared to commence negotiation on SNF immediately after the negotiations on the CFE Treaty are finalized. We are looking forward to a CW treaty. We hope the US and USSR will reach agreement on cutting strategic nuclear weapons.

The walls and curtains that posed physical and psychological barriers dividing Europe have come down. There has been an opening up of Eastern Europe on a scale which no one forecast even one year ago. At the Ottawa Conference, ministers welcomed the agreement on ceilings for US and Soviet forces in Europe outside national territory. In Ottawa, six nations agreed on a process to deal with the international aspects of German unification.

None of these factors was present when President Eisenhower launched his original proposal. Indeed many of them occurred after President Bush's proposal of last May. These developments have led some to conclude that the idea of Open Skies has become redundant, overtaken by events. Canada does not accept that view, but to those who do, I would recall the words of Mr. Shevardnadze in Ottawa that no excess is too much when it comes to verification.

I have also heard it said that the inability to move forward on Open Skies is a price being demanded by some elements of the military of one country to enable them to accept concessions elsewhere. There are two ways of looking at such a hypothesis: one is that the military can be bought off for a relatively small price compared to other more substantive decisions already taken; the other, more serious way, is that those who oppose Open Skies


are opposed to aerial glasnost and all the principles that underpin it. Glasnost cannot survive in a climate where fear and suspicion keep the skies of one country open to only its own aircraft and limit even the number of those overflights to two per month.

The concept of Open Skies is an essential element of the new security structure for Europe and North America. That structure must be built on a solid foundation — that of openness. There cannot be a common European home where some countries have restricted or unlit zones that give rise to suspicions and do not create confidence. The concept of the new European security structure cannot be based on old concepts of military power alone. The strength and stability that come from openness are a far better and more durable defence of each country's security interests than the artificial barriers, fears and suspicions of past thinking.

In the last decade of this millennium, as we strive to reach the basis for a better, more secure world, we must not be blown off course by those who wish to extol the ghosts of the past. We must look to a future of openness, which is the basis of confidence and understanding. Our vision of Open Skies not only builds confidence, but provides for equal treatment between the North American and the European participants. We do not seek any advantage; indeed, Canada is prepared to accept the same level of intrusiveness for Open Skies flights as we seek for purposes of aerial verification in the CFE.

Our vision should not be limited to what was feasible in 1986 in Stockholm and in 1988 with the INF Treaty. We are in a new era, and new confidence-building measures like Open Skies must build confidence, not remain static.

As we return to our capitals, key political decisions are required. We all need to reflect on these. Any successful negotiation is a matter of give and take in which no one feels disadvantaged. We are hopeful that the vision that led our political masters to take many of the steps I mentioned previously will prevail in these negotiations too, and the sooner the better.



Detail of the former imperial palace in Budapest.

UNDC Wraps Up Old Agenda Items

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) held its 1990 substantive session from May 7 to 29 at UN headquarters in New York. This session saw the beginning of the implementation of a reform package agreed upon during consultations in the fall of 1989. The reforms are designed to revitalize the UNDC, whose limited accomplishments in recent years have been a disappointment to many.

The reforms were outlined in a paper entitled "Ways and Means to Enhance the Functioning of the Disarmament Commission." This document urged member states to conclude at the 1990 session all outstanding items, many of which had appeared on the agenda for several years with little progress. Beginning in 1991 the UNDC should, according to the paper, limit its agenda to four items, none of which should remain on the agenda for more than three years.

Member states participating in the 1990 session demonstrated a remarkable determination to implement the reforms. All six carry-over items were concluded, four of them with a consen-

sus document — an achievement unprecedented in UNDC history. Perhaps the greatest success was the consensus text on "The Nuclear Capability of South Africa." The Canadian delegation, led by Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, was also pleased with preliminary consideration of the single new item on the agenda: "Objective Information on Military Matters." Canada looks forward to substantive consideration of this item in 1991.

Discussions are currently underway concerning the 1991 agenda. Aspects of regional disarmament and conversion of military facilities to civilian uses are among the proposed items. In Canada's



At the 1990 UNDC: Col. Doug Fraser, Counsellor, Canadian Mission to the UN; Mr. Perry Calderwood, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, EAITC; and Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament.

view, the UNDC is now in a position to start anew. Canada is committed to making every effort to ensure that the UNDC plays a real and productive role in addressing today's pressing disarmament issues. ■

Preparations Advance for PTBT Amendment Conference

An organizational meeting in preparation for the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) Amendment Conference was held at United Nations Headquarters in New York from May 29 to June 8. The purpose of the meeting was to determine administrative and organizational aspects of the Amendment Conference, which will take place in New York from January 7 to 18, 1991. The Conference is the result of an initiative by some 40 signatories to convert the PTBT, through an amendment, into a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT).

The organizational meeting resulted in agreement on such matters as rules of procedure, background documentation and financing of the conference. A number of delegations, including Canada's, gave statements outlining general views on the issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

The Canadian delegation was led by Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, who will head Canada's delegation to the January Conference. In her address to participants, Ms. Mason reiterated Canada's commitment to achieving a CTBT. She said: "Canada believes that the Amendment Conference has the potential to build on common ground among parties and provide a fresh impetus to work towards the CTB goal, particularly at the Conference on Disarmament." She also noted that the Amendment Conference may play a useful role in furthering understanding of the verification requirements of a CTBT. ■

Forecast

A list of arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, October 1990 through February 1991.

Ongoing: CSBM Negotiations, Vienna

Ongoing to November 19: CFE Negotiation, Vienna

October 15 - November 30: UN First Committee, New York

November 19: CFE Negotiation scheduled for conclusion; to be followed by CFE IA (see page 16)

November: Canada-Netherlands trial CW challenge inspection of Canadian Forces Base Lahr, Germany

January 7 - 18, 1991: PTBT Amendment Conference, New York

February 1991: CD spring session begins, Geneva

Consultative Group Discusses Naval Arms Control at Halifax Meeting

Members of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs from the three maritime provinces and Newfoundland met with Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason in Halifax on June 25 to discuss a range of arms control and disarmament issues. In addition to Consultative Group members, the consultation included several others from the region who are knowledgeable about and interested in arms control and disarmament issues, as well as officials from EAITC and the Department of National Defence.

The consultation focused in particular on naval arms control, with presentations by Commander Peter Haydon, Royal Canadian Navy (retired), of Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, and Mr. Tariq Rauf, Senior Research Associate at the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament in Ottawa.

Commander Haydon, speaking about naval arms control's history and prospects, pointed to the Rush-Bagot agreement of 1817 between the United States and Great Britain as the ideal to imitate. He attributed the success of this agreement, which limited naval forces

most scope for naval confidence-building measures, particularly applied to non-nuclear navies, as well as for some superpower movement on the limitation of strategic and possibly tactical nuclear weapons.

Commander Haydon gave a mixed assessment of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. He argued that while it will be an important part of any future concept of maritime security, it is also likely to lead to boundary disputes and increase the risk of naval confrontation.

Mr. Rauf, addressing Canada's role in naval arms control, argued that the issue should be tackled sooner, rather than later. He proposed several initiatives that Canada could suggest to the superpowers, including: regular data exchanges and staff contacts; the introduction of permissive action links on sea-based nuclear weapons; the elimination of non-strategic naval nuclear weapons; a ban on all nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs); and negotiated deep cuts in general-purpose submarines.

On unilateral moves, Mr. Rauf recommended that Canada: add naval arms control to its present list of arms control objectives; begin naval verification studies; propose an extension of the CSBM Negotiations' Madrid Mandate to include independent naval activities; expand its existing incidents-at-sea agreement with the Soviet Union to include sub-surface activities; and take an active role in proposing naval arms control and confidence-building measures at the UN.

During the Group's discussion, there was some criticism of Canada's policy of supporting the practice of allies possessing a sea-based nuclear deterrent of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons aboard their warships during visits to foreign ports. It was also suggested that those concerned about the environmental

dangers posed by nuclear-armed or powered ships should devote greater attention to commercial vessels, which are involved in proportionately far more accidents than military ones.

The suggestion of a UN naval force was raised, but some participants voiced concerns about the inter-operability of navies and observed that any such force would be at substantial risk intervening in a war in, for example, the Persian Gulf.

While some argued that the Convention on the Law of the Sea provides an adequate legal basis for a future peaceful regime of the seas, others expressed opinions closer to Commander Haydon's view and emphasized the definitional ambiguities enshrined in the Convention.

In general, participants noted the complexity and difficulty of naval arms control, particularly as an increasing number of states come to regard navies as useful and flexible instruments of national power. The fact that navies are moving in several cases into quasi-military roles, which further complicates constraints, was also raised.

Other topics discussed during the consultation included the changing face of Europe and Canada's involvement therein, global security arrangements, the changing nature of security, possibilities for Arctic cooperation and Canada's policy on a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

Consultative Group meetings provide occasion for informed debate among people who approach current arms control and disarmament questions from very different perspectives. They also offer government representatives a chance to hear the most persuasive arguments in favour of and against various policy alternatives. Both governmental and non-governmental participants expressed satisfaction that the Halifax meeting continued this valuable tradition.

Participants noted the complexity and difficulty of naval arms control, as more states come to regard navies as useful instruments of national power.

on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain, to precision in geographic limits, realism in objectives, verifiability and establishment of a management process.

Commander Haydon was less sanguine about naval arms control's prospects, noting that with over 100 states now possessing combatant naval capability, the chances of universal agreement on radical change to the status quo are non-existent. He saw the

The Canadian Position on Naval Arms Control

The following are excerpts from an address delivered by Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, at the Conference on Naval Arms Limitation and Maritime Security sponsored by Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies in Halifax on June 27.

It is a cliché to say that Canada is a maritime nation. When it comes to naval arms control, however, it is a cliché that bears repeating. The three oceans off our shores are sources of great natural wealth, in the form of fish and energy resources. Seaborne trade contributes significantly to our national income. In fact, our domestic exports using a sea mode of transport are worth more than \$30 billion each year. Traditionally, the distance provided by the oceans has helped to keep us secure from military invasion.

If military invasion has, over the years, been regarded as a reasonably lower-order threat to Canada, the areas of potential vulnerability have remained similar to those faced by most maritime nations reliant on trade and vigorous port activity. These are: disruptions to our sea lines of communication and ports through anti-shipping attacks and mining of harbours and sea lanes; protection of our sovereignty and economic rights, particularly, but not exclusively, in fisheries; and protection from physical attack by long-range, sea-based weapons, mainly missiles (some of a nuclear variety), which could conceivably come into play were a major war to break out between East and West...

Developments in naval arms control and maritime confidence-building will not diminish Canada's responsibilities as a maritime-dependent, sovereign nation to be a credible caretaker in the ocean approaches to our nation. By international agreement, we are responsible for the conduct of affairs in sea areas totalling 11 million square kilometres — an area ten percent greater than our land mass. Clearly the priorities for Canada's maritime forces will continue to be surveillance, early warning, presence and control — on,

over and under the waves — in those areas for which Canada is responsible...

The solution is clearly not to eliminate the maritime defence aspect of our security, but to seek to complement it by the diplomatic instruments of naval arms control and maritime confidence-building...

[The Madrid Mandate, which governs the CSBM Negotiations,] limits CSBMs to the sea area adjoining the whole of Europe. The possibility might exist for some expansion of measures regarding naval activities directly linked to notifiable ground force activity, perhaps in the area of an information exchange. But this remains to be seen.

Nevertheless, there is a growing expectation that by the time of the next CSCE follow-up meeting in Helsinki in 1992, the possibility might exist of a negotiation on a new mandate, which might include naval forces and their activities. This would involve a complex deliberation, in which due consideration would have to be given to issues such as the following:

1. Do naval CSBMs run counter to a fundamental aspect of maritime policy for member states of NATO? NATO is vitally dependent on the free use of the sea for the collective defence of Europe. But naval CSBMs are often seen as limiting the capability of the US and Canada to reinforce Europe in a crisis. By contrast, the WTO enjoys an essentially self-contained land mass, with no challenge to its defence analogous to NATO's task of keeping sea lines of communication and supply routes open. Furthermore, some see naval CSBMs as possibly limiting the international right of passage on the high seas, as well as unimpeded transit through or over straits used for international navigation.

2. Would provisions for naval CSBMs have an inequitable effect on security? Naval CSBMs would disproportionately affect NATO, which is a maritime alliance, and the US in particular. In this sense, naval CSBMs, in the East-West context, could run counter to a basic CSCE principle by not providing for

"equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating states."

3. Are naval CSBMs appropriate to the CSCE? Naval CSBMs would constitute a de facto expansion of the CDE zone, but where would these lines stop? Artificial lines of demarcation in international waters might have to be drawn in an attempt to define as regional highly mobile and inherently global naval force activities.

4. Are naval CSBMs practical? For example, how are we to define a "naval manoeuvre"? Naval forces are constantly manoeuvring as a routine part of their daily operations. And how are we to verify, for example, a distinction between "activities" and routine "manoeuvres"? This poses an immense verification challenge. We have few answers as to how an appropriate and negotiable verification regime for naval CSBMs could be established.

There is, of course, another important area where some success has been registered in the realm of naval arms control...the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks...

Most significant in our view is the acceptance of the principle of constraints on nuclear SLCMs and the reaffirmation by the US and the Soviet Union of their 1987 Washington Summit Statement to continue to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of SLCM verification. Given Canada's longstanding support of verifiable constraints on nuclear SLCMs, we noted this part of the overall agreement with satisfaction.

Taken together with the other measures in START, including specific prohibitions on heavy SLBMs and their launchers; on new types of SLBMs with more than 10 re-entry vehicles; and on the flight testing and deployment of existing types of SLBMs with a number of re-entry vehicles greater than the number specified in the Washington Summit Joint Statement of December 1987, they constitute a first step towards the enhancement of strategic stability and collective security at sea. Canada strongly

supports the outline set forth for START II, and we hope it will lead the superpowers to further reductions and limitations in pursuit of these objectives...

At this year's session of the UNDC, naval disarmament was again considered. Substantive and open-ended consultations were conducted under the chairmanship of the representative of Indonesia and resulted in a chairman's paper that summarized the views and proposals of countries that participated in the discussion.

This paper, although it contains widely-divergent opinions, deals with a number of ideas, some of which may be pursued or elaborated in future multilateral consideration of naval arms control and disarmament. Ideas discussed included proposals on the regulation of nuclear-powered ships, including notification of accidents and safety guidelines for seaborne nuclear reactors, and an elaboration of earlier proposals on multilateralizing incidents-at-sea agreements. Canada supported consideration of naval disarmament issues in this forum, and we regard this dialogue as a useful and relevant one.

As I now turn back to an area where Canada believes are the best prospects for progress, at least in the short term, I am reminded of a well-known Canadian

journalist who, on the margins of the Open Skies Conference, compared Canadian arms controllers to Dale Carnegie instructors because of their fixation with confidence-building. This same Canadian journalist went on to say: "For the uninitiated observer, confidence-building seems to be like a mantra for the arms control experts, a phrase which, if chanted often enough, takes on magical, though undefined, properties."

Undefined though those properties may be, in my view they add up to a process, the sum of which is indeed greater than its parts — because of the mutually-reinforcing action of the process of confidence-building with the overall state of political relations.

That is why Canada has actively promoted discussion within NATO on confidence-building in the maritime environment. Preliminary consideration of naval security and arms control has been undertaken both in Brussels and in Ottawa. I believe that, despite the difficulties, we must continue to pursue such studies.

Canada favours, in principle, consideration of measures that would promote mutual trust through transparency, enhance personal contact, and build upon the seafaring traditions of fairness and courtesy. The recently-

signed Canada-USSR Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea is a good example of this approach on a bilateral basis. The Agreement includes a procedure enabling the timely passage of information concerning incidents that may occur at sea. It outlines a list of signals,

agreed upon in advance, which permit ships of one country to inform those of the other of their activities and intentions. This could avoid the possibility of ships incorrectly concluding that they are witnessing aggressive acts directed against them.

An important aspect of this Agreement is the human one. Annually, Canadian and Soviet naval staffs will meet to discuss the Agreement and other subjects of mutual interest. The signature of this agreement is therefore a step Canada has taken to promote stability and mutual confidence at sea.

Our military exchange agreement with the Soviet Union, which envisages expanded military contact, also includes reciprocal naval visits. Under this agreement, four Canadian vessels recently conducted an unprecedented visit to the port of Vladivostok...

Given that confidence-building measures are intended to address the psychological or subjective aspects of the perception of "threat," as well as its more objective aspects, the importance of promoting such contacts between our militaries cannot be overemphasized. In the Vienna CSBM context, for example, the value of the seminar on security concepts and military doctrines was as important for the fact that it allowed the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the 35 CSCE participants all to meet together face-to-face as it was for the content of the discussions.

In conclusion, in judging the prospects for naval arms control, it is important to bear in mind that we are at the early stages. Negotiations on conventional forces in Europe have been ongoing, in one form or another, for the past seventeen years, and are only now beginning to bear fruit. Negotiations on strategic arms have a twenty-one year history. Given the complexities of the maritime environment, it is unrealistic to expect rapid movement or dramatic action in this area, especially as so much attention is being placed on the large-scale reductions of conventional forces envisaged for Europe under CFE I and its follow-on. What is required now is a careful, imaginative assessment of the possibilities in the maritime area.



Canadian and Soviet officers on board a Soviet vessel during the Canadian visit to Vladivostok (see page 13). Rear-Admiral Cairns is in the front row, third from the right.

Naval Confidence-Building in Vladivostok

From June 3 to 7, a Canadian naval task group consisting of Her Majesty's Canadian Ships Huron, Kootenay, Annapolis and Provider visited the Soviet Far Eastern port of Vladivostok. The visit occurred under the umbrella of the military exchange agreement between Canada and the Soviet Union, signed in November 1989 during Prime Minister Mulroney's visit to the USSR. A reciprocal Soviet naval visit to Canada's West Coast is planned for 1991. The following paragraphs are drawn from the reports of Rear Admiral Peter Cairns, commander of the naval task group, and the Canadian Embassy in Moscow.

Admiral Cairns characterized the visit as follows: "I would say at the outset that the visit to Vladivostok was an outstanding success. Any less a superlative would, in my view, understate the case. Vladivostok has (with a few tightly controlled exceptions) been a closed city. This visit was the first time in 53 years that Westerners in significant numbers were allowed into the city with complete freedom of action, and the history of the occasion was not lost on the Soviets. From the time I set foot on land and partook of the traditional bread and salt welcoming ceremony until I completed the farewell handshakes and boarded Huron for departure, the inhabitants poured out their hearts to us, and our Canadian men and women responded with warmth, generosity and friendliness as only they can. You would have been proud to see them."

The Embassy observed that in extending the invitation to visit Vladivostok to Canada, the Soviet Union demonstrated unexpected openness. The ambitious schedule of events removed any lingering doubt about the Soviets' desire for the occasion to be "a special event for both sides." As the ships steamed into Vladivostok harbour on June 3, several thousand spectators were on the jetty, and buildings were festooned with English-language banners proclaiming peace, understanding and friendship.

This was to be but a small indication of the general public's response to the

Canadian presence during the four subsequent days. As the Embassy reported, "Soviet officials had obviously done considerable pre-visit preparation in alerting the local population, and while one is normally hesitant to wax so enthusiastically about civic attendance at public events in societies such as the USSR, spontaneity of outpouring of curiosity and warmth nevertheless clearly was obvious. The official welcome by the Soviet naval authorities and civilian city officials was equally warm and enthusiastic. One was left with the impression that the entire city of three quarters of a million people had been patiently waiting over 50 years for just such an event.

"Any suspicion that this reception was in any way contrived was immediately swept away by the reaction of the city's inhabitants to the presence of Canadian sailors and ships.

Uniformed Canadians were repeatedly mobbed by hundreds of curious and friendly onlookers on countless occasions. Soviet authorities freely allowed citizens to invite Canadians into their homes, although the highly-charged program prevented much contact of this kind. An estimated 30,000 people from all walks of Soviet life visited the Canadian ships. Many had to be turned away. Conversations among Canadians and Soviets on board and ashore were animated and open, with the latter asking many penetrating questions about Canada, its people, our way of life, and the Canadian Armed Forces. At the same time they were not reticent to talk about current events taking place in the USSR.

"The Canadian Naval Band played throughout the visits, most notably at an evening public concert, at which they offered a rendition of Tchaikovsky's 1812 Overture, not played in its entirety in this city for over 30 years; they received a standing ovation. Individual vignettes of this kind are too numerous to men-

tion, but all were indicative of a special atmosphere prevailing throughout."

Soviet naval officers who visited Canadian vessels showed little interest in equipment, but were intensely curious about bread-and-butter issues such as terms and conditions of service in the Canadian Forces and the pay, care and feeding of personnel aboard Canadian ships. They took extensive videos of mess facilities and living quarters. Given the ongoing debate within the Soviet military about the merits of full professional volunteer forces, such keen interest was telling.

Soviet media covered the visit extensively. Canadians conducted interviews with all major Soviet press organiza-

The visit was an outstanding success. When the Canadian ships left the jetty, there were few dry eyes to be found.

tions, both civilian and military. Coverage of the arrival and departure of ships was carried by state television, which also conducted interviews with Canadian service personnel. Japanese television crews were also on hand.

Summing up the visit, Soviet Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Gennady Khvatov declared that "President Gorbachev's visit to Canada and the stay of Canadian ships in Vladivostok will help our two nations forge closer contacts." He underlined the fact that Canada was an ally in the Second World War and remains a neighbour in the Asia-Pacific region today.

Admiral Cairns concluded his report by noting that "this visit did much to put a human touch to the process of openness that is going on in the USSR... I cannot conceive of how our men and women could have been any better ambassadors for Canada. There were thousands on the jetty to say goodbye, and when the last line was let go, there were few dry eyes to be found." ■

Disarmament Fund Projects

The following projects were assisted by a grant or contribution from the Disarmament Fund.

Looking for conference speakers or workshop facilitators? *Making a World of Difference: A Directory of Women in Canada Specializing in Global Issues* gives the names, addresses and backgrounds of 250 women in Canada with expertise in disarmament, development and/or environmental issues. The *Directory* was compiled by the Canadian Council for International Cooperation and can be ordered from the Canadian Research Institute for the Advancement of Women (CRIAW), 408-151 Slater Street, Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5H3. The price is \$15.00.

Policy-makers, academics and members of the attentive public spent three days discussing "Naval Arms Limitations and Maritime Security" at a conference sponsored by Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies in Halifax in late June. The conference was the second in a series of three dealing with maritime security issues related to Canada's security policy. The third, on "Maritime Interests, Conflict and the Law of the Sea," will be held in June 1991. For further information, contact the Centre c/o Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, B3H 4H6.

Guerre, paix et désarmement: bibliographie thématique en langue française and *Regards sur la guerre et la paix: filmographie critique en langue française*, both by Annie Bourret and Érik Poole of Laval University's Peace Research Group, provide a detailed inventory of, respectively, French-language documents and French-language films about war, peace and disarmament. To order, contact Les presses de l'université Laval, Avenue de la médecine, Cité universitaire, Sainte-Foy, Quebec, G1K 7P4.

Canada and Asia-Pacific in the 1990s

The following are excerpts from a speech delivered by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at a luncheon hosted by the Victoria Chamber of Commerce in Victoria, B.C. on July 17.

[E]vents in Europe find their reflection in Asia in reduced superpower tension and involvement. But the reduction in tension has been less complete, and that reduction has not acted to eliminate those conflicts which always have been — or have become — local in nature. There is a specific set of Asian security concerns which have gone unaddressed and which, if not managed, can threaten regional and indeed global peace.

This is where there has been a remarkable difference between the structure of security in the Pacific region and the structure of security involving North America, the USSR and Europe. During the Cold War, a web of military alliances and institutions for economic cooperation acted to coordinate state behaviour and to limit conflict. And now, in the post-Cold War period, a new set of institutions is emerging, in the form of transforming alliances, an enlarged and unified European Community and an institutionalized CSCE process.

Call for North Pacific security dialogue

The Asian equivalents of these organizations do not exist. There is no NATO, no Warsaw Pact, no CSCE. There are no regional institutions where leaders and officials can meet regularly to exchange views and construct new understandings. The one exception is ASEAN, a regional organization which Canada values. However, ASEAN can only fill part of the vacuum we see, because of its limited membership.

In our view, this difference is not simply a difference between regions. It is also a shortcoming. If there is one lesson which recent decades demonstrate, it is that economic prosperity cannot long endure without a structure of institutional relationships and stable security, just as security is short-lived if it is not accompanied by economic strength and social justice.

That security, that prosperity, that justice will best arise by nations regularly talking together, working together. No matter what the issue, the beginning of any process towards peace is conversation. Conversation which does not necessarily accept that the other side is right, simply that the other side has a legitimate viewpoint. It is an acceptance of the reality that on most issues there can be only winners — or only losers.

That kind of dialogue, and the development of the practice of working together are remarkable by their absence in Asia today. Dialogue is needed between India and Pakistan. It is needed among the four Cambodian factions. It is needed between the two Koreas. It is needed between Vietnam and China. It is needed between Japan and the Soviet Union. And it is needed among all the players in the region.

The time has come to develop institutions of dialogue in the Pacific to match the maturity and prosperity of those societies and those economies. Canada believes that one place to begin is among the countries bordering the North Pacific. That would include the United States and the Soviet Union, the two Koreas, Japan, China and Canada. At the outset, such a security dialogue need not involve fixed agendas or require that all issues be discussed. The priority should be to develop the habit of an open and free discussion. That process would identify the issues on which North Pacific nations could make progress together.

A North-Pacific security cooperation dialogue is long overdue. Security problems are a singular threat to continued economic growth. They are a chief cause of refugee movements and could easily derail democratic reforms throughout Asia. Persistent security problems perpetuate distrust, propel arms races, prompt

questionable nuclear programs and involve a massive haemorrhaging of resources. The absence of structures to manage these problems is in direct contrast to the intense economic activity in the region, and a direct threat to the future of that economic activity.

We might consider a Pacific adaptation of the CSCE. One area for initial exploration may be the so-called "confidence and security-building measures," which contributed so much to the transformation of Europe since the Helsinki Conference.

Throughout the 1980s, the Soviet Union made numerous proposals in this area. Most were either propaganda or a search for unilateral strategic advantage. But given the transformation in East-West relations, perhaps it is time to identify those proposals that have serious merit and to make serious counter-proposals.

Such measures could include information exchanges, military manoeuvre notification and Open Skies regimes. And if the dialogue on conventional forces in Europe develops into a dialogue on naval forces, the Pacific Ocean is an obvious locus of concern and action. ■

NATO Industry Verification Study Group Meets in Canada

In late autumn 1989, the Conference of National Armaments Directors commissioned the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) to undertake a study of conventional disarmament verification technologies. The Conference is a high-level body established under the authority of NATO's Atlantic Council to encourage member countries to join together in equipment and research projects, as well as to provide a means of information exchange on technical matters.

As a result, a NIAG study group — involving industry representatives from most NATO countries — is reviewing technology and systems available within the alliance relevant to the verification of future conventional arms control agreements. Representatives from Canadian companies played a key role in setting up the study and are actively participating in all aspects of the group's work. A Canadian — Dr. F.J.F. Osborne of Spar Aerospace Ltd. — has been selected as Deputy Chairman. The group held its first meetings outside Brussels in Montreal and Ottawa during the first week of September. Speaking at a luncheon co-hosted for the group by EAITC and the Department of National Defence, Mr. Rob Gillespie [DND's Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel)] and Mr. Mark Moher (EAITC's Director General for International Security, Arms Control and CSCE Affairs) emphasized the importance that Canada attaches to verification and the utility of the study group's work. Canada, Mr. Moher said, has invested considerable effort in exploring verification questions and is proud of the work of the Verification Research Program established within EAITC in 1983. Both Mr. Gillespie and Mr. Moher stressed the value of cooperation between government and industry in this field. They briefly outlined the structures in place to facilitate industrial cooperation between member countries of NATO, which could be used for cooperative projects on verification technologies.

The NIAG study is planned for completion in the spring of 1991. ■

Canadians Address Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space

After considerable delay in agreeing on a mandate and work program this year, the CD's Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space began serious and constructive deliberations during the CD's summer session. As part of this work, two Canadian experts made presentations to the Ad Hoc Committee.

Mr. Jeff Tracey of EAITC's Verification Research Unit spoke to the Ad Hoc Committee on July 19 about past, present and future capabilities of commercial satellite imagery for arms control verification purposes. The use of various types of presently-available commercial satellite imagery, including data from the French SPOT system, the Soviet Soyuzcarta program and the American Landsat program were discussed. Also mentioned were future

satellite programs such as Canada's RADARSAT satellite, the Soviet Almaz satellite, the American Landsat 7 satellite and the French Helios program. Through examples of current commercial airborne optical, infrared and synthetic aperture radar imagery, the future of commercial satellite imagery was explored as was the question of how the resulting data might be used for verification applications. Mr. Tracey also addressed other applications of high resolution commercial satellite imagery, such as to United Nations peacekeeping and to environmental monitoring.

Mr. Peter Stibrany of Spar Aerospace Ltd. addressed the Ad Hoc Committee on July 24. His presentation examined possible ambiguities that might arise concerning space activities over the next twenty years, in particular dis-

tinguishing between weapon and non-weapon activities. The question of what constitutes a "space weapon" has proven extremely contentious. Mr. Stibrany outlined some preliminary research undertaken on behalf of EAITC's Verification Research Program to develop a systematic way to discriminate between benign, hazardous or harmful space activities using a "harmfulness index." Such an index could prove useful in arms control schemes designed to constrain either the capabilities or configuration of spacecraft. Mr. Stibrany noted that verification of the level of relative harmfulness could be made most effective by supplementing existing treaty restrictions with confidence-building measures designed to add information about the missions of space objects. ■

Canadians Observe Soviet Military Exercise



Soviet General-Major Lavrenyuk (centre) with Canadian observers Lt. Col. Jack Harris (left) and Mr. Denis Boulet (right).

Two Canadians were among 46 officials from 23 countries who observed a Soviet military exercise in the Kiev military district in March. They were there in accordance with the 1986 Stockholm Document on confidence- and security-building measures, which requires signatories to invite all other CSCE members to send observers to exercises involving a minimum of 17,000 troops. The observers are to confirm that the exercise is carried out in conformity with the exercise notification.

Although the observation threshold is 17,000, nothing prevents a country from inviting observers to any exercise taking place on its territory, regardless of the level of participation. This was the case with the Soviet exercise, which was forecast to involve 17,000 troops but actually involved 12,000.

The Canadians — Mr. Denis Boulet of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division of EAITC and Lieutenant-Colonel Jack Harris, Military Attaché with the Canadian Embassy in Moscow — were flown to Kiev on March 19 with the other observers. There General-Major Lavrenyuk, Deputy Commander of the Kiev Military District, briefed them on the purpose of the exercise, the

number of troops participating and the observation program.

The observers had an opportunity to watch a number of military operations including offensives and counter-offensives, the construction of a 100-metre bridge and its subsequent crossing by armoured vehicles and trucks, an airborne assault and simulated tank combat. They visited a field care unit, a field hospital and a defensive position. In addition, they viewed a demonstration of equipment, including armoured vehicles, artillery pieces and air defence equipment. There were numerous opportunities for dialogue between observers and hosts, as well as between observers and troops taking part in the exercise.

There was no doubt in the minds of participants that the observation contributed significantly to the development of confidence, which in turn encourages the growth of security. It was with the satisfaction of knowing that the objectives of the Stockholm Document had been met that the observers returned on March 23 to their respective countries.

CFE Update

Beginning mid-year, work on a CFE treaty was accelerated to meet the target of concluding an agreement by November to coincide with a planned CSCE Summit meeting in Paris. In addition to aiming for this deadline, negotiators had to respond to dramatic changes in European security, which altered the underlying assumptions on which the CFE negotiation was based. The agreement reached in Ottawa in February, for example, which placed limits on the level of US and Soviet forces stationed in Europe, became irrelevant as a result of the bilaterally-negotiated withdrawals of Soviet forces from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Germany.

Responding to a widely-held view that follow-on negotiations could further improve security in Europe, NATO

leaders proposed at their Summit meeting in July that further talks on conventional force reductions begin — with the same participants and mandate — following signature of the first CFE treaty. Participants began to refer to the current round of negotiations as CFE I, and to the follow-on round as CFE IA.

Eastern concerns about the size of the armed forces of a unified Germany were resolved with a binding German commitment to reduce the size of its combined armed forces to 370,000 personnel. Western participants stated their readiness to address the issue of the level of their armed forces in follow-on negotiations.

By late September, considerable progress had been achieved in the

negotiation, but serious difficulties remained for resolution. The problems included demands by the Soviet Union concerning levels of combat aircraft, and sufficiency (the percentage of total treaty-limited equipment that any one state may hold). A Soviet demand to retain 80 percent of all WTO entitlements was opposed not only by Western states, but by most East European states as well.

In addition, negotiators had to resolve how to calculate quotas for the verification inspections envisaged in the treaty, how to define the operational criteria for aerial inspection, and how to accommodate Soviet demands for the large-scale, irreversible conversion of military equipment to peaceful purposes, as opposed to its destruction.

Canada and the New Europe

The following are excerpts from a speech delivered by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at Humber College, Lakeshore Campus, Toronto, on May 26.

Around the world, 1989 will be remembered as the year of European revolution... Canadians watched with wonder as what we thought would take decades came to pass in weeks. The impossible suddenly became possible and the dream became reality. But that reality, while hopeful, also carries heavy responsibilities — for Europeans and for Canadians.

If 1989 was the year of revolution, 1990 marks the beginning of a decade of reconstruction... The events of 1989 swept away oppressive and outdated economic and political structures. But new societies and new institutions remain to be built. That task has only just begun.

The remarkable events in Central and Eastern Europe are intensely personal for millions of Canadians whose roots are there. Many have ties of language and family. Some were forced to flee by the very regimes which have now collapsed. Most have family or friends whose hopes were thwarted, or lives diminished, by those old regimes, but who have the prospect now of building new lives and new societies in old homelands.

Virtually no other nation possesses the web of intense personal connections to Eastern and Central Europe which we have in Canada. That gives us a special interest, and a special capacity, in helping those societies become prosperous and free.

The revolution of 1989 has fundamental implications for the entire European continent — and for North America which, in terms of culture and history, is Europe across the Atlantic. The requirement for leadership and imagination extends across all issues — political, military and economic. That requires a new Canadian approach not only to

Central and Eastern Europe but towards the entire European region.

On February 5th, at McGill University in Montreal, I announced the initiation of a review of our policy towards Europe. The purpose of that review has been to define Canadian interests in Europe and to develop a strategy to secure those interests. I would like to share some thoughts with you that have arisen through that review.

I begin with two basic observations. The first is this: Canada's stake in Europe should not be taken for granted. We have interests around the world and our past preoccupation with Europe is no argument for a focus for the future. Nostalgia is no basis for policy. Our interests in Europe are real, contemporary and compelling.

The second observation is that Canada's wishes will not necessarily determine

Canada's role. Powerful new economic and political forces are at work, forces over which Canada has limited influence. A European role will not be bestowed upon us because we decide it is in our interests. It must be earned. That requires imagination and realism and hard work.

What are Canada's primary interests in the new Europe?

One of them is to help ensure that Europe does not again become what it once was. Another is to help ensure that Europe becomes a positive force for change both at home and around the world.

Our primary interest is the interest in peace. Two world wars this century have taught Canadians that a Europe at peace with itself is a Europe at peace with the world. Security in Canada has no meaning without security in Europe.

Our economic prosperity depends upon stability in the world. Threats to that stability are threats to our prosperity.

More directly, as a country dependent on trade for 30 percent of our GNP, the unifying market of Western Europe is vital for jobs and prosperity in Canada, and the vast and untapped markets of Eastern Europe constitute a long-term opportunity of potentially immense proportions.

Politically, the values which have triumphed in Europe are our values too. We rejoice in their ascendancy and also take comfort in the fact that democracies are inherently more peaceful than the totalitarian alternative. The construction of durable democracies there is not only a moral quest; it is also a security imperative.

Finally, Canadian interests in the new Europe relate not only to what occurs there but also to what is occurring elsewhere. For decades, our preoccupation with a brittle peace in Europe has hindered our ability to deal with mount-

Our interests in Europe are real, contemporary and compelling.

ing global problems — the threat to the global environment, the crises of international development and debt, the evils of the international drug trade and the proliferation of terror and weapons of mass destruction. Many of these problems do not have European origins. But our preoccupation with Europe — ideologically and militarily — has kept these other priorities far too low on the global agenda. With Europe at peace with itself, we can turn together to a planet in need of urgent action.

So we are not interested in Europe for reasons of history, or nostalgia, and certainly not for reasons of charity. It is not only their prosperity which is at stake, it is ours. It is not only their security, it is ours.

While our interests in Europe remain strong, the means by which we pursue those interests must change radically. They must change to reflect the new security framework now in evolution; they must change to reflect the growing power and unity of Western Europe;

and they must change to reflect the particular advantages and assets of Canada.

The primary Canadian bridge to Europe has been our contribution to the North Atlantic Alliance. That contribution has involved thousands of Canadian troops on the ground in Germany, troops whose lives have been put on the line daily in the defence of freedom. In a real sense, that contribution of Canadian lives can have no substitute and no parallel.

That military contribution is bound to decline. It will not be a decline which we regret, because it will be a product of the long-sought reduction in East-West tensions which is the result of the new Soviet foreign policy, the dissolution of Soviet control over Eastern Europe and the unilateral and negotiated reductions in conventional and nuclear forces. At long last, we are moving from a partial and artificial peace to a comprehensive, more natural peace, a peace where intentions are becoming benign and capabilities are being reduced to the point where surprise attack is no longer possible.

This process and this reality can only be applauded. What has begun must continue, and a firm foundation must be built for a structure of lasting security at the lowest possible level of military forces, conventional and nuclear. That will not come suddenly or easily, but it is now a realistic goal.

It is a seeming paradox that NATO's very success requires the Alliance to renew itself. But, in fact, that is easy to understand. An organization whose primary role has been to defend against plausible aggression must revise its role when that aggression becomes less plausible. It is only natural in these circumstances for NATO to assume a more political role, a role which would reflect both the new European reality and a declining military mission.

That is a change which Canada fully supports and which meets Canadian interests. But it is not enough to simply declare that NATO must become more political. NATO will only become a forum for increased dialogue if it is used for that purpose by all its members, European and North American. NATO

cannot be declared more political; it must be made more political.

To a large extent, the future relevance of NATO will depend on the degree to which it adopts, reflects and strives for a broader definition of security. Security must become cooperative rather than competitive. The time for the zero-sum game is over. Even more than in the past, NATO must embrace security through arms control with as much vigour as it has pursued security through armament.

NATO must review urgently and comprehensively all aspects of its nuclear and conventional strategy. It makes little sense to retain nuclear weapons whose only target can be our new friends in Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. It makes little sense to retain a military strategy which is based on a scenario of a surprise attack across a front which no longer exists and where surprise is no longer possible. And it makes little sense to continue to retain in Europe the largest peace-time deployment of military force in the history of the world.

This is not to deny the continuing requirement for prudence and military stability at this time of historic change. Twelve months do not invalidate the lessons of history. The possibility of instability is there and Soviet military capabilities remain substantial. Therefore, a strong military mandate for NATO continues to be valid and the North American commitment to Europe represented by the presence of Canadian and American troops there is crucial as we strive for strategic stability at significantly lower levels of military force.

But NATO cannot be seen as a barrier to the peace it has preserved so well for over 40 years. If NATO does not lead, it will lose the critical legitimacy it has enjoyed in Europe. NATO will be seen not as part of the solution, but as part of the problem.

It is important that NATO become even more actively engaged in the dynamic security dialogue now emerging between East and West. Those security questions involve NATO's members and NATO's interests; the Alliance

should turn outwards to embrace its old adversaries and new friends.

To this end, early consideration might be given to the Soviet foreign minister meeting on a regular basis with NATO foreign ministers. Similarly, a direct and regular dialogue between the leaders of the Western Alliance and the USSR might be worthy of pursuit.

In the field of arms control and disarmament, NATO should develop an enhanced capacity and role in confidence-building and verification activities. Dedicated, multinational forces on the ground might be deployed for this purpose. NATO should also look to the establishment of a Verification Centre to coordinate these activities.

In addition, in the context of reviewing its military strategy, NATO should move away from a rigid forward defence to a much more flexible approach involving mobile units, possibly including forces of a multinational nature. NATO's new military posture should be designed to minimize force levels and to maximize stability. We want to reduce insecurity in the East.

But NATO, although it is of enduring value, has its limitations, a function of its mandate and its membership. There are other institutions whose role must be enhanced and transformed if they are to play a useful role in the elaboration of a new European system. And it is there that Canada must also focus its efforts.

Central among these is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Its membership is comprehensive, encompassing the nations of Europe, North America and the Soviet Union. Its mandate extends across the board — to security, political and economic matters, as well as to human and social rights.

The principles embodied in its earlier accords provided the vision and the standards which helped inspire the brave democrats of Eastern Europe. The role of the CSCE must now be expanded so that it becomes the drawing board for the new European architecture. As a complement to NATO, the CSCE can become a true instrument of cooperative security, one which would

supplement deterrence with reassurance. And, as the nature of European security expands beyond military balances to political stability and economic prosperity, there is a central role for the CSCE in the areas of human rights, economic cooperation and environmental action.

Until now, the CSCE has functioned on an intermittent basis. It has lacked the institutional framework now required for effective and ongoing cooperation and confidence-building. If the CSCE is to become the preferred forum for comprehensive discussions in the political, economic, security and human dimensions, it must develop the tools to perform those tasks.

Canada believes that continuing political direction from the highest level is required on a regular and ongoing basis if the CSCE is to realize its full potential. Canada proposes that the CSCE should meet annually at the level of foreign ministers and biannually at the level of heads of government. This political body could serve as the beginning of a Council for European Cooperation, a future, permanent forum for dialogue on pan-European issues.

The CSCE should develop a forum to reflect the increasingly democratic character of its membership. Therefore, we also propose the establishment of a CSCE Assembly where parliamentary delegations from member states would meet on a regular basis to discuss issues of common concern.

In the security area, the CSCE will have a role in mandating a further round of conventional force reduction talks. These talks should be conducted among all 35 members of the CSCE, rather than solely the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The CSCE should also increase its role in verification and confidence-building. Here, I have in mind a CSCE Verification Agency which would facilitate and coordinate verification and confidence-building activities mandated by the negotiations on conventional force reductions and confidence- and security- building measures. In addition, there is a potentially valuable role to be played by the CSCE in crisis prevention


and conflict resolution. This could involve the creation of a mechanism whereby panels could be established to facilitate dialogue if a crisis develops involving any participating state and to conduct fact-finding investigations if required. This mechanism could recommend a strategy to resolve the crisis — whether it be mediation, arbitration or even peacekeeping. If the crisis develops into conflict, the CSCE could initiate mediation activities. These activities could be supported by a permanent Institute for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes which would provide expertise for crisis prevention and conflict resolution activities...

In designing a new role for the CSCE, we must avoid duplication and new bureaucracies. The goal is concrete progress, not talkathons. In this connection, if the CSCE is to assume an activist role in the new Europe, it may well have to modify, perhaps on a selective basis, the current principles of unanimity in its decision-making process...

I would like to address briefly one issue at the centre of Europe's evolution: the unification of Germany. The degree to which that historic union is accomplished smoothly and without rancour will determine the future pattern of European relations. We have articulated many times our strong support for a free, united and sovereign Germany — within NATO and the European Community — a Germany which will be a powerful instrument of stability, unity and prosperity at the heart of Europe.

The so-called "two plus four" talks now underway — and initiated in Ottawa at the Open Skies Conference — are looking at the external aspects of German reunification. Those talks must succeed.

There are delicate and important issues to resolve at those talks and elsewhere — within NATO, the European Community, at the Vienna talks and between a united Germany and its neigh-



The Right Honourable Joe Clark.

bours. These include the future of Germany in the Alliance, the size and status of stationed and German armed forces, and the implications for NATO's nuclear deterrent.

As these crucial issues are addressed, two realities must be borne in mind: the fact that the Soviet Union has legitimate, central security preoccupations which must be accommodated; and the requirement to ensure that

The CSCE can become a true instrument of cooperative security, supplementing deterrence with reassurance.

Germany's role retains the popular support of the German people. On these two points more than any other, success and stability will rest.

A new direction for NATO, an expanded role for the CSCE, and an intensified relationship with the European Community: those are the institutional pillars of our new policy towards Europe. They reflect our assessment of the most effective means by which the new Europe can be built. And they also reflect Canada's interests and assets — political, security and economic — in ensuring that we are at the table, that trans-Atlantic links are maintained and that our priorities are addressed...

I would like to conclude with three observations.

First, the policy I have discussed today addresses a Europe in transition. The policy itself must also evolve with the region it addresses. Europe is not static; and neither will be Canadian policy.

Second, I have described the extraordinary Canadian advantage represented by our multicultural community. That advantage also carries with it responsibilities. One of those responsibilities is this: as Europe frees itself from the shackles of the past, old animosities are re-emerging, animosities frozen by

repression and made more dangerous by the absence of traditions of compromise. These animosities can threaten the very social stability which will be required if democracy there is to survive. We Canadians — all Canadians — have a responsibility to avoid fanning the flames of intolerance. We also have an opportunity to encourage compromise and accommodation — the only avenue for societies who wish to turn their back on the old ways and embrace a democratic future.

One final point. What is happening in Europe illustrates graphically today's imperative of interdependence — interdependence between countries and

regions, and interdependence between issues — political, military and economic. Interdependence means opportunity. It also means challenge. Global existence today does not have an escape clause — or an escape hatch.

How we behave towards each other at home has an impact on our interests abroad. And what we do abroad determines how prosperous and safe we are here at home.

Engagement with the new Europe is not a luxury; it is a necessity. And Canada will be there, as we must, for our own sake, our own security, our own prosperity. ■

NATO Summit Declaration on a Transformed Alliance

The following Declaration was issued by the NATO Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London on July 5 and 6.

1. Europe has entered a new, promising era. Central and Eastern Europe is liberating itself. The Soviet Union has embarked on the long journey towards a free society. The walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing. Europeans are determining their own destiny. They are choosing a Europe whole and free. As a consequence, this Alliance must and will adapt.

2. The North Atlantic Alliance has been the most successful defensive alliance in history. As our Alliance enters its fifth decade and looks ahead to a

continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance as provided for by Article 2 of our Treaty.

3. The unification of Germany means that the division of Europe is also being overcome. A united Germany in the Atlantic Alliance of free democracies and part of the growing political and economic integration of the European Community will be an indispensable factor of stability, which is needed in the heart of Europe. The move within the European Community towards political union, including the development of a European identity in the domain of security, will also contribute to Atlantic solidarity and to the establishment of a just and lasting order of peace throughout the whole of Europe.

4. We recognize that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build

new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.

5. We will remain a defensive alliance and will continue to defend all the territory of all of our members. We have no aggressive intentions and we commit ourselves to the peaceful resolution of all disputes. We will never in any circumstance be the first to use force.

6. The member states of the North Atlantic Alliance propose to the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization a joint declaration in which we solemnly state that we are no longer adversaries and reaffirm our intention to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and with the CSCE Final Act. We invite all other CSCE member states to join us in this commitment to non-aggression.

7. In that spirit, and to reflect the changing political role of the Alliance, we today invite President Gorbachev on behalf of the Soviet Union, and representatives of the other Central and Eastern European countries to come to

NATO must be an agent of change.

new century, it must continue to provide for the common defence. This Alliance has done much to bring about the new Europe. No one, however, can be certain of the future. We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades. Yet our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united

Brussels and address the North Atlantic Council. We today also invite the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to come to NATO, not just to visit, but to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. This will make it possible for us to share with them our thinking and deliberations in this historic period of change.

8. Our Alliance will do its share to overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion. We are ready to intensify military contacts, including those of NATO Military Commanders, with Moscow and other Central and Eastern European capitals.

9. We welcome the invitation to NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner to visit Moscow and meet with Soviet leaders.

10. Military leaders from throughout Europe gathered earlier this year in Vienna to talk about their forces and doctrine. NATO proposes another such meeting this autumn to promote common understanding. We intend to establish an entirely different quality of openness in Europe, including an agreement on Open Skies.

11. The significant presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe demonstrates the underlying political compact that binds North America's fate to Europe's democracies. But, as Europe changes, we must profoundly alter the way we think about defence.

12. To reduce our military requirements, sound arms control agreements are essential. That is why we put the highest priority on completing this year the first treaty to reduce and limit conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) along with the completion of a meaningful CSBM package. These talks should remain in continuous session until the work is done. Yet we hope to go further. We propose that, once a CFE Treaty is signed, follow-on talks should begin with the same membership and mandate, with the goal of building on the current agreement with addition-

al measures, including measures to limit manpower in Europe. With this goal in mind, a commitment will be given at the time of signature of the CFE Treaty concerning the manpower levels of a unified Germany.

13. Our objective will be to conclude the negotiations on the follow-on to CFE and CSBMs as soon as possible and looking to the follow-up meeting of the CSCE to be held in Helsinki in 1992. We will seek through new conventional arms control negotiations, within the CSCE framework, further far-reaching measures in the 1990s to limit the offensive capability of conventional armed forces in Europe, so as to prevent any nation from maintaining disproportionate military power on the continent. NATO's High Level Task Force will formulate a detailed position for these follow-on conventional arms control talks. We will make provisions as needed for different regions to redress disparities and to ensure that no one's security is harmed at any stage. Furthermore, we will continue to explore broader arms control and confidence-building opportunities. This is an ambitious agenda, but it matches our goal: enduring peace in Europe.

14. As Soviet troops leave Eastern Europe and a treaty limiting conventional armed forces is implemented, the Alliance's integrated force structure and its strategy will change fundamentally to include the following elements:

- NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that Allied leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on multinational corps made up of national units.
- NATO will scale back the readiness of its active units, reducing training requirements and the number of exercises.
- NATO will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be needed.

15. To keep the peace, the Alliance must maintain for the foreseeable future

an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces, based in Europe, and kept up-to-date where necessary. But, as a defensive Alliance, NATO has always stressed that none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defence and that we seek the lowest and most stable level of nuclear forces needed to secure the prevention of war.

16. The political and military changes in Europe, and the prospects of further changes, now allow the Allies concerned to go further. They will thus modify the size and adapt the tasks of their nuclear deterrent forces. They have concluded that, as a result of the new political and military conditions in Europe, there will be a significantly reduced role for sub-strategic nuclear

SNF negotiations should begin shortly after a CFE agreement is signed.

systems of the shortest range. They have decided specifically that, once negotiations begin on short-range nuclear forces, the Alliance will propose, in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet Union, the elimination of all its nuclear artillery shells from Europe.

17. New negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces should begin shortly after a CFE agreement is signed. The Allies concerned will develop an arms control framework for these negotiations which takes into account our requirements for far fewer nuclear weapons, and the diminished need for sub-strategic nuclear systems of the shortest range.

18. Finally, with the total withdrawal of Soviet stationed forces and the implementation of a CFE agreement, the Allies concerned can reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. These will continue to fulfil an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military action might be discounted. However, in the transformed Europe, they will be able to

adopt a new NATO strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort.

19. We approve the mandate given in Turnberry to the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to oversee the ongoing work on the adaptation of the Alliance to the new circumstances. It should report its conclusions as soon as possible.

20. In the context of these revised plans for defence and arms control, and with the advice of NATO Military Authorities and all member states concerned, NATO will prepare a new Allied military strategy moving away from "forward defence," where appropriate, towards a reduced forward presence and modifying "flexible response" to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. In that connection, NATO will elaborate new force plans consistent with the revolutionary changes in Europe. NATO will also provide a forum for Allied consultation on the upcoming negotiations on short-range nuclear forces.

21. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) should

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become more prominent in Europe's future, bringing together the countries of Europe and North America. We support a CSCE Summit later this year in Paris which would include the signature of a CFE agreement and would set new standards for the establishment, and preservation, of free societies. It should endorse, *inter alia*:

- CSCE principles on the right to free and fair elections;
- CSCE commitments to respect and uphold the rule of law;
- CSCE guidelines for enhancing economic cooperation, based on the development of free and competitive market economies; and
- CSCE cooperation on environmental protection.

22. We further propose that the CSCE Summit in Paris decide how the CSCE can be institutionalized to provide a forum for wider political dialogue in a more united Europe. We recommend that CSCE governments establish:

- a program for regular consultations among member governments at the Heads of State and Government or Ministerial level, at least once each year, with other periodic meetings of officials to prepare for and follow up on these consultations;
- a schedule of CSCE review conferences once every two years to assess progress towards a Europe whole and free;
- a small CSCE secretariat to coordinate these meetings and conferences;
- a CSCE mechanism to monitor elections in all the CSCE countries, on the basis of the Copenhagen Document;
- a CSCE Centre for the Prevention of Conflict that might serve as a forum for exchanges of military information, discussion of unusual military activities, and the conciliation of disputes involving CSCE member states; and
- a CSCE parliamentary body, the Assembly of Europe, to be based on the existing parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe, in Strasbourg, and include representatives of all CSCE member states.

The sites of these new institutions should reflect the fact that the newly democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe form part of the political structures of the new Europe.

23. Today, our Alliance begins a major transformation. Working with all the countries of Europe, we are determined to create enduring peace on this continent.

Canada's Goal for the CSCE Summit

From November 19 to 21, the leaders of the 34 (with the reunification of Germany) countries of the CSCE will gather in Paris for a summit meeting. The following article on Canada's approach to the Summit was prepared by the International Security Policy and CSCE Affairs Division of EAITC.

The political scene in Europe differs significantly from that prevailing in 1975 when the Helsinki Final Act was adopted by the (then) 35 countries of the CSCE. The Final Act, and the follow-up to it, had a great deal to do with the changes that led to current political circumstances on that continent. In the past, the CSCE did much to ease the burden of a divided Europe. It now offers a framework for the management of pan-European security relations in the post-Cold War era. For this framework to become a reality, the CSCE will have to adapt to the ongoing changes in Europe.

The Paris Summit will set this process in motion. It will, we believe, affirm the validity of the CSCE process, register and consolidate the changes that are taking place in Eastern Europe, and give substantial new impetus to the CSCE process in all the principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act. Canada's goal for the Summit is to have the leaders arrive at a powerful and concise document that confirms and enhances the role of the CSCE as the key pluralistic, pan-European and transatlantic process within which a true cooperative security framework can be developed. An important aspect of this framework will be the establishment of a conflict prevention centre, which we see as the initial step in a comprehensive and evolutionary approach to European security.

Preparing for a Ban on Chemical Weapons: Trial Inspections in Canada

During the past two years, various countries, including Canada, have carried out "trial" verification inspections in their civilian chemical industry or at government facilities. Conducted on a national basis, these trial or mock inspections aim to test the procedures for verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) currently under negotiation at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The majority of trials have involved routine — as opposed to challenge — inspection procedures. These procedures are designed to provide confidence that chemicals are not diverted to the manufacture of chemical weapons.

The draft CW Convention deals with three "schedules" of toxic chemicals: Schedule 1 comprises agents that have no application other than as chemical weapons; Schedule 2 comprises chemicals that could serve as key precursors to the manufacture of chemical weapons, but have legitimate commercial applications; Schedule 3 contains toxic chemicals that are widely used in the chemical industry but could be modified to produce the chemical weapons listed in Schedule 1. Under the Convention, Schedule 1 chemicals will be banned. Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals will be monitored through a variety of routine inspection procedures.

Inspection of DRE Suffield

The draft CWC recognizes a requirement for research into defence and protective measures against the effects of chemical weapons. Thus, even though states joining a CWC will have forsworn the development, production, stockpiling, possession and use of chemical weapons, they will still retain the right to conduct research into and develop equipment for defence against possible CW attack. All states represented in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons at the CD regard this right as

a prudent and necessary aspect of CW disarmament.

As a result, each state, if it so desires, will be permitted to retain a single, small-scale facility (SSSF) at which limited amounts of Schedule 1 chemicals could be synthesized and used in experimental work in the area of protective research and development. Each SSSF will be under close scrutiny by the international inspectorate, the body established by the CW Convention to monitor and verify compliance with its provisions. Through routine visits to the facility, the inspectorate will establish whether:

- declarations made by the state with respect to the SSSF and activities carried out there are consistent with obligations assumed under the CWC;
- quantities of Schedule 1 chemicals produced, stored, transferred, or consumed are within the national limits prescribed by the CWC (i.e., one metric ton);
- reaction vessels used in the facility are limited in size and not designed for continuous operation (i.e., that the facility does not have the capacity to produce quantities of Schedule 1 materials in excess of the one metric ton limit).

Canada does not possess any production facilities for chemicals currently listed in Schedule 1. Nevertheless, as a contribution to the development of inspection procedures under negotiation at the CD, in November 1989 Canada carried out a trial inspection at a simulated SSSF. The facility selected for the trial was located at Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) in Alberta.

Small amounts of Schedule 1 chemicals have occasionally been prepared at DRES as part of ongoing research into protective measures against the effects

of chemical weapons. If and when such chemicals are needed, they are prepared in a standard organic synthesis laboratory of the type found at many universities and research institutes.

The research lab at DRES does not have any large reactors or permanently-installed processing equipment. Its capacity is limited to bench-scale synthesis. It is therefore not comparable to the kind of dedicated SSSF envisioned in the draft CW Convention, and the procedures for routine inspection outlined in the draft CWC had to be adapted accordingly for the DRES inspection.

Suffield trial demonstrates feasibility of carrying out routine inspections at an SSSF.

The Canadian trial simulated a routine, periodic (annual) inspection of an SSSF at which Schedule 1 chemicals could be produced. Having defined DRES as a simulated SSSF, the aims of the inspection were to:

- evaluate the approach to verification at an SSSF as outlined in the then-current version of the draft CWC (CD/952);
- determine the problems such verification procedures might create for the facility's normal operations;
- assess, in general, the routine verification provisions envisioned in CD/952 for an SSSF.

As part of the trial inspection, officials at DRES provided an "initial declaration" along the lines of that which would be required under the CWC for all states possessing an SSSF. The declaration included: a statement of the location and detailed technical description of the facility; a statement of the quantities of Schedule 1 chemicals possessed as of the date of the Convention's entry

into force; and a list of Schedule 2 chemicals (and their quantities) maintained as precursors for Schedule 1 chemical synthesis.

The inspection was conducted by a team of inspectors drawn from various federal government departments, including EAITC, the Department of National Defence, Agriculture Canada, and Industry, Science and Technology Canada. Five members of the team were scientists with backgrounds and experience in the chemical field. There was also a representative from the Canadian chemical industry.

The inspection successfully demonstrated the feasibility of carrying out routine verification inspections at an SSSF preparing Schedule 1 chemicals for protective purposes without compromising sensitive or secure facilities, equipment or operations. All aims of the trial were achieved, although some difficulty was encountered in adapting the SSSF model to a research laboratory site such as that found at DRES. The inspection was sufficiently realistic to test the practicality of the inspection procedures already contained in the draft CWC, and the results provided excellent guidance for their further negotiation. A number of recommendations pertaining to improvements in the inspection procedures, as well as a detailed description of the Canadian

trial inspection, were presented to the CD in April 1990 under the cover of CD document 987 (CD/CW/WP.290).

Inspection of a Pharmaceutical Facility

In July 1990, Merck Frosst Canada Inc. of Pointe-Claire, Quebec, received a team of inspectors whose ostensible task was to ensure that a certain chemical was not being diverted to the production of chemical weapons. In fact, this was a trial inspection, conducted with the cooperation of the company, and had little to do with a particular chemical. Rather, the purpose was to contribute to the development of procedures that could assist Canadian and international inspectors when a ban on chemical weapons enters into force.

Canada does not possess chemical weapons. Nonetheless, once a CWC enters into force, Canadian industry will be subject to reporting requirements on the disposition of certain chemicals that are used for legitimate commercial purposes. Canadian facilities will also be subject to inspection by the international inspectorate established under the Convention. These requirements reflect the concerns of CWC negotiators that certain chemicals, and certain chemical or pharmaceutical production facilities, could be diverted to covert production of chemical weapons, whether on a large or small (batch) scale.

July's Merck Frosst inspection attested to the cooperation that has developed since 1989 between the federal government and the Canadian

Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association and its members. Similar cooperation exists between the government and the Canadian Chemical Producers Association. Merck Frosst Vice-President Andy Quinn and his management staff spent the best part of two days receiving an inspection team made up of officials from EAITC (assisted by a consultant from the University of Saskatchewan), the Department of National Defence, Agriculture Canada, Environment Canada, the Bureau of Dangerous Drugs, and Industry, Science and Technology Canada. Also participating as an observer was an official from the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Such a range of expertise was considered essential because of the trial inspection's diverse objectives:

Merck Frosst inspectors confident that a Convention can be made to work without compromising commercial interests.

- to assess the value of using an audit trail of a (simulated) chemical of concern in order to verify compliance;
- to assess the impact of an audit trail inspection on confidential business information; and
- to investigate the use of quality control procedures and equipment as they might be required and available in support of such inspections.

The insights achieved as a result of the trial inspection have already been communicated to the CWC negotiators at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Everyone involved in the exercise — company management, government officials and scientists, and the foreign observer — agreed that the inspection was a challenging and informative experiment in the real world in which a CWC will have to operate. In particular, all came away with the belief that a Convention can be made to work without compromising the confidentiality of a company's commercial interests.



The trial inspection team with the management of Merck Frosst Canada Inc.

Canada Assesses CD's Progress Towards a CW Convention

The following are excerpts from a speech delivered by Mr. Gerald Shannon, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), to the CD in plenary session in Geneva on August 24.

In our view, some very useful and important work has been accomplished in the summer session...

Under Ambassador Hyltenius' [Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons] overall direction:

- Working Group A has further considered ways of improving the Inspection Protocol, in particular the section on "Alleged Use" and the overlaps with the Annexes to Article VI, and has begun examining the proposal for Ad Hoc Verification;
- Working Group B has been particularly successful in finding solutions to some critical technical issues related to Articles IV, V and VI, in particular on thresholds, definitions, and dates, and elements of the question of the Order of Destruction;
- Working Group C has carefully worked out texts on Amendments, Settlement of Disputes, and Measures to Redress a Situation that seem to enjoy a high degree of general support and which offer the hope that these issues might well now be on the way to final resolution;
- the various "Friends of the Chair" on such issues as Article X, "Old Chemical Weapons," and "Jurisdiction and Control" have made very laudable efforts to develop consensus approaches to these long-outstanding issues.

Notwithstanding these advances, however, we are disappointed and disturbed that more was not achieved during this past summer, particularly given the sense of heightened expectations that seemed to prevail during the spring session...

This failure to achieve greater progress is also surprising in light of the signing, on June 1st, of the USA-USSR bilateral agreement for the cessation of

CW production and the destruction of all but 5000 agent tons of their CW stockpiles by December 31 of the year 2002. My government welcomed this agreement and hoped that it would further facilitate the early conclusion of our multilateral negotiations here in Geneva.

In saying this, I should note that my delegation is not one of those that believe that all it will take to wind up our negotiations and produce a draft Convention for signature is simple political will. Certainly that will be necessary, but there yet remain a number of major, crucial issues to be resolved. There are also important technical questions that still need to be thoroughly addressed if we are to produce a truly effective Convention.

The reasons for this limited progress seem as varied as they are elusive. Some have indeed pointed to an alleged lack of willpower. Or perhaps there is an unreadiness in some quarters to accept that we might actually be on the verge of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Others might point to an insidious, dangerous degradation of the overall negotiating climate, where chemical weapons proliferation is increasing and where chemical weapons are seen by some — erroneously, we believe — as a "poor man's" weapon of mass destruction.

Quite irrespective of the current situation in the Middle East, that area has been a source of particular concern for some time because of the approach of some states in the region to chemical weapons. Chemical weapons were used there not long ago and, recently, threats to use CW have been made which then provoked counter-threats. We call upon all countries to refrain from such potentially inflammatory statements. These can only contribute to heightened tension and greater uncertainty. Canada firmly believes that chemical weapons should have no place in the armouries of modern nations, and that the only road to real security against the chemical weapons threat lies in the negotiation of a global ban of chemical

weapons on which we, in the Conference on Disarmament, are now actively engaged.

The Canadian government's position is very clear: we firmly support the goal of a total ban on chemical weapons. And we want to see this achieved as soon as is feasible — not tomorrow or next week, but also not five or ten years from now. Delay can only add to the risk of greater proliferation and greater use of chemical weapons.

We also want the Convention that realizes our goal of a total ban to be global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable. These three terms are not just catchwords — in our view they are essential if there is to be a total ban.

By global, we mean a Convention to which all of us here (members and observers alike), and the approximately 80 other states not participating in these negotiations, will wish to become parties. We seek a Convention that has addressed the security interest of CW-possessors and non-possessors alike...

By comprehensive, we mean a Convention that bans the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons; that provides for the complete destruction of all chemical weapons stocks and all chemical weapons production facilities; and that otherwise encompasses all activities that might be relevant to its goals.

A Convention that does not unequivocally provide these results raises serious concerns in our minds. These concerns stem from our position on globality. The Convention must attract the widest possible adherence. The surest path to widest adherence is through the Convention's comprehensiveness — i.e., complete destruction of all chemical weapons stocks and all chemical weapons production facilities by the end of the envisaged ten-year destruction period as is provided for in the current rolling text. To us, this implies an undertaking at the outset of the Convention to pursue these destruction processes to their completion.

By effectively verifiable, we mean a Convention that empowers the implementing organization with the means and authority to investigate, inspect and pursue any activity that might be related to non-compliance with the Convention.

While all three criteria are essential, I should like to underline the importance of the last: a truly effective verification regime. This, in our view, would be the only way to provide us with the necessary confidence in, and the means of ensuring, a total ban. The implementing organization must not only be responsible for supervising or monitoring the complete and final destruction of declared stocks and production facilities, and the activities of declared facilities producing scheduled chemicals; it must also be able to investigate activities and, as necessary, inspect undeclared facilities.

We are therefore convinced that, to be effective, the verification regime under the Convention must be as complete as possible and intrusive to an ex-

tent not hitherto realized under any other arms control agreement.

In the first instance, this means a challenge inspection component of exceptional rigour. Whether we call it "challenge inspection" or "inspection on request," and however we characterize it, it stands as the ultimate safety net of the Convention — the final means under the Convention whereby a state party can seek assurance that other states parties remain in full compliance with their obligations.

Notwithstanding the well-understood apprehensions of some negotiators, we are also convinced that a highly-intrusive challenge inspection regime — one that includes access to any site and which ensures that, if it so wishes, the state initiating the inspection process may be represented during it by the presence of an observer — can be made to work without unduly compromising those concerns...

But even when we have satisfactorily resolved the challenge inspection issue, Canada still believes that the verification system for the Convention would require additional measures to be effective — measures that would go beyond those of Article VI and which would enable the international inspectorate to inspect undeclared facilities, but without invoking the full panoply of Article IX — in short, ad hoc verification.

To our minds, ad hoc verification provides the means whereby the international inspectorate can, in a routine manner and with the minimum necessary amount of intrusiveness, periodically "sample" the activities of undeclared facilities and thereby ensure that there are no activities going on at such facilities that would threaten the purposes of the Convention. From this perspective, ad hoc verification should not be seen as a substitute for or an extension of challenge inspection: rather, it complements the regime by providing another needed component to effective verification...

We are convinced that if we can develop a fully effective verification regime — one that incorporates both a rigorous challenge inspection component and an ad hoc verification component — we will have leapt over perhaps the biggest remaining hurdle to the realization of the Convention. There are, as indicated, a number of other major problems that are critical to ensuring the globality and comprehensiveness of the Convention, but we believe that they, too, can be best addressed through a constructive and open-minded attitude...

I hope that the foregoing comments and the studies and reports noted will be seen as constructive and concrete demonstrations of my Government's firm commitment to negotiating an effective, total ban on the production, possession and use of chemical weapons. Notwithstanding our disappointment that more was not achieved, we continue to have high expectations that a successful conclusion to our negotiations in the near future is within our grasp.

Verification Research in Support of a CWC

A major area of activity for EAITC's Verification Research Program is the provision of support to the Canadian delegation to the chemical weapons negotiations at the CD. In addition to drawing on EAITC resources, the Program channels expertise from other federal government departments and from consultants outside the government towards the goal of a CWC. Particularly helpful to the Program during the last two years have been Professor Ronald Sutherland, on leave of absence from the University of Saskatchewan's Department of Chemistry, and Dr. Bruno Schiefer and his staff at the University of Saskatchewan's Toxicology Research Centre.

Anyone involved in research will realize that credible work is not produced and distributed overnight. However, 1990 has been a very fruitful year in seeing the conclusion of a number of projects. Canada has already submitted the following major reports to the CD:

- *Role and Function of a National Authority in the Implementation of a Chemical Weapons Convention;*
- *Verification Methods, Handling and Assessment of Unusual Events in Relation to Allegations of the Use of Novel Chemical Warfare Agents;*
- *Toxicity Determinations and the Chemical Weapons Convention;*
- *The Chemical Weapons Convention and the International Inspectorate: A Quantitative Study;*
- *National Trial Inspection at a Single Small-Scale Facility;*
- *Report on a National Trial Inspection.*

The first four of these reports have been distributed to Canadian university libraries and institutes concerned with arms control issues. Researchers can obtain the two reports of trial inspections from the Verification Research Unit of EAITC, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0G2.

Canada Hosts MTCR Meeting

From July 18 to 20, Canada hosted in Ottawa a meeting of countries participating in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR was established in 1987 to address concerns about the proliferation of missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons. The purpose of the July meeting was to examine ways of enhancing the implementation of the regime.

The MTCR consists of a set of guidelines concerning the export of certain missile-related equipment and technology. It is not a treaty, but rather an agreement among participating countries that each will apply the guidelines through its own national export controls.

A technical annex to the agreement lists all of the items covered by the MTCR and divides them into two categories. Category I contains the items of greatest sensitivity, such as complete rocket systems, complete subsystems, and guidance sets and rocket engines meeting certain specifications. Category II items include lightweight turbojet engines, launch and flight control systems, and selected propulsive substances.

The guidelines are such that items in Category I are rarely exported. The supplying government must be confident that the receiving government will use the items only for peaceful purposes, and that these purposes will not change after receipt. The receiving government must agree that the items will not be replicated, modified or transferred without the consent of the supplying government.

In the rare case where a Category I item is, in fact, exported, the supplying government assumes responsibility for taking steps to ensure that the item is put only to its stated use. Putting the burden on the supplier as well as the recipient is a unique initiative in arms control, and Canada believes that this is key to inhibiting missile proliferation.

The Ottawa meeting was attended by representatives of the seven original

MTCR partners: Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. It was also attended by representatives of the newest participants in the regime — Australia, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands — and by a Spanish representative.

In announcing the meeting, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark stated that "Canada attaches great importance to the Missile Technology Control Regime as an essential component of our efforts to work for peace and security. It is important we do all that we can to ensure that destabilizing weapons systems do not spring up in new locations at a time when great progress is being made in improving East-West relations."

Participants examined the technical and administrative issues that countries face when managing the MTCR guidelines. They considered the completeness of the annex to the guidelines, as well as ways for participating countries better to exchange relevant information with one another. They agreed that such discussions were useful and that future meetings of an MTCR Technical Working Group should be held. To facilitate this process, a permanent contact point for the MTCR was agreed.

Participants also discussed concerns about the continued diffusion to countries in unstable regional situations of capabilities for the manufacture and use of increasingly sophisticated and highly destructive weaponry, including nuclear, chemical and conventional. They agreed that the MTCR has thus far proven effective in addressing the concerns for which it was intended. They noted, however, that the threat posed by the proliferation of equipment and technology capable of contributing to a missile system capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction remains. The MTCR partners renewed their call to all states to adhere to the missile technology guidelines, in the interests of international peace and stability. ■

Building Cooperative Security

The 45th session of the UN General Assembly opened in New York on September 18. The following are excerpts from a speech delivered by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the General Assembly in New York on September 26.

Security has ceased to be something to be achieved unilaterally. Security has ceased to be something to be attained through military means alone. Security has become multi-dimensional and it has become cooperative.

In a world where poverty and underdevelopment plague most of the planet, the developed world cannot pretend to be secure simply because it alone is prosperous. In an era of nuclear and chemical weapons, of ballistic missiles, of terrorism, of interdependent markets and economies, of diseases, the development of prosperity throughout the world is not a question of charity but of security.

That mandates continued emphasis on Official Development Assistance, on more open and freer markets, on innovative debt strategies. Those are not only economic or humanitarian actions; they are security imperatives.

In a world where the frontiers of states may be secure but the air, land and water is being poisoned, environmental action is also a fundamental security question. And in a period of burgeoning population and rapid industrialization, where winds and water know no borders, environmental security will only be achieved through cooperation...

A new concept of security also requires that we address more effectively the political and military tensions which persist in so many regions of the world.

While there is much to be done globally, I believe that a new focus on regional approaches to security is more necessary and more promising than ever. It is more necessary both because of the consequences of conflict arising from interdependence and because of

the destructive nature of modern weapons. And it is more promising because the absence of East-West tension now frees countries and regions to pursue solutions to local problems on local terms.

Security is more than the absence of war; it is the presence of peace. That requires a shared sense on each side that the survival of the other is in its best interest. This means building trust and confidence.

Canada believes that a regional approach to confidence-building has much to offer. That approach can involve a variety of measures: dialogue itself designed to exchange perspectives and increase understanding; greater transparency in terms of military capacity; agreements to inform other members in the region of activities they might consider threatening in the absence of warning; and, eventually, institutions and processes of conflict resolution and crisis prevention.

Confidence-building is not a blueprint or a grand solution. It does not prejudge outcomes or impose solutions. It is not rigid. It is what this organization has always done best. It is

step-by-step. It is functional. It is flexible.

The success of such an approach in Europe is undeniable. Obviously, specific measures taken in Europe may not apply to other regions. Those regions will require approaches tailored to their nature and requirements. But the fundamental principles of confidence-building apply.

It is for this reason that, in addition to proposing new initiatives for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Canada has suggested that the countries of the North Pacific region may benefit from similar approaches to confidence-building. Those might include advance notification of military manoeuvres, an Open Skies regime and military data exchanges. Other regions of the world — the Middle East, Latin America — might also benefit from a regional approach to confidence-building.

One of the key elements of confidence-building is verification. Verification provides proof. And proof triggers trust. This is why Canada co-sponsored the resolution passed by the General Assembly calling for an experts' study on verification to be conducted by the

Secretary-General. A Canadian chaired this study and we will take the lead at this Assembly in proposing a resolution which will call on the UN to:

- promote increased dialogue between diplomats and experts on verification issues;
- establish a UN data bank of verification research material;
- support and expand, where appropriate, the powers of the Secretary-General to engage in fact-finding missions as they relate to the possible violation of existing arms control agreements.

Mr. President, there is one persistent security problem above all others which the international community has failed to address satisfactorily. And that is the problem of proliferation — proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as well as conventional weapons which have become so destructive.

We all recognize that arms do not cause conflicts. But we must also recognize that arms can make conflict more likely and that they make that conflict more destructive when it occurs.

The progress between the superpowers on the reduction of their stockpiles of nuclear weapons is welcome, as is the progress made to date in ensuring a successful conclusion to the conventional force reduction talks currently underway in Vienna. Those negotiations can and must succeed.

But to reduce capabilities and enhance confidence in one region and with some weapons is only part of the challenge. There is much more to be done.

In the area of nuclear proliferation, the just-concluded Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, despite consensus on almost all issues, was unable to agree on a concluding document. That failure should alert us all to the dangerous prospect of unravelling of this vital international treaty. Canada believes that movement is needed on all sides. We welcome the joint American and Soviet commitment to a step-by-step approach to further restrictions on nuclear testing. We believe that commitment should be followed up immedi-

Canada Presents Report to UN

In an address to the UN General Assembly in September 1989, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark promised that Canada would submit to the UN the results of its research into the utility of overhead remote-sensing technology for peacekeeping. On May 21, Canada's Ambassador to the UN, Mr. Yves Fortier, presented to the UN Secretary-General the results of the study entitled "Overhead Remote Sensing for United Nations Peacekeeping." The report and an accompanying slide briefing was also presented to member and observer states of the UN's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (known as the Committee of 34).

The report focuses on the potential of using commercially-available data

from airborne and spaceborne sources to increase the relative efficiency and effectiveness of UN peacekeepers. It, and the slides, were prepared under contract with the Verification Research Unit of EAITC by a leading Canadian remote sensing company, Intera Technologies Ltd.

Ambassador Fortier also presented the Secretary-General with a scroll listing the 16 verification principles. These principles were developed by a working group under Canadian chairmanship during the 1987 and 1988 sessions of the UNDC. They were subsequently adopted by consensus in the General Assembly in December 1988. The scroll was developed to heighten awareness in Canada of the UN's involvement in verification.

ately, with the final goal being a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

At the same time, we have been deeply disturbed by a tendency among some others to adopt positions which can only act to undermine the vital consensus which underlies the existing treaties on non-proliferation and nuclear testing. Clearly, compromise and forward movement is required on the part of everyone. But the pursuit of other objectives should not be allowed to threaten those existing agreements which have become so vital.

Mr. President, it is Canada's firm view that both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a comprehensive test ban treaty are too important for international peace and security to be held hostage one to the other.

Regional nuclear arms, the threat of chemical proliferation and use has been raised starkly again by the situation in the Persian Gulf. We must move quickly to a comprehensive and global ban. We urge all parties at the Conference on Disarmament to ensure that the opportunity for a successful agreement is not lost and that agreement is reached soon. During this Assembly, Canada, along with Poland, will seek to strengthen the commitment of all members to that end.

In addition, Mr. President, there is the very important issue of arms transfers and the arms trade. It is critical that peace in Europe not be purchased at the price of a more innovative arms bazaar elsewhere. That arms bazaar has stunted development by hijacking scarce resources. It has distorted whole economies. It has increased bloodshed.

It is important in this context that all parties to the conventional force reduction talks in Europe take steps to ensure that weapons affected by that agreement not end up as contributions to potential conflicts elsewhere in the world.

The continued proliferation of ballistic missile technology is particularly worrisome. Ballistic missiles raise the prospect of the delivery of weapons of mass destruction into the heart of enemy territory. That possibility means

UNGA 45: Hopes for First Committee

As this *Bulletin* went to press, the First Committee of the 45th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA 45) was beginning its consideration of arms control, disarmament and international security questions. The Canadian delegation, led by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason, was hopeful that this year's session would be characterized by the same positive atmosphere evident in last year's work.

Building on the spirit of UNGA 44, Canada will work closely this year with the Soviet Union and the newly democratic states of Eastern Europe to overcome the differences that have traditionally divided East and West and obstructed progress in the First Committee. At the same time, Canada will do its best to prevent East-West rhetoric and disagreements being replaced by an equally unproductive North-South divide.

Canada will play a leading role in UNGA 45 on several resolutions. These will include a resolution introducing the recently-completed experts' study on the UN role in verification and Canada's annual resolution entitled "Prohibition on the production of fissionable materials." As part of a general effort to increase consideration of proliferation issues, particularly in light of recent developments in the Middle East, Canada will be active on the chemical weapons agenda item, working to strengthen the annual Canada-Poland resolution. The Canadian delegation will also assume a prominent role on the issue of nuclear testing, reflecting the importance that Canada attaches to achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.

Like many other countries, Canada will continue to seek ways of enhancing the effectiveness of the First Committee, including the merging and biennializing of resolutions where possible. In Canada's view, the challenge of the 1990s will be to make the work of the First Committee and other UN disarmament fora mirror the rapid arms control and disarmament progress currently being realized between East and West.

not only great potential suffering; it only induces regional arms races.

That is why Canada has so strongly supported the recent expansion of the membership of the Missile Technology Control Regime. This Assembly should focus on this issue and call for all members to take measures to control the export of this technology. Canada will play a leading role in this effort.

Canada also believes that it is important to make arms transfers and procurement as transparent as is prudent and practical. Transparency builds confidence and is a recognition of the obligation we all have to the common interest. This is why Canada has strongly supported the work of the UN Group of Government Experts on Arms Transfer Transparency and why we support the widest possible voluntary reporting to the UN of military expenditures, procurement and arms transfers. I am

pleased to announce that, this year for the first time, Canada will be releasing an annual report on its exports of military goods.

There is, with arms, a demand side and a supply side. Measures can be taken to restrict supplies to stabilizing and prudent levels. But demand must also be addressed, and that is why a regional approach to confidence-building is relevant to this issue too.

Finally, Mr. President, Canada believes that more can be done to ensure that the UN's unique capacity to provide peacekeeping forces for regional conflicts remains effective and efficient. I am pleased that Canada was able to help breathe new life into the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which has now provided the UN with new proposals to improve present peacekeeping activities and to plan for new ventures. However, more

work and even greater commitment will be needed to ensure that the UN is provided with the capacity and the resources to mount varied, speedy and successful peacekeeping operations be they in Cambodia, Central America, the Western Sahara or in the Persian Gulf.

In particular, Canada would support a United Nations effort to secure a clear indication from all member countries of the forces and equipment they could make available in future UN peacekeeping operations. We believe that effort could include an inventory of civilian resources. This might include police forces, communications and logistics personnel and elections experts and observers which could be utilized not only to keep the peace but to prepare for peace...

Mr. President, as we move forward I believe there are several guidelines we can usefully adopt as we seek together to build a structure of cooperative security.

Guideline 1. Cooperative security is multi-dimensional. It is based on the recognition that there are many significant threats to our livelihood, our health, our development and our very existence.

Guideline 2. Cooperative security accepts that links exist between threats. It recognizes that few threats can be managed satisfactorily without also addressing others, that peace requires prosperity, that stability requires justice

within and between states, that democracy, development and disarmament are all related.

Guideline 3. Cooperative security is functional. It seeks to avoid blueprints and grand schemes and focuses on institutions and approaches which work and produce results.

Guideline 4. Cooperative security requires dialogue and compromise. It accepts the fundamental truth that conversation is almost always better than conflict and that conversation leading to compromise is the best way to solve problems.

Guideline 5. Cooperative security builds on the link between stability and change. It demands that we accept that order and predictability are not an alternative to change but rather its foundation, and that order in turn requires growth and flexibility if it is to endure.

Guideline 6. Cooperative security rejects blocs. Blocs perpetuate distrust. They build a tension between regions and groups which is no better than tension between states. They perpetuate a "them versus us" psychology, which may satisfy sentiment but does little to solve problems.

Guideline 7. Cooperative security rejects stale rhetoric and sterile ideology. It sees no advantage in stereotypes and much damage in the prejudice perpetuated by them. It rejects, as does Canada, such blemishes on this organization as the odious resolution

equating Zionism with racism, passed 15 years ago by this Assembly.

Guideline 8. Cooperative security recognizes that true security is impossible without justice. It accepts that democracy within states is a force for stability and prosperity, and that justice between states — whether through development assistance, debt relief or fairer and more open terms of trade — is a necessary component of a secure world.

Mr. President, today in Ottawa on Parliament Hill, a statue was unveiled to Lester B. Pearson... There was no cause to which he was more committed than the construction of an effective United Nations system.

Out of the ashes of World War II and World War I before it, he sought to build a structure of cooperative security which would prevent Armageddon and build a world which was prosperous, free and just for all. Lester Pearson never saw the UN fulfil its intended purpose. His dream was dashed by yet another war — the Cold War.

That war is now over. The promise is renewed, and the dream is re-kindled. Yet the challenges remain more acute, more demanding than ever.

Let us do now what we have been unable to do before. Let us shake off our past failings, confront our present and in so doing build a new future. Let us be have as United Nations.

Disarmament Fund Update

Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund, April 1, 1990 - September 30, 1990

CONTRIBUTIONS

1. Peace Education Centre of British Columbia - 1990 "Youth for Global Awareness Conference"	\$3,000
2. John Guy, University of Calgary - Participation in Ninth European Nuclear Disarmament Convention	300
3. Science for Peace, Toronto Chapter - University College Lectures in Peace Studies	1,000
4. Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa - Conference on "The Changing Soviet Union: Implications for Canada and the World"	10,000
TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS	\$14,300

GRANTS

1. Stornoway Productions, Inc., Toronto - Production of documentary on UN peacekeeping	\$10,000
TOTAL OF GRANTS	\$10,000
TOTAL OF GRANTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS	\$24,300

Focus: On the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Focus is our column for secondary school students.

The recent risk of war in the Persian Gulf has drawn the world's attention to the danger that more and more countries may be acquiring weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Articles in this *Bulletin* have looked at Canada's efforts to speed the negotiation of a treaty banning chemical weapons (the Chemical Weapons Convention). They have also reported on the Missile Technology Control Regime, as well as the conference to review the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the NPT). This article will look further at nuclear proliferation and the NPT.

What is proliferation?

Proliferation means to spread or increase in number. In the arms control and disarmament world, proliferation usually refers to the spread of nuclear weapons.

There are two types of proliferation. Horizontal proliferation means the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that don't already have them. Vertical proliferation means the increase in numbers of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of countries that already do. Used on its own, "proliferation" usually refers to horizontal proliferation.

What is the matter with proliferation?

Since the end of the Second World War, the United Nations has tried to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and encourage disarmament. These efforts have been based on two beliefs:

- the greater the number of countries that have nuclear weapons, the more likely it is that nuclear weapons will be used on purpose or by accident;
- the greater the number of countries that have nuclear weapons, the more difficult it will be to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons.

It is generally agreed that increasing the number of countries that have nuclear weapons will not increase

security. In fact, it is likely to make the world a more dangerous place.

What is the NPT?

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed in 1968. It grew out of the concerns mentioned above, and is based on the idea that countries that have nuclear weapons should not give control of such weapons to countries that don't have them. At the same time, the NPT is designed to promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to encourage negotiations towards general nuclear disarmament.

The NPT has eleven main parts, known as articles, five of which are key to the Treaty:

Article I - calls on states that have nuclear weapons (known as nuclear-weapon states) not to transfer nuclear weapons or control of nuclear weapons to states that don't have them (known as non-nuclear-weapon states). They are also not to encourage or assist non-nuclear-weapon states in acquiring their own nuclear weapons.

Article II - calls on non-nuclear-weapon states not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons, or to take control of nuclear weapons.

Article III - calls on non-nuclear-weapon states to accept the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on their nuclear activities. Safeguards are the measures and procedures the IAEA uses to make sure that nuclear material and equipment intended for peaceful uses are not being used to make weapons.

Article IV - calls on all states to assist cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Article VI - calls on all states to carry out negotiations with the purpose of ending the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament, leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

For the purposes of the NPT, a nuclear-weapon state is any state that

manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device before January 1, 1967. There are five nuclear-weapon states: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and China.

Why is the NPT important?

Over 140 states have signed the NPT, which is more than have signed any other arms control treaty in existence. Of the five nuclear-weapon states, three have signed the NPT: the US, the Soviet Union and the UK. Although France has not signed the Treaty, it has a policy of behaving as if it were a signatory. China has said that it will not help other states to acquire nuclear weapons.

The NPT has done a great deal to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. No signatory has ever been found in violation of the Treaty. No signatory has ever withdrawn from the Treaty. It has been estimated that without the NPT, there could be as many as 30 nuclear-weapon states by the year 2000, rather than the present five. Just as important, the NPT has helped to create an international standard, or norm, against the spread of nuclear weapons. This makes it more difficult even for countries that have not signed the NPT to proceed with any plans to develop or acquire nuclear weapons.

In addition to curbing nuclear proliferation, the NPT has played a central role in encouraging other arms control and disarmament efforts. If countries thought that all other countries were free to acquire nuclear weapons, they would want to keep their own weapons' options open. They would be very unlikely to agree to treaties limiting conventional, chemical or biological weapons. In particular, the nuclear-weapon states would not be likely to agree to treaties that limited their own nuclear weapons.

What are the problems with the NPT?

Several states that are thought to have nuclear weapons, or the capability to build them, have not signed the NPT.

They are thus not bound by its articles. These states include Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa.

Some of these states — and some of the states that have signed the NPT — argue that the Treaty discriminates against non-nuclear-weapon states. Nuclear-weapon states are allowed to keep their nuclear weapons while other states are not allowed to acquire them. In addition, non-nuclear-weapon states have to let their nuclear facilities be inspected by the IAEA, while nuclear-weapon states do not.

It has also been argued that the nuclear-weapon states have not done enough to live up to Article VI of the NPT, which requires them to undertake negotiations to end the nuclear arms race and eventually disarm. This link between preventing the spread of nuclear weapons on the one hand, and reducing and eliminating existing nuclear weapons on the other, is often called the "bargain" of the NPT.

The claim that this bargain has not been kept was the source of much disagreement at the review conference of the NPT held this past August and September.

What is Canada's role in the NPT?

Canada does not have any nuclear weapons. Although Canada participated, with the United States and the United Kingdom, in the development of the first atomic weapon, we gave up our option to produce nuclear weapons. We were thus the first country with the knowledge to build nuclear weapons that decided not to acquire them.

Canada was extremely active in the negotiation of the NPT and was one of the first countries to sign the Treaty. We have been strong supporters of the NPT and continue to encourage other countries to sign it.

As a major supplier of nuclear material and technology for peaceful uses, Canada engages in nuclear trade only with countries that have signed the NPT (or made a similar binding commitment to non-proliferation) and accepted IAEA safeguards on their nuclear ac-

tivities. In addition, we have gone further than the NPT in drawing up specific Canadian requirements that must be accepted by countries seeking nuclear imports from Canada.

Canada accepts that the NPT is unequal, in that it sets out different obligations for nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. Canada believes that the security benefits of knowing that other non-nuclear-weapon states have legally committed themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons outweigh any disadvantages of having to submit to IAEA safeguards.

Like many other countries, Canada is disappointed that more rapid progress has not been made in ending the nuclear arms race and undertaking disarmament. However, Canada does not agree with the criticism that the nuclear-weapon states have not lived up to their commitments under Article VI of the NPT. The United States and the Soviet Union signed in 1987 the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, under which they agreed to get rid of all of their nuclear weapons with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km. They are now negotiating a treaty that would require deep cuts in their long-range or "strategic" (over 5,500 km) nuclear weapons. They hope to sign this treaty by the end of the year. Canada believes that it is only by having a strong NPT that the superpowers will be encouraged to go even further in reducing their nuclear arsenals.

Canada regards the NPT as the world's most important multilateral arms control agreement. It will continue to work towards strengthening the NPT, and towards encouraging all countries to sign and live up to it.

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Acronyms

ASEAN — Association of South-East Asian Nations
 CD — Conference on Disarmament
 CFE — (Negotiation on) Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
 CSBM — confidence- and security-building measure
 CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
 CTBT — comprehensive test ban treaty
 CW — chemical weapons
 CWC — Chemical Weapons Convention
 DRES — Defence Research Establishment Suffield
 EAITC — External Affairs and International Trade Canada
 IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency
 INF — intermediate-range nuclear forces
 MTCR — Missile Technology Control Regime
 NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 NIAG — NATO Industrial Advisory Group
 NPT — Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
 PTBT — Partial Test Ban Treaty
 SLCM — sea-launched cruise missile
 SNF — short-range nuclear forces
 SSSF — single, small-scale facility
 START — Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
 UNDC — United Nations Disarmament Commission
 UNGA — United Nations General Assembly
 WTO — Warsaw Treaty Organization

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Disarmament Bulletin

A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

Number 15 - Winter 1990/91

Success in Vienna: CFE Treaty Signed



The Canadian delegation to the CFE negotiation with the completed Treaty. Standing, from left to right: Mr. Ian Mundell, Mr. Andrew Rasiulis, Mr. André Ouellette, Col. William Megill, Ms. Yolande Thibault and Mr. John Bryson. Seated: Ambassador David Peel.

On November 19, 1990 in Paris, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed by government leaders representing each member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the parties to the Warsaw Treaty. This concluded the first phase of an arms reduction process designed to enhance security and stability in Europe. Although a significant accom-

plishment in itself, the signature of the Treaty marks just the end of the beginning and sets the stage for the negotiation of even further conventional arms control measures in Europe.

The dramatic changes that swept Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1989-1990 tended to overshadow the CFE negotiation. The bilaterally-negotiated withdrawals of Soviet forces from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and the rapid move towards a

Treaty marks end of the beginning.

united Germany in NATO, may have left some with the impression that CFE had been overtaken by events. Such a view was valid, however, only if one assumed that the unilateral removal of the potential threat to Western Europe posed by Soviet-led Warsaw

Treaty forces provided a sufficient guarantee of long-term stability and security.

NATO's leaders had earlier concluded that the only stable alternative to military stand-off was a negotiated, cooperative and verifiable security arrangement in which members of the WTO — particularly the USSR — were actively and intimately involved. The form that

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M-113 armoured personnel carriers of the Royal 22nd Regiment take part in NATO manoeuvres in southern Germany. This type of equipment is limited under the terms of the CFE Treaty.

Canadian Forces photo by Sgt. Rick Sanschagrin

this new arrangement might take has been, and remains, the subject of considerable debate. Throughout the past year, however, it became clear that before new frameworks could be fully defined, the old order based on military confrontation between two opposing blocks had to be buried. When fully implemented, the CFE Treaty will achieve that goal.

Anyone who ventures to read the Treaty text will rapidly be immersed in a

framework for the negotiation — the CFE mandate — had lasted 23 months, from February 1987 to January 1989. In addition, the experience of 16 years of Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks had bred scepticism about Soviet motives and intentions, as well as doubts that Moscow was capable of taking decisions regarding force parity and verification that were required to secure agreement. Even the most sanguine among western negotiators expected that it would be two or three years before minimum results were forthcoming.

The negotiation was scarcely under way, however, before that assessment demanded revision. The comprehensive proposal tabled by Canada on behalf of NATO members on March 9, 1989 introduced, besides overall and regional limits, two measures aimed primarily at the USSR: a so-called "sufficiency rule" designed to limit the size of the armed forces that any one state could maintain within the area of application; and a ceiling on

forces stationed outside of a state's territory. The goal was to lower the level of confrontation in central Europe by forcing some redeployment of forces to the rear, and by constraining the USSR's ability to mobilize massive quantities of additional forces on its own territory for an attack on the West.

While essential to Western security, these two proposals were viewed as show-stoppers: measures which, on past experience, the Soviet leadership could not easily accept. When these were in fact accepted by the USSR just two months later, the West was provided with the most striking evidence available that CFE was to be a serious negotiation with realistic prospects of an early agreement. Despite this evidence, the call by NATO Heads of Government at the Brussels Summit in May 1989 for the conclusion of a treaty in 1990 appeared overly optimistic.

Events in late 1989 led to a virtual collapse of the WTO and essentially removed the threat of surprise attack from the East. As far as the West was concerned, this fulfilled one key objective of the CFE mandate. At the same time, these developments seriously complicated the negotiation. NATO's opening proposal had been based on the concept of a collective responsibility for collective ceilings and thresholds and, by implication, on the continued existence of two military alliances. It was feared that the effective dissolution of one of the alliances could potentially upset the entire framework of the negotiation. Fortunately, the new governments of Eastern Europe saw their long-term security interests served by continued cooperation with one another and the Soviet Union, at least for the purpose of implementing a treaty.

The CFE Treaty is composed of four elements: limitations and the means of achieving them; an exchange of information; verification; and follow-up. The following is a brief assessment of each element.

Limitations

The Treaty establishes ceilings, both Europe-wide and regional, for five categories of armaments. Overall ceilings per side are: battle tanks — 20,000;

Treaty fulfils objectives of the CFE mandate.

highly complex and detailed document, employing arcane language and a plethora of cross-references. Despite this appearance of impenetrability, the Treaty fulfils the objectives of the CFE mandate.

That the CFE negotiation could be concluded so rapidly was not apparent when it began in March 1989, nor believed possible even in early 1990. After all, negotiations to establish a

artillery – 20,000; armoured combat vehicles – 30,000; combat aircraft – 6,800; and purpose-built combat helicopters – 2,000. NATO will reduce armaments by over 13,000 pieces of equipment and Warsaw Treaty countries by over 36,000 to reach these ceilings. The Treaty's Protocol on Reductions sets out detailed procedures for fulfilling the destruction requirements.

The sufficiency rule (Article VI) is of particular importance to the limitations provisions. It establishes the general principle that no state party should possess more than approximately one-third of the armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty, and sets out specific figures for each category of Treaty-limited equipment. That measure, along with regional sub-limits, will seriously constrain the ability of any one state to initiate large-scale offensive action. The concept of national ceilings, although initially avoided by NATO, was introduced in the course of the negotiation as a means of identifying potential violators of collective responsibilities. It represents, along with limited mutual inspections by members of the same groups of states, an important step away from the bloc-to-bloc approach to security.

Exchange of Information

The CFE mandate called for an exchange of information in sufficient detail to allow a meaningful comparison of capabilities and to provide a basis for verification of compliance. Although some would argue that the Treaty does not go far enough, particularly concerning information on Treaty-limited equipment held by paramilitary forces, the exchange will provide the most comprehensive, detailed and — it is expected — reliable read-out of the order of battle of European forces ever obtained. It will also provide a basic road map for verifying compliance.

Verification

Achievements in this area provide detailed procedures for verifying compliance with Treaty obligations, although at present it is not clear how well these procedures will work in practice. For example, some would argue that the numbers of inspections should be

higher. In addition, the challenge inspection measure, while important, could have been strengthened by increasing the amount of territory to which each inspection will be keyed. More importantly, each challenge inspection will be at the expense of a declared site inspection.

Aerial inspections were regarded as being important to the CFE verification regime, but there was insufficient time to conclude negotiations on the modalities for this process. Instead, the issue will be pursued in follow-on negotiations in time for implementation during the residual period (see following articles). Thus it will be possible to corroborate with a reasonable degree of confidence the data provided by an inspected party in the information exchange, and to subsequently make informed judgements concerning Treaty compliance. However, NATO will retain considerable dependence on information derived from sensitive national technical means to detect non-compliance outside declared sites.

Follow-up

As the text makes clear, the CFE Treaty is not the final word on conventional arms control in Europe. The Treaty establishes a Joint Consultative Group to facilitate implementation and, on the basis of consensus, to propose amendments. Furthermore, Article XVIII states that parties to the Treaty shall continue negotiations "with the goal of building on this Treaty" through agreement on additional measures aimed at further strengthening security and stability in Europe. The follow-on CFE I(A) negotiation opened in Vienna in November 1990. Some delegations have already indicated measures for pursuit in these talks. Portions of the Treaty were applied provisionally from signature on November 19; the Treaty enters into force when all 22 states indicate that their national ratification procedures have been completed. It is obvious that the CFE Treaty is the beginning rather than the end of a process.

The CFE negotiation was conducted during a period of the most rapid peaceful change Europe has known since the first Congress of Vienna, 175 years ago. Begun in a climate of scepticism and

suspicion as a diplomatic contest between members of NATO and the WTO, the negotiation concluded as a joint effort by 22 countries to secure the best common, collective advantage from the changes that were taking place, and to provide a solid basis for the elaboration of new, pan-European security arrangements.

As Soviet Ambassador Grinevski observed at the November 15, 1990 plenary session: "Unbeknownst even to themselves, negotiators have, over the past few months, turned from being adversaries to being partners in a common cause — the building of a new Europe and of new relationships throughout the world. The CFE Treaty, by overcoming the bloc-to-bloc approach to security in Europe, can be likened to the destruction of a second Berlin wall."

The CFE Treaty: A Summary

The CFE Treaty consists of a main text (containing a preamble and 23 articles), eight protocols and two annexes, all of which constitute an integral part of the Treaty. Throughout the text there are references to specific, complementary time frames that will occur in the following sequence once the Treaty comes into force: a 120-day baseline validation period; a 3-year reduction period; a 120-day residual level validation period; and the residual period.

The Preamble sets the tone of the document and describes the framework within which negotiations took place as well as the participants' objectives in agreeing to CFE.

Article I broadly commits the signatories to carry out the undertakings of the Treaty, in particular with regard to battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), artillery, combat aircraft and combat helicopters, which collectively are referred to as TLE, or Treaty-limited equipment.

Article II provides specific definitions of terms and language used throughout the text, including "area of application,"

the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region (known as the ATTU), within which signatories are obligated to apply Treaty provisions. A "group of states parties" means either the members of NATO or the six remaining states parties, which signed the 1955 Treaty of Warsaw.

Article III provides counting rules to enumerate TLE and defines exceptions for identical equipment that is not to be limited (e.g., museum collections, the holdings of paramilitary forces, pieces awaiting disposal following decommissioning).

Article IV places ceilings on the total number of TLE that may be held by either group (and, for some types of TLE, maximum sub-ceilings on the numbers held by active units). The limits are:

- Tanks — 20,000 (16,500)
- ACVs — 30,000 (27,300)
- Artillery — 20,000 (17,000)
- Combat aircraft — 6,800
- Attack helicopters — 2,000.

Pieces not held by active units are retained in designated storage sites. Additional sub-ceilings place regional limits on active (and stored) TLE that may be deployed within portions of the ATTU.

Article V places additional constraints on the levels of TLE that might be held in a specific component of the ATTU.

Article VI establishes a "sufficiency rule," which places a ceiling on the levels of TLE held by any one signatory. In general, no state may have more than an average of one-third of the aggregate holdings of both groups of states parties.

Article VII obligates signatories not to exceed the national levels of TLE that are apportioned within each group of states parties and which collectively for each group must not exceed Treaty ceilings. National levels of holdings must be declared at Treaty signature.

Article VIII defines procedures and a 3-year time frame for reducing levels of declared TLE holdings to Treaty-imposed ceilings. Procedures include destruction, conversion of limited numbers of pieces to non-military purposes, and use as static displays or ground tar-

gets. (CFE verification provisions permit unlimited inspection quotas to verify TLE reductions.)

Article IX permits temporary holding sites for storing decommissioned TLE prior to ultimate disposal.

Article X allows states to designate permanent storage sites for holding TLE not with active units, and imposes conditions concerning the temporary removal of such TLE.

Article XI imposes a ceiling of 740 on the aggregate number of armoured vehicle launched bridges (AVLBs) held by active units within a group of states parties. All other AVLBs must be retained in permanent storage sites, from which limited temporary removal is permitted under certain conditions.

Article XII exempts states from counting the first 1,000 armoured infantry fighting vehicles (a defined type of armoured personnel carrier) held by paramilitary forces. Units in excess of this ceiling will be counted in national holdings subject to numerical limitations.

Article XIII obligates states to provide notifications and to exchange information concerning the structure of their conventional armed force and holdings of TLE.

Article XIV provides states with the right to conduct, and the obligation to accept, inspections to verify the compliance of other parties with numerical limitations on TLE, or to monitor TLE reduction and conversion procedures. Inspection teams may be multinational in character. Following completion of the residual level validation period, aerial inspections will be permitted.

Article XV endorses the use of national or multinational technical means to complement the Treaty's verification procedures and obligates states not to use abnormal concealment practices to impede the use of such surveillance techniques.

Article XVI establishes a Joint Consultative Group for several purposes, including discussion of compliance or circumvention of the Treaty provisions, resolution of technical questions, consideration of measures designed to im-

prove the Treaty, and consideration of disputes.

Article XVII requires states to provide notifications and information in written form.

Article XVIII obligates states to continue to negotiate on conventional armed forces in Europe, with the goal of building on this Treaty. States will endeavour to conclude these follow-on negotiations no later than the next CSCE review conference, scheduled to be held in Helsinki in March 1992.

Articles XIX through XXIII pertain to administrative details concerning withdrawals from the Treaty, amendments, review conferences, ratification, and entry into force (10 days after the last signatory has indicated its ratification procedures are complete). The Netherlands will serve as the Depositary to give effect as required to administrative procedures.

The following Protocols and Annexes provide explicit guidance, interpretations, procedures, formats, and provisions to implement the Treaty:

- Protocol on Existing Types and Annex
- Protocol on Aircraft Reclassification
- Protocol on Reduction
- Protocol on Helicopter Reclassification
- Protocol on Information Exchange and Annex
- Protocol on Inspection
- Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group
- Protocol on Provisional Application.

Outline of CFE Verification

The verification package established by the CFE Treaty is perhaps the most complex ever negotiated for an arms control agreement. Its extensive provisions will require an extremely high degree of cooperation among all the parties to the Treaty, which only a short

time ago might have been difficult to achieve.

The verification package has five basic components:

- notifications and information exchange (Articles XIII and XVII and the Protocol on Information Exchange);
- ground on-site inspections (Article XIV and the Protocol on Inspections);
- national or multinational technical means (Article XV);
- aerial inspections (Article XIV [6]); and
- the Joint Consultative Group (Article XVI and the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group).

Notifications and Information Exchange

It is largely on the basis of the extensive procedures for notifications and exchanges of information that verification will be conducted. In terms of detail, scope of coverage and national security sensitivity, this data exchange is unprecedented. Not all the information exchanged, however, will be subject to explicit verification, particularly by ground inspections.

The information to be exchanged includes data on:

- the structure of each party's land and air forces;
- the overall holdings of conventional armaments limited by the Treaty;
- the location, numbers and types of conventional armaments in service and not in service;
- objects of verification and declared sites; and
- the location of sites from which conventional armaments have been withdrawn.

The foregoing is to be exchanged upon signature of the Treaty, 30 days after the Treaty's entry into force, December 15th of each year following entry into force, and following completion of the 40-month reduction phase.

In addition, parties are to provide information within specific time frames and other parameters concerning:

- changes in organizational structures or force levels;
- entry into and removal from service of Treaty-limited equipment (TLE); and
- entry into and exit from the area of application of conventional armaments.

Inspections, reductions and certifications of armament reclassifications also have their own specific notification requirements.

Information exchanges and notifications are to be carried out through normal diplomatic channels or through the computerized communications network being established among the 34 states of the CSCE as part of the Vienna Document (see article elsewhere in this *Bulletin*). This latter alternative is a significant innovation.

Ground Inspections

The most complex component of the CFE verification package involves the procedures relating to ground on-site inspections. The purpose of inspections as outlined in the Treaty is to verify numerical limitations using the information exchanged among the parties, to monitor the process of reduction, and to monitor the certification of recategorization of certain types of helicopters and aircraft. Reflecting this purpose, there are essentially four kinds of inspections:

- declared site inspections;
- challenge inspections within specified areas;

- reduction inspections; and
- certification inspections.

Of these, the latter two are not limited by quotas. For declared and challenge inspections, a party has "passive" and "active" quotas. A country's passive quota is the maximum number of inspections it must receive, while its active quota is the number of inspections it can conduct. The size of each type of quota will vary during the phases of Treaty implementation.

Parties have the right to inspect any other party, but they cannot conduct more than five inspections of another party belonging to the same alliance. It is the responsibility of each alliance to determine the allocation of the active quotas for each of its members. A party's entitlement to conduct inspections can be transferred to another party within its alliance.

The focus of declared site inspections and quotas is a party's "objects of verification." An object of verification (OOV) is essentially a military formation, such as a brigade or air wing (holding TLE), as well as certain kinds of storage sites. A declared site may include a number of OOVs, each of which is subject to inspection. However, the number of inspections charged against quotas will depend on the number of OOVs inspected, not on how many sites are visited. Common facilities (e.g., training areas) shared by several OOVs can be examined whenever one of these OOVs is inspected. Inspections can be conducted sequentially by the same

Symposium Looks at CFE Verification

The Seventh Annual Ottawa Symposium on Arms Control Verification was held October 3 to 6, 1990 at Montebello, Quebec, on the subject of "Implementation of the CFE Verification Package." Some 40 participants from Canada, the United States and Europe, including civilian and military officials as well as selected academics, addressed the technical, organizational and operational issues associated with CFE verification. CFE aerial inspections and Open Skies, CFE and the CSCE, the estimated costs of a CFE Treaty, and future verification issues were also discussed.

Participants concluded that the work on verification in Europe is far from over. The verification measures adopted for CFE I will require implementation and assessment. Follow-on agreements are likely to produce new requirements and pose new problems for verification. The Symposium was sponsored by EAITS and organized by the York Centre for International and Strategic Studies.

Some Characteristics of CFE Inspections

	DECLARED SITE INSPECTIONS	CHALLENGE INSPECTIONS WITHIN SPECIFIED AREAS	REDUCTION INSPECTIONS (INCLUDING CONVERSION)	CERTIFICATION INSPECTIONS ¹
RIGHT OF REFUSAL?	No ²	Yes	No	No
QUOTA?	Yes ³	Yes ⁴	No	No
PASSIVE QUOTA DURING:				
A) BASELINE VALIDATION (first 120 days after entry into force)	20% of a party's OOVs	Up to 15% of the number of declared site inspections that a party is obliged to receive	N/A	N/A
B) REDUCTION (first 3 years after baseline validation)	10% per year of a party's OOVs	Up to 15% per year of the number of declared site inspections that a party is obliged to receive	N/A	N/A
C) RESIDUAL LEVEL VALIDATION (first 120 days after reduction)	20% of a party's OOVs	Up to 15% of the number of declared site inspections that a party is obliged to receive	N/A	N/A
D) RESIDUAL (period after residual level validation)	15% per year of a party's OOVs	Up to 23% per year of the number of declared site inspections that a party is obliged to receive	N/A	N/A
NOTIFICATION	Minimum of 36 hours in advance of inspectors' ETA at point of entry/exit	Minimum of 36 hours in advance of inspectors' ETA at point of entry/exit	Minimum of 96 hours in advance of inspectors' ETA at point of entry/exit	Minimum of 96 hours in advance of inspectors' ETA at point of entry/exit
DURATION	Maximum of 48 hours at a declared site ⁵	Maximum of 24 hours within a specified area ⁵	Throughout one or more calendar reporting periods ⁶	Two days
GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE	All territory on a site belong to the OOV being inspected, including separately-located areas where TLE belonging to that OOV is located plus territory on the site shared with other OOVs	Maximum of 65 square km, with no straight line between any two points in the area exceeding 16 km	To observe the reduction process, including armaments before reductions and remnants after destruction	To inspect helicopters and aircraft subject to certification

Acronyms:

OOV = object of verification

ETA = estimated time of arrival

TLE = Treaty-limited equipment

N/A = not applicable

Notes:

1. Certification of recategorized multipurpose attack helicopters and reclassified combat-capable trainer aircraft.
2. The inspected party can, however, refuse inspectors access to "sensitive points" and can shroud objects.
3. For quota calculation, the number of OOVs does not include reduction sites or certification sites.
4. Challenge inspections also count against passive declared site inspection quota.
5. The total time an inspection team that is conducting sequential inspections can spend continuously in one country is a maximum of ten days.
6. A "calendar reporting period" is the period, defined in days, during which a planned number of conventional armaments is destroyed or converted.

inspection team, provided it spends no more than ten days within the inspected state.

Challenge inspections do not focus on a declared site or declared OOVs, but are intended to provide a means of checking for unnotified equipment or movements in other areas.

The duration of inspections varies with the type of inspection, as do the requirements for notification and responses. There are also limits on the number of simultaneous inspections a party is obliged to receive, and on the proportion of inspections a party is obliged to receive from any single party.

Inspection teams can be composed of up to nine inspectors. Multinational inspection teams are expressly permitted, though one country must be responsible for leading the team and, in the case of declared site and challenge inspections, the inspection is charged against the quota of one country.

Inspectors must designate in advance whether they will conduct the inspection on foot, by cross-country vehicle, by helicopter or by some combination of these. The inspected state is obliged to provide the helicopters for such inspections within certain specified parameters. Use of the inspecting state's cross-country vehicles is possible.

Only challenge inspections can be refused. Inspectors of declared sites have the right of access to all structures capable of holding TLE, except sensitive points from which they may be barred. However, in such cases there are obligations on the inspected state to demonstrate that the Treaty is not being violated. During their work, inspectors have the right to use a wide variety of their own equipment, including cameras.

At the end of an inspection, an inspection report is prepared by the inspecting team and signed by both the inspection team leader and the escort team leader.

NTM/MTM

The third component of the CFE verification package is the right to use national or multinational technical means (NTM/MTM). These are not defined in the Treaty but generally can

be assumed to include surveillance satellites as well as aircraft, ships and ground-based sensors operating from outside the monitored country's borders. The Treaty also, importantly, obliges parties not to interfere with the use of NTM/MTM for verification nor to use concealment measures that impede such use. These provisions are similar to those in several bilateral agreements between the US and the USSR. What is new and noteworthy, however, is the explicit mention of a party's right to use multinational technical means. While such MTM do not yet exist, several possible multinational systems have been suggested, including Canada's PAXSAT concept.

Aerial Inspections

The fourth pillar of CFE verification — aerial inspections — is not yet in place. However, the Treaty states that each party shall have the right to conduct and be obliged to accept an agreed number of aerial inspections beginning after the completion of the residual level validation period, i.e., approximately 44 months after entry into force of the Treaty. The modalities of such aerial inspections are to be worked out in the follow-on negotiations to the CFE Treaty. Aerial inspections will involve the use of specialized remote sensors (such as aerial photographic systems, radars, etc.) on aircraft that fly within the territorial boundaries of the inspected state, unlike NTM/MTM. The introduction of an aerial component to CFE verification will provide a powerful additional verification method to complement and reinforce other components of the verification package.

Joint Consultative Group

The final, though not least important, component of the CFE verification package consists of the methods for seeking clarification concerning exchanged information, resolving ambiguities relating to compliance, and handling difficulties with regard to implementing the verification provisions. In this regard, the main provision in the Treaty is Article XVI, which establishes the Joint Consultative Group (JCG), a body composed of representatives from each party. While the scope of the JCG

is broader than verification, its functions include addressing questions relating to compliance and resolving ambiguities of interpretation concerning how the Treaty is implemented, which would encompass the verification provisions.

Alliance Cooperation

These, then, are the five components of the verification system established by the CFE Treaty. Another essential element exists, however, which is not explicitly referred to in the Treaty itself: the cooperation and coordination procedures established within NATO. The alliance has created a Verification Coordinating Committee together with a small Verification Support Staff to assist in verification by establishing a shared database and procedures to coordinate inspection efforts of the NATO parties, and by providing for other inspection support such as training.

Summary and Assessment

The negotiation of the CFE verification package proved long and arduous, in part because of the detail involved and in part because of the number of parties and their varying political interests. It is a major accomplishment. However, it must be acknowledged that the effectiveness of the package will be subject to considerable attention. At this early stage, the package may best be described as satisfactory, with some significant qualifications.

To begin with, it is disappointing that aerial inspections could not be incorporated into the package at an earlier point in the implementation of the Treaty. This powerful technique would have made a significant contribution to the "layered" approach to verification (involving multiple, complementary methods) that has long been advocated by Canada. Other methods, too, such as entry/exit points, portal/perimeter monitoring and tagging may warrant further consideration as part of the CFE follow-on talks. Their utility may depend on how well the existing CFE verification system operates in practice.

While the situation is still unclear, there is considerable concern that NATO countries may have significantly fewer ground inspections in the USSR than they had anticipated because the

USSR has reported an unexpectedly low number of OOVs. This question of active inspection quotas is particularly important to Canada. Because we have relatively few troops stationed within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone, our active quota is expected to be low. Though Canada's quota is not yet finalized and may be augmented by transfers from other NATO members, we are committed to making a significant contribution in this regard. Canada views its participation in CFE verification operations, including inspections, as an important demonstration of our continuing involvement in European security matters.

A significant difficulty for CFE verification may be managing the extensive data deriving from information exchanges and inspections to produce meaningful results. The armaments being monitored will not be stationary and may well be moved around frequently. This is particularly true for aircraft and helicopters. This movement, combined with some potential weaknesses relating to notification thresholds, incomplete monitoring of certain conventional armaments (notably those associated with paramilitary forces), and low inspection quotas, may make monitoring the numbers and locations of TLE difficult. Whether the armaments "accounting system" will work in practice to detect militarily-significant anomalies remains to be seen.

The cost of verifying the CFE Treaty has been a concern to some. Canada, like other parties to the Treaty, wants to ensure that verification will be cost-effective. We recognize that effective verification is not necessarily cheap. At the same time, effective verification does not mean applying every conceivable verification method to the fullest extent possible. Trade-offs between enhanced effectiveness and cost are inevitable. The cost-effectiveness of CFE verification will require regular evaluation by the parties.

Despite the above caveats, it is clear that the CFE verification package sets a historic precedent. Particularly in terms of the level of cooperation required among the 22 parties, the Treaty's verification provisions represent a truly significant accomplishment. ■

DND Trains CFE Verification Inspectors

In anticipation of the verification provisions included in the CFE Treaty, the Department of National Defence's Directorate of Arms Control Verification Operations (DACVO) developed during 1990 a series of courses designed to train prospective CFE inspectors. This includes an on-site inspector and team leader course, an aerial inspector course, an inspector assistant course, an inspector escort course, and a destruction inspector course.


Priority is placed on the on-site inspection course as the test-bed for inspector training. The aim of this course is to train selected officers to conduct on-site inspections of WTO garrisons, plan a verification inspection and report inspection results. The course includes a detailed study of: the CFE Treaty inspection protocol; recording and reporting procedures; the use of cameras and tape cassettes; identification of WTO equipment, organization, training and garrison layouts; and the planning and conduct of on-site inspections.

The course consists of two phases: a two-week theoretical phase in Ottawa and a one-week practical-exercise phase in Europe.

During the first phase, course participants progressively develop skills and practice procedures in small, local training exercises. The second phase incorporates all aspects of an on-site inspection, with a period of planning and preparation at a staging base, a move to a point of entry, a move to a target site or sites, a site briefing, an inspection of Treaty-limited equipment (TLE), submission of an initial report, a return to the staging base and submission of a draft final report. Canadian Forces Europe units in Germany (at Lahr and Baden-Soellingen) provide the target TLE, site briefing and inspector escorts.

The use of Canadian Forces Europe units in the exercise provides several benefits. The inspected units are exposed to the CFE Treaty and its ramifications, and can exercise the support requirements for receiving inspections. The inspector escorts have an opportunity to practice their duties. In addition, the Canadian TLE data is verified by each course.

As of January 1, 1991, DACVO had conducted two courses, qualifying a total of 25 inspectors. Course participants were drawn mainly from Canadian Forces Europe personnel, but also included National Defence Headquarters staff officers and EAITC officials. Planned courses are expected to provide a nucleus of approximately 50 on-site inspectors for the near future. Additional courses will be designed and conducted based on the training specifications already developed and lessons already learned.



Verification inspector trainee photographing a tank.

Canadian Forces photo

Vienna Document on CSBMs Adopted at Paris Summit

Package Supersedes Stockholm Document

The Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) reached a milestone in November 1990 with the adoption of a significant package of measures by the 34 participating states at the CSCE Summit in Paris. The package, known as the Vienna Document, came into effect on January 1, 1991. It supersedes the Stockholm Document of September 1986, which provided for the circulation of annual military calendars, prior notification and observation of certain military activities, and on-site inspections.

Some of the measures in the Vienna Document appear for the first time while others augment those found in the Stockholm Document. Divided into ten sections, the Vienna Document includes provisions for: the annual exchange of military information; risk reduction; improved contacts; prior notification of certain military activities; observation of military activities; circulation of annual exercise calendars; constraining provisions; compliance and verification; improved communications; and the establishment of an annual implementation-assessment meeting.

The section on the annual exchange of military information requires participating states to exchange information concerning the military organization, manpower and major weapon and equipment systems of their forces within the CSBM zone (the whole of Europe). This includes information about whether a unit is active or non-active, its normal peacetime location and strength, and numbers of armoured vehicles, artillery pieces, battle tanks, helicopters, etc. The participating states will also exchange information about plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems within the zone, including information concerning the types and total numbers of weapon systems, and whether the equipment will add to or replace existing equipment. In addition, participating states are required to exchange information on their military budgets for the forthcoming fiscal year.

The section on risk reduction establishes a mechanism whereby participating states will consult and cooperate with each other about any unusual and unscheduled militarily-significant activities of their forces outside of normal peacetime locations. Any participating state with concerns about such an activity may transmit a request for an explanation to the state where the activity is taking place. An explanation must be given within 48 hours.

In the interests of improving contacts between countries, the participating states will, as appropriate, promote and facilitate exchanges, visits and contacts between academics, military personnel and military institutions. As well, the Vienna Document requires each participating state with air combat units to invite representatives of other participating states to visit one of its normal peacetime air bases. This will provide the visitors with the opportunity to view activity at the air base, and to gain an impression of the approximate number of air sorties and types of missions being flown. No state will be obliged to arrange more than one visit in any five-year period.

As an enhancement to the Stockholm Document's provisions on compliance and verification, the Vienna Document allows for information provided under the annual information exchange provisions to be subject to evaluation (similar to a mini-inspection). Each participating state is obliged to accept a quota of one evaluation visit per calendar year for every 60 military units (brigades, regiments) stationed in Europe. No participating state is obliged to accept more than 15 visits per calendar year.

The section on communications provides for the establishment of a network of direct communication among the participating states for the transmission of messages relating to agreed CSBMs, such as information exchange and notification of unusual military activities. The network will complement the existing use of diplomatic channels.

The Vienna Document also requires participating states to hold an annual meeting at the Conflict Prevention Centre (established under the CSCE Charter of Paris, described elsewhere in this *Bulletin*), to discuss the present and future implementation of agreed CSBMs. Discussion will extend to: clarification of questions arising from implementation; operation of agreed measures; and implications arising from the implementation of agreed measures for the process of confidence- and security-building in the framework of the CSCE. The first implementation-assessment meeting will be held in 1991.

The Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures opened in Vienna on March 9, 1989 and will continue under the present mandate until the next CSCE Follow-Up Meeting, which is scheduled to be held in Helsinki in 1992. Canada expects that the Helsinki meeting will see the adoption of a document that expands the Vienna Document and includes a package of new measures to increase transparency about military organization and predictability about military behaviour, with the purpose of more firmly establishing confidence and stability. The Helsinki meeting should also result in a decision concerning the future of the CSBM negotiations: their mandate should either be extended or revised, possibly to incorporate a broader scope.

Canada actively participated in the successful negotiation of the Vienna Document. Canada's experience in the field of verification enabled us to make a special contribution to the design and implementation of a means to evaluate information exchanged. Similarly, Canada's expertise in telecommunications facilitated the development of the parameters for the communications network that will be used for data and information exchange involving both CSBM and CFE issues. Canada will continue to play an active role in the CSBM negotiations, and in the confidence-building process as a whole. ■

CSCE Summit Results in Charter of Paris for a New Europe



Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (seated at right) with US President George Bush (centre) and US Secretary of State James Baker (left) at the CSCE Summit in Paris.

Bill McCarthy, PMO

From November 19 to 21, 1990, leaders of the 34 participating countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) gathered in Paris for a summit meeting to mark the end of the Cold War and inaugurate the new Europe. In addition to providing opportunity for the signing of the CFE Treaty and the Joint Declaration of 22 (see articles elsewhere in this *Bulletin*), the Summit resulted in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which enhances and strengthens the CSCE to meet the challenge of building a cooperative security framework in a dramatically-changing Europe.

The Charter celebrates the merging of two Europes into one that, in the words of French President François Mitterand, shares the same vision of the world. It expresses a sense of solidarity among the CSCE countries and starts the process of putting into place machin-

ery to reflect that solidarity and give it greater substance, so that the end of a bipolar Europe does not bring with it another era of interstate or intrastate conflict.

The Charter has three sections. The first contains a commitment to build, consolidate and strengthen democracy; pledges a new era of friendly relations among the participating states; endorses a substantial new set of confidence- and security-building measures; looks forward to further progress in negotiations on military security; defines the broad lines of future cooperation in order to build a "new European unity"; and concludes with a declaration of support for the UN and for global solidarity.

The second section of the Charter sets out the future course for the CSCE. It defines the arms control and disarmament agenda over the next year and a half; suggests expert meetings to dis-

cuss cooperation in strengthening democratic institutions and protection and promotion of national minorities; and reaffirms commitments regarding the elimination of racial or ethnic hatred (including anti-semitism), the protection of human rights, and cooperation in the cultural, economic and environmental spheres.

The third section deals with the development of the structure of the CSCE process and consists of a list of decisions regarding: regular consultations at the political and senior officials levels; the establishment of a Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna, a small secretariat in Prague and an Office for Free Elections in Warsaw; work programs regarding other possible institutions (such as a CSCE Assembly); and experts' meetings on minorities (Geneva, June 1991) and democratic institutions (Oslo, November 1991).

The Summit thus met Canadian aims in recommitting CSCE states to the still seminal principles of the Helsinki Final Act and in taking the first steps towards institutionalizing the CSCE. As Prime Minister Brian Mulroney noted in his address at Paris on November 19, the Summit "launches a...structure that stands for liberty and democracy and justice and opportunity."

The Summit also reinforced the transatlantic link, affirming in very clear terms that "the participation of both North American and European states is a fundamental characteristic of the CSCE; it underlies its past achievements and is essential to the future of the CSCE process. An abiding adherence to shared values and our common heritage are the ties which bind us together..."

The CSCE, begun in 1975 with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, brings together Canada, the United States and all European countries (except Albania) in a cooperative forum to discuss the full range of issues affecting their mutual relations.

CFE and Open Skies

The CFE Treaty commits parties to negotiate an aerial inspection regime for verification of Treaty measures, which would go into effect at the beginning of the so-called residual phase of implementation, i.e., after the reductions mandated by the Treaty have been completed. The relationship between the proposed CFE aerial inspection regime and Open Skies, as well as the future of Open Skies in light of CFE, are discussed in the following excerpts from a statement made by Ambassador David Peel, head of the Canadian delegation to the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, in Vienna on December 6, 1990.

A number of speakers last week noted the complementary nature of Open Skies and aerial inspections. There is indeed a good deal of overlap

and any attempt to elaborate the two regimes must strive to avoid duplication, particularly the sort of duplication that would lead to an excessive burden of overflights within the CFE area of application. In our view, however, the two regimes are qualitatively different. Open Skies is and must remain a confidence-building measure, while aerial inspections should be geared to detecting and identifying armaments and equipment in the context of the CFE Treaty. This implies rather different modalities in our approach to these two undertakings...

The signing of the CFE Treaty has altered the negotiating landscape and increased the attractiveness of an early Open Skies agreement. A solid basis for an agreement has been provided by the work done at the Ottawa and Budapest conferences. More important, however, is the political will to see this exercise brought to early fruition... In this regard, we were encouraged by statements made in this forum last week and also by discussions our Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Clark, had in Moscow three weeks ago. Although we originally preferred parallel development of Open Skies and aerial inspection regimes, we now see a definite advantage in a sequential approach, with priority being given to Open Skies.

We therefore would welcome the resumption of the Open Skies conference here in February in Vienna, in order to facilitate coordination with our aims in CFE and make full use of resident expertise. We would add only one small condition — a caution rather — which is that delegations come prepared to negotiate seriously with a view to concluding an agreement in a matter of weeks. At the opening of the Ottawa conference, the hope was expressed that an Open Skies treaty might be signed in Budapest on the anniversary of President Bush's proposal. I would like to reiterate that hope, the only difference being that it would be signed on the second, rather than the first anniversary — that is, on May 12, 1991.

As this Bulletin went to press, negotiators were discussing when and under what conditions to resume the Open Skies negotiations. ■

Joint Declaration of 22 Signed

In Paris on November 19, 1990, the 22 member countries of NATO and the WTO issued the following Joint Declaration.

1. The signatories solemnly declare that, in the new era of European relations which is beginning, they are no longer adversaries, will build new partnerships and extend to each other the hand of friendship.
2. They recall their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirm all of their commitments under the Helsinki Final Act. They stress that all of the ten Helsinki Principles are of primary significance and that, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the other. In that context, they affirm their obligation and commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any state, from seeking to change existing borders by threat or use of force, and from acting in any other manner inconsistent with the principles and purposes of those documents. None of their weapons will ever be used except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
3. They recognize that security is indivisible and that the security of each of their countries is inextricably linked to the security of all the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
4. They undertake to maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to prevent war and provide for effective defence. They will bear in mind the relationship between military capabilities and doctrines.
5. They reaffirm that every State has the right to be or not to be a party to a treaty of alliance.
6. They note with approval the intensification of political and military contacts among them to promote mutual understanding and confidence. They welcome in this context the positive responses made to recent proposals for new regular diplomatic liaison.
7. They declare their determination to contribute actively to conventional, nuclear and chemical arms control and disarmament agreements which enhance security and stability for all. In particular, they call for the early entry into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and commit themselves to continue the process of strengthening peace in Europe through conventional arms control within the framework of the CSCE. They welcome the prospect of new negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction of their short-range nuclear forces.
8. They welcome the contribution that confidence- and security-building measures have made to lessening tensions and fully support the further development of such measures. They reaffirm the importance of the Open Skies initiative and their determination to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.
9. They pledge to work together with the other CSCE participating States to strengthen the CSCE process so that it can make an even greater contribution to security and stability in Europe. They recognize in particular the need to enhance political consultations among CSCE participants and to develop other CSCE mechanisms. They are convinced that the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and agreement on a substantial new set of CSBMs, together with new patterns of cooperation in the framework of the CSCE, will lead to increased security and thus to enduring peace and stability in Europe.
10. They believe that the preceding points reflect the deep longing of their peoples for close cooperation and mutual understanding and declare that they will work steadily for the further development of their relations in accordance with the present Declaration as well as with the principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act.

UNGA 45 First Committee Holds Productive Session

The 45th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 45) was held in New York from September to December 1990. As usual, issues related to arms control, disarmament and international security were considered in the First Committee, where national delegations make statements about, debate and then vote on the resolutions introduced. Resolutions passed by the First Committee are forwarded to the UNGA plenary, where they are officially adopted. At UNGA 45, the First Committee recommended for adoption to the plenary over 50 resolutions and four draft decisions.

In keeping with a trend evident during the past several years, the First Committee conducted its work in a business-like manner with a minimum of

delegation monitored and participated in the debate on all issues dealt with by the UNGA 45 First Committee. Canada provided leadership on four resolutions in particular.

One of these was the resolution on the subject of verification (see article elsewhere in this *Bulletin*). As a result of all sides demonstrating flexibility, it was possible to reach agreement on a single verification text that the First Committee adopted by consensus. Canada was highly satisfied with this outcome, particularly in light of the fact that there exists a range of views among UN members on this issue, which made seeking consensus a considerable challenge. In a manner consistent with their approach to a number of areas of the First Committee's work, member states demon-

strated a willingness to focus and build on their common views and concerns about a UN role in verification

rather than to dwell on their differences. The resolution that emerged from this process (45/65) requests the Secretary-General to take appropriate action on the recommendations of the Group of Experts' study on verification. These include the establishment of a UN consolidated data bank of published material on verification and the organization of exchanges between experts and diplomats on issues related to verification.

Resolution 45/65 also requests the Secretary-General to report back to the General Assembly at its 1992 session on progress made towards the implementation of the recommendations. Canada looks forward to contributing to the consolidated data bank and to assisting the Secretariat, where appropriate, in its endeavour to respond to the other recommendations.

As in the past, Canada introduced to the First Committee a resolution on the prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. This resolution calls for the Conference

on Disarmament, at an appropriate stage in its work, to "pursue its consideration of the question of adequately verified cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons." This resolution again received overwhelming support, with 146 votes in favour, one opposed and six abstentions.

The issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB) maintained a high profile in the work of the First Committee. The early conclusion of an effective and verifiable CTB treaty being a fundamental Canadian arms control objective, Canada was active as one of the six countries drafting one of the two resolutions adopted on this subject. This resolution (45/51), urges the Conference on Disarmament to continue its substantive work on issues related to a CTB treaty, and was adopted in plenary by a vote of 140 in favour, two opposed and six abstentions.

Each year Canada, jointly with Poland, sponsors a resolution on the subject of a convention to ban the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. At the 1990 session of the First Committee, Poland assumed the lead on this initiative. Canada worked intensively with the Polish delegation and others in an effort to achieve a text that would attract unanimous support. This goal was met, and the resolution adopted strongly urges the Conference on Disarmament to intensify its efforts to resolve outstanding issues and to conclude its negotiations on a chemical weapons convention.

Positive as the trends and atmosphere were at the UNGA 45 First Committee, Canada is convinced that this forum has the potential to play an even more productive role in contributing to global and regional disarmament. The First Committee is unique as a disarmament and international security forum in that its membership is nearly universal. In Canada's view, the First Committee must seek to intensify further its efforts to fulfil its potential in encouraging disarmament and fostering international peace and security.

Committee shows greater willingness to look at issues lying outside the East-West context.

ideological rhetoric. This set the stage for serious and constructive debate on the issues at hand, and contributed to the successful adoption of about half of the resolutions by consensus. Another encouraging development was that of placing several previously perennial resolutions on biennial or triennial cycles. This helps to reduce the number of resolutions under consideration at any one session, thereby allowing more focused discussion and negotiation of the draft resolutions that remain.

The Canadian delegation was also pleased with the fact that the First Committee no longer seems disinclined to deal with issues lying outside the East-West context. There was greater willingness to allow the consideration of regional arms control and disarmament measures, as evidenced by the wide support accorded to Belgian and Pakistani resolutions on regional disarmament, including from states in conflict-prone regions.

Led by Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, the Canadian

UN Verification Study Completed

The year 1990 saw the conclusion of a UN study in which Canada played a key role. On December 7, 1988, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 43/81B, which authorized the creation of a Group of Governmental Experts to "undertake a study on the role of the UN in verification." Specifically, the Group was to:

- identify and review existing UN activities in the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements;
- assess the need for improvements in existing activities as well as explore and identify possible additional activities, taking into account organizational, technical, operational, legal and financial aspects; and
- provide specific recommendations for future UN action in this context.

Canada was instrumental in the adoption of the resolution and, as a reflection of Canada's high international profile on verification issues, the Group chose Mr. Fred Bild — then Assistant Deputy Minister of the Political and International Security Branch of EAITC — to be its Chairperson.

The Group's 20 members, who acted in their own capacities rather than as representatives of their respective governments, undertook a thorough examination of verification issues. The resulting study is arguably the most comprehensive and authoritative treatment of the UN's involvement in verification — and of multilateral verification in general — in existence. Over the coming years, the chapters exploring the underlying generic, conceptual and technical aspects of verification may well prove to be the most useful of the entire exercise, as the absence of an agreed survey of this material has long contributed to misunderstandings of the terms and concepts involved.

The section of the study most likely to generate immediate interest is the final one, which contains the Group's recommendations. These were the subject of intense discussion among the experts — discussion that reflected essentially two different conceptions of the most

productive future role for the UN in verification.

According to one view, the UN's primary importance in verification lies in its ability to disseminate information and to act as an equalizer of opportunities. All experts agreed that the UN could and should play a useful role in activities designed to promote this end, such as compiling and maintaining an up-to-date verification database and sponsoring a series of practical workshops on verification intended to bring together diplomats, technicians and academics.

According to another view, the UN could more valuably involve itself in actual verification activities through the creation of a standing verification agency. On this point, there was wide disagreement. Some were of the opinion that a standing UN verification agency should be created immediately. Such an agency, they argued, would provide a ready-made mechanism for the verification of future arms control and disarmament treaties. Others took the opposite view. They reasoned that the UN could not create an agency, and endow it with sufficient technical and personnel resources to verify potential arms control and disarmament agreements, in the absence of a treaty-related mandate for such services. Quite apart from the considerable costs involved, it was suggested that the question of what the agency would do in the absence of a specific need for its expertise could not be adequately answered.

In the end, the Group agreed to differ on this question. Their extensive discussions on the subject are fully reflected in the study. The Group did agree that an immediate, hands-on verification role with respect to certain arms control and disarmament agreements does exist for the UN, in terms of the Secretary-General's "fact-finding" powers. The Group recommended that these powers be strengthened.

The Group's study was forwarded to the Secretary-General on July 13, 1990. The Secretary-General, in turn, forwarded the study to the General Assembly for consideration in the First Committee. Canada, acting with its traditional partners (France and the Netherlands), drafted a resolution welcoming the study and calling upon the UN Secretariat to implement its recommendations. The resolution was adopted by consensus.

Now that the study has been officially welcomed by the General Assembly, the task of implementing its recommendations can begin. Although the main responsibility for action rests with the UN Secretariat, the Group recognized that individual member states could render invaluable assistance. Canada has already pledged to cooperate with the Secretariat in this regard. For example, the considerable research holdings of EAITC's Verification Research Unit will be made available to the Secretariat as it strives to establish the data bank called for in the recommendations. Canada will be examining other ways in which it can assist the Secretariat in the months ahead. ■



The UN Group of Experts on Verification at a workshop in Canada in July 1989.

Resolutions on Arms Control and Disarmament and International Security Adopted at UNGA 45

Resolutions Supported by Canada

RESOLUTION NUMBER (Lead Sponsor)	RESOLUTION	VOTE Yes-No-Abstain
45/8 (Costa Rica)	Tenth Anniversary of the University for Peace	Consensus
45/14 (Mongolia)	Implementation of the Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace	Consensus
45/48 (Mexico)	Implementation of General Assembly resolution 44/104 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco	141-0-3
45/51 (Australia)*	Urgent need for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	140-2-6
45/52 (Egypt)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	Consensus
45/53 (Pakistan)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	114-3-28
45/54 (Bulgaria/Pakistan)	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	145-0-3
45/55A (Egypt)*	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	149-0-1
45/55B (Argentina)	Confidence-building measures in outer space	149-0-1
45/56A (Sierra Leone)	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa	145-0-4
45/57A (Poland/Canada)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	Consensus
45/57B (Austria)*	Chemical and bacteriological weapons	Consensus
45/57C (Australia)*	Chemical and biological weapons: measures to uphold authority of Geneva Protocol	Consensus
45/58A (Yugoslavia)	Relationship between disarmament and development	Consensus
45/58C (China)	Conventional disarmament	Consensus
45/58D (China)	Nuclear disarmament	Consensus
45/58E (Sweden)	Comprehensive UN study on nuclear weapons	Consensus
45/58F (Germany)	Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	Consensus
45/58G (Denmark)	Conventional disarmament	Consensus
45/58H (UK)*	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	99-0-50
45/58I (France)*	Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe	Consensus
45/58J (Hungary)	Prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities	141-1-11
45/58K (Sierra Leone)	Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes	144-0-9
45/58L (Canada)*	Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes	146-1-6
45/58M (Belgium)*	Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	Consensus
45/58O (USSR)	Defensive security concepts and policies	148-0-5
45/58P (Pakistan)	Regional disarmament	142-0-10
45/59A (Nigeria)	UN disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services program	Consensus
45/59C (Mexico)	World Disarmament Campaign	Consensus
45/59E (Brazil)	UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the Caribbean	Consensus
45/61 (Germany)*	Science and technology for disarmament	Consensus
45/62A (Nigeria)	Declaration of the 1990s as the Third Disarmament Decade	Consensus

* Resolution co-sponsored by Canada

45/62B (Indonesia)	Report of the Disarmament Commission	Consensus
45/62F (Germany)*	Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures	Consensus
45/62G (Sri Lanka)	Tenth anniversary of the UN Institute for Disarmament Research	Consensus
45/64 (Sweden)	Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects	Consensus
45/65 (Canada)*	Study on the role of the UN in the field of verification	Consensus
45/66 (Egypt)*	Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons	Consensus
45/79 (Malta)	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region	Consensus
45/81 (Poland)	Implementation of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace	Consensus

Resolutions Opposed by Canada

RESOLUTION NUMBER (Lead Sponsor)	RESOLUTION	VOTE Yes-No-Abstain
45/59B (India)	Convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons	125-17-10
45/59D (Mexico)	Nuclear arms freeze	126-14-12
45/62C (Yugoslavia)	Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war	132-12-9

Resolutions on which Canada Abstained

RESOLUTION NUMBER (Lead Sponsor)	RESOLUTION	VOTE Yes-No-Abstain
45/49 (Mexico)	Cessation of all nuclear test explosions	127-3-17
45/50 (Mexico)	Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference	116-2-28
45/56B (Sierra Leone)	Nuclear Capability of South Africa	118-4-27
45/58B (Yugoslavia)	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	131-0-22
45/58N (Sweden)	Charting potential uses of resources allocated to military activities for civilian endeavours to protect the environment	138-3-12
45/60 (India)	Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security	133-3-16
45/62D (Yugoslavia)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	128-8-16
45/62E (Mexico)	Comprehensive program of disarmament	123-6-22
45/63 (Jordan)	Israeli nuclear armament	98-2-50
45/77 (Yugoslavia)	Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	128-4-17
45/80 (Yugoslavia)	Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security	123-1-29

Draft Decisions

In addition to the above resolutions, there were four draft decisions adopted by the First Committee. These were all supported by Canada and dealt with the following subjects:

International arms transfers (Colombia)

Naval armaments and disarmament (Sweden)

Conventional disarmament on a regional scale (Peru)

Information on arms control and disarmament agreements (UK)*

* Resolution co-sponsored by Canada

Canadian Statement to First Committee

The following is the text of the statement made by Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, to the First Committee at United Nations Headquarters in New York on October 16, 1990.

We gather at a time of great hope and unprecedented expectations. The Cold War is over. The disarmament process between the superpowers and in the broader East-West context is unfolding at a pace that none of us could have imagined only a few short years ago. States that for decades viewed each other with mistrust and suspicion are now engaged in constructive dialogue and negotiations aimed at mutually beneficial cooperation and enhanced security for all at drastically lower levels of armament.

There is, I believe, a momentum in place that, with the continued commitment of all parties, can enable us to build on the results of ongoing negotiations to produce further important milestones on the road to disarmament, and to firmly establish the spirit of trust and cooperation among the states concerned.

Unfortunately, however, there remain difficulties and situations that impede our quest for a world whose citizens may feel secure from the threat of ruinous armed conflict. Particularly alarming is the recent and brutal Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, a sovereign member of the United Nations. In addition to the tragic consequences of the invasion itself, this blatant disregard for the most fundamental norms of international relations seriously undermines any efforts to reverse the destructive build-up of arms and achieve a just and lasting peace in that troubled region of our planet.

There are other disturbing trends that contrast with the positive developments in the East-West context. Canada is particularly alarmed at the unabated proliferation of modern weapons and their delivery systems. The introduction of chemical, biological, nuclear and ever-more sophisticated conventional weapons into regions, particular those characterized by chronic political ten-

sion, can only exacerbate regional arms races and, ultimately, threaten the future of the people whose interests they were intended to protect. In Canada's view, states in all regions where tensions persist must focus their efforts on negotiating resolutions to their differences and on seeking ways of building mutual confidence. Such a course of action offers prospects of genuine security for the peoples concerned. The acquisition of new and sophisticated weapons, on the other hand, offers only a costly arms race and increases the risk of death and destruction.

In this regard, in his statement to the 45th session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 26th last, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, underscored the importance of the parties to the conventional force reduction talks in Europe taking steps to ensure that weapons affected by that agreement not end up as contributions to potential conflicts elsewhere in the world.

In Canada's view, if this Committee is to fulfil its unique and irreplaceable role, it must, in the coming weeks, take into full account the realities, both positive and negative, to which I have referred. More specifically, my delegation would expect our deliberations to appropriately recognize the important progress that is currently taking place in the fields of arms control and of disarmament. But given that much remains to be done, we should also encourage the states concerned to redouble their efforts towards the early conclusion of even more dramatic measures. Equally, we should seek to stimulate considera-



Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason (centre) with Mr. Jai Pratap Rana, Chairman of the First Committee (left) and Mr. Sohrab Kheradi, Secretary of the First Committee (right) at UNGA 45.

tion of arms control and disarmament measures in areas where substantial progress has yet to be made.

I wish to briefly elaborate on Canada's perspective regarding some recent developments in arms control and disarmament negotiations.

Canada commends the perseverance demonstrated by the United States and the Soviet Union in negotiating a START treaty that will substantially reduce their arsenals of strategic nuclear weapons. The forthcoming signing and implementation of this treaty will represent a significant achievement in the process towards nuclear disarmament. Canada welcomes the commitment of both sides to follow up the START I treaty with negotiations on a START II treaty that would further cut the superpowers' nuclear arsenals.

On nuclear testing, Canada welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have concluded verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 treaties and that these two agreements will soon be ratified. While this step, in the eyes of many, was overdue, we believe that it represents an important basis upon which further restrictions on nuclear testing can be negotiated. In his

plenary statement, my country's Secretary of State for External Affairs welcomed the joint American and Soviet commitment to a step-by-step approach to further restrictions on nuclear testing. He then went on to state Canada's belief that "that commitment should be followed up immediately..."

Another positive development on this subject was the re-establishment — after a long hiatus — of an ad hoc committee on nuclear testing at this year's session of the Conference on Disarmament. This committee has initiated substantive consideration of issues related to a CTBT. The upcoming Partial Test Ban Treaty Amendment Conference will provide an additional opportunity for parties to exchange views on all aspects related to this fundamental issue. It is Canada's hope that it will also provide fresh impetus to the CD's consideration of nuclear testing.

Parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty recently held their Fourth Review Conference in Geneva. As a staunch supporter of that Treaty, which we regard as a vital security instrument for the entire international community, Canada played an active role in the review and was very satisfied with progress that was achieved, particularly in the areas of full-scope safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Despite a rigorous review of, and much agreement on, the disarmament aspects of the Treaty, Canada greatly regrets that no overall consensus was possible on Article VI-related questions because of differences of view over the nuclear testing issue and its relationship to the future of the NPT. In this regard, I would like to reiterate the deep concern expressed by Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs at the tendency of some states parties to threaten the continued existence of the NPT by seeking to make its extension conditional on the achievement of a CTBT. In his words, "it is Canada's firm view that both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a comprehensive test ban treaty are too important for international peace and security to be held hostage one to the other."

Turning now to conventional weapons and forces, another landmark

achievement that will become reality in the very near future is the agreement to drastically reduce the current levels of conventional forces in Europe. As an active participant in the CFE negotiation, Canada takes great satisfaction in the highly positive outcome of this process. We look forward to future stages of these negotiations to consider even further reductions of conventional forces and an eventual CFE II agreement. The CFE process complements continued observation of the terms of the Stockholm Document. It will benefit further from the implementation of the next set of confidence- and security-building measures to be agreed in the ongoing CSBM negotiations in Vienna.

The Helsinki process, which has provided the impetus for so much good work in the area of cooperative security, as well as human rights, will take a historic step forward when the leaders of Europe, Canada and the United States meet next month in Paris to declare the end of the Cold War and to celebrate the beginning of a new era of cooperation among the 34 countries of the CSCE. With its unique transatlantic and pan-European membership, Canada believes the CSCE can make a major contribution to the new European architecture. Thus, we would like to see the Summit begin the institutionalization of the CSCE by, inter alia, establishing a secretariat, regularizing political consultations and by providing CSCE participating states with a Centre for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflict. Such a Centre could support the implementation of agreed CSBMs and play a key role in using other mechanisms — political, legal and technical — in the prevention and resolution of conflict.

Canada believes that other regions of the world characterized by high levels of armament or by tension would likewise benefit from the negotiation and implementation of confidence- and security-building measures. In this regard, we note the important role that the UN may play, as exemplified by the recent Kathmandu meeting on "The

Security-Enhancing Role of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures."

In the area of chemical weapons, efforts have been intense over the last year towards overcoming differences in order to conclude a treaty on a worldwide ban. The bilateral US-USSR agreement on chemical weapons destruction, signed in June, represents an important achievement that gives us all encouragement that verifiable disarmament in the area of chemical weapons is possible and, indeed, about to begin on a bilateral level. Nevertheless, we have a long way to go towards the global elimination of chemical weapons. Negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament this year confronted challenging problems that must be overcome. While not diminishing the complexity of the outstanding differences, Canada is convinced that a determined effort by all states involved in the negotiations both can and must succeed in concluding — at the earliest possible date — a treaty acceptable to all sides.

Canada looks forward to actively participating in consideration of the full range of items on the agenda of this Committee. I wish to comment briefly on four items of particular interest to my delegation.

Verification is an area where Canada has a long tradition of both expertise and leadership in the multilateral context. We were therefore delighted that a Canadian, Mr. Fred Bild, was selected

Regions outside Europe could benefit from the negotiation and implementation of CSBMs.

to chair the Group of Qualified Governmental Experts' study on the Role of the United Nations in Verification. On behalf of Mr. Bild, I will introduce the final report of that Group later this week.

In Canada's view, the study provided an excellent opportunity to exchange views on a number of proposals concerning how the United Nations might make a contribution to the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements.

The Canadian Position at the PTBT Amendment Conference

This *Bulletin* went to press just as states parties to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) were gathering at United Nations headquarters in New York to consider an amendment to convert the PTBT into a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT). Canada was represented at the Amendment Conference — which was scheduled to last from January 7 to 18 — by a delegation headed by Ms. Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament.

The next issue of the *Bulletin* will feature a full report on the PTBT Amendment Conference. In the meantime, we offer the following summary of the Canadian position as the Conference began.

Canada initially opposed the convening of the Amendment Conference because it did not regard this procedure as an appropriate or realistic way to achieve a CTBT, which remains a fundamental Canadian arms control objective. Nonetheless, after the required number of states parties to the PTBT requested the convening of the Conference (according to the terms of the PTBT, a conference must be held if requested by one-third of the parties), Canada announced that it would attend and participate constructively.

The Canadian delegation goes to the Amendment Conference optimistic that the Conference has the potential to make a meaningful contribution to ongoing efforts towards the conclusion of a CTBT that could attract universal adherence. Canada looks forward to participating in a thorough exchange of views among PTBT parties regarding their different perspectives on this important issue. A focused debate on issues related to a CTBT could help define where areas of agreement exist and identify where differences remain to be overcome.

Canada believes that the Amendment Conference also offers an opportunity for detailed consideration of the verification regime that would be necessary for any CTBT to be effective. Having considerable expertise in the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements, Canada welcomes the opportunity to participate in discussions on verification issues. The Canadian delegation includes an expert on seismic verification and Canada hopes to circulate at the Conference a document outlining the Canadian experience in research applicable to CTBT verification.

Canada will work for a Conference outcome that contributes to the ultimate achievement of the CTBT goal. Such an outcome would entail the Conference giving detailed consideration to all aspects of a CTBT and channelling its findings to the Conference on Disarmament, which is the most appropriate multi-lateral forum to address this issue. Canada believes that a constructive approach to the Amendment Conference by all participants can give significant impetus to the ongoing work of the CD towards the conclusion of a verifiable and effective CTBT.

We were particularly pleased that the Group succeeded in reaching a consensus final report that included a number of specific recommendations for further action. Again, as indicated by the Right Honourable Joe Clark in his plenary statement, Canada plans to introduce a draft resolution on verification into this Committee that would lay the basis for appropriate follow-up action on the consensus recommendations of the Group.

In particular, the resolution will call on the UN to take appropriate action on the recommendations of the Group, including the establishment of a consolidated data bank of verification research material and the promotion of increased dialogue between experts and diplomats on verification issues.

Jointly with Poland, the Canadian delegation will introduce to this Com-

mittee a draft resolution designed to give impetus to the Geneva negotiations on the conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. As we are all aware, that negotiation is currently proceeding through a critical stage and we hope to see the General Assembly adopt a strong and unequivocal statement in support of the Conference on Disarmament's early conclusion of a convention by providing, as in previous years, consensus approval of this resolution.

Canada continues to attach importance to the negotiation of a verifiable agreement on the cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, at an appropriate stage, in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation will again introduce a draft resolution calling for such a ban.

Another issue that Canada will be following very closely in this Committee's work is that of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. As the conclusion of an effective and verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty is a fundamental Canadian arms control objective, my delegation will join others in co-sponsoring a resolution urging steps and recommending measures that would contribute to the early conclusion of a CTBT.

When Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs addressed the 45th UNGA, he spoke of cooperation as the new realism and pragmatism as the only path to progress. The weeks ahead offer us the opportunity to seize the spirit of cooperation and compromise that has allowed parties in other arms control and disarmament fora and in various negotiations to make impressive strides forward.

Canada firmly believes that the First Committee has a unique and vitally important role to play in finding common ground and in providing direction to the international community, in both the global and regional contexts, in our collective efforts to achieve meaningful disarmament and to strengthen the security of all. We look forward to a serious consideration of the agenda at hand with a view to further advancing towards these goals.

Horizontal Proliferation Focus of Consultative Group Meeting in Saskatoon

Members of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs from Alberta, Saskatchewan and Manitoba met with Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason in Saskatoon on October 4, 1990 to discuss a range of arms control and disarmament issues. In addition to Consultative Group members, the consultation included several others from the region who are knowledgeable about and interested in arms control and disarmament issues, as well as officials from EAITC and the Department of National Defence.

The consultation focused in particular on the theme "Beyond East-West Arms Control: Horizontal Proliferation." Ambassador Mason gave a brief overview of the Fourth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. She outlined the Conference's accomplishments, such as the elaboration of language on full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply and on the extension of export controls on nuclear materials to include tritium, and expressed Canada's regret at the lack of a final document. While the Conference's advances can be built on by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, the Ambassador observed that non-parties to the NPT are already using the fact of no final document to undermine developments they dislike.

Dr. Ron Sutherland of the University of Saskatchewan's Department of Chemistry spoke about the control of chemical and biological weapons. He opened with a discussion of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, noting the inadequacy of the Convention's verification provisions and cautioning that advances in biotechnology make verification of the Convention even more difficult. Turning to chemical weapons, he observed that negotiators are close to reaching a chemical weapons convention, although negotiations are currently in a state of waiting while differences on several "soluble" problems — related mainly to verification — are being worked out. Dr. Sutherland addressed the problem of chemi-

cal weapons proliferation, noting that an estimated 15 to 20 states possess or would like to possess chemical weapons. He argued that while export controls imposed by chemical suppliers can halt proliferation in the short-term, the only real solution to the problem lies in a verifiable, global chemical weapons ban.

Dr. Jim Fergusson of the Program in Strategic Studies at the University of Manitoba gave a critique of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). He argued that the MTCR is not likely to be effective in stopping the proliferation of missile technology, since several technology transfers took place before the regime was established and since several key suppliers remain outside the regime. Insofar as the MTCR does make it more difficult for states to acquire missile technology, it is likely to freeze existing regional asymmetries, which may be destabilizing and may push countries towards acquiring nuclear weapons capability to compen-

sate for inaccurate delivery systems. Dr. Fergusson argued that a more responsible approach would be to promote the creation of relative balances in missile capabilities — in other words, to promote systems of stable regional deterrence. He observed that arms control in the East-West context followed, rather than preceded, the acquisition of missile technology and the achievement of relative equality in these systems.

During the subsequent discussion, there was some disagreement with Dr. Fergusson's assessment, although the opinion was also voiced that weapons systems are not necessarily destabilizing and that promotion of regional deterrence may be desirable. Some participants noted that many less-developed countries may start to want to acquire their own sources of intelligence and will try to enter the satellite-launching business for this purpose, which could complicate implementation of the MTCR. The creation of an inter-



At the Consultative Group meeting in Saskatoon, from left to right: Dr. Peter Lockwood, Defence Research Establishment Suffield; Dr. Jim Fergusson, University of Manitoba; Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason; Major-General John Sharpe, Department of National Defence; Dr. Ron Sutherland, University of Saskatchewan.

national intelligence-gathering agency, with a common satellite launch facility, was proposed as a solution. The absence of a "trigger list" was cited as a problem with the MTCR. Canada was encouraged to explore and identify items that might fall within this category (e.g., gyroscopes) and develop controls for them. It was noted that dual-use equipment could pose a problem for the

Canada encouraged to develop an MTCR "trigger list."

MTCR and other supplier regimes in the future and that, to circumvent controls, countries may try to bring military specifications into line with civilian requirements.

There was general agreement that an effective, global chemical weapons convention will be difficult to arrive at. While one participant criticized the Department of National Defence's Defence Research Establishment Suffield (DRES) for its research into protective measures against the effects of chemical weapons, another noted that DRES has taken many positive steps to respond to public concerns about its activities.

Although there was some sentiment that the general problem of horizontal proliferation is best dealt with on a

regional basis by addressing regional security problems, other participants were of the opinion that the problem could better be solved by the West (or North) making greater efforts to reduce its own arsenals, particularly its nuclear arsenals.

Participants spent some time discussing Canada's approach to events in the Persian Gulf. While several were pleased at the coordinated UN response, they also expressed extreme reservations about the military situation in the Gulf, in particular about the

danger of use of chemical or nuclear weapons. Many argued strongly that there should be efforts to move towards a diplomatic solution, and encouraged Canada and its allies to think of a "face-saving" way for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. One participant urged Canada to promote the development of UN mechanisms to deal with potential crises before the fact and cited, as examples, Palme Commission proposals for a joint military council, Secretary-General fact-finding missions, and UN intelligence-gathering.

On other topics, the government was encouraged to promote arms transfer transparency and control; to consider the possibility of using aircraft under multinational control for Open Skies

overflights; to pursue the idea of an Arctic Zone of Peace; to establish a UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in this country, which could also serve as headquarters for a Conference on Arctic Security and Cooperation; to insist on a mandate for the CD to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty; and to redirect resources from military purposes towards alleviation of poverty and protection of the environment.

Some participants argued that anticipated reductions as a result of START or CFE agreements, although welcome, would be of negligible value given the overall number of weapons in the world. The concern was also expressed that qualitative improvements in weaponry would negate the benefits of any reductions. Several participants called on Canada to inject a sense of urgency into its security policy and to demonstrate greater "vision" in its approach to security questions.

Consultative Group meetings provide occasion for informed debate among people who approach current arms control and disarmament questions from very different perspectives. They also offer government representatives a chance to hear the most persuasive arguments in favour of and against various policy alternatives. Both governmental and non-governmental participants were pleased that the Saskatoon meeting continued this valuable tradition. ■

Curbing Proliferation: What Canada is Doing

Recent events in the Persian Gulf have again forcefully drawn the world's attention to the danger that an increasing number of countries may be acquiring weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, as well as vast quantities of conventional arms. The following provides a brief summary of Canadian efforts to discourage the proliferation of various types of weapons.

Chemical Weapons

Canada has placed a number of chemicals under export controls because of the items' potential use in the production of chemical weapons. In

1985, Canada joined with other Western countries that had taken similar action in the "Australia Group," which now consists of 20 countries. The Australia Group has since expanded its area of concern to the general problem of chemical and biological weapons proliferation. It meets every six months to address this problem and to review the effectiveness of measures taken. Canada has a total of 14 chemicals under export controls and is making a significant contribution to Australia Group activities.

In addition, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Canada has as-

sumed a lead role in the negotiation of a multilateral chemical weapons convention that would ban the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons on a global basis. Such a convention provides the only effective means of dealing with the threat posed by chemical weapons proliferation.

Biological Weapons

Canada is a party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, which bans the development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of biological and toxin weapons. Canada is one of the few parties to comply

regularly with the undertaking to report annually on research centres and laboratories active in the field.

Canada is currently preparing for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference, scheduled for September 1991, and will work at that Conference to improve the Convention's effectiveness.

Nuclear Weapons

Canada remains one of the strongest supporters of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Canada worked intensively at the Treaty's Fourth Review Conference, held in August-September 1990, to ensure progress in several areas related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear trade and safeguards. Canada regularly makes its views on the importance of joining the NPT known to non-parties and will continue to encourage the maintenance and strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.

Missile Technology

Canada participates with 13 other countries in a coordinated policy to control exports that could contribute to the proliferation of missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons. This endeavour is called the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Canada hosted a meeting of MTCR partners in July 1990 to review the effectiveness of the regime and prepare the way for new adherents.

Conventional Weapons

Canada enforces strict and effective controls on the export of conventional military goods and technology. Multilaterally, Canada is represented on the UN Group of Experts (established under resolution 43/751) that is studying ways and means of promoting transparency in international arms transfers. Because Canada believes that transparency can contribute to the building of confidence, it will be releasing for 1990 and future years an annual report on its exports of military goods. Canada hopes that the current situation in the Persian Gulf will encourage both supplier and recipient nations to re-examine their arms export and import policies, with a view to increased restraint. ■

Canada-Netherlands Trial CW Inspection: Exercise ACID BREW

During the summer of 1990, EAITC and National Defence officials initiated discussions with the Netherlands about conducting trial chemical weapons (CW) and CFE inspections with a view to developing techniques and methods. The parties reached an agreement whereby Canada would host a trial CW inspection at the Canadian Forces Base in Lahr, Germany from November 25 to 28, 1990. Commander Canadian Forces Europe was formally tasked to host the inspection — nicknamed ACID BREW — in mid-October 1990. The protocol for exercise ACID BREW was based on the "rolling text" of the CW convention currently under negotiation at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and was designed to: test the challenge inspection procedures; determine whether sensitive information might be divulged during the course of an inspection; and gain experience in the planning, conduct and hosting of challenge inspections.

In addition to CFB Lahr units and personnel, participants included two arbiters (one Canadian and one Dutch), 15 inspectors/inspection assistants (four Canadian and 11 Dutch), one Dutch observer and two German guest observers. The inspection team arrived at Lahr by Dutch aircraft on November 25. Although link-up with the escort team and inspection of equipment was done on arrival, the inspection itself did not begin until the morning of November 26. The inspection ended at 8:30 a.m. on November 28, and was followed by a debriefing, "hot wash-up" and luncheon.

The initial impressions of both parties were that the trial inspection was very successful. The inspection team and observers fulfilled their respective functions and roles professionally and thoroughly. Their detailed knowledge of the inspection protocol, and the manner in which they discharged their duties, made the task of the escort officers challenging and satisfying. The two arbiters provided guidance when required and ensured that all participants remained within their respective roles, thus contributing in large measure to the success of the inspection.

Planning is currently underway for the CFE trial inspection in the Netherlands. Based on the spirit of cooperation developed during exercise ACID BREW, the CFE trial should prove equally beneficial.



Canadian and Dutch inspectors audit unit data.

UNIDIR Expert Group Meeting on Verification Held in Canada



Experts at the Montebello meeting.

The first meeting of a newly-established United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Expert Group on verification was held October 24 to 27, 1990 at Le Château Montebello in Quebec. The meeting was organized by the York Centre for International

and Strategic Studies under the sponsorship of EAIRC's Verification Research Program.

Canada has been a firm supporter of UNIDIR's work since the Institute's inception. This support has taken several forms, including budgetary contributions, the provision of Canadian experts for selected research tasks and the provision of other assistance, as in the holding of meetings.

The Montebello meeting brought together a total of 16 experts from eight countries to discuss a new UNIDIR research project entitled "Verification: Proposals and Prospects in the Context of Current Negotiations on Disarmament and the Limitation of Armaments." The project is a follow-on

to an earlier UNIDIR study, now completed, on "Verification of Current Disarmament and Arms Limitation Agreements: Ways, Means and Practices." The purpose of the follow-on project is to assess new problems for and approaches to verification as they appear in current disarmament negotiations and/or discussions. The project will include agreements that are likely to be signed in the near future, such as START. It will not, however, cover arms control and disarmament agreements that have already been signed.

The experts assembled at Montebello defined the issues to be covered by the project, discussed the contents of each submission, and developed a timetable for the Group's work. A second meeting will be held in the USSR in June 1991, with a third meeting to follow in late 1991 or early 1992. The Group's study is scheduled for completion and publication in 1992.

Disarmament Fund Update

Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund, April 1, 1990 - January 1, 1991

CONTRIBUTIONS

1. Peace Education Centre of British Columbia, Vancouver — 1990 "Youth for Global Awareness Conference"	\$3,000
2. John Guy, University of Calgary — participation in Ninth European Nuclear Disarmament Convention	300
3. Science for Peace, Toronto Chapter — University College Lectures in Peace Studies	1,000
4. Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa — conference on "The Changing Soviet Union: Implications for Canada and the World"	10,000
5. Centre québécois de relations internationales, Laval University, Sainte-Foy, Quebec — conference on "The Germanies in a New Europe"	5,000
6. Mouvement Option Paix, Hull, Quebec — publication of a special issue of the magazine <i>Option Paix</i>	1,000
7. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa — symposium on the environmental consequences of increased nuclear testing at Novaya Zemlya	10,000
8. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa — conference on "Canadian-Soviet Arctic Cooperation"	5,000
9. Charles Van Der Donckt, Sainte-Foy, Quebec — research on "The Naval Arms Race in South-East Asia: Regional and Strategic Implications"	5,000

TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS

\$40,300

GRANTS

1. Stomoway Productions, Inc., Toronto — production of documentary on UN peacekeeping	\$10,000
2. Albert Legault, Laval University, Sainte-Foy, Quebec — research comparing the arms control regimes of outer space and chemical weapons	6,000
3. Alex Morrison, Toronto — study of the verification issue at the United Nations	5,000
4. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva — verification research	25,000
5. United Nations World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund, New York — communications activities	25,000

TOTAL OF GRANTS

\$71,000

TOTAL OF GRANTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

\$111,300

Focus: On Conventional Arms Control and Disarmament

Focus is designed primarily for secondary school students. We welcome your comments and suggestions for future topics.

When people think about arms control and disarmament, they usually think first about nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are the most powerful weapons known to humankind. They have the capacity to cause widespread death and destruction in a single blow and, if used in large quantity, could threaten life on the planet as a whole. For this reason, nuclear weapons have been the main subject of arms control discussions, negotiations and agreements since 1945, like the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty discussed in the last issue's *Focus*.

However, nuclear weapons have not been used in war since 1945. All of the wars since that time — over 150 of them — have been fought mainly with another category of weapons, known as conventional weapons. It is hard to say for certain how many people have lost their lives in these wars, but the United Nations estimates the death toll at over 20 million.

A conventional weapon can be defined as any weapon that is not a nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapon. Conventional weapons include the things we usually think of as weapons, such as guns, tanks and fighter aircraft. They can be delivered to their targets from land, sea or air. When people speak of conventional "weapons," they often mean conventional "means of warfare" in the widest sense. Thus, conventional weapons include armed forces, actual weapons and weapon delivery systems, as well as other conventional military equipment and facilities.

The world arsenal of conventional weapons includes approximately 140,000 main battle tanks, some 35,000 combat aircraft and 21,000 helicopters, about 1,000 major surface warships and some 900 attack submarines. Approximately 80 percent of the world's total military expenditure goes towards conventional weapons and armed forces.

Even for the nuclear-weapon states, conventional weapons make up the bulk of military spending.

Conventional weapons have become more destructive since 1945. New types are being produced that use highly sophisticated technologies to help them reach and destroy their targets with greater accuracy and effectiveness. Certain conventional weapons, such as cluster bombs and fuel-air explosives, have the potential to cause death and destruction on a scale comparable to that of chemical weapons or a very small nuclear weapon.

The United Nations has considered the question of conventional arms control and disarmament several times since 1945. In 1980, at a UN-sponsored conference, a number of countries agreed on a Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. In short form, this is known as the Inhumane Weapons Convention. The Convention prohibits and restricts the use of especially cruel and inhumane conventional weapons, such as those that leave fragments in the human body that cannot be detected by X-rays, incendiary weapons (e.g., napalm), land mines and booby traps. Over 30 countries are parties to the Convention and its Protocols. Canada is a signatory to the Convention. Until recently, this was the only international conventional arms control agreement in effect.

The world's greatest concentration of conventional weapons is found in Central Europe, where NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) forces face each other directly. Beginning in 1973, the two alliances held negotiations known as the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, aimed at reducing and limiting their forces and armaments in Europe. The MBFR talks ended without agreement in February

1989, but immediately after that, in March 1989, the members of NATO and the WTO opened a new set of talks known as the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, or CFE for short.

The goals of Canada and its allies in the CFE negotiation were to: establish a secure and stable balance of conventional forces in Europe at considerably lower than existing levels; eliminate any inequalities between forces that made the balance unstable; and eliminate the capability to launch a surprise attack or to begin large-scale offensive action. Helped by the recent improvement in East-West relations, the CFE negotiation progressed very quickly and ended successfully in November 1990 with the signing of a treaty that achieves these goals.

The CFE Treaty sets equal levels in Europe between NATO states and members of the WTO for those weapons that are most suitable for surprise attack and offensive action.

All wars since 1945 have been fought mainly with conventional weapons. The CFE Treaty makes a start in reducing such weapons.

These include tanks, artillery, armoured personnel carriers, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. In addition, the Treaty limits the amounts of these weapons that can be held by any one country. The Treaty also has strong provisions for checking to make sure that countries live up to their obligations. Any equipment above and beyond that allowed in the Treaty must be destroyed or irreversibly converted to civilian use, so there is no chance that it will be sent to countries in other parts of the world. Other articles in this *Bulletin* describe the CFE Treaty in more detail.

Canada helped to negotiate the CFE Treaty and will play a role in verifying that its provisions are carried out. However, since the Treaty does not apply to North America, and since Canada's



A Leopard main battle tank rolls through a West German farm village during a NATO exercise. It is from the Royal Canadian Dragoons based at CFB Lahr. Tanks are among the weapons controlled by the CFE Treaty.

Canadian Forces photo by Sgt. Margaret Reid

military presence in Europe is relatively small, the Treaty is not expected to have a significant effect on the size of the Canadian Armed Forces.

The CFE Treaty will result in the large-scale reduction of conventional forces in Europe, primarily on the WTO side. Once the Treaty is fully put into effect, the chances of a conventional war in Europe will be much less than they have been. Since the signing of the CFE Treaty, the 22 members of NATO and the WTO have opened another set of negotiations aimed at further reducing conventional forces in Europe.

Although disarmament progress is being made in Europe, other regions of the world, such as the Middle East and South Asia, remain heavily armed. Canada hopes that now that East and West are beginning to reduce their conventional forces, countries in other areas will start to consider how they too might reduce such weapons to levels that provide greater security and less risk of war. Canada is looking at ways in which it might assist this process. ■

Forecast

A list of arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, January through May 1991.

Ongoing: CSBM Negotiations, Vienna

Ongoing: CFE I(A) Negotiation, Vienna

January 7-18: PTBT Amendment Conference, New York

January 22 - March 29: CD in session, Geneva

January 29 - February 1: Canada-Netherlands trial CFE inspection in the Netherlands

April: Preparatory Committee meeting for the Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (to be held in September), New York

April-May: UN Disarmament Commission, New York

May 14 - June 28: CD in session, Geneva ■

Acronyms

ACV — armoured combat vehicle
ATTU — Atlantic-to-the Urals region
AVLB — armoured vehicle launched bridge
CD — Conference on Disarmament
CFB — Canadian Forces Base
CFE — Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CSBM — confidence- and security-building measure
CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTB(T) — comprehensive test ban (treaty)
CW — chemical weapons
DACVO — Directorate of Arms Control Verification
DRES — Defence Research Establishment Suffield
EAITC — External Affairs and International Trade Canada
JCG — Joint Consultative Group
MBFR — Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (talks)
MTCR — Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT — Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NTM/MTM — national/multinational technical means
OOV — object of verification
PTBT — Partial Test Ban Treaty
START — Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TLE — Treaty-limited equipment
UNGA — United Nations General Assembly
WTO — Warsaw Treaty Organization ■

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The Disarmament Bulletin

A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

Number 16 - Spring 1991

Gulf War Highlights Need for Better Proliferation Control

Canada offers proposals for post-hostilities planning

The Persian Gulf War highlighted the global consequences of the virtually unrestrained build-up of arms in a country outside of Europe and North America. Official and public opinion in many countries has been jarred by the revelations of enormous expenditure on arms by Iraq and the resulting costs — and risks — of the war effort. Unfortunately, gross overarmament is not a condition unique to Iraq. Nor is it a condition unique to the Middle East.

The human, economic, military and political costs of the Gulf War are large, but they can perhaps be partially offset if we have the foresight and will to learn the War's lessons.

Foremost among these is to recognize the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, as well as by massive build-ups of conventional weapons.

There are already several regimes and processes in place — both unilateral and multilateral — to deal with proliferation. These include the Australia Group for control of chemical and biological substances, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the

negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a chemical weapons convention. They include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its associated safeguards, designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. They include the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which controls the export of



Canadian Forces personnel in the Gulf wearing protective gear against possible chemical weapons attack. Canadian Forces photo

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goods and technologies for ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. They include, as well, the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM), which restricts the export of conventional arms.

Most of the existing regimes are neither universal in scope nor rigorous enough in terms of enforcement. All of them can be built upon and improved. Strong regional cooperative security frameworks would reduce the motives for excessive arms acquisition in the Middle East and elsewhere and are

problems inherent in the export of weapons and weapons technology, and to encourage transparency and constraint.

In dealing with concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Canada believes that the focus should be placed on global measures that will be as equitable as possible. Efforts to enhance the effectiveness of export controls — a vital component of non-proliferation measures — need to be guided by the principle of non-discrimination. The objective is to control the proliferation of

weapons, not to prevent the use of technology for peaceful purposes.

The success of non-proliferation efforts to date has been limited primarily by the lack of political will and the mixed

objectives of many major players. If real progress is to be made, global political will must be mobilized.

It was with this in mind that Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark proposed on February 8 that there be a World Summit on the Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction. This would be a gathering of world leaders, under United Nations auspices, to issue a statement of global political will condemning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, as well as massive build-ups of conventional weapons, and endorsing a comprehensive program of action to address these concerns.

Under such a program of action, individual proliferation concerns would be addressed in the multilateral forums set up to deal with them. The following are goals that Canada will be pursuing in its non-proliferation efforts during the coming months, and would hope to see included in a Summit action plan. Since February, the Prime Minister, Mr. Clark and Canadian officials have been consulting with their counterparts in other countries about these goals and the proposed Summit.

Countries should seize the opportunity provided by Gulf War concerns and the end of the Cold War to address the proliferation problem positively and effectively.

clearly necessary for the long-term, effective control of weapons proliferation. However, it is equally clear that a particular responsibility for controlling arms build-ups rests with the major arms exporters, particularly those leading in the development of weapons technology.

Canada has long been a strong proponent of measures to deal with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have also called for transparency, restraint and controls on the export of conventional weapons. In Canada's view, the end of the Cold War and the heightened concerns about proliferation as a result of the Gulf War provide a window of opportunity to address proliferation issues positively and effectively. We believe that the international community should seize this opportunity.

Major weapons suppliers in both East and West have already been spurred by events in the Gulf to look at ways of tightening existing restrictions. Canada believes that renewed efforts should be undertaken among these countries — but also reaching beyond them to include other arms exporters — to ensure greater sensitivity to the

On chemical weapons

- a solemn commitment by countries to conclude, by the end of 1992, the negotiation of a global and comprehensive chemical weapons convention at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva; and
- the expansion of the Australia Group's membership and the enhanced enforcement of national controls on the export of chemicals that could be used in the production of chemical weapons.

On biological weapons

- a strengthened Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention through (1) further development of its confidence-building and conflict resolution provisions at the Review Conference in September and (2) agreement of signatories to convene a specially mandated conference in 1993 to negotiate verification provisions for the Convention.

On nuclear weapons

- an early commitment by NPT signatories to the NPT's indefinite extension at the Fifth NPT Review Conference in 1995;
- a reaffirmation by nuclear-weapon states of their commitment to pursue further nuclear disarmament measures pursuant to the NPT's Article VI; and
- the strengthening of effective multilateral controls on dual-use nuclear goods.

On missile systems

- the achievement of a global consensus on the need to end the proliferation of missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction;
- the expansion of membership in the MTCR to include the USSR and other potential participants; and
- the revision of MTCR parameters to capture missiles with smaller payloads and longer ranges, and to more clearly promote the legitimate exchange of missile technology for peaceful, space-related purposes.

On conventional arms

- the convening of a meeting of the major arms exporters to encourage a formal commitment to ensure greater sensitivity in the export of conventional arms. This could include greater transparency and agreement to consult about situations where unusual build-ups seem to be developing;
- early action on an arms transfer information-exchange system, including serious examination by all countries of the recommendations of the UN Experts Group now studying arms transfer transparency (to be submitted for consideration at this fall's General Assembly); and
- a politically-binding commitment by the 22 signatories of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) to ensure that arms affected by that accord are not exported to regions of tension or conflict. While the Treaty obligates signatories to destroy or irreversibly convert to civilian use any equipment reduced under its terms, we are concerned about equipment in Europe not directly limited by the Treaty, equipment outside the Treaty's zone of application, equipment disposed of before the Treaty enters into force, and equipment below the Treaty-allowed level but above what a country wishes to keep.

In addition to the global measures listed above, it is clear that regionally-based measures will have to be pursued. Proliferation will be inevitable as long as the underlying factors that motivate weapons acquisition remain in play. To be effective, efforts towards proliferation control will have to proceed in tandem with efforts to arrive at solutions to regional conflicts, including — most probably — regional arms control agreements.

The choice to opt for security at lower levels of armament is a complex one. Canada is actively encouraging suppliers and recipients to take the steps necessary to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, to curtail the excessive acquisition of conventional arms, and to promote the construction of a durable peace in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Canada and the Challenges of the Post-War Period in the Gulf

The following are excerpts from a speech delivered by the Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at a luncheon hosted by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in Quebec City on February 8.

The forceful occupation of the territory of a United Nations member is unacceptable and violates the basic principles of the international order. Faced with the invasion of Kuwait, the international community had certain options, one of which was inaction and passivity. This would have been an unpardonable abdication, the acceptance of the outmoded notion of the power of the strong over the weak. An immediate, unilateral counter-strike by a limited number of countries would have amounted to a small group of countries appropriating the role of world policeman. These options were both unacceptable and would both have had disastrous consequences for the future of world relations.

With wisdom but not without some reticence, the community of states resolved to resort wholly to the United Nations to face this threat to its collective security. This was a great victory for the UN system and for countries like Canada, which have based their diplomacy on the construction of a credible, effective multilateral system. Rarely have such unanimity and such determination been shown within the Security Council, and with the support of the vast majority of UN members. Let us not forget that countries as disparate as Pakistan and Argentina, Senegal and Bulgaria, Australia and Spain have played an active part in the 29-country coalition established to apply the sanctions.

The diplomatic community has never, in the modern era, seen such a feverish and intense period as that between last August and mid-January. Every available means was sought to obtain the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. The disappointing and painful recourse to force is the result of our having reached the limits of diplomacy — not the absence of efforts to apply it. The blame for this failure can be placed squarely on the shoulders of the Iraqi President.

Why, you might ask, were the sanctions not prolonged? The answer is simple: we tried, but we had to face facts — sanctions could not succeed where diplomacy had



Soldiers such as Canadian Forces Corporal Susan Lefebvre, shown here downloading an AIM-7 air-to-air missile from a CF-18 in Qatar, are entitled to expect politicians to do everything possible to prevent us from finding ourselves in such straits in the future.

Canadian Forces photo by Sgt. Ed Dixon

failed. For the entire period during which they were in force, he was also pillaging Kuwait, building up huge reserves for his forces and compelling the Kuwaiti population to take flight. Within a short time, the Coalition would have liberated nothing but a desert and a few inhabitants in total subjection to Saddam Hussein. No, the United Nations had no choice, under the Charter, but to use force in the interest of justice and thus begin an operation to restore peace and international security...

The soldiers who are courageously discharging their mission are entitled to expect the politicians to do everything possible to prevent us from finding ourselves in such straits in the future. They are perfectly justified in this.

The building of peace

Paradoxical as it may seem, this war expresses the firm desire of the international community to build a better world founded on justice and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This determination must go far beyond the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty. We have waited too long for this kind of attitude, this demonstration of responsibility on the part of the United Nations, not to feel collegially committed to ensuring that this new spirit also manifests itself in the search for long-term solutions to the inextricable problems of the Middle East.

Canada is playing an active part in this undertaking. I would like to share with you today my thoughts on the matter, along with certain initiatives that the Prime Minister is announcing today in Ottawa and that Canada intends to pursue in the months ahead.

To begin with, we must, above all, be realistic. For Canada at this stage to claim to have the answers to the problems of the Middle East would be presumptuous. Why? Simply because it is first and foremost the business of the countries in the region to together find solutions to the current situation. No lasting solution can be imposed from without. A commitment on the part of the countries immediately involved is essential to stability and security in this region.

This having been said, the task is a considerable one and will also require the cooperation of countries beyond the Middle East. In fact, many of the causes of instability in this region, such as the central problem of the proliferation of arms, call for solutions that would involve the whole international community. We will also have to count on the mobilization of international resources, notably those of the UN, to respond to the humanitarian and security problems that have been aggravated by Saddam Hussein's adventurism...

Immediate post-war issues

[T]hree pressing questions will arise once the objectives of the Security Council resolutions have been achieved and the ceasefire has been established:

- humanitarian assistance will have to be provided to the civilian populations and to displaced persons;
- a peacekeeping force will have to be established; and
- the damage caused to the environment by the huge oil slicks in the Gulf will have to be repaired.

Humanitarian assistance

We must continue the magnificent coordination and cooperation effort that the various international organizations have begun... Canada has made a substantial contribution to these efforts, by channelling about \$16 million to humanitarian needs of the total \$77.5 million we have committed for economic assistance. We intend to continue our commitment without any *a priori* exclusivity. It will be necessary, no doubt, to help the Iraqi people and to respond to the needs of countries such as Turkey, Jordan and Egypt. However, we will have to mobilize the resources of the entire international community, especially countries that have shown considerable surplus oil revenues and those whose military commitment within the Coalition has been limited.

A peacekeeping force

Moreover, the borders of Kuwait must initially be guaranteed by a peacekeeping force, ideally under the

authority of the United Nations. Canada feels that this force must consist mainly of troops from the countries of the region. Their expertise, however, is limited. That is why Canada, which has a well-established reputation in this field, has offered its services to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the countries of the region to establish a training program. In addition, we are prepared to participate both in the establishment of such a peacekeeping force and in the planning operations that its deployment requires. We are also prepared to cooperate with the United Nations in calling a meeting of experts in Canada with the responsibility of analyzing needs and identifying the various alternatives that are worth exploring...

Restoration of the environment

[W]e must collectively tackle the clean-up of the damage caused by the insane dumping of unprecedented quantities of crude oil into the Gulf. A team of Canadian specialists is already on site and is busy planning this operation together with colleagues from many countries. But we must also look further ahead and examine how to strengthen present conventions on the use of the environment for military purposes. It may be necessary to negotiate a new instrument. We have already taken the initiative of contacting certain countries to pursue this project further. At the same time, we will examine the possibility of reinforcing the international mechanisms currently provided to respond to such emergencies.

Medium-range challenges

But these immediate post-war problems seem almost trivial compared to the challenges of establishing lasting peace and security in this region...

A global approach to security

While a peacekeeping force is a factor in maintaining equilibrium, it cannot in and of itself claim to fully guarantee the security of the Gulf states. Regional arrangements must thus be complemented by international guarantees

which could take the form of international accords committing some of the countries in the Coalition under the authority of the UN. Such multilateral arrangements would, no doubt, be more acceptable to the people of the region. In the same spirit, Canada feels that it would be preferable for these guarantees not to include the permanent deployment of foreign forces in the Gulf.

On a longer-range basis, however, these countries must work to establish mechanisms and structures that will enable them to resolve their disputes peacefully and contribute to greater trust among them. While the experience of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe cannot be transferred to this region as is, some of its lessons may offer promising avenues.

Several European countries are engaged in actively exploring this concept. After the War ends, they may propose the creation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, which would also include the Persian Gulf region for this purpose. This is an ambitious project and Canada is carefully monitoring its development.

In the same spirit, when visited recently by my colleague Dr. Meguid, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, we agreed on the importance of beginning immediately a study of post-war security structures. This would include a consideration of possible mechanisms to incorporate into a regional security structure. Border guarantees, a peaceful mechanism for the resolution of disputes and the establishment of confidence-building measures would form the bases for this structure. Such a mechanism would also allow the discussion of non-military matters, as in the case of the CSCE's second and third baskets.

Such a global approach to security matters, based on the establishment of genuine dialogue among the various regional partners, would allow such issues as the development of democratic institutions in the region to be addressed. But if they are to have any chance at all of succeeding, efforts to achieve greater regional security and stability must courageously address the

very roots of the problems that exist in the Middle East. These root causes are well known.

The Israeli-Arab conflict

The thorniest issue involves relations between Israel and the Arab countries. After decades of conflict, the build-up of hatred and misunderstanding has been enormous.

No regional security plan can expect to succeed unless it is firmly determined to make progress towards a comprehensive, lasting, negotiated settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict, including the Palestinian question. Such a negotiated settlement must be founded on Resolutions 242 and 338 of the Security Council. In this regard, even before the Gulf War, Canada let it be known that it favoured holding an international conference. While we should not exclude other options, a well-organized conference with reasonable chances of success could indeed be useful and contribute to the peace process.

Economic disparities

When faced with numerous conflicts, especially those involving less-developed countries, Canada has always emphasized social and economic imperatives. This need is even more urgent in the Middle East. Reconstruction is doomed to fail if it ignores social and human dimensions and does not address economic disparities.

The region requires a new framework, which must be defined by the nationals and the states that make up the region and the people who live in them. There can be no peace without prosperity and no stability without justice either within states or between states. Democracy also promotes justice, prosperity and peace. Long-term security cannot be built solely on military structures and political agreements. Long-term security, in the Middle East as elsewhere, can rest only on genuine cooperation between states, a guarantee of dialogue and confidence...

Our role is to encourage the countries of this region to strive towards such an objective. For instance, after the hostilities have ceased, the Gulf states and indeed the entire Middle East

might consider creating an organization for the purpose of economic cooperation. Such an organization, which might be affiliated with the United Nations and maintain contact with the major international economic and financial institutions, would help to ensure greater economic stability in the region.

Lessons of the crisis

Finally, we must begin now to learn the important lessons of this conflict. We bear a considerable burden of responsibility. Over the years, to varying degrees, we have all helped to create a military apparatus in this region, especially in Iraq, that is beyond human comprehension. Military assistance in the region has exceeded economic assistance. This must stop. The governments most concerned are already making an effort in this regard.

To be credible, any peace plan must include strict measures to check the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the stockpiling of conventional weapons in the region. Multilateral negotiations have already begun regarding these crucial issues, such as the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and missile-launching techniques. So far, however, their success has been limited owing to the lack of political will or the conflicting interests of the various parties involved. It is urgent that we make further efforts to display a strong political will.

In this belief, Canada plans to promote a World Summit on Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction in the coming months. This summit would become a showcase for a new political consultation. It would aim to develop a strict plan of action that would result in the adoption by 1995 of an integrating framework for systems ensuring the non-proliferation and control of weapons, including conventional weapons...

If this war is to have any meaning, it must serve to build peace. It is on our ability to build this peace that we will be judged. We are aware of this, and Canada does not intend to spare any effort to meet this extraordinary challenge. ■

Clark: We Have an Obligation to End the Mid-East Arms Race

The following are excerpts from a speech delivered by Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark at a luncheon hosted by the Calgary Chamber of Commerce on March 1.

Opportunity seldom arises without risk. And just as [the Gulf] War gives rise to a new opportunity — and obligation — to build an order based on law, so too it gives rise to risks we must confront with candour and conviction.

Those risks are real. There is the risk arising from deep popular resentment in the Arab world to yet another perceived intrusion by outsiders in their region. There is the risk of tension between the Arab states themselves, some of whom are with the Coalition, others of whom are not. There is the risk of continued enmity between Israel and her neighbours... There is the risk that security will be sought in...solutions that will not work in the future any more than they have in the past — the solutions of re-armament, of the endless pursuit of an always elusive balance of power. There is the risk that the United Nations will not be shored up, but will be shunned, treated as a cloak of convenience, a fig-leaf for national preference disguised as global principle.

We must act now to reduce those risks. That task will not be easy. Many of these problems exist not because of neglect but because of genuine difficulty. The solutions will be gradual. Many will be long-term. But we must start on that road now or history will judge our accomplishments in the Gulf as minimal — another opportunity missed, another challenge in which we failed.

Let me start with the principles of peace. I believe four apply.

First, peace will only be built if it involves the nations of the region itself...

Second, peace must be just and fair. The United Nations and international law have provided for recourse to compensation for aggression. But victory must not become a vendetta.

Third, a durable peace will require addressing the full spectrum of problems that plague that region. That

means dealing with other conflicts — including the Arab-Israeli conflict. That means addressing the symptoms of conflict — the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the arms trade, the constant chase for spheres of influence. And that means addressing underlying causes of conflict — the uneven distribution of wealth between and within societies, the lack of economic cooperation between countries and the fragility of political systems that need greater popular participation.

Fourth, and finally, peace requires the UN. After August 2nd, the world came to the UN to reverse aggression peacefully. After January 15th, when the search for peace had failed, the members of the UN resolved to reverse aggression through force. And now that victory is at hand, the members of the UN must use that organization to build a peace that works.

On February 12th, the Prime Minister put forward elements of a package of proposals which we believe begin to convert these principles to practice. We are exploring those actively — with the United Nations, with our Coalition partners, and with others inside and outside the region. I will not repeat them here. But I do wish to focus and expand on one of them: the obligation to end the arms race.

For 45 years the search for security in the Middle East has been pursued largely through the avenue of arms. That search has failed. It has been folly. Despite billions and billions of dollars spent on arms — what have we seen? We have seen five wars between Israel and her neighbours. We have seen Lebanon reduced to rubble.

And we have this war, a war in which 75 percent of the arms in the arsenal of Saddam Hussein came from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, who are mandated to uphold international peace and security; a war in which dozens of companies in the West helped give Saddam the capacity for chemical warfare; a war in which the costs to the Coalition of this conflict far exceed any profits that have gone into

Swiss bank accounts or national treasuries; a war in which our soldiers are shot at by guns that Coalition governments sold to Iraq.

Twenty-eight nations supplied both Iran and Iraq during their eight-year war. Between 1984 and 1988, the dollar value of major weapons exports to Iraq was higher than to any other country in the developing or developed world. During that same period, Middle Eastern countries occupied five of the top six spots as destinations for arms. The Middle East — much of it under-developed — has spent a larger portion of its gross national product on arms than any other region in the world.

And there is a worrying parallel phenomenon — the growth of new suppliers in the developing world, many of whom put few restrictions on their arms exports. Between 1984 and 1988, 99 percent of Syria's arms exports went to countries at war. Eighty-six percent of Egypt's exports and 40 percent of Brazil's also went to states in conflict.

This is all insane. It must end. If it does not — if the world continues to treat this region as an auction block and not a tinder box, we will have failed. The UN has imposed an arms embargo against Iraq. When this war is over, the UN must become engaged in a serious effort to control the sale of arms, not only to Iraq, but to that region and others. The difficulties here are enormous:

1. Every country is entitled to defend itself. But when does prudent defence become destabilizing offence? How much is enough?

2. Although arms can contribute to conflict, arms are also a symptom of conflict. Countries have real security problems to address. How can arms be reduced when unresolved conflicts persist?

3. Although Canada's economy depends comparatively little on arms exports, the economies of others are heavily dependent. How can they be convinced to accept more effective control and restraint?

4. Restrictions to the arms trade must not be seen as a discriminatory strategy perpetrated by the North against the countries in the South. We must all build down.

5. When is a weapon defensive or offensive? What makes a weapon stabilizing or destabilizing? Who decides? Who interprets?

6. The distinction between military and non-military goods is becoming increasingly blurred. Often they are indistinguishable. Chemicals used in plastics and fertilizers can be chemicals used in weapons. How can restraint in the arms trade be secured without also restricting trade generally?

Those difficulties demand prudence and caution. But they do not remove the requirement to act. In order to give political energy to negotiations now underway and to launch new initiatives where needed, the Prime Minister has proposed a World Summit on the Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction to be held under UN auspices... We will pursue this with

vigour in the weeks and months ahead. We will also be looking at ways to prevent the use of environmental spoilage as a weapon of war as practiced by Saddam Hussein in his deliberate pollution of the Gulf.

As part of our initiative to address the arms control problems thrown into relief by the Gulf War, I am announcing today that Canada will take the following additional steps.

First, we will propose that the countries who are signatory to the Conventional Forces Agreement in Europe undertake not to export arms affected by that agreement to countries outside Europe. The residue from the Cold War in Europe should not become the raw material for wars elsewhere.

Second, Canada will move immediately to increase the number of precursors for chemical weapons on our Export Control List from 14 to 50, in order to restrict the possibility of Canada

being used as a source or conduit for components of chemical arms.

And lastly, I am releasing today, for the first time ever, a *Report on the Export of Military Goods from Canada...* That report is intended to demonstrate Canada's strong commitment to greater transparency in the arms trade, a

Difficulties in controlling the arms trade do not remove the requirement to act.

transparency that is needed so the world knows what the traffic in arms is.

These initiatives will not, in and of themselves, address the arms trade challenge. Canada's share of the world arms trade is minuscule. Action — concerted action — is required by others, especially those whose policies and practices are less restrictive than our own. But they contribute — and I believe they indicate our firm commitment to moving from hope to action... ■

Canada Releases Annual Report on Military Exports

Following up on a commitment made by Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark in his address to the UN General Assembly on September 26, 1990, Canada released in March its first *Annual Report on the Export of Military Goods from Canada*.

The report lists in tabular form the dollar value of Canadian military exports according to country of destination and Export Control List (ECL) item number. A summary table showing the breakdown of exports to "NATO (except USA)," "Other OECD" and "Others" is also included.

Canada closely controls the export of military goods and technology to countries that pose a threat to Canada or its allies, countries involved in or under imminent threat of hostilities, countries under UN Security Council sanctions, and countries with a persistent record of serious human rights violations, unless it can be demonstrated that

there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population.

Military goods are defined in Group 2 (Munitions) of Canada's ECL as goods "specifically designed or adapted for military use." The goods controlled on the ECL are similar to those on the International Munitions List used by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls (COCOM).

The report was tabled in Parliament on March 6 by Mr. Clark and presented to the UN Secretary-General by Ambassador Yves Fortier. It will be circulated as an official document to all UN member states under UNGA 46 item 60(b) — General and Complete Disarmament, International Arms Transfers.

Canada's intention in releasing the report is to promote greater transparency in international conventional arms transfers by making reliable information

about arms exports widely available. As Mr. Clark told the General Assembly in September, "Canada believes that it is important to make arms transfers and procurement as transparent as is prudent and practical. Transparency builds confidence and is a recognition of the obligation we all have to the common interest." Canada hopes that as a result of its initiative, other countries will soon issue similar reports.

Canada is represented on the UN Group of Governmental Experts currently carrying out a study of ways and means of promoting transparency in international arms transfers. We look forward to examining the Group's report, which will be submitted to the General Assembly in the fall of 1991.

Copies of Canada's first *Annual Report* can be obtained free of charge by writing to the Export Controls Division, EAITC, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0G2. ■

Canada Increases Chemical Controls

Although the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use in war of chemical and biological weapons, it does not prohibit their production and stockpiling. This gap has been partially filled by the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which completely bans biological and toxin weapons. In addition, negotiations have been underway since 1984 at the Conference on Disarmament to achieve a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons (CW). Canada plays an active role in these negotiations and, although certain problems remain, we are optimistic that the desired result is achievable in the not-too-distant future.

During the last few years, however, Canada and others have had to address the problem of what can be done immediately to stop the proliferation of CW in view of an increased interest on the part of some countries — most notably Iraq — to acquire them. There have been few means at our disposal to ensure that chemicals having legitimate and widespread commercial applications would not be diverted to the production of CW. Nevertheless, there has been growing international support for the view that the available means be exploited and improved as much as possible to present additional obstacles to proliferation.

Since 1985 Canada has participated in the 20-member, informal "Australia Group," in which countries examine ways to harmonize their national policies in addressing their common concern about CW proliferation. As a result, Canada controls the export of 14 chemical precursors under Item 5301 of the Export Control List. At the last meeting of the Australia Group, the majority of participants — including Canada — agreed that all 50 identified CW precursors should be under strict export controls. Canada has drafted the necessary regulations and expects to have controls covering the additional chemicals in place by May 1991.

Most of the 50 identified chemical weapon precursors are not manufactured in Canada. There will thus be minimal direct impact on Canadian trade as a result of these added control measures. From a Canadian perspective, the primary reason for maintaining controls over all identified chemicals is to ensure that such chemicals produced elsewhere are not exported from a country of manufacture through Canada to a third country.

For further information, contact the Export Controls Division of EAITC at 613-996-2387 and request the pamphlet entitled "Chemical Weapons: Be Vigilant."

Conference Looks at Strengthening the BTWC

A conference held from February 6 to 8 in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, brought together officials, defence scientists, disarmament experts and academics to explore ways and means of strengthening the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The conference host — the Government of the Netherlands — sought a free-ranging discussion of ideas for improving the confidence-building measures that are presently politically-binding on parties to the BTWC. In addition, it encouraged participants to consider further confidence-building measures that might be adopted at the Third Review Conference of the BTWC, to be held in Geneva from September 9 to 27. Legally-binding verification measures, which the BTWC lacks, were also discussed.

The conference was, in the best sense of the word, a "brainstorming" session, in which participants put aside official positions to remain receptive to new ideas that might provide the basis for further policy development in the run-up to the Review Conference. The unstated assumption of all present was that opportunity exists to strengthen the BTWC from within — that is, not through the potentially divisive procedure of treaty amendment but through expanding existing provisions or adding, through agreed protocols or politically-binding declarations, further commitments to transparency and confidence-building.

Canadian participation at the conference was led by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason. The following are excerpts from the informal Canadian discussion paper presented there, which does not necessarily represent the official Canadian position.

The objective of confidence-building in the context of the BTWC is to dispel doubts about the aims of research for permitted purposes on biological and toxin warfare agents and to ensure that such warfare agents are not being developed for offensive purposes...

Quo Vadis Open Skies?

The changes that have occurred in Europe since the Open Skies negotiations began in February 1990 have made the successful conclusion of a treaty more relevant than ever. As was recognized in the communiqué of the 22 leaders who signed the CFE Treaty in November 1990, Open Skies has an important role to play in reducing misunderstanding and mistrust in the new, multipolar Europe.

Unfortunately, differences over the Soviet interpretation of the CFE Treaty (see "CFE Update") have made progress on arms control difficult in recent months. Nonetheless, the NATO

allies continue to discuss outstanding issues of the Open Skies negotiations during regular, high-level consultations in Brussels. Their goal is to identify possible compromises that might be tabled once the negotiations resume in earnest. At the same time, it is recognized that the Soviet position will have to undergo fundamental changes before a truly "open" Open Skies regime can be achieved.

Canada remains committed to achieving an Open Skies treaty, which would provide for regular, short-notice overflights of participants' territory using unarmed surveillance aircraft.

While openness is the surest means to begin the process of confidence-building regarding military-related activities, the straightforward exchange of information may not in itself be sufficient. We will have to accept that some form of on-site inspection is required to bolster such exchanges by providing the initial means of establishing the accuracy of such information and helping to clear up any potential ambiguities resulting from different interpretations of the same data. This means that we may have to consider much more intrusive and, in some cases, "challenging" instruments and procedures of arms control and disarmament verification...

Similarly, we require further thought on developing a regime that is not simply a forum in which one lodges complaints about alleged non-compliance, but one in which we can go further to take concrete steps in actually resolving doubts about compliance...

We need to recognize that extending the scope of current CBMs and future verification measures to embrace research activities at all centres at which there are Biological Safety Level BL4 and BL3 containment units may not in fact capture all those centres at which work is being done on the micro-organisms of concern for the Convention... [H]ighly lethal work on toxins is being done mainly in chemical, and not such "specialized" microbiological contain-

ment laboratories. Even those research centres specializing in protection and prophylaxis do not always have the bulk of their work directed against biological weapons per se. Perhaps we might consider declarations that list *all* facilities considered to be at the BL4 or BL3 containment levels, since not all countries subscribe entirely to World Health Organization guidelines.

It may be the case that on-site inspection would have to be complemented by the exchange of scientists or permanently-placed foreign scientists at declared facilities... Also, in the area of information exchange, there could be a declaration of listings of bacterial and viral cultures and toxin stocks held in declared facilities. In addition, one could ensure that there is a full exchange of publications, including in-house ones, between declared laboratories. States should provide details of national BW defence programs. Further, there could be, as some have suggested, an exchange of information on national regulations concerning health and safety at labs and facilities handling pathogenic organisms, genetically-manipulated organisms, or toxins...

We may be reaching that stage in the maturation of the BTWC...where we should consider concrete measures to improve adherence and support. There could be incentives to join and disincentives to remain apart. This would involve

considering what concrete measures might be undertaken to improve scientific and technical cooperation between and among states parties for peaceful purposes. The flip side of this is that export controls on BW-relevant technologies may have to be considered in introducing a greater inducement for adherence to the Convention.

More controversially, one might look at whether thresholds or limitations could be imposed (and effectively verified) to give quantitative boundaries to activities involving development and production of agents or equipment for prophylactic or protective purposes....

Clearly there is room for carrying out national trial inspections, much along the lines of those that have been carried out in the context of the CW negotiations. What might be particularly promising in monitoring declared facilities is the use of "audit trails" similar to those used in the pharmaceutical and other industries. This could prove to be a less intrusive, but nevertheless effective, means of confirming that only permitted activities were occurring at the inspected facility...

Over the next few days we will undoubtedly hear a variety of proposals for strengthening the confidence-building aspects of the BTWC. Some will argue that the only way to really strengthen confidence is to negotiate a detailed, intrusive and tough verification



Participants at the Netherlands conference on the BTWC. Canadian representatives Ms Mary Ellen Kennedy (Health and Welfare Canada), Mr. John Barrett (EAITC) and Ambassador Peggy Mason are seated on the table, first through third from the left.

MTCR Partners Meet in Tokyo

From March 18 to 20, Canada participated in a meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners, held in Tokyo. The regime, which aims to limit the transfer of missile equipment and technology, was established in 1987 to address concerns over the proliferation of missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons.

Recent events in the Persian Gulf have emphasized the need for mechanisms such as the MTCR, and the Tokyo meeting provided an ideal opportunity to review the effectiveness of the regime. Canada recommended that the meeting focus on two points: reviewing the Equipment and Technology Annex with a view to expanding its scope and making it more stringent; and determining which additional countries might be encouraged to adhere to the export guidelines.

The Equipment and Technology Annex presently addresses those items that could assist in the delivery of nuclear weapons. Canada believes that the Annex might usefully be amended to account for the differing parameters (distance and payload) necessary for the delivery of chemical and biological weapons.

The MTCR began with seven participants: Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US. Since 1987, nine additional countries have announced their adherence to the regime's guidelines: Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Spain and — most recently — Austria. The current partners will continue their efforts to increase the number of participants and to investigate ways in which to involve less-developed countries.

MTCR partners considered the Tokyo meeting a success. They reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening and expanding the regime to better address the problem of missile proliferation. The partners are expected to meet next in Washington this fall.

The MTCR remains an integral part of Canada's network of non-proliferation mechanisms and Canada is committed to active participation in the workings of this group.

protocol for the BTWC, and that the goal of the Third Review Conference should be to gain the mandate to begin the negotiation of such a protocol. Perhaps making the existing confidence-building process politically-binding would be desirable. We shall listen to all these arguments with an open, and in some cases, sympathetic ear. We shall also want to see where the experience gained in the negotiation of the chemical weapons convention might usefully be applied to our deliberations over the next days on strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

However, we should not neglect the smaller, perhaps less dramatic, measures that can be taken in the near term to continue setting out and improving the basic foundation of confidence — namely, greater transparency through information exchange... Require-

ing all parties to give explicit annual notices, even if there is nothing to declare, would be such a small, but useful step. Perhaps there are simple ways we can suggest for removing potential ambiguities from the information already provided in declarations.

Nevertheless, in the pursuit of additional information to support and enhance the objectives of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, we should not, as some of our British colleagues have mentioned elsewhere, become "swamped in a sea of marginal and irrelevant material." In considering new confidence-building measures, we should remain focused on activities that are "directly related" to the objectives of the Convention — i.e., those associated with legitimate defensive research on biological agents and weapons.

CFE Update

Follow-on stalled over Soviet interpretation

When the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed on November 19, 1990, it was anticipated that by early 1991 representatives would have diligently resumed their task of negotiating follow-on improvements to the European conventional armed forces regime in accordance with Article XVIII. Instead, forward movement is stalled as 21 signatories question the actions of the USSR, which has adopted an unexpected interpretation of the Treaty text, specifically Article III, the so-called "counting rules" article.

One of the most important outcomes of the Treaty is the establishment of national limits, which signatories agreed to place on the battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters they will maintain within the Treaty's zone of application, namely the Atlantic to the Urals region. Article III is key to identifying the equipment that is subject to the Treaty's limits. It clearly states that *all* Treaty-limited equipment (TLE) must be counted, except for those pieces falling within the seven areas of exclusion (e.g., museum collections, short-term transit, in production, etc.).

Despite the clear meaning of Article III, the USSR claims that CFE limitations and counting rules do not apply to TLE held by the ground defence forces it subordinates to the Navy and to the Strategic Rocket Forces. This is equivalent to demanding that the USSR be permitted to hold more than 5,400 pieces of equipment in excess of the allocations negotiated with the other Treaty signatories. Canada and the other signatories cannot accept this post-signature demand and are requesting the USSR to adhere to its Treaty undertakings. As proof of the foresight that negotiators had in concluding the CFE Treaty, the Joint Consultative Group is already serving as a forum in which states can make their positions on this problem known to the USSR.

Symposium Examines European Verification Issues

The CFE Treaty, signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, constitutes the most significant multilateral arms control and disarmament agreement to date. This Treaty and the Vienna Document on confidence- and security-building measures, signed at the same time, provide the foundation for a radically-changed European security framework.

As Treaty provisions are implemented, with all the definitional and procedural problems likely to arise, follow-on negotiations will continue in Vienna

(a) The Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBM) negotiations: all 34 CSCE participating states have agreed to continue negotiations in accordance with the mandate of the Madrid and Vienna CSCE follow-up meetings with the objective of building on and expanding the results already achieved in the Stockholm and Vienna Documents.

(b) The Open Skies negotiations: a solid basis for an Open Skies agreement has been developed by the work accomplished at the Ottawa and Budapest Conferences in 1990. The signing of the CFE Treaty has simplified the negotiating landscape and increased the attrac-

The Symposium brought together 44 government, industry and academic experts from six countries including the USSR, as well as from two international organizations. The proceedings should be available from the Centre for International and Strategic Studies this summer.

CFE follow-on talks, CSBM negotiations and Open Skies negotiations provide the focus for verification leading to the 1992 CSCE Helsinki follow-up meeting.

with the same mandate and with the goal of building on the CFE Treaty. The 22 state parties will seek to conclude this second round of negotiations no later than the follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) scheduled for Helsinki in March 1992.

While the objectives for the follow-on — or CFE IA — negotiations include agreement on additional (unspecified) measures aimed at strengthening security and stability in Europe, the CFE Treaty itself identifies areas for further negotiation relating to:

- personnel strength (Article XVIII) — developing measures to limit the personnel strength of armed forces within the area of application; and
- aerial inspection (Article XIV) — achieving a regime that will provide procedures for conducting an agreed number of aerial inspections within the area of application.

Two other negotiations will have an effect on the CFE arms control agreement(s) and requisite verification process as the CSCE follow-up meeting approaches:

tiveness of an Open Skies agreement. Nevertheless, the two regimes are qualitatively different. Open Skies is and must remain a confidence-building measure while aerial inspection should be geared to detecting and identifying armaments in the context of the CFE Treaty. There is a good deal of overlap, however, and any attempt to elaborate the two regimes (CFE aerial inspection and Open Skies) should strive to avoid duplication.

With these developments in mind, York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies was invited to host the Eighth Annual Ottawa Verification Symposium from March 6 to 10 as part of EAITS's Verification Research Program. Entitled "Towards Helsinki 1992: Arms Control in Europe and the Verification Process," the Symposium focused on the conventional arms control process at the outset of the resumption of the CFE IA, CSBM and Open Skies negotiations, in a manner that permitted the participants to draw upon existing experience to identify areas of commonality (to facilitate agreement) and areas to be considered (particularly in the negotiating process).

NATO Information Director Visits Ottawa

NATO's Director of Information and Press, Dr. Erika Bruce, a Canadian, visited Ottawa on February 5 to promote NATO Information Program activities. In her meetings with EAITS and National Defence officials, Dr. Bruce carried a strong message of encouragement for Canadians to take advantage of the many opportunities offered under NATO's Information Program to learn more about the Atlantic alliance and its evolving role in the new Europe. Activities such as the Visits, Speakers and Fellowships Programs have been particularly effective in promoting public interest in NATO and security issues both in North America and Europe.

Dr. Bruce also shared her enthusiasm for NATO activities designed to enhance cooperation and friendship with the newly-emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the USSR. Information Program initiatives such as the Democratic Institutions Fellowship Program and the April 1991 Prague Seminar on the Future of European Security have been immensely successful in achieving this goal. Dr. Bruce expressed optimism that Canada would continue to play a leading role in promoting NATO outreach to its former Warsaw Treaty adversaries.

For further information about NATO Information Program activities, contact the Defence Relations Division, EAITS, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0G2.

Canada-Netherlands Trial CFE Inspection: Exercise UMBRELLA HANDLE

From January 29 to February 1, a Canadian inspection team conducted a trial inspection of military facilities in the Netherlands under the provisions of the Inspection Protocol of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). Dubbed UMBRELLA HANDLE, the inspection was the second of two trials conducted jointly by Canada and the Netherlands to develop inspecting and hosting procedures and to train personnel. The first, ACID BREW, a trial chemical weapons inspection of the Canadian Forces base in Lahr, Germany, took place in November 1990.

To derive maximum training benefit and to test the Treaty for areas of ambiguity or potential difficulty, both nations agreed in advance to follow the Inspection Protocol closely, including adhering to in-country and inspection-site time constraints. The nine-person Canadian team was headed by L.Col. Charles Oliviero, Senior Arms Control Staff Officer at Canadian Forces Europe headquarters. The team members — all of whom were graduates of the Canadian Forces On-Site Inspector Course described in the Winter 1990/91 *Disarmament Bulletin* — were drawn from National Defence headquarters, EAITC and the Lahr arms control staff. Three Ottawa-based observers evaluated the Canadian team's preparations and inspection technique from a national perspective. The Netherlands escort team was comprised of 14 army and air force officers led by L.Col. Jos de Waart. The inspection group was joined by military observers from the nine Western European Union nations.

The inspection involved the confirmation of Treaty-limited equipment (TLE) holdings at two sites selected by the inspectors: an air force base and an army casern with training area. Each of these environments provided unique challenges. For example, the air base visit involved the sequential inspection of two fighter aircraft squadrons, with the second unit being examined at night. The army unit inspection included a helicopter flight to verify equipment deployed in the large training area. The inspection concluded with an extensive debriefing involving the two teams, observers and national representatives. The participants concluded that, in general, the Inspection Protocol provides a suitable framework for on-site inspections. Both Canada and the Netherlands expressed full satisfaction with the inspection.



Inspection of self-propelled artillery at the Van Steveninck army casern in the Netherlands.

Canadian Forces photo

Disarmament Fund Projects

The following recently-completed projects were assisted by a grant or contribution from EAITC's Disarmament Fund.

Over 200 academics, policy-makers and others from Europe and North America gathered in Quebec City on October 4 and 5, 1990 to discuss "The Germanies in a New Europe." This 22nd annual meeting of Laval University's Centre québécois de relations internationales (CQRI) examined economic, political and security issues related to the integration of Germany. Papers presented at the meeting will be published in a special issue of CQRI's *Choix*. For further information, contact the CQRI at Local 5460, Pavillon de Koninck, Université Laval, Ste-Foy, Quebec, G1K 7P4.

"Canadian Perspectives on Maritime Strategy" is the name of the latest in the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament's *Issue Brief* series. It offers comments on the US Navy's maritime strategy by Commander (ret'd) Peter Haydon of Halifax, Rear Admiral (ret'd) Fred Crickard, Research Associate with Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, and Dr. Douglas Ross, Director of the Centre for International Studies at Simon Fraser University. *Issue Brief 11* can be ordered from the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament at 151 Slater Street, Suite 710, Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 5H3. The price is \$5.50 (50 percent discount for members).

The second edition of *The Canadian Peace Educators' Directory*, edited by Wally Heinrichs and Rob Macintosh, is now available. The *Directory* provides detailed listings of 350 Canadian and international organizations concerned with formal education about peace and global issues. To order, contact The Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development, P.O. Box 7558, Drayton Valley, Alberta, T0E 0M0 (tel. 403-542-6272; fax 403-542-6464). The price is \$25.00.

Disarmament Fund Update

Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund, April 1, 1990 - March 31, 1991

CONTRIBUTIONS

1. Peace Education Centre of British Columbia, Vancouver — 1990 "Youth for Global Awareness Conference"	\$3,000
2. John Guy, University of Calgary — participation in the Ninth European Nuclear Disarmament Convention	300
3. Science for Peace, Toronto Chapter — University College Lectures in Peace Studies	1,000
4. Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, Ottawa — conference on "The Changing Soviet Union: Implications for Canada and the World"	10,000
5. Centre québécois de relations internationales, Laval University, Sainte-Foy, Quebec — conference on "The Germanies in a New Europe"	5,000
6. Mouvement Option Paix, Hull, Quebec — publication of a special issue of the magazine <i>Option Paix</i>	1,000
7. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa — symposium on nuclear weapons testing	10,000
8. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa — conference on "Canadian-Soviet Arctic Cooperation"	5,000
9. Charles Van Der Donckt, Sainte-Foy, Quebec — research on "The Naval Arms Race in South-East Asia: Regional and Strategic Implications"	5,000
10. Peter Brogden, Ryerson Polytechnical Institute, Toronto — workshop on "Technology for Arms Control Verification in the 1990s"	11,155
11. Political Studies Students' Conference, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg — conference on "In Defence of Canada: Constitutional, Economic and Security Dimensions"	6,000
TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS	\$57,455

GRANTS

1. Stornoway Productions Inc., Toronto — production of a documentary on UN peacekeeping	\$10,000
2. Albert Legault, Laval University, Sainte-Foy, Quebec — research comparing the arms control regimes of outer space and chemical weapons	6,000
3. Alex Morrison, Toronto — study of the verification issue at the United Nations	5,000
4. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva — verification research	25,000
5. United Nations World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund — communications activities	25,000
6. Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax — conference on "Maritime Interests, Conflict and the Law of the Sea"	10,344
7. United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, New York — television documentary on chemical weapons	10,000
8. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa — symposium on nuclear weapons testing	5,000
9. Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa — conference on "Canadian-Soviet Arctic Cooperation"	5,000
TOTAL OF GRANTS	\$101,344
TOTAL OF GRANTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS	\$158,799 ■

About the Disarmament Fund

The purpose of EAITC's Disarmament Fund is to encourage Canadian research and information-dissemination activities in the arms control and disarmament field.

The recipient of a Disarmament Fund grant or contribution can be a non-governmental organization (formal or informal), an academic or public interest group, or an individual. The Disarma-

ment Fund will assist in defraying the costs of a project only if it can be determined that the project will promote a *balanced* discussion of arms control and disarmament issues. A balanced discussion is one that takes into account or reflects the various—sometimes opposing—knowledgeable viewpoints on the subject of arms control and disarmament.

For the fiscal year 1991/92, \$45,000 is available in grants and \$66,000 is available in contributions, for a total of \$111,000.

To receive further information and an application form, contact the Disarmament Fund Secretary, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, EAITC, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0G2. ■

PTBT Amendment Conference Concludes Without Amendment



Seated at the podium at the opening of the PTBT Amendment Conference, from left to right: UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar; President of the Conference Ali Alatas, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia; and Secretary-General of the Conference Sohrab Kheradi.

UN photo 177195

By Ms Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament

Parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963 met at United Nations headquarters in New York from January 7 to 18 to consider a proposal to amend the Treaty to convert it into a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). The PTBT prohibits all parties from conducting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater, but allows testing underground. The proposed amendment would prohibit testing in all environments, including underground.

The Amendment Conference was convened at the request of one-third of the parties, as is required by the Treaty. The initiative reflected frustration on the part of many at the slow pace of progress towards the CTBT goal in other fora. However, numerous state parties, including Canada, initially expressed reservations about the value of holding such a conference. These reservations reflected several concerns, not the least of which was the fact that two of the three depositary states, all of whom enjoy a right of veto over any amendment, firmly opposed the proposed amendment and made clear that they would vote against it if it were pressed to a vote.

Despite our initial concerns, Canada was among the first Western countries to announce that it would attend the Amendment Conference and participate in its work in a constructive manner. As Ambassador for Disarmament, I headed the Canadian delegation to the Amendment Conference. The delegation of five included an expert on seismic verification and an advisor from a non-governmental organization.

In my opening statement to the Conference, I reiterated Canada's firm conviction regarding the importance of a CTBT and explained how we believe that progress towards this objective can be achieved. Our delegation was active in debate over verification requirements of an eventual CTBT, and a paper outlining the work that has been conducted in Canada in the area of seismic verification of a CTBT was circulated to the Conference.

The final week of the Amendment Conference was dominated by consideration of how to end the meeting, with some delegations favouring the reconvening of the Conference at a fu-

ture date and others opposed to such a continuation of the Conference. Despite intensive negotiations, it was not possible to reach a compromise on this question that could command the support of all parties. Instead the Conference concluded with a vote on a draft decision which stated that participating parties agreed to mandate the President of the Conference to continue consultations with a view to achieving progress on unresolved issues, such as verification and compliance with a CTBT, and to "resuming the Conference at an appropriate time."

This decision was adopted by a vote of 74 in favour, two against (United Kingdom, United States), and 19 abstentions. The abstentions included Canada and most of our NATO allies, Japan, Israel, the former Warsaw Treaty Organization countries of Eastern Europe and the European neutral countries of Finland, Switzerland and Austria.

In our view, it is regrettable that this draft decision was pressed to a vote. Genuine progress towards the CTBT goal can only be achieved through processes that include all relevant parties, particularly those most directly involved, i.e., the nuclear-weapon states.

"Holding a vote cannot create agreement where there is none, nor can it remove the necessity of agreement if the process purporting to be agreed upon is to have any meaning at all."

A divisive vote tends to polarize positions rather than build on the common ground shared by all parties. Canada abstained on the draft decision for this reason and because the draft decision inaccurately stated that there was agreement where no agreement, in fact, existed. As I said in my explanation of vote to the Conference, "holding a vote cannot create agreement where there is none, nor can it remove the necessity of agreement if the process purporting to

be agreed upon is to have any meaning at all."

Despite the fact that the Amendment Conference was unable to conclude with a consensus declaration or decision, I believe that the exercise was not a waste of time. The Conference provided an opportunity for a thorough and focused discussion of the CTBT issue and, in that regard, clarified the positions of a wide range of states on the issue. The deliberations should facilitate the Geneva Conference on Disarmament's consideration of a CTBT at its current session, which began shortly after the close of the Amendment Conference.

Canada regards the Conference on Disarmament as the appropriate multi-lateral forum to address the CTBT issue. Unlike the PTBT (to which France and China are not parties), all five nuclear-weapon states are represented in the Conference on Disarmament and there is agreement among all members to continue to work towards a CTBT in that forum. ■

Canada's Opening Statement to PTBT Amendment Conference

The following are extracts from the statement delivered by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason to the PTBT Amendment Conference in New York on January 10.

Prime Minister Mulroney has indicated the conclusion of a CTBT as one of six fundamental Canadian arms control and disarmament objectives. Canada's co-sponsorship of an annual United Nations General Assembly resolution entitled "Urgent need for a CTBT" reflects the priority that my government attaches to this issue...

Canada has traditionally viewed a ban on nuclear testing as an important means of stifling the development of new weapons that might have a destabilizing effect on international security. Not all new weapons and sys-

tems have such a negative impact. Nonetheless, as we experienced during the Cold War, an unbridled competition among nuclear-weapon states to develop new weapons breeds suspicion and uncertainty and detracts from efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.

Fortunately, the nuclear arms race, particularly in the context of the United States and the Soviet Union, is of a less alarming nature today than just a few short years ago. To their credit, the superpowers have embarked on a course of intensive negotiations which has led to the precedent-setting INF Treaty and, we expect, they will soon conclude a START treaty that will substantially reduce their arsenals of long-range nuclear weapons.

The United States and Soviet Union have committed themselves to follow up the implementation of a START agreement with negotiations on a START II treaty that would see further cuts to their stocks of strategic nuclear weaponry, and to hold broad discussions on enhancing strategic stability. Equally encouraging is the commitment of the two sides to commence negotiations in the very near future on short-range nuclear forces. Bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament have thus acquired considerable momentum. This process promises to continue to diminish and, we hope, permanently remove the threat of nuclear annihilation that for years loomed as a result of the confrontational atmosphere that was characteristic of the Cold War.


These developments, in my delegation's view, are most welcome and Canada urges both sides to persevere in their efforts to negotiate further deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals. However, these historic achievements do not obviate the need for a CTBT. The nuclear arms race cannot be definitively ended as long as states continue to develop and deploy, in an unregulated fashion, new nuclear weapons. A CTBT would make a significant contribution in this regard.

In addition to impeding the nuclear arms race, a CTBT would make a significant contribution towards discouraging the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Conducting nuclear

tests is an important element in any state's efforts to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. The conclusion of a CTBT with widespread, if not universal adherence, would represent an additional pillar of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. In a world where a number of non-nuclear-weapon states have yet to forego the nuclear weapon option in any binding international instrument, the value of a CTBT in this regard is, in Canada's view, significant.

Concern for the environmental effects of nuclear testing played a decisive role in the negotiation of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Underground testing does not represent the same hazard of radioactive fallout as did atmospheric testing. Nonetheless, in an era when all citizens of our planet must be aware of the hazards and irresponsibility of contaminating our environment, this aspect of nuclear testing is one that cannot be dismissed. Nuclear testing in unusually fragile environments raises particular concern. The conclusion of a CTBT is the only way to remove categorically this potential environmental threat.

Canada, like many other countries, has regretted that progress towards the goal of a CTBT has, for a number of years, been very slow and painstaking.



Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason.

This has reflected very different approaches on how efforts should proceed towards this goal and on the appropriate timing for the implementation of a CTBT.

While progress towards a CTBT has been elusive for many years, Canada believes that recent developments offer reason for hope that the process is on track and that significant progress on reducing and ultimately banning nuclear tests is within our reach in the foreseeable future.

Step-by-step approach is most realistic means of achieving progress towards CTBT goal.

Canada has long advocated a step-by-step approach as the most realistic means of achieving meaningful progress towards the CTBT goal. In our view, such a process allows, and indeed fosters, mutual confidence among the parties, and offers concrete experience on key issues such as compliance and verification that are crucial to the implementation of an effective CTBT.

The mechanism for such a step-by-step process has been in place since 1987 when the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to initiate "full-scale, stage-by-stage" negotiations on nuclear testing. These negotiations, as a first step, have succeeded in concluding verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976. The protocols were signed at the Washington presidential summit in June 1990 and Canada welcomes the fact that the ratification process of these treaties has now been completed, allowing them to be brought into force.

In Canada's view, the ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties provides a solid base upon which negotiations on further testing restrictions can be built. In this regard, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, in his statement to the 45th session of the United Nations General Assembly last September, expressed Canada's belief that the United States and the Soviet Union should immedi-

ately follow up their commitment to negotiate further restrictions on nuclear testing with the final goal of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. Canada urges the two states concerned to negotiate further limitations on their respective nuclear testing programs, which could include both limits on the number and yield of tests as intermediary measures on the road to the conclusion of an effective and verifiable CTBT at an early date.

Being a crucial issue of relevance to the entire international community, it is appropriate that efforts also be made in relevant multilateral fora to advance

towards the CTBT goal. Canada was pleased that the Conference on Disarmament, after a lengthy hiatus, succeeded in establishing an ad hoc committee during its 1990 session on the subject of a nuclear test ban. This development represents a breakthrough as it opens the door to substantive consideration of issues related to a CTBT. Although time was limited, the 1990 CD session engaged in useful preliminary work on the issues at hand. Canada looks forward to the re-establishment of this ad hoc committee, with the same mandate as in 1990, at the beginning of the CD's 1991 session, with a view to carrying forward the initial work undertaken last year.

The Conference on Disarmament has also undertaken important work over a number of years in verification of a CTBT, particularly in the area of seismic verification. The Group of Scientific Experts, in which Canadian representatives have been active, has made commendable efforts in fulfilling its mandate, given by the Conference on Disarmament in 1976, to devise a conceptual design for an international seismic data exchange system. The excellent work of the Group of Scientific Experts with the support of a wide range of technical experts around the world will, we believe, play a central role in the verification regime of a CTBT.

The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 marked an important achievement in

multilateral arms limitation and disarmament negotiations. This Treaty effectively ended atmospheric testing by the three nuclear-weapon signatories and set a norm — that of limiting nuclear testing to underground explosions — that is now adhered to by all five nuclear-weapon states. Furthermore, the preamble of the PTBT clearly reflected the yearning of the international community for a complete ban on nuclear testing and the nearly 120 parties to the Treaty have, in signing the Treaty, committed themselves to seeking this goal.

Those states party to the PTBT that called for the convening of this Conference have proposed that a CTBT be concluded by means of an amendment to the PTBT. Canada has consistently held the position that the conclusion of a CTBT has not yet been achieved because of fundamental differences among the international community over the appropriate process to achieve such a treaty, as well as over timing. These fundamental differences have constrained the work of the Conference on Disarmament and the bilateral negotiations on this issue and will similarly affect our consideration of a CTBT at this Conference.

However, despite the challenging nature of the task at hand, the Conference on Disarmament is now addressing this issue in a serious way. Canada believes that with the cooperation of the parties concerned, the CD, as well as the bilateral process, will succeed in overcoming the hurdles that stand in the way of concluding an effective CTBT...

Canada hopes that our collective efforts over the next week and a half will provide impetus to the Conference on Disarmament in its consideration of the nuclear test ban item. This, in our view, is the appropriate forum for multilateral work in pursuit of a CTBT. A serious and constructive approach by all delegations to this Conference can, in Canada's view, produce results that will enhance and expedite the work of the Conference on Disarmament on this issue. Canada will seek to ensure that our deliberations produce such a positive outcome.

B.C. Consultative Group Members Discuss Naval Arms Control

British Columbia members of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs met with Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason in Vancouver on February 11 to discuss a range of arms control and disarmament issues. In addition to Consultative Group members, the meeting included a number of others from the province who are knowledgeable about and interested in arms control and disarmament issues, as well as officials from EAITC and DND.

Consultative Group meetings provide an occasion for informed debate among people who approach current arms control and disarmament questions from very different perspectives. They also offer government representatives a chance to hear the most persuasive arguments in favour of and against various policy alternatives.

The Vancouver consultation focused in particular on naval arms control and disarmament. Participants listened to presentations by Ms Patti Willis (Resource Coordinator, Pacific Campaign to Disarm the Seas, Denman Island), Vice-Admiral (retired) Nigel Brodeur (Chairman, Defence Associations National Network Pacific Region, Victoria) and Dr. Douglas Ross (Director, Centre for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby).

Ms Willis called on Canada to take an active, visible role in promoting naval arms control and disarmament (ACD). She argued that the US and the USSR are engaged in an unrestrained naval arms race, which inherently increases the risk of war at sea. Some naval ACD measures could reduce the likelihood of inadvertent conflict.

Ms Willis observed that lack of political will on the US side is a larger obstacle to naval ACD than any technical difficulties. She was somewhat encouraged by recent developments and suggested that naval ACD is becoming more a question of "when" and "how" rather than "if."

Ms Willis recommended a number of steps that Canada could take to further

the cause of naval ACD. These included, among other things:

- making naval ACD one of the government's stated priority arms control and disarmament objectives;
- encouraging the expansion of present incidents-at-sea agreements to include sub-surface activities, and encouraging the multilateralization of such agreements;
- working with other countries that have proposed the regulation of nuclear-powered vessels;
- promoting naval confidence-building measures in the CSCE context, including an exchange of information on naval forces, notification and observation of naval exercises, and a dialogue on naval issues;
- encouraging the US to reevaluate its maritime strategy and to end its policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on naval vessels;
- encouraging the US and the USSR to agree to reduce further and eventually eliminate potential first-strike naval nuclear weapons, to agree to a ban on all long-range nuclear SLCMs, and to agree to limits on attack submarines; and
- encouraging the development of a regime to control submarine technology, along the lines of the existing MTCR.

V.Adm. Brodeur offered a historical perspective on the development of the Canadian Navy and inter-war arms control efforts, from which he drew lessons for present-day would-be naval arms controllers. He noted that the Canadian Navy has

long been involved in non-military activities, and that the need for future Canadian maritime forces will be governed largely by unforeseen events over which Canada may have little or no control. He further opined that in future the Navy will probably require more, as opposed to fewer, forces.

In V.Adm. Brodeur's view, the inter-war Washington and London Conference treaties were unsuccessful because they failed to limit the submarine and failed to prevent the rise of Germany and Japan as naval powers. He drew these lessons from the experience:

- any Pacific naval ACD measures must be equitable and binding on all Pacific Rim nations;
- those who lack the naval qualifications and experience to do so should avoid indulging in the "numbers game"; and
- nations must not fail to adequately address submarines and naval industrial capacity when considering naval ACD measures.

V.Adm. Brodeur concluded that efforts to abolish nuclear-powered sub-



At the Consultative Group meeting in Vancouver, from left to right: Col. Alain Pellerin, Director, Nuclear and Arms Control Policy, DND; R.Adm. Peter Cairns, Commander, Maritime Forces Pacific, DND; Dr. Douglas Ross; Ambassador Peggy Mason; Mr. Dennis Snider, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, EAITC; V.Adm. Nigel Brodeur; Ms Patti Willis.

marines or to impose a moratorium on their construction or proliferation would be so strongly opposed by many nations that they would be doomed to failure. He argued that a similar fate would befall any measures seeking to exclude states from portions of the high seas. He thought that confidence-building measures involving meetings, the exchange of naval visits, and agreements designed to prevent incidents at sea

Southeast Asia, where a naval arms race is in progress.

Dr. Ross argued that desirable naval ACD measures would include:

- the denuclearization of ships and attack submarines and/or a ban on all SLCMs;
- a ban or deep cuts in counterforce-capable sea-launched ballistic missiles such as Trident II;
- a nuclear-free zone for parts of the Pacific, such as the Northwest;
- reciprocal anti-submarine warfare (ASW)-free zones;
- a variety of CSBMs such as the notification of naval exercises, exchanges between naval officer training schools, and agreements to prevent incidents at sea.

Turning to the potential Canadian role in naval ACD, Dr. Ross suggested that Canada should concentrate its diplomatic efforts on Tokyo and Moscow, perhaps encouraging the Soviets to opt for solely Arctic basing of their ballistic missile submarine fleet. In addition, Canada should promote transparency at sea by investing in satellite inspection and verification technologies. Although such activities would be expensive, Dr. Ross argued that the costs of doing nothing are also high. He also recommended that Canada oppose the offensive dimension of the US maritime strategy.

In the subsequent discussion, one participant echoed Dr. Ross's assertion that without naval ACD, countries will move to unilateral naval solutions involving increasingly sophisticated technology. It was suggested that emerging nuclear-weapon powers, in particular, will be interested in developing the submarine as a delivery platform. This participant argued that modern nuclear-powered submarines pose an enormous offensive threat and that many countries in both North and South have an interest in restricting access to submarine technology. He advocated movement towards a nuclear-powered submarine

control — i.e., non-proliferation — regime.

Several participants observed that the initiative for naval ACD must come from the US and that Canada is not likely to have much influence on this issue. One participant argued that Canada is perceived by other Pacific nations, such as Japan, as playing a minimal role in the Pacific and therefore as having little right to say in Pacific security matters. A number of participants agreed that the notion of credibility is important if Canada wishes to have a voice on naval ACD issues. It was suggested that to have credibility in the North Pacific, Canada must demonstrate commitment and risk in the region.

Some participants felt that Canada's greatest hope for influence on naval ACD issues lies in "nudging" the US to be more open to naval talks of one sort or another. Another participant argued, however, that Canada is not likely to be able to nudge the US very far and that attempting to do so could raise suspicions among other countries about Canada's commitment to naval ACD. It was suggested that Canada should instead take action on issues that benefit its maritime security but on which the US does not have a strong position. For example, Canada could conduct ecological surveillance of the oceans, making public every instance of suspicious activity it finds. Other suggestions included that Canada should spend the money necessary to improve maritime transparency in all areas, and that it should use the UN as the primary vehicle for promoting naval ACD.

One participant suggested that naval ACD is going to be a long, incremental process, beginning with simple CSBMs and political solutions to regional disputes. A couple of participants questioned whether naval forces could be dealt with in a vacuum, given Soviet suggestions that future CFE and START agreements will be dependent on the inclusion of naval forces, and given Soviet efforts to circumvent the CFE Treaty by transferring Treaty-limited equipment to naval units. It was suggested that we may see a hiatus in meaningful ACD at any level until naval armaments are dealt with.

Credibility important if Canada wishes to have a voice on naval ACD issues.

were worth pursuing. In addition, he saw potential in an "open seas" transparency measure.

In his presentation, Dr. Ross noted that there has been a significant pulling back from confrontation in recent years in the Pacific. US and Soviet forces have been shrinking through modernization and this trend is likely to continue, although it has not been matched by reduced defence spending by other countries in East and Southeast Asia. While an early start to naval arms control negotiations would be desirable, strong US opposition to formal negotiations makes the early prospect of significant naval ACD highly unlikely.

According to Dr. Ross, naval ACD would be beneficial in terms of lowering the costs of naval development, reducing the risk of inadvertent war caused by the deployment of new systems capable of surprise attack, and stemming the proliferation of new naval warfare technologies to third countries. In Dr. Ross's view, the US is turning away from a closing "window of opportunity" to stabilize developments in the Pacific through naval ACD. There is a need for collective security arrangements and reciprocal naval confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) to prevent a rush into unilateral improvements in naval technology. Dr. Ross said that Canada's proposal for a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue is a step in the right direction, although its prospects for success seem limited. He suggested that there is also a need for regional security arrangements in

A number of participants argued that Canada should refuse to accept port visits from nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered ships, and that government plans to deal with potential nuclear accidents in Canadian ports are ineffective. One participant suggested that DND is well-prepared for accidents, but does not have sufficient decontamination units to handle the probable number of casualties. It was recommended that the government either provide the civilian protection and response capabilities needed, or stop the ships from coming into Canadian harbours. This led into a discussion of the likelihood of a nuclear-related accident, with some suggesting the risk is high while others suggesting it is extremely low.

A number of other topics were also discussed at the meeting. Comments on each are summarized below.

World Summit

A number of participants voiced approval of the Canadian proposal for a World Summit on Instruments of War and Weapons of Mass Destruction and of the general Canadian outline for post-hostilities activities in the Gulf region. It was suggested that Canada might also want to support the concept of humanitarian ceasefires (for immunization and other civilian relief purposes) in the Gulf War and other conflicts.

Chemical and biological weapons control

One participant noted that as chemical and biological weapons technologies have ready civilian applications, industrialized countries cannot easily deny these technologies to the Third World. He suggested that to make verifiable chemical and biological weapons agreements more attractive to developing countries, any proposed international inspectorate should deal with health and environmental, as well as proliferation, concerns. For example, an inspecting agency could provide advice on safety and security issues and procedures.

Missile technology control

The overlap between the technologies required for missile and satellite development was noted, along with its implications for a potential North-

South divide on control issues, as evidenced by Indian concerns about the implications for commercial secrecy of an intrusive verification regime. It was suggested that states such as India are not prepared to accept another two-tier system like the non-proliferation regime in the area of missile technology control.

Arms transfers

It was suggested that there is hypocrisy in Canada's encouraging others to restrain their arms exports while we continue to subsidize weapons production and participate in arms exhibitions. Some participants recommended that Canada stop exporting arms completely (or stop, at minimum, exporting arms to the Middle East).

It was suggested that Canada use the "Group of Seven" industrialized countries or OECD or other forum, possibly East-West, to organize a discussion on the control of conventional arms transfers prior to the World Summit.

CTBT

One participant argued that Canada's policy towards the PTBT Amendment Conference was inconsistent with our stated goal of achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT).

Another participant made the following recommendations for Canadian action on a CTBT:

- strongly support constituencies in the US that are pressing for early negotiation of a CTBT;
- further develop our step-by-step policy by defining the number and upper yield of tests to be negotiated in future steps, with reductions each year to a target date for eliminating all testing. This position could be presented in a working paper to the CD's ad hoc committee that deals with nuclear testing issues; and
- actively assist the President of the PTBT Amendment Conference in his mandate to conduct consultations and to resume the work of the Conference at an appropriate time.

Approaches to security and arms control

Several participants argued that prospective arms controllers should not

look at weapons in the abstract but should also consider the underlying security concerns that lead countries to accumulate weapons. It was suggested that a variety of bilateral and multi-lateral political agreements must be in place before arms control has a hope of being successful. In this regard, Canada's approach to post-war activities in the Persian Gulf and general proposals for cooperative security were welcomed. It was noted that non-governmental organizations have advocated similar ideas for years.

One participant opined that NATO's success has been due to the fact that it is a political, as well as military, body, that it has worked through consensus, and that it has operated under the UN umbrella. NATO could thus perhaps serve as a model for other regional security arrangements. Others disagreed, arguing that NATO has been successful in exporting its wars over the past forty years. It was also suggested that NATO's success has had much to do with the wealth of the countries involved, thus the alliance may not be a useful model for other regions.

It was suggested that Canada's arms control efforts are close to being counterproductive. Rather than act as if the norm is to have weapons and to solve conflicts by resort to violence, Canada should instead try to change the norm, so that weapons and resort to violence are regarded as unacceptable.

Several participants argued that true security cannot be achieved through armaments. It was suggested that disarmament is a mechanical process and that arms controllers should broaden their view to look at issues of peace and justice.

Arms and the environment

Some participants expressed concern about the potential for environmental disaster as a result of the Gulf War.

In addition, it was suggested that Canada should put the issue of the environmental consequences of preparations for war and of war itself on the agenda of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, to be held in Brazil in June 1992. ■

1991 UNDC Starts With Fresh Slate

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) will hold its 1991 substantive session from April 22 to May 13 at UN headquarters in New York. The UNDC is a deliberative body established in its present form in 1979 to give in-depth consideration to a select number of disarmament-related issues.

Recent years saw the agenda of the UNDC expand and consideration of a number of items stall as a result of profound differences of approach among participating members. Alarmed that the UNDC risked losing its relevance to multilateral disarmament altogether, following the 1989 session many countries urged the implementation of reforms to revitalize the institution. This culminated in agreement on a set of reforms, approved by consensus, that were brought into effect at the 1990 session. Primary among these was the decision to conclude all outstanding items at the 1990 session so that the UNDC could begin anew in 1991 with a clear slate. To the credit of its members, the UNDC lived up to this commitment and terminated at the 1990 session its consideration of all carry-over items.

As agreed in the reform package, beginning with the 1991 session the UNDC will limit the number of items on its working agenda to four. One of these, "Objective information on military matters," received preliminary consideration at last year's session and will be examined in greater depth this year. Canada, like many other countries, was very satisfied with the initial discussion of this subject under the chairmanship of Austria, and is optimistic that the UNDC's eventual conclusions on this item will be of value.

Three new items appear on the 1991 working agenda. The item entitled "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security" will offer an unprecedented opportunity — in a global, multilateral forum — to thoroughly examine issues of regional disarmament, including, no doubt, confidence- and security-building measures.

The item on "The role of science and technology in the context of international

security, disarmament and other related fields" will provide a forum for debate of an important issue that has yet to receive in-depth consideration at the multilateral level. Under this subject, it is expected that the issue of modernization of weapons systems and its impact on the international security environment will be examined.

The final item on the 1991 working agenda is entitled "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons." Nuclear disarmament has been considered at length in the past by the UNDC and has been an issue on which progress has proved to be most difficult. This divergence of views at the multilateral level has continued despite unprecedented progress in nuclear arms control at the bilateral level.

The Canadian delegation to the 1991 UNDC session will be headed by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason. Canada views the session as an opportunity to solidify the gains made last year at reinvigorating the UNDC, and looks forward to participating actively in discussions on all items. ■

NIAG Study Status

By Dr. F.J.F. Osborne. Dr. Osborne, a space consultant with Spar Aerospace Limited of Montreal, is Deputy Chairman of the NIAG study group. This article is extracted from a presentation given at the Eighth Annual Ottawa Verification Symposium in March.

Background

The NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) study on conventional disarmament verification originated as an industrial initiative proposed to NIAG for submission to NATO (see Fall 1990 *Disarmament Bulletin*, p. 15). The study proposed the development of a comprehensive data base of technologies presently available or projected

to be so within the NATO partners and applicable to conventional arms control and verification.

The study is the responsibility of and directed by a Study Management Group, with representatives of the industries of the participating nations. Work is divided amongst five study teams, dealing respectively with: (1) Integrated Systems Requirements; (2) Integrated System Design; (3) Space Technologies; (4) Aerial Technologies; and (5) Land Technologies. The study was initiated in late May 1990. First total report integration is to take place in April 1991.

Integrated requirements

The study is unusual for NATO in that, as an industrial initiative, the work did not respond to a NATO requirements document, nor was there a single clear sponsoring group within NATO. Consequently, Team 1 was charged with developing the study requirements to be used by the other teams, which it did by studying arms control treaties under discussion and/or negotiation. This team also had to develop general technical specifications regarding the needs, the time scales of verification and processing, the confidence levels required, the definition of militarily-significant deviations, and related matters.

Integrated systems

Team 2 was charged with developing the verification system concept. Thus Team 2 interpreted the requirements of Team 1 in terms of general technologies applicable, or of potential interest, and assigned responsibilities for the requirements across the technology teams. Because the study involves not only present capabilities but also those projected as available a decade or more from now, it was anticipated that alternate total systems configurations would be available, depending on the actions allowed by the treaties of differing eras.

As the study progressed, it was found that the technological assessments could be made against a set of six generic problems. These were: to monitor infrastructure; to monitor Treaty-limited equipment (TLE) parking areas; to

count items that might be TLE (including look-alikes, etc); to count identified TLE; to assess traffic flow; and to detect new installations.

Space technology

The Space Team examined the imaging instruments appropriate to its assigned verification tasks and projected the capabilities of instruments. These sensor performance data were developed into scenarios by combining them with orbital considerations and data on spacecraft buses and launch vehicles. It must be noted that neither the "national technical means" of the superpowers nor the military programs of any nation were considered in the course of the study.

To develop cost data regarding operations and data processing, it was found necessary to postulate a generalized architecture for the system as a technical assumption. Since in any reasonable configuration the space system was data-intensive, a portion of the capability was communications. Thus, consideration was given to support of the communications requirements of the entire verification system including such aspects as on-site inspection (OSI) and the verification data dissemination.

Aerial technology

The Aerial Team's approach was somewhat similar, but the presently available technologies and platforms are demonstrably a better match to the assigned problems. The conclusions of Team 2 were an early indication of an ability to support an Open Skies regime.

Land technology

The Land Technologies Team had the greatest diversity of operations and thus potential for innovation. As indicated above, the overall study encompassed treaty data validation, TLE destruction or disposal confirmation, and compliance monitoring, all of which are or can be addressed by terrestrial procedures.

Many of the technologies in respect to portal/choke-point monitoring, perimeter or line monitoring and area

surveillance are drawn directly from well-developed civil technologies. In the early stages of the Land Team's activity, working definitions had to be developed for OSI, with both visiting and hosting aspects of OSI operations being considered.

The Land Team was also charged with considering "tagging" technologies, because this is a highly cooperative and potentially intrusive operation similar to OSI. The definitions used in the study included cooperative signature enhancements on TLE as well as various transponding and/or otherwise readable identifiers.

The problems of TLE disposal were treated in some detail to determine the

optimum approach to validation of "disablement" or "disposal." This emphasis is, of course, a result of the immediacy of CFE I and the recognition of the high costs and environmental problems of effective disposal.

Conclusion

Although it is not appropriate to speculate on the final study conclusions and recommendations, it is clear that present and projected technologies available to NATO can be applied to the verification of conventional armament agreements, improving the effectiveness of the arms control process within a treaty environment. ■

Study on the Future of Verification

A new climate of East-West cooperation on security-related matters has emerged as the hallmark of recent years, resulting in a number of arms control and disarmament agreements. The process of verification cannot help but be affected by these developments; this will continue throughout the decade. However, exactly how current trends in arms control are likely to evolve and affect verification remains to be seen.

A recently-completed Canada-US research project explores this issue in depth. The genesis of the project — which was funded by EAITC's Verification Research Program — was the desire to examine the requirements, challenges and opportunities likely to face the verification process in the 1990s. Four distinguished scholars — two Americans (Ambassador Sidney Graybeal and Dr. Patricia McFate) and two Canadians (Dr. George Lindsey and Mr. James Macintosh) — were invited to:

- identify trends with respect to the verification of arms control and disarmament agreements (including confidence-building), both bilateral and multilateral;
- outline how these trends may be expected to evolve to the year 2000; and

- suggest profitable areas for further research in the field.

The resulting report, entitled "Verification to the Year 2000," represents an innovative, insightful and rigorous attempt to examine developments over the next ten years with respect to verifying arms control and disarmament agreements in both the bilateral and multilateral fields.

This report is also a significant example of Canadian-American cooperative research in verification. The Verification Research Program has, in the past, undertaken projects on a government-to-government level with several other countries including the US. This project, however, is one of the first in which representatives from Canadian and American industry, academia and government have come together under the auspices of the Program.

"Verification to the Year 2000" is being published as the fourth major study in EAITC's *Arms Control Verification Studies* series and will soon be available for distribution to specialists in the field. It should provide useful guidance for what promises to be an exciting decade in international security and arms control verification.

Focus: On the Arms Trade

Focus is designed primarily for secondary school students. We welcome your comments and suggestions for future topics.

The Gulf War has made a lot of countries stop and think twice about the arms they are selling around the world. Many of the weapons used by Iraq during the War were supplied by the five permanent members of the Security Council — China, France, the UK, the US and the USSR — three of which fought in the coalition against Iraq. This shows one of the dangers of the arms trade for suppliers: that the arms you supply might one day be used against you. But there are other dangers of the arms trade for suppliers, recipients and the international community as a whole. This is why Canada has proposed that there should be more controls on the arms trade.

What is the arms trade?

There is no one, accepted definition of the arms trade. We can, however, say this about it.

1. The arms trade involves conventional weapons and other conventional military equipment (such as bullets, guns, tanks, and submarines), not weapons of mass destruction (such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons).

2. The arms trade also involves components of conventional weapons and military equipment, as well as services and knowledge directly related to the production or operation of conventional weapons. This means, for example, that an American instructor training fighter pilots in Saudi Arabia would be considered part of the arms trade.

3. The arms trade involves weapons designed to be used by regular or irregular (such as rebel) military forces. This means that guns bought for hunting or collecting are not considered part of the arms trade.

4. Trade takes place when control over the equipment, services or knowledge is transferred to a recipient that is not a national of the supplier

country. The recipient is usually — but not always — located outside the supplier country. For example, it is not considered trade when the Department of National Defence sends weapons from Canada to Canadian forces in Germany. It would, however, be considered trade if DND bought weapons for those forces from a German company.

5. Trade can be between governments, companies, groups or individuals.

How big is the arms trade?

The arms trade is hard to measure. Most countries don't publish statistics about how many arms they supply or receive. The countries that do publish statistics don't all use the same standards of measurement or define arms in the same way. Measures of the arms trade usually include only weapons and components, not services and knowledge.

It is estimated that the value of arms traded in 1988 was US\$49 billion. This is less than in previous years. The size of the arms trade rose throughout the 1960s and 1970s, reaching a peak in the mid-1980s. Although the size of the trade has dropped off since then, more sophisticated weapons are being traded.

The leading exporters (or suppliers) of arms are the USSR, the US, France, the UK, China and West Germany. These six countries alone accounted for almost 90 percent of the major weapons exported between 1985 and 1989.

The leading arms importers (or recipients) are India, Iraq, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Spain, Turkey, Poland and Afghanistan. These 12 countries accounted for over 50 percent of the major weapons imported between 1985 and 1989.

The arms trade is thus fairly concentrated, with a small number of countries accounting for a large percentage of the trade.

What is good about the arms trade?

People sometimes talk about the arms trade as if it were an entirely bad practice. However, there are some benefits to the trade — at least for suppliers and recipients — otherwise they wouldn't engage in it. There are also benefits for the international community.

Security benefits

For recipients, buying weapons can increase a country's security by making the country more able to deter and defend against attack. Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, every state has the right to defend itself if an armed attack occurs. So every state also has the right to acquire the means necessary for such self-defence.

For suppliers, providing arms to a country may substitute for the supplier having to send its own forces to help defend allies, or may mean it can send less forces.

For the international community, the arms trade can make war less likely by helping to ensure there is a stable balance of forces among countries in a region.

Political benefits

For suppliers and recipients, arms transfers help to cement good relations among friends and allies.

Military benefits

Arms transfers help to promote the standardization of equipment between suppliers and recipients, making it easier for allies to share parts and cooperate in training.

Participating in the arms trade makes it easier for suppliers to maintain an arms-producing industry to supply their own armed forces.

Economic benefits

For suppliers, the arms trade creates jobs and provides a source of cash. In addition, it reduces the costs of producing weapons for one's own armed forces.

For recipients, importing arms makes it unnecessary to invest in expensive arms industries of one's own. For many developing countries, arms transfers are the easiest way to gain access to the advanced technology of the developed arms exporters. Sometimes this technology can be used in non-military ways. Furthermore, developed suppliers will often build infrastructure — such as roads, ports, airstrips and bridges — for developing recipients so they can use the weapons they have bought. This, too, benefits the civilian economy.

What is bad about the arms trade?

Although there are benefits to the arms trade, there are also many drawbacks.

Security drawbacks

For the recipient, acquiring arms does not always increase security. The supplier's weapons may not be suited to the terrain, climate or skills of the recipient. The supplier may learn important details about the recipient's armed forces that could be used against it in a war. In addition, acquiring arms can put the recipient out of balance with neighbouring countries and lead to a regional arms race. This, in turn, can make war more likely. This is a big drawback of the arms trade for the international community.

There are security drawbacks for suppliers as well. As was mentioned earlier, the supplier's arms could someday be used against it. As well, suppliers may be drawn into recipient's wars.

For all parties, the build-up of traded arms can make wars more deadly and make them last longer.

Political drawbacks

The recipient may have to change some of its policies to suit the supplier.

The arms trade can encourage the militarization of the recipient — that is, it can enhance the position of the military in society, giving it priority over civilian needs. Highly militarized societies are more likely to have repressive governments and human rights abuses.

The arms trade can lead to the presence of many foreigners in the recipient country (e.g., building infrastructure, providing training or technical support). This can cause strains in the recipient society.

Military drawbacks

Filling foreign orders can leave the supplier short of weapons for its own armed forces. In addition, the weapons produced may be designed to suit the export market and not the supplier's forces.

The recipient can become dependent on the supplier for spare parts, ammunition and technical services.

Economic drawbacks

The supplier may become dependent on the international arms market which is highly competitive and unstable.

For the recipient, buying arms can lead to large debt loads. The weapons also absorb resources that could otherwise go to social and economic development.

Controlling the arms trade

Since there are both benefits and drawbacks to the arms trade, the question to ask is not "what can we do to stop the arms trade?" Rather, it is "what can we do to limit the bad effects of the arms trade while preserving the good ones?"

Some controls on the arms trade already exist. Most countries have policies restricting the export of arms from their territories. Canada, for example, has very strict controls on its arms exports. We generally don't export arms to:

- countries that pose a threat to Canada and its allies;
- countries involved in or likely to soon be in a war;
- countries under Security Council sanctions; and
- countries whose governments have a persistent record of serious violations of human rights, unless it can be shown that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population.

Canada is not a major arms exporter. We account for less than one percent of the global arms trade.

Even though countries have their own controls, there is currently no international treaty or mechanism for the widespread control of conventional arms transfers.

Earlier this year, Canada proposed several measures to reduce the bad effects of the arms trade. We suggested that there should be a meeting of the major arms exporters, at which they could agree to pay more attention to the potentially harmful effects of their arms transfers, and to consult on situations where large or unusual build-ups of arms seem to be developing.

We also called for countries to make the arms trade more transparent, by exchanging information about their arms transfers. Right now, not much information is available about the arms trade. Reliable information about arms imports could prevent countries from overestimating the amount of arms their neighbours are receiving and could thus slow down arms races based on misperception. In this sense, transparency would build confidence, as discussed in "Focus" in *Disarmament Bulletin* 12 (Winter 1989/90). In addition, increased public knowledge about arms transfers might stop suppliers and recipients from carrying out some transfers because they fear a bad reaction. Transparency measures could also create a base of information for further study and control of the arms trade. Canada recently published a report of its arms exports, to promote transparency.

Canada has also called for the countries that signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (discussed in "Focus" in *Disarmament Bulletin* 15) not to send the arms they don't need because of disarmament in Europe to regions of tension or war.

Obstacles to controlling the arms trade

The arms trade is not easy to control. Many recipients are suspicious of attempts to restrain arms exports. They argue that arms transfer controls make it harder for them to defend themselves

but do nothing to stop arms build-ups in countries that have developed their own arms industries.

A number of suppliers, as well, are not interested in controlling the arms trade. They see exporting arms as a way to make money and to help sustain their defence industries. Since a large number of countries make small arms and other unsophisticated weapons systems, recipients can always turn to them if the major suppliers stop supplying.

Effective arms transfer controls depend on countries agreeing on what is and is not an "arm" and on having border guards and customs officials trained to recognize such items. Many pieces of equipment — such as helicopters — have both military and non-military uses. Countries may import these so-called "dual-use" items for civilian purposes and then turn them to military use. In addition, the sale of arms is gradually being replaced by the sale of technology, which is harder to identify and control.

There is a small "black market" in arms. This illegal trade will likely increase if it becomes more difficult to legally trade arms.

Conclusion

Since only about 20 percent of the arms produced in the world are traded, even a complete end to the arms trade would not prevent countries from acquiring too many arms. However, more controls on the arms trade would help to limit some of the drawbacks of the trade and thus would benefit suppliers, recipients and the international community. Controls on the arms trade would be most effective if they were combined with agreements to limit all arms — whether imported or produced locally — in a region, and with other measures to build confidence among countries and reach solutions to conflicts. These are the kind of measures that Canada is promoting in the Middle East. We hope that suppliers and recipients will learn the lessons of the Gulf War and move in the direction of achieving security with lower levels of weapons. More controls on the arms trade would be a useful part of this. ■



Canadian Forces personnel in the Persian Gulf fitting ammunition to the ship-board Phalanx air defence system. The Gulf War has made many countries take a closer look at controlling the arms trade.

Canadian Forces photo

Forecast

A list of arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, May through September 1991.

Ongoing: CSBM Negotiations, Vienna

Ongoing: CFE IA Negotiation, Vienna

Ongoing: CFE I Joint Consultative Group meetings, Vienna

April 22 - May 13: UN Disarmament Commission, New York

May 14 - June 28: CD in session, Geneva

July 23 - September 9: CD in session, Geneva

September 9-27: Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, Geneva ■

Acronyms

ACD — arms control and disarmament
ASW — anti-submarine warfare
BTWC — Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
BW — biological weapons

CBM — confidence-building measure
CD — Conference on Disarmament
CFE — Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
COCOM — Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls
CSBM — confidence- and security-building measure
CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTB(T) — comprehensive test ban (treaty)
CW — chemical weapons
DND — Department of National Defence
EAITC — External Affairs and International Trade Canada
ECL — Export Control List
INF — intermediate-range nuclear forces
MTCR — Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIAG — NATO Industrial Advisory Group
NPT — Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OECD — Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSI — on-site inspection
PTBT — Partial Test Ban Treaty
SLCM — sea-launched cruise missile
START — Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TLE — Treaty-limited equipment
UNDC — United Nations Disarmament Commission
UNGA — United Nations General Assembly ■

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Disarmament Bulletin

A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

Number 17 - Fall 1991

Leaders Resolve to Tackle Proliferation

Canada's call for action echoes through high-level meetings

Spurred by the Gulf War, political leaders around the world have taken up the call sounded by Canada in February for stronger efforts to stop the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, missiles and excessive build-ups of conventional arms. The spring and summer saw a series of high-level declarations condemning proliferation and committing governments to action.

At the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly held from June 3 to 8 in Santiago, Chile, OAS foreign ministers — Canada's Barbara McDougall among them — recognized the perils of proliferation and agreed to begin consultations on hemispheric security, including proliferation issues. Member States subsequently gave unanimous approval to a resolution proposed by Canada that condemned proliferation and initiated OAS study of the subject, including the possibility of exchanging information about arms transfer policies and of consulting about excessive arms build-ups.

In Copenhagen on June 6 and 7, Mrs. McDougall and her NATO counterparts discussed the dangers to international security posed by proliferation and renewed their commitment to early progress in international fora dealing with proliferation issues.

CSCE foreign ministers meeting in Berlin on June 19 and 20 agreed, at Canada's encouragement, that halting the spread of weapons of mass destruction and promoting restraint and transparency in conventional arms



At the G7 London summit: SSEA Barbara McDougall, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, USA President George Bush, Netherlands Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek and Netherlands Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers.

Bill McCarthy, PMO

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External Affairs and
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Canada

transfers should be a priority of CSCE governments. They decided to maintain a dialogue on these issues.

Such statements were paralleled in fora of which Canada is not a member.

Recent declarations increase likelihood of faster action to stop the spread of dangerous weapons.

On June 29, leaders of the European Community issued a declaration supporting strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, improvement of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and early agreement on a chemical weapons convention. They also advocated immediate international action to promote restraint and transparency in the transfer of conventional weapons and said they hoped to strive towards harmonization of national arms export policies.

This was followed on July 8 and 9 by a USA-initiated meeting in Paris of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to review issues related to non-proliferation and conventional

arms transfers, with emphasis on the Middle East. The five — China, France, the UK, the USA and the USSR — agreed to support the establishment of a UN arms transfer register, to develop and

observe rules of restraint for transferring arms, and to consult and exchange information about arms transfers to the Middle East. They also supported the goal of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

Canada welcomed the outcome of the Paris meeting, which followed closely the objectives Canada has been promoting on a global basis. As the world's major arms exporters, the Security Council "Permanent Five" have a spe-

cial responsibility to prevent excessive arms build-ups. The Paris meeting made clear that they recognize and accept this responsibility.

Canada's attempts to ensure priority consideration of proliferation issues met with further success at the summit meeting of the Group of Seven leading industrialized countries held in London in mid-July. In a declaration issued on July 16, Prime Minister Mulroney and the leaders of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the USA expressed their determination to tackle the unchecked spread of weapons.

On conventional arms, the Group of Seven (G7) pledged to work for the early adoption of a UN arms transfer register, to encourage all countries to exercise restraint in transferring arms, especially in cases of advanced technology weapons and in sales to countries and areas of concern, and to give these issues their continuing close attention.

On nuclear weapons, they agreed to work towards maintaining and reinforcing the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty beyond 1995, improving the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system and achieving Nuclear Suppliers Group measures to ensure adequate export controls on dual-use items.

The G7 also committed themselves to pursuit of a strengthened BTWC, to conclusion of a chemical weapons convention as soon as possible, and to improved control of exports that could contribute to the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. In addition, they called on all countries to adopt the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines for missile technology transfer.

This recent proliferation of non-proliferation declarations is encouraging and increases the likelihood of faster action to stop the spread of dangerous weapons. One of Canada's objectives in launching its February initiative was to stimulate leaders to inject political will into existing efforts to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to begin efforts to curb unwarranted accumulations of conventional arms. This objective is well on its way to being reached.

CSCE Ministers' Conclusions

The following are highlights from the Summary of Conclusions of the meeting of CSCE foreign ministers in Berlin on June 19 and 20.

2. The Ministers welcomed the Republic of Albania as a participating State of the CSCE.
6. They adopted a mechanism for consultation and cooperation with regard to emergency situations.
7. They decided that the communication network, to be established under the provisions of the Vienna CSBM Document 1990, will be preferably used for all communications foreseen in the procedures in emergency situations.
9. They welcomed the establishment of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly.
15. They looked forward to a range of informal discussions and consultations on new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building open to all CSCE participating States. In this context, they requested their representatives in Vienna...to start informal preparatory consultations in September this year aimed at establishing by 1992, from the conclusion of the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building open to all participating States as set out in the Charter of Paris. They decided that formal preparatory negotiations for the new forum will be carried out at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting.
17. In the light of the recent experience in the Gulf region, the Ministers see a need to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction and for restraint and transparency in the transfer of conventional weapons and weapons technologies, particularly to regions of tension. This should be a priority of CSCE governments, and Ministers agreed to maintain a dialogue on these issues among CSCE countries.

Canada continues to believe that there is value in convening a high-level meeting of representatives from states around the globe to focus on proliferation issues. By attempting to bridge the North-South, supplier-recipient divide, such a meeting would complement the work of other, primarily supplier-based fora such as the G7 and the Permanent Five. It also has the potential to encourage all countries to work together towards objectives that are in the interests of the entire international community. Further to its February call for a World Summit on proliferation, Canada is consulting with a regionally-representative group of countries on ways to jointly promote non-proliferation objectives, including the possibility of a high-level meeting.

Canada also continues to pursue the points of its action plan on non-proliferation, described in *Disarmament Bulletin* 16. As you will read in this *Bulletin*,

we are seeking to strengthen the BTWC at its Third Review Conference and, in collaboration with others, are drafting a UN resolution to establish a global arms trade register. In addition, we are working to conclude a global chemical weapons convention, to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and to improve the Missile Technology Control Regime.

Canada will actively follow-up on the declarations made in the OAS, the CSCE, the G7 and other fora to ensure that proliferation issues receive continuing, priority attention and that political commitments are translated into something tangible. A sustained combination of political will and serious action should make the secretive build-up of an Iraqi-style arsenal — with its destabilizing effects on regional and international security — much less likely in future. ■

New SSEA



On April 21, the Honourable Barbara McDougall was appointed Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA). She replaces the Right Honourable Joe Clark, who had held the post since September 1984. Mr. Clark is now Minister Responsible for Constitutional Affairs and President of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada.

Mrs. McDougall was first elected to Parliament in September 1984 to represent the Toronto riding of St. Paul's. She has served as Minister of State (Finance), Minister of State (Privatization), Minister Responsible for the Status of Women, Minister Responsible for Regulatory Affairs and Minister of Employment and Immigration.

Prior to her election in 1984, Mrs. McDougall had a distinguished career in the financial sector in Vancouver, Edmonton and Toronto.

Mrs. McDougall serves as Chairperson of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy. She sits on the Planning and Priorities Committee of Cabinet and is also a member of the Cabinet Committee on Canadian Unity and Constitutional Negotiations.

Canada Welcomes Accessions to NPT

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been bolstered and brought closer to the goal of universal adherence over recent months with the accession, or decision to accede, by several states.

Zambia, Tanzania and South Africa deposited their instruments of accession to the Treaty in the May-July period. Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall welcomed all three accessions and expressed Canada's confidence that the states in the southern African region that remain outside the NPT — Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe — will also join at an early date.

Canada was equally pleased by the announcements of France and China, two nuclear-weapon states, of their intentions to accede to the NPT. The French "decision in principle" to join the Treaty was announced on June 3 by President Mitterrand in the context of his "Arms Control and Disarmament Plan." In early August, China indicated its plans to accede. Neither state has specified the date on which it intends to submit its instrument of accession. Canada looks forward to the early accession of both states, which will bring all acknowledged nuclear-weapon states into the Treaty.

The NPT currently has 145 parties, making it the most widely adhered-to arms control treaty. As a staunch supporter of the NPT, Canada has vigorously encouraged all non-parties to accede and will continue such efforts until the goal of universal adherence is achieved. ■

No Summer Issue

Due to resource constraints, there was no Summer 1991 issue of *The Disarmament Bulletin*. With the current issue, the *Bulletin* begins publication on a three (rather than four) times-per-year schedule.

Roiling the waters: Canada Spurs OAS Consideration of Proliferation Issues



Canada's SSEA Barbara McDougall (front row, second from the left) at the 21st OAS General Assembly in Santiago, Chile.

"Throwing a bomb into the quiet waters of the OAS" is how one wag described Canada's proposal, broached in April, to include on the agenda of the 21st General Assembly an item dealing with weapons' proliferation. Indeed, Canadian officials had to work overtime in Ottawa, Washington and other OAS capitals to dispel initial concerns that the subject was unsuitable for OAS attention and that its consideration would adversely affect hemispheric security.

OAS sends important political signal about its commitment to international peace and security in the post-Cold-War era.

By the time delegations gathered in Santiago in early June, however, bemused or resistant reactions had turned to support. Member States adopted by consensus a resolution in which they resolved to support efforts aimed at stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to exer-

cise sensitivity in arms transfers and to initiate a study of the problems posed for international security by arms proliferation (see text on next page). Among the resolution's 23 co-sponsors were Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the USA.

In adopting the resolution, the General Assembly was guided by the decision taken by OAS foreign ministers earlier in the week to initiate a process of consultation on hemispheric security, including arms proliferation. Canada's Barbara McDougall, who had urged her colleagues to deal with proliferation in the so-called Santiago Commitment, welcomed the decision. "In addressing this problem," she said, "OAS foreign ministers are sending an important political signal to all regions of the world about our commitment to contributing to international peace and security in the post-Cold-War era."

Canada's initiative in the OAS was an outgrowth of its global non-proliferation initiative launched in February. Canada believed that the OAS was particularly well-placed to take a lead in combatting proliferation and excessive arms build-ups because of the steps Member States had already taken to reduce arms, military spending and tensions within the hemisphere. Although the General Assembly had in the past dealt with arms-control-related matters such as clandestine arms traffic, conventional arms limitation and the advisability of establishing a mechanism for the inspection of weapons and military personnel, it had never looked at the broader issue of proliferation.

As a result of the resolution, the OAS has established a working group to study questions related to arms proliferation and excessive arms build-ups. Among other things, the group will examine the possibility of exchanging information about national policies, laws and administrative procedures governing the transfer and procurement of arms, and the possibility of establishing a mechanism for consultations about situations where excessive arms build-ups appear to be developing. The working group will also study questions related to hemispheric security in general, as follow-up to a Honduran-initiated resolution adopted by the General Assembly.

The OAS's attention to proliferation is particularly important insofar as the Organization is the first regional group that includes a substantial number of developing-world arms suppliers and recipients to seriously address these questions. In adopting the Canadian-initiated resolution, Member States signalled their willingness to consider closer cooperation in issues related to arms transfers and restrictions. OAS study of the subject should lend support to international processes to curb proliferation. In addition, it has the potential to result in regional arrangements that are tailored to the particular needs of the hemisphere and might go beyond what can be agreed internationally. ■

**COOPERATION FOR SECURITY IN THE HEMISPHERE.
CURBING THE PROLIFERATION OF INSTRUMENTS OF WAR AND
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION**

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, CONSIDERING:

That the Organization of American States, to fulfil its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, has proclaimed that among the essential purposes of the Organization are:

- the strengthening of peace and security in the hemisphere,
- the achievement of an effective limitation of arms that will make it possible to devote the largest amount of resources to the economic and social development of the Member States;

That cooperation for security in the hemisphere is of fundamental importance in fulfilling these purposes;

That such cooperation must address, in a positive and active manner, significant themes bearing on security, among them the encouragement of arms control and disarmament;

That a climate of enhanced peace and security, both globally and within the hemisphere, should liberate human and material resources needed for the promotion and strengthening of democracy, the furtherance of economic and social development, the protection of the environment and the safeguarding of human rights;

That all forms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction undermine international security and risk a perilous escalation of conflict in regions of tension;

That the convergence of views in the Geneva negotiations on the need for the global, effective and complete elimination of chemical weapons is of relevance to negotiations in other areas of disarmament and arms limitation;

That measures aimed at regulating international exchanges of sensitive technologies should take into account the need to preserve and permit access to use of such technologies for peaceful purposes;

That OAS Member States are proud of their efforts with respect to the control of arms and, in particular, of steps taken by the democratic countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, which are among the least armed and militarized countries in the world;

That build-ups of arms beyond legitimate defence requirements contribute to instability and increase the risk of armed conflict, and that increased transparency and consultation surrounding the acquisition and transfer of arms would contribute to the growth of confidence and security,

RESOLVES:

1. To express its strong support for efforts in bilateral and multilateral deliberations, and in particular in the United Nations, to eliminate all forms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to bring about a global and more effective prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and dissemination of chemical and biological weapons.
2. To urge all members of the international community to exercise sensitivity in transfers of arms and technologies related to arms systems, particularly with respect to countries involved in or under the imminent threat of hostilities or involved in unwarranted build-ups of arms.
3. To request the Permanent Council to study the problems posed for international security, and for the furtherance of economic and social development, by the proliferation of instruments of war and weapons of mass destruction, and to examine the possibility of exchanging information regarding national policies, laws and administrative procedures governing the transfer and procurement of arms, including the establishment of a mechanism for consultations about situations where excessive arms build-ups appear to be developing.
4. To recommend to the Secretary General that he bring this resolution to the attention of the Member States and that he report on its implementation at the next session of the General Assembly.

G7 Address Arms Transfers and Non-Proliferation

The following is the text of the Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Non-Proliferation issued on July 16 by the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the USA at their economic summit in London.

1. At our meeting in Houston last year, we, the Heads of State and Government and the representatives of the European Community, underlined the threats to international security posed by the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and of associated missile delivery systems. The Gulf crisis has highlighted the dangers posed by the unchecked spread of these weapons and by excessive holdings of conventional weapons. The responsibility to prevent the re-emergence of such dangers is to be shared by both arms suppliers and recipient countries as well as the international community as a whole. As is clear from the various initiatives which several of us have proposed jointly and individually, we are each determined to tackle, in appropriate fora, these dangers both in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Conventional arms transfers

2. We accept that many states depend on arms imports to assure a reasonable level of security and the inherent right of self-defence is recognized in the United Nations Charter. Tensions will persist in international relations so long as underlying conflicts of interest are not tackled and resolved. But the Gulf conflict showed the way in which peace and stability can be undermined when a country is able to acquire a massive arsenal that goes far beyond the needs of self-defence and threatens its neighbours. We are determined to ensure such abuse should not happen again. We believe that progress can be made if all states apply the three principles of transparency, consultation and action.

3. The principle of *transparency* should be extended to international transfers of conventional weapons and associated military technology. As a step in this direction, we support the proposal for a universal register of arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations and will work for its early adoption. Such a register would alert the international community to an attempt by a state to build up holdings of conventional weapons beyond a reasonable level. Information should be provided by all states on a regular basis after transfers have taken place. We also urge greater openness about overall holdings of conventional weapons. We believe the provision of such data, and a procedure for seeking clarification, would be a valuable confidence- and security-building measure.

4. The principle of *consultation* should now be strengthened through the rapid implementation of recent initiatives for discussions among leading arms exporters with the aim of agreeing on a common approach to the guidelines that are applied in the transfer of conventional weapons. We welcome the recent opening of discussions on this subject. These include the encouraging talks in Paris among the Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council on 8-9 July, as well as ongoing discussions within the framework of the European Community and its Member States. Each of us will continue to play a constructive part in this important process, in these and other appropriate fora.

5. The principle of *action* requires all of us to take steps to prevent the building up of disproportionate arsenals. To that end, all countries should refrain from arms transfers which would be destabilizing or would exacerbate existing tensions. Special restraint should be exercised in the transfer of advanced technology weapons and in sales to countries and areas of particular concern. A special effort should be made to define sensitive items and production capacity for advanced weapons, to the transfer of which similar restraints could be applied. All states should take steps to ensure that these criteria are strictly enforced. We intend to give these issues our continuing close attention.

6. Iraqi aggression and the ensuing Gulf War illustrate the huge costs to the international community of military conflict. We believe that moderation in the level of military expenditure is a key aspect of sound economic policy and good government. While all countries are struggling with competing claims on scarce resources, excessive spending on arms of all kinds diverts resources from the overriding need to tackle economic development. It can also build up large debts without creating the means by which these may be serviced. We note with favour the recent report issued by the United Nations Development Program and the recent decisions by several donor countries to take account of military expenditure where it is disproportionate when setting up aid programs and encourage all other donor countries to take similar action. We welcome the attention that the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund and the President of the World Bank have recently given to excessive military spending, in the context of reducing unproductive public expenditure.

Non-proliferation

7. We are deeply concerned about the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missile delivery systems. We are determined to combat this menace by strengthening and expanding the non-proliferation regimes.

8. Iraq must fully abide by Security Council Resolution 687, which sets out requirements for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision of its nuclear, biological and chemical warfare and missile capabilities, as well as for verification and long-term monitoring to ensure that Iraq's capability for such weapon systems is not developed in the future. Consistent with the relevant UN resolutions, we will provide every assistance to the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so that they can fully carry out their tasks.

9. In the nuclear field, we:

- re-affirm our will to work to establish the widest possible consensus in

favour of an equitable and stable non-proliferation regime based on a balance between nuclear non-proliferation and the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

- re-affirm the importance of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and call on all other non-signatory states to subscribe to this agreement;
- call on all non-nuclear-weapon states to submit all their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, which are the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime;
- urge all supplier states to adopt and implement the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines.

We welcome the decision of Brazil and Argentina to conclude a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA and to take steps to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force, as well as the accession of South Africa to the NPT.

10. Each of us will also work to achieve:

- our common purpose of maintaining and reinforcing the NPT regime beyond 1995;
- a strengthened and improved IAEA safeguards system;
- new measures in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to ensure adequate export controls on dual-use items.

11. We anticipate that the Biological Weapons Review Conference in September will succeed in strengthening implementation of the Convention's existing provisions by reinforcing and extending its confidence-building measures and exploring the scope for effective verification measures. Each of us will encourage accession to the Convention by other states and urge all parties strictly to fulfil their obligations under the convention. We each believe that a successful Review Conference leading to strengthened implementation of the BTWC would make an important contribution to preventing the proliferation of biological weapons.

12. The successful negotiation of a strong, comprehensive and effectively verifiable convention banning chemical weapons, to which all states subscribe, is the best way to prevent the spread of



Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (right) with UK Prime Minister John Major at the G7 London summit.
Bill McCarthy, PMO

chemical weapons. We welcome recent announcements by the United States which we believe will contribute to the swift conclusion of such a convention. We hope that the negotiation will be successfully concluded as soon as possible. We re-affirm our intention to become original parties to the convention. We urge others to become parties at the earliest opportunity so that it can enter into force as soon as possible.

13. We must also strengthen controls on exports that could contribute to the proliferation of biological and chemical weapons. We welcome the measures taken by members of the Australia Group and by other states on the control of exports of chemical weapons precursors and related equipment. We seek to achieve increasingly close convergence of practice between all exporting states. We urge all states to support these efforts.

14. Our aim is a total and effective ban of chemical and biological weapons. Use of such weapons is an outrage against humanity. In the event that a state uses such weapons, each of us agrees to give immediate consideration to imposing severe measures against it both in the UN Security Council and elsewhere.

15. The spread of missile delivery systems has added a new dimension of instability to international security in many regions of the world. As the founders of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), we welcome its extension to many other states in the last two years. We endorse the joint appeal issued at the Tokyo MTCR meeting in March 1991 for all countries to adopt these guidelines. These are not intended to inhibit cooperation in the use of space for peaceful and scientific purposes.

16. We can make an important contribution to reducing the dangers of proliferation and conventional arms transfers. Our efforts and consultations on these issues, including with other supplier countries, will be continued in all appropriate fora so as to establish a new climate of global restraint. We will only succeed if others, including recipient countries, support us and if the international community unites in a new effort to remove these threats which can imperil the safety of all our peoples. ■

Need for Supply-Side Controls and Global Measures

The following are excerpts from a June 21 address by Mr. de Montigny Marchand, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Conference on the Supply-Side Control of Weapons Proliferation. The conference, which was held in Ottawa, was sponsored by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.

The phrase "lessons of the Gulf War" has been bandied about a great deal during the past several months. It often seems as if as many lessons are being drawn as there are people drawing lessons. But one indisputable lesson, recognized even before the War's end by Institute staff when they began to finalize

the conference program in February, is that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and excessive build-ups of conventional arms are destabilizing, dangerous and must be stopped.

This is not a new lesson. Those of you working every day in the peace and security field did not need the Gulf War to unveil this revelation. What the Gulf War did, though, was bring this lesson home to publics. Each day, through countless television sets, newspapers, magazines and radios, people around the world were brought face-to-face with the consequences of Iraq's missile-launching capability, with fears about its chemical and biological weapons poten-

tial, and with the absurdity of Coalition forces being under threat from Coalition-supplied equipment. In touching publics, the Gulf War touched politicians. Proliferation — already recognized by specialists as the biggest arms control challenge of the 1990s — became a public challenge and a political challenge.

This happened no less in Canada than elsewhere. The Canadian government was the first to publicly advance a comprehensive proposal for combatting proliferation in the post-Gulf-War world, both regionally and globally. We recognized that Iraq was but one, Kafkaesque example of what can happen in

START Signed

In Moscow on July 30, USA President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) which, once ratified, will lead to a reduction in the two countries' long-range nuclear weapons.

The Treaty limits each party to a maximum of 1,600 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers, with a sub-limit of 154 deployed heavy ICBMs (only the USSR deploys heavy ICBMs). It further limits each party to 6,000 "accountable" warheads deployed on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, with sub-limits of 4,900 on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and 1,540 on heavy ICBMs. The remaining 1,100 warheads must be deployed on heavy bombers in the form of air-launched cruise missiles, bombs or short-range attack missiles. Because the START counting rules "discount" bomber weapons (i.e., each may count as less than one warhead), each party will in fact be permitted to deploy more than 6,000 warheads.

In addition to mandating reductions in superpower nuclear forces, the Treaty prescribes intrusive verification measures, including 12 types of on-site inspection.

Canada has long regarded the successful negotiation of START as an arms control priority. We welcomed the Treaty's signature and look forward to its ratification and implementation. START will enhance strategic stability at lower levels of nuclear arms and will thus contribute to collective security. The USA and the USSR have established a working group to consider follow-on negotiations to START. In Canada's view, the objective of strategic stability should remain paramount throughout follow-on negotiations on long-range nuclear forces, and on defence and space arms.

a world where the non-proliferation of weapons and technology is not effectively pursued. We recognized that Canadians' support for the War effort was in part conditional on the government doing everything in its power to make sure we would not find ourselves in a similar situation a few years down the road. Parenthetically, that is why Canada has also been in the forefront of those calling for a strengthening of the UN system.

On the proliferation front, we believed that what was needed, in the first instance, was a jolt of political energy to spur ongoing efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology, as well as to encourage progress in non-proliferation negotiations and the development of measures to deal with the virtually untouched realm of conventional arms accumulation.

As a consequence, the initiative launched by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs on February 8 had two components. We are pursuing both with vigour. The first consists of the mobilization of political

will by encouraging leaders of all states to commit themselves publicly and unequivocally to do their utmost to condemn and combat weapons' proliferation. In gathering political commitments at the highest levels, we hope to generate and maintain the momentum necessary to free specific negotiations and processes from the complacency or technical minutiae in which they have tended to become mired and thus to make progress on what are among the most urgent security issues of our time.

The second component of our initiative consists of an action program for moving ahead in each area of concern...

One of the reasons for Canada's success in ensuring that proliferation issues receive the required attention at the political level has been that our initiative has found a tremendous resonance in the international community. In the months since we put forward our proposal, numerous countries have come forward with their suggestions for dealing with proliferation in the post-Gulf-War world, echoing ideas prominent in the Canadian initiative... We welcome all of these proposals,

which complement Canadian efforts to advance the same objectives.

Expressions of political concern, however...while extremely welcome and clearly necessary, are not sufficient to bring about an end to proliferation. As we continue to garner high-level commitments, we must make sure that these commitments are reflected in progress at the nuts-and-bolts level. We have no illusions about the practical, technical difficulties involved in the measures we are proposing.

You have dealt with many of these difficulties — and possibilities — in your conference. Supply-side control represents the front line of the war against proliferation. It is not an ideal solution. There are questions about effectiveness, about comprehensiveness, about verification, about capturing dual-use goods and technology, about capturing services, about discrimination and about implications for legitimate, non-military transactions. But we do not live in an ideal world.

In tackling proliferation in the real world, it is a question of doing what is feasible, while bearing always in mind the ideal and striving towards it wherever possible. Where effective movement can be made towards curbing the spread of clearly unacceptable weapons, movement should be made. This may mean tightening and better-coordinating national export controls. It may mean an agreement among countries in a region not to acquire particular types of weapons. We would hope it could mean a common effort by the entire international community, working on a common understanding that what is prohibited to one should ultimately be prohibited to all. But Canada does not believe that the best should be the enemy of the good, or even the enemy of the next-to-worst, if that is all that is attainable at any one moment.

Supply-side control is one part of what is feasible and attainable now. It will not on its own stop proliferation, as many of you have remarked over these past few days. What is ultimately required is a comprehensive approach that deals with both supply and demand and draws as many states as possible into effective, global regimes. In the interim, however, where no global instru-

ment exists, supply-side controls are frequently the only means available for curbing proliferation of the weapons system in question.

Supplier states that have adopted a policy of self-restraint have a moral and practical obligation to their publics and to their exporting communities to ensure that their products and technologies are not being diverted to purposes other than those intended. Even where global instruments exist, as in the case of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, there will continue to be a need for effective supply-side controls. Supply-side controls provide an important means of preventing the spread of prohibited weapons to states that remain outside global treaties. They also provide a double check for ensuring that the self-restraint on the part of potential suppliers and potential recipients that has been codified in a multilateral instrument is being respected.

But supply-side controls are primarily a short-term measure. They buy time — for building confidence, for dampening regional tensions, for gathering a consensus on the value of restraining weapons acquisition, for forestalling the rise of dangerously-armed powers in unstable situations. This is valuable time admittedly, but it does not provide the assurance on non-proliferation that we are all seeking, assurance that can only come from effective, comprehensive non-proliferation regimes adhered to by as many states as possible.

That is why the Canadian program of action I discussed earlier includes a blend of supply-side and global measures. It calls for enhancing efforts in relation to the Australia Group, as well as for conclusion of a chemical weapons convention and for strengthening of the BTWC. It calls for strong and effective multilateral controls on dual-use nuclear goods, as well as for shoring up the NPT. It calls for consultations among major conventional arms suppliers, as well as for consultations among suppliers and recipients. It calls for strengthening the MTCR, as well as for reaching a global consensus on the need to stop missile proliferation. In the short-term, in the absence of global non-proliferation measures, our emphasis

may have to be on supply-side control. Even in the long-term, supply-side control will be required to deal with those states that — for whatever reason — remain outside of global regimes. What we advocate is a gradual shift of emphasis away from primary reliance on supply-side control, as we secure agreement on the global measures we need.

Such measures cannot be dictated by suppliers. They can only be arrived at through the cooperation of the international community as a whole. This is why Canada, in seeking to advance its initiative, is assembling a core group of interested countries that includes both suppliers and recipients, countries from East, West, North and South. It is also why we were extremely interested in the proposal by Argentina and Brazil at this year's session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on seeking norms in the international transfer of sensitive technologies that command universal support. This is an objective in which Canada sees merit.

We fully recognize the right of access of all states to the peaceful uses of technology. In our view, though, this is not a right of assured access. Some states would argue that if you provide us with the technology we will be on our best behaviour; we would respond that you have to be on your best behaviour before we provide you with the technology.

Canada's goal is a global framework of equitable, comprehensive and verifiable non-proliferation regimes of which all well-intentioned members of the international community are part. This is an ambitious goal. It is a necessary goal. We believe it is an attainable goal. The 1990s, marked by the end of the Cold War, the growing commitment to cooperative security globally as well as regionally, and the focusing of minds of the Gulf War, provide us with an unprecedented opportunity to effectively stop proliferation. We must seize this opportunity. Through a combination of political will, public support, official endeavour, and analytic input, we can translate our burgeoning concerns about proliferation into tangible, durable results. We can build a more stable world with fewer and less dangerous weapons. ■

Canadians Brief Space Committee

"Satellites Harming Other Satellites" was the subject of a June 25 briefing to the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space by Dr. Peter Hughes, a leading Canadian space scientist and founder of Toronto's Dynacon Enterprises Ltd., and Mr. Peter Stibrany of Spar Aerospace Ltd. The briefing was based on an innovative research project conducted by Dynacon and funded by EAITC's Verification Research Program.

Mr. Stibrany outlined for Committee members the concept of a "Harmfulness Index," which involves the rigorous classification of the modes of harm one satellite can cause another. Project researchers have developed a computer program called HARMDEX, which can generate a quantitative estimate of the potential harmfulness of any satellite vis-à-vis another. This methodology could form one basis for confidence-building measures (CBMs) in space.

Dr. Hughes demonstrated the pros and cons of various types of keep-out zones, which have been suggested for building confidence regarding the safety of satellites in space. Summarizing Dynacon's work, Dr. Hughes highlighted how an estimate of satellite harmfulness could assist in managing a flexible, "free space" keep-out zone more securely. He also described an outer space CBM involving the use of verification beacons on satellites.

Dr. Hughes' summary of Dynacon's research, entitled "Satellites Harming Other Satellites," has been published by EAITC as *Arms Control Verification Occasional Paper No. 7*.

During the 1991 Conference on Disarmament session, the Verification Research Program also provided expert support on legal matters concerning outer space. Dr. Lucy Stojak of McGill University's Centre for Air and Space Law attended a number of meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space. She concentrated her efforts on the legal aspects of keep-out zones and terminological questions related to arms control and outer space. ■

Commission Verifies Iraq's Compliance with Resolution 687



UN team inspecting nuclear reactor at the Tuwaitha research facility near Baghdad.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the United Nations Security Council undertook a number of actions aimed at restoring peace and security in the Middle East. Most notably, it mandated the establishment of a 21-member United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) with the objective of verifying Iraq's compliance with the provisions of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). Mr. F.R. Cleminson, Head of EAITC's Verification Research Unit, was appointed to the Commission by the UN Secretary General.

Under Resolution 687, Iraq is required, *inter alia*, to "unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision," of all its chemical and biological weapons and/or stocks of precursor agents. In addition, Iraq must dispose of "all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities." Similar measures were applied to Iraq's activities in the nuclear field. In particular, Iraq is compelled to renounce forever the acquisition of nuclear weapons and is required to sub-

mit to stringent inspections. The Special Commission has been directed to develop a plan for verification of future compliance by Iraq with all these obligations.

UNSCOM has been authorized not only to verify the veracity of Iraqi weapons declarations by visiting any sites within Iraq it needs to inspect, but also to organize "the destruction, removal or rendering harmless" of the proscribed material. In the overall verification task, UNSCOM is authorized to seek expert assistance from such agencies as the World Health Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as required. The UN Secretariat is also deeply involved in this process.

Since its initial meeting on May 6 under the leadership of Sweden's Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, who was appointed Executive Chairman, the Special Commission has initiated or participated in an extraordinary series of difficult and technically-complex on-site inspections relating to Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological weapons technology and to its ballistic missile capabilities. The nuclear-related inspections have been conducted by teams organized and led by the IAEA, with the support and cooperation of UNSCOM. The remainder of the inspections have been organized by UNSCOM, drawing on expertise from UN member states,

from specialized UN agencies and from the UN Secretariat.

Canadians have been active in all aspects of UNSCOM operations. Mr. Cleminson participated in the first nuclear inspection, which took place from May 14 to 22 at the Tuwaitha research facility just outside Baghdad. He continues as one of four commissioners focussing on future compliance. Lieutenant Colonel Jim Knapp and Dr. Peter Lockwood, a scientist with the Defence Research Establishment at Suffield, Alberta (DRES), were active in the first chemical weapons inspection near Samarra the following month. Colonel Knapp has continued to operate with UNSCOM as a staff officer based in New York, while Dr. Lockwood has agreed to act as an advisor to the Commission on safety matters. They will both be engaged with approximately 70 other scientists in the chemical weapons "super inspection" scheduled to take place in September.

Dr. John McCandless of DRES has been participating as a Canadian expert on UNSCOM's panel on chemical weapons destruction. DND has contributed a number of explosive demolition experts to other inspections as well. It is expected that Canadian leadership and technology, coordinated through a close partnership between DND and EAITC, will figure prominently in UNSCOM's future activity. ■



Inspectors at the Tuwaitha research facility.

Bill C-6 Allows Restricted Export of Automatic Weapons

Parliamentary committee to study Canadian arms export policy

A bill passed by the House of Commons in June provides for the severely-restricted import, possession and export of automatic weapons for certain narrowly-defined military and related industrial purposes. Bill C-6 removes an anomaly in the Criminal Code that has effectively prevented Canadian defence firms from manufacturing automatic weapons for our NATO allies and close defence partners. As well, it establishes a new Automatic Firearms Country Control List on which any prospective recipient of Canadian automatic weapons must first be placed.

In passing the bill, the government and opposition parties mandated the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade to study and report on Canadian arms export and defence production policies. The Committee will hold public hearings and submit its report by December 31, 1991.

Until the Parliamentary report is completed, the government will include on the Automatic Firearms Country Control List only those ten countries with which it already has the required bilateral defence research, development and production agreements. It will also include Saudi Arabia, assuming the required agreements can be successfully negotiated by the end of the year. No Canadian export of automatic weapons to Saudi Arabia will be permitted before the end of the year, except of those mounted on light armoured vehicles under a proposed sale by General Motors.

The following are excerpts of an address by the Honourable Michael Wilson, Minister of Industry, Science and Technology and Minister for International Trade, to the House of Commons during debate on second reading of Bill C-6 on May 30.

Under present law, alone among Canada's few manufacturers of military materiel, our producers of automatic firearms and related equipment are effectively prevented from competing on a level playing field, even in that small part of the international market to

which Canadian foreign policy would quite properly limit their access.

As things stand now, these firms can manufacture such equipment only for the Canadian military or police. They may not even produce for Canada's allies and closest defence partners, while foreign firms are at liberty to sell to Canada's armed forces. The restrictions put Canadian companies at an unnecessary disadvantage and threaten the viability of some. They could eventually preclude Canada from meeting its own future requirements for weapons.

Introducing carefully-defined new flexibility to permit exports of automatic firearms to our NATO allies and close defence partners will demonstrate Canada's commitment to meeting its own requirements for basic defence products from Canadian sources. It will also enhance Canada's contribution to joint allied preparedness, most notably its role in the North American defence industrial base.

As everyone in this House knows, Canada's role in UN peacekeeping is long-standing and widely respected. Imagine Canada's peacekeeping forces in country "x." Could they do their job without the appropriate weapons? And if our troops were there side-by-side with other UN peacekeeping forces, be they Swedish, Australian or whatever, would it be wrong for those Swedes or Australians to be armed with Canadian firearms? I think not.

Bill C-6 will place very tight controls on exports of automatic firearms from Canada by establishing a new Automatic Firearms Country Control List under the Export and Import Permits Act... The authority of the Secretary of State for External Affairs to approve permits for exports of automatic firearms will be limited to those countries listed on [the List]. Her authority to refuse inappropriate applications remains total and un-

diminished. The List is to include only those countries with which Canada has an intergovernmental defence research, development and production agreement... In keeping with the concern shared by most Canadians for restraining the arms trade, the required defence production arrangements will be concluded only with Canada's NATO allies and close defence partners. Those countries will be made known through the publication of the Automatic Firearms Country Control List... Sales will be permitted only to governments and acceptable designated consignees approved by the Canadian government. Sales to civilians will not be permitted.

Canada currently has defence production arrangements with ten countries, of which Sweden is the only one not a member of NATO. An arrangement with Spain is under negotiation... Proposals to include other countries on the List will be subject to an intense, case-by-case basis review to confirm that:

- the requirement for automatic firearms is legitimate and reasonable;
- defence cooperation with Canada will enhance regional cooperation and security; and
- the country being considered for defence cooperation does not threaten regional or world security,

Exports allowed only to countries on Automatic Firearms Country Control List. Inclusion on List does not guarantee export.

and does not maintain an excessive level of armaments...

A country's inclusion on the new control List does not in itself constitute authority to export automatic firearms to that country... Applications to export automatic firearms will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis and will be subject to the same strict guidelines and licensing procedures applied to all exports of military goods from Canada... Certainly

no permit would ever be approved to export automatic weapons from Canada to a country that undertook [an excessive] build-up of arms. It simply would not happen. If a country with which Canada had a defence production agreement began to develop its military arsenal to the point of threatening its neighbours and regional security, we would simply stop issuing export permits and suspend all outstanding ones.

Such action is within the discretionary authority of the Secretary of State for External Affairs... It has been exercised in the past in response to changing security considerations, and would be used in the future without hesitation if necessary... Our intention is to control more effectively, not to prohibit, sales of military equipment. Canada will be extremely careful in deciding which countries it should sell firearms to. We will also make known which military goods are exported and to which countries.

Consistency with arms control policies

The following are excerpts from a May 30 statement on Bill C-6 by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs.

I join the debate on Bill C-6...to respond to the suggestions that the proposed amendments to the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA) are inconsistent with the arms control proposals made in February by the Prime Minister and Mr. Clark. No such inconsistency exists.

Under the proposed amendments, exports of automatic weapons will be subject to the same stringent controls that have long been applied to the export of other military goods from Canada. These controls fully reflect Canada's arms control and disarmament policies. They are, in fact, driven by Canada's security policy, of which arms control and disarmament are a major component. They allow, and have always allowed, the export of particular types of military equipment to particular countries under particular circumstances. At the same time, they ensure, and will continue to ensure, that Canada does not contribute to the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction or to excessive build-ups of conventional arms.

What Canada proposed in February was that countries learn from the Gulf War that proliferation and excessive arms build-ups are destabilizing, dangerous and must be stopped. We put forward a range of proposals aimed at mobilizing the political will and the mechanisms necessary to minimize these dangers in the future in the Middle East and elsewhere. We proposed expanding and strengthening existing regimes to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We also proposed measures to promote international transparency, consultations and restraint with a view to preventing excessive build-ups of conventional arms. By excessive build-ups of conventional arms we mean the acquisition of quantities of conventional arms that go beyond legitimate defence requirements.

As my predecessor made very clear before a Committee of this House in March, we are not proposing to put an end to the arms trade. Nor are we proposing to constrain any country's ability to acquire arms for legitimate defence purposes. We have never suggested that defence needs should be left unmet. What we are proposing is that the international community should take appropriate measures to ensure that states will not in future be allowed to overarm themselves as Iraq did...

In February, this Government made a commitment to work to diminish the likelihood and risks of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and excessive build-ups of conventional arms. That commitment remains strong and, as I have explained, is in no way diminished by or inconsistent with the proposed amendments to the Export and Import Permits Act.

The EIPA is the main legal instrument under which the government controls exports and imports. The Act provides for control of exports on the basis of product using the Export Control List and on the basis of destination using the Area Control List.

Goods and technologies may be placed on the Export Control List for a number of reasons, including the protection of the security of Canada and its allies. The majority of items are on the List to fulfil international commitments to control the proliferation of arms and to deny potential adversaries access to industrial goods that might have a

Review process ensures Canadian exports do not contribute to excessive arms build-ups.

military or strategic application. These commitments have been made in the context of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls.

In addition, export permits are required for all exports to countries on the Area Control List, regardless of whether the particular goods or technologies are listed on the Export Control List.

Canadian export controls are among the most restrictive of all western countries, particularly with respect to the transfer of arms. A standard review process exists for the proposed export of military equipment to any destination, except to members of the NATO alliance and a handful of other countries, including Australia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland. All proposals to export military goods or technology to a country aside from those just noted are reviewed by the Departments of National Defence and Industry, Science and Technology, as well as extensively within EAITC. The export of offensive military equipment requires my own personal review and approval. The export of non-offensive military equipment requires my review and approval if the country of destination is engaged in or under imminent threat of hostilities, has a record of human rights abuses, is under United Nations sanctions or is deemed to be a threat to Canada and its allies.

These amendments do not affect this review process, which remains in place

and in fact will be extended to cover any proposal to export automatic firearms. All other controls provided for under the EIPA remain unchanged.

As Secretary of State for External Affairs, I am responsible for developing

and implementing Canada's arms control and disarmament policies. I am also responsible for issuing permits under the EIPA. I will continue to ensure that all of our military exports — including any as a result of the proposed amend-

ments to the Act — are fully consistent with our arms control and disarmament policies and do not contribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or to excessive build-ups of conventional arms. ■

UN Group of Experts Calls for Arms Transfer Register

The UN Group of Experts on Arms Transfer Transparency wound up its final meeting on July 5 with agreement on a report that calls for greater transparency in the international arms trade and recommends the establishment of a UN arms transfer register as soon as possible. Under such a register, states would voluntarily report their arms exports and imports each year to the UN, which would make the information publicly available.

The Experts recommend that the register be set up on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, including both arms suppliers and arms recipients. States should report transfers according to agreed categories, so that the information provided can readily be compared.

The Experts also call on states to make all their military activities as open as practicable, and suggest that the arms transfer register could usefully be supplemented by measures to promote transparency in other areas such as military holdings and procurement and military doctrines. They encourage states to pursue regional and sub-regional, as well as global, transparency measures.

The Group's report devotes a section to the illicit arms trade, defined as trade contrary to national or international law. The objective in this case is not the promotion of transparency but rather eradication through tighter control. In general, the Experts urge states to have in place the legal and administrative machinery necessary to effectively regulate and monitor their arms transfers. This is particularly important with respect to preventing illicit trade, as are measures to control borders, to combat bribery and corruption, and to share with other countries information about trafficking and detection of illicit arms.

Canada was delighted with the Group's report. As the Secretary of State for External Affairs told the UN General Assembly in September 1990, Canada believes it is important to make arms transfers and procurement as transparent as is prudent and practical. The establishment of a global arms transfer register has been a major goal of Canada's post-Gulf-War action plan to stop excessive build-ups of conventional arms.

As noted by the Experts, an arms transfer register has the potential to build confidence among states, to promote restraint in arms transfers and to assist the identification of trends in the arms trade.

Increased transparency in military matters between members of NATO and the former Warsaw Treaty Organization has helped considerably to reduce tensions and create conditions conducive to arms control and disarmament in Europe. The regular, voluntary sharing of information about arms transfers is likely to promote similar confidence in military capabilities and intentions on both a global and a regional scale. It may encourage cooperation in other areas affecting military security, and should reduce the likelihood of arms races and wars based on misperceptions about military capabilities.

Arms transfer transparency could also help to provide states with advance

warning of situations where arms are being acquired to excess. This could discourage further transfers to the country involved and lead to measures to deal with potential hostilities before they become actual.

An exchange of information on arms transfers would also provide a better database for policy projections and research. Questions about the effects of arms transfers on national economies and regional stability have been the subject of international debate since the early 1970s. A register could contribute to this debate by providing reliable information for further study and monitoring.

Canada is now working with other countries to draft a General Assembly resolution that establishes a UN register. Canada is proposing that the resolution promote transparency in arms procurement and holdings as well as in transfers. We are also suggesting that the resolution establish a mechanism whereby states can consult about the operation of the register and exchange views on the data provided to it.

Canada was represented on the UN Experts' Group by Mr. Ernie Regehr, Lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Waterloo and Research Coordinator of the non-governmental organization Project Ploughshares. The Group's report will be published by the UN later this year. ■

What is Transparency?

The UN Experts' Group defines transparency as "involving the systematic provision of information on specific aspects of activities in the military field under informal or formal international arrangements." Transparency is related to openness, which involves a general national policy of making information about military matters public. Transparency reflects the willingness of all states participating in transparency measures to practice openness in the areas covered by those measures.

1991 UNDC: Fiddling Over Militarism's Flames

The United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) held its annual substantive session from April 22 to May 13 at United Nations headquarters in New York.

The 1991 session marked the beginning of the UNDC's work under a reformed structure. The new structure limits the number of items on the working agenda to four, thereby preventing the problem of an overloaded agenda which, in the view of many observers, hindered the UNDC's work in the late 1980s. The reforms also limit consideration of any item on the agenda to a maximum of three years. Canada and others hope this will pressure delegations to move towards conclusions in their deliberations, rather than fall into limitless debate without clear direction or outcome.

The Canadian delegation, led by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason, played an active role in all four UNDC working groups. Canada believes that the work of the 1991 session offers some grounds for optimism that the reformed UNDC may acquire a more constructive and relevant role in multilateral arms control and disarmament than it has occupied in the past.

Canada was particularly pleased that an item entitled "Regional approach to disarmament within the context of global security" was included on the agenda. This reflects Canada's view that sources of tension and causes of arms build-ups in certain regions are primarily of a regional nature, rather than an extension of a broader East-West conflict. This has become increasingly evident in recent years as East-West relations have improved dramatically, yet a number of regions continue to be characterized by chronic tensions and high levels of armament.

In her opening statement to the working group, Ambassador Mason summarized Canada's approach to this subject. She stated that "regional approaches to disarmament have a unique and irreplaceable place in our collective pursuit of the broader objectives of disarmament and international security. Measures implemented in a regional context complement steps that, because

of their nature, may be more appropriately undertaken at a global level or, in some cases, bilaterally."

A number of useful papers were submitted to this working group touching on various aspects of regional disarmament. Canada tabled a paper entitled "Open Skies in other Regional Contexts: Lessons of the Current Negotiations," the purpose of which was to inform the international community at large of the principal issues occupying the Open Skies negotiations and to draw conclusions that might be of value should states in another regional context someday endeavour to negotiate a similar type of regime.

"The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields" was another new item of constructive discussion. In the words of its final report, the group addressed "a wide-ranging and challenging mandate encompassing matters that have never before been dealt with in a systematic debate in the UN." One of the most interesting and important themes considered by this working group was the issue of transfers of sensitive high tech-

nologies with military applications, an issue of great significance in addressing weapons proliferation concerns.

A third item on the agenda was "Process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons." This item, which addressed the full range of nuclear disarmament issues, regrettably demonstrated the lack of progress that characterized work on a similar item in previous years.

Finally, the UNDC continued its consideration of the item entitled "Objective information on military matters," initiated at the 1990 session. This working group considered a number of ways of increasing openness and transparency, including extending the UN reporting system on military expenditures and establishing a UN register of conventional arms transfers. Consideration of this item will be concluded at next year's session and Canada hopes that an agreed-upon set of principles and recommendations will emerge.

Despite the stimulating exchange of views that took place at the 1991 session, the Canadian delegation registered



Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason and Canadian Mission Counsellor Colonel Douglas Fraser at the 1991 UNDC session in New York.

Photo courtesy of Sentinel

profound concern, in its closing statement, about the reluctance of some delegations to allow working groups to consolidate important areas of agreement in the form of a report that could serve as a basis for further progress at next year's session.

Ambassador Mason criticized delegations for refusing to acknowledge areas of agreement, even in the form of

UNDC is at a crossroads: danger of irrelevancy versus need for action.

general principles, when such agreement was clearly in evidence. The argument by some that nothing needed to be agreed upon in the first year of an item's consideration represented, in Canada's view, an abdication of responsibility. It resulted in UNDC failure to seize important opportunities to advance multilateral disarmament and to restore the tarnished reputation of the Commission itself. In Ambassador Mason's words to the plenary:

"In the past, when every aspect of the UN was frozen in the prism of Cold War confrontation, to have a constructive discussion of issues was a worthwhile goal in and of itself, and I am not suggesting that mere discussion is still not a very worthwhile activity. But now that action is possible, discussion — however constructive — is simply not good enough, not when the problems we face are so daunting and urgent, and not when our colleagues in the Security Council, in the Committee on Peacekeeping and in the specialized agencies dealing with humanitarian needs have already moved beyond talking and are acting together in the most sensitive, delicate and difficult of areas.

"In my culture, one of the quintessential symbols of utter abdication of responsibility is that of the leader Nero, who played the fiddle while his city, Rome, burned to the ground. During the crucial period when action could have been taken to stop the fire before it became too large, he did not act to stop it; he amused himself with pleasant diversions.

"While the flames of militarism continue unabated in many regions of this world, I ask what did we, the distinguished representatives of the 1991 session of the UNDC, do?

"Well, we pointed out in great detail the height of the flames. We exchanged a diversity of views on the heat generated by those flames. We identified in admirable detail the destruction

being wreaked in various parts of the world by those flames, but when it came to agreeing on the most basic steps in combatting those flames, then the argu-

ment was put forward that there was simply no need to rush. We have two more years to agree on what type of fire-fighting equipment to purchase, who should pay for it and, above all, who should take the lead in actually beginning to fight the flames. Why all the rush? Why indeed!...

"At the end of the 1989 session of the [UN General Assembly] First Committee, Canada very reluctantly decided that we would no longer participate in the Ad Hoc Committee on the IOZOP [Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace]. We have not left completely, as some chose to do, but we are not participating.

"I believe that this was the first time Canada took such an action in a multilateral forum dealing with disarmament issues. The Canadian representative on that committee was dividing his time between discussions there, which have not advanced in some 13 years beyond a completely sterile and futile effort to assign blame to one group or another for every ill in the zone, and discussions in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping on how to make the UN response in this area more comprehensive, more timely — in short, more effective.

"As the gap between the sterile rhetoric of the IOZOP Committee and the ever-increasing, action-oriented work on the Special Committee on Peacekeeping grew, it became clear where Canada wished to focus its attention, given the resource and personnel constraints we are facing. Increasingly those resource constraints are forcing us to make difficult choices. But is the

choice so difficult when it is between form and substance, between making endless lists and agreeing to concrete actions?

"I believe that the UNDC is at a historic crossroads. One path points backwards and leads to irrelevancy. It is the way of Nero. The other points forward. It is not an easy road and it is one that cannot be travelled alone because the challenges that face this newly multipolar world are beyond the capacity of any one country or group of countries to solve alone. This new path of shared responsibility beckons to us all. Let us go down it together."

Canada and most other delegations represented at the 1991 session demonstrated which path they wish to follow. At the UNDC's 1992 session, Canada will continue its efforts to revitalize this body. We will vigorously press all members to allow the Disarmament Commission to assume its mandate effectively and to make a meaningful contribution to the multilateral pursuit of disarmament objectives. ■

UNGA 46 First Committee Starts Work

The First Committee of the 46th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 46), which considers resolutions dealing with arms control and disarmament issues, begins its work on October 14. The Canadian delegation to the First Committee will be headed by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason and will take an active role in the negotiation and promotion of several resolutions.

As in previous years, Canada will provide leadership, jointly with Poland, in drafting a resolution calling for the early conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons. This resolution will be particularly important as negotiators at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva are under intense pressure from their governments to conclude such a convention during the CD's 1991 session. A strong UNGA

resolution, adopted by consensus, should provide a clear signal to negotiators of a global political determination to achieve an effective and verifiable abolition of these reprehensible weapons.

Another resolution to which Canada attaches special importance is one on the subject of international arms transfers. This resolution is expected to acknowledge the report of the UN Secretary-General on ways and means of promoting transparency in international arms transfers.

This report, which was prepared by a Group of Experts including Mr. Ernie Regehr from Canada, was requested by the General Assembly at its 1988 session. As recommended in the report, Canada favours the establishment of an international arms transfer register, under UN auspices, as a means of building confidence and of discouraging states from embarking on excessive accumulations of conventional arms. Canada is pleased that support for an arms transfer register has become very broad and is optimistic that UNGA 46 will create such a system.

The Canadian delegation will again work within a core group of six countries to elaborate a resolution entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive test ban treaty." This year's resolution is expected to acknowledge developments over the past year relevant to a nuclear test ban treaty, and to add momentum to ongoing efforts towards this fundamental Canadian arms control objective.

As in the past, Canada will introduce a procedural resolution on a prohibition of the production of fissionable materials.

The important achievements of arms control and disarmament negotiations over the last year — notably the signing of the START and CFE treaties and the significant progress towards conclusion of a chemical weapons convention — is expected to contribute to a positive atmosphere at the UNGA 46 First Committee. Canada will seek to ensure that the Committee's work reflects positive developments and encourages further progress in all areas of arms control and disarmament. ■

Ambassador Consults on Arms Control and Disarmament Issues in Asia-Pacific



Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason (standing, centre) in Kyoto, Japan.

From May 27 to 30, Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason participated in the Second United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues, which was held in the ancient temple city of Kyoto, Japan. This timely international conference brought together politicians, diplomats specializing in disarmament issues, academics, technical experts and representatives of a wide range of non-governmental organizations. Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu addressed the opening plenary, as did the foreign ministers of Japan, Australia, the Philippines and the Russian Republic, as well as the head of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Under the broad theme of challenges to multilateral disarmament, participants focussed on regional approaches to disarmament, control of weapons' proliferation and problems arising from the implementation of disarmament measures.

Ambassador Mason was invited to address the issue of "non-proliferation regimes versus partial or comprehensive prohibitions." In her remarks, she noted that Canada sees the topic not as an opposition — not a "versus" — but as a unison — an "and." In Canada's view, both non-proliferation regimes and partial or comprehensive prohibitions have their role in preventing the spread of weapon systems. This is why Canada, in framing its own initiative to encourage urgent international attention to curbing proliferation, is not trying to dictate a particular approach.

As Ambassador Mason explained, "We are not attempting to force decisions on the relative merits of the NPT versus the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga, or a chemical weapons convention versus a mechanism such as the Australia Group. We recognize that there are differing, legitimate views within the international community on how best to deal with proliferation. We recognize as well that national decisions often cannot continue to wait upon more broadly-based action. What we are proposing is that each individual state commit itself to move ahead in the various existing non-proliferation regimes, forums and processes, be these unilateral, regional or global, *as it sees fit.*"

Conference participants discovered no quick fixes. Indeed, in the area of the implementation of verification accords, participants were struck by the many daunting problems surrounding the destruction of arms. Nonetheless, the Conference deepened multilateral understanding of current challenges and opportunities in the disarmament field, and of the increasingly interdependent and multidimensional nature of security.

At the close of the Conference, many of the participants joined in a tour of the Peace Memorial Park in Hiroshima, a poignant reminder of the urgent need to find enduring ways to resolve disputes peacefully.

Following the Conference, Ambassador Mason spent ten days in the Asia-Pacific region, where she engaged in disarmament consultations with officials, academics and NGO representatives. In addition to Japan, she visited New Zealand, Australia, Indonesia and South Korea.

While in Wellington, Ambassador Mason met with members of the New Zealand government's Advisory Committee on Disarmament Affairs — made up of members of the public — and, while in Canberra, she visited the Peace Research Centre at the Australian National University.

The Ambassador's consultations provided an excellent opportunity to follow up on the work of the 1991 session of the UN Disarmament Commission and to begin preparations for the 46th session of the UN General Assembly. She also discussed security issues in the Pacific region and Canada's proposal for a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue.

In addition, Ambassador Mason focussed on efforts to improve the functioning of multilateral arms control and disarmament bodies and on the need to promote enhanced cooperation on disarmament issues among like-minded countries from both the developed and developing worlds.

On June 27, shortly after returning from the tour, the Ambassador gave a seminar to students and faculty at York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies on the results of her consultations. ■

Consultative Group Looks at Arms Control and Disarmament in the 1990s

Arms control and disarmament in the 1990s was the focus of discussion when Quebec members of the Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control Affairs met with Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason in Montreal on March 20.

Participants heard from three speakers: Professor Harold Klepak of the Strategic Studies Department at the Royal Military College of St-Jean, who offered a North-South perspective; Ms Janine Kriebler, PhD candidate at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris (residing in Washington), who presented an East-West perspective; and Professor Jules Dufour of the Social Sciences Department at the University of Quebec in Chicoutimi, who took a functionalist approach.

A North-South perspective

Professor Klepak cautioned that the optimism that is justified in the East-West arms control context is misplaced when it comes to the Third World. While the end of superpower competition will have some beneficial effects, Third World states continue to have genuine security needs to which arms are a response. He went through the range of proliferation issues likely to dominate North-South arms control and disarmament relations in the 1990s.

On nuclear weapons, Professor Klepak saw signs that augur well for progress, including Brazil's and Argentina's agreement on nuclear cooperation, South Africa's announcement that it would sign the NPT, and Pakistan's and India's declared intention to take more seriously their agreements on not attacking one another's nuclear facilities.

On missile systems, Professor Klepak expressed greater pessimism. Ballistic missiles are an extremely attractive delivery system to Third World states; the Gulf War demonstrated their political — if not military — effectiveness; and the MTCR is limited in scope and membership. On chemical weapons, Professor Klepak was similarly unhopeful. Although such weapons were not

used in the Gulf War, their prestige may have been augmented as "the world held its breath." On conventional weapons, aside from Latin America, where improved relations have led to the possibility of negotiations, he did not see strong prospects for arms control.

Professor Klepak concluded by observing that Third World states recognize recent shifts in the international power balance and are scrambling to find their place in the new world order. Security questions are high on their agenda. If the North does not assist in providing security arrangements through diplomacy, the South will not disarm. He argued in favour of the parallel pursuit of arms control and conflict resolution, on a regional basis.

An East-West perspective

Ms Kriebler focused on the meaning and implications of the "new world order." She noted that President Bush's conception of a world governed by the rule of law between nations is a long-standing ideal, also held by the creators of the UN, that in practice will be hard to construct. In her view, the post-Cold-War international system is characterized by interdependence, the end of bipolarity, the splintering of blocs and — as the USA and the USSR become proportionately less dominant — increased autonomy for middle powers. It is a more complex world, also a more dangerous one. Conflicts are likely to be smaller but also more frequent and more numerous.

Ms Kriebler opined that the world is moving towards a balance-of-power system, where alliances are supple — witness the Gulf Coalition — and conflicts can come from any quarter. To counter the inherent instability of such a system, she advocated the use of diplomacy, treaties and multilateral understandings to regulate activities and reduce the need for arms. She favoured the retention of Cold War institutions like NATO which could develop into political bodies capable of promoting adherence to a code of conduct among states.

She advocated arms control and disarmament for the same reason, as long as the objectives are realistic.

Ms Kriebler argued that with the superpowers reducing their defence budgets and exercising less control over the system, the question of the dissemination of weapons becomes of utmost importance. She argued in favour of stricter national arms export controls.

A functionalist perspective

According to Professor Dufour, the 1990s will be characterized by increases in armed conflict, in terrorism, in economic problems and in ecological catastrophes. He opined that the mainstream, arms controller approach to peace and security — namely to maintain the established order through deterrence and use of force if necessary — is costly and difficult to sustain. He advocated an alternative approach, promoted by peace and environmental movements, which emphasizes justice, equal sharing of planetary resources, common security and respect for human rights and the environment.

Professor Dufour argued that Canada's international image as a peacemaker suffered during the Gulf War and that, to regain this image, Canada should make tangible gestures for peace and disarmament in the 1990s. He recommended that the government develop and adopt a "White Plan" for peace, in collaboration with non-governmental organizations. As examples of policies that could be incorporated into such a plan, he proposed:

- introducing an obligatory course on disarmament and peace in Canadian universities;
- withdrawing from NATO;
- eliminating all Canadian weapons and converting the Canadian arms industry to non-military production;
- transforming DND into a Department for Security and Peace, which would incorporate the functions of Environment Canada; and
- creating "zones of security" or "parks of peace" across Canada and making the country a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

During the lively discussion that followed, several participants expressed support for Professor Dufour's

proposals. Others disagreed with his assumptions, pointing out that Canada is not participating in an arms race and that the defence budget has not been keeping pace with inflation. They further noted that much of the defence budget goes to support regional economic development. These participants argued that Canada cannot charge ahead and disarm the world, but must work slowly and steadily within the limits of the international system.

Conversion

Several participants argued that the government should develop a national conversion plan and support industrial conversion efforts in Canada. They suggested that the Defence Industry Productivity Program, which provides funds to companies for military research and development, could be a source of funding for conversion studies and support. Participants noted that employee and other non-governmental organizations in Quebec have already done much study in this area and that government and industry could usefully draw on this expertise when developing policy.

Arms transfers

Pointing to the difficulty of identifying stable regions and noting that stable regions can quickly become unstable, some participants argued that Canada should stop exporting military goods. It was also recommended that Canada strengthen its policy guidelines to prohibit the export of military goods to any country that violates human rights, and that the government stop subsidizing the defence industry.

Nuclear proliferation

One participant argued that the NPT is a disaster in the long run. By selling nuclear technology, we are building "nuclear mines" around the world and thus creating the potential for proliferation under the guise of non-proliferation. He recommended that NPT Article IV, which encourages cooperation to facilitate the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, be amended to encourage the sharing of "energy" technology, without specifying nuclear. This proposal received some support. It was further suggested that possession of nuclear

weapons should be regarded akin to apartheid and slavery, and that countries engaging in the practice should be shunned as international pariahs.

Other participants argued that Canada must deal with the reality of the international system, where competing national interests and state sovereignty rule. They opined that the elimination of nuclear weapons would be more dangerous than the control thereof. Another participant observed that there is a tendency among Canadians to believe international problems can be regulated by law. Outside Canada, international law and the UN are far from being seen as important. Security problems are looked at in bilateral and regional perspective.

Other

It was also suggested that the government do the following:

- put the environmental consequences of military activities on the agenda of the UN Conference on the Environment and Development, to be held in Brazil in 1992;
- ban war toys and other cultural objects that promote the use of arms as a means of solving conflicts;
- stop uranium exports and cruise missile testing;
- reduce DND's share of the federal budget;
- make Canada a "zone of peace," i.e., disarm completely and put in place a system of local, non-violent civil defence;
- use the West's desire for indefinite NPT extension as a bargaining chip to convince the USA to stop further development of nuclear weapons; and
- extend the MTCR approach to cover other dangerous technologies.

The Consultative Group consists of academics, peace activists, private researchers and former officials who meet periodically to advise the government on its arms control and disarmament policies. In addition to Consultative Group members, the Montreal consultation included a number of other individuals from Quebec who are knowledgeable about and interested in arms control and disarmament issues, as well as officials from EAITC and DND. ■

Canada Calls for BTWC Compliance Regime

As this Bulletin went to press, States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) were gathered in Geneva to review the Convention's operation with a view to assuring its purposes and provisions are being realized. The BTWC, which prohibits the development, production, acquisition and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons, was negotiated in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (the forerunner of today's Conference on Disarmament) and was opened for signature in April 1972. Canada deposited its instrument of ratification in September 1972. The BTWC entered into force in March 1975. More than 115 states now adhere to the Convention, including all permanent members of the UN Security Council. Previous review conferences were held in 1980 and 1986.

Below are excerpts from the opening statement by the head of the Canadian delegation to the Third Review Conference, Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason. The Conference was held from September 9 to 27.

If ever there was any doubt as to the horror associated by our publics with the prospect of the use of biological weapons, the recent Gulf War has erased that doubt and indeed has underscored through press reports the full extent of that public horror. There can be no justification whatsoever for the use, or threat of use, of such terrible instruments of terrorism, capable of causing casualties and death on a massive scale. Outright condemnation of such weapons is the very foundation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which seeks to ensure — by banning their development, production and stockpiling — that these weapons will never be available for use.

The Gulf War and its aftermath, particularly the work of the United Nations Special Commission, have highlighted not only the timeliness of this Review Conference but also the urgent need for States Parties to consider all appropriate measures to strengthen the legal and moral ban enshrined in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

The general purpose of this Review Conference is already established by the Convention itself: it is to review the operation of the Convention with a view to assuring that its purposes and provisions are being realized. It has also been established that the review will take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

My delegation is pleased to join with others who have distributed material on the subject of scientific and technological developments — developments both dramatic in nature and swift in their impact. In this regard, I am referring to the document entitled "Novel Toxins and Bioregulators: The Emerging Scientific and Technological Issues Relating to Verification and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention" which Canada has distributed to delegations through the Secretariat. This document describes some of the exciting work that has taken place relatively recently in the field of biotechnology, and it expresses some concern about the potential for diversion of such materials and technologies to hostile purposes.

This brings me to another important element on the agenda of the Third Review Conference. The Final Declaration in 1986 specified that we would consider not only whether further cooperative (or politically-binding) measures might be warranted, but also that we would consider whether legally-binding improvements to the Convention, or a combination of both, might be called for. On these matters there will undoubtedly be a variety of views and a need to find suitable compromises. However, let me state clearly at the outset that my delegation is fully prepared to consider the creation of additional legally-binding commitments, whether for the purpose of confidence-building or verification or both.

With respect to verification, we do not believe this will be a simple matter open to simple solutions. In fact, the document that we have circulated adds additional weight to the view that there

are many complex dimensions to the verification issue, particularly as regards the diffuse biotechnology sector. Nevertheless, verification is not just a yes-or-no, all-or-nothing proposition, and Canada is of the view that, despite the difficulties, progress can be made in strengthening this vital aspect of the Convention. We must begin to tackle the questions as to exactly what can be done and how best to go about it, and my delegation very much looks forward to a constructive and imaginative discussion of these questions.

Let me turn to the cooperative measures agreed at the Second Review Conference and the modalities subsequently agreed by an Ad Hoc Meeting of Scientific and Technical Experts. My delegation recognizes that there may have been some confusion in relation to what action was expected on the part of States Parties in order to implement the agreed measures. Surely this Review Conference will ensure that we can lay to rest these misperceptions and emerge with a common understanding on this important matter. The time has come for us to demonstrate solidarity on what has already been agreed, as a necessary step along the road to the effective consideration of further measures. In the meantime, we can derive some satisfac-

Verification is not a simple matter open to simple solutions. Obligations entail national efforts and costs.

tion from the fact that there has been a noticeable increase in the number of annual reports submitted to the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs.

One thing is clear, however. It is not sufficient simply to argue in favour of, or lend support to, establishing obligations, whether legally- or politically-binding. We must all face up to the fact that such agreed measures entail subsequent national efforts and costs. Much has been said about the "peace dividend" that can arise from spending less money on armaments and diverting

Canada Withdraws BW Reservations to Geneva Protocol

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Barbara McDougall, and the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Marcel Masse, announced in September that Canada is withdrawing its reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol so that they no longer apply to bacteriological weapons.

"Let there be no doubt as to the depth of Canada's abhorrence of biological weapons," said Mrs. McDougall. "Our decision to withdraw these reservations underlines Canada's long-standing view that there is no justification whatsoever for the use, or threat of use, of such terrible weapons."

In 1925 when signing the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, Canada retained the right to retaliate in certain circumstances, such as where biological or chemical weapons are used against Canadian citizens. As long ago as 1970, however, the Canadian government declared that it would not use biological or toxin weapons at any time in the future.

"The Canadian Forces have never used chemical or biological weapons. We do not possess them nor do we have the intention of ever acquiring them," said Mr. Masse. "We have only ensured our troops have adequate training and equipment to protect themselves against such an attack. Withdrawing these reservations further entrenches our opposition to their use as a means of waging war."

that expenditure to much more socially-productive uses. In such a case, spending less in one area can lead in certain circumstances to spending more elsewhere, for the common good.

There is also an arms control peace dividend, but it works slightly differently. It involves making an investment up front — spending money on negotiations, contributing to the creation of international mechanisms to verify agreements, as well as setting up national mechanisms to ensure the fulfilment of obligations — so as to create the improved security environment whereby other substantial savings can be realized and the funds diverted to more productive purposes. In our determination to make prudent decisions in light of current fiscal realities, we must take due account of this "multiplier effect" and of the longer-term benefits to be realized through such reasonable initial investments. To put it another way, what price will we pay in the longer term if we fail to do what we can now?

I believe there are many delegations gathered here that are prepared to consider additional confidence-building measures and, indeed, the establishment of a compliance or verification regime. In the case of confidence-building

measures, there are many candidates for consideration. Some non-government organizations, in particular, have been very active in producing proposals for our consideration, and I am certain that my delegation is not alone in expressing its gratitude for these helpful and thoughtful suggestions. Much effort and a great deal of technical expertise have been offered in a true spirit of altruism, and this effort deserves to bear fruit.

We government representatives shall have hard choices to make from the generous menu before us. In this regard, my delegation shall strive to evaluate the various proposals while bearing three characteristics, or criteria, in mind:

- practicability;
- effectiveness in enhancing transparency in relation to compliance with the Convention; and
- economy.

Although it is probably premature at this stage to recite a list of confidence-building measures that may find support at this Conference, there are three in particular that I would like to mention. Canada is of the view that more information can be provided by States Parties with respect to relevant defence research programs, including contractor-performed research. On this subject of

openness, my delegation will soon be circulating through the Secretariat a document entitled "Transparency Mechanisms for the Canadian Chemical and Biological Defence Program." In particular, this document describes the establishment and functioning of a Review Committee which allows certain respected members of Canada's non-governmental community to have access to all aspects of our chemical and biological defence program. We hope that other States Parties may find this experience to be of some interest, and that it will help stimulate further discussion on the subject of openness with respect to such programs.

In the civilian sphere, we also believe that more can be done in terms of reporting certain facilities. Again with a view to stimulating such discussion, my delegation will also be circulating a document prepared by Health and Welfare Canada on the subject of "Laboratory Biosafety Guidelines" outlining Canadian practices in relation to classification of agents according to risk and related physical containment levels.

A final point on the subject of confidence-building measures is warranted. My delegation will be pleased to join with others in proposing that a small group be established and tasked directly with responsibility for a number of Convention-support activities between Review Conferences, including follow-up in relation to annual reports in accordance with agreed confidence-building measures.

The issue of verification has been discussed at previous Review Conferences, as it shall be over the next three weeks. As I have already mentioned, this discussion often gets bogged down in all-or-nothing rhetoric, with the "good" possibly being held hostage to perfection, to paraphrase a popular expression. Furthermore, the discussion often tends to focus on technical matters, forgetting that there is an important political dimension to verification, both at the international and national level. Verification regimes, it seems, are often portrayed as magic black boxes, to which a compliance question is inserted at one end and an unequivocal answer comes out at the other. Of course, we

know that such a view misconstrues the real process of verification.

It has been said many times that verification is a process, just as confidence-building is a process, whereby States Parties can focus attention on compliance matters of concern and work together to address those concerns. That is why my delegation prefers to speak in terms of the creation of a "compliance regime" for the Convention that will encompass not only confidence-building measures but also verification measures — with the latter perhaps focussed on particular situations.

What is the difference in a name? Most importantly, the title of compliance regime conveys very clearly that it is the obligation of States Parties to demonstrate compliance with the Convention. In this way, we mean to put the emphasis on cooperative approaches to the resolution of any concerns that may occur.

Such a compliance regime could combine:

- the politically-binding commitments of States Parties on confidence-building measures;
- a provision for fact finding in circumstances when one or more States Parties may desire clarification, and this coupled with a strengthened consultation mechanism; and
- the establishment of institutional/procedural arrangements necessary for effective implementation.

Canada believes that such an integrated approach would constitute a practical and positive contribution to strengthening the international security regime of which we are all a part. My delegation is prepared to cooperate with others in moving forward in each of these areas...

I would like to take a moment to address the important issue of universal adherence to this Convention. Canada welcomes the new States Parties that have joined the vast majority of states in declaring clearly and forcefully that there is no place in this world for biological and toxin weapons. In fact, Canadians find it difficult to understand how it is that some countries still stand outside this circle. Surely these countries cannot be any more secure in knowing that, by standing apart, they

themselves may be promoting suspicions among others. The fact that some of those countries are attending this Review Conference is an encouraging sign, and the warmth of our welcome could only be further enhanced by their becoming full participants as States Parties to the Convention. Some, in fact, have already taken the first step in signing the Convention, and we regard this as more than just a symbolic gesture. We recognize that the very act of signing the Convention carries with it certain obligations under international law.

As the final substantive point of my intervention — but not the least important — I would like to take this opportunity to announce that Canada has recently modified its reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use in war of chemical weapons and of bacteriological methods of warfare, by removing the reservations insofar as they relate to bacteriological methods of warfare. As long ago as 1970, the Canadian Government unilaterally declared that it would not use biological or toxin weapons at any time in the future. The more recent formal action taken with regard to the 1925 Geneva Protocol is meant simply to ensure that there can be no suggestion of uncertainty anywhere as to the extent of Canada's abhorrence of biological warfare and the means of conducting it.

This is an exciting time in the field of biotechnology and indeed in international affairs. Canada believes that the many triumphs of science can be harnessed and applied where they are most needed for the general good, and the perversions of distrust and hostility defeated. This is, however, not the work of a single moment, a single signature. It requires a continuous application, cooperation among states and scientists, and willingness to move forward in our levels of commitment and vigilance.

Our goal is nothing less than a universal Convention with the strict adherence of all States Parties to its purposes and provisions. It is, I believe, an achievable goal.

Forecast

Arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, October 1991 through January 1992

Ongoing: CSBM Negotiations, Vienna

Ongoing: CFE 1A Negotiation, Vienna

Ongoing: CFE 1 Joint Consultative Group meetings, Vienna

Ongoing: Open Skies negotiations, Vienna

October 14 - late November: UNGA First Committee, New York

November - December: CD inter-sessional meetings, Geneva

Biological and Chemical Defence Review Committee Releases Report

The Honourable Marcel Masse, Minister of National Defence, announced on August 15 the release of the Biological and Chemical Defence Review Committee's (BCDRC) first annual report. The Committee concluded that the Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces (DND/CF) biological and chemical self-defence programs, including research, training and facilities, are managed in a professional manner with no threat to public safety or the environment.

The BCDRC was established in May 1990 as a result of the 1989 Barton Report, a comprehensive review of the conduct of biological and chemical defence within the DND/CF. The Committee consists of prominent members of Canada's scientific community. It is chaired by Dr. E.R.W. Neale of Calgary, with Dr. C.E. Holloway of York University and Dr. G.L. Plaa of the University of Montreal as members.

"The BCDRC Report makes a number of practical suggestions concerning defence in a hostile biological and chemical environment," said Mr. Masse. "In particular, it emphasizes that CF personnel must continue to have the highest level of training and equipment to protect themselves against exposure to a variety of nerve agents."

Canada and USSR Sign Agreement on PDMA



General Moiseyev (seated, left) and General de Chastelain (seated, right) signing the Agreement.

Canadian Forces photo

In Ottawa on May 10, the Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff, General John de Chastelain, and the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and First Deputy Defence Minister of the USSR, General M.A. Moiseyev, signed on behalf of their respective governments an Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (PDMA).

The Agreement is designed to ensure the safety of personnel and the protection of equipment when the armed forces of the USSR and the armed forces of Canada exercise or operate in close proximity to each other. The Agreement, which is guided by the principles and rules of international law, commits both parties to avoid dangerous military activities and to resolve any incidents quickly and peacefully. The parties will meet regularly to review the Agreement's implementation. The USSR signed a similar agreement with the USA in 1989.

General Moiseyev was in Ottawa to discuss a wide range of bilateral issues, including international and European security, arms control, and the future of Soviet-Canadian military visits and exchanges. A two-year program of visits and exchanges, including bilateral military staff talks, began in 1990. While in Canada, General Moiseyev became acquainted with the life and activities of Canadian Forces personnel through visits to the Royal Roads Military College in Victoria, B.C., and to a number of naval, land and air force installations across the country.

In the summer of 1990, General de Chastelain became the first Canadian defence chief to visit the USSR, where he spoke to members of the Military Academy of the Soviet General Staff and visited military installations in Leningrad and the Kola Peninsula.

According to the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable Marcel Masse, "General Moiseyev's visit and the signing of the Agreement are both reflections of the greater understanding and professional friendships that have been fostered between our two forces over the past year."

NATO Ministers Issue Communiqué

The following communiqué was issued in Copenhagen on June 7 by NATO foreign ministers.

At their Summit in London last July, our Heads of State and Government committed our Alliance of free and democratic nations to a process of adaptation commensurate with the changes that have reshaped the face of Europe. The fundamental review that they mandated of the Alliance's political and military strategy is being carried out on all levels and is approaching completion. Our Heads of State and Government will convene in Rome on 7th and 8th November to bring this process to its conclusion.

The process initiated by the London Declaration is an important contribution to enhancing stability and security within a free Europe. Our efforts to ensure stability in peace and freedom will recognize the political, economic, social and ecological elements of security, along with indispensable defence dimension. The Alliance, and the EC, the WEU, the CSCE and the Council of Europe are key institutions in this endeavour. We are guided by our ultimate goal of establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in the whole of Europe.

To this end, much has been achieved recently. Following the entry into force of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, united Germany for the first time participates in a meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Ministerial level as a fully sovereign member of this Alliance. As we noted in our statement issued yesterday, the division of Europe has been overcome. In fulfilment of the undertakings contained in the Charter of Paris and the Joint Declaration of 22 States signed last November, which now assume ever greater relevance, we are cooperating with the Soviet Union and the other Central and Eastern European states more closely than before. We will work to make the forthcoming meeting of CSCE foreign ministers in Berlin a decisive new step in the development of the CSCE process.

In adapting to the new era in Europe and in striving to develop cooperative structures of security for a Europe whole and free, the Alliance will continue to perform its enduring basic missions. Today we have issued a separate statement setting out these core security functions of the Alliance. They will provide an essential basis from which the Allies will be able to take full advantage of new opportunities in building the new Europe.

* * *

1. A transformed Atlantic Alliance constitutes an essential element in the new architecture of an undivided Europe; we are agreed that the Alliance must have the flexibility to continue to develop and evolve as the security situation dictates. An important basis for this transformation is the agreement of all Allies to enhance the role and responsibility of the European members. We welcome efforts further to strengthen the security dimension in the process of European integration and recognize the significance of the progress made by the countries of the European Community towards the goal of political union, including the development of a common foreign and security policy. These two positive processes are mutually reinforcing. The development of a European security identity and defence role, reflected in the strengthening of the European pillar within the Alliance, will reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Atlantic Alliance.

2. We are agreed, in parallel with the emergence and development of a European security identity and defence role, to enhance the essential transatlantic link that the Alliance guarantees and fully to maintain the strategic unity and indivisibility of security of all our members. We will continue, in particular, to ensure the Alliance's capability to fulfil its essential functions. The Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty, as expressed in the statement on NATO's core security functions accompanying this communique. We all agree that the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defence of the Allies must

be maintained. This applies in particular to the integrated military structure for the Allied countries that participate in it.

3. Recognizing that it is for the European Allies concerned to decide what arrangements are needed for the expression of a common European foreign and security policy and defence role, we further agree that, as the two processes advance, we will develop practical arrangements to ensure the necessary transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence identity as it emerges in the Twelve and the Western European Union, and the Alliance. There will be a need, in particular, to establish appropriate links and consultation procedures between them in order to ensure that the Allies that are not currently participating in the development of a European identity in foreign and security policy and defence should be adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security.

4. Allies are convinced that arms control and confidence-building measures will continue to shape and consolidate a new cooperative order in Europe in which no country need harbour fears for its security. The CFE Treaty is the key-stone for such a stable and lasting peace on the continent. In our separate statement yesterday, we expressed our hope that a binding agreement can soon be reached to resolve the problems which had arisen with respect to the Treaty, allowing it to move forward to early ratification and entry into force and full implementation. Once concluded, such an agreement will open the way for us to make new proposals on military manpower in Europe without delay in the CFE 1A Negotiation now taking place in Vienna. In the CSBM Negotiations, we will seek further to strengthen openness and stability. Work within the Alliance is moving forward in preparation for new negotiations on conventional arms in Europe, open to all CSCE members, after the Helsinki CSCE Follow-up Meeting in 1992. We look forward to informal preparatory consultations on this

subject with CSCE partners in the autumn.

5. The Allies attach high importance to the earliest possible establishment of an Open Skies regime as an essential contribution to transparency among all participants. We have recently made fresh proposals to that end, and we call on all participants to join us in a prompt resumption of productive negotiations.

6. In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, Allies support the United States' efforts to reach a final agreement that will provide a framework for strategic stability into the next century. Preparations among the Allies concerned are advancing on an arms control framework for USA-Soviet negotiations on the reduction of their short-range nuclear forces.

7. Allies have worked for many years to advance progress in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament on a regional and global basis. The Gulf crisis demonstrated what we have long recognized: the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and of missiles capable of delivering them, and excessive transfers of conventional arms undermine international security and increase the risk of armed conflict throughout the world. To meet this challenge, we have renewed our commitment to the earliest possible achievement of advances in the international

Allies renew commitment to earliest possible advances in fora dealing with proliferation issues.

fora dealing with specific proliferation issues. We fully endorse the goal of concluding a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention by mid-1992 and support President Bush's initiative of 13th May to that effect. We will also seek in September 1991, at the Third Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention, to strengthen that Convention and to encourage further accessions to it. We will urgently pursue efforts in the United Nations and elsewhere to

address the problem of excessive build-ups of conventional arms by ensuring transparency and restraint. Several of our leaders have recently proposed arms control and non-proliferation initiatives, including for the Middle East. These initiatives reflect our commitment to the goals described above.

8. The Gulf conflict confirmed the importance of intra-Alliance consultations and information-sharing, which helped to reinforce political solidarity among Allies throughout the crisis. The collective expression of support for the Ally facing a direct threat demonstrated our resolve to stand by our commitments under Article V of the Washington Treaty and helped to deter a further expansion of hostilities. Although NATO itself was not involved in the Gulf War, the long practice of cooperation, common procedures, collective defence arrangements and infrastructure developed by NATO provided valuable assistance to those Allies that chose to make use of them in their respective efforts in support of the UN Security Council resolutions on the Gulf.

9. Looking to the future, we believe that just and lasting solutions to the problems of the Gulf and the Middle East are urgently needed. We thus support current efforts for comprehensive negotiated settlements to the problems of that region.

10. The Gulf crisis underlined that, in an interdependent world that is increasingly affected by technological advances, we must be prepared to address other unpredictable developments that are beyond the focus of traditional Alliance concerns, but that can have direct implications for our security. Now more than ever, worldwide developments which affect our security interests are legitimate matters for consultation and, where appropriate, coordination among us. We will thus increasingly need to address broader issues and new global challenges. We will seek to do so in our consultations and in the appropriate multilateral fora, in the widest possible cooperation with other states.

11. We express our deep appreciation for the gracious hospitality extended to us by Her Majesty the Queen and the Government of Denmark. ■



SSEA Barbara McDougall with French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas at the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Copenhagen in June.

NATO's Core Security Functions

The following statement was issued by NATO foreign ministers on June 7.

The purpose of the Alliance

1. NATO's essential purpose...is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged.

The nature of the Alliance

2. NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their common interests.

3. The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity within the Alliance, given substance and effect by NATO's daily work in both the political and military spheres, ensures that no single Ally is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them through collective effort to enhance their ability to realize their essential national security objectives.

4. The resulting sense of equal security amongst the members of the Alliance, regardless of differences in their circumstances or in their national military capabilities relative to each other, contributes to overall stability within Europe and thus to the creation of conditions conducive to increased cooperation both among Alliance members and with others. It is on this basis that members of the Alliance, together with other nations, are able to pursue the development of cooperative structures of security for a Europe whole and free.

The fundamental tasks of the Alliance

5. The means by which the Alliance pursues its security policy to preserve the peace will continue to include the maintenance of a military capability sufficient to prevent

war and to provide for effective defence; and overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its members; and the pursuit of political efforts favouring dialogue with other nations and the active search for a cooperative approach to European security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.

6. To achieve its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following fundamental security tasks:

I. To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.

II. To serve, as provided for in Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

III. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.

IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

7. Other European institutions such as the European Community, WEU and CSCE also have roles to play, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these fields.

The creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. However, the extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can perform all four core security functions. NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.

8. In defining the core functions of the Alliance in the terms set out above,

member states confirm that the scope of the Alliance as well as their rights and obligations as provided for in the Washington Treaty remain unchanged. ■

CFE Update

The problem arising from the USSR's interpretation of Article III, the "counting rules" of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), was resolved on June 14 following several months of discussion and negotiation. Final resolution of the problem occurred within the framework of the CFE itself: an Extraordinary Conference pursuant to Article XXI was convened to permit the 22 signatory states to issue legally-binding statements which constitute a separate international agreement. A meeting of the Joint Consultative Group was also held to permit the USSR to issue a statement on military equipment held east of the Ural Mountains, where it is not covered by CFE.

The USSR addressed the concerns of all other signatories on the Article III issue by stating its willingness to assume several obligations. It agreed to place a cap on the holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the treaty (TLE) to be held by its Naval Infantry, Coastal Defence and Strategic Rocket Forces within the CFE area of application. The caps would be at levels existing on November 19, 1990. The USSR also agreed that the only TLE assigned to the Strategic Rocket Forces would be armoured personnel carriers.

Furthermore, the USSR undertook to reduce the number of TLE held by other units within the CFE's area of application so that its total holdings of TLE within the area would conform with all CFE numerical limitations. Most importantly, in order to clarify CFE counting rules for the future, the USSR also agreed that irrespective of assignment or subordination, unless otherwise specified in the Treaty or the statements exchanged on June 14, all TLE based on land within the area of application would be subject to CFE limitations.

The identical statements of the other 21 signatories in response to the USSR's

statement accepted the legally-binding nature of the statements, agreed that these statements would enter into force simultaneously with CFE, and noted that the USSR statement provided a satisfactory basis for proceeding towards ratification and implementation of the CFE. In the ensuing months, Czechoslovakia was the first state to deposit its instrument of ratification. Others are expected to do so in the next few months. It is anticipated, however, that the restructuring of the USSR, and the separation of the Baltic states in particular, may require some additional adjustments in order to implement all CFE obligations. ■

Open Skies Talks Resume

Negotiations on an Open Skies agreement resumed in Vienna on September 9 among the members of NATO and the former Warsaw Treaty Organization. The Open Skies proposal calls for unarmed, short-notice surveillance flights designed to build confidence among participating countries. Previous rounds of Open Skies talks were held in Ottawa in February 1990 and in Budapest in April 1990. In April of this year, Canada presented a new compromise position to the USSR on behalf of the NATO allies.

In announcing the resumption of negotiations jointly with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Mr. Gesa Jeszensky, SSEA Barbara McDougall observed that "an Open Skies regime is an important component of a new security order. We are delighted to work so closely with Hungary in these talks."

Mr. Jeszensky said, "We hope that the experience gained from both the Canada-Hungary trial flight [of January 1990], as well as the bilateral Open Skies regime that Hungary established with Romania, will contribute to the successful conclusion of these negotiations."

Talks on Open Skies will continue throughout the fall. Initial indications are that all sides are considering compromises and that an agreement can be reached within the next six months. ■

Focus: On Biological Weapons

Focus is written primarily for secondary school students.

By the time you read this article, over 70 countries, including Canada, will just have spent three weeks looking at ways to improve a disarmament treaty known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Because their use in modern times has been so rare and unspectacular, biological weapons are usually overshadowed in the news by their cousins in the mass destruction business — nuclear and chemical weapons. Like nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are capable of causing death and suffering on a huge scale. Fortunately, unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, they are under an international ban.

What are biological weapons?

Biological weapons — which are sometimes called “bacteriological” or “germ” weapons — are made up of two parts: a biological warfare agent and a delivery system.

Biological warfare agents are living organisms — such as viruses, fungi and bacteria — that cause disease or death in humans, animals or plants. In the case of humans, biological warfare agents can enter the body through the digestive system (by being eaten or drunk), the respiratory system (by being inhaled) or the skin (through bites or injections). They multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked and can often spread to others. Typhus, cholera, anthrax and yellow fever are examples of biological warfare agents.

The delivery system is the means of carrying the biological warfare agent to its target. The delivery system can be a city's water supply or a building's ventilation system, contaminated by a terrorist. It can be an infected insect, such as a mosquito, a louse or a mite. Most likely it will be a shell or a spray that delivers biological warfare agents in the form of clouds of tiny particles. The particles are then carried by the wind and inhaled by victims. Aircraft, bombs, artillery shells and missiles can be designed for this type of delivery.

The effects of biological weapons vary depending on the agents used and the targets attacked. For example, anthrax can cause high fever, breathing difficulties, collapse and often death within 18 to 24 hours. On the other hand, brucellosis causes headaches, weight loss and a fever that lasts from several weeks to several months.

A biological weapons attack could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths, which is why biological weapons are considered one of the “weapons of mass destruction” (the others are nuclear, chemical and radiological weapons). The World Health Organization has estimated that if anthrax were sprayed over a city with a population of 5 million, 100,000 people would die and a further 150,000 would be incapacitated. Another report, by the University of Sussex, says that some biological weapons could kill as many people as high-yield nuclear weapons could.

Biological weapons are different from chemical weapons, which consist of chemical (as opposed to living) substances. Chemical weapons cannot multiply themselves. They work strictly through their direct, poisonous effects on humans, animals and plants.

Toxins are another class of poisons that can be used for weapons purposes. Although they are chemical compounds and cannot reproduce themselves, toxins are usually grouped with biological weapons because in their naturally-occurring form they are produced by animals, plants or micro-organisms. Toxins can also be made and manipulated in the laboratory. Botulism toxin, shellfish poison and snake venom are examples of toxins.

Biological weapons' use

Primitive forms of biological weapons (BW) were used in ancient times. The Greeks and Romans are reported to have poisoned drinking wells with human and animal corpses. In modern times, even though Britain, Germany, Japan, the USA and the USSR all started BW research programs in the 1930s or 1940s, the use of BW has been rare. It is believed that the Japanese used BW against Chinese cities between

1940 and 1944, killing some 700 victims. There is also evidence that at least 3,000 prisoners of war died in BW experiments carried out by the Japanese during World War II. More recently, the USA accused the USSR of using toxin weapons in Kampuchea, Laos and Afghanistan, and the USSR accused the USA of using BW in Cuba. Both parties have denied the allegations.

BW use has been rare for a number of reasons. BW are hard to stockpile because many biological warfare agents deteriorate when stored for long periods. BW also tend to be unreliable when used. Few germs can survive contact with air pollutants, sunlight and humidity different from what they are used to. As a result, many BW lose their strength by the time they reach their targets. The effectiveness of BW also depends on the wind speed and direction, which can't be controlled by the attacker. Given that many BW are highly infectious, the attacker risks damaging not only the target population but also its own, or that of neutrals and allies. The attacker could try to immunize its military and civilians, but this could alert the enemy to the prospect of BW use and make it hard to achieve surprise. Even if BW reach the target population, their effects take time to develop and spread. In a fast-moving battle, they might not make much difference to the outcome.

The rarity of BW use is probably also due in part to the widespread belief that such weapons are immoral. Biological warfare would be a deliberate reversal of the disease prevention and health care measures all countries have painstakingly worked towards in the 20th century. Also, as described below, BW are illegal.

Biological weapons treaties

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 bans the use in war of poisonous gases and other biological methods of warfare. It does not ban the development, production or stockpiling of these weapons. Neither does it say what countries should do if the treaty is violated and BW are used in war. Over 125 countries have ratified the Geneva Protocol. Many of these countries reserve the right to use BW if BW are used against them.

In 1972, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) was signed. It bans the development, production, acquisition and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. It also requires the destruction or conversion to peaceful purposes of existing BW. Over 115 countries are party to the BTWC.

Canada and BW

Canada does not possess biological or toxin weapons.

Canada ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1930. Like most other parties, Canada reserved the right to use BW against countries that didn't sign the treaty, and to use BW if BW were used against it. In 1970, to draw more attention to the need to control BW, Canada announced its clear policy not to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile or use BW at any time. To ensure that there is no confusion, Canada recently removed its reservations to the Geneva Protocol with respect to bacteriological methods of warfare. That is, Canada will never use BW, no matter what the circumstances.

Canada played an important role in the negotiation of the BTWC. We signed and ratified the treaty in 1972, further committing ourselves to never develop, produce or stockpile biological or toxin weapons.

Since not all countries have signed the Geneva Protocol and the BTWC, it is possible that the Canadian Forces will someday have to participate in a war or a peacekeeping operation where BW might be used. During the Gulf War, for example, it was thought that Iraq might try to use BW. To make sure that Canadian personnel would be properly protected in such a case, the Department of National Defence carries out research into defensive measures against BW. These include protective clothing, respirators, anti-toxins and vaccines. This type of research is consistent with the terms of the BTWC.

Canada is concerned about the possibility that some countries might be developing and stockpiling biological or toxin weapons. As a result, the federal government has started a program to make Canadian industry and universities aware of the dangers of BW proliferation. They are advised to be on the look-out for suspicious attempts to gain knowledge about the use of biological technologies, as well as for attempts to acquire materials and equipment that could have BW uses. The goal is to make sure that Canadians involved in research and production for peaceful purposes do not contribute, either directly or unintentionally, to another country's biological or toxin weapons program.

Canada is also working to make the BTWC more effective. At a conference held in September to review the BTWC, Canada and other countries proposed that the treaty be strengthened to promote transparency (in other words, sharing of information) and to ensure compliance (in other words, to ensure that parties are acting in accordance with the terms of the BTWC).

Some arms controllers are worried that recent advances in biotechnology — especially genetic engineering — could make BW more effective and reliable, and thus a more attractive option to some countries. Biotechnology techniques make it easier for countries to come up with new biological warfare agents and to produce toxins on a large scale. At the same time, the equipment for doing so is becoming smaller and more difficult to track, and the range of civilian research with potential military applications is increasing. There are therefore some serious challenges to making arms control a reality in this evolving field.

So far, the world has had a relatively lucky track record with biological weapons. The goal is to make sure that the treaties banning these horrible weapons, and the national means for their control, remain effective and up-to-date. ■

Disarmament Fund Update

Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund, April 1 - September 30, 1991

CONTRIBUTIONS

1. North American Model United Nations (Toronto) — 1992 Simulation of UN General Assembly	\$5,000
2. North Coast Tribal Council (Prince Rupert, B.C.) — Nuclear conference, April 1991	1,000
3. UN Association in Canada (Vancouver branch) — Conference on naval arms control, November 1991	5,000
4. Canadian Association of NATO Defence College Anciens (Ottawa) — Symposium on "Canada and NATO," October 1991	4,000
5. Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (Toronto) — Canadian Strategic Forecast 1991 seminar	3,000
6. Division of University Extension, University of Victoria — Public forum on "Canada's Role in Disarmament, Arms Control and Arms Trade," October 1991	5,000
7. Park View Education Centre (Bridgewater, N.S.) — 1992 Atlantic Coast Model UN on the Arms Trade	5,000
8. Peace and Environment Resource Centre (Ottawa) — Purchase of books about disarmament for library	1,000
9. Voice of Women (national office, Toronto) — 1991 Study tour of UN General Assembly	3,000
TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS	\$32,000

GRANTS


1. Project Ploughshares (Waterloo, Ont.) — Research and publication on naval arms control	7,000
2. Jocelyn Coulon (Outremont, Que.) — Book on Canada and the Gulf War	2,500
TOTAL OF GRANTS	\$9,500
TOTAL OF GRANTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS	\$41,500 ■

Acronyms

ACD — arms control and disarmament
 BCDRC — Biological and Chemical
 Defence Review Committee
 BTWC — Biological and Toxin
 Weapons Convention
 BW — biological weapons
 CBM — confidence-building measure
 CD — Conference on Disarmament
 CF(B) — Canadian Forces (Base)
 CFE — Conventional Armed Forces in
 Europe
 CSBM — confidence- and security-
 building measure
 CSCE — Conference on Security and
 Cooperation in Europe
 DND — Department of National
 Defence
 DRES — Defence Research Establish-
 ment Suffield
 EAITC — External Affairs and Interna-
 tional Trade Canada
 EC — European Community
 EIPA — Export and Import Permits Act
 G7 — Group of Seven leading in-
 dustrialized countries
 IAEA — International Atomic Energy
 Agency
 ICBM — intercontinental ballistic mis-
 sile
 IOZOP — Indian Ocean as a Zone of
 Peace
 MTCR — Missile Technology Control
 Regime
 NATO — North Atlantic Treaty Or-
 ganization
 NPT — Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
 of Nuclear Weapons
 OAS — Organization of American
 States
 PDMA — [Agreement on the] Preven-
 tion of Dangerous Military Activities
 SLBM — sea-launched ballistic missile
 SSEA — Secretary of State for External
 Affairs
 START — Strategic Arms Reduction
 Talks/Treaty
 TLE — treaty-limited equipment
 UNDC — UN Disarmament Commis-
 sion
 UNGA — UN General Assembly
 UNSCOM — UN Special Commission
 WEU — Western European Union ■

At right: photo taken from aerostat during
 test at CFB Lahr. Aircraft are Belgian Air
 Force F-16 fighter jets.

Verification from a New Perspective



The assembled aerostat.

EAITC's Verification Research Unit has been investigating the use of an air-
 borne, helium-filled blimp system as an arms control verification tool. The Unit has
 contracted Aeroblomp Incorporated, a Waterloo-based manufacturer and supplier
 of portable blimps or aerostats, to demonstrate an overhead surveillance system
 using a tethered aerostat as the platform.

During the past year, the Verification Research Unit conducted three evaluation
 tests of this innovative monitoring system: one at Canadian Forces Base (CFB)
 Petawawa, one at CFB Lahr in Germany and one at CFB Uplands in Ottawa. The
 main purpose of the tests was to evaluate an overhead imaging system in support of
 on-site inspections for arms control verification operations. Although the CFE
 Treaty does not presently allow for overhead monitoring, this system could be used
 for portal perimeter and traffic monitoring, and for area and object-of-verification
 surveillance. Other potential applications include drug enforcement, peacekeeping
 and search-and-rescue operations.

The aerostat is approximately 11 metres long and, when fully inflated with helium,
 is capable of supporting a 25 kilogram payload. For demonstration purposes, a
 35 mm camera was coupled to a high resolution video camera and operated from a
 height of 37 metres. Both cameras can be operated from the ground. By manipula-
 tion of a joystick, high-resolution 35 mm images were obtained using the video
 camera and its zoom capability as a viewing and directional guide. The tests
 demonstrated that the imaging camera system could adequately monitor a radius of
 approximately three kilometres (or 28 square kilometres) on a continuous basis.



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Disarmament Bulletin

A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

Number 18 - Winter 1991/92

UN Arms Register Marks Triumph for Canada



As part of the UN arms register, countries are asked to report exports and imports of seven categories of weapons, including combat aircraft such as the Canadian CF-18 fighter jets pictured above at their base in Qatar during the Gulf War.

Canadian Forces photo

A Canadian arms control initiative achieved a major success on December 9 when the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution establishing a global arms register. The resolution passed by an overwhelming 150 in favour, none opposed and two abstentions (Cuba and Iraq). China, Djibouti, Laos, Myanmar, Sudan, Syria and Vietnam did not participate in the

vote, along with six other small states which, it is believed, were simply not present in the General Assembly rather than opposed to the resolution. The UNGA First Committee had earlier adopted the resolution by a vote of 106 in favour, one opposed (Cuba) and eight abstentions (China, Iraq, Myanmar, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Singapore and Sudan). The increased support for the resolution in plenary was the result of extensive lobbying by Canada and other countries.

Canada first called for an arms register in the fall of 1990, when then-Secretary of State for External Affairs (SSEA) Joe Clark told the General Assembly that Canada favoured the widest possible reporting to the UN of military expenditures, procurement and arms transfers. Current SSEA Barbara McDougall repeated the call at UNGA 46. Creation of a register has been a key component of Canada's action plan to prevent excessive build-ups of conventional arms, launched in February 1991.

Although endorsed by a number of international fora including the G7, the European Community and the Commonwealth, and recommended by a UN Group of Experts, establishment of an arms register was no sure thing. The register resolution, entitled "Transparency in Armaments," was the subject of intense negotiations in the First Committee. The most contentious issues were the following:

- timing of the register. Canada and many other countries insisted that the UN should take advantage of current political momentum and establish the register immediately, with first reports required for calendar year 1992 (the first practicable year for reporting, since countries must know at the start of

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the year on what items they should be collecting data). Others wanted further study of the concept before implementation.

- inclusion of procurement and holdings. Many countries, including Canada, argued that arms procurement from domestic sources and arms holdings should be reported to the

According to the terms of the resolution ultimately adopted, the register — which will be maintained at UN Headquarters in New York — will initially cover conventional arms transfers only. Member States are called upon to annually provide the register with data on their imports and exports of the following categories of weapons: battle tanks; armoured combat vehicles; large-calibre artillery systems; combat aircraft; attack helicopters; warships; and missiles or missile systems. First reports are required by April 30,

1993 in respect of calendar year 1992.

However, recognition of the relevance of procurement and holdings to the exercise, and their de facto inclusion, is assured by a clause inviting Member States to provide the register with information about their military holdings, their military procurement through national production, and relevant policies.

In addition, the resolution sets in motion a multi-pronged review process to examine possibilities for early expansion of the register's scope, and to look at issues related to technology transfers and weapons of mass destruction.

As a first step, the Secretary-General will establish a panel of governmental experts to:

- 1) elaborate the register's technical procedures, such as the form in which data should be reported; and
- 2) prepare a report on procedures for early expansion of the register to (a) include further categories of equipment and (b) formally include data on military holdings and procurement. The report will be presented to the General Assembly at its 47th session (fall 1992).

In addition, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) will address, as soon as possible, questions related to excessive and destabilizing arms build-ups, including military holdings and procurement, and will elaborate means to increase openness and transparency in this field. The CD will also look at ways to increase transparency related to the transfer of high technology with military ap-

plications and to weapons of mass destruction.

The resolution further invites Member States to provide the Secretary-General with their views, no later than April 30, 1994, on:

- 1) the operation of the register during its first two years; and
- 2) the addition of other categories of equipment, military holdings and procurement to the register.

Finally, the Secretary-General will convene another group of governmental experts in 1994 to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the register and its further development, taking into account the work of the CD and the views expressed by Member States. The report will be submitted to the General Assembly with a view to a decision at its 49th session (fall 1994).

Once it is fully operational, the arms register is expected to do three things:

- build confidence among states by reducing uncertainties about their military capabilities and intentions;
- promote restraint in arms procurement and transfers by exposing states to international scrutiny; and
- assist the identification of cases where arms are being acquired beyond reasonable defence needs.

The degree to which the register fulfils these ends will depend on the degree to which it is supported by Member States. All reporting to the register will be voluntary, but given the large number of votes in favour of the resolution and the many high-level political statements of commitment to the register, there should be a high degree of reporting to it, particularly by Western arms suppliers. Reporting by some less-developed countries may be delayed as they develop the technical means necessary to collect and process the requested data.

Canada was instrumental in developing the register resolution and in gathering widespread support for it. We will continue to participate keenly in all aspects of its follow-through. The Secretary-General has already invited Canada to provide a member for the first panel of governmental experts, which begins its work in January. Canada will report to the register as requested for 1992, providing data on

Register should build confidence, promote arms transfer restraint and assist identification of excessive arms build-ups.

register from the outset, along with arms transfers. This would make the register non-discriminatory to states that rely on arms imports for their defence needs, and would provide a more accurate picture of arms accumulation than would a register of transfers alone. Others argued that the desirability of expanding the register's scope beyond arms transfers should be considered at a later stage, in light of experience with the register.

- inclusion of technology transfers. Some countries wanted the register to include transfers of technology with military applications. Other countries thought this impractical. Canada was not, in principle, opposed to the inclusion of technology transfers, but did not want to see implementation of the register delayed by the difficulties inherent in defining and tracking such transfers.
- inclusion of weapons of mass destruction (i.e., chemical, biological and nuclear weapons). Some countries argued that the register should include weapons of mass destruction — particularly holdings thereof — to avoid being discriminatory to states that possess only conventional weapons. Canada and others opposed such a move on the grounds that other, separate processes already exist or are under negotiation to monitor and control the acquisition of non-conventional weapons. In addition, including such weapons in the register would appear to legitimize their possession.

arms transfers and on Canada's military holdings and procurement from domestic sources.

In the meantime, Canada will continue its practice of issuing an annual report on its military exports, which covers all categories of military equipment, not just the seven elaborated in the UN resolution. The report covering calendar year 1991 should be available in March 1992.

In a statement to the UNGA First Committee in November, Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason urged other Member States to demonstrate a similar commitment to full implementation of the resolution and to provide data on both arms transfers and procurement at the earliest possible opportunity. ■

Commonwealth Heads Call for Stronger Non-Proliferation Efforts

The following is an extract from the communique resulting from the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe in October. Canada strongly encouraged its Commonwealth partners to make such a statement, as a demonstration of their political commitment to addressing proliferation issues.

Heads of Government noted with concern the continuing dangers of regional and local conflicts. These dangers, and the example of the Gulf War, underlined the need to strengthen international regimes limiting weapons of mass destruction and the need to curb the build-up of conventional weapons beyond the legitimate requirements of self-defence. In this context, they noted the recent accessions of several states to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They strongly urged all states to redouble efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects. They called for the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention in 1992 and endorsed in principle the proposal to establish a register of arms transfers at the United Nations.

SSEA to UNGA: Building a More Effective UN

The following are excerpts from a speech delivered by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the 46th session of the UN General Assembly in New York on September 25.

We meet this year at a time of opportunity and challenge. The pace and direction of events of the past few months have, in general terms, augured well for a more secure and more equitable world order, and for the ultimate triumph of a world dedicated to the rule of law. But progress has presented challenges...

The challenge to the international community is one of adaptation, from a world centred on the individual nation-state to an interdependent world, from a world dominated by bilateral diplomacy to one in which multilateral institutions occupy a central place...

I believe, Mr. President, that we must look beyond a system that only inhibits armed confrontations. I believe that we need a new definition of the concept of multilateral security, a definition that takes into account the new and varied threats to global peace and security. These include the depletion of the ozone layer, the degradation of our seas, the debilitating scourge of illicit drugs, and

worldwide epidemics such as AIDS, mass exoduses of people from one country to another, and the desperate poverty that persists in many parts of the world.

We recognize as well that our collective security depends upon democracy and respect for human rights.

UN effectiveness

Mr. President, the Gulf crisis showed that the United Nations has the will and the capacity necessary to repel military aggression. But can we meet other challenges — challenges to economic and social development, to human rights and freedoms, and to the environment?

For Canada, the single most important priority is to make the United Nations stronger, more effective and more relevant to today's challenges.

Mr. President, we can begin by taking a fresh look at both the UN Charter and the Security Council. Few people, for example, realize that seven countries, which have joined the United Nations and are now serving it with distinction, are still identified as "enemy states." We can and should find ways to remove this archaic stigma.

As for the Council itself, we, like others, are looking for effective leader-

ship from the current five members who today are working together in the kind of partnership envisaged in the Charter. Canada believes it is not too soon to start looking ahead to the day when key countries, representing all regions of the globe, are permanent members on the Security Council. In the meantime, our immediate priority is to ensure that the Council in its present form functions with vision, effectiveness and wisdom.

As a starting point, we must strengthen the Security Council's capacity to take preventive or anticipatory actions. An ability to assess impending flash-points, engage the necessary political will at the earliest stage, and act effectively and decisively in timely ways, will increase the lead time in reacting to events, and will reduce the security risk by minimizing the element of surprise. Indeed, the very capacity of the UN system to provide early and effective warning may, itself, discourage recourse to conflict...

At another level, for the UN to be efficient all Member States must respect their financial obligations. This means paying obligations on time and in full. Given its enhanced role, it is unacceptable that the UN should be paralyzed by a lack of sufficient resources because assessments go unpaid.



SSEA Barbara McDougall at a press conference during UNGA 46.

Mr. President, Canada is committed to improving the UN's ability to channel the military resources of Member States to peaceful purposes. This is essential for humanitarian purposes, as well as to promote peace and security through peacekeeping and through military enforcement when necessary. We look to increasing the capability of the Secretary-General to plan and conduct peacekeeping missions. We should also explore ways of turning these military resources to humanitarian relief purposes.

Regional security

We are all aware that the UN Security Council's ability to deter aggressive action cannot by itself provide global security. In addition, we need effective regional security arrangements on a cooperative basis, arrangements that can address some of the underlying causes of insecurity and instability.

The new global climate for cooperation has created opportunities for regions to address their own problems without being used as dominoes in some wider ideological game. It has also created obligations to do so. This approach is crucial for long-lasting peace and security in regions such as Central and Eastern Europe and the Asia-

Pacific. It has been essential for the progress towards peace in Cambodia and the solution of other regional conflicts.

In the Middle East problems remain, but we believe that solutions to these difficult problems are now a little closer. Canada will continue to support constructive initiatives such as the current efforts of the United States, based on the principles enshrined in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. We call for direct negotiation between the parties concerned as the only route to a just and lasting peace. We continue to hope that a peace conference can open the door to those negotiations.

In the meantime, all countries can make particular efforts in the coming session to demonstrate their sensitivity to the parties directly concerned...

Arms proliferation: a Canadian initiative

Mr. President, renewed efforts to design a comprehensive and effective framework dealing with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are also absolutely essential. The Gulf conflict showed that conventional arms, as well as weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, can destabilize whole regions. Since 1950, the world has suffered 125 wars which have killed 25 million people, almost all as a result of conventional weapons. How many more conflicts, how many more deaths, how many more destitute refugees does the international community need before we apply the necessary political commitment to eliminating these threats?

Canada was among the first nations to call for definitive action. In February, our Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney, characterized as insane the build-up of weapons that had taken place in Iraq. At that time, he launched an initiative that called for a number of concrete steps:

- universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and its indefinite extension beyond 1995;
- immediate conclusion of a global, comprehensive and verifiable convention banning the acquisition, possession and use of chemical weapons;
- strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; and

- transparency of international arms sales, particularly by the establishment of a UN register.

We are, with others, moving ahead with proposals to address the areas of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. With respect to conventional weapons, transparency is vital — not only for knowing what is happening in the arms trade, but also for building confidence and trust. A global arms transfer register that is universal, non-discriminatory and effective is long overdue. That register should include national inventories as well. And we must be prepared to act on the basis of that information.

We applaud the historic advances made over the past year in East-West arms control. We urge all parties to ratify and implement the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties as soon as possible, and then to begin anew to reduce unnecessarily large arsenals further.

We are not naive. Every country has a legitimate right to assess its own defence needs and act accordingly. But no country, under guise of defence, has the right to accumulate arms that are intended to destroy its neighbours. Equally troubling, of course, are excessive expenditures on arms which sacrifice other important priorities such as health, education and agriculture.

The choice is there for all of us to make: instruments of destruction or tools for peace...

Conclusion

Throughout our deliberations, we must remind ourselves that we are not here to represent blocs or to promote ideologies but to represent people: "We the peoples of the United Nations."

Never have these words meant more or held more promise. But words alone are not enough. They cannot turn famine into bounty, discrimination into equality, repression into freedom, or brutality into compassion. They will mean little if we fail to give ourselves the tools for effective action or if we succumb to the temptation of unilateralism.

Mr. President, Canada is determined not only to honour those words, but to ensure that this Organization has the means to put them into practice.

First Committee Concludes Productive Session

Profound changes in the international scene, most dramatically in the former USSR, and important progress in East-West arms control and disarmament provided the backdrop for the work of the First Committee at the 46th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 46). These factors contributed to one of the most productive First Committee sessions ever, from a Canadian perspective.

The First Committee adopted 40 resolutions and four decisions on disarmament and international security issues, and two resolutions on the subject of Antarctica. The number of resolutions adopted was the lowest in several years — a reflection of the continued trend towards merging competing resolutions and rationalizing the Committee's work. The trend indicates growing consensus in some areas and, in general, a cooperative and non-confrontational approach by delegations.

The most important achievement of the session and the issue that overshadowed all others in the First Committee was the negotiation and adoption of a resolution establishing a UN arms register (see article on pages 1-3). The implementation of this resolution will represent a significant and tangible contribution by the First Committee to multilateral arms control and disarmament efforts. The broad support the resolution received, and the flexibility demonstrated by a wide range of states involved in its consideration, augurs well for the future of the First Committee as a forum that can advance the multilateral disarmament agenda in a concrete way.

Another noteworthy achievement was the adoption of a single resolution on the issue of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT). Since 1980, two competing resolutions had been adopted on this issue, each of which outlined a different approach to the objective of a CTBT. The adoption of a merged resolution at UNGA 46 thus represents an important step towards global consensus on how to move towards the CTBT goal.

The resolution (46/29) reaffirms the General Assembly's conviction that a CTBT is a matter of priority and urges

the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to intensify its substantive work on issues related to a CTBT. These include structure and scope of a CTBT as well as verification and compliance. Resolution 46/29 was adopted by a vote of 149 in favour, two against (France, USA), and four abstentions (China, Israel, Micronesia, UK). It received the broadest support of any resolution on this issue in recent years. Canada has traditionally been one of a "core group" of co-sponsors that drafts one of the two CTBT resolutions. At UNGA 46, the Canadian delegation again played an active role in finding compromise language and in promoting support for the merged resolution.

The First Committee also adopted its annual resolution on the subject of a chemical weapons convention. Canada and Poland take turns introducing the resolution each year; Canada provided the lead at UNGA 46. This resolution "strongly urges the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of the highest priority" to resolve outstanding differences and achieve a final agreement during its 1992 session. The fact that the resolution was adopted by consensus makes it a strong global statement which Canada hopes will give political impetus to the successful conclusion of a chemical

weapons convention during the CD's current session.

As in the past, Canada introduced a resolution on the "Prohibition of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes." The UNGA 46 resolution was amended to include a positive reference to the unilateral nuclear weapons initiatives announced by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in September and October respectively. As Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason stated when introducing this resolution to the First Committee, these welcome developments "enhance prospects for the realization" of the goal of a prohibition on the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. The resolution was adopted with a record level of support although, as in the past, this majority regrettably did not include four nuclear-weapon states. The vote was 152 in favour, two against (France, USA) and three abstentions (China, India, UK).

Canada believes that the positive outcome of the UNGA 46 First Committee provides a solid foundation for continued revitalization of this forum in the years ahead, enabling the First Committee to effectively advance multilateral arms control and disarmament objectives. ■

Canada Welcomes Korean Declaration

On January 2, Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall praised the joint declaration on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula reached between South and North Korea on December 31. "This important event is a further milestone in the progress realized in recent months towards improving relations between the two Koreas and lessening tensions on the peninsula," said Mrs. McDougall.

In the declaration, South and North Korea agree that neither side will develop, possess or use nuclear weapons or possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities, and that nuclear energy will be used only for peaceful purposes. The declaration also provides for the creation of a joint committee to implement inspections of nuclear facilities in both countries to verify the denuclearization of the peninsula. The declaration was to be signed by the Prime Ministers of South and North Korea on January 20, and will be subject to ratification in both capitals.

Canada also welcomes North Korea's undertaking to sign a full-scope nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We urge North Korea to sign and implement such an agreement without delay.

Resolutions on Arms Control and Disarmament and International Security Adopted at UNGA 46

Resolutions supported by Canada

RESOLUTION NUMBER (Lead sponsor or sponsors)	RESOLUTION	VOTE Yes-No-Abstain
46/25 (Germany/Romania)*	Transparency of military expenditures	Consensus
46/26 (USA)*	Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements	Consensus
46/27 (Costa Rica)*	Education and information for disarmament	Consensus
46/29 (Mexico/New Zealand)*	Comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty	147-2-4
46/30 (Egypt)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	Consensus
46/31 (Bangladesh/Pakistan)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	121-3-26
46/32 (Pakistan)	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	152-0-2
46/33 (Egypt/France)	Prevention of an arms race in outer space (as a whole)	155-0-1
46/34A (Ethiopia)	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa	Consensus
46/35A (Argentina)	Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction	Consensus
46/35B (Australia)*	Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: measures to uphold the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol	Consensus
46/35C (Canada/Poland)*	Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons	Consensus
46/36A (Finland)	Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques	Consensus
46/36B (Brazil/Sweden)	Study on charting potential uses of resources allocated to military activities for civilian endeavours to protect the environment	Consensus
46/36C (Yugoslavia)	Relationship between disarmament and development	Consensus
46/36D (Canada)*	Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes	152-2-3
46/36E (Canada)*	Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	Consensus
46/36F (Belgium)	Regional disarmament, including confidence-building measures	Consensus
46/36G (France)	Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe	Consensus
46/36H (Colombia/Peru)*	International arms transfers	Consensus
46/36I (Pakistan)*	Regional disarmament	154-0-4
46/36K (Ethiopia)	Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes	Consensus
46/36L (EC/Japan)*	Transparency in armaments	150-0-2
46/37A (Mexico)	World Disarmament Campaign	Consensus
46/37B (Belgium)	Regional confidence-building measures	Consensus
46/37E (Nigeria)	United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services program	Consensus
46/37F (Nepal)	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean	160-1-1
46/38A (Austria)	Report of the Disarmament Commission	Consensus
46/38D (Brazil)	The transfer of high technology with military applications	Consensus
46/40 (Sweden)	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects	Consensus
46/42 (Malta)	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region	Consensus

* Resolution co-sponsored by Canada

Decisions

6/411 (Mexico)	Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 45/48 concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco	Consensus
6/412 (Peru)	Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	Consensus
6/413 (Peru)	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 1995 Conference and its Preparatory Committee	Consensus
6/414 (Yugoslavia)	Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security	Consensus

Resolutions opposed by Canada

6/37C (Mexico)	Nuclear-arms freeze	119-18-23
6/37D (India)	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	122-16-22

Resolutions on which Canada abstained

6/28 (Mexico)	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water	110-2-35
6/34B (Gabon)	Nuclear capability of South Africa	108-1-49
6/36J (Yugoslavia)	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations	130-0-26
6/38B (Mexico)	Comprehensive program of disarmament	123-6-32
6/38C (Yugoslavia)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	131-8-23
6/39 (Arab Group)	Israeli nuclear armament	76-3-75
6/49 (Yugoslavia)	Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	127-4-30

Canadian Statement to First Committee

The following are excerpts from the statement delivered by Ms Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, to the First Committee at United Nations Headquarters in New York on October 18.

Our work at last year's session of the General Assembly had as its backdrop the grave situation resulting from the Iraqi occupation and attempted annexation of Kuwait. The expansionist campaign of Saddam Hussein was reversed by the effective action of the United Nations Security Council with the overwhelming support of Member States, including Canada, but the price was appallingly high in loss of life, damage to the environment and immense suffering. Now in this post-Gulf-War, post-Cold-War era, waves of democracy surge over diverse regions and former adversaries reach landmark agreements to reduce nuclear and conventional weapons. Conversely, many longstanding disputes are exacerbated and long-repressed destructive forces unleashed by the process of rapid and fundamental change —

change that also creates new instabilities. In this context, never has the need been greater or the opportunity more clearly present to ensure that the principles of the UN Charter govern the emerging international order. Our task is nothing less than the creation of a new, overarching security framework based on the international rule of law...

It is now overwhelmingly clear that the processes of arms control and disarmament are essential elements in the broader process of building and maintaining international peace and security. Canada is convinced that the First Committee has an important and, indeed, irreplaceable role to play in advancing arms control and disarmament objectives. While certain initiatives are most effectively pursued at a bilateral or regional level, other disarmament goals, because their realization depends on the active support of all militarily significant states, require the attention of the global community. It is incumbent upon all of us to redouble our efforts to ensure that this Committee plays its full part in

securing progress on disarmament issues. We must strive to ensure that multilateralism in the disarmament sphere fulfills its positive potential.

Iraq's actions during the Gulf crisis highlighted the urgent need for the international community to step up efforts to effectively address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to consider ways of discouraging excessive accumulations of conventional arms. Canada is committed to energetically pursuing these issues, both in their horizontal and vertical dimensions. In the spring session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and in opening statements before this Committee, concrete suggestions have been made concerning how better to utilize multilateral arms control fora to promote a broader dialogue on proliferation issues. Canada welcomes these proposals and looks forward to studying them further.

In the area of nuclear weapons, Canada commends the leadership and vision demonstrated in the unilateral measures and proposals announced by

President Bush last month. We also welcome the equally positive announcements by President Gorbachev in response. These bold steps build on the solid basis of START and clearly demonstrate the commitment of the United States and the Soviet Union to seriously pursue nuclear disarmament. The withdrawal of naval nuclear weapons from ships and submarines is a particularly welcome decision and a step that Canada has long advocated.

The elimination of most categories of land-based tactical nuclear weapons is another extremely positive component of these initiatives and one that will further enhance confidence and security. The reduction in alert status of bombers reflects the tremendous relaxation of tensions between the superpowers and, indeed, will further contribute to the lowering of such tensions.

Canada is also pleased to note that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to engage in discussions on non-nuclear defences against ballistic missiles and to explore the prospects for moving towards greater reliance on defensive systems. In this context, Canada reiterates its support for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

In the area of preventing horizontal nuclear proliferation, there have been very positive developments over the last year. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been bolstered substantially in recent months by the accessions of Lithuania, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Canada wholeheartedly welcomes these states into the NPT and looks forward to the accession of other countries that have taken the decision to join, including Angola, China, France and Namibia. Canada also commends Argentina and Brazil for their cooperation, in consultation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in developing a trilaterally-based safeguards system that has the potential to meet regional needs for reassurance while at the same time satisfying global non-proliferation concerns.

However, there remain regions of substantial nuclear proliferation concern. One of these is the Korean peninsula where the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has yet to fulfil its obligation under NPT accession to con-

clude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Canada looks forward to the early conclusion of such an agreement and to its early ratification and implementation.

Another area of nuclear proliferation concern is the South Asian region. Canada strongly urges all countries in the region that have not already done so to accede to the NPT without further delay. If states of the region are not prepared to accede to the NPT at this time, other measures to reduce proliferation-based tensions and to build confidence and security should be pursued as a matter of priority. The agreement between India and Pakistan committing each to refrain from attacking the other's nuclear facilities in the event of conflict provides a valuable first step upon which other initiatives could be built. The objective of such a process should be to achieve progress in confidence- and security-building that takes into account, as a matter of primary importance, the need for nuclear non-proliferation reassurance, aimed at assuaging both regional and broader international concerns...

Canada has long attached great importance to regional confidence- and security-building and continues to play an active role in this regard in the context of the CSCE. One of the urgent issues currently facing the CSCE is the resurgence of nationalist, ethnic and religious antagonisms, which threaten peace and stability and the consolidation of democracy in Europe. It is for this reason that Canada has made the enhancement of the CSCE's conflict prevention and resolution machinery a key priority. In order to respond to the diverse challenges in Europe, the CSCE must use all of the tools at its disposal, including regular political consultations and the new CSCE institutions and mechanisms.

The Conflict Prevention Centre should be permitted to realize its full potential in assisting the Council of Foreign Ministers in reducing the risk of conflict. Mediation, conciliation, fact-finding, monitoring and peacekeeping missions should all form part of the package of tools available to heads of government or foreign ministers in managing and resolving conflict. We

believe we must explore all avenues that might assist us in building a democratic and peaceful Europe.

As a strong supporter of the proposal for an Open Skies regime covering the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok, Canada particularly welcomes the decision reached on October 15 to resume negotiations in early November. Recalling the high priority which the Member States of the European Community attached to Open Skies in their statement to this Committee, we urge all participating states to successfully conclude these negotiations before the CSCE Helsinki Main Follow-Up Meeting in 1992. We believe that the transparency resulting from an Open Skies regime will serve to strengthen stability and enhance predictability, and will facilitate the arms control and disarmament process in the region covered.

Canada has also been involved in a recently-launched initiative to consider security matters at the Organization of American States. At the General Assembly of that Organization in June, two resolutions calling for a study on security-related issues were adopted by consensus. We hope that this study, which is currently underway, will lend support to international non-proliferation efforts and will consider regional arrangements tailored to the particular needs of the hemisphere that might go beyond what can be agreed globally.

The three UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament have consistently demonstrated the positive contribution they can make in promoting regional dialogue and confidence- and security-building measures. The Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) is also to be commended for its sponsorship of timely conferences on topical disarmament issues, such as the very successful conference held in Kyoto in May of this year.

Another area of DDA's work of strong interest to Canada is the establishment of a consolidated database of published materials, provided by members, on all aspects of verification and compliance, as requested in Resolution 45/62 of last year's General Assembly. During this session of the First Committee, I will submit to the DDA and provide to members of this Committee a

Bibliography on Arms Control Verification prepared by the Canadian government...

As co-sponsor of an annual resolution calling for the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, Canada attaches high priority to the realization of this fundamental objective. We welcome the stimulating discussion on a nuclear test ban at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) during this year's session and the valuable work of the Group of Scientific Experts, including the second technical test concerning the global exchange and analysis of seismic data. We look forward to further consideration of this important issue at the 1992 session of the CD. Canada also believes that it is time for the United States and the Soviet Union to redouble their efforts to build on the basis of existing bilateral testing limitations. Unilateral steps, while welcome, cannot substitute for the negotiation of binding measures leading to the conclusion of an effectively verifiable ban on all nuclear test explosions.

The nightmare of chemical warfare, which arose in all its horror in World War I, was long thought to have become a thing of the past. Events of the past decade, and the last year, have disabused us of this illusion. The CD's negotiations on a chemical weapons convention have made significant headway over the past year. Nonetheless, important differences on crucial issues remain and must be overcome before a global, comprehensive and effectively verifiable chemical weapons ban can be concluded. We believe that these issues can be resolved in 1992...

Canada is particularly heartened with the outcome of the recently concluded Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Clearly, the international community was galvanized by real concerns that such weapons could recently have been used. As a result, substantial progress was made at the Review Conference in improving, and supplementing, agreed confidence-building measures to enhance transparency in what are very complex fields of endeavour. This was a key accomplishment and one that will now require efforts at the national level by all States Parties to the Convention to

Canada Adds Verification Bibliography to UN Database

In 1990 (Resolution 45/65), the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus the report of a Group of Qualified Governmental Experts on the role of the UN in the field of verification. Among the report's recommendations was the development of a UN "consolidated data bank of published materials and data provided on a voluntary basis by Member States on all aspects of verification and compliance." In recommending the establishment of a database, the Experts underlined the useful role the UN can play in making research and data related to cooperative arrangements and verification available to wider audiences.

During UNGA 46, Canada contributed to the UN database a detailed *Bibliography on Arms Control Verification* covering more than 1500 entries between the years 1962 and 1991. While not pretending to be exhaustive, the *Bibliography* covers publications and submissions from governments and international organizations, as well as the research community's literature on the subject. It also includes a detailed subject index. The database from which the *Bibliography* is drawn is computerized to facilitate subject searches. Canada is distributing the *Bibliography* to libraries across Canada and around the world in the hope that it will assist officials, diplomats and researchers in verification.

Canada is urging other UN Member States with relevant experience to make similar contributions to the verification database.



UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Yasushi Akashi receives a copy of the *Bibliography on Arms Control Verification* from Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason.

give the confidence-building measures substantial meaning and effect.

Canada is also pleased that the issue of verification of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention will receive a thorough examination in an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts open to all States Parties...

As Norway pointed out in its plenary statement to this Committee, there will be modest costs associated with implementing the decisions of the Review Conference. Particularly in light of the admonition from Under-Secretary-General Akashi regarding the very real and serious constraints on the resources

Forecast

Arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, February through May 1992

Ongoing: CFE 1A Negotiation, Vienna

Ongoing: CFE 1 Joint Consultative Group meetings, Vienna

Ongoing: High Level Working Group (CFE signatories plus eight successors to former USSR with territory covered by CFE), Brussels

Ongoing: Open Skies negotiations, Vienna

Ongoing: OAS Working Group on Cooperation for Hemispheric Security, Washington, D.C.

Ongoing until March 24: CSBM Negotiations, Vienna

Ongoing until March 27: CD in session, Geneva

March 11 - 13: Ninth Annual Ottawa Verification Symposium — Multilateral Verification and the Post-Gulf Environment, Montebello, Quebec

March 24 - July: CSCE Main Follow-Up Meeting, Helsinki

March 30 - April 10: Meeting of UN Panel of Governmental Experts on the Arms Register, New York

March 30 - April 10: Meeting of Ad Hoc Group of Experts on BTWC Verification, Geneva

April 8 - 10: MTCR experts meeting, Rome

April 20 - May 11: UN Disarmament Commission, New York

May 11 - June 26: CD in session, Geneva

ventional armaments." We believe that it is necessary to begin a process aimed at discouraging and preventing excessive build-ups of conventional weapons. This is an area where this Committee can make a tangible, valuable contribution.

The Canadian delegation will be working earnestly with other delegations to secure a resolution on international arms transfers that establishes an international arms transfer register. Canada believes it is of the utmost importance to build on the current political momentum in favour of a register, and on the recommendation of the UN Group of Governmental Experts that a register be established "as soon as possible." As the Experts made clear in their excellent consensus report on "Ways and Means of Promoting Transparency in International Transfers of Conventional Arms," East-West experience with the benefits of enhanced transparency in building confidence, reducing tensions and ultimately in expanding the scope for negotiated agreements has been overwhelmingly positive. The Gulf War demonstrated the urgent need to extend transparency to the hitherto untouched field of conventional arms acquisition, to extend it on a global basis and to extend it immediately.

To fulfil its confidence-building potential, the register must be effective. It must be as broadly supported as possible. It must include both suppliers and recipients. It must present an accurate picture of arms accumulation. And it must be non-discriminatory to those who rely on arms imports to supply their defence needs. This is why Canada considers it essential that domestic arms procurement and arms holdings be reported to the register at an early stage.

The provision of data to the register will in itself be valuable, as it will allow Member States to demonstrate the non-destabilizing character of their activities. But confidence-building is not a fixed point, it is a process, and to encourage maximum development of that process, we believe the resolution should specify a forum wherein Member States can annually review the operation of the register and consult about the information provided to it. An annual meeting on the margins of the First Committee, for example, might serve as an appro-

priate forum for this purpose. This will help to ensure that the register remains effective and adapts to political circumstances. Consultation will enable Member States to develop clearer understandings of one another's views on such matters as how security is affected by arms acquisition. It may also facilitate improvement of national control mechanisms and help to prevent illicit arms trade.

Canada believes it is important to confine the register to conventional arms. This is not a question of being discriminatory. As Ambassador Donawaki of Japan noted, elaborate international mechanisms already exist, or are under negotiation, to constrain the acquisition of other types of weapons. In the case of weapons of mass destruction, our aim is not simply to promote transparency and to discourage excessive accumulations — our goal is the elimination of these weapons altogether.

In short, our first task is to foster a climate conducive to voluntary restraint and more responsible behaviour on the part of suppliers and recipients alike. Canada firmly believes that an international arms transfer register can make a significant contribution to this end. But over the longer term our goal must clearly be, and again I quote the Secretary-General, "to seek to develop fair criteria for multilateral control of arms transfers while at the same time meeting the legitimate security needs of states."

The construction of an enduring system of cooperative security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter cannot be accomplished solely on a bilateral or a regional basis. We all must do our part. This Committee provides the opportunity for every UN Member State to play a concrete role in advancing specific disarmament objectives and in helping to shape the broader principles of international security. Virtually every one of the delegations that has spoken before me has stressed that the prospects for progress on the range of issues before us has never been better. In another context, Canada's foreign minister stated that there simply are no viable alternatives to practical, future-oriented results. Let us resolve to engage in a constructive, productive dialogue to that end.

of the DDA, we share Norway's hope that a way can be found during the deliberations of this Committee to satisfactorily resolve this issue.

In her statement to UNGA 46, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mrs. Barbara McDougall, stressed the urgent need to address the proliferation of conventional weapons... Attention to this issue by the international community is long overdue. The Secretary-General in his 1991 report on the work of the UN again expressed his "grave concern over the problem of excessive and destabilizing transfers of con-

BTWC Review Conference Improves on CBMs



Presiding over the Third Review Conference of the BTWC, from left to right: Mr. Jan Mar-ensson, Director-General, UN Office at Geneva; Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs; Mr. Roberto Garcia Moritan of Argentina, President of the Conference; and Mr. Sammy Kum Buo, Senior Political Affairs Officer, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs and Secretary-General of the Conference.

UN photo 178173

The Third Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) ended on September 27 with substantial progress in improving and supplementing confidence-building measures (CBMs) relevant to the Convention. The Conference also agreed to set up an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts, open to all States Parties, to look at potential verification measures for the BTWC. Canada, which had pressed for improvements to the CBMs and for detailed consideration of a BTWC compliance regime, was pleased with the outcome.

The BTWC bans the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons or agents for other than peaceful purposes. It was negotiated within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (a forerunner of the present Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament) and was opened for signature in April 1972. It entered into force in 1975. To date, approximately 125 states have adhered to the Convention.

Biological weapons rely on microbial or other agents that achieve their effects

through their biological action, i.e., they cause death or illness through self-reproduction in the target body. Toxins are chemicals produced through biological processes or, more recently, artificial synthesis. Like chemical weapons agents, toxins cause death or illness by their toxic chemical effects in the target body. Although toxins are therefore more properly considered chemical weapons, they were included in the BTWC because historically they were derived from living organisms.

The BTWC's weakness comes from a lack of any meaningful verification provisions. It contains a provision for consultation and cooperation among parties to resolve any problems, as well as a provision concerning the lodging of a complaint with the UN Security Council.

A modest strengthening step was taken at the First BTWC Review Conference in 1980, when it was agreed that States Parties have a right to request a consultative meeting at the expert level. At the

Second Review Conference in 1986, more significant measures to strengthen confidence in compliance with the BTWC were agreed. These included:

- reaffirmation of the provision for consultations at the expert level and an elaboration of procedural options at such a consultative meeting;
- agreement on exchanges of data relating to research facilities with very high safety standards;
- information exchanges on infectious disease outbreaks;
- encouragement of publication of biological research results; and
- active promotion of increased contacts among scientists engaged in research relevant to the BTWC.

The Review Conference held in September improved substantially upon these. The existing set of CBMs was expanded to require:

- a very detailed declaration of information relating to biological defence programs and facilities;
- a declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures in place to implement the provisions of the Convention and/or to control the export or import of micro-organisms pathogenic to man, animals or plants;
- a declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programs since January 1, 1946; and
- a declaration of vaccine production facilities.

While an improvement, these measures still fall short of what one expects in terms of verification. It is pos-

Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts will look at potential verification measures for the Convention.

sible that the chemical weapons convention now under negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament may include toxins within its scope. If so, this would apply the more stringent verification

provisions of the chemical weapons convention to toxin weapons. However, given the nature of modern biotechnology, verification to a high level of assurance may never be entirely feasible in relation to biological and toxin weapons.

Canada was an original party to the BTWC and has participated actively in all review conferences. We have pressed strongly for improved confidence-building measures, particularly in the form of exchanges of data on related defence research facilities. Canada is one of the few countries to have participated fully in each of these annual data and information exchanges.

Canada will continue to promote measures that would enhance confidence in compliance with the BTWC. Specific improvements and additions to the CBMs at the Third Review Conference originated with the Canadian delegation, which was led by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason. Canada, with others, also pressed for detailed consideration of a compliance (verification) regime by an Ad Hoc Group of Experts. This proposal received wide support and ultimately consensus agreement at the Conference. The Group, which will hold its first meeting from March 30 to April 10, is to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. Canada will participate in the study.

As noted in *Bulletin 17*, prior to the Third Review Conference Canada formally modified its reservations to the 1925 Geneva Protocol by removing them insofar as they relate to bacteriological methods of warfare. At the Third Review Conference, the Canadian delegation led the effort that culminated in the Conference stressing the importance of the withdrawal of *all* reservations to the Geneva Protocol related to the BTWC. Other States Parties, including the United Kingdom, have since announced similar action.

All told, the outcome of the Third Review Conference reflected well upon the preparations and efforts of the Canadian delegation. The next Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention review conference will be held no later than 1996. ■

A CW Convention in '92?

The use of chemical weapons (CW) by Iraq against Iran in their war and the threat of CW use during the 1991 Gulf campaign added impetus to the negotiations for a CW convention at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Last May 13, USA President George Bush called for the negotiations to be completed in mid-1992, and in June the CD set a mandate for its Ad Hoc Committee on a CW convention to complete the negotiations in 1992.

The current round of negotiations has been under way since 1984 and there are now only a few core outstanding issues. These still represent a substantial barrier to achieving a text that is rigorous, economical, adequately verifiable, adaptable and likely to attract universal adhesion.

During 1991, the CD made headway on some important technical questions such as the lists of chemicals, the thresholds for control and reporting, and on certain legal and institutional questions, including some important definitions. The USA's decision to forego retention of a retaliatory CW capacity (part of the May 13 announcement) allowed a blanket ban on CW use to be included in the agreement. Despite this progress, differences remain. In general, they are not specifically North-South or East-West, although the Group of 21 (neutral and non-aligned countries) has taken strong positions on certain issues.

Among the major outstanding issues are: challenge inspections; "capable" industries and their treatment; the role and composition of the Executive Council; trade controls in relation to the convention; and the treatment of old stocks.

On challenge inspections, there was some discussion in 1991 on how to achieve an appropriate balance between the need of international inspectors to gain early access to the vicinity of a site, secure it, and examine its installations, and the right of the inspected state to protect its most sensitive locales and installations through appropriate safeguards. Getting this balance right is central to the effectiveness of a convention.

The convention is expected to provide some means for covering the activities of

the bulk of the world's chemical industries which do not produce scheduled chemicals but could be capable of doing so. Means of demarcating the industries subject to inspection and monitoring their activities have been discussed.

Discussion of the composition of the Executive Council of the new international CW organization has as yet been only preliminary. There are certain to be differences over whether states with larger industrial or military interests should benefit from weighted or guaranteed representation.

Possible use of trade controls on chemicals has been suggested by one Western country as a means of inducing countries to adhere to a CW convention, while some Group of 21 countries have sought assurances of non-discrimination in the use of trade controls on chemicals among parties to the convention.

Old stocks of CW are a source of public concern in certain countries affected by military operations in former years, or concerned about potential problems of accountability. There are complex difficulties of ownership, liability and disposal associated with this class of problem.

In addition to these, negotiators have to deal with a range of less acute problems both of a technical and a legal/political nature. Once an agreed working text is achieved it must be made internally consistent and updated, and must then receive the attention of legal drafters to put it into treaty form. If outstanding problems are resolved quickly, a text for signature could be ready by the fall of 1992.

Canada attaches a high priority to the CW negotiations. In our estimation, conclusion of a strong, verifiable chemical weapons convention would be the most effective response to the threat of CW proliferation.

Canada has participated vigorously in the negotiations since their inception, and was an early and strong advocate of effective verification measures in a CW convention. We have made available to the Ad Hoc Committee studies and documentation bearing on its work, and have provided strong representation for its subsidiary bodies.

As the negotiations have evolved, countries have become conscious of a range of interests needing to be accommodated: security considerations; legal and competitive rights of the chemical industry; consequences of toxicity and chemical structure; and consequences of political sovereignty and national policies. Within this framework, Canada has tried to maintain the integrity of a convention that would extend the ban on CW in a comprehensive fashion and ensure that it is effectively verified. Canada has also striven inside and outside the CD to persuade other countries to become original signatories to a CW convention when it is concluded.

Canada welcomed the bilateral arrangements concluded by the USA and the USSR in 1989 under which they exchanged information on the size of each other's CW stockpiles and agreed on a program of destruction scheduled to start in 1992. However, the second phase of this agreement has been held up by Soviet internal difficulties and it is unclear what the impact on it will be of recent constitutional developments in Russia. Canada has urged components of the new commonwealth of ex-Soviet states to fulfil existing treaty obligations and to promote CW disarmament. ■

MTCR Partners Meet in Washington

Canada participated in a meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) partners in Washington from November 4 to 7. The MTCR, which aims to control the international transfer of missile technology, has served as a valuable nuclear non-proliferation measure since its creation in 1987. The Washington meeting focused on two issues: expanding the scope of the MTCR and clarifying membership criteria.

Given the progress in missile technology and the threat of non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction such as biological and chemical weapons, the MTCR partners agreed on the desirability of expanding the scope of the regime to include missiles capable of delivering *all* types of weapons of mass destruction. Since the current MTCR guidelines (a missile capable of delivering a 500 kg payload across a range of 300 km) may be too restrictive, the MTCR partners have undertaken to study the need for a revised set of parameters, while acknowledging the need to permit the legitimate exchange of missile technology for peaceful purposes.

Membership in the MTCR has increased from its original seven participants to include 18 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the USA. At the Washington meeting, the partners recognized that the admission of new members could strengthen the effectiveness of the regime in combatting missile proliferation. To that end, the partners established a set of criteria for considering applications by potential new members. Essentially, the criteria seek to determine the applicant's commitment to non-proliferation and its ability to implement an effective export control system.

MTCR partners considered the Washington meeting a success. They reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening and expanding the regime to better address the problem of missile proliferation. For Canada, the MTCR remains an integral part of our non-proliferation program. The partners plan to hold their next meeting in Oslo in the summer of 1992. ■

ENMOD Review Conference Scheduled

On December 6, the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution noting that a majority of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (known as the ENMOD Convention) wish to convene a conference to review the Convention in September 1992.

The ENMOD Convention, which entered into force in 1978, currently boasts 53 parties, including Canada. The Convention was concluded because of a growing awareness that scientific and technical advances were opening the possibility of modifying the natural environment not only for beneficial purposes (such as increasing rainfall during a drought) but also for hostile actions.

According to the Convention, parties undertake not to engage in, or assist

other states to engage in, military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques that have widespread, long-lasting or severe effects, as the means for injuring any other State Party. "Environmental modification techniques" are defined as techniques for changing — through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes — the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space. The kind of phenomena covered by this prohibition include, among other things, earthquakes, tsunamis and upsets to the ecological balance of a region, as well as changes in weather patterns, climate patterns, ocean currents, the state of the ozone layer and the state of the ionosphere.

An earlier review conference, held in September 1984, confirmed that the obligations under the Convention had been faithfully observed up to that time and that the Convention's provisions remained effective.

In view of the extensive destruction caused by the release of oil into the Persian Gulf and the ignition of oil-fires by Iraqi forces in Kuwait during the Gulf War, the upcoming review conference should prove timely. While no complaint has been lodged pursuant to the Convention by any State Party including Kuwait (which is a party) against Iraq (which has signed but not ratified the Convention), a number of participants in the conference will undoubtedly raise concerns arising from the Kuwaiti experience. ■

UNSCOM Completes First-Phase Inspections in Iraq

No smoking gun but powder burns evident

The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), established to verify Iraq's compliance with the provisions of Security Council Resolution 687, has completed the survey phase of its inspections. Through this intensive set of first-phase inspections, UNSCOM has compiled sufficient information to give a general picture of Iraq's capabilities and facilities in the nuclear, chemical, biological and missile fields.

Although the proverbial "smoking gun" related to a nuclear weapons production program remains elusive, the evidential "power burns" are clear enough to cause serious concern. Indeed, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has, for the first time in its history, condemned a member state — Iraq — for violation of its safeguards agreement. It expressed its grave concern about Iraq's "deception and obstruction" of IAEA inspectors. Physical obstructionist tactics displayed by the Iraqis in the second and sixth nuclear inspections, and a general practice of misinformation/disinformation in other areas, continue to be worrisome indicators as the Special Commission turns its attention to the issue of longer-term compliance.

Inspection experience

By the end of 1991, UNSCOM — in concert with the IAEA, which leads on nuclear inspections — had initiated or participated in 24 major on-site inspections in Iraq: seven nuclear; seven chemical; seven ballistic missile; and three biological. There have been almost 500 inspection personnel deployments comprising nearly 300 individual inspectors representing more than 34 nationalities. The accumulated inspection experience is potentially precedent-setting in terms of the multilateral verification process.

December 1991 witnessed the conclusion of first-phase (baseline) inspections. The second phase (verification of removal/destruction) and the third phase (verification of future com-

pliance) are becoming increasingly dominant and will be of longer duration, though the dividing lines are not entirely clear. For example, destruction of the Iraqi ballistic missile capability has been carried out for some time now in tandem with a series of ballistic missiles baseline inspections. As well, in mid-November two Soviet aircraft undertook the removal of nuclear material to the USSR while additional nuclear inspections were underway.

The Soviet airlift, including shipping preparations, is estimated to have cost up to \$1.5 million. A subsequent longer-range British/French removal program could reach into the \$30 million range. As a result of a series of chemical baseline inspections, it is estimated that the chemical weapons destruction phase will take "millions of dollars" and "last for one to two years."

Continuation of the UNSCOM operation will thus be an extended and expensive undertaking. A rough estimate of UNSCOM's costs to the end of 1991 is \$40 million. UNSCOM's high altitude airborne imaging support, provided by a Member State, and the use of two C160 Transall aircraft plus three CH-53 helicopters in support of on-site inspections, constitute other significant expenditures.

Canadian participation

Canadians have participated in inspections in all four weapons categories. Mr. F.R. Cleminson, Head of EAITC's Verification Research Unit and Canada's representative on UNSCOM, participated in the initial nuclear inspection led by the IAEA at the Iraqi nuclear research facility at Tuwaitha in May 1991. Lieutenant Colonel Jim Knapp (Department of National Defence) and Dr. Peter Lockwood (Defence Research Establishment Suffield) have participated in senior positions in a number of chemical weapons inspections at the main chemical weapons facility near Samarra and at other locations. Captain Gilles Clairoux (DND) completed a chemical weapons

inspection in late November that covered a number of Iraqi airbases. Five other Canadians found themselves on CNN during the "parking lot" incident in Baghdad during the sixth nuclear inspection. In all, Canadians have constituted approximately five percent of the inspection personnel deployments. DND's staffing arrangements have shown a high degree of flexibility in responding to short-notice requirements, and UNSCOM has expressed its gratitude to Canada for this.

Nuclear weapons

Following the seventh nuclear inspection, and in spite of the obstructionist tactics displayed including the "parking lot" episode, Iraq provided for the first time formal, though incomplete, written acknowledgement of its nuclear weapons program:

"Various research and studies of the sort to which you refer as 'weaponization' have been carried out. The objective in carrying out such research and studies was to establish the practical, technical and scientific requirements for a program of this nature in the event that a political decision were to be taken to proceed in that direction."

Iraq's recent record in the nuclear area continues to be consistent with, if less dramatic than, its earlier actions. These included the concealment of evidence of plutonium separation, of uranium enrichment and of nuclear weapons development, refusal to permit inspection teams to enter some sites and exit others, and confiscation of documents from inspectors in the course of the sixth nuclear inspection. In sum, Iraq has not cooperated in the critical area of nuclear-weapons-related activity, and UNSCOM and the IAEA remain some distance from achieving the desired degree of transparency.

Chemical weapons

With the data compiled by major survey inspections undertaken at the Al

Muthanna State Establishment now analyzed, the Special Commission has a very good understanding of Iraq's declared primary chemical weapons site. Furthermore, discussions on the destruction of chemical weapons and agents have resulted in a considerable improvement in technical understanding by both sides, particularly as regards the potential hazards involved in some operations and the technologies potentially available for implementing the various destruction processes. The chemical agent destruction process is likely to start early in 1992.

Ballistic missiles

By the end of 1991, UNSCOM inspection teams had supervised the destruction of 62 ballistic missiles, 18 fixed missile launch pads, 33 ballistic missile warheads, 127 missile storage support racks, a substantial amount of rocket fuel, an assembled 350 mm supergun, components of two 500 and two 1,000 mm superguns, and one ton of supergun propellant. The assembled supergun was destroyed by Iraqi engineers at its site in Iskandariyah, 50 kilometres south of Baghdad, under UN supervision in early December.

Conclusion

As UNSCOM and the IAEA confront the difficult issues likely to arise in connection with the destruction, removal or rendering harmless of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and the facilities for their production, and as the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification are put into effect, support of the Security Council, the Secretary General, the Secretariat and Member States of the United Nations will be essential.

Experience to date has shown that results can be achieved only when resolute stands are taken in response to Iraqi challenges to the implementation of the mandate of UNSCOM and the IAEA. Such resolute stands can be based only on the full support of the United Nations and its Member States in achieving all the basic objectives of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687.

Skies May Soon be Open

Negotiations on an Open Skies agreement, which resumed this past fall in Vienna among the members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, appear to be overcoming difficulties encountered in previous rounds of talks. Negotiators believe an agreement could be reached early in 1992. Among factors that could complicate the final stages are uncertainty over arrangements affecting territory of the former USSR and agreement on management arrangements for aircraft and data.

An Open Skies agreement would aim to build confidence by providing for unarmed, short-notice surveillance flights of signatory countries. During earlier rounds of negotiation — the first held in Ottawa in February 1990 and the second in Budapest in April-May of that year — the NATO participants pressed for overflights to be permitted under a regime that was as open as possible. That would entail use of aircraft belonging to the overflying country, use of sophisticated "all-weather" sensors, no restrictions on

flight plans except for air safety reasons, and a relatively large quota of overflights.

The USSR, with some support from other East European participants, argued for inspected countries having the right to require use of their own aircraft and to stipulate certain areas as being permanently out of bounds, for monitoring equipment to be limited, and for the data from each overflight to form part of a universally-available pool of information. The USSR also argued for very restrictive limits on the number and duration of flights.

The current round of negotiations was able to get under way following indications that the USSR would be willing to accept some non-optical sensors on board inspection aircraft, would open all its territory to overflights, and would accept a substantially larger quota of overflights. For their part, the Western allies indicated a willingness to accept the use of aircraft from the inspected country. Overflying aircraft, from whichever country, would operate using



Canadian aircraft commander Capt. John Latulippe (left) speaking with an officer of the Hungarian Air Force during Canada's trial Open Skies overflight of Hungary in January 1990. As this Bulletin went to press, a reciprocal Hungarian trial overflight of Canada was scheduled to take place January 13 to 18.

commercially-available sensor technologies.

Negotiators are now fleshing out the means by which this framework can be put into practice. They are specifying the characteristics of the approved sensors, the procedures to be followed for approving visiting or host-country aircraft, the quotas of overflights given and received, scheduling, transit arrangements, equipment-pooling possibilities and financial aspects, among others.

Countries are already beginning to make plans for implementing the agreement. Both in Eastern and Western Europe feelers are being reported about the kind of pooling arrangements that would be practical and desirable under the agreement.

Canada is gratified to have its early work in launching the Open Skies negotiations repaid by the prospect of an early, successful outcome. The agreement will be useful to all participants, but perhaps most of all to smaller countries that otherwise have little access to this type of data. During the latest round, European neutral and non-aligned countries have been able to participate as observers in all aspects of the negotiations and are demonstrating an active concern.

The primary objective of Canada is to assist the negotiations to reach a successful conclusion. In pursuit of this goal, the Canadian delegation is developing proposals and options to cover difficulties that arise, and to provide for contingencies. It is also ensuring that Canadian interests in the procurement, processing and sharing of data are fully met.

Canadian negotiators are building on Canada's extensive experience in the remote sensing field to create a better understanding among other delegations of remote sensing's potential, and of the best means for using it in Open Skies. As well, Canada and Hungary are making plans for a trial Hungarian overflight of Canada, scheduled to take place January 13 to 18. This is a reciprocal flight to one conducted by Canada over Hungary in January 1990. As with the earlier trial, the goal is to gain practical experience about the administrative and operational procedures expected to form part of an Open Skies regime. ■

CSBM Update

The success of the confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) outlined in the November 1990 Vienna Document has been impressive. The Vienna Document CSBMs, which came into force January 1, 1991, have increased transparency about military organization and predictability about military behaviour among the 38 CSCE participating states.

Under the provisions of the Vienna Document, Canada, along with the other CSCE states, has exchanged information on military forces, budgets, and plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems. Canada has also exchanged with the CSCE states annual calendars of military activities for 1992 and 1993. In addition to increased exchanges of information, the Vienna Document encourages increased military contacts. Under this provision, Canada participated in visits to air bases in Sweden and the Netherlands in 1991, and is planning to host a similar visit at Canadian Forces Base Lahr in Germany in the spring of 1992.

The Vienna Document also contains measures to ensure compliance and to allow for verification. Under these provisions, Canada conducted an inspection from September 5 to 7 in the Leningrad Military District of the former USSR. The Canadian inspection team confirmed that the Soviet notification of a reduction in its planned military exercise in this district did, in

fact, occur. In addition, the Canadian inspectors reported that the high level of cooperation between the Soviets and the Canadian team set a positive tone for future inspections and evaluations.

To facilitate the transmission of messages relating to both CSBM and CFE issues, the CSCE participating states have established a communications network. Canada's expertise in telecommunications allowed us to contribute to the development of this network, which became operational November 1. The network complements the existing use of diplomatic channels.

To review the implementation of agreed CSBMs, the Vienna Document calls for an annual meeting to be held at the CSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, located in Vienna. The first such meeting was held from November 11 to 13. Discussion extended to clarification of questions arising from implementation and operation of agreed measures, and implications for the process of confidence- and security-building in the CSCE framework.

Canada actively participated in the development of the Vienna Document. In the current CSBM negotiations, which will continue through to the CSCE Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting beginning in March 1992, Canadian representatives are discussing proposals for improvements to the Vienna Document as well as for new CSBMs. Canada's experience in verification ensures that we will continue to play an important role in the negotiations and in the confidence-building process as a whole. ■

Canada Expects Ukrainian Compliance

Further to Canada's recognition of Ukraine as an independent state on December 2, a Canadian delegation visited Kiev in early December to begin negotiations on establishing diplomatic relations. Among other things, the delegation sought assurances regarding the secure control of nuclear weapons, Ukrainian compliance with existing arms control and disarmament agreements, and adherence to and implementation of all commitments embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris and other CSCE documents.

Ukraine has stated that it will respect and implement international agreements entered into by the former USSR, in particular START and CFE. Ukraine has stressed its commitment to the earliest possible elimination of all nuclear weapons from its territory and to the accession of Ukraine to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapons state. It has also said that all nuclear weapons in Ukraine will remain under a single unified control. Canada welcomes these commitments. ■

CFE Update

Resolution of the counting rules dispute cleared the way for CFE 1A negotiators to begin substantive work on satisfying obligations contained in Article XVIII of the CFE Treaty. Priority attention has been given to developing measures to limit personnel strength.

Following the summer break, CFE 1A negotiations resumed in September. Work proceeded on defining the categories of personnel whose numbers will be limited, on determining cost sharing for verification activities, and on producing standardized report formats. Simultaneously, participants agreed on how to reconcile CFE provisions with the independence of the Baltic states.

A legally-binding agreement on the Baltics was reached at a meeting of the CFE's Joint Consultative Group held on October 18. It was agreed that the CFE area of application did not include the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In addition, signatories accepted the USSR's undertaking to apply CFE provisions to its forces while these were present on the territories of the newly independent Baltic states.

In November, CFE 1A negotiators added stabilizing measures to the list of topics under consideration. NATO's High Level Task Force had done considerable preparatory work on one set of measures which was tabled for consideration. This included proposals to place limitations on the future call-up of reservists, and to obligate states to notify permanent increases in the personnel strengths of military units.

As 1992 began, CFE signatories increasingly turned their attention to the consequences of the dissolution of the former USSR. Participants began to consider how the CFE obligations and entitlements of the USSR could be apportioned among the independent republics, and what legal mechanisms would be appropriate to ensure that the treaty is ratified by the individual members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. At the suggestion of the German foreign minister, the newly formed North Atlantic Cooperation Council set up a working group to begin discussions on these issues with representatives of the relevant republics. ■

Post-Helsinki Security Negotiations

In a communique issued following their meeting of December 19, NATO foreign ministers made the following comments about establishing new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building at the CSCE Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, which begins on March 24.

The Helsinki meeting will mark a turning point in the arms control and disarmament process in Europe, and we are actively engaged in developing a common approach. The CSCE Council of Ministers on 19th-20th June 1991 launched informal preparatory consultations aimed at establishing at the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building. They decided that formal preparatory negotiations for the new forum would take place at the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting. We have followed closely and participated in these informal preparatory consultations, carefully noting the views of CSCE partners. A broad measure of consensus is already apparent.

In the period leading to the Helsinki meeting and at the meeting itself, we propose that our negotiators and those of our CSCE partners should be guided by the following broad policy objectives:

- in order to achieve our goal of a new cooperative order in which no country need harbour fears for its security, we should establish a European security forum in a manner which preserves the autonomy and distinct character of the various different elements in the process, but which also ensures coherence between them;
- we should strengthen security and stability through the negotiation of concrete measures aimed at keeping the levels of armed forces in Europe to the minimum commensurate with common and individual legitimate security needs, within Europe and beyond: these may entail further reductions of armed forces;
- we should institute a permanent security dialogue, in which participants will be able to address legitimate security concerns, and which will foster a new quality of transparency and cooperation about armed forces and defence policies. This dialogue should contribute to the strengthening of the achievements of the Helsinki process in the field of security; and
- we should enhance the ability of CSCE institutions, including the Conflict Prevention Centre, to reduce the risk of conflict through the full and open implementation of agreed measures in the security field, and through the elaboration of relevant conflict prevention and crisis management techniques.

We consider it important that, in addition to setting the broad objectives for the new process, the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting should establish a concrete work program for the first phase of the process. In our view, early attention should be given to:

- the appropriate harmonization of arms control obligations in Europe, which will provide a basis for consideration of further limitations and, to the extent possible, reductions of armed forces;
- negotiated confidence-building and cooperative measures, designed to ensure greater transparency and predictability in military affairs;
- cooperation to support and enhance existing multilateral non-proliferation regimes, including in the field of transfer of conventional weapons; and
- enhancement of mechanisms and instruments for conflict prevention and crisis management.

We envisage that some measures may appropriately be devised on a selective or regional basis.

Disarmament Fund Update

Grants and Contributions from the Disarmament Fund, April 1 - December 31, 1991

CONTRIBUTIONS

1. North American Model United Nations (Toronto) — 1992 simulation of the UN General Assembly	\$5,000
2. North Coast Tribal Council (Prince Rupert, B.C.) — nuclear conference, April 1991	1,000
3. UN Association in Canada (Vancouver branch) — conference on naval arms control, November 1991	5,000
4. Canadian Association of NATO Defence College Anciens (Ottawa) — symposium on "Canada and NATO," October 1991	4,000
5. Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (Toronto) — Canadian Strategic Forecast 1991 seminar	3,000
6. Division of University Extension, University of Victoria — public forum on "Canada's Role in Disarmament, Arms Control and Arms Trade," October 1991	5,000
7. Park View Education Centre (Bridgewater, N.S.) — Atlantic Coast Model UN on the Arms Trade, February 1992	5,000
8. Peace and Environment Resource Centre (Ottawa) — purchase of books about disarmament for library	1,000
9. Voice of Women (national office, Toronto) — 1991 study tour of the UN General Assembly	3,000
10. Political Studies Students' Conference, University of Manitoba (Winnipeg) — conference on "Canada, the United States and New Challenges to Security," January 1992	4,500
11. Science for Peace (Toronto chapter) — 1992 University College lectures in peace studies	1,500

TOTAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS

\$38,000

GRANTS

1. Project Ploughshares (Waterloo, Ont.) — research and publication on naval arms control	7,000
2. Jocelyn Coulon (Outremont, Que.) — book on Canada and the Gulf War	2,500
3. UN World Disarmament Campaign Voluntary Trust Fund (New York) — information activities	30,000
4. UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (Lima, Peru) — seminar on the relationship between hemispheric security, weapons proliferation and military expenditure	10,000

TOTAL OF GRANTS

\$49,500

TOTAL OF GRANTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

\$87,500

Focus: On the United Nations and Disarmament

Focus is written primarily for secondary school students.

Every fall the countries that belong to the United Nations adopt a number of resolutions calling for arms control and disarmament measures. As long ago as 1959, the UN adopted the goal of "general and complete disarmament under effective international control." Yet many countries continue to possess a large number of arms, in some cases far beyond what they need for self-defence. What is the role of the UN in promoting disarmament? How effective is it?

UN role in disarmament

The UN is involved in disarmament in many ways.

1. UNGA First Committee

The UN General Assembly (UNGA) meets every year in New York from

September to December. All states that are members of the United Nations have a seat in the General Assembly. The General Assembly's role is to debate and consider issues of international interest. The General Assembly can make recommendations, but it cannot force states to follow them. The General Assembly expresses its views and makes its recommendations in the form of resolutions.

The General Assembly divides its work into seven committees. Disarmament issues are looked at by the First Committee, in which all members of the UN, including Canada, are represented. The First Committee meets in October and November. Delegations first hold a general debate on disarmament issues. They then consider draft resolutions on disarmament. Many of the resolutions are the same from year to year and cause little debate. However, a few draft

resolutions are the subject of intense negotiations. States often make changes to their resolutions to arrive at drafts that will gain the widest support possible but still achieve something useful.

After negotiations, the First Committee votes on the draft resolutions. Each Member State has one vote. A state can vote in favour of or against a resolution, or it can abstain, which is a way of saying it takes a position between "yes" and "no." A state might abstain when it does not oppose the principle of the resolution, but does oppose a particular phrase or recommendation within it. If all states are in favour of a resolution, the resolution is adopted by consensus. The aim of the First Committee is to reach consensus on as many resolutions as possible.

If a resolution receives more "yes" votes than "no" votes in the First Committee, it is sent to the General Assembly.

ly for another vote. Since the members of the First Committee are the same as the members of the General Assembly, you might expect the voting results would be the same. However, since the goal is to reach consensus, supporters of a resolution sometimes try to convince non-supporters to change "no" votes to abstentions or abstentions to "yes" votes. As a result, the General Assembly voting can differ slightly from the voting in the First Committee.

At the 1991 session of the General Assembly, Member States adopted 44 resolutions dealing with disarmament, 27 of them by consensus. The resolutions and the voting results are listed on pages 6 and 7.

2. Disarmament Commission

The UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) meets in New York for approximately three weeks every spring. All members of the UN can participate in the UNDC. The UNDC looks at a much smaller number of disarmament items than the First Committee does and considers these items in more detail. At its May 1991 session, the UNDC discussed the following items: (1) objective information in military matters; (2) nuclear disarmament; (3) regional disarmament; and (4) the role of science and technology in international security and disarmament.

The goal of the UNDC is not to produce resolutions on each item, but to agree on a statement or a set of recommendations. Unlike the First Committee, the UNDC takes its decisions by consensus, not by vote. This means that all Member States must agree to the statement; a majority is not enough.

3. Conference on Disarmament

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) meets each year in Geneva, Switzerland, for about six months. Thirty-nine countries belong to the CD, including Canada. The role of the CD is to negotiate disarmament treaties. It can also set up special committees and working groups to study disarmament issues. Since 1980, the CD has been negotiating a treaty that would ban the development, production, stockpiling, possession and use of chemical weapons. The

CD is also looking at other issues, including a nuclear test ban and how to prevent an arms race in outer space. Like the UNDC, the CD can take decisions only when consensus exists. The CD reports to the General Assembly and gets its budget from the UN, but it sets its own agenda and does not have to follow General Assembly recommendations.

4. Disarmament Treaties

A number of arms control and disarmament agreements have been reached through UN initiatives. Examples include the Antarctic Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The UN regularly organizes conferences where parties can review these treaties.

5. Special Sessions on Disarmament

The UN General Assembly has held three Special Sessions on Disarmament, in 1978, 1982 and 1988. The 149 states that participated in the first Special Session — known as UNSSOD I — agreed on a Final Document calling for an end to the arms race and a reduction in arms. The Final Document contained a Program of Action to help bring this about. The Second Special Session (UNSSOD II) was not able to move much beyond the Final Document of UNSSOD I. UNSSOD III could not agree on any final statement at all.

6. Other

The UN has a Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), which helps carry out the recommendations contained in General Assembly resolutions. The DDA conducts studies, organizes conferences and distributes information about disarmament around the world.

In addition to the Special Sessions, the UN General Assembly occasionally holds special conferences on disarmament-related issues, such as the UN Conference on Disarmament and Development held in 1987. In addition, as a result of a UN Security Council decision, a UN Special Commission is now looking after the destruction of Iraq's missile, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons capabilities.

Problems with the UN in disarmament

Since almost all states in the world take part in most UN disarmament discussions, it is hard to find recommendations on which all — or even most — can agree. States often use the First Committee and the UNDC as places to talk "at" one another rather than "with" one another. Even the CD, with its smaller membership, has found it difficult to bring together states' differing opinions on the complicated issue of a chemical weapons ban.

The resolutions adopted by the General Assembly sometimes contradict one another. Resolutions that are adopted by consensus often contain language so general that it would be hard to turn them into treaties, which need to be clear and precise. Resolutions that are not adopted by consensus have less force. Moreover, the states voting against the resolution are often the ones who would have to put the recommendations into effect. It's important to remember that the UN does not exist independently of the states that make it up. If Member States are not prepared to take steps towards disarmament, the General Assembly cannot force them to.

Because of the largeness and slowness of the UN, states that want to negotiate a disarmament treaty often do so outside the UN. Over the last ten years, all major disarmament treaties have been negotiated outside the UN. These include the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the USA and the USSR, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the USA and the USSR.

Value of the UN in disarmament

The UN provides a forum for states to exchange ideas about disarmament and to identify areas where they agree. For states that don't participate in disarmament talks between East and West, the UN may be the only place they can put forward their concerns and opinions on disarmament. UN studies and conferences can explore new approaches to



General view of the opening of the 46th session of the UN General Assembly (September 1991).
UN photo 177993/M.Grant

disarmament and help them gain international attention and acceptance.

Even though UN resolutions don't always lead to the action they call for, they show clearly that Member States consider the issues to be important. And, when states do manage to agree on a disarmament issue or measure through the UN, that agreement carries a lot of weight. Resolutions adopted by consensus express the objectives, concerns and priorities of the international community. This helps to maintain the pressure for disarmament on all Member States.

Often, measures agreed to by UNGA or the UNDC help to lay the ground for further measures. For example, in 1985 Canada succeeded in persuading the General Assembly to adopt by consensus a resolution on verification. This led to a special UN study of verification issues and, eventually, to agreement by Member States on 16 verification principles. Member States also agreed to establish a database of verification material at the UN. Since verification, or checking to make sure that parties are carrying out the terms of a disarmament agreement, is a key part of disarmament treaties, this UN consensus will have benefits in many negotiations.

The General Assembly took another important step forward at its 1991 session, when it voted by a large majority to establish a UN arms register. This means that Member States will be in-

vited to provide the UN with data about their arms exports and imports, as well as with information about their overall arms holdings and their arms purchases from domestic sources. Canada was a strong supporter of this measure, which may eventually lead to international controls on the arms trade.

Although the UN disarmament process may be slow, the value of having all states involved should not be underestimated. Some disarmament agreements affect only certain states or regions and thus are best negotiated by the states involved. However, other disarmament agreements, to be effective, must include virtually all states of the globe. This is true of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was negotiated through the UN and has helped to stop the spread of nuclear weapons (see the Focus article in *Bulletin 14—Fall 1990*). It is also true of the chemical weapons convention now being negotiated by the CD.

The efforts of the UN in the disarmament field reflect the importance of disarmament to the entire international community, as well as the difficulty of reaching international agreement on issues so close to the heart of security as traditionally understood. The end of the Cold War should make it easier for Member States to make real disarmament progress through the UN. Canada is encouraging Member States to move in this direction.

Acronyms

BTWC — Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
CD — Conference on Disarmament
CFE — Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
C(S)BM — confidence- (and security-) building measure
CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTBT — comprehensive test ban treaty
CW — chemical weapons
DDA — (UN) Department for Disarmament Affairs
DND — Department of National Defence
EAITC — External Affairs and International Trade Canada
ENMOD — (Convention on the) Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
G7 — Group of Seven leading industrialized countries
IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency
MTCR — Missile Technology Control Regime
NPT — Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OAS — Organization of American States
SSEA — Secretary of State for External Affairs
START — Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
UNDC — UN Disarmament Commission
UNGA — UN General Assembly
UNSCOM — UN Special Commission

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The Disarmament Bulletin

A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

Final Notice - June 1992

Skies Are Open

Two years after Canada hosted the opening round in Ottawa, Open Skies negotiations concluded with signature of a treaty on March 24 during a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) meeting in Helsinki. The Treaty allows each signing country to overfly the territory of the others at short notice using unarmed surveillance aircraft. The aim is to reduce suspicions and build confidence by increasing openness in military activities. In addition, the Treaty should help to solve problems arising from the implementation of other arms control agreements, such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The Open Skies Treaty is the first confidence-building agreement to include the territory of North America and the Asian part of Russia as well as Europe. Its 25 signatories include the members of NATO, the former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Georgia. Other Soviet successor states can automatically accede to the Treaty. Other CSCE members can apply for accession, subject to the approval of existing States Parties.

The Treaty requires each signatory to accept a specified number of overflights and entitles each signatory to carry out a specified number. A signatory must open *all* of its territory to overflight. Countries being overflown may insist on the use of their own aircraft, equipped with an authorized package of sensors representing commercially-available technologies. The sensors allowed under the Treaty are capable of acquiring images of military equipment 24 hours a day, in all weather.

An Open Skies Consultative Commission, based in Vienna, will coordinate Treaty implementation. Canada is chairing the Commission's first session, which is considering several questions remaining from the Open Skies negotiations, including the allocation of costs for overflights when the host country provides the aircraft, quotas for new entrants, and sensor calibration.

Canada helped get the Open Skies negotiations off the ground in 1989 and the Canadian delegation has played a leading role in the talks since then. In recognition of this, Canada will be a depositary of the Treaty, as will Hungary. This means they will hold the legal texts of the Treaty and will receive the instruments of ratification and accession from the other participating countries.

PM Calls for Stepped-Up Non-Proliferation Efforts

In a speech at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland on May 21, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney called for stronger international action to deal with the threat of nuclear proliferation. The PM advocated:

- indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty when it comes up for review in 1995, and universal adherence to the Treaty;
- increased funds for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and use of IAEA "anytime, anywhere" challenge inspections to deter and catch nuclear cheaters, with recourse to the UN Security Council in cases of non-compliance;
- tightened controls on the export of nuclear weapon material and technology, including a strengthened Missile Technology Control Regime;
- measures to end the sale of nuclear know-how to pariah states;
- strengthened regional security cooperation, particularly in South Asia, the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East;
- deeper cuts in existing nuclear arsenals, to the lowest level consistent with nuclear deterrence; and
- a global moratorium on nuclear weapon testing.

He announced that Canada would be prepared to join in an international program to assist the countries of the former USSR in the destruction of nuclear weapons. To discourage proliferation, Canada is also pledging \$3.5 million to the establishment of International Science and Technology Centres in Russia and Ukraine, which will provide non-military employment for former Soviet nuclear weapon specialists.

Last Disarmament Bulletin

We regret to inform you that, due to resource constraints, *The Disarmament Bulletin* has ceased publication. Copies of back issues are available free-of-charge from the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, External Affairs and International Trade Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0G2. Questions about Canadian arms control and disarmament activities should be directed to the same address.

Publication

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CFE Update

On June 5 in Oslo, foreign ministers of the parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), including Canada's Barbara McDougall, signed a document that provides a basis for resuming progress towards entry into force of CFE. The Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties formally acknowledges the appearance of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine in place of the USSR, and takes note of the agreements reached by those states on the apportionment of all CFE rights and obligations of the former USSR. CFE will enter into force 10 days after the last of the 29 parties has ratified the Treaty.

In Vienna, negotiators hope to conclude work on a CFE 1A agreement in time for the results to be approved at the CSCE summit in Helsinki on July 9. The goal of CFE 1A is to achieve limits on a national basis of the personnel strength of conventional armed forces within the CFE area of application. Participants hope that in the new negotiations among CSCE states on disarmament and confidence- and security-building, which are to begin in September, the achievements of CFE can contribute to the development of a common regime to which all CSCE states will adhere. ■

Briefly Noted...

Ex-Soviet export controls

Canada, in conjunction with a number of its G7 partners and Australia, sent a delegation in May to several countries of the former USSR to describe national export control systems and international cooperation in the conventional, biological, chemical, nuclear and missile areas. The visiting delegations urged their hosts to adhere to international non-proliferation regimes and offered to assist the new states in setting up their own effective export control systems.

BTWC verification

Verification experts from Canada and 52 other countries met in Geneva March 30 to April 10 to begin identifying measures that could determine whether a State Party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is in compliance with its obligations. The experts compiled lists of potential measures in three areas: development; acquisition or production; and stockpiling or retention. They are now examining these measures in relation to a number of criteria, including strengths and weaknesses, resource requirements and availability, and financial and legal implications. The experts will meet to review their respective findings in late November, with a view to concluding their work in 1993.

UNDC

Delegates to the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) made mixed progress during this year's session, held April 20 to May 11 in New York. They produced a consensus report on "objective information on military matters," containing detailed recommendations for increased transparency in areas such as military spending, arms transfers and procurement practices. In drafting sessions chaired by Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason, delegates also arrived at a report that modestly expands common ground on issues related to the transfer of sensitive technologies. Less ambitiously, the working group on nuclear disarmament agreed on a structure of work for next year, while the group dealing with regional disarmament remained mired in conflicting approaches.

Hemispheric security

The Organization of American States (OAS) Working Group on Cooperation for Hemispheric Security — established last year as a result of a Canadian initiative — wrapped up its work in May with a Canadian-drafted report recommending a number of steps OAS members can take to curb weapons proliferation and strengthen regional security. These recommendations became the basis for a resolution

on "Regional Contributions to Global Security," which was unanimously adopted at the OAS General Assembly held in Nassau, the Bahamas, May 18 to 22. The Assembly also agreed to establish a Special Committee on Hemispheric Security to continue consideration of the Working Group's agenda.

UN arms register

The Panel of Governmental Technical Experts on the UN Arms Register, which includes a Canadian representative, has met twice since the register's establishment in December. The Panel is refining the categories of weapons to be included, defining the format for reporting, and considering means for expanding the register's scope. The Panel will hold a final meeting in July, at which it will prepare a report for presentation to this fall's General Assembly. Meanwhile, the Conference on Disarmament has added "Transparency in armaments" to its 1992 agenda and has agreed to address the item in a series of informal meetings.

Middle East arms control

Canada participated in the first meeting of the Middle East Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, held in Washington May 11 to 14. Canada outlined its conceptual approach to arms control and regional security, and offered to make a more detailed presentation at the next meeting, the date of which is not yet decided.

MTCR

Portugal and Switzerland recently joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), bringing the number of participants to 20. Members follow a coordinated policy of controlling exports that could contribute to missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Canada is a founding member and has been working to improve the MTCR's effectiveness in curbing nuclear proliferation, including by increasing the regime's scope and membership. The members will hold their next meeting June 29 to July 2 in Oslo, where they will discuss ways to strengthen the regime.

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Disarmament Bulletin

A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

Number 19 - Winter 1992/93

Bulletin is Back



I am pleased to announce the resumption of publication of *The Disarmament Bulletin* by External Affairs and International Trade Canada. *The Bulletin* has been widely recognized, both by specialist audiences and the general public, as an information and research tool of high quality with respect to non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.

I warmly welcome the return of *The Disarmament Bulletin* and hope that readers will continue to find it of interest and value. I believe that *The Bulletin* will play an important role in fostering a better understanding of the issues we are now facing as we endeavour to make the international environment a safer one.

The Honourable Barbara McDougall
Secretary of State for External Affairs

Chemical Weapons Ban Agreed

After many years of negotiation, agreement on the text of a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was reached at the Conference on Disarmament in September. Once implemented, the CWC will prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, retention and use of chemical weapons and their precursors.

Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall welcomed the accord. "This Convention represents one of Canada's major arms control objectives," said Mrs. McDougall. "Ever since Canadian soldiers first came under gas attack in Ypres 77 years ago, Canada has advocated a total abolition of chemical weapons."

International discussions on a chemical weapons ban began in 1968, with formal negotiations underway since 1984. Canada has participated in the talks since their inception and has made a strong contribution to the Convention's verification provisions through, for example, the preparation of expert studies and the conduct of trial inspections. Although Canada would have preferred stricter verification procedures, it has accepted the agreement as the best text attainable.

In December, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution, co-sponsored by Canada, commending the Convention to Member States for signature. A formal signing ceremony will be held in Paris on January 13. Canada has committed to being an original signatory to the CWC. Once 50 countries have signed, a Preparatory Committee will convene to begin planning for the Convention's implementation, including establishment of the Hague-based Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which will verify compliance. The Convention will come into force 180 days after ratification by 65 countries, but

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not earlier than two years after opening for signature, i.e., probably sometime in 1995.

Canada stopped production of chemical warfare agents before the end of World War II and has since destroyed its stockpiles, which it kept for retaliatory purposes only.

CWC Text Meets Canada's Criteria

The following are excerpts from the address by Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon to the Conference on Disarmament plenary on August 6, 1992, commenting on the final text of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

[Although this] text is far from being the ideal CWC that Canada would have preferred to see adopted...it reflects the result of years of thorough, complex negotiations during which many states have had to concede ground on issues which they considered extremely important but for which they could not attract the consensus support of others...

All of us have already had to make compromises to get as far as [this] text, Canada perhaps more than most, since we were and still are among the strongest supporters of a truly confidence-building inspection regime which would be rapid, thorough and comprehensive. Thus, the old idea of the right to call for an inspection "anywhere, anytime" and to have it take place virtually at once without any constraints on the inspectors would still be what Canada would have felt safest with. The challenge provisions now in [the text] are a far cry from that approach, given the lengthy time frames, the restrictions on the discretion left to the inspectors, and the increased degree of protection now afforded to the inspected State Party.

In the same way, Canada has problems with the provisions on routine inspection of the chemical industry and with the narrow definition of "capable facilities"...

Our bottom line, however, is that it would be very foolish of us to allow a wish for only the very best of results to obstruct the possibility of our instead obtaining what is, nonetheless, a very good CWC regime. Even as it is, [the text] does

meet Canada's three basic criteria for an acceptable CWC.

First, it is comprehensive: it calls for a complete ban on development, production, stockpiling, retention or use of chemical weapons and their precursors.

Second, it is global, or at least it has the potential to be so if others, too, show flexibility: already, like Canada, a significant number of states from all geographic regions have indicated that they can support it and would be prepared to be original signatories. We are convinced that the vast majority of the rest of the world will join us.

Third, it is effectively verifiable: though the regime is not as strong as we would have wished, it nevertheless establishes new norms of verification and inspection that far surpass those of any previous multilateral arms control and disarmament instruments.

Briefly Noted...

Canada Ratifies Open Skies

Canada became the first country to ratify the Open Skies Treaty, depositing its instrument of ratification on July 21 in Budapest. The Treaty, signed on March 24, 1992 by 25 countries belonging to NATO or the former Warsaw Pact, allows signatories to conduct short-notice observation flights over one another's territory.

MTCR Guidelines Tightened

At a June 29 to July 2 meeting in Oslo, Canada and the other 21 members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) reached agreement on stricter export control guidelines for ballistic missiles and related technology. The agreement broadens MTCR restrictions to include missile systems and technology capable of delivering *all* weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological, as well as nuclear weapons). The new guidelines respond to increasing concerns about the proliferation of smaller, lighter missile systems, such as those used by Iraq during the Gulf War.

UNSCOM Discusses Iraq's Compliance

The UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) set up to verify Iraq's compliance with Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), which mandates the disposal of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, held its fourth plenary session in New York from October 28 to 30. The Commission discussed the destruction of Iraq's chemical weapons, considered how to implement plans for ongoing monitoring and verification to ensure that Iraq does not reacquire proscribed weapons, and looked at plans for the future control of Iraqi imports. Mr. F.R. Cleminson, Head of EAITC's Verification Research Unit, is one of UNSCOM's 21 international commissioners.

Canada-South Korea Verification Workshop

Representatives from EAITC's Verification Research Unit travelled to Seoul for a verification workshop with South Korean officials on June 16 and 17. The Canadians made presentations on Canada's verification research program, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Open Skies, and new approaches to multilateral verification. The South Koreans, in turn, provided an assessment of problems related to verification and confidence-building on the Korean peninsula. The workshop underscored Canada's interest in confidence- and security-building in the Asia-Pacific region.

Asia-Pacific Security Conference

Scholars and officials from Russia, Japan, the US, North and South Korea, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and other interested countries will join their Canadian counterparts in Vancouver from March 21 to 24, 1993 to discuss issues related to Asia-Pacific security and stability. The conference is part of EAITC's North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD), initiated in July 1990. The NPCSD involves a series of academic and non-governmental organization (NGO) workshops aimed at focusing attention on security issues in the North Pacific and at exploring prospects for regional security dialogue.

SSEA to UNGA: Time for Member States to Act

The following are excerpts from the address by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the 47th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 47) in New York on September 24, 1992.

Once again the nations of the world meet in full assembly to discuss the state of our world, to report on our actions of the past year, and to express the focus for our intentions in the coming years.

Many of us had hoped that this might have been a time for celebration, a time for rejoicing, as the deep freeze of a lengthy Cold War gave way to the soothing warmth of a new era of enlightenment, understanding, caring and purpose. But we have little joy and our celebration was far too brief. Whatever insights we may have gained from the cruel and terrible events of the past half-century are sorely needed now in a world that breeds new forms of tyranny, hatred and brutality almost on a daily basis.

Many people in this chamber have seen the evidence up close: the bullets, the bodies and the fear in ordinary men and women. But there is no need to lose hope — we have the capacity, and we must continue to build for the future. What we need is the collective will.

I believe that it is this institution, this United Nations, this global forum where we must dedicate ourselves to securing the peace and stability that have evaded many generations before us. We must build a new world, individual by individual, nation by nation, but we must remove the double standards that are everywhere...

It is our belief that we are not in need of better principles in this United Nations — the drafters of the original Charter have served us well. What we need from this organization and its members is the will to act. We need deeper understanding of the root causes of conflict between nations, so that together we can “break the chain of violence, defuse the lust for revenge, voice the peoples’ needs and affirm the peoples’ dignity,” as our Prime Minister said in this Assembly on its 40th anniversary.

I believe that the United Nations has taken up that challenge, and I salute the Secretary-General for his vision and lead-

ership and for his courage in making this organization more relevant in and to our time. His report, *An Agenda for Peace*, lights a path to the future.

The Secretary-General also made the important link between peace among nations and peace within nations when he pointed out that “there is an obvious connection between democratic practices — such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making — and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order.”

There are within nation states three fundamental weaknesses that can cause disputes that go beyond their borders. Primary among these is the absence or abuse of fundamental human rights. If people have no rights, they have no hope; if they have no hope, eventually they will have no fear; if they have no fear, they will seek any means possible to restore their rights, even to die in the trying. It is a pattern for instability, a pattern for failure, one that has happened all too often in the past.

The UN must lead in the field of human rights. In El Salvador, Cambodia, Croatia, Bosnia and Somalia, efforts to protect human rights are of fundamental importance in attempts to bring peace to these troubled lands. Canada is currently serving in all of these places.

The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights offers a unique opportunity for all members of the United Nations to work in a constructive and cooperative spirit to strengthen the foundation of universal respect for human rights.

Particularly insidious among the forms

of human rights abuse is systemic discrimination, whether based on gender, race or ethnic origin...

Canada protests, in the strongest terms possible, the abhorrent practice of “ethnic cleansing,” whatever its reason, wherever it is being practiced. It represents the basest form of inhumanity and abuse of the individual and cannot be tolerated by this world community. In this connection, Canada calls for the drafting of a statute by the International Law Commission to establish an international criminal court. For this purpose, Canada will convene shortly an international meeting of experts to mobilize legal expertise on this matter.

A second major weakness that exists within many nation states is the absence of a developed system of democratic values and institutions, and this too can ultimately lead to conflict.

One should not be fooled by the outward trappings of democracy. How can peace flourish when a democratically-elected leader is placed under house arrest, as in Myanmar, or a democratically-elected government is violently overthrown, as in Haiti? A true and lasting democracy requires time and understanding, like a true and lasting friendship, and it requires two-way trust between a nation’s peoples and its leaders.

We recognize the enormous challenges facing countries where democracy is in its early stages. We must all promote a climate of trust within these emerging democracies so that new ideas have time to flourish. Canada is doing this through its aid programs and by its participation in

Verification Bibliography Updated

In October, Canada submitted to the UN an update to the Canadian *Bibliography on Arms Control Verification: 1962-1991*, which was distributed at UNGA 46 in 1991. The original *Bibliography* contained over 1,500 entries, representing English-language publications and submissions by governments and international organizations as well as the academic community’s literature on the subject. The *Update* includes more than 800 new entries, covering approximately the same period as the 1991 *Bibliography*, with special emphasis on literature produced between the summers of 1991 and 1992. The *Update* also encompasses French-language material.

The *Update* was prepared as a further Canadian contribution to the development of a UN data bank on verification, and to assist governmental experts, negotiators and researchers in their work on verification matters. It is being widely distributed to the relevant communities.



Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall addressing the UN General Assembly in September 1992.

the social and economic agencies of this organization.

A third major weakness that exists within nation states is the inability to make responsible choices in the management of public policy.

Good governance is important because it ensures that adequate attention is paid to social justice, health and education in the provision of government programs and in the distribution of government resources. It also promotes equitable economic opportunity through the development of a free-market system. Ultimately, these are the means to defeat poverty.

Canada's own assistance to developing nations is increasingly tied to their efforts to protect basic human rights, to develop democratic values and institutions, and to undertake "good governance" in their policies and programs. We urge other Member Nations and this General Assembly to adopt a similar philosophy and similar practices if we are to eradicate the seeds of conflict from within nation states.

These are, of course, resolutions for long-term prevention of conflict. We cannot, however, ignore the current state of the world and that is why the Secretary-General's report, *An Agenda for Peace*, is such an important and pivotal document for this General Assembly.

Canada is no stranger to the process of

bringing and keeping peace to all the regions of the world. Of the 45,000 peacekeeping forces currently serving under the UN flag, 4,300 or almost 10 percent are Canadian.

No other nation has made a greater commitment to UN peacekeeping than Canada. Canada has served in virtually every UN peacekeeping mission, and Canadians currently serve in such varied missions as El Salvador, Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and the Middle East.

Our experience in these and other missions has taught us that no two missions are the same, and our experience has taught us that "peacekeeping," which is not even mentioned in the UN Charter, is a dynamic concept that must be further refined to meet the challenges of the 1990s and beyond. Consequently, we are pleased that the Secretary-General consulted so broadly on this matter and that much of our experience and many of our suggestions are reflected in the final report.

Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking

We commend the Secretary-General's emphasis on preventive diplomacy and peacemaking as the preferred options. We encourage him to continue to use all of the

means at his disposal to defuse crises, from fact-finding missions to mediation. We consider it a duty of all Member States to share with the Secretary-General all information that can help him to fulfill this role.

We strongly support the concept of preventive peacekeeping and urge the Security Council to adopt this option when lives can be saved, confrontation averted or democracy stabilized. In Kosovo, for example, preventive diplomacy by the Security Council and the Secretary-General may well prevent bloodshed and anarchy.

In the area of peacemaking, we agree that the Secretary-General should continue to use mediation and negotiation to facilitate the process of peace, and that the Security Council should avail itself of the provisions of the Charter, which permit it to recommend appropriate measures for dispute settlement. We also agree that there is a broader role for the International Court of Justice and that, pursuant to Article 96 of the Charter, the Secretary-General be authorized to take advantage of the advisory competence of the Court.

Peacekeeping

I have already alluded to the 4,300 Canadian men and women currently committed to UN peacekeeping operations. Canada has for many years maintained a battalion on standby for peacekeeping operations. We also have a long-standing policy whereby other Canadian Forces members can and have been called upon for peacekeeping duties. We are prepared to confirm these arrangements in an exchange of letters with the Secretariat as suggested in the Secretary-General's report. We urge other countries to do the same.

We agree with the need to make available human rights monitors, electoral officials, refugee and humanitarian specialists and police, whatever the situation calls for. We have committed, for example, 45 members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to serve with the UN civilian force in the former Yugoslavia. Let me add that we believe that countries that make available such civilian experts to the UN should have their supplemental costs reimbursed.

Peace Enforcement and Peace-building

Whereas "peacekeeping" has become

very much central to United Nations action and philosophy, the concepts of "peace enforcement" and "peace-building" are less familiar. We in Canada believe, however, that both will have an increasing role in the future, if the international community is truly dedicated to ending conflict and to enhancing democracy.

Of the two, the use of "enforcement" is the more controversial. Recent events demonstrate that the use of force may be a necessary option, and we urge full consideration of the Secretary-General's views in this regard. For our part, we insist on the right of Member Nations to take part in any decision involving their nationals.

We also believe that further work is required, on an urgent basis, to determine the circumstances under which enforcement activities should be undertaken and the limits of potential enforcement action.

"Peace-building," on the other hand, has already been undertaken, most notably in the multidimensional UN activities in Cambodia and El Salvador. These operations are long, difficult and costly.

Building lasting peace is critical, despite the obstacles, not only because of the stability and opportunity it brings to the people most directly affected but because, in the long run, it is less difficult, less disruptive and probably less costly than continued hostilities.

Canada, while active in both El Salvador and Cambodia, is fully prepared as well to assist the UN to expand and shape its approach to peace-building in the future.

Financing

We support the Secretary-General's proposals to improve the effectiveness and timeliness of peacekeeping operations, most notably to establish a peacekeeping start-up fund of \$50 million, and the other proposals in his report.

All Member States must pay their dues fully and on time. In May of this year, in the presence of the Secretary-General, Prime Minister Mulroney noted publicly that money is the clearest measure of political will. He went on to say that "the Secretary-General of the UN, the holder of one of the most important offices in the world, should not be treated as a modern-day mendicant, forced to wander around wealthy capitals, imploring the decision-makers to pay their bills so that the UN can do its job. He must be free to devote

his entire time and energy to running the UN and solving global problems, rather than passing the hat for peace and security."

UN financing *à la carte* will, over time, erode its financial base as well as weaken the commitment of Member States to the broad range of UN activities.

Canada is opposed to the recent decision of the Security Council to enlarge the mandate of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) at no cost to the UN, with the cost to be borne by the participating countries. This sets an unfortunate precedent and goes against the UN principle of collective responsibility.

We also have serious concerns about certain long-standing missions, such as the one in Cyprus, where Canadians and others have served for 28 years. In Cyprus, an entire generation has grown up regarding the presence of peacekeepers as the norm. We cannot allow the parties in any dispute to institutionalize permanent peacekeepers so that they are just another aspect of the status quo. This is simply unacceptable. The parties involved must accept their responsibility directly and work with the Secretary-General to find a resolution without further delay.

Cooperation with Regional Organizations

We are interested in the Secretary-General's suggestion for increasing cooperation with regional arrangements and organizations in functions like preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-building. I have encouraged the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to develop some of these mechanisms, and Canada, working within the Organization of American States, remains dedicated to a return to democracy in Haiti.

There is no doubt that regional efforts in preventive diplomacy and peacemaking should be encouraged. I hope that future developments in those institutions will enable them to carry out peacekeeping operations under certain circumstances, but it is the United Nations that has the ultimate authority.

Expanding the circle of peacekeeping and peacemaking organizations may serve to reduce some of the disproportionate burden that, in the past, certain countries such as Canada have willingly assumed. Future needs, however, will require a broadening of participation by Member States.

Non-proliferation and Disarmament Issues

Member States also have a direct responsibility to reduce the numbers and kinds of weapons available for conflict.

Last year, we took a major step to increase transparency in arms transfers and to inhibit excessive build-ups of conventional weaponry, with the establishment of the UN arms register.

This year, we can take two even more important steps. This General Assembly will launch the preparations for the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995. An indefinite extension is the only option.

France and Russia have declared nuclear testing moratoria; the other nuclear powers — the United States, the United Kingdom and China — have no reason not to join them. All nuclear-weapon states should observe an immediate moratorium on nuclear testing and summon up the political will and energy to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty.

We are seeing some progress. After many years of difficult negotiations, our negotiators at the Conference on Disarmament have succeeded in producing a

All nuclear-weapon states should observe an immediate moratorium on nuclear testing and negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty.

Chemical Weapons Convention that, when implemented, will ban all chemical weapons forever. I urge all Member States to join Canada as original signatories when the Convention is opened for signature in Paris next year.

There are other substantive issues that I would have liked to discuss in greater detail before this General Assembly today — notably the follow-up to the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. Canada's Prime Minister

urges acceptance of the Conventions on Climate Change and on Biological Diversity in a ringing call to action: "As political leaders, our job is to force the pace and stretch out the limits of international cooperation. Nations... have the human genius to create a world free from deprivation and secure from degradation. What remains is for governments to provide the leadership the world so desperately needs."

The job of this General Assembly is to continue to stretch the limits and to demonstrate that leadership, through the establishment of both a Commission on Sustainable Development and the Conference on the High Seas.

There are as well many issues of process, such as the reform of the UN development system, which require our immediate time and attention. Canada put forward detailed proposals in this regard in July in the Economic and Social Council, and we will continue to take an active role in this matter.

What a large task we have set ourselves!

However, one of the lessons that we have learned in the post-Cold War era is that there is no breathing space; there is no long pause for contemplation and reflection. Decisions must be made on a timely basis, and when those decisions are made, all Member States must vigorously support and abide by them.

Last month, at the London Conference on the former Yugoslavia, I made it clear that Canada is losing patience with much of the posturing that historically masquerades as international diplomacy. I know that others in this Assembly share this frustration. But, as we speak, the body count rises in what is left of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not to mention the thousands of men, women and children facing starvation in Somalia.

The United Nations needs the commitment of its Member States, it needs well-thought-out decisions, and it needs follow-up action. Anything less is failure.

Let us not spend the next four or five years debating the niceties of "this" principle or "that" concept. Let us all get on with the job of building peace and prosperity.

No one should be here if they are not prepared to work towards those noble objectives, and no one should leave without confirming their commitment to work together for the benefit of all the peoples of the world.

Arms Control and Disarmament Must Contribute to Cooperative Security

Ambassador for Disarmament Addresses UN

The following are excerpts from the statement of Canada's Ambassador for Disarmament, Peggy Mason, to the UN General Assembly First Committee in New York on October 15. The next issue of The Disarmament Bulletin will include a summary of arms control and disarmament resolutions adopted by the 47th session of the General Assembly (UNGA 47).

The Global Security Environment

Canada joins other nations in welcoming the complete demise of the Cold War era. The unprecedented levels of armaments built up in those times of East-West tensions were an intolerable burden to both sides and, indirectly, to the world community. The arms race generated by the Cold War was the central challenge to the cause of arms control and disarmament. It is testimony to the perseverance of the UN, the Conference on Disarmament, the CSCE and other multilateral arms control bodies that so much was accomplished even when the political climate seemed so bleak.

We must realize, however, that the challenge today is to adapt our hard-earned successes in arms control and disarmament to the new threats to international security emerging in the aftermath of the Cold War.

It is for this reason that we welcome the general recognition that the work of this Committee must be firmly situated in the larger context of global security. Arms control is an instrument, not a goal in itself. During the Cold War, the goal was to contain and control East-West tensions. Now we must seek to understand the conditions necessary for global security, and to use arms control agreements to help build the foundation on which global security can be based.

On many occasions my government has emphasized the need to promote democracy as a basis for harmonious relations between states...

There is also an obvious connection between development and democracy. Nations and peoples must be able to enjoy a

reasonable standard of living if democracy is to flourish. This is where arms control and disarmament find their place. If we can reach agreement on the global control of armaments and on measures for disarmament, then we improve prospects for regional and global stability, and for "true peace and security."

As we now address these large and complex questions, Canada welcomes the seminal guidance provided by the Secretary-General's report, *An Agenda for Peace*. His emphasis on "peace-building," for example, provides the broader context for the work of this Committee. His support for stronger links between the United Nations and regional organizations may also point the way for our future deliberations.

Regional Approaches

As the newest member of the Organization of American States (OAS), Canada has sought to share with its hemispheric partners its long experience in verification and the development of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). The OAS now has a working group studying the application of these measures to regional security. Other regional organizations might also profit from the experience and successes of multilateral arms control.

Canada is actively seeking to promote peace through its participation in all five working groups established within the framework of the multilateral negotiations of the Middle East peace process...

The efforts of the Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security are especially important and relevant to the deliberations of this body. Discussions within the Working Group have focused on a wide range of confidence-building and arms control measures with a view to building peace and stability in the region.

Canada, as one of the non-regional parties in the multilateral phase of the peace process, aims above all to support the efforts of the co-sponsors and all participants to move forward the overall peace process. Responsibility for resolving the

Arab-Israeli conflict rests with the parties involved in the direct bilateral negotiations. The multilateral negotiations are no substitute for these talks.

However, the multilateral negotiations may offer an opportunity for the parties to acquire a vision of the tangible benefits to be gained from an eventual overall political settlement — a more hopeful vision of the future for the Middle East. Canada, with its long-standing experience in peacekeeping and in other areas such as verification and aerial monitoring, and with its developed relations with parties throughout the region, will continue to contribute to the efforts of all participants to build such a future.

As we extend our reach to encompass regional and global security, we should also be aware of new issues on the arms control agenda. The dismantling of conventional arsenals and weapons of mass destruction requires the conversion of military production to civilian uses. That in itself is a Herculean task, but it will not be enough unless it is accompanied by the re-training and democratization of the personnel and military forces created to bear those weapons.

In company with other countries, Canada has begun to lend its technology and know-how to the task of conversion. We are also playing a leading role in the establishment of an International Centre for Science and Technology in Kiev to employ nuclear scientists and engineers in civilian endeavours. But it will require a massive and concerted effort to achieve progress. It would be an irony, indeed, if the very success of arms control created a vast pool of human and technological resources which, unemployed and idle, became the catalyst for future conflict.

Since 1989, the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission (UNDC) have been placing increasing emphasis both on regional approaches to disarmament and on new and emerging issues on the post-Cold War agenda. Through its three regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament and its program of conferences, such as the one co-hosted with the Shanghai Institute of International Affairs in August of this year, the Office of Disarmament Affairs (ODA) has been actively promoting regional dialogue. Discussions have been facilitated on conflict prevention, non-proliferation in both its global and regional dimensions, confidence-



Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason (right) with UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (left) at the UNGA 47 First Committee.

building and transparency, safe storage and disposal of weapons, and conversion.

In our view, the UN has an important role to play in promoting informal mechanisms for dialogue — particularly in regions or sub-regions where institutional frameworks for such discussions are not yet fully developed. Canada commends these ongoing activities of the ODA and pledges its continuing support for them.

Non-proliferation

Under-Secretary-General Petrovsky drew attention in this Committee to the concern repeatedly expressed earlier this fall in the General Assembly over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Canada fully shares his view that “non-proliferation in all its aspects...is becoming one of the most important subjects on the disarmament agenda, including not only nuclear but all weapons of mass destruction, as well as their means of delivery and dual-purpose technology that may be transferred for non-peaceful purposes.”

As Prime Minister Mulroney emphasized in Canada’s Non-Proliferation Program of Action in May of this year, the

problem requires sustained action on all fronts, from the strengthening of global norms and their enforcement, through the broadening and deepening of supplier groups, down to the rigorous implementation of national export controls. Particularly important is the work underway in the International Atomic Energy Agency to strengthen the nuclear safeguards regime — work that deserves our fullest support, both political and financial. Simply put, the IAEA must be given the tools and the backing to get the job done.

Turning to the linchpin of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime — the NPT — Canada echoes the satisfaction expressed by many other delegations on the positive developments over the past year. These include continuing cuts in the Russian and American nuclear arsenals, several important new accessions to the Treaty, and concrete steps to consolidate the regimes of military denuclearization on the Korean peninsula, in Africa and in Latin America.

But much remains to be done as we prepare for the launching of the NPT into the 21st century. Our Prime Minister has called for even deeper cuts in the nuclear

arsenals of Russia and the US. He has urged Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to carry out their pledges to honour START and to sign the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. There is no rational reason for delaying this process. Any imagined advantage of using nuclear weapons as bargaining chips is far outweighed by the dangers. Adherence to these non-proliferation principles is fundamental to the process of expanding cooperation between Canada and these new states.

Canada believes that the NPT must be indefinitely extended in 1995 and the goal of universal adherence relentlessly pursued. Recalling the basic "bargain" on horizontal and vertical non-proliferation implicit in the NPT, Prime Minister Mul-

that would allow for arms limitation to take place. Since the demise of the Cold War, we are learning just how hard it is to put that collective security system in place in a positive and enduring fashion. In Canada's view, a credible assurance by the Security Council to all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT could be a significant step forward in creating the post-Cold War architecture of cooperative security.

CWC

Turning to the work before this year's session of the First Committee, Canada echoes the views of all the delegations before me on the historical importance of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). It is the first multilateral disarmament agreement with effective verification provisions that bans an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. It is comprehensive and calls for a complete pro-

hibition on the development, production, stockpiling, retention or use of chemical weapons and their precursors. It is global and already, like Canada, a significant number of states from all geographic regions have indicated they will support it and be original signatories. Because it establishes new norms of verification and inspection that far surpass any previous multilateral arms control and disarmament instruments, in Canada's view it is a pace-setting agreement.

For many years now, Canada and Poland, working together in the UN, have introduced a resolution supporting the work of the Conference on Disarmament on the Chemical Weapons Convention and urging its early completion. This year we are joined by Germany which, under the most able and dedicated leadership of Ambassador Von Wagner, chaired the CD Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to its successful conclusion.

As one of the 133 co-sponsors to the draft resolution, we urge all Member States to endorse the resolution and the Convention itself. Let us set the stage for the signing conference in Paris in early 1993 and, as Ambassador Von Wagner stated, let us seize this "singular opportunity to lay the foundation of a new cooperative concept of international security."

NPT

During this session of the First Committee we will have before us a resolution that will begin the preparatory process for the 1995 NPT extension conference. Without the NPT there can be neither nuclear security nor peaceful nuclear trade. Canada pledges its full cooperation in bringing about a smooth launching of this vitally important process.

CTBT

The conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) has long been a fundamental Canadian arms control objective. Nuclear testing moratoria are an important step towards this end, clearing the way for the negotiation itself. Canada congratulates President Bush for signing into law a bill that not only takes that step but, in addition, commits the Administration to submitting annually to Congress a plan for achieving a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons on or before September 30, 1996.

In our view, this law embodies a clear political commitment by the US to negotiate in good faith a CTBT within a reasonable time frame. Moreover, this political commitment is reinforced by the fact that Congress will have the opportunity to annually review the plans of the executive branch on the achievement of a successful outcome to the negotiation.

In light of these momentous developments, Canada hopes for even broader support on the CTBT resolution than last year, when two related resolutions were, for the first time, successfully merged.

Cut-off

Canada will once again introduce our traditional resolution regarding a prohibition on the production of fissionable material for weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We regard this as a timely call supporting global non-proliferation objectives. In light of recent important developments regarding the disposition of fissionable material as a result of the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the US decision to unilaterally cease the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, we hope for even broader support than in the past for this resolution.

The NPT must be extended indefinitely in 1995 and the goal of universal adherence relentlessly pursued.

rone has also urged that the 1995 extension conference confirm that relationship. To help pave the way, he called specifically for all nuclear-weapon states to agree to a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons. Canada views the recent US decision to join France and Russia in declaring a testing moratorium as a watershed in the long-standing international effort to achieve a total ban on such tests in all environments for all time. We call on the UK and China to join them. Perhaps even more important is the US commitment not to test at all after 1996 provided other nuclear-weapon states refrain as well. We urge the other four nuclear-weapon states to make a mutually-reinforcing commitment to this end.

Prime Minister Mulroney also called for progress on the issue of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT. The proposal by President Bush in his General Assembly address that the Security Council take up this issue is a most timely and important one.

Former UN Under-Secretary-General Brian Urquhart wrote recently that the basis for global arms control and disarmament — as foreseen by the architects of the UN Charter — was to be a collective security system that would provide the "sense of security and mutual confidence"

Verification

I would now like to turn to the question of verification. Delegations will recall that, two years ago, Resolution 45/65 of December 4, 1990 welcomed the Group of Governmental Experts study on "The Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification." That consensus resolution encouraged Member States to give active consideration to the Group of Experts study's recommendations and to assist the Secretary-General in their implementation where appropriate. It also called on the Secretary-General to report to UNGA 47 on actions to implement these recommendations.

During the last decade, Canada has played a particularly active role in the United Nations consideration of the issue of "verification in all its aspects," including the study conducted by the Group of Governmental Experts. Following on this, Canada, working closely with a number of other Member States, including France and the Netherlands, and building upon the text of earlier consensus resolutions on verification, will submit a draft verification resolution at this year's UNGA. The resolution will take note of the Secretary-General's report on implementing the recommendations of the Group of Experts study and reiterate the call for assistance by Member States in this implementation. As I have said before in this Committee, the usefulness of United Nations activities with respect to the Group of Experts study's recommendations will be determined in large measure by the assistance provided by Member States.

The draft resolution will go beyond this, however. Since the 1990 Group of Governmental Experts study, there have been major developments in the international system that indicate a renewed interest in, and commitment to, multilateral institutions for addressing security questions. Such developments — including the recent experience of the United Nations and the increasing reliance of the world community on United Nations peacekeeping activities — provide important opportunities for the consideration of a useful United Nations role in verification.

To explore these new opportunities, the draft resolution introduces language calling for a follow-on Group of Governmental Experts study focusing on two topics: 1) the preliminary practical lessons from the recent UN experience and other in-

ternational developments relating to verification, for UN verification activities; and

- 2) how the verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements can facilitate UN activities with respect to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building.

Canada is convinced that verification remains as relevant today as it was at any time in the past. Verification is not an East-West issue that has died with the Cold War. In the words endorsed unanimously in Resolution 43/81 (B) of December 7, 1988, "adequate and effective verification is an essential element of all arms limitation and disarmament agreements."

Moreover, verification must be seen as more than simply a matter of substituting concrete evidence for blind trust or of providing some sort of "police" function for arms control and disarmament agreements. Rather, verification is one dimension of a common institution-building process. It should help meet the need to institutionalize, in the context of relations among states, the kind of accepted rules, procedures and expectations that govern the conduct of relations among individuals in all civilized societies. Such rules and procedures do not presume bad faith or malevolent intent, but they allow for such possibilities and provide a framework in which unjustified accusations can be authoritatively rebutted, misunderstandings clarified and resolved, and non-compliance objectively established. Viewed in this light, an exploration of the role that verification activities can play in relation to the ideas advanced by the Secretary-General in his *An Agenda for Peace* report, should prove very timely.

BTWC

While on the topic of verification, I would also like to briefly comment on the work that has been accomplished to date by the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts concerning potential verification measures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). A framework has been established that will permit detailed examination of such measures and an eventual narrowing of the field to a promising few.

The difficult technical task of assessing each measure's potential contribution to verification, simply or in combination with other measures, should not be underestimated. At the same time, however, we must not allow the study to become so bogged down in detail that we lose sight of the overall determination of the last BTWC Review Conference that effective verification could reinforce the Convention. With those objectives clearly before them, the experts should be able to provide the technical basis in 1993 for early subsequent consideration of such measures by the appropriate political authorities of States Parties to the Convention.

Arms Register

As a country that participated in the Secretary-General's Panel of Governmental Experts, Canada welcomes his report. I am especially pleased that the report reflects a consensus among a wide geographic range of countries. In that aspect, the report is one further indication of the dedication of the global community to promote transparency in armaments and to tackle in a practical way the problem of excessive and destabilizing arms build-

NPT Preparatory Committee to Meet

During UNGA 47's First Committee, 133 countries voted in favour of a resolution that set in motion the process of extending the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at the Treaty's Fifth Review Conference in 1995. No country voted against the resolution and only Cuba and India abstained. The resolution mandated the formation of a Preparatory Committee, open to all NPT parties, to prepare for the Review Conference, with its first meeting to be held in New York from May 10 to 14, 1993. The 1995 Conference will be crucial for the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. As noted by Prime Minister Mulroney in a speech at Johns Hopkins University last May, Canada is pressing for indefinite extension of the Treaty as well as universal adherence to it. Despite bilateral and multilateral urging, a number of major countries, including Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Israel and Pakistan, have not yet acceded to the NPT.

Canada to Report Military Holdings

As part of its commitment to promoting transparency in military matters, Canada is thus far the only country to announce that it will include statistics on military holdings in the data submitted to the UN arms register for the 1992 period. The register was established by a 1991 UN resolution, co-sponsored by Canada. It calls for the reporting of exports and imports of seven categories of weapons and invites states to include information about their arms holdings and arms procurement. The 1992 reports are due by April 30, 1993. In addition, Canada will continue to issue its own annual report on military exports, which covers all categories of military equipment, not just the seven reported to the UN.

two years, and on the addition of further categories of equipment and the elaboration of the register to include military holdings and procurement through national production.

ENMOD

Canada pledges its cooperation with respect to the resolution to be introduced by Australia as President of the Second Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD). The environmental aggression by Iraq during the Gulf War catapulted this hitherto obscure treaty onto centre stage. The Review Conference held in September provided the opportunity to put in place a process for adapting ENMOD to contemporary relevance.

In Canada's view, the Review Conference made plain that all is not well with the ENMOD treaty, largely because of serious differences of interpretation of the treaty's scope among States Parties. The Final Declaration made a modest step towards clarifying those differences. Most notably, it was agreed that "any" and all environmental modification techniques are covered, regardless of the level of technology employed. Further, it was agreed that the use of herbicides is covered by the Convention.

However, the review also made clear that there is no basis for affirming the continuing effectiveness of this treaty without a more careful examination — by experts — of the interpretational problems. Canada is therefore one of the countries referred to in Paragraph 2 of the Final Declaration as desiring a Consultative Committee of Experts to be convened pursuant to Article V of the Treaty.

It is our hope that the First Committee will lend its support both to the resolution and to the efforts of many States Parties to ensure that there is a timely follow-up to the Review Conference. Like Finland, Canada will consult with other interested States Parties to this end. In our view, the ENMOD Convention must be liberated from its Cold War past and allowed to play a more meaningful role in curbing the obscenity of environmental warfare.

Procedural Reform

The Cold War has left its mark not only in the immense quantity of weaponry that

must now be dismantled, but in an equal weight of mind-sets and work habits that are the direct result of the First Committee being reduced for 40-odd years to a mainly declaratory, rather than genuinely deliberative, body. The sheer logistics of keeping track of the resolutions are such that genuine dialogue within groups, let alone among them, is stymied. The impediment this situation creates to truly meaningful progress in this body cannot, in our view, be overestimated.

Since 1988, in a process begun under Canadian chairmanship of the First Committee, low-key but fairly consistent efforts have been underway to improve the efficiency of this body by encouraging delegations to dispense with outdated resolutions, merge related ones and to biennialize recurring issues. This process has had modest but steady results...

Last year's experience with the resolution establishing the UN arms register, in our view, directly contributed to the decreased number of resolutions. Delegations were engaged in an important negotiation involving a range of views that crossed traditional groupings and that had as its goal a concrete and important objective. In short, all of us were forced to set priorities and the result was less resolutions and more dialogue. In our view, this is a trend that must continue if we are to successfully adapt this body to the new challenges on the multilateral arms control agenda.

An Agenda for Peace, Part Two

On the occasion of this general debate on disarmament and international security, we have all alluded in one way or another to the basic contradiction that confronts us. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War has opened the way to significant arms control and disarmament measures. On the other, it has unleashed an avalanche of local and regional conflicts.

An Agenda for Peace gives us both the broad framework for promoting global security and concrete recommendations with respect to many critical aspects of conflict prevention and peace-building. However, it does not deal at all with the role that arms control and disarmament *per se* can play in this overall process. Neither is this touched on in the first annual report by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

ups. We hope that all 17 Panel countries will co-sponsor the current resolution endorsing the Secretary-General's report. We now must work for universal participation in the register. Canada will report fully to the register by April 30, 1993, for the calendar year 1992. We call on all Member States to do likewise.

The Panel agreed on definitions of categories of equipment of which transfers are to be registered. It also developed a user-friendly, standardized form for reporting international transfers. Most importantly, the Panel focused on the question of the modalities for early expansion of the register. In this context, the Panel noted that the possibility of the addition of further categories of equipment and the elaboration of the register to include military holdings and procurement through national production will follow the examination of these issues by the group of governmental experts to be convened in 1994.

In Canada's view, the inclusion of military holdings and procurement through national production in 1994 is essential to making the register a meaningful instrument of transparency in armaments. In the interim period, we encourage all Member States to contribute fully to the register and to prepare their views, as requested in Paragraph 11(a) of Resolution 46/36L, on the operation of the register during its first

In Canada's view, the time has come for *An Agenda for Peace, Part Two*, which will elaborate in more detail the contribution that the multilateral arms control and disarmament fora can make to building a new cooperative security framework. An essential aspect of this review will be the role of the Office of Disarmament Affairs as the focal point for a revitalized UN role in multilateral arms control and disarmament. We urge all members of the First Committee to consider how they might contribute to this end.

Unfortunately we do not have the lux-

ury of unlimited time for reflection. As the demand for UN peacekeeping missions only too clearly shows — as we speak the UN has over 40,000 men and women currently serving in 12 UN peacekeeping operations in Central America, Europe, the Middle East, Asia and Africa, and nearly 10,000 more are preparing to go to Bosnia, Somalia and Mozambique — the need for progress in creating a new framework of international security is in

danger of completely outstripping our capacity to respond.

Let us therefore ensure that the deliberations of this Committee over the coming

Need for revitalized UN role in arms control and disarmament.

weeks reflect the need for prompt and concrete actions in our shared task of peace-building. ■

Arms Register Panel Reports to UN

The Panel of Governmental Technical Experts, charged with elaborating procedures for reporting to the UN arms register, has arrived at a consensus report that recommends adjustments to the categories of weapons to be reported and details procedures for the register's operation, including a standardized reporting form.

The adjustments affect the definitions of the seven weapons categories (tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and missiles) annexed to the 1991 General Assembly resolution that established the arms register. For armoured combat vehicles, the Panel recommended reducing the relevant gun calibre from 20 mm to 12.5 mm and broadening the category to include armoured combat vehicles that launch any type of missile, instead of only anti-tank missiles. The Panel also recommended modifying the wording of the combat aircraft and attack helicopter categories to make clear that transfers of reconnaissance and electronic warfare versions are to be reported. For combat aircraft, transfers of versions designed for air defence suppression are also to be reported.

In the warship category, the Panel called for lowering the reporting threshold to 750 tonnes, thus extending the category's scope to ensure coverage of all corvettes. Panel members also recommended including vessels below this threshold that are equipped to launch missiles or torpedoes to a range of 25 km or beyond. In the missile category, the Panel reached consensus on the exclusion of ground-to-air missiles from the register. It did, however, recommend the inclusion of remotely-pi-

loted vehicles that are capable of delivering a weapon at least 25 km, to address concerns about the possible modification of such vehicles into cruise missiles.

As for operating procedures, the Panel designed a form for reporting arms exports and imports that is simple to complete and lends itself to easy compilation. The reported data will be collected and stored by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA) in a computerized data-

base. The ODA will also maintain an index of any background information submitted by states on their military holdings, procurement through national production, and relevant policies. Each year, the Secretary-General will combine the arms transfer reports and the ODA index in a report to the General Assembly. The Panel's report outlines the duties and rights of Member States, the Secretariat and the public with respect to access to the register.



Canada will be reporting its transfers and holdings of combat aircraft, such as these CF-18s from 425 Tactical Fighter Squadron, Canadian Forces Base Bagotville (Quebec), along with six other categories of weapons, to the UN arms register in 1993.

Canadian Forces Photo by M.Cpl. Michel Roy

The Panel also offered suggestions for early expansion of the register's scope and looked at the resource implications of maintaining the register. The Panel noted that recent UN cutbacks give rise to serious concerns about the ODA's ability to operate and maintain the register.

The Panel was established by the Secretary-General in December 1991. It consisted of representatives of all geographical regions of the globe, including both arms exporters and arms importers. Canada was represented by Mr. Don Sinclair, Deputy Director of the Non-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division of EAITC. In December 1992, the UN General Assembly approved by consensus a resolution accepting the Panel's recommendations. A second group of governmental experts will be convened in 1994 to review the register's operation and to consider its further development. ■

Report on Military Exports Released

Canada's *Second Annual Report on the Export of Military Goods* was released in June 1992. The *Report* outlines the government's strict criteria for permitting the export of Canadian-made military goods and lists countries that purchased Canadian military goods under the export permit system during 1991. Of these goods, 75 percent were classed as "non-offensive," such as bomb-disposal suits and communications equipment. Overall, 95 percent of Canadian military exports during 1991 went to Canada's NATO allies and to countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

"Canada leads the world in the campaign for transparency in arms transfers," said Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall on the *Report's* release. "We were instrumental in the United Nations decision to establish a new global arms register last December and our own report far exceeds what is required for the register. I'm confident that our efforts will contribute to greater international openness about the sale and transfer of arms."

The *Report* was tabled in the House of Commons and at the United Nations. ■

Canada Responds to Secretary-General's Report on Arms Control

On October 27, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented Member States with a report containing his vision of the UN's potential role in disarmament. *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War World* builds on the Secretary-General's earlier report on UN involvement in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping, entitled *An Agenda for Peace*.

In a November 11 statement delivered by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason, Canada welcomed the report and strongly supported its thesis that three key issues — namely integration of disarmament issues into the broader peace and security agenda, globalization of the arms control and disarmament process, and revitalization of the process in the wake of the Cold War — must be the foundation of an intensified international effort to enhance the effectiveness of arms control and disarmament.

On the issue of revitalization, Canada noted that despite recent positive developments, the proliferation of technology and equipment capable of making weapons of mass destruction continues to be a source of instability. In Canada's view, the multilateral system must respond quickly in two key ways:

- 1) by confirming and strengthening global non-proliferation instruments, like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the forthcoming Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); this also involves concluding a comprehensive nuclear test ban and developing further — and harmonizing where possible — export controls of sensitive technologies; and
- 2) by developing and applying regional arms control regimes, linking global and regional measures as required.

Canada noted with interest the report's proposal to examine the role of private arms dealers and their connection to problems associated with international arms transfers. Canada commended the proposal to establish a task force to provide Member States with advice on military conversion programs. Canada also expressed interest in receiving further details concerning the role the Secretary-General envisages for the Security Council in disarmament matters, especially in the enforcement of non-proliferation.

Canada strongly supported the Secretary-General's proposal to reassess the UN disarmament machinery to ensure it is able to address new realities and priorities. The Conference on Disarmament (CD), in particular, requires a rationalization of agenda and membership to reflect changed geo-political circumstances. However, Canada expressed reservations about a suggestion that the CD take on the role of a permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements. In Canada's view, the CD's focus should not be diverted from being the sole UN body with the authority to negotiate global arms control agreements. ■

ENMOD Review Conference Held

The Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military and Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) was held in Geneva from September 14 to 21. The Canadian delegation to the Conference was led by Ms Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament. The following are excerpts from Ambassador Mason's opening and concluding statements to the Conference.

Opening Statement

Our task, according to Article VIII, is to "review the operation of the Convention, with a view to ensuring that its purposes and provisions are being realized, and...in particular [to] examine the effectiveness of the provisions of Article I, Paragraph I, in eliminating the dangers of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques"...

Clearly the time is most opportune for assessing the relevance of a multilateral instrument that was borne of the Cold War and then largely ignored. It existed without much notice over the years, mainly because the conduct it sought to preclude, such as man-made earthquakes, seemed esoteric and beyond practical application in the foreseeable future.

ENMOD emerged from obscurity in 1991 in the wake of the Gulf War and the scenes of billowing clouds of smoke as hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells were deliberately set ablaze, and the equally horrifying pictures of slick, black waves of oil slopping onto the shore along with the bodies of dying cormorants and gulls. These images brought to centre stage what had hitherto been seen as a peripheral agreement on an obscure topic. But the glare of centre stage immediately exposed the weaknesses of the Convention. Did the ENMOD Convention even apply? The prevailing sentiment at the time was — and I believe remains so — that, if ENMOD did not prohibit such deliberate acts of environmental aggression as were perpetrated by Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, then clearly it should. This is certainly the Canadian view...

Concern over the inability of ENMOD to adequately address environmental warfare centres on two interrelated issues — first, the limited adherence to the Convention and second, the significant interpretational problems in respect of its scope.

Since there are only 55 States Parties to the Convention, ENMOD lacks the degree of broad international support that is essential for an effective multilateral treaty. In the case of Iraq, though a signatory, it is not a party to the Convention. I hasten to add, however, that as a signatory Iraq was, at a minimum, under an obligation to refrain from acts that defeat the very object and purpose of the Convention.

Clearly, the perceived lack of relevance of ENMOD to the real security needs of most states is the reason for the low level of adherence. This brings us to the second problem in relation to ENMOD — what exactly does it prohibit?

The answer is not clear because there are interpretational difficulties associated with key elements of the Convention. Most problematic is the lack of agreement on what constitutes a “deliberate manipulation of a natural process” (Article II). The second problem relates to what has been called the “threshold of seriousness”

Workshop Looks at ENMOD Verification

“Verifying Obligations Respecting Arms Control and the Environment: A Post-Gulf War Assessment” was the topic of a workshop held in Saskatoon from April 13 to 16. Sixteen specialists drawn from the legal, technical, scientific and diplomatic sectors reviewed existing provisions for verifying compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Techniques (ENMOD), with a view to identifying possible improvements.

Participants discussed such issues as:

- whether or not the ENMOD Convention was breached by Iraq’s deliberate release of oil into the Persian Gulf and the ignition of oil well fires in Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War;
- how to collect evidence in terms of verification of non-compliance, and what form that evidence might take; and
- how the results of using a variety of monitoring techniques could improve the effectiveness, including cost-effectiveness, of the verification process with respect to ENMOD.

Participants concluded that, in general terms, there is a need for clearer definition of terms such as “environmental modification techniques” (ENMOD Article II) and for development of more effective verification provisions (ENMOD Article V). On this last, they suggested following the precedent set by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), where States Parties agreed to first develop confidence-building measures that could eventually form the basis for a more formal compliance mechanism. Participants noted a number of illustrative events for which it might be possible to demonstrate a verification process, including forest fires, oil fires, misuse of herbicides, water diversion, electromagnetic pulses and introduction of new species.

The significance of the use of oil as a weapon was less clear. While participants felt that Iraq was unlikely to be found in technical or legal breach of ENMOD, they argued that Iraq was in moral contravention of the Convention.

The workshop, which was sponsored by EAITC’s Verification Research Program and organized by the Toxicology Research Centre of the University of Saskatchewan, was helpful in making final preparations for Canada’s participation in the ENMOD Review Conference held in September.



Participants at the ENMOD verification workshop in Saskatoon.

set out in Article I, which limits the Convention's ambit to environmental effects that are "widespread, long-lasting or severe"...[T]hese terms remain ambiguous at best...

[T]here are also more fundamental questions such as whether *any* level of damage caused by the hostile use of environmental modification techniques should be tolerated. Another question relates to the scope of the protection afforded by the Convention. It currently applies only with respect to States Parties. Given the inherent difficulty in controlling such environmental effects, should this limitation be deleted? Finally, questions arise as to the degree of intent necessary to be found in breach of the Convention...

Canada joins others in appealing to all states to accede to the ENMOD Convention, as well as to all other relevant international agreements that provide protection for the environment in times of armed conflict, particularly:

- the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 (The Fourth Geneva Convention);
- the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (the First Protocol); and
- the 1980 Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and Annexed Protocols.

The simple truth is, however, that all such appeals will fail unless we address the interpretational problems forthwith.

There have been a number of proposals on how to do this. It has been suggested that the Final Declaration seek to express in as clear language as possible the understanding of all participating States Parties on certain key elements of the Convention's scope. I would draw particular attention to the following affirmations:

- actions like the massive release of oil into the Gulf as well as the deliberate setting on fire of oil wells by Iraq during the Gulf War fall within the ambit of Articles I and II of the Convention;
- the Understandings in relation to Articles I and II are confirmed as is the interpretative statement of the US in relation to herbicides; and
- the Convention covers the hostile use

of environmental modification techniques of *whatever level* of technical sophistication — or lack thereof.

A Final Declaration incorporating these understandings is an immediate step that we can take to make ENMOD more relevant to today's security concerns. But it is clearly not a sufficient step. We must...start a process that could lead to legally-binding improvements in the Convention's effectiveness. At the very least, we need to thoroughly canvass what measures might be taken to that end. It is for this reason that Canada strongly supports the creation of a Consultative Committee of Experts, pursuant to Article V of the Convention and the Annex thereto, with a mandate "to examine the provisions of the Convention, with a view to determining the effectiveness of their application in relation to its objectives, and to identifying areas for improvement."

In keeping with the urgency of the task, it is our proposal that the Terms of Reference of the Consultative Committee include a provision for recommendations to be presented to the States Parties at a consultative meeting no later than six months after the end of the Second Review Conference...

Beyond the legal issues of the Convention's scope and applicability, however, lies the still relatively unexplored area of verification procedures to monitor compliance with the Convention. In April of this year, Canada convened a workshop, entitled, "Verifying Obligations Respecting Arms Control and the Environment: A Post-Gulf War Assessment"... I am pleased to submit to the Conference the proceedings of this extremely informative workshop...

In addition, I would draw to the Conference's attention a paper prepared by Canada's Verification Research Unit that seeks to provide a comprehensive overview of the capabilities of space-based and airborne sensors as a significant means of verifying compliance with the ENMOD Convention. It is the conclusion of this paper that the science of overhead remote sensing — a science that has progressed to the point of admissibility as evidence in courts of law — could play a valuable role in the verification of non-compliance with respect to the ENMOD Convention.

However, given that our point of departure is a convention — the scope of which is unclear and with enforcement provi-

sions that are, as yet, limited to a "complaint and consult" mechanism — it seems unlikely that substantive progress on verification procedures to monitor compliance with the Convention can be agreed upon in the near term. In the meantime, we need not settle for inaction. If we follow the example of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), a proven pragmatic course could be the implementation of a series of confidence-building measures (CBMs) that enhance the short-term effectiveness of the Convention, while laying the groundwork for more substantive progress in the future.

Recently, Canada commissioned a study to examine — in light of our experience with the BTWC — what CBMs might be applicable to ENMOD. One example, increasing military awareness of the provisions of the ENMOD Convention and the obligations of States Parties, would involve a minor financial outlay and could be implemented immediately. Other examples of CBMs directed at promoting greater transparency with respect to activities of relevance to the Convention include the declaration of past environmental modification research, development or operational programs, and advance notification of such activities in future. Unilateral CBMs would demonstrate a State Party's commitment to compliance and would serve to encourage others to follow suit. The next step would entail increasing contacts among States Parties, through the exchange of data and the promotion of ties among scientists conducting environmental modification research. As the barrier of mistrust erodes, we could then move from informational CBMs to consideration of more substantive verification measures.

Canada therefore proposes that the Consultative Committee of Experts also be mandated "to consider ways of enhancing the process of consultation and cooperation amongst States Parties to the Convention, including the use of confidence-building measures."

Final Statement

Our work over the past week, culminating in the text of the Final Declaration, has demonstrated that all is not well with the ENMOD Convention, due in large measure to significant interpretational problems in respect of the treaty's scope.

In Canada's view, it is self-evident that

ENMOD fits within the larger context of international treaty law on the protection of the environment in times of armed conflict. Yet at least one State Party maintains that ENMOD has nothing to do with the protection of the environment. It is — this Party alleges — solely concerned with prohibiting a certain means of warfare. Of course this is patently not the case because, even taking the most limited interpretation of the Convention, its ban is not confined to military uses but also covers...“any other *hostile* use” of environmental modification techniques... [W]hy are we bothering to outlaw military or other hostile uses of environmental modification techniques if it is not precisely because we want to protect the environment from the horrendous damage that might otherwise ensue?

I raise this...to make the point that there is a fundamental disagreement among States Parties even over what constitutes the overall objectives of the ENMOD Convention. Debate, however, has mainly focused on the scope of ENMOD.

There are some States Parties who maintain...that ENMOD is a futuristic document, covering exotic technologies that have yet to be invented, while at the same time asserting that it also covers the use of herbicides, a decidedly low-technology environmental modification technique, in existence for at least as long as the Convention itself. Canada prefers the more consistent approach that any and all environmental modification techniques are covered, regardless of the level of technology employed...

There is no basis for affirming the con-

tinuing effectiveness of the ENMOD treaty unless and until we clear up the interpretational problems. That is why Canada, along with other delegations, sought a decision of this Review Conference to establish a Consultative Committee of Experts (CCE)...Let me indicate now that Canada will be consulting with other countries on the issue of requesting...the establishment of the CCE before the end of 1994...

In summation...[we] have it in our power to bring ENMOD into contemporary relevance. I believe the Final Declaration takes a very modest step in that direction. Let us ensure we follow through and see that a Consultative Committee of Experts...is established to carry on this important work. ■

Open Skies Sensor Parameters Defined

Technical issues dominated the agenda as the newly-formed Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) made agreement on the operational parameters and specifications of airborne imaging sensors a priority following signature of the Open Skies Treaty in March. Canada took the lead as chair of the OSCC's first session.

In June, the OSCC negotiated the technical parameters for Open Skies-permitted cameras, assisted by trial overflights at Boscombe Down in the United Kingdom in which the Canadian Department of National Defence took part. As a result of the trials, such issues as camera and film


types, methods for optimum film processing, and minimum requirements for aerial camera operations were recommended and introduced as Decisions 3, 4 and 5 of the Open Skies Treaty.

The OSCC's next task was the development of technical specifications for synthetic aperture radars (SARs), the most complex of the sensors allowed under the Treaty. In September, under a United Kingdom chair, the OSCC's informal working group on sensors met with technical experts in Vienna to discuss an outline of agreed parameters and specifications for SAR sensors.

These were tested on October 6 and 7 at an abandoned airfield south of Budapest in Hungary. Three aircraft and SARs, provided respectively by Denmark, Russia and Canada, flew over a series of agreed targets, or corner reflectors, provided by the United States. The reflectors were specifically designed to backscatter SAR microwave energy. The intent of the trials was to demonstrate technical issues with respect to the spatial resolution calibration of three very different SAR systems, and to introduce the “lessons learned” into the Open Skies Treaty as a decision.

The resultant SAR data were processed at the Hungarian Institute of Geodesy, Cartography and Remote Sensing, where specifications of calibration targets to measure dynamic range, impulse response and the ground resolution of the SAR systems were determined. These data were taken back to Vienna to be discussed by the OSCC and drafted as Decision 7 by the SAR technical experts.

This experiment was a milestone in technical cooperation among parties to the Open Skies Treaty. The monumental task of negotiating such complicated issues as SAR parameters was a vivid example of the confidence-building intent of the Treaty at work. Technical experts from the Department of National Defence and EAITC participated in the October SAR trials. ■



Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery collected by a Canadian aircraft, owned by Intera Information Technologies Ltd., during a trial overflight in Hungary in October. The bright returns located on the airfield's main runway and between the taxiways are readily discernable. The spatial resolution of this image is six metres. The Open Skies Treaty permits SAR imagery resolution down to three metres.

New European Security Forum

At a meeting in Helsinki on July 9 and 10, leaders of the 52 states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) decided to establish a new Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). The Forum's objectives include:

- to strengthen security and stability through the negotiation of concrete measures aimed at keeping, or achieving, levels of armed forces to a minimum commensurate with common or individual legitimate security needs within Europe and beyond;
- to address the question of harmonization of obligations agreed among participating states under the various existing instruments concerning arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building; and
- to negotiate new stabilizing measures in respect of military forces, and new confidence- and security-building measures designed to ensure greater transparency in the military field.

The Forum opened in Vienna on September 22. It replaces both the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the CSCE Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-building Measures (CSBMs). Participating states have already begun discussions on cooperation in non-proliferation and arms transfers, a code of conduct in the field of security, extension of existing security obligations to all European states, a global exchange of military information, and a common review of defence planning.

As a priority, Canada is working within the FSC to encourage wider and more effective adherence to the objectives of existing multilateral non-proliferation regimes, and to achieve greater transparency in arms transfers.

The full potential of the CSCE process as an educational mechanism and forum for dialogue involving the newer CSCE states has not yet been met due to the inability of many such states to attend the FSC on a permanent basis.

CSCE: A Comprehensive Approach to Security

The following are excerpts from the address by Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit in Helsinki, Finland on July 9, 1992.

We all have preconceived notions about what we can and should do in the CSCE. There are traditions, positions and a diplomatic language that have their own mystique and philosophy — and rigidity. But publics everywhere are demanding more from multilateral institutions: more action, more decisiveness, more leadership. That is why we have a special responsibility to make sure the CSCE works.

In the past, we have dedicated ourselves to the promotion of what I would call certain basic propositions: the right of people to freedom of thought, conscience, travel, expression, religion, human contacts and things that we really believe in. Back in 1975, the mere fact that we, as so-called ideological adversaries, could sit at a common table and reach agreement on some issues was a security-giving exercise in itself.

Our world has become more complex and so have our security needs. We now have a CSCE community where, ostensibly, democratic pluralism, human rights and the rule of law are accepted as our common foundation. Our task now is to entrench our CSCE commitments and take steps to implement them, promote them and protect them. Then and only then will we have meaningful security. In other words, we have to mean what we say, and as members of this organization we are going to hold each other to it...

Ensuring the equal treatment of all citizens, whatever their ethnic or religious origin, must be the first task of all governments. The time for clever arguments in this forum has passed. The minority issue in Europe is not a question of definition; it is a question of basic human rights and, in many cases, basic human survival. Our CSCE commitments in this regard are clear. The time has come to hold governments to these commitments — in bilateral relations and multilateral programs. Otherwise, Canada's cooperation with any offending country will be affected...

There is some useful machinery in the CSCE — the Human Dimension Mechanism and the new High Commissioner on National Minorities. We can take action without consensus and we can send missions to fact-find and to expose violations. We have to continue to strengthen the machinery and to use it effectively. Countries that are concerned about their minorities outside their borders must seek recourse through these types of mechanisms.



Canadian inspectors carrying out a CFE baseline inspection in Zary, Poland in October. See article on next page.

Unilateral action through military force will never be accepted by this community, but neither will the flagrant abuse of human rights...

The CSCE framework also offers us a way of dealing with conflict — not simply resolving conflict but, more importantly, preventing conflict.

Canada continues to believe that the best conflict prevention mechanism is the implementation of our commitments. To enhance that, we need other tools.

Early warning through the Committee of Senior Officials, the Office for Democratic Institutions or the High Commissioner is essential, but we must respond promptly once we have been warned. We must be prepared to dispatch fact-finders or a good offices mission to sit on the ground and work patiently to bring parties together before they get too far apart...

We also need the means to interposition forces, before or during a conflict. Canada has been a leading force in developing CSCE peacekeeping. Our credentials on this issue are, I believe, beyond question.

Some months back we said we needed to reconcile the ability of the CSCE to create security with NATO's ability to provide security. I believe we have finally done it.

The Helsinki Document gives us the political mandate for CSCE peacekeeping. The procedures in that document, coupled with the willingness of regional and transatlantic organizations to support our efforts, give us the means. This is an important step forward in giving the CSCE the operational ability it needs to take action.

It also gives life to the notion of the interlocking elements in European security. Not simply the CSCE and NATO, but the European Community, the Western European Union and the Council of Europe all contribute to our security blanket.

Protection for minority rights, effective conflict prevention, a positive security forum — these are all keys for the 1990s.

The drafters of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act have indeed been vindicated in the comprehensive approach they took to security so many years ago. Canada strongly believes in the enduring validity and importance of the CSCE.

Our challenge now is to translate the unique political and moral authority of the CSCE, which we struggled so long to establish, into effective machinery to manage our problems. ■

CFE Enters Into Force



Canadian CFE inspectors in Poland in October.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) entered into force on a permanent basis on November 9, following the deposit of instruments of ratification by the last of the 29 signatories. In view of the Treaty's importance, and faced with only minor technical delays in ratification by some of the newly independent states on the territory of the former USSR, CFE States Parties had earlier agreed to a provisional entry into force effective July 17.

On that date, signatories began the first phase of Treaty implementation, namely the 120-day baseline validation period. During this period, each state was obliged to accept a number of inspections equivalent to 20 percent of its declared objects of verification. An object of verification is essentially a military unit, such as a brigade or an air wing holding Treaty-limited equipment (TLE), or a TLE storage site. Canada was one of the first CFE states to initiate its program of on-site inspections, visiting units in Russia, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and Georgia.

The Canadian program was coordinated with NATO partners to ensure that inspections by Allies provide a reasonable basis for determining that all signatories fulfill their Treaty obligations. NATO members conducted 238 inspections during the baseline period and were subjected to 128 in-

spections by teams from non-NATO countries. Non-NATO states conducted an additional 17 inspections within their own group.

The Canadian inspectors found no anomalies and the majority of inspections carried out by NATO members were similarly uneventful. The most significant exceptions occurred immediately after the August 14 exchange of new information on military forces, at which time Russia tried to curtail inspectors' access by redefining the boundaries of military facilities in a manner incompatible with the Treaty definition. Following high-level demarches to the Russian government by other States Parties, inspector access was restored to the levels permitted by the Treaty.

During the baseline period, several CFE parties that are required to destroy or convert military equipment began these procedures on a small scale. Now that the baseline period is over and the three-year reduction period has begun, states will intensify their destruction efforts. Twenty-five percent of the final reduction target must be reached by November 13, 1993, with the remaining excess equipment to be destroyed or converted by November 1995. Opportunities to inspect such procedures and their results will keep Canadian inspectors fully occupied during the coming months. ■

Canada Hosts Seismic Experts Workshop



Participants in the Group of Scientific Experts November workshop at Montebello.

The Russian, French and American nuclear testing moratoria, reinforced by a US Congressional call for a comprehensive test ban (CTB) by 1996, provided fitting backdrop for a November 17 to 22 workshop sponsored by EAITC's Verification Research Program and hosted by Energy, Mines and Resources Canada. Seismic experts from 19 countries gathered at Montebello, Quebec, for the first significant discussions to focus primarily on the design and implementation of a global monitor-

ing system for verification of a CTB. Participants were members of the Conference on Disarmament's Group of Scientific Experts (GSE), which recently completed a comprehensive multi-year experiment involving the world-wide exchange and processing of seismic data. As a result of this test, the GSE concluded that the development of a global seismic network to provide adequate verification of compliance with a CTB is technically feasible.

At Montebello, the experts explored

practical aspects of a global monitoring system. These included issues related to design and selection of, and communications and interactions between, national seismic data centres with the intent of establishing an International Data Centre for CTB verification. Concepts for a global system and related costs were also addressed. The workshop followed on Prime Minister Mulroney's recent reaffirmation of a CTB as a Canadian priority, and aimed to assist the GSE with its mandate to make expeditious progress in the next Conference on Disarmament session.

Cooperative Security Programs Established

On July 27, Secretary of State for External Affairs Barbara McDougall announced the establishment of the Cooperative Security Competition Program with an annual budget of \$2.1 million. The program will provide financial assistance for projects that advance understanding, knowledge and public discussion of cooperative security issues. Mrs. McDougall also announced the establishment of a Cooperative Security Scholarship Program of \$200,000 per year.

"The Government of Canada firmly believes that international peace and security is dependent on fostering bilateral and multilateral dialogue and cooperation across the entire range of interstate relations," said Mrs. McDougall. "These pro-

grams will allow us to assist scholarship and projects that increase Canadian and international understanding of cooperative security and promote its practical implementation."

Establishment of the programs follows through on the government's February 1992 budget commitment to reduce expenditure. Some continuing resources have been transferred from the now-closed Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS) to EAITC. The Competition Program also incorporates monies previously allocated to EAITC's Disarmament Fund. The termination and consolidation of programs will result in significant savings.

Mrs. McDougall further announced that

CIIPS' library collection and associated database are being transferred to the Canadian Forces Command and Staff College in Toronto. The College will maintain and develop the collection, and will ensure that scholars and the interested public continue to have access to the library.

Examples of projects eligible for assistance from the Competition Program include research, publications, conferences and seminars. Application deadlines are April 30 for an August decision and October 31 for a February decision. For further information and an application form, contact the Cooperative Security Competition Program, 55 Metcalfe Street, Suite 1180, Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 6L5 (tel: 613-233-4448; fax: 613-238-2062).

Focus: On Chemical Weapons

Focus is written primarily for secondary school students.

"The story they told we could not believe; we put it down to their terror-stricken imaginings — a greenish grey cloud had swept down upon them, turning yellow as it travelled over the country, blasting everything it touched, shrivelling up the vegetation...[the soldiers] were blinded, coughing, chests heaving, faces an ugly purple colour — lips speechless with agony, and behind them in the gas choked trenches we learned that they had left hundreds of dead and dying comrades...It was the most fiendishly wicked thing I have ever seen."¹

This account of the German use of chlorine against French troops at Ypres in April 1915 provides a graphic description of the horror of chemical warfare. Canadian soldiers came under chemical attack on that same German offensive, as well as several other times during World War I. Driven by this memory, Canada has long been working with other countries to achieve a complete ban on chemical weapons. The negotiators have finally succeeded. By the time you read these words, Canada will have put its signature to a treaty that aims at ridding the world of this category of weapons forever.

Chemical Weapons

Chemical weapons (CW) are weapons that achieve their effect through use of a toxic agent derived from chemical substances. In other words, they are poisons. The chemical agent may take the form of a gas, aerosol, liquid or solid. It can enter the human body in several ways: by being inhaled through the nose and mouth, by being absorbed through the skin, or by being consumed as a contaminant on food.

Not all chemical weapons are lethal. Some can be used to temporarily disable troops but do not usually have long-lasting effects. Others — like chlorine, described above — can cause rapid death, depending on the dose.

Chemical agents can be delivered to their targets by ground, air or naval weapons. Examples of delivery systems include missiles, aerial bombs, grenades, artillery shells, mines and mortar bombs. CW can be used in many weather conditions, at

any time of day or night, and in any location. However, weather conditions and location affect how well CW work. Wind is the most important factor because it determines how long an airborne agent will stay in the target area. Temperature, rain and humidity can also affect the behaviour of chemical agents.

CW Use

CW can be used to harass the enemy, to cause casualties, or to deny the use of terrain to an enemy. While some CW remain in the air for only a few seconds before dispersing, others, such as mustard gas, can contaminate an area for weeks at a time. CW may also be acquired in the belief that they act as a deterrent, or threat, against the potential use of CW or other powerful weapons by a rival country. Whether in fact they do so is a question open to debate.

Chemical weapons were used widely in World War I, resulting in over one million injuries and over 90,000 deaths. Since 1918, there have been numerous reports of the use of CW in various conflicts. The main documented events are the use of mustard gas by Italy in Ethiopia in 1936, the use of mustard gas and other agents by Japan against the Chinese in World War II, and the use of mustard gas by Egypt in Yemen in the early 1960s. Iraq used several chemical agents, particularly mustard gas and nerve gas, during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Many other accusations of CW use have been made but not confirmed. It is possible that accusations of CW use are sometimes made for political purposes.

The fact that CW have not been used more often is due in part to public revulsion against these weapons, which makes leaders reluctant to authorize their use. There are also legal constraints on CW use. In response to the horrors of World War I, states signed an agreement in 1925 called the Geneva Protocol, which bans the use of chemical weapons in war. Over 125 countries, including Canada, are parties to this treaty.

The rarity of CW use is also due to the fact that it is hard to create an effective CW military capability. While CW are easier to make than nuclear weapons, producing large quantities requires materials

and technologies that are not always readily available, even in advanced industrialized countries. Although there are thousands of natural and synthetic chemicals, fewer than 100 have been developed for chemical warfare and even fewer used. In the field, CW require special operational skills, for which troops must be trained. Also, the vulnerability of CW to factors such as weather means it is hard to predict the outcome of CW use.

To defend against CW use, a soldier can wear a mask and respirator and special protective clothing. It is harder to protect the general population. This means that CW are often feared as a terror weapon, which could be used against civilians. For example, many people worried that Iraq might use CW in its Scud missile attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Gulf War.

CW Possession

The US, the former USSR and Iraq are the only countries that have said they possess chemical weapons. In 1990, the US and the USSR agreed between themselves to stop producing CW and to destroy their CW stockpiles. It is often reported in the media that perhaps another 15 to 20 countries either have CW or are trying to acquire them. Canada does not possess CW, although it does undertake research on how to defend against CW.

CW Control

Although the 1925 Geneva Protocol bans the use of CW, it does not prohibit the stockpiling, development and production of these weapons. This means that states have been able to legally develop and build these weapons and to equip their armed forces with them.

In September 1992, negotiators completed a treaty that seeks to close this option. When the new Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is ratified and enters into force, states that are parties will be required to destroy any CW they possess and to undertake never to acquire CW. Since CW are not easily identifiable from a distance (e.g., from surveillance satellites), the CWC contains very strict provisions for checking that states are living up to their obligations under the Convention.

These verification measures include watching the destruction procedure, monitoring certain national chemical industries, and providing for the inspection of civilian and military sites at short notice.

Canada and a number of other states have already said that they will sign the CWC when it is opened for signature in January 1993. Even so, the CWC will not enter into force before 1995. It is very important that all countries agree to abide by the Convention. Too many states leaving open the option of arming themselves with CW would undermine the treaty. Canada will be working hard to convince other states that they will be more secure if the world is free of the threat of CW than they will be if they hang on to the CW option.

In the mid-1980s, concerned about the spread of CW, Canada joined with a number of other countries in the so-called "Australia Group" to place strict controls on the export of legitimate chemicals and certain legitimate equipment that could be diverted to make CW. These controls will stay in place to help ensure that Canadian exports are not contributing to the production or acquisition of CW by other countries.

¹O.S. Watkins in the *Methodist Reporter*, cited in Valerie Adams, *Chemical Warfare, Chemical Disarmament* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 25.



Canada is a leader in research in gas mask technology and other defences against chemical weapons.

Photo courtesy of the Defence Research Establishment Ottawa

Forecast

Arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, January through April 1993.

Ongoing: CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Vienna

Ongoing: CFE Joint Consultative Group, Vienna

Ongoing: Open Skies Consultative Commission, Vienna

January 13: CWC signing ceremony, Paris

January 18-20: Conference on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Latin America and the Caribbean (co-sponsored by Canada), Asuncion, Paraguay

January 18 - March 26: CD in session, Geneva

January 27-29: ENMOD seminar, Geneva

February: Middle East Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, Washington

February 8-12: CWC Preparatory Committee, The Hague

March 8-11: MTCR experts meeting, Canberra

March 8-12: Resumed session of UNGA First Committee, New York

March 21-24: North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Conference, Vancouver

April 19-23: CWC Preparatory Committee, The Hague

April 19 - May 10: UNDC, New York

Acronyms

BTWC — Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

CCE — Consultative Committee of Experts

CD — Conference on Disarmament

CFE — Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

CIIPS — Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

C(S)BM — confidence- (and security-) building measure

CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CTB(T) — comprehensive test ban (treaty)

CW — chemical weapons

CWC — Chemical Weapons Convention

EAITC — External Affairs and International Trade Canada

ENMOD — (Convention on the) Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques

FSC — Forum for Security Cooperation

GSE — Group of Scientific Experts

IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency

MTCR — Missile Technology Control Regime

NGO — non-governmental organization

NPCSD — North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue

NPT — Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OAS — Organization of American States

ODA — (UN) Office for Disarmament Affairs

OSCC — Open Skies Consultative Commission

SAR — synthetic aperture radar

SSEA — Secretary of State for External Affairs

START — Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

TLE — treaty-limited equipment

UNDC — UN Disarmament Commission

UNGA — UN General Assembly

UNSCOM — UN Special Commission (on Iraq)

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A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

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Canada Signs Chemical Weapons Convention

At a January 13 ceremony in Paris, External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall signed, on Canada's behalf, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, known in short form as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC was negotiated over the past six years in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament, of which Canada is a member. Once it enters into force, the CWC will prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, retention and use of chemical weapons and their precursors.

"I am honoured to sign this Convention on behalf of Canada and it is my hope that it signals an end to a tragic chapter in world history," said Mrs. McDougall. "Canadians can take special pride in the conclusion of this treaty. The total abolition of chemical weapons has been one of our arms control objectives ever since Canadian soldiers experienced the horror of gas attacks during the First World War."

Canada was one of 130 countries to become an original signatory to the Convention. The major non-signatories include Iraq, Libya and North Korea. The Convention will come into force 180 days after ratification by 65 countries, but not earlier than January 13, 1995. Canada will ratify the CWC sometime during the next two years, once appropriate legislation is prepared and passed.

To implement the Convention, an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is being established in The Hague. The Organization will comprise:

- a Conference of States Parties, composed of all signatories, which will meet on an annual basis;
- a 41-member rotating Executive Council, consisting of States Parties' representatives, elected for two-year terms (the Executive Council will have day-to-day



External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall at the CWC signing ceremony.

Photo by Jean-Bernard Porée

SPECIAL ISSUE ON PEACEKEEPING

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- responsibility for supervising the activities of the Organization); and
- a Technical Secretariat headed by a Director-General.

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is estimated to cost about US \$75 million per year. It will be financed on the basis of assessed contributions by signatories.

The main component of the Organization's Technical Secretariat will be the Inspectorate responsible for verifying compliance with the Convention. The CWC's verification provisions are the most rigorous ever developed in a multilateral agreement. They allow the Organization to confirm the destruction of chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles and CW production facilities, to monitor closely any continuing permitted production of certain toxic chemicals, to gather information about the global chemical industry, and, when requested by States Parties, to carry out short-notice "challenge" inspections.

Canada has not produced chemical warfare agents since the Second World War and has since destroyed its CW stockpiles. The Canadian chemical industry will be subject to routine monitoring under the Convention. The "National Authority," which the Convention requires be established in each ratifying state as the contact point for the international Organization, will be set up within an existing federal government department.

The CWC in Summary

Article I of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) establishes a complete ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons (CW), and calls for the destruction of all CW stocks and CW production facilities within a specified period. Article I also obliges States Parties that have abandoned CW on another State Party's territory to assume joint responsibility for destroying those stocks.

Articles IV and V set out detailed verification measures for the destruction of CW stocks and production facilities. Complete destruction is to be achieved within 10 years. However, because some states might have economic problems organiz-

Canada Welcomes START II

Canada welcomed the signing of the Second Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) by then-US President George Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin on January 3.

"START II represents the single greatest reduction in destructive power ever mandated by an arms control treaty," said External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall. "Canada is delighted that the new spirit of cooperation between former adversaries has resulted in such a tangible gain for world security."

START II calls for massive reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the US and the Russian Federation, to a level of between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads each by the year 2003. This amounts to a cut of roughly 70 percent from current levels. Heavy, land-based multiple-warhead missiles, generally regarded as the most destabilizing, will be eliminated entirely by both parties.

Mrs. McDougall called on other countries of the former Soviet Union with nuclear weapons on their territory (Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) to honour their arms reduction commitments. In particular, she urged those states to fully implement their undertakings with respect to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). "START II constitutes a significant boost for the nuclear non-proliferation process. Its signing takes on even greater significance as we move towards the NPT review and extension conference in 1995," the Minister added.

ing a destruction program, the Convention allows for an extension of this period of up to five more years.

For similar reasons, Article V also permits States Parties to convert to permissible civilian use — rather than destroy — certain production facilities. This can be done only under strict conditions designed to prevent possible re-conversion to CW use. In both instances, additional verification measures will be applied to prevent cheating.

As a safeguard against clandestine CW production, Article VI specifies a comprehensive and graduated regime for routine monitoring of government CW-related production activities and of the global chemical industry. Monitoring will be carried out through national declarations supplemented by international on-site inspections by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

The basis of the regime is set out in three schedules (lists) of toxic chemicals annexed to the CWC. Facilities producing chemicals listed on Schedule 1 (which covers agents that *have* been used as chemical weapons) for certain approved purposes, such as developing protective equipment or for medical research, will be subject to the most rigorous verification measures. Facilities producing Schedule 2 (toxic chemicals that *could* be used as chemical weapons and their precursors) or Schedule 3 (toxic chemicals that *might* be used as chemical weapons) chemicals,

will be subject to progressively less rigorous measures. All other chemical production facilities deemed relevant to the Convention — estimated to number in the tens of thousands worldwide — will be liable to occasional random inspection.

Article IX establishes a system for short-notice "challenge" inspections. Under this provision, any State Party's facility or site can be inspected if another State Party has reason to believe that the site is engaged in activities incompatible with the obligations and goals of the Convention. The "challenged" state will not be able to refuse such inspections; it must allow the Organization's inspection team access to such sites, although there are several measures available to a State Party to protect (for national security or other reasons) activities it considers unrelated to the challenge or to the scope of the Convention.

Article XII allows the Organization to require a State Party deemed not to be in full compliance with the Convention to take remedial action. In the event that the offending state fails to do so, the Organization can apply a number of penalties, including voluntary sanctions.

In recognition of the UN Security Council's paramount responsibility for matters affecting international peace and security, cases of particular gravity are to be referred to the Security Council for possible further (mandatory) action under the UN Charter.

Peacekeeping: A Canadian Contribution to Global Security

The following article was prepared with the assistance of the Department of National Defence.

A central feature of Canada's foreign and defence policy since the Second World War has been the commitment to promote international peace and security. The effective participation of Canadians in peacekeeping operations has contributed directly to the easing of tensions in trouble spots throughout the world. Over 4,500 Canadian Forces and RCMP personnel are currently deployed on international peacekeeping operations and in Somalia, making Canada one of the leading nations in this field.

Purpose of Peacekeeping

Canada recognizes that international peacekeeping has many limitations and should not be viewed as an end in itself. The purpose of peacekeeping is not only to halt conflict, but also to create conditions in which the search for peaceful solutions to the underlying causes of tensions can take place through negotiations. Canada will continue to place considerable emphasis on the interrelationship between peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts in the difficult process of international conflict resolution.

Canada's Involvement

The Canadian Forces have always been in the forefront of United Nations efforts to keep the peace. In fact, Canada is the only country to have participated in all of the UN peacekeeping operations since 1947. We have sent troops to such far away places as Kashmir (1949-79), West New Guinea (1962-63) and Yemen (1963-64). Canadian military personnel have been associated with such politically delicate operations as clearing mercenaries from Katanga and securing the territorial integrity of the former Belgian Congo (1960-64), now Zaire. They have stood between Egyptians and Israelis in the Sinai (1956-67, 1973-79) and assisted Namibia's transition to independence (1989-90).

Canada has also participated in peacekeeping missions not under the auspices of the United Nations. These include the International Observer Team to Nigeria (OTN, 1968-69); two truce supervisory operations in Indochina — the Interna-



Corporal Bob Berlasty checks movement of vehicles in Dragovic, Croatia. Cpl. Berlasty is attached to the 3rd Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, which arrived in October 1992 for a six-month tour of duty with the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia.

Canadian Forces photo by Sergeant Margaret Reid

tional Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC, 1954-74) and the International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS, 1973); one truce supervision in the Sinai, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO, since 1986); and the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM, since 1991) in the former Yugoslav republics.

Quite distinct from peacekeeping operations was the Korean conflict (1950-53), in which the Canadian Forces fought under the aegis of the United Nations in defence of a victim of aggression. Although the Korean operation did not fall within the current definition of a peacekeeping operation, it nonetheless represented a major action by the United Nations to restore peace. Some 27,000 members of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force served in the Korean theatre of war over a span of three years, the maximum forces committed at one time being more than 9,000. These forces suffered more than 1,600 casualties, including 516 deaths.

Overall, between 1947 and 1992, tens of thousands of Canadians have participated in peace-restoring, peacekeeping and truce supervisory operations mounted by the United Nations, and in truce super-

visory or observer missions conducted outside the UN framework. Since Korea, 83 Canadians have died while serving in peacekeeping forces.

Recent Commitments

Canada has recently been involved in the following UN-sponsored activities.

Iran-Iraq

The United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) was established in 1988 to monitor the ceasefire at the end of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. Canada provided 15 officers as observers or staff officers for the duration of this mission. During the early months, Canada contributed a communications squadron of 525 troops responsible for setting up the Observer Group's communications requirements along the 1,200 kilometre border between the two countries. On February 28, 1991, the UN Security Council allowed the UNIIMOG mandate to lapse.

Namibia

The United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was created in March 1989 by the UN Security Council as a military/civilian operation to supervise Namibia's transition to independence.

Canada contributed 301 logistics and support personnel to the operation, which was located outside the Namibian capital of Windhoek. The operation was successfully completed in March 1990.

Central America

The United Nations Observer Group in Central America, known by its Spanish acronym of ONUCA, was created by the UN Security Council on November 7, 1989, to monitor the peace process in that region. At the operation's peak, Canada provided 175 personnel and eight medium and light helicopters. In late January 1992, ONUCA was disbanded.

Haiti

Eleven Canadian Forces officers participated in the UN Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH), charged with verifying Haiti's election process. The Canadian observers were part of an unarmed multinational group formed for a four-month period in November 1990. Brigadier-General Gabriel Zuliani, a Canadian Forces officer, was in charge of security aspects of ONUVEH. More recently, Canada provided military advice on peacekeeping to the Organization of American States (OAS) in its efforts to return democracy to Haiti after the September 1991 coup.

Present Commitments

Canada is currently committed to the following activities (figures are as of January 28, 1993).

India-Pakistan

Canadian participation in the United Nations Military Observer Group in India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP) involves the provision of a Hercules aircraft to assist in the twice-yearly moves of UNMOGIP headquarters between India and Pakistan.

Middle East

The Canadian Forces currently participate in two UN operations in the Middle East: the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).

UNTSO was the first United Nations peacekeeping mission. It was formed in 1948 to observe and maintain the ceasefire and to assist in supervision of the General Armistice Agreements concluded between Israel on one side and Egypt, Leba-

non and Syria on the other. Canada has been active in the mission since 1954 and contributes 13 officers as observers or staff officers. The mandate is open-ended.

UNDOF was established on the Golan Heights by a UN Security Council resolution in 1974. The 180 Regular and Reserve Force members serving with the Canadian contingent provide logistics, communications and technical support to the UN force. Most members are located at Camp Ziouani on the Golan Heights and in Damascus, Syria, while small detachments are deployed throughout the Area of Separation on the Heights. The mandate is due for renewal every six months (May 30 and November 30).

Cyprus

Canada has contributed peacekeeping troops to the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) since 1964. The Canadian battalion is responsible for a sector that includes the city of Nicosia, where opposing factions are often only metres apart. Operations involve manning observation posts along the ceasefire lines, conducting mobile patrols within the sector, investigating ceasefire violations, mediating disputes between the opposing forces and conducting humanitarian relief tasks. This mandate must be renewed every six months (June 15 and December 15).

On December 11, 1992, Canada announced that it will withdraw its peacekeeping force from Cyprus, starting in June (see p. 9). In the meantime, Canada is maintaining a contingent of about 500 military personnel on the island.

Sinai

In response to a request by the governments of Egypt and Israel, Canada agreed in 1985 to participate in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) based in the Sinai Peninsula, separate from United Nations commitments. Until 1990, Canada provided eight helicopters plus aircrew and support personnel. At that time, the size of the force was reduced and the MFO asked Canada to withdraw its eight helicopters. There are currently 27 Canadians serving with this mission.

Afghanistan-Pakistan

Canada was one of 10 countries to provide military observers to the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), which commenced in May 1988. In March 1990,

with the expiry of the UNGOMAP mandate, the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP) was created. A Canadian is one of 10 officers employed in a military advisory role to OSGAP. OSGAP is intended to serve as the basis for any future peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan.

Iraq-Kuwait

The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), established in April 1991, is stationed within a demilitarized zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border. The Canadian contingent consists of 29 Canadian Forces members, the majority of whom are military engineers, whose task is to clear mines and unexploded ordnance from the demilitarized zone. The mandate is due for renewal semi-annually (April 9 and October 9).

Western Sahara

The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established in April 1991. Canadian Major-General Armand Roy was the mission's first Force Commander. The military component of MINURSO consists of 33 Canadian Forces members as observers, movement control and support personnel.

Angola

Canada currently has 15 Canadian Forces members with the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM). Established in June 1991, UNAVEM's mandate is to verify the ceasefire and demobilization arrangements agreed to by the government of Angola and the forces of Angolan resistance. This mandate expired in January 1993.

El Salvador

In late January 1992, the members of the observer group that had been part of ONUCA relocated to El Salvador to monitor that country's ceasefire. The move was part of an overall expansion of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (UNOSAL). The mission's mandate has been extended until the end of May 1993 to ensure the successful completion of the peace process. There are presently five Canadian Forces officers in El Salvador.

Cambodia

The United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) began in 1991.

The Canadian contingent consisted of logistics personnel, administrative support staff and several staff officers. The Canadians were involved in arranging communications relating to the ceasefire and in establishing mine awareness training and demining programs to enable the resettlement of refugees. UNAMIC was the precursor to a much larger force of approximately 16,000 peacekeepers, known as the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The UNAMIC operation ceased in May 1992 as UNTAC commenced. The Canadian UNTAC contingent is now 214 strong and consists of engineers, a transportation logistics unit, a naval contingent and additional headquarters personnel.

Ex-Yugoslavia

Canada is providing some 1,050 personnel to the 13,000-strong United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR I), including an infantry battalion, a combat engineer regiment, military observers and members of the RCMP. The Canadian contingent deployed in late March 1992. Its mandate is to carry out vehicle and foot patrols, establish check points, and perform area and perimeter protection, as well as to maintain routes, carry out mine clearance operations and look after the construction and maintenance of shelters in Croatia.

The Canadian peacekeepers were tem-

porarily deployed to Sarajevo airport to allow the airlift of humanitarian relief supplies into that city. The battalion returned to Croatia after being relieved by a larger force of French, Egyptian and Ukrainian units. Canadian Major-General Lewis MacKenzie was the first Chief of Staff for the force and later served as Sector Commander Sarajevo.

Another contingent of 1,250 Canadian troops has been dispatched to Croatia to be part of a protection force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR II). Canada is considering a UN proposal to deploy this battalion in Sarajevo. One company of the Canadian contingent with UNPROFOR II has been temporarily redeployed to Macedonia pending the arrival of military personnel from the Nordic countries.

Canada has also been participating in the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM) since September 1991. The ECMM's mandate was originally to help broker a ceasefire. It now monitors the ceasefire and any other agreements made between the Serbians, Croats and Moslems. Unlike the UN contingent, whose movements are restricted to the four UN protected areas, the ECMM is able to operate throughout all of the former republics of Yugoslavia. Twelve Canadians currently serve with the ECMM.

Somalia


On December 3, 1992, the UN Security

Council adopted Resolution 794, which paved the way for a US-led coalition of countries, called the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), to use all necessary means to "establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."

Canada supports Resolution 794 and is contributing to UNITAF, which now numbers over 30,000 troops from 21 countries. The Canadian contingent of over 1,300 military personnel was in the field by the first week of January, replacing Canada's earlier commitment of up to 750 military personnel for peacekeeping duties with the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Resolution 794 authorized the suspension of UNOSOM's deployment. The Secretary-General will likely decide when and where to employ UNOSOM peacekeepers only when order has been re-established in the country.

The main body of the Canadian contingent consists of 900 soldiers from the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (Petawawa, Ontario). The Canadian battalion is presently situated in Belet Huen and is expanding its field of responsibility to include outlying areas. It is supported by Canadian Forces armoured vehicles, a signals platoon, engineers and support staff. In addition, a Canadian Forces supply ship, HMCS *Preserver*, is stationed off Mogadishu to provide logistical and medical support.

Current Canadian Peacekeeping Deployments



Canadian Centre for Global Security / by Trevor Johnston

Canada's Involvement in International Peacekeeping

Canadian participation in international peacekeeping forces and observer missions since 1947 (as of January 28, 1993).

Operation	Mandate	Location	Dates of Canadian Participation	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution
United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK)	Supervise elections in South Korea	Korea	1947-48	2	—
United Nations Military Observer Group India-Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	Supervise ceasefire between India and Pakistan	Kashmir	1949-79	27	—
United Nations Command Korea (UNCK)		Korea	1950-54	9,000	—
United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization Palestine (UNTSO)	Supervise General Armistice Agreements (formed in 1948)	Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria	1954-	22	13
*International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC)	Supervise withdrawal of French forces	Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam	1954-74	133	—
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I)	Supervise withdrawal of French, British and Israeli forces	Egypt (Sinai)	1956-67	1,007	—
United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)	Ensure no infiltration across Lebanese borders	Lebanon	1958	77	—
Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC)	Assist in maintaining law and order	Belgian Congo (now Zaire)	1960-64	421	—
United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA)	Maintain peace and security	West New Guinea (now West Irian)	1962-63	13	—
United Nations Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM)	Observe withdrawal of Egyptian troops	Yemen	1963-64	36	—
United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	Assist in maintaining law and order	Cyprus	1964-	1,126	514
Mission of the Representatives of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)	Observe withdrawal of OAS forces	Dominican Republic	1965-66	1	—
United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission (UNIPOM)	Supervise ceasefire	India-Pakistan border	1965-66	112	—
*Observer Team to Nigeria (OTN)	Observe ceasefire	Nigeria	1968-69	2	—
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II)	Supervise redeployment of Israeli and Egyptian forces	Egypt (Sinai)	1973-79	1,145	—
*International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS)	Supervise truce	South Vietnam	1973	248	—
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	Supervise redeployment of Israeli and Syrian forces	Syria (Golan Heights)	1974-	230	180
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	Confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces	Southern Lebanon	1978	117	—

* Operation outside UN framework

Operation	Mandate	Location	Dates of Canadian Participation	Maximum Troop Contribution	Current Troop Contribution
*Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)	Prevent violations of peace treaty (Camp David Accord 1979)	Sinai	1986-	140	27
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)	Confirm withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan	Afghanistan	1988-90	5	—
United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)	Supervise ceasefire and withdrawal of forces	Iran-Iraq	1988-91	525	—
United Nations Transition Assistance Group Namibia (UNTAG)	Assist transition to independence	Namibia	1989-90	301	—
Grupo de Observadores de les Naciones Unidas en Centroamérica (ONUCA)	Verify compliance with Esquipulas Agreement	Central America	1989-92	175	—
Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP)	Military advisory unit	Afghanistan, Pakistan	1990-	1	1
United Nations Observer Group for the Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH)	Observe 1990 Haitian elections	Haiti	1990-91	11	—
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)	Monitor demilitarized zone	Iraq, Kuwait	1991-	301	29
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO)	Monitor ceasefire	Western Sahara	1991-	—	33
United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM)	Monitor ceasefire	Angola	1991-	—	15
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (UNOSAL)	Investigate human rights violations, monitor progress leading to military reform	El Salvador	1992-	—	5
United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)	Monitor ceasefire and establish a mine awareness program	Cambodia	1991-1992	103	—
*European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM)	Monitor and report on the implementation of ceasefires	Yugoslavia	1991-	—	12
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)	Facilitate communications, establish mine awareness program, provide transportation and other logistical support	Cambodia	1992-	—	214
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)	Conduct observation patrols, clear mines, construct and maintain shelters	Yugoslavia	1992-	2,400	2,302
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM)	Distribute relief supplies	Somalia	1992-	—	—
*Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF)	Establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations	Somalia	1992-	—	1,361

*Operation outside UN framework

Peacekeeping in the "New World Order"

The following are excerpts from an address by External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall at a seminar on "Canada's Agenda for International Peace and Security" in Ottawa on February 8.

These discussions could not be more timely. Every day, the "New World Order" seems to fall further into disarray. Somalia and the Balkans are stark visual images that have already scarred our future memories of this decade. The return of murderous quarrels in Angola, India and Pakistan, the excuse of religious dogma for widespread, vicious attacks against other ethnic groups and women, and strife in parts of the former Soviet Union provide us with almost universal evidence of the incapacity of human beings to live up to the ideals of peace and harmony that they themselves have helped to establish.

The international community and its institutions were seemingly caught off guard by the rapid and widespread descent into instability that followed the end of the Cold War. No doubt, as the Berlin Wall was enthusiastically knocked to the ground, there were entrails to be read, portents of disintegration to come.

Was the international community not paying attention? Did it ignore warning signals that could have led us towards policies and actions of a different kind? Possi-

Canada's commitments to the United Nations, to multilateralism and to peacekeeping are not at issue. We will continue to be activists when it comes to peace and security, especially through the UN.

The real focus of this seminar must be a hard look at how we can best support the UN and other organizations in achieving and maintaining peace and security in the world.

We cannot ignore the rapid and profound changes that are taking place in the world, nor can we pretend that these changes do not have significant implications for Canada and the international community. For some 40 years the developed world concentrated its attention, its energy, its ingenuity, on managing superpower rivalry. The goal was to avert another world war and, in that respect, we were successful.

But the legacy of our efforts during the Cold War is mixed. It has left us with a number of serious problems, not the least of which are vast arsenals of strategic and conventional weapons. More positively, it has left us with sophisticated alliances and global crisis management systems — possibly somewhat too primitive — to address the new reality.

In recent years, some of the worst excesses of the Cold War era have been addressed. We have worked hard to make real progress on nuclear non-proliferation, arms control, verification and confidence-building.

The signings of the START agreement and the Chemical Weapons Convention offer glimmers of hope that we are headed in the right direction. But we have more — much more — to do, especially in light of the diversity and magnitude of the new challenges we face.

Today the international community is called upon to intervene in a multitude of localized or regional conflicts caused by ethnic and religious hostility, the re-emergence of virulent forms of nationalism, famine and the abuse of human rights.

It was with these new threats to international peace in mind that the UN Secretary-General put forward his *Agenda for Peace*. I have, at every available opportunity, including at the UN General Assem-



External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall

bly last year, expressed Canada's support for this report — the most comprehensive since the Charter — because I believe that it maps out creative and effective approaches to international peace and security.

I know that many of you are familiar with the *Agenda for Peace*, so I will not go into great detail about it tonight. However, I do think it is useful to recap briefly the distinct approaches the Secretary-General has outlined, if only to ensure that in our discussions we are all using the same vocabulary.

First, **peacekeeping** — something we are very familiar with in this country, thanks to Lester Pearson. Peacekeeping usually involves military and civilian operations that are carried out with the consent of the parties to a dispute. It may also include assistance to resolve the dispute, such as the missions in Angola and El Salvador. But even this basic definition has been expanded in recent initiatives — for example, with the provision of military escorts for humanitarian aid in the former Yugoslavia.

Second, **peacemaking**. Peacemaking involves diplomatic action, such as the London Conference on Yugoslavia, to prevent or resolve conflicts. Some people tend to

The increased risk of peace missions does not make them less necessary or less desirable.

bly, but I, for one, regard those brief few months of relaxed international tensions as a different kind of portent — a brief vision of what our world can be like if we truly accomplish what we thought we had achieved then: a new level of stability, harmony and hope.

The question the international community is wrestling with now in this period of volatility is, where do we go from here? And the situation Canada happily finds itself in is that our expressed perspective, our skills and our steadfastness to our own ideals may be what the world needs in the face of these dauntingly complex challenges.

As we begin our discussions here today and tomorrow, one thing should be clear:

confuse this with enforcement.

Enforcement is military action, such as the Gulf War and the operation in Somalia, to enforce an end to a conflict without the consent of the parties involved.

Next is **preventive diplomacy**, which is diplomatic action to prevent disputes from turning into conflicts, such as our recent efforts in Kosovo. Another example is South Africa, where Canadians are part of a joint Commonwealth/UN effort to build confidence and trust among domestic parties who are trying to build a new post-apartheid South Africa.

Finally, the *Agenda for Peace* talks about **peacebuilding**. This is post-conflict action to build and support structures that help to prevent a recurrence of violence or conflict.

In our discussions about these approaches and the role Canada should play, we must address a number of developments and issues that may restrict our abilities to contribute to the peace process, now and in the future.

For example, there is now an unprecedented number of UN missions for peace, and others are possible under the aegis of regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Another factor that must be kept in mind is that peace missions today are riskier than ever. The classic precondition of a complete ceasefire has given way to new political realities in complex situations such as the former Yugoslavia and Somalia.

In many situations, we just cannot wait any longer for the beginnings of political settlement before acting, nor can we allow ourselves to be held hostage by factions that see no advantage in peace. Intervening without being invited by all parties to a dispute has made the job of attaining peace riskier, both politically and militarily.

The fact that such intervention is riskier does not make it less necessary or less desirable. Sometimes we must act to put an end to morally reprehensible practices. In other cases we are trying to stop human rights abuses. At times we also may wish to prevent localized conflicts from engulfing other countries or regions. But, no matter what the motive is, when troops are sent uninvited into a territory, the chances for injury or even death increase.

I assure you — we approach this with

Canada to Withdraw from Cyprus

On December 11, External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall and then-Defence Minister Marcel Masse announced in a press release that Canada has decided to withdraw its peacekeeping contingent from the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in mid-1993. Canada has been serving in UNFICYP since 1964 and currently has over 500 troops involved, responsible for the critical Nicosia sector. Prior to Canada's 1992 contribution to peacekeeping in the former Yugoslav republics, Canada's largest peacekeeping force was in Cyprus. More than 30,000 Canadian Forces members have served on the island.

"Peacekeeping must never be considered as an end in itself or as a substitute for political leadership, honourable compromise and negotiation," said Mrs. McDougall. "Whether or not Canadian troops remain in Cyprus, it is the Greek and Turkish Cypriots who bear the ultimate responsibility for resolving the dispute."

"Canadian peacekeepers have made a long and successful contribution to keeping peace in Cyprus for 28 years. It is time for other nations to step in and do their part," said Mr. Masse. "Our soldiers will continue to use their expertise to advance the cause of peace elsewhere around the world."

Over the years, the government has carefully reviewed the situation in Cyprus and encouraged a permanent resolution to the conflict. Mrs. McDougall has held numerous consultations on the Cyprus issue with the UN Secretary-General, with the main parties to the conflict, and with the countries contributing troops to UNFICYP, including Britain, Denmark and Austria. Denmark announced in June 1992 that it would be withdrawing its peacekeeping contingent by year's end. Britain and Austria have announced plans to reduce their numbers of military personnel in Cyprus.

"In deciding to withdraw our troops, we are not saying that the United Nations should put an end to its peacekeeping mission in Cyprus," said Mrs. McDougall. "That is a matter for the Security Council, the Secretary-General and the parties involved to consider. We will continue to support the Secretary-General's ongoing efforts to find a peaceful, negotiated solution."

Canada will maintain its peacekeeping contingent in Cyprus through the next round of UN-sponsored negotiations. Canadian troops will be withdrawn in close consultation with the UN, beginning in June. The withdrawal is scheduled to be completed by September.



Canadian peacekeepers on duty in Cyprus.

Canadian Forces photo by Lt. K. Mair

Paying for the Peacekeepers

Canada's assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping have historically ranged from C \$4-15 million a year. By 1991-92, they had risen to C \$32 million and will be about C \$100 million in fiscal year 1992-93. The UN's overall budget for peacekeeping operations funded by assessments (as opposed to voluntary contributions) has risen from a historical figure of some US \$100 million per year to almost US \$3 billion. This compares to the UN regular budget of roughly US \$1 billion. Each time a new peacekeeping operation is mounted, Canada and other Member States are charged their assessed share of the costs of the operation, whether or not they participate directly by deploying personnel.

Voluntary funding presents dangers insofar as it is likely, over time, to erode the UN's financial base and weaken the commitment of Member States to the broad range of UN activities. In Canada's view, all peacekeeping, peacemaking and preventive diplomacy activities should be financed from assessed contributions.

no scales on our eyes and only after thorough analysis, particularly by our military.

Another very serious consideration, as we look at the future of peacekeeping, is cost. The price tag for Canada's assessed contributions to the UN has grown sharply from \$8 million to almost \$90 million annually — in other words, more than a ten-fold increase in a few short years.

Add to that the costs associated with maintaining several thousand troops in various missions abroad, as well as the costs, for example, of civilians acting as electoral observers and the costs of the RCMP in various peace operations, and the price tag is even higher...

Peacekeeping costs are like icebergs — the costs for soldiers and supplies are only the tip, while under the surface is a whole other range of costs. For example, even the most modest contribution of troops abroad must be backed up logistically and otherwise by resources at home.

Clearly, whether future peacekeeping missions are fully funded or not, our financial obligations are growing and will continue to grow. We are already bumping up against resource ceilings for our involvement in missions.

Our financial constraints force us to think hard about the reasons we are involved and the objectives we want to achieve. Other difficult questions also present themselves. Is there a payback to Canada for shouldering our fair burden — and more — of the costs of peace and security? Should there be? Does our involvement serve broader national interests? What are they?

These questions lead us into other areas that reflect the changing needs and require-

ments of each new peace mission — needs very much associated with the human dimension of each operation.

As the Prime Minister remarked at Harvard University in December, "There is a need to bolster the capacity of the United Nations to respond to humanitarian and political emergencies."

Fundamentally, we cannot lose sight of the fact that international initiatives to restore and maintain peace and stability must take into account and respond to the desperation and suffering of the individuals who find themselves trapped in an area of conflict.

Weapons cannot simply be replaced with other types of weapons, forces with other types of forces. The cycles of violence and hatred must be broken with new forms of intervention.

This will place increasing demands on the UN and other organizations and their members to reshape current systems for dealing with hostilities and crises. The United Nations is already under considerable pressure to adjust to these new realities — and we must work with the UN in making its organization and its systems more responsive.

There was a time when peace operations — whether they involved peacekeeping or enforcement — were essentially military operations. But when you consider expanded activities such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacebuilding, a much wider range of people, expertise and resources is required.

Consider for a moment the operation in Cambodia: in addition to soldiers, there is a need for legal experts, medical personnel, civil servants and other civilians. We can expect this demand for civilian agents for peace to grow.

Fortunately, in recent months, some of the traditional inhibitions that used to prevent other countries from participating have disappeared. An increasing number of permanent members of the UN Security



Canadian troops with the Unified Task Force in Somalia. The Somali operation, conducted by a non-UN multinational force in support of a UN resolution to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations, illustrates the changing nature of peace missions.

Canadian Forces photo

Council, many Third World countries, and other countries with constitutional restraints, such as Japan and Germany, are now more willing to play an active peacekeeping role. Russia and Ukraine both have troops that can and are being made available for peacekeeping. It will be important, as the participant base is broadened, to ensure the highest possible standards and uniformity of purpose.

These recent developments have important implications for the management of Canada's role in international peace and security. While holding firm to our commitment to the UN and other multi-lateral peace and security efforts, we must ask ourselves some direct questions and consider the available options for how best to adapt our commitment to the new realities.

For example, in light of the increasing number of countries willing and able to provide troops for peace missions, we might consider how to increase and improve our ability to provide planning, training, command and logistical support.

We could place greater emphasis on Canadian participation in the front end of operations — that is, in the planning phases — where expertise is needed by international organizations and where our involvement could be as effective but less resource-intensive.

We could also place a greater emphasis on training. Since we virtually invented peacekeeping, why not put our experience and expertise to good use, helping other countries who are new to the field?

We might also consider placing greater emphasis on our participation in preventive actions and preventive diplomacy. It was a report by Canadian Ambassador David Peel that led to the creation of a special CSCE mission to Kosovo.

The idea would be to focus our involvement increasingly on the knowledge and skill dimensions of peace and security activities.

No one suggests that it will be easy in a world where deeply-

felt hatreds dominate in many regions, and where democratic values are only superficially understood in others. And the international community may have to re-examine its traditional definitions of sovereignty in order to take preventive action where trouble is looming.

But we must get on with the task. The lives of millions of people around the globe rely on our abilities to find new ways to deal with old problems.

Canada has contributed human and financial resources to every peacekeeping mission since the founding of the UN. Can we continue to do so, taking into account our finite resources and the rapidly expanding demands? How do we reconcile our pride in our past involvement in peace and security, and our stake in the future of peace and security?...

Canada must consider how to adapt its traditional commitment to peacekeeping to the new realities.

Support for peace and security operations has been, and continues to be, a pillar of Canadian foreign policy. It has given us not only a distinctive role in the world, but also an influence in international relations that goes well beyond the normal reaches of a middle power...

Lester Pearson, in his Nobel Prize lecture in 1957, remarked quite pointedly that "the grim fact is that we prepare for war like giants and for peace like pygmies." I would like to think that we, as Canadians, at least have learned some lessons over the past 35 years. By discussing how we can best serve the cause of peace in the years to come, there is no guarantee that we may become "giants," but at least we can avoid the alternative. ■

Regional Peacekeeping: The CSCE

As the result of a Canadian initiative, the 1992 Helsinki Document, The Challenges of Change, makes provision for peacekeeping by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The relevant paragraphs are excerpted below.

Peacekeeping constitutes an important operational element of the overall capability of the CSCE for conflict prevention and crisis management intended to complement the political process of dispute resolution. CSCE peacekeeping activities may be undertaken in cases of conflict within or among participating States to help maintain peace and stability in support of an ongoing effort at a political solution.

A CSCE peacekeeping operation, according to its mandate, will involve civilian and/or military personnel, may range from small- to large-scale, and may assume a variety of forms, including observer and monitor missions and larger deployments of forces. Peacekeeping activities could be used, *inter alia*, to supervise and help maintain ceasefires, to monitor troop withdrawals, to support the maintenance of law and order, to provide humanitarian and medical aid, and to assist refugees.

CSCE peacekeeping will be undertaken with due regard to the

responsibilities of the United Nations in this field and will at all times be carried out in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The CSCE, in planning and carrying out peacekeeping operations, may draw upon the experience and expertise of the United Nations.

The Chairman-in-Office will keep the United Nations Security Council fully informed of CSCE peacekeeping activities.

The Council, or the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) acting as its agent, may conclude, because of the specific character of an operation and its envisaged size, that the matter should be referred by the participating States to the United Nations Security Council.

CSCE peacekeeping operations will not entail enforcement action.

Peacekeeping operations require the consent of the parties directly concerned.

Peacekeeping operations will be conducted impartially.

Peacekeeping operations cannot be considered a substitute for a negotiated settlement and therefore must be understood to be limited in time.

Requests to initiate peacekeeping operations by the CSCE may

be addressed by one or more participating States to the CSO through the Chairman-in-Office...

The CSO will exercise overall political control and guidance of a peacekeeping operation.

Decisions to initiate and dispatch peacekeeping operations will be taken by consensus by the Council or the CSO acting as its agent.

The Council/CSO will only take such decisions when all parties concerned have demonstrated their commitment to creating favourable conditions for the execution of the operation, *inter alia*, through a process of peaceful settlement and their willingness to cooperate. Before the decision to dispatch a mission is taken, the following conditions must be fulfilled:

- establishment of an effective and durable ceasefire;
- agreement on the necessary Memoranda of Understanding with the parties concerned; and
- provision of guarantees for the safety at all times of personnel involved...

All participating States are eligible to take part in CSCE peacekeeping operations... Participating States will be invited by the Chairman-in-Office of the CSO to contribute, on an individual basis, to an operation case-by-case...

Costs of CSCE peacekeeping activities will be borne by all CSCE participating States. At the beginning of each calendar year, the CSO will establish a reasonable ceiling for the cost of peacekeeping operations to which the CSCE scale of distribution will be applied. Beyond that limit, other special arrangements will be negotiated and agreed to by consensus...

The CSCE may benefit from resources and possible experience and expertise of existing organizations, such as the European Community, NATO and the Western European Union, and could therefore request them to make their resources available in order to support it in carrying out peacekeeping activities. Other institutions and mechanisms, including the peacekeeping mechanism of the Commonwealth of Independent States, may also be asked by the CSCE to support peacekeeping in the CSCE region.

Decisions by the CSCE to seek the support of any such organization will be made on a case-by-case basis, having allowed for prior consultations with the participating States which belong to the organization concerned. ■



Members of a CSCE mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina to inspect places of detention, with their ECMM escorts, on a police boat going around the front lines from Dubrovnik. Canadian representative Tom Boehm, of EAITC, is second from the left. The mission took place from August 29 to September 4, 1992.

Shaping a New Europe: The CSCE

The following is a summary of the conclusions of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Council meeting held in Stockholm December 14 to 15, 1992. External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall attended on behalf of Canada.

The Ministers consulted on a broad range of issues, in particular the aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, the crisis in parts of the former Yugoslavia, other regional crises and issues, together with the strategy and structure of the CSCE.

In the light of serious threats to peace and security in the CSCE area, the Ministers agreed to pursue a strategy of active diplomacy. They will provide the necessary resources.

The Ministers expressed their continuing commitment to use the CSCE to consolidate human rights, democracy, the rule of law and economic freedom as the foundation for peace, security and stability, and to prevent, manage and solve conflicts in the CSCE area.

The Ministers condemned the extended use of force in Europe, which has bred ever more violence and hatred. They strongly rejected continuing flagrant violations of human rights. They committed themselves to act to counter the growing manifestations of racism, anti-semitism and all forms of intolerance in the CSCE area.

Important aspects of the CSCE strategy include:

- strengthening the CSCE's operational capabilities through structural reforms and the appointment of a Secretary-General;
- emphasizing the CSCE's ability to provide early warning through the appointment of a High Commissioner on National Minorities who will enjoy the full political support of all participating States;
- active use of missions and representatives as part of preventive diplomacy to promote dialogue, stability and provide for early warning;
- enhancing opportunities for the peaceful settlement of disputes through the approval of a comprehensive set of measures to this end. The Ministers stressed their expectations that participating States will avail themselves increasingly of these mechanisms;

- effective use of missions and representatives in crisis areas as part of a strategy of consultation, negotiation and concerted action to limit conflicts before they become violent;
- cooperating, as appropriate, with international organizations and with individual participating States to ensure that the broad spectrum of CSCE mechanisms and procedures, including peace-keeping, can be applied;
- increased efforts at treating the root causes of conflicts by applying all aspects of the human dimension of the CSCE and by involving non-governmental organizations and individual citizens more directly in the work of the CSCE;
- making all governments accountable to each other for their behaviour towards their citizens and towards neighbouring states, and holding individuals personally accountable for war crimes and acts in violation of international humanitarian law;
- greater use of the Forum for Security Cooperation as a place for negotiation and dialogue that can ensure continued progress in reducing the risks of military conflict and enhancing stability in Europe; and
- an active program to help newly-admitted participating States to participate fully in the structures and work of the CSCE.

Editor's note: This last was the result of a Canadian initiative. ■

CFE Update

With few exceptions, provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe are being implemented successfully. Equipment destruction is taking place, albeit more slowly than expected, and meetings of the Joint Consultative Group are providing a valuable forum for discussing Treaty-related issues.

Participants have discovered that the arms reduction procedures and associated verification activities are more costly than initially anticipated, leading to some desire for changes. States burdened with high reduction liabilities have proposed revisions to Treaty-mandated destruction processes. These are being reviewed from the perspective of maintaining the standards of irreversibility and verifiability established by the Treaty.

Inspecting states have noted that a greater degree of coordination by all participants would also reduce costs. More attention to timely notification and scheduling of sequential destruction events is anticipated. Over 100 destruction events were scheduled in the first three months of the reduction phase, but more effort will be required to reach the goals established for the first full year of activity.

The increased level of cooperation between States Parties engendered by the CFE process was shown in late January at a NATO-hosted seminar in Brussels. Participants welcomed NATO offers concerning participation by all states in CFE inspector-training courses, and in forming joint inspection teams. Preliminary discussions were also held on the possibility of opening up NATO's CFE database to use by all CFE signatories.

Canada Trains South Korean Inspectors

Eleven senior South Korean military officials were in Ottawa from December 14 to 18 to learn about conventional forces inspection techniques. The verification training seminar, conducted by officials of the

Department of National Defence, EAITC, and Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, was designed to assist South Korean efforts to reduce arms and build confidence on the Korean peninsula.

"For many years now, Canada has specialized in the field of verification techniques," said External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall when announcing the seminar. "As part of the government's efforts to prevent excessive conventional arms build-ups worldwide, I am pleased that we can share this information with our Korean colleagues."

Canada has been strongly supportive of the two Koreas' attempts to improve their mutual relations. In December 1991, North and South Korea signed an "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation," which provides, among other things, for steps to build confidence and reduce arms, with appropriate verification. The two have made some progress in implementing the agreement, but significant difficulties remain.

The Ottawa seminar, which was arranged at the request of the South Korean



Korean participants with their Canadian hosts during the Conventional Forces Inspectors Training Seminar, held in Ottawa in December 1992.

government, provided an opportunity for Canada to pass along the lessons learned from its experience in verifying conventional arms control agreements. Department of National Defence staff have conducted inspections in six countries under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and three under the CSCE Vienna Document on confidence- and security-building measures. They have participated in approximately 60 trial inspections with Canada's allies.

The seminar complemented a growing bilateral defence relationship between Canada and South Korea. In June 1992, EAITC officials participated in a verification workshop in Seoul. In September, the Korean National Defense College visited Canada, followed by Korean Minister of Defense Choi Sae-Chong in October, the first visit to the other by a defence minister of either country. South Korea has been actively involved in the non-governmental track of Canada's cooperative security dialogue initiative in the North Pacific. Canada expects the December seminar to lead to further practical cooperation in security and related fields, including other aspects of arms control as well as peacekeeping.

In March 1992, Canada hosted a similar five-day verification workshop for representatives of countries of the former Soviet Union. That seminar, conducted in cooperation with the Netherlands and with the assistance of NATO, focused on verification requirements of the CFE Treaty. ■

First Committee Meets Canadian Goals

The First Committee of the 47th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 47), held in the fall of 1992, was a general success. As at UNGA 46, delegations continued to break down the ideological divide that had stymied past sessions, and to pursue a more pragmatic approach. For the first time, the Committee adopted over 60 percent of its resolutions by consensus. Canada achieved all of its objectives, with the related resolutions passed either by consensus or by a strong majority vote.

The Canadian delegation, led by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason, entered the session with six main goals.

CWC

Canada aimed to promote a resolution calling on UNGA to adopt the draft Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to set an early date for its signature. There was some concern that countries would continue to pursue CWC negotiating objectives through modifications to the resolution text and that others might try to incorporate a higher national or group profile. Canada, along with Germany and Poland, successfully led the campaign to ensure that the Committee passed by consensus — with a record 144 co-sponsors — a resolution endorsing the Convention and specifying a January 1993 signing date.

NPT

Working with others, Canada hoped to ensure a smooth launch of the process leading to an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at the Treaty's Fifth Review Conference in 1995. The First Committee passed a resolution mandating the formation of a Review Conference Preparatory Committee, which will hold its first meeting in New York from May 10 to 14. One hundred and thirty-three countries voted in favour of the resolution, no country opposed it, and only Cuba and India abstained. In the subsequent General Assembly vote, the "yes" count increased to 168, although India afterwards requested that its vote, mistakenly cast as "yes," be changed to an abstention.

Transparency in Armaments

Canada wanted to follow up on the UNGA 46 establishment of a UN arms register, which is a key component of Canada's action plan to prevent excessive build-ups of conventional arms. At UNGA 47, the Canadian delegation campaigned in favour of a resolution endorsing the report of a panel of experts, which specifies procedures for the register's operation (see *Disarmament Bulletin* 19 for details). This will enable 1992 reports to be submitted on schedule, by April 30, 1993. The resolution was adopted by consensus.

Verification

Canada took the lead in drafting a resolution that called, in effect, for an update of the Canadian-initiated 1990 UN study of the UN role in verification. The aim was to take account of lessons learned from the experience of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), and to consider how verification could facilitate UN activities with respect to preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. The resolution met with some opposition from countries that, *inter alia*, questioned the usefulness of studying the UNSCOM experience at this stage. Canada crafted an amended resolution that delays the proposed study while Member States' views are solicited. The amended resolution passed by consensus.

Canada Pays 1993 UN Contribution

On December 31, 1992, External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall announced that Canada has paid its annual assessed contributions to the 1993 Regular Budget of the United Nations and of the major UN specialized agencies.

"By making payment before the end of the year," said Mrs. McDougall, "Canada wishes to show our support for the essential work of the United Nations in international peace and security, humanitarian assistance, and furthering human rights and development throughout the world. Payment of UN dues in full and on time is a treaty obligation, and Canada calls upon all Member States to meet their obligations in a timely fashion." The Minister stressed that the UN continues to face a serious financial crisis that threatens its ability to carry out the new tasks that it is regularly asked to take on, particularly in the field of peacekeeping.

Canada's assessed contribution to the UN's Regular Budget for 1993 stands at 3.11 percent, or US \$31,743,607. Canada has also paid its 1993 assessed contributions to the major UN specialized agencies, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In addition to its contribution to the UN's Regular Budget, Canada pays assessed contributions of about US \$80 million a year to 10 UN peacekeeping operations.

CTBT

The conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) is a long-standing Canadian objective and Canada aimed, at UNGA 47, to generate further support for this objective, buoyed by the French, Russian and US testing moratoria. The CTBT resolution was adopted by a vote of 159 in favour, one opposed (US) and four abstentions (China, France, Israel, UK). This exceeds the favourable margin achieved at UNGA 46, where the vote was 147 in favour, two opposed (France, US) and four abstentions (China, Israel, Micronesia, UK).

Cut-off

Canada introduced its traditional resolution calling for the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In light of the recent (and prospective) large-scale dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the US decision to unilaterally cease production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, Canada hoped for even broader support than in the past for this

resolution. In the event, the vote was 164 in favour, none opposed, and three abstentions (India, UK, US). France later requested that its "yes" vote be changed to an abstention. This compares favourably to the UNGA 46 tally of 152 in favour, two opposed (France, US) and three abstentions (China, India, UK).

In addition to taking the lead or acting as an original co-sponsor on several important resolutions, including the above, Canada was instrumental in brokering the deal that enabled the UN Disarmament Commission resolution to pass by consensus and played a key role in launching the process of UN arms control and disarmament reform.

With the end of the Cold War, the major powers appear less interested in entering into multilateral arms control negotiations resulting in legal commitments. Instead, they seem to favour unilateral undertakings at a political level. Canada, among others, believes that multilateral institutions provide a more stable environment in which to achieve security. The changing UN role in international security — and unease among some non-aligned

delegations about the growing influence of the Security Council — underlay First Committee deliberations and had the positive effect of making delegations focus and cooperate on ways of dealing with the reform process.

During UNGA 47, Canada also successfully chaired both the Barton Group and the newly-constituted Group of Democratically Oriented States (GODOS). This last, like the Barton Group, provides a forum for consultation on resolutions. GODOS has a broadly-based membership that cuts across traditional East-West and North-South dividing lines.

The First Committee will reconvene from March 8 to 12 in New York for a special session with the purpose of reassessing the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery. Member States will examine the respective roles of the First Committee, the UN Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, and will look at ways to enhance the efficiency of these bodies. The aim is to reach agreement on recommendations for action. ■

Reassessing the UN Disarmament Machinery

In a decision adopted by the General Assembly at UNGA 47, Member States were asked to provide their views on UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's report entitled "New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era." Below are excerpts from Canada's official response, focusing on the roles and functioning of the UN disarmament machinery. See Disarmament Bulletin 19 for further Canadian reaction to the Secretary-General's report.

We strongly agree with the Secretary-General that the time is ripe for a thorough reassessment of the UN disarmament machinery in order to ensure that it is able to meet new realities. A useful starting-point is to recall the main functions of each of the three multilateral arms control and disarmament (ACD) bodies — the First Committee, the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) — then to identify problems in the effective carrying out of these roles, and finally to identify practical means of responding to these problems.

The First Committee

In Canada's view, the role of the First Committee — a global, deliberative body — is to identify priorities on the multilateral ACD agenda and to build support and momentum as an essential first step in the broader process of international norm-building as it relates to arms control and disarmament. This process not only contributes to the identification and promotion of broad principles, but increasingly — as the arms register so graphically demonstrates — focuses on concrete steps that the international community can take towards the achievement of these broad goals or norms.

The First Committee continues to provide a useful framework for the UN membership to elaborate and clarify positions on a variety of ACD issues. Rationalization of the First Committee's work is progressing by, for example, combining the debate on disarmament and international security items. We should now take the logical next step of combining action on these two sets of items. Only then will we

have fully integrated our consideration of means — ACD measures — with our desired end — the maintenance of international peace and security.

We need to accelerate the task of rationalization, of setting concrete and practical priorities, and of ensuring fewer resolutions and more genuine dialogue. Now that East-West polarization is over, there is the possibility for greater functional cooperation on specific issues among delegations from differing groups and perspectives...

The UNDC

The UNDC's primary role is to allow focused discussion of a limited agenda without the pressure of voting on resolutions. Its function encompasses conceptual discussion, consensus-building with respect to arms control and international security-related issues (e.g., transfer of technology), as well as the identification of global and regional measures for negotiation elsewhere. The UNDC also prepares *(continued on p. 17)*

Resolutions on Arms Control and Disarmament and International Security Adopted at UNGA 47

Resolutions Supported by Canada

RESOLUTION NUMBER (Lead sponsor)	RESOLUTION	VOTE Yes-No-Abstain
*47/39 (Germany)	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction	Consensus
*47/44 (Germany)	The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields	Consensus
*47/45 (Canada)	Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification	Consensus
*47/47 (Mexico)	Comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty	159-1-1
47/48 (Egypt)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	Consensus
47/49 (Pakistan)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	144-3-1
47/50 (Pakistan)	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	162-0-1
*47/51 (Venezuela)	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	164-0-1
47/52A (Peru)	Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: 1995 Conference and its Preparatory Committee	168-0-1
*47/52B (Russia)	Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons	Consensus
*47/52C (Canada)	Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes	164-0-1
47/52D (Kenya)	Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes	Consensus
*47/52E (Australia)	Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques	Consensus
47/52F (Indonesia)	Relationship between disarmament and development	Consensus
*47/52G (Peru)	Regional disarmament	Consensus
47/52H (Russia)	Study on defensive security concepts and policies	Consensus
*47/52I (UK)	Confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe	Consensus
*47/52J (Pakistan)	Regional disarmament	168-0-1
*47/52K (Indonesia)	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	Consensus
*47/52L (Netherlands)	Transparency in armaments	Consensus
*47/53A (Nigeria)	United Nations Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Program	Consensus
*47/53B (Singapore)	Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia	Consensus
47/53D (Mexico)	World Disarmament Campaign	Consensus
47/53F (Cameroon)	Regional confidence-building measures	159-1-1
*47/54A (Canada)	Report of the Disarmament Commission	Consensus
47/54B (UK)	Guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters	Consensus
*47/54C (Mongolia)	Disarmament Week	Consensus
*47/54D (UK)	Implementation of the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures	Consensus
47/54E (Belgium)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	Consensus
*47/54F (France)	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research	166-0-1
47/56 (Sweden)	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects	Consensus
47/58 (Malta)	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region	Consensus

*Resolution co-sponsored by Canada

RESOLUTION NUMBER Lead sponsor)	RESOLUTION	VOTE Yes-No-Abstain
47/60B (Russia)	Maintenance of international security	79-0-84
47/61 (Mexico)	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	Consensus
47/76 (Kenya)	Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa	Consensus

Decisions

(Colombia)	International arms transfers	Consensus
I (Peru)	Conventional disarmament on a regional scale	Consensus
II (Togo)	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean	Consensus
V	Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session	Consensus

Resolutions Opposed by Canada

47/53C (India)	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	126-21-21
47/53E (Mexico)	Nuclear arms freeze	121-19-27

Resolutions on which Canada Abstained

47/43 (India)	Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security	128-3-30
47/46 (Mexico)	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water	118-2-41
47/55 (Qatar)	Israeli nuclear armament	64-3-90
47/59 (Indonesia)	Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	129-3-35
47/60A (Indonesia)	Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security	122-1-43

A resolution on the "Question of Antarctica" (47/57) was also adopted by a vote of 96-1-9. Canada, along with 61 other countries, did not participate in the vote.

*Resolution co-sponsored by Canada

Reassessing the UN Disarmament Machinery (continued from p. 15)

the groundwork for the CD through the development of principles as well as by providing, at least potentially, a degree of focus for the CD agenda.

We believe that a mechanism is required to provide a greater degree of linkage between the UNDC and the CD in order for UNDC deliberations to become more relevant and results-oriented... In the longer term, when membership of the two bodies is more similar, the merging of the two may be feasible, especially if cost factors can be overcome. Greater linkage between the UNDC and the CD will, however, be problematic as long as membership of the CD remains restricted and UNDC membership universal.

Within the UN, the reform process in the UNDC is most advanced. For example, we are well on the way to achieving a

rolling, three-item agenda which, on the one hand, ensures a degree of predictability while, on the other, allows us to incorporate contemporary issues in a timely manner.

Beyond this, the UNDC is at the stage where it has too much time to engage in general debate but — without more advance preparation by delegations — too little time for in-depth dialogue on complex issues in which there exist some rather fundamental differences of view. In order for the Disarmament Commission to live up to its full potential, every effort must be made to circulate focused working papers — preferably reflecting joint efforts of a number of countries spanning differences of view — in *advance* of the session so delegations come prepared for in-depth dialogue.

The CD

The primary role of the Conference on Disarmament is to negotiate global arms control and disarmament instruments. The CD can also usefully conduct pre-negotiation discussions, as it currently does on a nuclear test ban and outer space. Conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention has, however, temporarily exhausted a meaningful agenda for that body. Negotiation in the CD of a treaty to eliminate all nuclear testing in all environments for all time remains a priority objective. There should be strong verification provisions building on the work of the Group of Scientific Experts to establish global monitoring mechanisms.

CD procedures and membership are closely linked but subsidiary to its substantive negotiating agenda. We have recog-

nized for some time that the current CD membership, and possibly the CD itself, no longer reflect the changing international security environment. We are in favour of broadening CD membership to admit those states that have formally applied.

We also hope that the CD can energize movement on the issue of transparency in armaments. We hope that the current session of the CD will provide productive debate on this issue as well as with respect to radiological weapons and outer space.

The Secretary-General suggested in his report that the CD take on the role of a permanent review and supervisory body for some existing multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements. Canada has reservations about the notion of having the CD take on such a role. The focus of the CD should not be diverted away from being the sole body in the United Nations with the authority to negotiate global arms control agreements.

Conclusion

The three multilateral ACD bodies have distinct, yet complementary and inter-related, functions. In Canada's view, the resumed session [of the *First Committee, March 8 to 12*] therefore offers a unique opportunity to:

- (1) reaffirm the distinctive roles of each of the three multilateral ACD bodies and of the Office for Disarmament Affairs as the "focal point" for multilateral ACD activity;
- (2) provide additional impetus to the ongoing work of rationalization of the three ACD bodies; and
- (3) provide for focused consideration of practical ways to enhance the effective interaction of these bodies...

We agree with the Secretary-General's assertion that...the process of conflict resolution must be supported by concrete arms control and disarmament measures.

Beyond this, is the need to liberate the term "arms control and disarmament" from its Cold War preoccupation with numbers of weapons. As important as this is, arms control and disarmament is now seen both to embrace and to constitute part of a far broader process of confidence-building, of transparency, of accountability and, most importantly, of promoting less reliance on weapons and more reliance on genuinely cooperative mechanisms for creating and enhancing international peace and security. ■

Focus: On Peacekeeping

Focus is written primarily for secondary school students.

The end of the Cold War has led to an increase in demand for international peacekeepers. The number of United Nations peacekeeping operations launched in the last four years is as great as the total number launched in the previous 40. Almost every evening, television screens are filled with pictures of peacekeepers at work in Yugoslavia, Cambodia or elsewhere. This recent recognition of the importance of peacekeeping is no surprise to Canadians, who have been strong supporters of the concept since its beginning. But the nature of peacekeeping is changing, raising new questions for Canada and the international community.

The Origins of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is not mentioned in the UN Charter. The founders of the UN thought that maintaining international peace and security would be the task of the great powers in the Security Council, using their military forces as well as those of other UN members. However, this arrangement depended on agreement among the great powers, which soon became impossible because of East-West tension.

Between 1945 and 1956, the UN created a number of truce supervisory groups, including in the Middle East and in Kashmir, on which Canadians served. The first UN peacekeeping force was established in November 1956 during the Suez crisis. When fighting broke out between Israel, Britain and France on the one side and Egypt on the other, the Security Council was deadlocked. Canada's External Affairs Minister, Lester Pearson, proposed the formation of a UN force to separate the fighting parties and maintain peace in the area until a political settlement could be reached. The General Assembly approved his suggestion and the UN Secretary-General appointed a Canadian, Major-General E.L.M. Burns, to head the new UN Emergency Force (UNEF).

Canada contributed to UNEF until the force was removed at Egypt's request in 1967. Mr. Pearson, who later became Canada's prime minister, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his role in the Suez crisis.

Traditional Peacekeeping

Since the birth of UNEF, peacekeeping has been used to reduce tensions in more than 20 conflicts around the globe. It has played a particularly important role in the Middle East, the Belgian Congo (now Zaire) and Cyprus. In general, a peacekeeping operation is characterized by the following:

- a multinational force, under UN command, loaned by countries not involved in the dispute and thus seen as impartial. Typical providers of peacekeeping forces include Australia, Austria, Canada, Ireland, Norway, Poland and Finland;
- advance consent of all the fighting parties. It may seem surprising that hostile countries and factions would ask for or agree to UN intervention. In practice, though, peacekeeping has often provided parties with a face-saving alternative to continued fighting;
- arrival of peacekeepers only *after* a ceasefire has been achieved; and
- no use of force, except in self-defence. UN peacekeeping forces are only lightly armed. They are allowed to use force only if they are attacked or if armed persons try to stop them from carrying out their orders.

When a UN Member State, a group of states or the Secretary-General proposes establishment of a peacekeeping operation, three basic conditions must be met. First, the parties to the conflict must be agreeable to the idea. Second, the proposal must enjoy broad international support; specifically, it must be adopted by the Security Council. This means that at least nine of the 15 Security Council members must vote in favour of the proposal, and that none of the five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) vote against it. Third, Member States must be ready to volunteer the troops needed.

Once these conditions are met, the Secretary-General makes the arrangements to establish the force. This involves choosing a force commander and asking Member States to provide troops, supplies and equipment, transportation and logistical support. The Security Council must approve these arrangements.

Soldiers involved in a UN peacekeep-

ing mission wear UN blue berets or blue helmets with the uniforms of their own countries. They serve under the operational command of their commanding officer (who takes orders from the Secretary-General) but they remain under the commands of their own countries in matters of pay, discipline and promotion.

The aim of a peacekeeping force is to maintain a ceasefire and prevent a resumption of fighting so that the warring parties can try to work out a settlement to their dispute. Peacekeeping is not an end in itself, but must be part of a wider political process to bring a conflict to an end.

Peacekeepers can do many things. They may be assigned to observe a situation and report on it to the Secretary-General. They may be asked to investigate ceasefire violations or to supervise troop withdrawals. They are also used to patrol buffer zones. In addition, peacekeepers often provide emergency medical services, assist in the resettlement of refugees, and work to restore normal civilian activities in war-torn areas.

Peacekeepers can prevent fighting from breaking out by blocking the movement of troops and arms, and by reminding fighting parties that the eyes of the world are upon them. However, for peacekeeping to work well, there must be a peace to be kept and the peacekeepers' role must be clearly understood and welcomed by the local parties. If local support is lacking, peacekeepers can find their freedom of movement and use of technologies tightly constrained. Moreover, if not all armed groups are supportive of the UN presence, the peacekeepers may wind up in situations where they are under fire and cannot do their job.

The UN is not the only operator of peacekeeping forces. Regional bodies, including the League of Arab States, the Organization of African Unity, the Organization of American States, and the European Community, have also launched peacekeeping missions, though on a much smaller scale than the UN.

Canada and Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is a particularly Canadian contribution to the UN. In addition to proposing the first organized peacekeeping force, Canada is the only country to have participated in all of the UN peacekeeping operations (see pp. 6-7 for a list). More than 87,000 Canadians have served

abroad in UN operations, and more than 80 have died while on peacekeeping duty. Canadian troops have also participated in peacekeeping and observer operations outside the UN. Because it is detached from most disputes in a way that major powers cannot be, Canada is viewed as an objective participant. It also has the diplomatic, economic and military resources to make a significant contribution to peacekeeping missions.

Canadian troops have developed a reputation as being among the world's best peacekeepers. They are needed for their technical skills as engineers, logisticians, communicators, commanders and staff planners. They are also wanted for their combat skills in riskier operations.

Each request for a Canadian contribution to peacekeeping is considered on its own merits. Canada's decision on whether or not to participate is based on the following guidelines:

- there must be a threat to international peace and security, as determined by the Security Council;
- the main parties in the dispute must agree to the peacekeeping mission and to Canada's participation;
- the operation should be linked to an agreement by the parties to work towards a political settlement;
- the operation must be accountable to a political authority, such as the Security Council;
- the operation must have a clear and realistic mandate; and
- the operation must have sufficient funding and logistical support.

Peacekeeping's Future

The end of the Cold War has made possible an end to fighting in many regional conflicts (e.g., in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Central America) leading to a demand for peacekeepers. It has also allowed the emergence of conflict in previously tightly controlled areas (e.g., Yugoslavia), further spurring the demand for peacekeepers. Most importantly, the end of the Cold War has made Security Council agreement on UN intervention more likely.

As the UN becomes more involved in maintaining global peace and security, peacekeeping is taking on new forms. Peacekeeping missions today have broader roles, more players and more clearly defined mandates than peacekeeping operations in the past. Whereas

peacekeeping traditionally aimed mainly at containing conflict, peacekeeping is now part of a range of conflict-resolution activities that often blur into each other. In addition to peacekeeping, these include:

- preventive diplomacy, or activities designed to prevent disputes from arising in the first place, to keep them from worsening or to keep them from spreading. Examples include fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections and monitoring;
- peacemaking, or activities designed to bring hostile groups to agreement peacefully. Examples include the provision of good offices, negotiation, mediation and arbitration;
- enforcement, or military activities designed to make states comply with a Security Council resolution; and
- peacebuilding, or activities — once the conflict has ended — designed to strengthen peace and prevent conflict from starting again.

Recent peacekeeping operations are much more complex than earlier ones. Peacekeeping missions today contain not only the traditional military forces, but also police, electoral officials, human rights officials and other civilians. Peacekeepers are increasingly being used to monitor human rights, organize elections, resettle refugees, supervise disarmament and rebuild economies.

In Namibia in 1989, the UN operation not only monitored a truce but also undertook a wide range of military, political, humanitarian, economic and social functions. The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (UNOSAL) is playing a major role in restructuring El Salvador's police and in monitoring human rights violations. In Cambodia, the UN peacekeeping force is providing a transitional government. Protection of humanitarian relief operations was a new task for UN troops in northern Iraq, and is the main mission of the (non-UN) multinational force in Somalia.

There is a growing belief that the UN should be more willing to intervene in conflict situations, particularly where there is a clear need for humanitarian assistance. As things now stand, however, the UN can hardly cope with existing peacekeeping demands, let alone consider new ones. Although it is an increasingly frequent and important UN function, peacekeeping is still handled as if it were a rare emergency activity. The UN staff for overseeing peacekeeping operations is small, scat-

tered in many locations, and overworked. As well, peacekeeping does not receive enough funding. Many Member States do not pay a fair share of peacekeeping expenses, pay late or do not pay at all.

The UN Secretary-General has prepared a report called *An Agenda for Peace* that looks at ways to strengthen the UN capacity for preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping. Some of his recommendations include allowing the UN to intervene in situations that would in the past have been looked on as being a state's internal affairs. As well, he proposes that well-armed "peace enforcement units" should be at the disposal of the UN, able to deploy to trouble spots in 48 hours or less.

As one of peacekeeping's "old hands" and major contributors, Canada will have much influence in the debate on the future direction of peacekeeping. Already Canada has made clear that the peacekeeping tradition should be enlarged to protect people as well as states, as proposed by the Secretary-General. Canada has also called on all UN members to pay their peacekeeping bills promptly. Canada will continue to make a strong contribution to international security through peacekeeping, a contribution that includes people, equipment, experience and ideas.



Canadian Forces Master Corporal Hugh Mackenzie takes down the name of a Serbian from whom soldiers confiscated a C-79 automatic weapon while on peacekeeping patrol in the UN Protected Area. As part of the UNPROFOR mandate to demilitarize the area, locals are not allowed to carry automatic weapons. Canadian Forces photo by Sergeant Margaret R.

Forecast

Arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, April through July 1993.

Ongoing: CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Vienna

Ongoing: CFE Joint Consultative Group, Vienna

Ongoing: Open Skies Consultative Commission, Vienna

April: Middle East Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, Washington

April 19-23: CWC Preparatory Committee, The Hague

April 19 - May 10: UN Disarmament Commission, New York

May 10-14: NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee, New York

May 10 - June 25: CD in session, Geneva

July 10 - September 2: CD in session, Geneva

Acronyms

ACD — arms control and disarmament

CD — Conference on Disarmament

CFE — Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CSO — (CSCE) Committee of Senior Officials

CTBT — comprehensive test ban treaty

CW — chemical weapons

CWC — Chemical Weapons Convention

EAITC — External Affairs and International Trade Canada

ECMM — European Community Monitoring Mission (Yugoslavia)

GODOS — Group of Democratically Oriented States

NPT — Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OAS — Organization of American States

RCMP — Royal Canadian Mounted Police

START — Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

UNDC — UN Disarmament Commission

UNEF — UN Emergency Force (Middle

East)

UNFICYP — UN Force in Cyprus

UNGA — UN General Assembly

UNOSAL — UN Observer Mission in El Salvador

UNPROFOR — UN Protection Force (Yugoslavia)

UNSCOM — UN Special Commission (on Iraq)

For additional peacekeeping mission acronyms, see pp. 6-7.

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A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities



Number 21 - Summer 1993

Canada Deplores North Korea's Withdrawal from NPT



Canada has expressed grave concern about North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). "By withdrawing from the NPT, North Korea is isolating itself from the international system put in place to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons," said External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall on March 12, the date North Korea deposited its notice of withdrawal with the UN Security Council. "Canada rejects as clearly ridiculous the North Korean government's rationale that the move is a measure against aggressive American military manoeuvres. I call upon North Korea to rescind this retrograde move."

The withdrawal will take effect June 12. In the meantime, North Korea remains subject to the NPT and to its associated safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Prior to its decision, North Korea had resisted the IAEA's efforts to conduct a "special inspection" of two suspected, but undeclared, nuclear facilities, as provided for under its safeguards agreement with the Agency.

On March 31, the IAEA Board of Governors met and passed a resolution — co-sponsored by Canada — finding North Korea in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement and referring the matter to the UN Security Council.

International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors at work. North Korea's unwillingness to submit two suspected, but undeclared, nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection has prompted it to withdraw from the NPT.

IAEA photo

Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Progress and Prospects

One year ago, in a speech at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore (May 21, 1992), Prime Minister Brian Mulroney called for stronger international efforts to stop nuclear proliferation and outlined an agenda for action. This issue of the *Bulletin* looks at the progress made and the prospects for future action in a number of areas identified by the Prime Minister, including IAEA safeguards reform, preparations for the NPT Extension Conference, cuts in existing nuclear arsenals, controls on ballistic missile technology, a nuclear test ban and regional security cooperation.

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Twenty-eight countries voted in favour of the resolution. Two (China and Libya) voted against and four (India, Pakistan, Vietnam and Syria) abstained.

On April 6, the depositary powers of the NPT (the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia) issued a joint statement urging North Korea to reconsider its withdrawal and to comply fully with its Treaty commitments and safeguards obligations. Mrs. McDougall expressed Canada's full support for the statement. "The NPT is a cornerstone of international security," she said. "It is entirely in North Korea's interest to remain as a member. Withdrawal from the NPT and refusal to permit international inspections will jeopardize stability in the Korean peninsula and in the entire region. If Pyongyang is truly interested in good international relations — as it claims — this is the wrong way to go about it."

Some 156 countries are parties to the NPT. North Korea is the only party to have withdrawn in the Treaty's 25-year history.

Briefly Noted

CWC Implementation

Preparations for the establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) continue, with a plenary meeting of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Preparatory Commission in the Hague from April 19 to 23. The OPCW will oversee the destruction of all chemical warfare agents, precursors, munitions, stockpiles and most production facilities according to the terms of the CWC. The CWC was opened for signature in Paris on January 13. To date, some 140 countries, including Canada, have become signatories and two have ratified. The Convention will enter into force 180 days after it has been ratified by at least 65 countries, but no earlier than January 13, 1995.

Report to UN Arms Register

Canada submitted its first report to the UN arms register, covering calendar year 1992, by the April 30 deadline. The register requests information about exports and imports of seven major conventional weapons systems, namely main battle

tanks, fighter aircraft, warships, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, attack helicopters, and missiles and missile launchers. In addition to providing information about transfers, Canada submitted a report on its holdings of these seven categories. Canada is a strong advocate of the register's early expansion to include military holdings and procurement through national production. The register was established as a result of a Canadian-sponsored resolution at the fall 1991 UN General Assembly.

Canada Funds Nuclear Safety

With a contribution of \$7.5 million, Canada is one of the first countries to fund the newly-created Nuclear Safety Account of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The multilateral fund is an initiative of the G7 aimed at improving the safety of nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe. The funding is provided under the ongoing \$30 million Canadian Nuclear Safety Initiative.

Middle East Arms Control

The Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group of the Middle East peace process will meet in Washington from May 18 to 20 after an eight-month hiatus. The Working Group will continue its discussion of arms control and confidence-building proposals and concepts as they pertain to the Middle East. The Canadian delegation will outline Canada's experience in the arms control field and encourage the states of the region to identify and pursue those concepts most applicable to their security needs.

START Stalled

At their summit meeting in Vancouver on April 3 and 4, US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed to direct efforts towards the entry into force of START I and the ratification of START II as soon as possible. START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) I, which was signed July 30, 1991 between the US and the USSR, limits each party to a maximum of 1,600 long-range nuclear launchers and 6,000 "accountable" warheads. START II, signed by the US and

Russia on January 3, 1993, calls for further reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals, to a level of between 3,000 and 3,500 warheads each by the year 2003. This represents a cut of roughly 70 per cent from current levels. START II's entry into force is dependent on that of START I.

In May 1992, in a document called the Lisbon Protocol, the four former Soviet republics that retain strategic nuclear weapons — Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia — became parties to START I in place of the USSR. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine also committed themselves to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon states "in the shortest possible time." Since then, Belarus has voted to ratify START I and to accede to the NPT, Kazakhstan has ratified START I but has not yet acted on the NPT, and Ukraine has begun legislative debate on the two treaties but has not ratified or acceded to either. Russia has ratified START I. It has said, though, that the Treaty cannot enter into force until the other three former republics fulfil all of their Lisbon obligations.

The US ratified START I in October 1992. It has offered substantial financial and technical assistance towards easing the other parties' dismantlement and destruction burdens and has indicated that it is prepared to offer Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine certain security assurances. Ukraine, in particular, has expressed concern about the costs of nuclear disarmament and about its future security vis-à-vis Russia.

Canada, which welcomed the signing of both START I and START II, has emphasized that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine must abide by their Lisbon Protocol commitments. Canada fully accepts the security and economic concerns of Ukraine, but does not accept any effort to use those concerns to postpone indefinitely or to preclude Ukraine confirming its non-nuclear-weapon state status.

Canada has repeatedly and at the highest levels advised the Ukrainian authorities that the full development of friendly relations between our two countries will depend on Ukraine fulfilling its nuclear weapon commitments.

In a speech in Moscow on February 4 to the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry, External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall observed that Rus-

ia could ease the process by responding to the legitimate security concerns of its neighbours. "Confidence-building is a co-operative effort, requiring a sustained commitment by all four nuclear successor states," said Mrs. McDougall.

She indicated that Canada would be prepared to join an international program to assist the countries of the former Soviet Union in destroying their nuclear weapons. Canada has explored and wishes to continue to examine areas where it can assist with the implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and nuclear safety.

Mrs. McDougall also called on the nuclear-weapon states — which include China, France and the UK as well as the US and Russia — to go beyond "build-down" and provide non-nuclear-weapon states with security guarantees in addition to those implicit in the NPT.

Study on Verifying Non-Proliferation

The current restructuring of the international system has had significant effects on verification. As old threats melt away and new security concerns emerge, the process of verifying arms control obligations will have to be increasingly flexible, responsive and cost-effective. While many studies have evaluated specific verification techniques, procedures or agencies, relatively little has been written about the synergies among these processes — that is, about the ways in which operations and data from several sources can combine to produce a result that goes beyond what could be achieved by each of the inputs alone.

EAITC's Verification Research Program recently invited four distinguished scholars to explore the synergistic effects among various methods and approaches to verification. Their report — "Constraining Proliferation: The Role of Verification Synergies" — has been published as the fifth major study in EAITC's *Arms Control Verification Studies* series and is being distributed to libraries and research institutes in Canada and abroad. In addition to evaluating past verification synergies, the authors identify how such effects could be harmonized to enhance verification, particularly in the context of curbs on proliferation. Their report is unique and comprehensive, breaking new conceptual and practical ground. It is also timely in view of the priority assigned by governments, including Canada's, to efforts to deal with proliferation.

Preparing for the NPT Extension Conference

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the centrepiece of global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the five declared nuclear-weapon states (the US, Russia, the UK, France and China). Article X mandates that 25 years after the NPT's entry into force, a conference must be held to decide "whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods." As the NPT entered into force in 1970, the decision will be taken in 1995.

Given its importance to the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference is already the subject of much national and international attention. A UN General Assembly resolution in the fall of 1992 mandated the formation of a Preparatory Committee for the Conference, open to all NPT parties, with its first meeting to be held in New York from May 10 to 14.

For Canada, the overriding objectives are indefinite extension of the NPT in unaltered form and universal accession to the Treaty. In working with other states towards these goals, Canada is emphasizing the need to:

- progress that has been achieved;
- shift the focus of attention away from the US and Russia towards the other nuclear-weapon states, and towards the "threshold" and "pariah" states that are seeking nuclear weapons;
- reinforce the absolute essentiality of the NPT, from the standpoint of stemming horizontal proliferation as well as of maintaining the foundation for nuclear commerce;
- seek progress towards a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), which will improve the climate of the extension process. However, point out that the NPT and a prospective CTBT are separate and distinct issues; and
- create a process for the Preparatory Committee meetings and the 1995 Conference that is clear and unambiguous. This means procedurally separating the decision to extend the NPT from the NPT review process, and from the conclusions at which that process might arrive. Two of the four earlier NPT review conferences did not produce agreed final statements.

To permit independent progress on the two sets of issues at stake in 1995 (extension and review), States Parties should establish a Review Committee and an Extension Committee. The Review Committee should be the umbrella for three sub-com-

mittees: one to review the provisions relating to non-proliferation; a second to review the provisions relating to transfers of technology and peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and a third to review the provisions relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones, disarmament and confidence-building measures. An emphasis on the period since the last Review Conference in 1990, coupled with a review of the preceding five-year periods, seems the most efficient and productive. The mandate of the Extension Committee should be limited strictly to drafting a resolution on whether the Treaty should continue in force indefinitely or be extended for an additional fixed period or periods.

The Preparatory Committee's work should include the preparation and review of papers and other procedural matters. The deliberation of substantive issues should be left to the 1995 Conference. Canada believes that while the Preparatory Committee meetings could take place in Europe, the Extension Conference should be held in New York to ensure the greatest possible attendance. Many smaller states that have UN missions in New York do not have diplomatic representatives in Geneva. Every effort should be made to encourage participation by all States Parties in this decision of utmost importance to the security of all states.

Stopping Proliferation: IAEA Safeguards Reform



The Vienna International Centre, which houses the IAEA headquarters.

Petr Pavlicek/IAEA

The discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapon program in Iraq has raised questions about the international community's ability to detect violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and prompted a flurry of proposals for safeguards reform.

The NPT requires non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to renounce the nuclear weapons option and to put all of their nuclear activities under safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA also safeguards some nuclear activities in nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT and in non-NPT states. Regular inspections by the IAEA verify that no non-peaceful uses of declared nuclear material, equipment, technology or facilities are taking place. However, despite regular inspections of Iraq's declared facilities for over a decade, the IAEA did not discover Saddam Hussein's secret nuclear bomb program. For those who believe the Agency's reputation has been tarnished by the Iraqi episode, only a tangible strengthening of safeguards will restore confidence in the IAEA.

Study of safeguards reform is taking place at the Agency itself, both internally and under a group of outside experts convened by IAEA Director Hans Blix. Mr. Mark Moher, Director General of EAITC's International Security, Arms

Control and CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) Affairs Bureau, is participating in this group in a private capacity. Proposals for reform are also being put forward by states and by groups of states. All of these efforts will start to come together in the summer, when reform options will be discussed by the IAEA General Conference and the Board of Governors.

Canada has been strongly encouraging and actively participating in efforts to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system. In Canada's view, the main objective of safeguards reform should be to improve the capacity of the Agency to uncover undeclared nuclear activities, thus enhancing the *effectiveness* of IAEA safeguards. A second objective should be to improve safeguards *efficiency*, i.e., their cost/benefit ratio.

Effectiveness Measures

Canada believes that priority should be given to the detection of clandestine efforts to evade non-proliferation responsibilities. This will require the provision of resources and the marshalling of collective will to exercise to the fullest the inspection rights inherent in the IAEA Statute and in individual safeguards agreements.

States under full-scope safeguards should be encouraged to accept the Agency's right of access "at any time, at any place" to declared or undeclared nuclear facilities. States should be reassured, however, that IAEA inspections do not threaten their legitimate military, scientific and industrial secrets, and that they in fact bolster sovereignty by enhancing security.

Canada thinks that the concept of "managed access," found in the Chemical Weapons Convention, could be adapted for some inspections in non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). Managed access would allow states under inspection to protect secrets unrelated to undeclared nuclear activities. Another CWC-inspired reform would be the use of environmental sampling, especially to uncover reprocessing activities.

It will also be important to attain near-universal acceptance of transparency measures by states and by the Agency.

Significant transparency measures include

- the reporting of transfers of nuclear and nuclear-related items;
- the reporting of production of nuclear materials;
- the early provision of design information on nuclear facilities; and
- the creation of new reporting instruments by the Agency.

To be able to reach conclusions about the possible presence of clandestine nuclear activities, the IAEA must be endowed with sufficient capacity and competence to analyze information. This includes interpretation of data from open sources, from voluntary declarations, from inspection reports and from national intelligence means.

Nuclear-weapon states could agree to implement IAEA reforms, including access "any time, any place," on their civilian nuclear programs. They could consider accepting special inspections in any part of their territory, except on their declared military sector.

Non-NPT states could also voluntarily accept transparency measures, the "access any time, any place" principle and even special inspections. If special inspections are not possible, greater transparency, wider access and better intelligence could still enable the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in these states.

Efficiency Measures

Safeguards reform has to be performed in a situation of scarce financial resources, as the IAEA remains under a directive of zero real growth. This has led to demands to streamline the system.

For instance, many states have proposed that, to save money, the future safeguards regime should rely heavily on verification activities performed by local State Systems of Accounting and Control (SSACs). Canada is willing to participate in the elaboration and implementation of this model if it does not undermine the trust that the Agency must foster and maintain to achieve its non-proliferation goal. Close attention will have to be paid to the possibility of a perception of discrimination between advanced states and less developed ones, since in such a system the former would enjoy more autonomy than the latter in their safeguarding activities.

Canada would welcome an alternative safeguards model that enhanced the Agency's role through greater reliance on resident IAEA inspectors, who would take charge of most of the inspection work. It would be based on guaranteed "any time, any place" access. Improved automatization and real-time transmission of data for material accountancy, surveillance and containment should also be important features of this model. Canada thinks that significant savings and security gains could be obtained from such a system. Moreover, this model would not discriminate between states with advanced SSACs and those without.

Any new safeguards system will require real-time or near-real-time transmission of production, transfer and inspection data. Containment and surveillance will also have to be improved. Canada is willing to devote non-IAEA budgetary resources to research, development and testing in safeguarding, as it has always done through its Safeguards Support Program, and is urging other developed states to do the same. However, this is only a partial solution to the financial demands that an enhanced safeguards system will impose.

It will be impossible to increase effectiveness without increasing the IAEA safeguards budget, particularly in the face of new safeguarding duties as a result of the inclusion of former Soviet republics and some developing states. This will inevitably come up against the zero-real-growth

constraint and raise questions for the balance between the IAEA's verification activities and its activities in promoting cooperation in peaceful nuclear uses. Canada has argued in favour of breaking with zero real growth, specifically as it pertains to safeguards.

To reduce costs, the number of routine inspections on declared materials in NNWS could be decreased. This, however, will be acceptable only if the Agency is able to uncover clandestine nuclear activity through transparency, "any time, any place" access, intelligence and special inspections. If this condition is met, the Agency might need only a few random inspections per year, complemented by "managed" special inspections or genuine special inspections, if needed.

Canada will continue to support endeavours to achieve cost savings in safeguards without compromising their efficacy. However, enhancing effectiveness should remain the primary objective of safeguards reform. ■

Missile Technology: Looking Beyond Supply-Side Control

Members of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) held a productive meeting in Canberra, Australia from March 8 to 11. They welcomed Iceland as the newest member of the Regime, bringing the number of MTCR partners to 23. They also welcomed applications from Argentina and Hungary to participate in the Regime and agreed to invite the two to become partners. Participants noted with satisfaction that the decision to extend the Regime's guidelines to include missiles capable of delivering *all* weapons of mass destruction (chemical and biological, as well as nuclear) — taken at the MTCR meeting in Oslo in July 1992 — was fully implemented by January 7. Partners were also pleased to observe that a number of countries outside the Regime have declared their intention to continue to abide by the MTCR guidelines and they jointly appealed to all states to do likewise.

Discussion at the Canberra meeting was influenced by a Canadian proposal to consider future directions for the MTCR. During its six-year history, the MTCR has successfully slowed the overall rate of proliferation of ballistic missile technology. However, the Regime faces many challenges, including:

- the enhanced risk of proliferation brought about by the weakness of enforceable export controls in the states emerging from the former Soviet Union;
- the failure of key current suppliers to join the Regime; and
- the growing sophistication of production capability in many potential suppliers, who also remain outside the MTCR.

Beyond this, the MTCR is limited by the fundamental inability of any supply-side control effort to halt proliferation completely. In most cases, proliferation is fuelled by chronic regional instability and perceived military vulnerabilities. Efforts to reduce regional instability must be seen as a necessary complement, and indeed the *sine qua non*, of future progress in thwarting proliferation of all types of weaponry. Even then, there will continue to be pariah states who remain committed to the acquisition, diffusion and development of missile technology at almost any price.

If the MTCR is to continue to be an effective non-proliferation regime, it will have to adapt to the changing international environment. MTCR partners will have to consider how to attract key current and potential suppliers to fulfil the non-proliferation objectives underlying the Regime, including determining the best way to increasingly isolate those states that continue to seek a missile delivery capacity for weapons of mass destruction. They must also find more positive ways of addressing commercial concerns in the expanding international market, given that the use of missile technology for the peaceful exploitation of space is a legitimate scientific/commercial activity. Finally, they should consider how the Regime might evolve from being a pure export control regime to a broader, more formal multilateral non-proliferation arrangement that develops and promotes international norms in the transfer and control of missile technology.

In Canberra, partners agreed to meet next in Switzerland at the end of November to give further detailed consideration to future directions for the Regime. ■

Security Competition Results

On March 4, External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall announced the results of the first Cooperative Security Competition Program. The Program provides financial assistance to projects that advance understanding and public discussion of issues related to cooperative security, one of Canada's central foreign policy objectives.

The Program received over 90 proposals for research studies, conferences, publications and other projects. After a careful review, 47 projects totalling \$1.2 million were chosen. Preference was given to projects dealing with significant international issues from a Canadian perspective or with direct relevance to Canada, projects promoting cooperation between individuals or institutions across Canada, and projects promoting consultation and the dissemination of ideas or information.

The concept of cooperative security recognizes that true peace and security depend on dialogue and cooperation between states across the entire range of their relations, from political and social issues to military and economic matters. Projects selected in the first competition include studies on cooperative security in the post-Cold War era, the politics of peacemaking and peacekeeping, environmental security and freshwater resources, multilateral missile defence regimes, nuclear non-proliferation, and security and conflict issues in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region. Other successful projects include conferences and publications on such issues as peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy, peace enforcement, maritime security and middle powers in the new world order.

The Program welcomes further applications. Deadlines are April 30 for an August decision and October 31 for a February decision. To obtain an application form or a list of recipients, contact: Cooperative Security Competition Program, 55 Metcalfe St., Suite 1180, Ottawa, Ontario, K1P 6L5. Tel: (613) 233-4448. Fax: (613) 238-2062.

Towards a Nuclear Test Ban

The following are excerpts from a speech by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason at a United Nations Regional Conference on "Disarmament and National Security in the Interdependent World," held in Kyoto, Japan from April 13 to 16.

Proliferation, of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, has become one of the greatest perils facing the international community in the post-Cold War period. Though we have long been concerned about the dangers of proliferation, we now live in an environment in which rivalries that had been suppressed, contained, or in some cases merely masked by the frozen surface of the Cold War landscape, are now re-appearing around the globe. The recent decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to quit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is a stark reminder of the dangers we face. Meeting in Kyoto, we cannot but recognize the implications of this retrograde step for regional and international stability.

In perhaps what is a supreme and tragic irony, just as decisive steps have been taken to halt and to begin to reverse the "vertical" nuclear arms race, the "horizontal" dimension of nuclear proliferation seems to be accelerating at an alarming rate.

Significance of a CTBT

Where does a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) fit into this post-Cold War proliferation scenario — for perhaps no single disarmament objective has so preoccupied the United Nations for so many years as the goal of an end to all nuclear test explosions in all environments for all time?

Despite the failure of United Nations efforts throughout the Cold War period to engage the nuclear-weapon states in meaningful negotiations towards a global test ban, the international community did manage to keep the issue front and centre on the multilateral arms control and disarmament agenda. The convening of the 1991 Partial Test Ban Treaty Amending Conference and the role the

test ban issue played in the failure of the 1990 NPT Review Conference to reach an agreed Final Declaration are but two of the most dramatic examples of the pre-eminent status the test ban issue has achieved.

Now that the Cold War is over and with it superpower military competition, many would argue that the "symbolic value" of the CTBT far outweighs the concrete benefits that might flow from it. What then are those benefits? If proliferation poses a grave danger to the maintenance of international peace and security — as my government believes it does — what role will a CTBT play to curb that danger?

Clearly a CTBT will *not* impede the ability of existing nuclear-weapon states to manufacture additional weapons using old designs, nor will it have any effect on delivery systems. Considerable progress has already been made between the US and Russia in this regard in the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF), START and START II treaties. Nonetheless, a CTBT is not a substitute for further negotiated reductions in existing nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia and for similar actions by the other three nuclear-weapon states...

As the examples of Iraq and North Korea vividly demonstrate, we face perhaps as never before the potential for a dramatic increase in the number of states both capable of, and inclined towards, producing nuclear weapons. And the reluctance of threshold states to give up their nuclear weapon option is based largely on

Despite its symbolic value, a comprehensive test ban treaty is no panacea for nuclear proliferation, either vertical or horizontal.

their own geostrategic assessments of regional political and military rivalries. Therefore, while a cessation of tests — by de-emphasizing the military role of nuclear weapons — could affect the views of the threshold states, a nuclear test ban is unlikely to be sufficient in and of itself for their definitive renunciation of nuclear weapons.

Hardest of all to assess is the impact that a CTBT would have in reinforcing the NPT — and with it the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime — by providing potent evidence of the determination of the nuclear-weapon states to fulfil a key aspect of the “basic bargain” between the nuclear haves and have nots that underlines the NPT.

While this benefit may be as unquantifiable as the global norm of non-proliferation itself, at the very least it can be said that the moral authority of the nuclear-weapon states — that is, of the United Nations Security Council five permanent members — would be strengthened, and along with it, their ability to exercise effective leadership in response to countries seeking to stand against this international norm.

A comprehensive test ban treaty then is no panacea for nuclear proliferation, either vertical or horizontal. As important as it is, it is not a substitute for sustained action by the international community on all fronts, from the strengthening of global non-proliferation norms and their enforcement, through the broadening and deepening of supplier groups, down to rigorous implementation of national export controls.

Central to the process of strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is the indefinite and unconditional extension in 1995 of the lynchpin of that regime, the NPT, together with the relentless pursuit of its universal adherence. Particularly important as well is the work underway in the International Atomic Energy Agency to strengthen the nuclear safeguards regime to permit “anytime, anywhere” inspections. Equally urgent is the need for Ukraine and Kazakhstan to follow the lead of Belarus and to unambiguously and unequivocally formalize their status as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT.

At the same time the international community has the right to expect, and the duty to demand, from the five nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT continued progress towards their fulfilment of the nuclear disarmament objectives enshrined in Article VI.

One thing we cannot afford, however, is to make progress in one area of non-proliferation conditional on progress in another — what Under-Secretary-General Petrovsky has called counterproductive “linkage diplomacy.” In my view, the

cause of international security is ill-served by arguments and stratagems that have the effect — however unintended — of shielding, rather than exposing, would-be nuclear proliferators. The danger of nuclear proliferation is all too real. What is required is an acceleration of efforts along as many tracks as possible to get the job done. Again, to use Petrovsky’s words, what is required is “constructive parallelism.”

It is from this perspective then that I now turn to the prospects for a CTBT.

cause the UK tests only in the US, the result was an involuntary moratorium for that country as well.

The legislation under the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act pursuant to which this American action was taken — however grudgingly by the then Bush administration — marks a watershed in international efforts to achieve a global test ban. Critically important are the provisions of the legislation that require the Administration to submit annually to Congress a plan for achieving a comprehensive ban on the testing of nu-



The mushroom cloud from an atmospheric nuclear explosion. Above-ground nuclear tests were banned by the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, as were tests in outer space and under water. Canada has long advocated a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty to prohibit nuclear tests in all environments for all time.

Photo courtesy of the Canadian Centre for Global Security

Prospects for a CTBT

I think it is no exaggeration to say that the need for a CTBT has not been greater, or the prospects for achieving one brighter, in a very long time indeed. All five declared nuclear-weapon states are now party to the NPT. Russia has been observing a testing moratorium since October 1991 and France since April 1992. In July of that year, the US renounced modernization as the basis for any of its nuclear tests. Next came its decision in October 1992 to join France and Russia in declaring a nuclear testing moratorium. Be-

clear weapons on or before September 30, 1996.

In a letter to Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell dated February 12, 1993, President Clinton rejected as totally inadequate the report submitted in January by the Bush Administration. He then went on to indicate that he would submit a new report as soon as his review was completed of “questions relating to the forum and modalities for negotiating a CTB and the related question of resuming a limited program of US nuclear testing after July 1, 1993.” The significance of the quoted por-

tion of the letter is its focus, not on *whether*, but on *how* to negotiate a comprehensive test ban.

Most recently, at the Vancouver Summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that negotiations on a multilateral nuclear test ban should commence at an early date and that their governments would consult each other accordingly.

Of course, the situation, while promising, is not unequivocally so. Two nuclear-weapon states — the UK and China — have not declared nuclear testing moratoria. The US legislation foresees the possi-

the GSE to date. This remarkable group was formed in 1976 with a mandate to develop concepts for an international seismic data exchange system. The purpose of this system would be to assist the parties to a CTBT to monitor compliance by providing data for their own national verification purposes.

The GSE has held two international seismic data exchange experiments, in 1984 and in 1991, and has developed and refined a series of concepts that would form the backbone of a future international seismic verification network. In addition to the purely seismic aspects of the challenge, the Group has looked at such areas as communications procedures and the joint analysis of seismic data.

The GSE is now moving to implement the results of earlier studies. For example, one of its working groups is actually selecting the existing high quality seismographic stations that should be included in the global network, and is beginning site investigations in regions that will require new stations. Another working group is assessing the capabilities that will be achieved by various networks, so that the GSE will be able to provide some general cost-versus-capability options to the CD. Importantly, the GSE has established a target date of January 1, 1995 to have a sufficient global system implemented to begin full-scale testing.

Though it is generally recognized that a seismic exchange system would be the most important technical monitoring verification measure for a CTBT, other potential measures exist. For example, one could consider the following:

- a) "National Technical Means" of data collection, including aerial and space surveillance techniques. In this context, I would note that the first multilateral aerial surveillance agreement, the Open Skies Treaty, was signed last year. This practical, cost-effective regime puts aerial surveillance within the technical and financial grasp of many countries that could not otherwise have afforded it. At this time, four of the five nuclear-weapon states are covered by this Treaty.
- b) Other aspects of access to, and analysis of, remotely-sensed imagery as may be negotiated.
- c) Collection and analysis of atmospheric radionuclides, usually stated as a means

of monitoring venting from underground tests, but obviously useful for detecting atmospheric tests. Once again, I would note that the parties to the Open Skies Treaty have agreed that they will develop that regime for purposes of environmental monitoring.

- d) On-site inspections, with all of the protocols and allowed technical measurements that might be associated with the inspection teams.
- e) The overall financial and administrative aspects of the treaty, particularly the bureaucratic means of dealing with a suspected violation.

The GSE could take up these important topics, but a more direct way of accomplishing the objective would be to have the CD, or its Nuclear Test Ban Ad Hoc Committee, initiate discussions on the non-seismic aspects of CTBT verification. This step would serve to get the CD itself engaged in discussions over a concrete aspect of an eventual CTBT.

Another step we could take would be to have the CD urge the GSE to proceed with the installation and testing of the global seismic system. It seems to me that we have reached the stage where it is important to develop a real, rather than a hypothetical, system. Such a system would allow the GSE to gain experience with its real capability, and to present clear choices to the CD as to the projected costs, capabilities and types of network that would be most suitable.

It would also help the GSE to have an explicit acceptance by the CD of its target date of January 1, 1995, since by this date or sooner the GSE is going to require guidance from the CD on the type of system it wants pursued. The overriding point is that a decision on which verification system should be pursued can only be reached through negotiations. The sooner the negotiations proceed in earnest, the sooner the CD will be able to "overtake" the work of the GSE and begin to lead it.

Conclusion

We have now come to the point where the only way forward is to commence negotiations. Let us get on with the task. Let us ensure that we make the most of this singular opportunity to achieve an end to all nuclear test explosions in all environments for all time. To quote Ambassador Goodby in his earlier presentation to this conference, "Let us now be wise."

The focus is no longer on whether to negotiate a CTBT, but on how.

bility of a resumption of a limited number of tests for safety and reliability purposes only after July 1. Such a resumption by one nuclear-weapon state could lead to similar actions by the others. This would be particularly troubling in light of the fragile Arctic environment of Novaya Zemlya, the site of the last Soviet test...

With the successful conclusion of the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is now in a position to tackle another major subject and there is none more pressing than a CTBT. I might add, parenthetically, that the CD would be in an even stronger position to proceed were it to act decisively on the membership issue and open its doors to all UN Member States that wish to contribute to the negotiation of a global test ban treaty or any other multilateral disarmament issue.

Of course, the CD has undertaken extremely useful work on specific aspects of the nuclear test ban issue for many years. The Group of Scientific Experts (GSE), for example, has made important contributions to our understanding of the verification requirements of a test ban. But none of this can substitute for the negotiations themselves. The time is now ripe to move from the preparatory to the negotiating phase of our work.

Immediate Steps

What then, would be the most useful and practical steps that could be taken immediately in such negotiations? In the field of verification, I believe that we must build upon the considerable work done by

Strengthening Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation

A key component of Canada's non-proliferation action plan is strengthening regional security cooperation to reduce underlying causes of tension, particularly in such chronic hot-spots as the Korean Peninsula, the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent. Canada is bringing its experience and expertise in verification to the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group of the Middle East peace talks. We have also been instrumental in encouraging the countries of the North Pacific to consider ways to enhance their security through cooperation and dialogue.

The following is the text of an address by External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall at the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Conference in Vancouver on March 21. Scholars and officials from nine Asia-Pacific countries participated in the Conference, which was organized by York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies.

Last month I addressed the Vancouver Board of Trade and the Asia-Pacific Foundation prior to my trip to Japan. I chose as my topic that day "Canada and the Pacific Century," and I emphasized the remarkable pace of economic growth in Asia-Pacific and Canada's role within this dynamic region. Today, I want to address the evolving security agenda in Asia-Pacific and Canada's objectives in the region.

We are at a pivotal moment in Asia-Pacific security. The past three years have seen enormous progress in a variety of forums. But where do we go from here? It is worth taking as our starting point the stark reality that only a few years ago Asia-Pacific was locked in the stalemate of the Cold War. A series of initiatives by countries in the region, beginning in 1986, opened up the issues of Asia-Pacific security to wider discussion.

True, many of these early proposals were steeped in the logic of Cold War thinking. Ultimately, too, most were unworkable in the absence of any regional forum to advance debate. Canada drew two early conclusions:

- that it is almost impossible to rely on unilateral or bilateral approaches to address what are essentially multilateral questions; and
- that, though the end of the Cold War removed many of the reasons for security

arrangements in Asia-Pacific, new worries almost certainly would emerge.

In addition, there were concerns shared by many in the region that US political and military withdrawal would create a subsequent power vacuum and that local rivalries would persist. These concerns triggered new debates about the relationship between regional and sub-regional security, and how to create stability.

Our own examination of the Asia-Pacific security agenda three years ago resulted in our conclusion that a sub-regional approach to building institutions was necessary before constructing a larger regional institution. We began by focusing on the North Pacific. We created a two-track approach, governmental and non-governmental, to encourage the broadest possible interchange of ideas.

While the focus of much of our efforts was on the North Pacific, we did not neglect the other regional security dimensions. Some two and a half years ago, at a special Canadian-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) foreign ministers meeting in Jasper, we suggested to

ASEAN foreign ministers that they consider security issues for the agenda of the annual ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference — the PMC. Two years ago at the 1991 ASEAN-PMC, I spoke openly about Canada's interest in discussing security issues with our partners. Many in ASEAN also sensed the sea change in international security issues and the need for new approaches.

As you know, in 1992 the ASEAN-PMC did place regional security issues on its agenda. This dialogue was expanded through the recent decision by ASEAN to host security discussions with ASEAN and Dialogue Partner senior officials outside the PMC.

Even more broadly, Canada is consolidating a consistent and balanced involvement in the region that addresses not only political and security issues, but also trade and economic questions.

In promoting dialogue, we have focused on our strengths. We have used our multilateral credentials to advantage, for example, through our activities in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) to seek greater inclusiveness and institutionalization, as the process of multilateral cooperation matures. We have also used our official development assistance to work with others to foster dialogue on regional issues — the Spratly Islands question has been a prominent case in point.

We are prepared to use imagination and flexibility to defuse tensions or to advance cooperation in arms control and disarmament issues and participation in regional policy planning discussions. For example, Canada recently called for a moratorium on nuclear weapon testing, an issue of great concern to China's neighbours and the Asian subcontinent.

Another example is the Canada-Japan



External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall (right) with Yuan Ming (centre) of Peking University and Paul Evans (left) of the University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies at the Vancouver North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Conference in March.

Photo courtesy of the York University Centre for International and Strategic Studies

Forum 2000, which conducted a comprehensive review of the Canada-Japan bilateral relationship and potential joint approaches to multilateral issues. The recommendations of the forum, now under active consideration by the two governments, include a call for the creation of a Joint Centre for Conflict Prevention and Resolution on Vancouver Island, which could eventually draw wider participation by other countries in Asia-Pacific and elsewhere.

Finally, we have worked hard in the United Nations, the Group of Seven leading industrialized countries (G7) and other institutions to encourage all countries in the region to adhere to their international commitments to arms control, non-proliferation measures and human rights. In the United Nations, our aim is to use the authority of the UN on global initiatives to help ensure positive and reinforcing interaction between the global and the regional levels. Our call for an international arms register is a good example of this approach.

Other governments are, by definition, our natural partners, but we realize that there are many other stakeholders with a contribution to make — and a responsibility to do so. We are firmly committed to working together with academic communities, non-governmental organizations and commercial organizations as well.

We will continue to support academic research on the topic: first, through funding for a consortium of Canadian universities dealing with Asia-Pacific security issues; and, second, by continuing to support initiatives bringing non-governmental and governmental experts into the same forum to address the key concerns of the region.

As one could expect, despite recent pro-

gress, the security agenda is long and tensions in some parts of the region are increasing. This underlines the need to move quickly from the focus on "process" to a greater concentration on "substance." We believe it will be prudent to build security forums now before the need becomes more urgent.

I believe the most important issue in the region is Russia. It must be included within the regional Asia-Pacific system. The political uncertainty graphically illustrated by this weekend's events could adversely affect the progress of President Yeltsin's cooperative foreign policy, with very significant implications for Asia-Pacific. All of us have an interest in advancing

forthcoming withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, I issued a statement urging the North Korean government in the strongest possible terms to reconsider, and to allow inspections of all facilities.

Ensuring full respect for the NPT is of paramount importance to Canada. North Korea's withdrawal is a retrograde step that poses a serious challenge that will further isolate that country from the world. Active consultations are underway bilaterally, at the International Atomic Energy Agency, and multilaterally at the United Nations.

You are, of course, aware of the self-imposed absence of the North Korean team

from this particular meeting, an absence we regret. There can be no reasonable prospect of confidence and reduced tensions while the region is held hostage to the threat of a covert nuclear weapons program. We believe a more developed multilateral regional security dialogue might have offered an opportunity to avoid the current crisis.

Another difficult issue is the broad and gradual integration of China into the wider world. We have never believed that an isolated China was in anyone's best interest.

Equally, however, China must realize that Canada will be faithful to our fundamental policy of advancing the principles of human rights and democratic government, whether in Beijing, Tibet, Hong Kong or Taiwan.

We remain deeply concerned that China's military budget continues to increase at a greater rate than its rapid economic growth. The mutual confidence and respect fundamental to regional security can never be advanced while there are egregious violations of human rights, or political processes that preclude demo-



A Canadian peacekeeper with the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

Canadian Forces photo

ing the process of political and economic reform in Russia — and President Yeltsin is its only champion.

A stable Russia with confident leadership would allow serious new bilateral discussions with Japan, which is the only way that the Northern Territories issue can be settled. Its resolution would pave the way for closer economic cooperation in the North Pacific, ease residual anxieties and move the region forward.

Another current issue is North Korea, where the threat of nuclear proliferation is immediate and pressing. On March 12, when we received word of North Korea's

tratic participation, or blatant accumulation of arms.

We fervently believe that economic reform, political progress and enhanced security are totally integrated. Regional security must entail building equilibrium between economic progress and political development in every aspect.

Another challenge of unprecedented proportions is Cambodia. Canada is there, on the ground, as we have been with every United Nations peacekeeping force. But the nation-building process in Cambodia — the transition from an economic and political wasteland to a flourishing democracy — will be long and arduous. The key question is how we ensure that all parties in Cambodia — especially the Khmer Rouge — come, however reluctantly, to an appreciation of the rights of all.

South Asia, like other regions, must find ways to attack root causes of regional tensions. The nuclear weapon programs of India and Pakistan are largely a symptom of ancient distrust and rivalry. Proliferation of nuclear weapons is the most important security issue on the international agenda. We must be prepared to confront its implications in South Asia, as we are determined to do with respect to North Korea.

Until recently, there has been no intensive effort to deal with urgent security problems and there is no regional framework. Such a framework would have to include China, Russia and the United States, and perhaps others as well.

In addition to these sub-regional problems, we must address a series of common issues affecting many countries of the region. The proliferation of conventional arms sales, unresolved border disputes, civil and ethnic conflict, and increased military capabilities are not yet being addressed successfully, within an established framework for discussion or negotiation. The region now consists of a number of countries with substantial economic weight — and that number is growing every day. They must now play a political role commensurate with their new economic stature. Only a concerted effort by the major powers — the US, Japan, Russia and China — can ensure the development of rule-based systems that will foster long-term stability in the region. But their efforts must be matched and encouraged by others.

We recognize that security structures

and mechanisms are no panacea. Witness the tragedy of the former Yugoslavia continuing despite the UN, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But cooperative dialogue can result in avenues for cooperation, the acceptance of shared obligations, and the resolution of conflict. So then, where do we go from here? How do we move forward?

Let me express my own vision. I see an Asia-Pacific in which there is a web of interdependence at different levels, motivated by a common recognition that our individual futures are linked. It would be a region committed to habits of dialogue and cooperation. It would have a series of interlocking, mutually supportive, formal and informal mechanisms to expand dialogue as political circumstances required:

- a truly engaged ASEAN-PMC;
- a form of Five Power Dialogue in South Asia; and
- a formal mechanism in Northeast Asia dealing with the Korean Peninsula and providing the framework for a Russian-Pacific partnership.

While we see an opportunity now to extend intergovernmental dialogue, there is clearly a role for major contributions from outside government. Some have proposed a broader "track two" agenda embracing all of the region. This would be an enormous practical and intellectual contribution, which Canada would support, either focused on Northeast Asia or more broadly.

Governments now come together at the ministerial level in the ASEAN-PMC. There is a need for a more substantive agenda for these discussions. The proposals made by Australia at the last PMC offer an opportunity to build a consensus approach to regional confidence- and security-building mechanisms. I emphasize that these approaches are useful also for the region as a whole, and for their extension beyond Southeast Asia.

- Canada has no strict preconditions about the next steps. But four main principles are relevant for the immediate future:
- first, inclusiveness. There can be no hidden agenda. All key stakeholders must be involved, as well as those with significant economic stakes in the broader community;
 - second, any new regional framework must allow for differentiation in sub-re-

gions, recognizing distinct security approaches;

- third, a broad multilateral framework in the ASEAN-PMC, and possibly in APEC, must build on — not replace — those bilateral relationships that are indispensable to establishing a sense of confidence in the region; and
- fourth, as the building of appropriate institutions proceeds at the government level, a stronger pattern of cooperation among other communities — notably academic — must develop, since many of you have been at the cutting edge of the Asia-Pacific security dialogue. You must continue to press governments on hard regional issues. We need you to bring your ideas to bear on wider issues of global stability, and on how the region can make a real contribution to world peace.

Over time, we expect Asia-Pacific will acquire the stability and sense of self-confidence that would permit it to play a more active and more effective role in global affairs, equal to its economic strength. Today, Asia-Pacific is the most dynamic area of the world. It has become a model to others in the economic field. But its potential for security cooperation has yet to be achieved. An outward-looking, confident Asia-Pacific has much to offer others in helping to manage global affairs.

Canada's commitment to Asia-Pacific is strong. For many years now, our trade across the Pacific has surpassed our trade with Europe. Fifty percent of new Canadians are from Asia and Chinese is now the third most widely spoken language in Canada.

We take our responsibilities as a regional partner seriously and we are prepared to bring our skills and expertise to the table. We will continue to support initiatives that ensure that Canada and Canadians are closely involved with others in developing new frameworks for Asia-Pacific cooperation.

When I spoke a few weeks ago about "the Pacific Century," I emphasized Canada's belief in multilateral approaches to peace and security and our willingness to back up these beliefs with substantial commitments of human and financial resources. Let me reinforce that pledge today.

As a Pacific country, Canada will be part of the Pacific century. ■

Canada's Peace and Security Agenda: A Seminar Report

On February 8 and 9, External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall hosted a seminar on the topic "Canada's Agenda for International Peace and Security."

Forty-nine participants, representing non-governmental organizations, academia, business, labour, government and Parliament, attended the session, which was held in Ottawa.

Disarmament Bulletin 20 included excerpts from Mrs. McDougall's address to the seminar. The following are excerpts from the seminar report prepared by Alex Morrison, Executive Director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.

If there was one theme that emerged as a result of the discussions it was that there is being forged in Canada a new peace-keeping coalition composed of External Affairs and International Trade Canada, the Department of National Defence, other interested government agencies including the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Elections Canada, and a wide variety of non-governmental organizations and interested citizens.

It was apparent that the scope, intensity and frequency of peacekeeping activities carried out around the world by representatives of Canada are much greater than many had realized prior to the seminar.

It was generally argued that a more comprehensive public education and information program ought to be instituted and maintained on a wide scale, not only to ensure that Canadians are aware of the Canadian contribution to international peace, security and stability, but also to foster a continuing and informed discussion...

State of the Post-Cold War World

Participants generally agreed that the world has not entered the period of peace, harmony and tranquillity that we were expected to enjoy at the end of the Cold War. All segments of Canadian society must be involved in a national discussion to determine how to respond effectively to the new challenges. It is clear that the nationality, religious and ethnic differences kept in check during the Cold War have now burst through the surface. Once the



A Canadian with the Unified Task Force in Somalia (UNITAF).

Canadian Forces photo

current situations in the former Yugoslavia and in Somalia are resolved, however that comes about, it is certain that United Nations resources will be required in many other areas of the world.

Definition of Peacekeeping

It was acknowledged that, until recently, the single term "peacekeeping" has served to cover a multiplicity of United Nations activities. However, the recent dramatic increase in the types and numbers of peacekeeping operations has given rise to the more frequent use of such terms as peacemaking, peacebuilding, peace-enforcement, peace-restoration and peace-establishment.

There are those who hold that each of these terms ought to be defined precisely and related to a spectrum of action. Others, trying to avoid a definitional morass, believe that peacekeeping has such a positive reputation that it ought to be the only term used. The latter group uses the illustration of a "peacekeeping umbrella," under which stand missions ranging from an observer type, through the classic interpositional model of Cyprus, all the way to operations such as those in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. The umbrella also

covers an expanding range of tasks, including those of an environmental, anti-crime or maritime nature.

Some participants expressed the need for a philosophical, intellectual and conceptual framework to be used in determining and refining future approaches. The "aggression-anarchy" spectrum could be a starting point.

Public Education

The seminar itself was a good indication of the wide range of Canadians — individuals and organizations — that ought to be involved in determining the future foreign policy direction of peacekeeping. Parliamentarians, non-governmental organizations, academics and research institutions all have a vital role to play.

While Canadians take great pride in our country's peacekeeping record, the detail and extent of our participation are unknown to many. A comprehensive program of informational materials is needed. Canadians ought to be better informed of the peacekeeping activities carried out not only by the professional men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces, but also by humanitarian organizations, Elections Canada and the RCMP.

One participant described the project of an Arctic Council, bringing together eight Arctic countries. Such a council could be expected to further the discussion of strategic issues, particularly as these relate to the North.

Canadian Commitment

There is no doubt that Canadians want our future contributions to peacekeeping to be as significant as those of the past. It was asked whether Canada should continue to "cover the waterfront" of peacekeeping or whether it should concentrate in the areas where Canada has the most expertise.

In the past, Canada's contribution to peacekeeping has consisted mainly of personnel and financing. In the current climate of continuing reductions in the strength of the Canadian Armed Forces and with the declining budget, it is probable that more emphasis will be placed on peacekeeping expertise and on the non-military activities of humanitarian assistance, election supervision and policing.

The best peacekeepers are those who have been trained to a general-purpose combat capability level. Peacekeeping requires professionals. A good deal of confidence was expressed in the professionalism of Canadian troops, but participants were reminded that peacekeeping requires more than military skills. At times, it requires knowing how to harness "the power of CNN." There were also participants who pointed to the risk of Canadian soldiers getting involved in others' internal conflicts. For the most part, however, those attending the seminar shared the view that participation in peacekeeping will continue to be in Canada's best interests.

Capacity of the United Nations

Many felt that the United Nations is in a period of flux as it reorganizes to deal with the rapid extension of peacekeeping requirements. It will need to develop methods and procedures to enable it to command and control effectively the over 50,000 military and civilian personnel currently employed on peacekeeping operations. Although there is a strong case against the United Nations possessing its own standing military force, there are still some who believe this is desirable. Others hold that what is needed is a commitment by governments to maintain certain forces on a standby basis, to be committed to the United Nations in accordance with national interests.

Role of Major Powers

In his opening remarks, Professor Albert Legault of Laval University said the United Nations can serve as an interface between the small and the very powerful. The question was nevertheless raised as to whether one country or a very small group of countries should be able, by means of offering or withholding personnel, goods and/or services, to determine the effectiveness of the organization in meeting its challenges. There was concern that repeated exercise of such perceived powers might have a negative impact on the international legitimacy of the United Nations.

It was contended on the one hand that the United States is the only country in the world capable of mounting the operations required by the extended definition of peacekeeping. On the other hand, participants were reminded that the US has no intention of providing mercenaries for the world.

Canada Contributes to Mozambique Operation

On February 12, External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall and Defence Minister Kim Campbell announced that in response to a request from the UN Secretary-General, Canada will contribute up to 15 military observers to the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ).

ONUMOZ will deploy up to 7,500 troops, police and civilians to implement the peace agreement signed by the Mozambique government and the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) last October, ending 16 years of civil war. Four key elements in implementing the peace agreement are: troop demobilization and reintegration into civilian life; refugee repatriation; humanitarian assistance for displaced victims of war and drought; and preparations for national elections.

Other peacekeeping developments since the last issue of the *Bulletin* are listed below.



Armoured personnel carriers driven by Canadians with the UN Protection Force pass through the checkpoint at "B" company headquarters in Dragovic, Croatia. The Canadians were in a staging area in Croatia prior to moving south into Bosnia.

Canadian Forces photo by Sergeant Margaret Reid

Ex-Yugoslavia

The 2nd Canadian Battalion with the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) has been deployed from Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina to assist in the distribution of humanitarian relief supplies. The company of the 2nd Battalion that had been assigned to Macedonia has rejoined the battalion in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Iraq-Kuwait

Twenty-nine Canadian engineers have come home from the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM). Currently there are four Canadian military observers and one officer stationed at UNIKOM headquarters.

Angola

Due to the renewal of the Angolan civil war, the Secretary-General scaled the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) down to approximately 30 people. Only one Canadian observer is still assigned to UNAVEM.

Sovereignty

A number of participants alluded to the developing view within the international community that governments ought not be allowed to mistreat their citizens, deprive them of basic human rights or resist international aid on the basis of national sovereignty. The question was posed: "Who decides when a country's sovereignty can be breached?" Participants were reminded that it is only the media that make us aware of gross excesses on the part of governments...

Suggestions for Canada

The plenary discussion revealed the necessity of informing all Canadians of the wide range of humanitarian and other activities currently being carried out by non-governmental means, which quite appropriately deserve to be placed under the peacekeeping umbrella. The importance of the media in stimulating public awareness was stressed. Also emphasized was the positive result to be gained through cooperation with organizations currently

working in the field, and through the implementation of effective follow-through programs. Some participants spoke of the need for an early warning system involving the collection, collation, interpretation and dissemination of information.

It was suggested that Canada:

- 1) take the lead in ensuring that the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs better coordinate its activities;
- 2) participate in the much-needed redesign of UN agencies' mandates, to take into account the changing international situation;
- 3) spearhead the creation of a UN organization to deal with internally displaced persons, who now outnumber refugees; and
- 4) play a greater part in the lifting and detonation of land mines. It was mentioned that ten people (seven in Senegal, three in Somalia) have been lost to land mines in the last 30 days.

Though the enormity of the difficulties confronting the UN was not discounted by participants, some "success stories" were also brought up in discussion. Notable

among these were the UN operations in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Namibia.

Rapporteur's Remarks

Clearly we are in a new peacekeeping age. New, enhanced and innovative approaches to education and training are required. The diversity of approach and backgrounds of members of the new peacekeeping coalition ensures a rich diversity of skills upon which the Canadian government can call.

There were a number of good suggestions for future research and action. Proposed subjects for research included a peacekeeping early warning system, techniques of preventive diplomacy, and sovereignty and peacekeeping. Ideas that could be translated into projects include the development of prototype peacekeeping training and more interchanges between the Canadian Forces and humanitarian organizations. Most important, seminar participants demonstrated the firm conviction that Canada should continue to make a significant contribution to international peace, security and stability.

First Committee Considers Disarmament Machinery

The UN First Committee met from March 8 to 12 in New York to reassess the multilateral arms control and disarmament machinery, including ways and means of enhancing its functioning and efficiency. The reassessment was driven in part by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's October 1992 report entitled *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*. This report and Canada's written response to it (see *Disarmament Bulletin* 20) formed the

basis of much of the discussion at the March session.

Canada found the session disappointing insofar as there was little movement towards better integrating arms control and disarmament issues into the broader international peace and security agenda. Canada argued that arms control is part of a wider process of promoting less reliance on weapons and more reliance on coopera-

tive mechanisms for creating and enhancing peace and security. We put forward suggestions on how to better join the consideration of disarmament and political-security issues in a single General Assembly committee.

However, several states expressed reluctance to more clearly engage the arms control process with broader issues. They also hesitated at trying to improve integration of the various components of the arms control machinery — the First Committee, the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) — to improve functioning

and efficiency, although the consensus resolution produced by the session does call for enhancing dialogue and cooperation among the three.

On the positive side, the First Committee made progress in reinforcing reform within the UN disarmament bodies. There was support for continued rationalization of the First Committee's work. There was also strong support for the UNDC's cur-

rent role and its reform campaign. Definition of the CD's role, agenda and composition, and its place in the disarmament machinery, proved more complex. The First Committee resolution encourages the CD to reach early agreement on the expansion of its membership.

The resolution also urges the Secretary-General to strengthen the Office for Disarmament Affairs to carry out its mandated tasks. The Secretary-General must report to the 48th session of the General Assembly, scheduled for this fall, on what measures he will take. There was some discussion of whether the Office should remain located in New York or be moved to Geneva. Canada strongly favours keeping the Office in New York.

The First Committee also considered the Security Council's role in disarmament but came to no agreement. The Secretary-General's suggestion that the Council should play a more pro-active role, particularly on non-proliferation, received the support of many countries. However, others argued against overloading an already busy Council.

Resumed session produces mixed results.

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Can UNDC Make a Credible Contribution?

The 1993 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) was held in New York from April 19 to May 10. The following are excerpts from the plenary statement by Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason on April 20.

The Disarmament Commission is a UN body of universal membership, which has as its mandate the focused consideration of a limited number of items. Its subject matter comprises issues that need more in-depth consideration than is possible in the First Committee, but that are not yet ready for negotiation in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

During the resumed session of the First Committee, this basic mandate of the UNDC was reaffirmed and support given to the ongoing efforts to enhance the functioning of this body. In particular, an earlier agreement in principle on a three-item phased agenda was confirmed, to ensure that the subject matter before the UNDC would have both an element of predictability on the one hand and flexibility on the other. However, while agreement was reached in principle, it was not reached in practice and the result is that our efforts to move to a three-item phased agenda with one item in the first, one item in the second and one item in the third and final year of consideration, have been put in jeopardy. We shall have to give careful consideration to this problem at the 1994 Organizational Meeting later this year in order to determine how we can get back on track. In particular, we may have to consider whether one of the new items — and when they are agreed upon — can be successfully concluded in two, rather than three, years.

Turning to this year's agenda, as many speakers have already pointed out, we have a considerable amount of work ahead of us if we are to successfully conclude the items on "regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security" and "the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields." Yet successfully conclude them we must if we are to demonstrate that a three-week meeting of the Disarmament Commission can make a credible contribution to the increasingly difficult search for

international peace and security in the post-Cold War era.

With respect to the time available to us, Canada has observed in the past that three weeks is far too long for a mere exchange of formal positions but relatively little time in which to reconcile broadly divergent views on complex and sensitive issues. This is why we have advocated preparations in advance of the session with a view to developing working papers jointly presented by countries with quite different perspectives on the issues at hand. And this is precisely what Canada and Brazil have tried to do with respect to the agenda item on science and technology. The result is a joint working paper on "the transfer of high technology with military applications" which we hope will help the deliberations of Working Group IV. This paper will be formally introduced in the working group itself. Let me now briefly set out Canada's overall approach to the science and technology issue.

We strongly believe that this item merits our close attention because it offers us an opportunity to broaden international agreement in a particularly difficult area of non-proliferation — the transfer of sensitive technologies. In Canada's view, we must find ways to ensure that technology developed for peaceful purposes does not find its way into the hands of those seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery. At the same time, the application of such technologies for economic and social development must be encouraged.

In Canada's view, the way to attain

both objectives is to make the commitment to, and fulfilment of, comprehensive non-proliferation norms or standards a *sine qua non* for the promotion of international cooperation in the transfer of sensitive technologies. Once this framework for cooperation has been established on a government-to-government basis, the way is then clear for the respective commercial sectors of the countries in question to pursue mutually advantageous arrangements.

The international community — whether it be in the context of the IAEA or the Second Preparatory Meeting of the OPCW or the ongoing work of the BTWC Experts Group — is engaged in a wide variety of efforts to develop global, comprehensive, effectively verifiable non-proliferation regimes to regulate the transfer of material, equipment and sensitive technologies that have the potential for use in research, development, acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The Disarmament Commission can make a tangible contribution to these broader efforts if agreement can be reached on guidelines that genuinely enhance the prospects for transferring sensitive technologies solely for peaceful purposes.

As a country that has conducted extensive research in the area of verification, Canada also hopes that the guidelines will support the strengthening of international cooperation in — and greater access to — disarmament-related technologies.

Canada has devoted increasing attention to regional disarmament and international security questions over the past year

UN Should Integrate Efforts

The following is an excerpt from the March 8 statement of Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason to the resumed session of the First Committee in New York.

The UN cannot hope — over the longer-term — to reduce the time it devotes to crisis management if it does not expend some considerable effort on nurturing workable mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes long before they reach the crisis stage. This is conflict prevention in its most fundamental sense. The regional activities of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA) should be seen as an integral part of the early warning apparatus of the UN. Likewise, the arms control database, including the arms register, should be seen as part of the arsenal of information, techniques and expertise that the UN can call upon in its early warning, good offices and other preventive diplomacy efforts. In our view, the work of the ODA — and indeed of the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission — should be more closely integrated into the other preventive diplomacy efforts of the UN.

Need to Expand CD Membership

The following are excerpts from a statement by Canadian Ambassador Gerald Shannon to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on March 18. The CD has a limited membership (39 countries), though non-member states may be invited to participate as observers.

Canada has recognized for some time that the current Conference on Disarmament membership no longer reflects the changing international security environment. We in Canada think exclusivity is no longer acceptable. Collectively, as Conference on Disarmament members, we are now in the process of defining criteria for changing the membership of the Conference on Disarmament. However, many problems regarding membership need first to be answered: how can the limited membership being advocated by some be justified in 1993? Why should countries be excluded because they are situated in a certain geographic region? And who is to judge that countries should be excluded because they are not directly involved in the problems emerging from the new international security environment?

The United Nations funds the operations of the Conference on Disarmament and all United Nations members have assessed costs. In our view, it is unthinkable in this new age of international cooperation and democratization that United Nations Member States can be called upon to fund a multilateral organization but be excluded from its membership. Canada believes strongly that any interested state that applies for membership in the Conference on Disarmament should be welcomed as a full member.

as it becomes more and more apparent that a host of post-Cold War problems are best addressed at the regional level. At the same time, it is equally clear that regional approaches must be consistent with, and supportive of, global norms. In our statements during both the regular and resumed sessions of the First Committee, we have focused on the unique role that the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs is playing in promoting a mutually reinforcing interaction between the regional and global levels.

It is our hope that agreement can be reached in Working Group III on language that will provide concrete support to the "regional role" of the United Nations as well as to other, complementary, efforts at regional security building.

Regarding the subject matter of Working Group I, nuclear disarmament, Canada shares the hope of our Chairman, Ambassador Castro, that our general exchange of views this year lays a solid foundation for conclusion of this item in 1994. In that discussion Canada will call not only for further reductions by the US and Russia but also for meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament on the part of China, the United Kingdom and France.

The time has also come for the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning all nuclear test explosions in all envi-

ronments for all time. The US has enacted legislation calling for a negotiation and, more recently, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed at the Vancouver Summit that "negotiations on a multilateral test ban should commence at an early date." In Canada's view the negotiations should proceed forthwith in the Conference on Disarmament. In the working group, we will elaborate some ideas on how the CD might proceed to tackle verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

I would also note that, in Canada's view, the CD would be in the best possible position to proceed were it to act decisively on the membership issue and open its doors to all UN Member States that wish to contribute to the negotiation of a CTBT or any other multilateral disarmament issue.

Turning to the 1994 session, Canada strongly supports inclusion of the item on non-proliferation. We attach singular priority to sustained action by the international community on all fronts, from the strengthening of global norms and their enforcement, through the broadening and deepening of supplier groups, down to rig-

orous implementation of national controls. Central to the process of strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime is the indefinite and unconditional extension of the lynchpin of that regime, the NPT, together with the relentless pursuit of its universal adherence. In that regard, Canada deeply regrets and deplores the decision of the DPRK to quit the NPT. At the same time, we congratulate Belarus for its accession and call on Ukraine and Kazakhstan to do the same.

Canada also looks forward in 1994 to starting discussions on international arms transfers, with particular reference to illegal activities. The establishment of the UN register of conventional arms is an important first step in bringing international scrutiny to bear on the problem of excessive and destabilizing accumulations of conventional armaments. We intend to submit our report to the register in full by the April 30 deadline and we urge others to do the same.

In supporting the addition of this item to the UNDC agenda, we are cognizant that the CD and the UN Experts Group will be examining the expansion of the register in 1994. We will need to ensure that our discussions in this forum focus on unique aspects of the problem and do not repeat the efforts of others. In this regard the issue of the role of private arms dealers, highlighted by the Secretary-General in his *New Dimensions* report, may warrant examination by the Commission. Such an approach may also allow us to successfully conclude this item in two years, thus enabling the Commission to finally begin a fully phased approach.

In conclusion, the post-Cold War era abounds with urgent challenges to international peace and security. What role can

The way forward lies not in language "fixes" or in lowest common denominator texts, but in a genuine broadening of multilateral agreement.

the Disarmament Commission play in helping to meet these myriad demands? One thing seems clear — the way forward does not lie in language "fixes" or lowest common denominator texts. What is needed is a genuine broadening of multilateral agreement on the items before us. Canada believes that the objective is both attainable and worthy of the effort.

Symposium Looks at Converging Roles of Verification, Confidence-Building and Peacekeeping

Governmental and academic experts from eight countries took part in the Tenth Annual Ottawa Verification Symposium, entitled "Proliferation and International Security: Converging Roles of Verification, Confidence-Building and Peacekeeping," held in Montebello, Quebec, from February 24 to 27. A key theme of discussion was the future involvement of the United Nations in these fields, a topic of growing interest in view of the Secretary-General's reports on *An Agenda for Peace* (UN Document A/47/277) and *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era* (UN Document A/C.1/47/7).

Since the demise of the Cold War, states have been demonstrating a greater willingness to consider multilateral approaches to security issues, as opposed to national or bilateral approaches. As states come to recognize the advantages of multilateral approaches — including cost-effectiveness — they are increasingly likely to assign verification, confidence-building and peacekeeping roles to international organizations and regional bodies. This is already happening to some extent in the United Nations Special Commission on



Participants at the Tenth Annual Ottawa Verification Symposium.

Iraq (UNSCOM), the CSCE and other organizations.

A heightened role for international bodies in these areas and related security fields is consistent with long-held Canadian policy. Symposium participants considered ways in which Canada and other states can facilitate this process, as well as

the growing integration of verification, confidence-building and peacekeeping.

The Symposium was sponsored by EAIRC's Verification Research Program and organized by York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies. The latter will publish the proceedings in the near future.

Fostering Democracy and Security in the Ex-Warsaw Pact: The North Atlantic Cooperation Council

NATO has consistently encouraged the development of democracy in the countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe.

To foster a sense of security and confidence and to make democratic change irrevocable, NATO first sought to build a new relationship with its former adversaries by extending its hand of friendship and establishing regular diplomatic liaison and partnership, including high level visits and military contacts. Then, at the Rome Summit in November 1991, NATO leaders agreed to establish NACC — the North Atlantic Cooperation Council — as a forum for developing "a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation on political issues."

NACC membership now totals 38 (in-

cluding all of the countries of the former Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and Albania). Finland attends ministerial meetings as an observer.

NATO allies and the NACC cooperation partners meet regularly at expanded sessions of virtually all of the established NATO committees, including the Political, Economic and Military Committees. Foreign ministers attend ministerial sessions of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and defence ministers meet in the Group on Defence Matters. In addition, a NATO embassy in each cooperation country serves as the NATO information office. The Canadian Embassy in Warsaw, for example, is responsible for NATO liaison with Poland.

In December 1992, NACC ministers ap-

proved an expanded program of consultation and cooperation. The 1993 Work Plan features activities on a wide range of issues including peacekeeping, defence planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil-military coordination of air-traffic management, the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes and enhanced participation in NATO's "Third Dimension" in scientific and environmental programs.

In addition, NACC ministers discussed contentious security issues such as withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Baltic states, control of Russian and Ukrainian nuclear weapons, and the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Peacekeeping and the situation in the former Yugoslavia

were also discussed.

Most recently, the Group on Defence Matters met and reviewed defence cooperation activities, including a number of peacekeeping seminars and training sessions planned for 1993 by the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping.

Canada's contributions to date include: hosting a seminar on the role of the military in democratic societies (Montebello, February 1992); funding for NACC training sessions on civil and emergency planning (NATO School, Germany, 1992-93); and funding for the Canadian NACC internship program at NATO headquarters in Brussels.

NACC consultations and cooperation are intended to help meet the legitimate security concerns of cooperation partners and thereby to enable them to focus their resources on consolidating their democratic institutions. NACC has been particularly helpful in establishing contacts with senior level defence and military officials in the cooperating countries. The time, however, has come to move from contacts to substantive practical cooperation and assistance.

Some cooperation partners, including Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, continue to press NATO for security guarantees and full NATO membership. NATO's response to date has been that the expansion of NATO membership at this time would not enhance European security and that the security interests of non-NATO countries — including Russia — should be taken into account.

CSCE Conflict Management

At the Helsinki Summit of July 1992, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe decided to further strengthen its role in conflict management. The Summit established a wide range of instruments to this end: mechanisms for fact-finding, rapporteur and CSCE-mandated peacekeeping missions; early warning mechanisms (e.g., the High Commissioner on National Minorities); and mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes (such as the Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE, approved by the CSCE Council

meeting in Stockholm in December).

Since the Helsinki Summit, in addition to dispatching a large number of short-term rapporteur missions, the CSCE has established a number of missions on the ground in Eastern and Central Europe, the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. These missions, initiated relatively quickly with minimal infrastructure and modest costs, have established an international presence in potential conflict areas and, in some cases, initiated or supported a framework for political dialogue.

As a strong proponent of a more vigorous CSCE role in conflict management, Canada views these "preventive diplomacy" missions as a great success, providing the CSCE with an additional instrument for addressing tensions and managing crises. CSCE missions are deployed in the following areas:

Georgia-Ossetia

In November 1992, the CSCE established an eight-person team composed equally of civilian and military personnel in Ossetia, Georgia to undertake discussions with all parties to promote civil order and political reconciliation. The mission is to maintain contact with local authorities and military commanders of the Commonwealth of Independent States peacekeeping forces. The mission is also tasked with facilitating a political solution to the conflict in Abkhazia. The size of the mission was recently enlarged to eleven members and its mandate extended to August.

Moldova-Trans-Dniestr

The initial six-month mandate of the CSCE mission, which began in March, is to facilitate a lasting and comprehensive political settlement to the conflict between forces from the Republic of Moldova, forces of the self-proclaimed Trans-Dniestr Moldovan Republic, and Russian soldiers stationed in the region. Last June, more than 1,000 people were killed and over 100,000 displaced in the fighting.

Estonia

Established in February, the initial six-month mandate of the CSCE mission is to promote stability, dialogue and understanding between Estonian- and Russian-speaking communities in the country.

Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina

In September 1992, the CSCE established "Missions of Long Duration" to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina in the former Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and

Montenegro). The missions' mandate is to promote dialogue between the various parties, to attempt to resolve specific local differences, and to collect information on human rights violations. The three regions are considered vulnerable to "spillover" from the conflict elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. The size of the missions has recently been increased and their mandate extended to August 31.

Skopje

Also in September, the CSCE established a "Spillover Mission" for six months in Skopje, the capital of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The mission's mandate is to attempt to prevent the spillover of the conflict elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. The mission's mandate was recently extended to August 31.

Sanctions Assistance

In addition, the CSCE has deployed "Sanctions Assistance Missions" to a number of states neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to assist them in implementing UN sanctions. Such missions are deployed in: Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania.

Focus: On IAEA Safeguards

Desire to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy combined with concern about the spread of nuclear weapons led countries to conclude the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the late 1960s. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is widely regarded as the world's most important multilateral arms control agreement. It has done a great deal to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and has become the cornerstone of peaceful nuclear trade, especially for countries such as Canada.

Despite the NPT, however, worries about the spread of nuclear weapons still exist. A number of countries with nuclear programs have not signed the NPT. Furthermore, it is always possible that nuclear material used in peaceful nuclear research and the electricity-generating industry could be diverted by any country — even an NPT signatory — to develop a nuclear

plosive device. Guarding against this possibility requires effective verification. It is only reasonable that countries that in an arms control agreement want some means of determining whether or not other countries are abiding by their commitments. In the case of nuclear non-proliferation, in particular the NPT, this is primarily undertaken by the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through its system of nuclear safeguards. Safeguards are procedures — such as on-site inspections, audits and inventory controls — designed to provide assurance that nuclear material intended for peaceful activities is not diverted to military purposes.

Background

The IAEA was founded in 1957 with a two-fold mandate: to promote the benefits of nuclear energy and to establish a system of international safeguards. The first IAEA safeguards system was introduced in 1961, covering small electric power reactors of up to 100-megawatts capacity. In 1965, a revised system covering all reactors was introduced and in 1966 it was extended to include nuclear fuel reprocessing plants. Provisions covering conversion and fabrication plants were added in 1968. As the IAEA system developed, many nuclear suppliers and recipients gradually transferred to the Agency responsibility for verifying the peaceful uses commitment under their bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements.

Under the NPT, which came into force on March 5, 1970, States Parties that do not possess nuclear weapons — including Canada — are required to conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of safeguards to all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities. The IAEA drew up a model NPT safeguards agreement which was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors before the end of 1970. Agreements based on this model are now applied in over 100 countries, including most of those having significant nuclear activities.

As one of the world's earliest nuclear suppliers, Canada was deeply involved in the process of developing the IAEA and its safeguards system. Canada concluded a NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA in February 1972, at which time inspection of Canadian facilities commenced. Since 1976, Canada has required

all countries with which it engages in nuclear trade (except the nuclear-weapon states) to have either:

- ratified the NPT, and thereby accepted NPT safeguards on all their present and future nuclear activities; or
- made an equally binding commitment to non-proliferation by accepting NPT-type full-scope safeguards — that is, safeguards on the *entire* nuclear program in each country, not just on those aspects in which Canadian materials would be used.

Canada's domestic and international safeguards commitments are administered by the Atomic Energy Control Board.

How Safeguards Work

The main political objectives of safeguards are to:

- gain assurance that countries are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful use undertakings; and
- deter the diversion of safeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives, and the misuse of safeguarded facilities to produce unsafe-guarded nuclear material.

To achieve these political objectives, the IAEA has set itself the technical objective of the "timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by risk of early detection." The "significant quantities" of nuclear material used as the IAEA's detection targets are 8 kg of plutonium or 25 kg of highly enriched uranium. These are the amounts required to manufacture a nuclear explosive device. "Timely detection" refers to the time required to convert diverted material into components for an explosive device.

To meet this technical objective, the IAEA has established a process for verifying the continued presence of nuclear material placed under safeguards. The process consists of comparing the accuracy of reports and other information provided by a country against independent, objective information collected by IAEA inspectors and from containment and surveillance equipment, such as cameras and seals, installed by the IAEA at the country's nuclear facilities. To date, the IAEA has never concluded that material under safeguards has been diverted.

Problems with Safeguards


The IAEA safeguards system has several limitations. Most of these have been a focus of international attention ever since it was discovered that Iraq — an NPT signatory — managed to conduct a clandestine nuclear program despite IAEA safeguards.

First, key installations in countries of proliferation concern are not under the IAEA system. A number of these countries have not signed the NPT, and some that have signed the Treaty have not concluded the required safeguards agreement.

Second, the Agency's definition of "significant quantities" may be too large. Iraq's hidden production was at the gram level. In addition, measurement techniques are not sufficiently accurate to keep complete track of nuclear materials in bulk form (i.e., as powders, liquids or gases). This makes it theoretically possible for a country to divert a small percentage of material for military purposes without detection, since this could appear to be a normal operating discrepancy. The problem is especially dangerous at fuel fabrication, reprocessing and enrichment plants.

Third, although the IAEA has the right to conduct "special inspections" of undeclared sites, it has — until recently — limited itself to regular inspections of declared facilities. Low IAEA budgets and human resources have also meant that far fewer inspections are conducted than are needed to fully meet the IAEA's safeguards objectives. Although the IAEA is responsible for monitoring over 900 installations in over 50 countries, some 70 per cent of the safeguards budget is spent on just three countries — Canada, Germany and Japan; these have numerous safeguarded installations but are not of proliferation concern. Other problems include the fact that it is almost impossible for Agency inspectors to make unannounced visits to safeguarded installations. States are also permitted to reject particular IAEA inspectors.

In view of the Iraqi experience, steps are being taken to strengthen the safeguards system. Canada is pushing the process (see pp. 4-5). However, even if IAEA safeguards functioned perfectly, their usefulness might still be limited when applied to highly enriched uranium and plutonium, materials directly usable for nuclear weapons. Even if the IAEA reacted instantaneously to diversion, the



IAEA inspectors at work in a nuclear power station.

IAEA photo

state appropriating this material could in theory manufacture nuclear weapons within a matter of weeks if all the non-nuclear components had been prepared in advance. In such a setting, safeguards cannot provide "timely warning" sufficient to allow the international community to react in advance of the *fait accompli*.

The IAEA itself has no authority to impose sanctions in the event of non-compliance with a safeguards agreement. The Agency's Board of Governors is authorized to notify the UN Security Council. It is then up to the Council to take appropriate action, if desired.

Conclusion

The IAEA safeguards system is still evolving and incorporating advances in technology to improve containment, surveillance and other techniques. The system is not perfect and there remain many political, legal and technical difficulties to surmount.

Limitations notwithstanding, the deterrent value of safeguards remains strong, since would-be diverters could not have confidence that their misuse of nuclear materials would go undetected. It has been estimated that without the NPT and associated safeguards, there could be as many as 30 nuclear-weapon states by the year 2000, rather than the present five. While the cost of safeguards is appreciable — the IAEA's safeguards budget for 1991 was US \$65.1 million, out of a total budget of US \$196.9 million — it is a small burden to bear in comparison with the considerable contribution to international security that IAEA safeguards provide.

Forecast

Arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, June through September 1993.

Ongoing: CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Vienna

Ongoing: CFE Joint Consultative Group, Vienna

Ongoing: Open Skies Consultative Commission, Vienna

May 24 - June 4: meeting of experts on BTWC verification, Geneva

May 10 - June 25: CD in session, Geneva

July 10 - September 2: CD in session, Geneva

September 13 - 27: concluding meeting of experts on BTWC verification, Geneva

Acronyms

APEC — Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ASEAN (PMC) — Association of South-east Asian Nations (Post-Ministerial Conference)

BTWC — Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

CD — Conference on Disarmament

CFE — Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CTB(T) — comprehensive test ban (treaty)

CWC — Chemical Weapons Convention

EAITC — External Affairs and International Trade Canada

GSE — Group of Scientific Experts

G7 — Group of Seven leading industrialized nations

IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency

INF — intermediate-range nuclear forces

MTCR — Missile Technology Control Regime

NACC — North Atlantic Cooperation Council

NNWS — non-nuclear-weapon states

NPT — Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

ODA — (UN) Office for Disarmament Affairs

ONUMOZ — UN Operation in Mozambique

OPCW — Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

SSAC — State System of Accounting and Control

START — Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

UNDC — UN Disarmament Commission

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Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations in Sight

On August 10, the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) gave its *Ad Hoc* Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a general mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT). This followed US President Bill Clinton's July 3 announcement that the Administration is extending the current moratorium on US nuclear weapon testing through September 1994, provided no other state tests during that period. CD members, including Canada, are now defining the organization of and a specific mandate for CTBT negotiations. The goal is to begin negotiations in January 1994.

Canada has long advocated a nuclear test ban as a central arms control objective and thus wholeheartedly supports the US and CD decisions. The plan to negotiate a CTBT comes at a particularly important juncture as a number of countries have linked the conclusion of a CTBT and indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) when the latter comes up for review in 1995. While Canada firmly rejects that linkage as an element of the NPT extension process, there is no doubt that continued testing would complicate the process of extending indefinitely the NPT.

Canada has urged the other nuclear weapon states to respond positively to the US initiative to extend the moratorium on testing. Russian President Boris Yeltsin has confirmed the continuance of Russia's nuclear testing moratorium and has indicated Russia's willingness to proceed with CTBT negotiations. France, which has been observing a testing moratorium since April 1992, has said that it favours a CTBT as long as the treaty is universal and verifiable. The UK has not pronounced itself in favour of CTBT negotiations but, since it tests only in Nevada, is



Surface preparations for an underground nuclear test at the Nevada site.

caught in the US unilateral ban. China, which last tested in September 1992, has said that it supports a ban on nuclear tests "within the framework of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons."

A US law passed last year sets September 30, 1996 as the target date for completion of a CTBT.

CD Can Contribute to CTBT

The following are excerpts from the statement delivered to the Conference on Disarmament on August 5 by Canadian representative Paul Dubois.

In early July, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton announced the extension of the moratoria on nuclear testing. The

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External Affairs and
International Trade Canada

Canada

Beatty Named External Affairs Minister

On June 25, the Honourable Perrin Beatty, MP for Wellington-Grey-Dufferin-Simcoe, was named Secretary of State for External Affairs. He replaces the Honourable Barbara McDougall, who had held the post since April 1991.

Mr. Beatty was born in Toronto in 1950 and educated at James McQueen Public School, Fergus, Upper Canada College and the University of Western Ontario. He was first elected to the House of Commons in 1972. In 1979, he became the youngest cabinet minister to that point in Canadian history, serving as Minister of State for the Treasury Board. Since then, Mr. Beatty has held a number of Cabinet posts, serving variously as Minister of National Revenue and Minister Responsible for Canada Post Corporation, Solicitor General of Canada, Minister of National Defence, Minister of National Health and Welfare and, most recently, Minister of Communications.



The Honourable Perrin Beatty

US also announced that it planned to initiate discussions with the other nuclear weapon states on modalities and objectives of negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty. France, the UK and China have responded positively. These announcements are indeed welcome developments and they bode well for an early start to CTBT negotiations....

Canada favours negotiations towards a CTBT in a multilateral forum such as the Conference on Disarmament, at the same time realizing that such negotiations must be predicated upon the kind of political will and leadership that has been demonstrated last month by the nuclear weapon states. It is essential, therefore, that the CD take stock of its own resources and expertise which might contribute towards facilitating successful negotiation of a CTBT. The international community must make its contribution to a strong and effective CTBT. The final agreement must be open to signature by all and contain strong verification procedures. This process would, in our view, increase in credibility and international acceptance if the CD could agree to expand its membership to include all those wishing to be members.

Canada is pleased with the positive and constructive responses of the other nuclear weapon states to President Clinton's important initiative. We also urge them to continue their existing moratoria on nuclear testing. There is no reason why we cannot launch these negotiations now and my government supports initiatives to review at an early stage the mandate of the nuclear test ban *ad hoc* committee in order for it to negotiate a CTB. We are now engaged in the NPT extension process and an early start to CTB negotiations would give an important psychological boost to a successful NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995.

On June 3, 1993, our Swedish colleagues made a valuable contribution through their tabling of a revised version of a draft CTBT, which builds upon CD/1089 of July 25, 1991. In our view, the Swedish papers provide focus to certain key issues, while recognizing that many details will need to be filled in once negotiations get underway. It is always useful to have at hand a significant body of relevant information to facilitate the negotiations, especially when this includes a vision of what the end-product might comprise.

There is, of course, a wealth of material upon which to draw. All of the attention now being directed to non-seismic technologies, and to their potential to play a supportive

role in a verification regime, can only be helpful to the elaboration of a treaty that can be effectively verified. The Canadian position is that the elements of any verification regime are already very well-defined, based on the work of the Group of Scientific Experts (GSE), and could be put in place within a reasonable period of time.

In this regard, we note that the last GSE report to the CD (CD/1185, March 2, 1993), based on earlier tests and their evaluations, elaborated a concept of a system for international seismic data exchange which would provide states with data and information to meet their national CTB verification needs. The GSE is now moving through the design stage with the aim of beginning global testing of the proposed concept at an early date.

Canada fully supports this effort by the GSE and its contributing participants. In our understanding, this would not be another test to compile data along the lines of the two that have already taken place, in 1984 and 1991. It would, in fact, constitute the initial phase of establishing the architecture that could then be called upon to serve the needs of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

It is also the Canadian view that our current deliberations and future negotiations must continue to include the contributions that other, non-seismic technologies can make to CTB verification. Let me be clear on this point. While it is our position that all of these various options are on the table and merit serious consideration, they should not constrain our rapid progress to conclude a comprehensive test ban. In fact, it is our firm belief that a package of seismic and non-seismic verification measures could be put together and be ready to go within a relatively short period of time.

As an active participant in the GSE, Canada supports the role proposed for a seismic monitoring network, although a number of the parameters of the network will need further refinement as the work of the GSE progresses. Furthermore, Canada supports continued exploration in the CD of the relevance of the methodology and the parameters of a hypothetical network for radionuclides monitoring.

The 1991 Swedish draft text identifies the important role that imagery from "available satellite systems" would serve for CTBT verification. Canada strongly endorses such a monitoring system; delegations will remember that the May 1993

Canadian CD submission on non-seismic technologies significantly updated the understanding of the types of sensors and imagery available from current commercial satellite systems and how these systems are evolving. The CD should continue to examine the role of overhead imagery for CTBT verification.

A number of non-seismic technologies and their potential applications, which were included in the Canadian submission to the CD in May 1993 and the subsequent presentations, clearly have relevance to verifying a comprehensive test ban treaty. Canada will continue to support the CD in its exploration of these methodologies and consider making further submissions on selected ones in the search for an effective, yet affordable, verification regime.

Clearly, in 1993 the understanding of the performance and design requirements of a seismic network has advanced considerably through the work of the GSE and the active contributions of its individual participating states. The 1992 verification conference in Montebello, Quebec made a particularly significant contribution in this regard. Major gaps in knowledge remain, however, and these relate to:

- a) assessments of effectiveness;
- b) detection standards;
- c) other design parameters; and
- d) cost, including cost-effectiveness.

The GSE will need some direction from the CD on these matters if it is to move to fill these knowledge gaps as it proposes to do through testing the concept by January 1995.

The Canadian submission to the CD in May 1993, and subsequent presentations, sought to fill some of the information gaps, both with regard to chemical detection from the air and at ground level, and with regard to the other technique of surveillance of atmospheric radionuclides. In both of these cases, much work needs to be done to determine performance capabilities, effectiveness and cost parameters. Much of the required information, however, could only be obtained from countries that have conducted nuclear tests. One of the reasons for the Canadian submission and presentation in May was to attempt to prompt countries that have, or could get, the information to do so and share it with others.

In sum, the Swedish text puts down the appropriate markers with regard to airborne sensing and inspection, and to

ground-level inspection. The operational parameters will need, however, to be further explored through trial inspections and more detailed consultations with knowledgeable experts.

It is important to utilize to the maximum extent what we have learned so far as a foundation for our continuing efforts towards achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, as directed by the mandate of the nuclear test ban *ad hoc* committee. To accomplish this, Canada has concluded that the time has come to provide a process whereby the input of technical experts can be more productively consolidated within our substantive work on specific and interrelated test ban issues, including structure and scope as well as verification of compliance.

We have come to the conclusion that this can be best done by adding related technical strands to the existing seismic focus of the Group of Scientific Experts, as suggested by Australia on June 24. We note in particular in this context that work needs to be done on the relevance and feasibility of atmospheric radiation, infrasound and hydroacoustic monitoring. These methodologies have data collection, analysis and dissemination requirements similar to those of a global seismic network and, thus, the GSE's experience may make that body an appropriate forum for exploration of these non-seismic methods.

Of course, different technical expertise would be required to deal with these new subjects in the GSE.

The GSE may also need to modify the organization of its work to accommodate these new responsibilities. In the final analysis, the GSE has been structured in such a way as to be responsive in its support of the test ban treaty negotiations.

To recap my comments:

- As an active participant in the GSE, Canada supports the role proposed in the Swedish paper for a seismic monitoring network, although a number of the parameters of the network will need further refinement as the work of the GSE progresses.
- On balance, Canada supports continued exploration in the CD of the relevance of atmospheric radionuclides monitoring for CTBT verification and the parameters of a hypothetical network for

such monitoring.

- Canada will continue to engage actively in the CD on the role of overhead imagery for CTBT verification. Absence of this verification methodology from a CTBT text would be a serious omission.
- A number of other verification methodologies, which have emerged in the past few years, clearly have relevance to verifying a CTBT. Canada will continue to support the CD in its exploration of these methodologies and consider making further submissions on selected ones.

Canada supports continued exploration in the CD of on-site inspections for comprehensive test ban verification. "Challenge" inspections, and perhaps in some special cases routine and close-out inspections, are needed for effective CTBT verification.

To conclude, it is worth emphasizing that, except perhaps with respect to work on an international seismic data exchange network, we are still in the early phase of our efforts to redefine a viable and effective verification package for a CTBT. We all recognize that the seismic data exchange network will likely form the core verification method for a CTBT. In Canada's view, other methods also have a valuable contribution to make to test ban verification.

To the credit of Sweden, its draft treaty underlines the value of using a variety of

Much remains to be done in defining a viable and effective CTBT verification package. The CD can provide useful guidance.

complementary verification methods. Operating synergistically, such a package of methods can provide the most cost-effective approach to CTBT verification in the long run. We must concentrate on constructing a verification system that will stand the test of time. It must be flexible enough to adapt to new circumstances, such as the advent of new verification requirements and methodologies. It must be resilient enough to withstand heightened political tensions; indeed, it must provide a bulwark for refuting inaccurate suspicions about violations that might exacerbate tensions. ■

CTBT: Challenge for Multilateral Verification

Although multilateral discussions relating to a nuclear test ban have taken place in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) for more than 20 years, there has never been agreement on a multilateral negotiating mandate. For a brief period in the late 1970s, tripartite negotiations were undertaken by three nuclear weapon states (the US, the USSR and the UK) but there was

niques such as seismic detection, imagery exploitation, on-site inspection, data analysis and notifications.

There is general agreement in the CD that the core of the verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty is seismic technology. The basic concept of an international seismic data exchange system for verifying a CTBT is already well-defined

by the CD's Group of Scientific Experts (see article on next page). A resulting difference — in terms of verification — between the CTBT and other treaties is that

much of the seismic network required for verification can be put together from existing infrastructure.

Nevertheless, in Canada's view and that of many other countries, seismic technology *alone* is unlikely to provide an adequate and effective level of assurance of compliance with a CTBT. What is needed is a package of verification methodologies

that operate together to reinforce each other. For example, an international seismic monitoring network might detect an anomalous event, which in turn would trigger the use of other verification methodologies to help locate and identify that event. Such a multi-layered approach to CTBT verification is illustrated in the diagram below.

The following are some technologies that could contribute to an effective test ban verification package:

- seismic technologies;
- ground-based cross-border radionuclide network sensing;
- an airborne radionuclide network;
- satellite sensors;
- satellite imaging;
- airborne imaging;
- on-site inspections;
- chemical analysis;
- collateral analysis;
- hydroacoustics; and
- data fusion.

Thus, another difference between a


Combination of methods needed to provide assurance of compliance.

little tangible progress. With the July 3 decision of President Clinton, in conformity with legislation passed by Congress, to continue the US test moratorium (on a no-first-test basis) until at least September 1994, the way appears clear to initiate CTBT negotiations in the CD in January.

The CTBT negotiations are likely to differ significantly from other multilateral negotiations both within the Conference on Disarmament and in other fora. The East-West confrontational environment, within which other significant multilateral negotiations were initiated, has disappeared. As a result, the organizational structure and the bureaucratic strictures can be significantly altered to smooth and energize the negotiating process. From the standpoint of verification, there is a reasonably well understood concept of what technologies are required.

Verification of a treaty to ban nuclear explosive tests in all environments will require confidence that possible violations can be detected, located and unambiguously identified.

The verification regime must be capable of resolving concerns about compliance and, if necessary, of triggering a political process to address non-compliance. It must be not just reactive, but proactive. This includes the ability to take collective preventive action, if possible before a test occurs. The verification regime must also be non-discriminatory, as well as balanced in terms of intrusiveness. The negotiating requirement, therefore, is to identify a package of technologies based on experience to date that will provide effective verification, taking advantage of the synergistic effects among cooperative tech-



The synergy of seismic and non-seismic methods for the verification of an underground nuclear test is shown here. The "time" refers to the approximate time from the underground test to the completion of the analysis acquired by each "verification means." The "accuracy" in locating an underground test constitutes a rough order-of-magnitude estimate for each verification technique.

CTBT regime and those of past arms control agreements, many of which depend largely upon a single method of verification — often on-site inspection — for compliance monitoring, is that a CTBT will have the opportunity to make use of the multi-layered approach to provide verification of compliance on a global, as well as a regional, basis. Speaking in the CD on August 5, Canadian representative Paul Dubois promised continued Canadian support for exploring a variety of verification methods for a CTBT: "Operating synergistically, such a package of methods can provide the most cost-effective approach to CTBT verification in the long run."

Clearly, much remains to be done in the identification and development of a package of technologies that can form an effective verification regime for a comprehensive test ban treaty. That is one of the major challenges facing the Conference on Disarmament as it attempts to move quickly to complete negotiations on this important issue. ■

Non-Seismic Technologies in Support of a Test Ban

A variety of non-seismic verification methodologies are being discussed in the CD with respect to a CTBT. These are preliminary discussions and no definitive conclusions have yet been reached. As a contribution to this process, Canada tabled on May 26 a paper entitled "Non-Seismic Technologies in Support of a Nuclear Test Ban." The paper addressed four such technologies:

- overhead surveillance from satellites and aircraft;
- chemical detection during on-site inspections;
- three-dimensional electrical resistivity measurements at a suspected test site; and
- surveillance of radioactive debris in the atmosphere and atmospheric tracer modeling.

The tabling of this report was followed in June by presentations to the CD's *Ad Hoc* Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban by two Canadian experts: Mr. Jeffrey Tracey of EAITC's Verification Research Unit, who discussed overhead surveillance using commercially available sources, and Dr. John Davies of Barringer Instruments Ltd., who spoke on chemical detection at the site of a suspected test.

This report and these presentations represent the results of on-going cooperation among the Canadian government, the private sector and academia with respect to CTBT verification. Among the contributors to this year's program were Intera Technologies of Calgary, Barringer Instruments of Toronto, Premier Geophysics of Vancouver and the Atmospheric Environment Service of Environment Canada.

The International Seismic Monitoring System

The following article was prepared by Mr. Peter Basham of the Geological Survey of Canada, who is a Canadian representative on the Group of Scientific Experts.

In 1976, the Conference on Disarmament formed the "Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Cooperative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events," commonly called the Group of Scientific Experts or GSE. Since that date, the GSE has been engaged in defining the technical specifications for a global system of seismic data exchange that would assist all participating countries in their national verification requirements for a comprehensive test ban treaty. Now that the CTBT negotiations will finally begin, and it is clear that seismic data exchange will form the most important part of the monitoring system, what kind of system has the GSE devised?

What is the ISMS?

The concept of the International Seismic Monitoring System (ISMS), the now generally accepted term for this system, has not changed fundamentally since it

was studied by the group of experts that met in Geneva in July 1958 "to study the methods of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests." The most difficult testing environment in which to detect nuclear tests is underground, where most testing has been conducted since the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 banned testing in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space. Underground nuclear explosions do, however, produce seismic waves that can be detected by seismographs, instruments that are commonly established in local, national and global networks to detect, locate and study earthquakes that occur naturally in the earth, and that in many countries pose significant risk to human developments.


Networks of seismographs will detect seismic events (explosions and earthquakes) down to a certain threshold size, depending on the numbers and sensitivities of the seismograph stations. One of the decisions to be made by the CTBT negotiators is the level of this threshold, recognizing that as the detection threshold is pushed down, the number of seismograph stations must increase and the costs can be

pushed up accordingly.

Detecting a "seismic event" is one thing; identifying the event as either an earthquake or an explosion is another. Large underground explosions are relatively easy to identify as such, but as the events get smaller, earthquakes and explosions tend to appear more and more alike in their seismic signatures. In the GSE concept for an ISMS, the responsibility for the identification of suspected violations of the treaty — that is, for deciding that a seismic event is indeed an explosion — is left to national efforts by parties to the treaty. The ability to do this, based on seismological research on underground explosions and earthquakes over the years, will also have a bearing on the desired detection threshold that negotiators will discuss.

The ISMS can therefore be viewed as a system composed of three main parts:

- 1) a global network of seismograph stations meeting minimum specifications, operated and maintained to agreed standards, and contributing their seismic data;
- 2) an International Data Centre (IDC) that receives data from these stations, proc-



Seismograph stations from across Canada relay data to a central laboratory at the Geological Survey of Canada in Ottawa.

esses them to produce a global bulletin of seismic events, and dispatches this bulletin within an agreed time frame to the national participants; and

- 3) an efficient global communications system that connects these facilities together. The IDC will maintain an archive of all of the relevant seismic data, any parts of which would be made available for analysis to the national agencies of the parties when the latter find "interesting" seismic events in the bulletins.

The ISMS Improves with Advances in Technology

Although the overall concept has not changed, the technology available to the ISMS has improved dramatically in the past 30 years. In the system described by the GSE in its first report to the CD in 1978, most of the world's seismograph stations were producing data on paper recordings, although some of the first digital seismographs were in operation, and national data centres were responsible for extracting parameters (e.g., arrival times and amplitudes of recorded seismic waves) from these recordings and transmitting them by telex-based communication systems to a number of IDCs. More than one IDC was required to cover the various regions of the globe and to address concerns about data tampering.

The GSE conducted an international experiment of this concept in 1984 called GSETT-1 (for GSE Technical Test Number One). GSETT-1 was a success, but it showed the shortcomings of the data communications systems in many parts of the globe (many of the data messages got lost), and the restrictions placed on the IDCs, which had only the derived parameter data with which to work and not the original recordings, or "waveforms." Making better use of the latter could improve the seismic event bulletins.

By the late 1980s, technological advances had been made in many of the components required for the proposed system: seismographs had improved significantly and become computerized; computers had become much more powerful and less expensive, for both national and IDC seismic data processing; and international data communications by satellite, fibre optic cables and commercial networks had become much more efficient and reliable. The first of three GSE workshops that Canada was to host met in Ottawa in 1986, allowing the GSE to consider the implications of these modern means of data communications for the ISMS.

Canada was also instrumental in developing modern seismograph technology. Through a joint EAITC/Energy, Mines and Resources initiative, a major (\$3.5 million) refurbishment of the Yellowknife Seismic Array, the principal research tool used by

the seismologists at the Geological Survey of Canada to conduct research on the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions, was undertaken. Thirty members of the GSE met in Yellowknife in September 1989 (the second Canadian GSE workshop) to attend the opening of the Array and to review plans for a second data exchange experiment (see *The Disarmament Bulletin* No. 11, Fall 1989). The Verification Research Program of EAITC is also supporting research, through Professor K.-Y. Chun at the University of Toronto, to improve the ability to distinguish underground explosions from naturally occurring earthquakes. Professor Chun and his team are using data from the new Yellowknife Array and other stations of the Canadian National Seismograph Network to improve techniques for detecting and discriminating small seismic events.

The second data exchange experiment (GSETT-2), completed in 1991, was designed to take advantage of recent technical improvements. In particular, it was established that the seismograph stations would transmit the original digital waveform recordings of each detected seismic event, rather than only parameters derived from these waveforms, to enable the IDC to make much better judgements during its processing of the seismic event bulletins. Four IDCs were operated for this experiment (in Washington, Moscow, Stockholm and Canberra) in order to establish whether different systems, using similar procedures could produce similar results. Canada's GSE delegates, Peter Basham and Robert North of the Geological Survey, coordinated GSETT-2 on behalf of the GSE.

The GSE spent 18 months evaluating GSETT-2, aided by the third Canadian GSE workshop held in Montebello, Quebec in November 1992. Two important changes were made to the system, due mainly to the continuing improvements in global data communications. First, it is now agreed that the ISMS can operate with only one IDC. Global data communications to a single IDC are feasible and any concerns about tampering with data can be alleviated with sophisticated authentication devices. Second, data from the primary network of seismograph stations will be transmitted directly, in real time, to the IDC. This innovation transfers responsibility for the seismic event detection processing from the national facility

to the IDC, but allows the IDC to produce a seismic event bulletin within hours, rather than days as in the former system.

These changes have probably brought the GSE's ISMS concepts to what might be considered a final design stage. Implementation and testing of a prototype system are now required. This is what currently occupies the GSE.

Moving Towards the Final ISMS

For GSETT-3, the United States has offered to install, develop and operate a prototype IDC in Washington. The GSE will designate the seismograph stations that should be involved in GSETT-3 from among the best around the globe, some of which may be newly installed for this purpose. The primary seismograph stations mentioned above, called "alpha" stations, which will transmit continuous data in real time to the IDC, will probably number about 50. In addition there will be designated about 100 "beta" stations, whose seismic data the IDC will automatically extract in order to improve the computed locations of seismic events detected by the alpha stations. Canada is expecting to contribute the Yellowknife Array and three or four stations of our national network as alpha stations and a number of other national network stations as beta stations. This system, composed of the prototype IDC and networks of alpha and beta stations, will be built up gradually over the next year. The GSE has set a target date of January 1995 by which enough of the system should be ready for full-scale testing.

The GSE has established three special working groups to manage GSETT-3, one each for planning, operations and evaluation. Many of the key developments will involve procedures to be implemented at the IDC and will involve a high degree of automation: in detection, using the alpha network; in acquiring additional data from the beta network; and in computing the most accurate possible locations for the seismic events in the distributed event bulletins. Many seismologists from the GSE delegations are expected to contribute to these developments at the IDC over the coming year. Many countries, including Canada, will also have to devote resources to modifying procedures in their national seismograph networks so that data from the designated stations can be made available to the experiment and, eventually, to monitoring compliance with a CTBT.

The CTBT negotiations that will begin in the Conference on Disarmament in early 1994 are expected to draw heavily on the technical expertise of the GSE. The negotiating framework may require a number of special tasks by this experienced group and individual national delegations will be calling on their experts for advice. However, it is expected that the negotiators will want GSETT-3 to continue, in order to demonstrate the feasibility of the

ISMS concepts that have been carefully refined by the GSE over many years. The exact form and composition of the final ISMS will, of course, be decided by the negotiators, and GSETT-3 can be modified as final agreements are reached. Ideally, we will see a gradual transition from the GSETT-3 system into the final, negotiated ISMS that will be ready for full-scale operation when a comprehensive test ban treaty has been agreed. ■

Role for PTBT in CTBT?

As the result of an initiative of a group of non-aligned countries, a conference to consider converting the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) into a CTBT was held in New York in January 1991. The Conference was unable to reach a unanimous conclusion so it adopted, by vote, a decision in which the States Parties acknowledged the complicated nature of certain aspects of a CTBT, especially with regard to verification of compliance and possible sanctions against non-compliance, and expressed the view that further work needed to be undertaken. The President of the Conference was mandated to conduct consultations with a view to achieving progress on those issues and resuming the work of the Conference at an appropriate time. The vote for this decision was 74 in favour, 2 against (US, UK) and 19 abstentions. Canada abstained because: (1) it regretted that the draft decision was pressed to a vote, which tends to polarize positions rather than build on the common ground shared by all parties; and (2) the draft decision inaccurately stated that there was agreement where no agreement, in fact, existed.

Pursuant to the 1991 Amendment Conference decision, a special meeting of the States Parties to the PTBT was held in New York on August 10 and 11. Presided over by Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, the meeting was convened to enable PTBT parties to exchange views on developments regarding nuclear testing and to consider the feasibility of resuming the work of the Amendment Conference. Parties agreed on a series of steps designed to keep the PTBT Amendment Conference option alive, while at the same time ensuring that the main CTBT negotiations will take place at the CD in Geneva. The following are excerpts from the statement to the meeting by Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason, delivered on August 11.

I join with all those before me in extending my appreciation to you, Mr. President, for the convening of this meeting, which affords us a most timely opportunity (1) to evaluate recent positive developments towards the achievement of a ban on all nuclear test explosions in all environments for all time and (2) to consider how the PTBT Amendment Conference process might contribute in as constructive a way as possible towards this long-standing goal of the international community. In this regard, we are particularly heartened by the very positive attitude demonstrated at this meeting by the depositary states as well as by all the other delegations who have spoken before me....

Today we have the historic decision of the Conference on Disarmament to give its *Ad Hoc* Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty. It is completely clear that the ingredient that has proven so elusive for so long is now present in abundance — I refer of course to the political will to negotiate a CTBT forthwith.

The issue before this informal meeting of States Parties to the PTBT is, then, how can we ensure that this process best contributes to the negotiation in Geneva to ensure that the result is — and here I quote my Australian colleague, who I believe has found the most all-encompassing form of words — a legally binding, effectively verifiable, universally applicable, multilaterally supported and enduring CTBT. To that I would add: and to ensure that this result is achieved in as expeditious a manner as possible.

There is much to negotiate in Geneva particularly with respect to the verification regime. Efforts must now be fully concentrated on Geneva to ensure the work of the

Group of Scientific Experts expands to begin to establish the architecture of the overall verification regime, including a package of measures that goes beyond seismic and includes some non-seismic measures as well. Canada has been actively involved in this work and intends to continue to be fully engaged in the elaboration of the verification regime....

Again this brings me back to the question of what role for this body? Canada agrees fully with those before me who have suggested that informal meetings such as this one can be a helpful tool in monitoring developments in the Geneva negotiation and — I might add — in keeping their negotiating feet to the proverbial fire! Like my New Zealand colleague, I too would regard a message from you, Mr. President, to the CD on the outcome of these and any further consultations as a helpful step. We also would not want to prejudge what role the PTBT Amendment Conference might have further down the road as substantial progress is made in the CD negotiation.

In closing, Mr. President, let me pledge the full cooperation of my delegation in working with you to ensure that this process contributes in as positive manner as possible towards the achievement of our shared goal — a CTBT. ■

NPT Extension Preparations

The first Preparatory Committee meeting for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) extension process took place in New York from May 10 to 14. The Canadian delegation to the meeting was led by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason. Parties made useful progress on several procedural matters, including setting the dates of succeeding Preparatory Meetings and of the Extension Conference itself (April 17 to May 12, 1995, in New York). A number of crucial decisions remain to be taken regarding rules of procedure and decision-making (voting or consensus), participation of non-parties and non-governmental organizations, agenda and documentation. The next Preparatory Committee meeting will be held in New York from January 17 to 21, 1994. ■

UNDC Produces Mixed Results

The 1993 session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) was held in New York from April 19 to May 10. The Commission dealt with three items: nuclear disarmament; regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security; and the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields. There was no noticeable progress on the nuclear disarmament item. Developments on the other two items, in which the Canadian delegation led by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason played an active role, are discussed below.

Regional Disarmament

The 1993 session saw the successful conclusion of a three-year UNDC study on "Guidelines and Recommendations for Regional Approaches to Disarmament within the Context of Global Security." The final report is divided into four sections:

- Relationship Between Regional Disarmament, Arms Limitation and Global Security;
- Principles and Guidelines;
- Ways and Means; and
- Role of the United Nations.

An annex lists various regional confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).

The report's first section outlines a conceptual approach to regional arms control and disarmament initiatives which seeks to ensure that such initiatives complement existing or proposed global agreements or initiatives. This was not contentious.

The second section was the subject of some debate. A few countries sought to introduce language that would have had the effect of making the elimination of nuclear weapons the most pressing regional arms control and disarmament goal in all areas of the world. Others argued that such an approach would have been overly prescriptive in that nuclear weapons are not the dominant regional security concern in every region. Some regions, for example, are under far greater threat from chemical weapons or from an excessive build-up of conventional arms. For this reason, compromise language was eventually found which says that each region should define the greatest threat to it and act accordingly.

The third section outlines a number of tools available in the pursuit of enhanced regional security. These range from CSBMs to arms control and disarmament agreements, to zones of peace, to zones free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, to consultative and cooperative arrangements. The report recognizes several new approaches in each of these areas. In the field of CSBMs, for example, emphasis is placed on the development of agreements in the environmental and economic areas as these affect security. The report also recognizes the danger that weapons made redundant by arms control and disarmament agreements in one region could then be sold into another.

The final section of the report is not as comprehensive as Canada would have liked. The only roles for the UN that could be agreed by consensus were in such areas as facilitating regional dialogues already underway and acting as an information repository and convenor of conferences and workshops.

Another disappointment to Canada is the fact that the report does not mention by name the existing multilateral non-proliferation agreements. The Canadian delegation, along with many others, argued that these should be included as they make a profound contribution to regional and global security. They also act as a starting point for the consideration of any regional non-proliferation agreements. The very small number of states that stand outside of these widely accepted global norms would not agree to their inclusion, however.

Despite these disappointments, the Canadian delegation, which helped to forge the compromises that made the final report possible, is pleased with the outcome. The report as a whole represents movement in the area of regional arms control and disarmament and security. The very fact that the UNDC spent three years examining the question demonstrates the importance many Member States attach to it. Ideas and action in this area are certain to evolve, and Canada will work to ensure that the progress contained in the report is used as a basis for further developments.

Role of Science and Technology

The working group on "The Role of Science and Technology in the Context of International Security, Disarmament and Other Related Fields" did not succeed in producing a consensus set of guidelines and recommendations as it had hoped to do. Among the reasons for this setback was a fundamental difference of perspective between supplier and recipient states on the legitimacy of non-proliferation arrangements such as the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group, as well as equally polarized views of the NPT itself. On the positive side, the UNDC made considerable progress in demonstrating the need for, and utility of, multilateral dialogue on dual-use transfers and in identifying principles for international cooperation in this area that might command broader support than is presently the case. Canada had the difficult task of chairing the drafting group for combining disparate views and producing a final document.

One of the interesting features of UNDC attempts to reach a consensus on this issue was the composition of various alliances on the different problems at play. For example, a sub-item on "the transfer of high technology with military applications" was the brainchild of an Argentinian-Brazilian working paper calling

for "wider multilateral dialogue" with a view to "seeking universally acceptable international norms and guidelines that would regulate international transfers of high technology with military applications." This sub-item ultimately became the basis for a Canadian-Brazilian joint working paper at the 1993 UNDC session.

The constructive role of Brazil at the session deserves to be highlighted. Brazil is taking concrete steps to prove *bona fides* as a serious non-proliferator, and provides a link between developing and developed countries. Canada and Brazil had beforehand negotiated a carefully balanced text, which formed the core of the draft document.

The crumbling of an emerging consensus began when hardliners from both the traditional West and Non-Aligned groupings reopened previously informally agreed text calling for "wider participation" in the NPT. However, the fact that the vast majority of delegations from all sides believed that a meaningful text was within sight led to the agreement, brokered by UNDC Chairman Castro of Brazil, for this item to be extended for one more year. Canadian Ambassador Peggy Mason was also able to preserve the "agreed" and "unagreed" portions of the text, thus there is every likelihood that the 1994 working group will pick up where the 1993 group left off. ■

Basis for Progress on Technology Transfers

The following are excerpts from Canada's closing statement to the 1993 session of the UNDC, delivered by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason on May 10.

I would like to offer Canada's perspective on the work of this session. Turning first to the nuclear item, the Working Group Chairman, Ambassador Victor Batiouk of Ukraine, laboured mightily in the face of an overcrowded agenda and delegations stretched very thin. This year, again, the deliberations of the Working Group revealed the tremendous difficulties to be overcome if this item is to be successfully concluded in 1994. For our part, Canada wishes to reiterate the priority it attaches to this item. We would urge Ambassador Batiouk to pursue inter-sessional consultations in order to further prepare the ground for next year's work.

I turn now to Working Group II.... Canada has devoted increasing attention to regional disarmament and international security questions over the past year as it becomes apparent that a host of post-Cold War problems are best addressed at the regional level. It is therefore with tremendous satisfaction that we congratulate the Working Group for the achievement of a meaningful consensus text. I am sure all delegations will join me in paying homage to the Working Group Chairman, Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann of Germany, whose absolutely unstinting efforts simply would not allow for anything short of success.

I turn now to Working Group III, with respect to which Canada had the privilege of chairing the Drafting Group. In that capacity I earlier today made a statement as to the outcome of this year's work. Let me now make a few additional observations....

To put it at its plainest, the subject matter of Working Group III required the Group to confront fundamental differences of perspective between supplier and recipient states in the area of the transfer of technology with military applications. Yet the

plain fact is that, whatever those differences, suppliers and recipients need each other if either side is to satisfactorily advance its non-proliferation and peaceful cooperation objectives.

In other words, what is required is a joint approach that adequately reflects the views of both suppliers and recipients in a way that meets our twin objectives of enhancing international security and promoting international cooperation for peaceful purposes. This is the approach reflected in the Brazil/Canada Working Paper that our two countries developed in advance of this session of the Commission.

Suppliers and recipients need each other if either is to advance their non-proliferation and peaceful cooperation objectives.

The result of that joint effort was not only the paper itself but a basis for cooperation that I believe was evident throughout the deliberations of Working Group III, particularly during the Drafting Group stage. In that respect, I wish to pay particular tribute to the Brazilian delegation for its outstanding efforts to advance understanding in this vital area.

Turning to the Chairman's Working Paper itself, in Canada's view there are many important principles and new understandings that are reflected in that document. I will take the time now to point to only one of them — one that, in my view, reflects not only the efforts made but the progress achieved in bridging the gap between supplier and recipient states. I am referring to paragraph 20 of the Chairman's text, which reads:

"Cooperation in this field among supplier and recipient states



Ambassador Peggy Mason

should be enhanced by a firm common commitment to prevent transfers of high technology with military applications for exclusively peaceful purposes from being diverted to non-peaceful uses. Such cooperation should be based on clearly defined and balanced rights and obligations, appropriate measures of transparency and verification, equity and fairness, and predictability of incentives and benefits."

Without in any way minimizing the extent of the outstanding differences... — because in my view it is critically important *not* to minimize them but to face them squarely — there is, in Canada's view, a clear basis for further progress.

I wish to pledge Canada's continued dedication to widening agreement in this area of non-proliferation and cooperation for peaceful purposes, beginning with intersessional work by Canada aimed at a joint Working Paper going beyond Canada and Brazil.

In conclusion, I would refer to paragraph 7 of the 1990 decision on ways and means to enhance the effective functioning of the Disarmament Commission, where it was agreed that the Chairman of the Commission should conduct consultations year round. I invite him to do so with a view to advancing our preparations for the fourth year of the science and technology item.

So, for those delegations that were looking forward to a respite from this item, I can only say that it promises to be a brief respite indeed. ■

Asia-Pacific Security Forum Established

At their annual meeting held in Singapore on July 23 and 24, foreign ministers of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) announced the launch of a forum for discussion of Asia-Pacific security issues. The so-called ASEAN Regional Forum will hold its first meeting in Bangkok next summer, prior to the annual ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC). Participants will include the six ASEAN countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), the seven "dialogue partners" that participate in the PMC (Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the US and the European Community) and five other states that are observers at the PMC (China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea). Participation will be at the ministerial level.

Security dialogue will also take place at the level of officials, in an annual Senior Officials Meeting (SOM). The first SOM, involving representatives of the ASEAN countries and the PMC dialogue partners, was held this year in Singapore on May 20 and 21. Discussion focused on substantive issues of broad regional and global security. These encompassed both Southeast Asian questions, including the South China Sea, the Straits of Malacca, Cambodia and Burma; and North Asian security issues, including Korea, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and China.

Canada circulated informally two short "food for thought" papers dealing with preventive diplomacy and conflict management and with non-proliferation. At the SOM's conclusion, Canada was tasked by the chair, Singapore, with pursuing further work in these two areas. Australia agreed to prepare a study on confidence-building measures applicable to the region, and South Korea a paper on Northeast Asian security. Next year's SOM will involve all 18 countries participating in the new ASEAN Regional Forum.

The SOM paved the way for the ASEAN PMC, which was held in Singapore from July 26 to 28. The Canadian delegation was led by External Affairs Minister Perrin Beatty. Again, the substan-

tive focus was on regional security issues, with particular importance placed on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Participants also held useful discussions on related political and economic issues.

The PMC's main results were confirmation of an inclusive participation format for future security discussions, involving PMC observer states, and a PMC mandate for senior officials to continue their substantive work on regional security, meeting annually or more frequently if need be. There was agreement on the need for future involvement by the international community in Cambodia, as well as an ASEAN commitment to further press for reform in Burma. In bilateral meetings, Canada and ASEAN countries discussed trade relations, regional security, environment, development cooperation, good governance and human rights.

Canada, which has been promoting the development of Asia-Pacific security dialogue since 1990, was very pleased with the outcome of the first Senior Officials Meeting and subsequent PMC, and with the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Institutionalization of the SOM and establishment of the Forum represent breakthroughs in advancing a cooperative approach to regional security. Canada was particularly happy with the inclusive approach to participation and with the agree-

The ASEAN Regional Forum and Senior Officials Meeting are breakthroughs in a cooperative approach to Asia-Pacific security.

ment to undertake substantive work at official levels. Canada intends to contribute to the process by following up with dispatch on the two areas assigned to us by the SOM.

ASEAN was created in 1967 to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in Southeast Asia and to promote peace and security. Canada has participated in PMCs since 1977. Taken collectively, ASEAN nations constitute Canada's sixth-largest trading partner. Canada-ASEAN two-way trade has doubled in the past five years, reaching a high of \$4 billion in 1992. ■

ASEAN Dialogue Key to Building Transpacific Community



The Canadian delegation to the ASEAN PMC held in Singapore in July. In the front row, from left to right: Mr. Howard Balloch, Assistant Deputy Minister, Asia-Pacific Branch, EAITC; External Affairs Minister Perrin Beatty; and Mr. Gavin Stewart, Canada's High Commissioner to Singapore.

Following are excerpts from the address by External Affairs Minister Perrin Beatty to the ASEAN PMC on July 26.

To determine the importance of Asia to Canada, we need only look at the trade figures. But the relationship, and the bonds between us, go much further. Trade has created economic bonds, immigration has created bonds of family and culture, and the increasing movement of our citizens across the Pacific has created a strong and lasting bond of friendship....

Canada is an active, committed player in the transpacific community. Our role in the world enables us to bring issues that affect this region to the table in international fora such as the G7, and to carry the results of such consultations back to meetings like this one. We equally value the opportunity to discuss the relevance of global issues in the regional context, particularly at this formative time and in this spectacular setting....

Security

The global political changes of recent years have forced us to reassess our traditional assumptions about security. It's a sign of ASEAN's maturity and vision that security issues have been placed squarely

on this week's agenda, and that ASEAN's partners and friends in the Asia-Pacific region have been invited to join the discussions at the ministerial level.

Canada agrees that an effective approach to security dialogue should be inclusive in its membership, engaging all relevant players. It also must be comprehensive in its agenda, reflecting the diverse challenges to security — some traditional, some not.

While we are at a critical and formative stage in this ASEAN process, it has been long in gestation. My predecessor, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, recommended such a process at a special meeting with his ASEAN counterparts in Canada in 1990. We then proposed a similar, although non-governmental, process for the North Pacific or Northeast Asia — a process that has borne real fruit in better understanding and dialogue. We have also, with our dialogue partner, Indonesia, sponsored a consultative process on the thorny issue of the South China Sea — a process that could serve as a model for broader application.

We favour identifying a common set of principles upon which to build a regional security dialogue — building perhaps on the Bali Declaration and drawing from the

broader international agenda with which we are all charged.

In this regard, I want to commend Singapore for holding the first ASEAN PMC Senior Officials Meeting in May. Not only will the SOM lay the groundwork for our annual discussions, but it will also feed into the growing network of complementary opportunities for dialogue on security in the region. These consultations should become a regular feature of our preparations, and we should offer a clear political endorsement of this process.

We are also very pleased that our hosts took the initiative to organize last night's informal dinner, which brought together the foreign ministers participating in both the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and the PMC. We hope that this dinner will be the first step towards a substantive ASEAN Regional Forum that produces greater transparency, increased understanding and a better guarantee of regional security.

Political

In our global and regional foreign policy, Canada gives high priority to human rights, democratic development and the rule of law. Canadians have upheld these values even when it was not in our immediate economic interests to do so.

There is no question, as we see from the shining example of Singapore, that stability is essential for economic advancement. However, we also believe that economic progress must be accompanied by political and social development.

The world increasingly expects not only economic leadership from ASEAN, but political and social leadership as well. As ASEAN countries continue their spectacular economic development, Canadians are encouraged by parallel progress in the areas of human rights and democratization. Peace, tolerance, freedom and respect for the individual are fundamental responsibilities of all governments — and are precious rewards in their own right.

I recognize that there is often a need to balance individual rights with the collective rights of communities and of societies as a whole. Individuals have social duties and responsibilities to their societies, as well as having individual rights as citizens. We are, however, passionate believers in the principle of universality, of the

G7 Pledge Cooperation in Combatting Proliferation

The following is an excerpt from the G7 Tokyo Summit Political Declaration issued on July 8. G7 members include Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US.

Enhanced cooperation is necessary in combatting the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. In particular, we:

- Urge North Korea to retract immediately its decision to withdraw from the NPT, and to fully comply with its non-proliferation obligations, including the implementation of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards agreement and the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula;
- Encourage the countries concerned of the former Soviet Union to ensure rapid, safe and secure elimination of nuclear weapons in accordance with current agreements, providing effective assistance to this end;
- Urge Ukraine to ratify the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty], and Ukraine and Kazakhstan to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

We also continue our efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regimes, including the Missile Technology Control Regime, and to establish effective export controls. We reiterate the objectives of universal adherence to the NPT as well as the Treaty's indefinite extension in 1995 and nuclear arms reduction. We also call on those countries that have not done so to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention and to accede to the Biological Weapons Convention.

In the field of conventional arms, we will work to ensure the effectiveness of the UN Register of Conventional Arms as an important step towards improving transparency and restraint in their transfers.

inviolability of certain rights and freedoms, as expressed in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

I want to underscore a comment [US] Secretary [of State Warren] Christopher made earlier: regional and cultural variations simply cannot be used as a blind behind which a regime can justify torture, summary executions and the systemic disrespect of the rule of law. We are pleased to note great similarities between our views on this issue and those you expressed in your AMM [Annual Ministerial Meeting] statement last week....

As we have in the past, we call once again upon the regime in Burma to restore democracy, to release all political prisoners, and to face up to the reality of change.... Let us be honest. Despite the appointment of a new chairperson, the State Law and Order Restoration Council in Burma has not demonstrated commitment to genuine reform in human rights and democratic development.

We urge all nations in the region to follow the strong lead of Singapore and to convey a clear and consistent message that continued intransigence is unacceptable.

Economic

We have all seen a great change in the economic and trade patterns developing across the Pacific. Our economies are becoming increasingly interdependent, and we have a very real sense of partnership, which allows our business communities to engage in joint ventures and equity arrangements that benefit millions of people on both sides of the Pacific....

We see an exciting future for APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation], building a transpacific community committed to transparency and fair and open trading throughout the region, in which business can expand and natural economies can prosper.

This transpacific community will best thrive in a world where global disciplines and trade liberalization have been assured through a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round [of multilateral trade negotiations]. But beyond the Round, it is only logical that countries of this most dynamic region enhance and extend understandings achieved globally. It may also be via APEC that we help build better understanding about sub-regional arrangements like the NAFTA [North American

Free Trade Agreement] and AFTA [ASEAN Free Trade Area], and ensure that they are consistent with both the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and with the open regional community we are trying to build.

To underline our commitment to this regional prosperity, on Wednesday I will sign with my ASEAN colleagues a revised Canada-ASEAN Economic Cooperation Agreement. This new agreement will be the basis for our economic and commercial relations, and highlights the commitment of Canada and ASEAN to a more active role for our respective private sectors as we forge even stronger links across the Pacific. Today, we see Canada-ASEAN cooperation as a relationship of mutual benefit and shared interests — indeed, of real economic partnership.

Before concluding, let me reflect for a moment on important changes on the political scene in Canada. Ten years since our transpacific trade surpassed our transatlantic trade, and at a time when Chinese has become the third most widely spoken language in Canadian homes, it is only fitting that our new Prime Minister, the Right Honourable Kim Campbell, is the first prime minister born and raised on Canada's Pacific coast. This background has profoundly shaped her view of Canada and the world.

No one can walk down a street in Vancouver without being struck by the impact of Asian trade and culture on that part of our country. Just as Canadian history and development have moved westward from Europe, across the Atlantic and over the continent, our vision and our vocation for the future have increased inexorably in the Pacific. Kim Campbell is uniquely aware of our economic and cultural ties with Asia, and I can assure you of a renewed and intensified focus on Asia-Pacific issues, challenges and opportunities.

In building the transpacific community of which we all speak, ASEAN dialogue is key. I am confident that ASEAN's success will produce a ripple effect, as the causes of peace, prosperity, human rights and security move forward both within this region and well beyond its boundaries.

A key focus of the 21st century will be on the Pacific region and its nations. It's a tremendous honour for me to join you today in the ASEAN PMC process, a process at the very heart of this new Pacific century.

Hemispheric Security: Canada in the OAS

Canada's third year in the Organization of American States (OAS) culminated in the meeting of the General Assembly in Managua in June, during which the OAS adopted a series of groundbreaking resolutions in the area of hemispheric security — thus placing security issues firmly on the OAS agenda and work program. Canada was instrumental in providing the substantive contribution and political leadership necessary to bring these issues to the General Assembly.

Building on successful efforts last year to establish the "Special Committee on Hemispheric Security," Canada pursued an action plan for engaging key Latin American partners through the OAS (as well as bilaterally) in bringing substance to the institutional framework we and OAS partners had created for ongoing discussion and practical cooperation on regional security issues. In particular, Canada focused discussions in areas such as conflict prevention, arms proliferation, conventional arms transfers and the relationship between the OAS and the UN on issues of peace and security, including the UN Secretary General's *An Agenda for Peace*. Canada also brought forward strong and clear views to the discussion on the future of the Inter American Defence Board (IADB) and its institutional relationship to the OAS.

These efforts resulted in OAS General Assembly adoption of the following decisions in the area of hemispheric security:

- Report and resolution of the Permanent Council on Cooperation for Security and Development in the Hemisphere — Regional Contributions to Global Security;
- resolution on the IADB;
- resolution on a "Meeting of Experts on Security Mechanisms and Measures to Promote Confidence in the Region";
- resolution on "Information on Defence Spending and Registry of Conventional Weapons"; and
- resolution on "Consolidation of the Regime Established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean."

Together, these resolutions span the hemispheric security agenda and define a broad program of work for the Special Committee in the coming year. They also provide a focus for activities in priority areas such as conventional arms transfers and conflict management.

The resolution on "Cooperation for Security and Development in the Hemisphere" reflected many ideas Canada had fed into the Special Committee's discussions during the last year and had pursued in contacts with the Committee's Chairman, Ambassador Hernan Patino of Argentina. As advocated by Canada, OAS states agreed in the resolution to continue and to intensify work in the Special Committee. The resolution also established a framework for "working groups of government experts" to meet to discuss selected topics on the security agenda.

The resolution outlines the work program for the Special Committee for the coming year. This will include:

- the relationship between the OAS and the UN;
- global and regional disarmament and arms control;
- the relationship between development, environment and disarmament and arms control;
- prevention of all forms of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and controls on the export of dual-use goods and technologies;

Managua General Assembly outlines work program for security committee.

- promotion of openness and transparency in the transfer of conventional weapons, including provision of information to registers on conventional weapons and exchanges of information on national policies;
- consideration of measures for conflict prevention and peaceful settlement of disputes, exchanges of information and consideration of measures to promote confidence and transparency; and
- examination of the special problems of small states including issues such as drug traffic, illicit arms trade and disaster management.

Canada will be an active participant in all of these areas. We will continue to work to strengthen the OAS role in hemispheric security and to establish the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security as the central forum within the OAS for discussion and practical cooperation on issues relating to hemispheric security. ■

Canada Hosts CBM Workshop for Middle East Peace Process

At the invitation of the cosponsors of the Middle East peace process (the US and Russia), and under the auspices of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group, Canada will host a three-day workshop on maritime confidence-building measures (CBMs) in Sydney, Nova Scotia from September 12 to 14. All of the regional participants in the peace process have been invited to the workshop, which will be the first of its kind.

The event will concentrate on two types of maritime CBMs. The first is the negotiation and implementation of agreements aimed at the prevention of incidents at sea. There are several such agreements between various NATO nations and Russia, negotiated during the Cold War. Canada and Russia have had such an

agreement since 1989. The agreements establish procedures to be observed by naval vessels when operating in proximity. The purpose is to prevent misunderstandings that could lead to an incident with serious consequences. The frequency of naval incidents — up to and including warships "bumping" each other — has dropped dramatically among parties to existing agreements. There are no equivalent agreements between or among Middle Eastern navies.

The second area to be examined is enhanced cooperation in regional maritime search and rescue activities. Though not related to military activities per se, such cooperation constitutes an important element in the development of a regional approach to

cooperation across a broad spectrum of humanitarian concerns. In particular, the coordination required to effectively mount a multilateral response to maritime disasters necessitates a high degree of ongoing consultation and cooperation among those involved in any multilateral regional search and rescue activities.

Many states have standing search and rescue agreements that outline common responsibilities and training procedures. For example, Canada has a search and rescue agreement with the US. In addition to its utility as a humanitarian gesture, the negotiation of such an agreement in the Middle East would enhance practical cooperation among the parties in the region on a daily basis.

Regional participants in the Middle East peace process include Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan/Palestinian delegation, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Qatar, Yemen and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, Canada has invited the US, Russia, Australia, China, Japan and Turkey to send delegations to the Sydney workshop.

It is Canada's hope that the regional parties will leave Sydney with new perspectives on how they might develop maritime CBMs in the Middle East. ■

The United Nations: The Will to Reform

Following are excerpts from an address by External Affairs Minister Perrin Beatty to the Freedom Forum in Toronto on August 18.

It's hard to believe that it was only three years ago that we were celebrating the defeat of Communism and the end of the Cold War. The Iron Curtain has been drawn back, the Berlin Wall has fallen, the threat of nuclear Armageddon has given way to the promise of a new order, but we are left with a world that is as troubled as ever, and in some ways more troubled than ever before.

The world is no longer divided between two opposing camps facing each other in a nuclear stand-off. However, instead of enjoying an unprecedented era of peace, order and prosperity, we find ourselves struggling with the ugliest forms of nationalism, interethnic hatred and religious rivalries that have been released from their Cold War constraints.

The UN remains the single most important instrument we have for promoting peace, democracy and freedom.

Martin Jacques's excellent essay last month in *The Sunday Times* magazine, which was entitled "The End of Politics," pointed out the irony of how Communism may have lost the ideological struggle, but the West has lost its sense of unity and purpose.

The collapse of Communism did not leave the West unscathed, triumphant and unchallenged, as most expected in 1989. On the contrary, the demise of bipolarism has thrown the West into crisis. An overriding enemy provides a sense of purpose, helps to subordinate and discipline other potential conflicts, gives a clear moral framework, and furnishes a sense of identity. Without it, all these questions rise to the surface in a new way, begging answers that are novel and profound.

The images you deliver to our homes from Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia and elsewhere, are a daily reminder that we have a long way to go before peace, order, freedom and respect for human rights become the rule rather than the exception.

As the Gulf War, the democratization of Cambodia, and the United Nations efforts in Bosnia demonstrate, the old divisions no longer stop the international community from responding to regional problems. We have an unprecedented opportunity to introduce order where there is chaos, peace where there is conflict, and relief where there is pain and suffering. The

challenge of our time is to match our abilities to that opportunity.

A large part of the answer lies in our multilateral institutions, especially the United Nations. While it was hobbled by the stalemate between the superpowers,

we could blame the UN's failings on the lack of fundamental consensus. We cannot do so now, when ideological schisms are behind us.

We have won a vital part of the struggle. What is needed today is the will to reform and the determination to finish the job. The UN remains the single most important instrument we have for promoting peace, democracy and freedom in the world. Surely no task is more important than to make it as effective as possible.

Let me talk first about how we can strengthen the UN's vital role in keeping the peace.

We all share in the benefits of peace. We all must share the responsibility for building and maintaining it. The two go hand-in-hand. No single state can or should be expected to serve as the world's policeman. The United States certainly should provide both moral leadership and material resources for peacekeeping. It has an indispensable role in revitalizing and strengthening the United Nations, as well as regional institutions, to prevent conflicts, to deal with them when they break out, to provide humanitarian relief, and to promote freedom and human rights.

In the long and troubled era since the end of World War II, America has accepted the burden of defending peace and freedom without succumbing to the temptation to once again turn inward to isolationism. Nor does it do so now, even when the greatest challenges to its global leadership are no longer military, but economic and social, and are often domestic instead of foreign.

All of us should be encouraged by the Clinton Administration's willingness to work in partnership with other members of the international community. Multilateralism can be frustrating, particularly when your country has long been asked to carry more than its fair share of the burden. Americans have every right to look to the rest of the world to do its part.

For that matter, so do we in Canada. Consider the fact that Canada's assessed contributions to the UN have grown from \$8 million to almost \$90 million annually. At one point last year, Canadians represented some 10 percent of forces involved in peacekeeping missions. Is it any wonder that we are also looking for other countries to pick up their fair share?

We believe in peacekeeping. We have had more experience with it than any other country in the world. With the third

largest peacekeeping contingent in the former Yugoslavia, with peacekeepers in Cambodia, the Middle East and elsewhere, obviously Canada remains firmly committed to making its contribution.

For example, in September 1991, Prime Minister Mulroney led the call for the UN Security Council to deal with the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Since April 1992, we have deployed some 2,400 troops and 45 Royal Canadian Mounted Police monitors with the UN Protection Force. Another 12 Canadian soldiers are deployed with a CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission.

We have provided over \$38 million worth of humanitarian assistance. This July, we contributed \$250,000 to the Canadian Red Cross for medical personnel and relief action for 230 abandoned patients, mostly children. And we are continuing to explore ways of helping the victims of this tragic conflict.

Our role in peacekeeping has been a source of national pride from the very first day former Prime Minister Lester Pearson came up with the idea during the Suez Crisis. We see it in a broad international context. We are conscious of the fact that our security and prosperity depend on a strong and stable international community, based on the rule of law and effective international institutions. This is not just my view or the government's. It is also the opinion of the vast majority of Canadians.

Let's look at some of the specific reforms needed to make the UN more effective.

A month from now, when the UN General Assembly begins, Canada's top priority will be to work with partners, such as the United States, to encourage a serious and determined process of reform. Prime Minister Campbell made that case forcefully at the G7 summit in Tokyo, and the final communiqué reflected the leaders' understanding that progress is needed now.

The United Nations needs more than fine-tuning. We need fundamental improvements in the way it is structured and operates.

Today, the international community is being called upon to intervene in a multitude of localized or regional conflicts caused by ethnic or religious hostility, famine and the abuse of human rights.

We find ourselves struggling to cope with new demands, new expectations and

new challenges, equipped with tools designed for another age and other purposes. In these circumstances, we must not allow ourselves to become discouraged or disaffected. Instead, we must be more determined than ever to give ourselves late-20th-century tools for late-20th-century problems.

The UN Secretary-General's *An Agenda for Peace* is an excellent road map. Isn't it time that we stopped just reading the map and took some bold steps down the road towards a more effective UN? Steps, for example, in areas such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, enforcement, preventive diplomacy or peacebuilding?

cepts and attitudes underlying our approach. Too many people still think of peacekeeping as an exclusively military operation, with soldiers in blue berets keeping former combatants apart. So much more is involved today. So much more is needed today.

For example, civilians are playing an increasingly important role in missions to restore peace. Cambodia is a case in point. Soldiers aren't the only ones on the front lines. There are also legal experts, medical personnel, and specialists in the area of election organization and monitoring. In other situations, there may be a need for professional police, experts on infrastruc-

Canadian Forces photo



At one point last year, Canadians represented some 10 percent of forces involved in UN peacekeeping missions.

Take, for example, the case of mandates that are given to UN peacekeeping missions. At times, these mandates have been unclear and imprecise. At times, the scope of the mandate has not been matched by the resources provided to the mission.

When UN missions are established, they must have clear and precise mandates, they must be given the authority they need to deal promptly and effectively with situations as they develop in the field, and they must be given the resources they need to get the job done.

We also need to change the culture of peacekeeping — the fundamental con-

ture and municipal administration, or human rights observers.

That is where the notion of peacebuilding comes in. The fact is that what is often required today is not just to restore peace, but to restore communities, to rebuild roads and schools, water and sewage systems, hospitals and basic public services.

Obviously, military operations will continue to be crucial to UN intervention in matters of peace and security. But, here again, there is plenty of room for improvement, especially in the areas of planning, training, command and logistical support. When you consider the fact that there has been a sixfold increase in the number of

people serving in UN forces in the last three years, it is obvious that UN headquarters must be better equipped to plan and manage its operations around the world.

The time for reform is now:

- Let's give the United Nations a permanent general staff to plan and conduct its peacekeeping operations.
- Let's establish a UN military college to train a corps of officers who can work effectively together.
- Let's ensure that the UN has the ability to stockpile equipment and to airlift material and personnel quickly to a theatre of operations.
- Let's develop a code of conduct and common operating procedures for all personnel under the UN flag. The UN suffers from the same problems of interoperability that have plagued NATO over the years. And finally,
- Let's pledge our countries to commit troops on a stand-by basis for use by the Secretary-General on short notice as crises develop.

Other reforms are necessary as well to improve the UN's capacity to act effectively in matters of peace and security, as well as in matters of humanitarian assistance and relief.

First, there is the matter of finances. It is simply unacceptable that the UN Secretary-General must go around the world, cap in hand, urging member countries, large and small, to pay their dues.

The United Nations cannot operate properly if it is constantly facing a financial crisis. Every country that believes in the value of the UN should pay its dues in full and on time. For its part, the UN itself has an obligation to the taxpayers of the world to ensure that it spends every single dollar wisely and properly.

We must also take a good hard look at the structure of the United Nations from two points of view: to make sure that we are making the best use of available resources; and to transform the organizational structure of the UN, including the Security Council, into something that is more relevant to today's world, not to the world as it existed 40 years ago.

Finally, we need to develop more effective working relations between the United Nations and regional institutions. The UN and the OAS [Organization of American States] are showing the way by working together to restore democracy and freedom in Haiti.

I know that this is a tall order, that we can't transform the UN in a day, a month or a year. But when you see the savage brutality of warlords, be they in Somalia or the former Yugoslavia or elsewhere, when you see the looks of terror and despair in the eyes of hundreds of thousands of refugees, when you see the enormous suffering of so many innocent civilians, can there be any more compelling task than to give ourselves the best possible instrument for promoting peace, democracy and freedom?

Reforming our international institutions so that they can function in a world that is more complex and less predictable than ever before is both our challenge and our reward now that the Cold War has been won. Clarity of vision and unshakeable determination are every bit as necessary today as they were throughout the four decades of struggle through which we have just passed with such great success. We owe our children a safer, freer and more peaceful world.

Canada's First Committee Priorities

The 48th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA 48) will open in New York on September 21. Arms control and disarmament issues will be considered in the First Committee, where Canada has traditionally played an active role.

Canadian arms control and non-proliferation priorities during the UNGA 47 First Committee were to complete negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to confirm and strengthen existing global non-proliferation instruments such as the NPT and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Canada also stressed the importance of initiating multilateral negotiations for a CTBT, of strengthening controls on the export of sensitive technologies, and of developing and applying regional arms control regimes, linking global and regional measures as required.

In addition, Canada initiated a resolution, adopted without a vote, that requested the views of Member States on ways to build upon the 1990 UN Group of Experts study on verification, as well as a resolution on the prohibition of the pro-

duction of fissionable material for weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

With the exception of the CWC, which has been concluded, the Canadian delegation to UNGA 48, led by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason, will continue to pursue the above objectives. Canada will place particular emphasis on First Committee resolutions that touch on CTBT negotiations. The delegation will also play a lead role in moving forward the process of rationalizing the work of the First Committee by exploiting new opportunities to enhance dialogue and cooperation among former adversaries.

Canada will maintain a strong interest and participation in the following resolutions that are likely to be considered at UNGA 48:

NPT

There will in all likelihood be a resolution on the 1995 NPT extension and review process. Canada will continue to call for the indefinite extension of the NPT and the goal of universal adherence.

Verification

Work has already commenced on a draft Canadian verification resolution that calls for a follow-on UN Group of Experts study to that of 1990.

CTBT

Canada will encourage UNGA to make every effort to support upcoming CTBT negotiations in the CD, particularly regarding the key issue of an effective verification package.

Cut-off

Canada will take its traditional lead on the fissionable material cut-off resolution.

Transparency in Armaments

There will probably be a resolution on the second stage of the work program of the UN arms register. Canada will continue to cosponsor this resolution.

Canada will also chair both the Barton Group and the Group of Democratic and Other States (GODOS), which provide fora for consultation on resolutions. The Barton Group originated during the early 1970s and consists of traditional Western states. GODOS was formed during UNGA 47. It has a broadly-based membership that cuts across traditional East-West and North-South dividing lines.

Peacekeeping: Canada Sends Observers to Uganda-Rwanda



Canadian peacekeepers on patrol in the former Yugoslavia.

Canadian Brigadier General Romeo Dallaire has been appointed the Chief Military Observer and commander of the recently-created United Nations Observer Mission Uganda Rwanda (UNOMUR). UNOMUR's mandate is to patrol the Ugandan side of the Uganda-Rwanda border to verify that no military assistance is reaching the Rwandan Patriotic Front from across the Ugandan border. In addition to General Dallaire, Canada is contributing one other officer to the 81-person mission. Other peacekeeping developments since the last issue of the *Bulletin* are listed below.

The Canadian withdrawal from the United Nations Force in **Cyprus** (UNFICYP) is scheduled to be completed by the middle of September.

The Unified Task Force in **Somalia** (UNITAF) has completed its task and has been replaced by the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The 1,300-strong Canadian contingent assigned to UNITAF has been repatriated and Canada has committed up to 15 military personnel to work at UNOSOM headquarters.

The mandate for the UN Transitional Authority in **Cambodia** (UNTAC) is scheduled to end at the end of August. UNTAC successfully carried out free and fair elections and the process of reconstruction is underway. All UN troops, including the 214 Canadians, are scheduled

to be out of Cambodia by November 15.

The mandate of the UN Observer Mission in **El Salvador** (UNOSAL) has been very effective in assisting the peace

process in that country. UNOSAL is currently downscaling its operation in view of the success of the peace process. As a result, Canada's contribution to the Mission has been reduced from five observers to two.

Canada continues to maintain its contribution of two battalions to the UN Protection Force in the **former Yugoslavia** (UNPROFOR). Canadian forces continue to aid in the delivery of humanitarian supplies in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to undertake traditional peacekeeping activities of truce supervision and the separation of forces in Croatia.

NATO, in conjunction with the UN, has developed plans for possible air strikes in Bosnia-Herzegovina to prevent the blockage of UN humanitarian relief supplies destined for war victims. First authorization for the air strikes would be made by the UN Secretary-General. Any NATO air strikes would have to be authorized by the NATO commander as well as the commander of UNPROFOR to ensure the safety of UN military and civilian personnel on the ground. ■

Report on Military Exports Released

The *Third Annual Report on the Export of Military Goods from Canada* is now available. The report outlines the government's strict criteria for permitting the export of Canadian-made military goods and lists countries that purchased Canadian military equipment under the export permit system during 1992. As a result of 1991 amendments to the Export and Import Permits Act, the report introduces a new category of country — those on the Automatic Firearms Country Control List (AFCCCL). That list includes countries with which Canada has defence research, development and production arrangements, namely Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US.

Overall, 93% of Canadian exports of military goods in 1992 went to Canada's NATO allies, countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Canada's AFCCCL partners.

"This report is evidence of Canada's commitment to increasing openness about military transfers," said then-External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall on the report's release in April. The report was tabled in the House of Commons and presented to the UN.

In addition to releasing the *Third Annual Report*, Canada this year provided the UN arms register with information about our 1992 exports and imports of the seven categories of conventional weapons identified by the register: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers. In addition, Canada went beyond UN requirements and provided information about its holdings of weapons in these seven categories.

To obtain a copy of the *Third Annual Report*, contact the Export Controls Division of EAITC (613-996-2387).

Focus: On a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

On August 10, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) decided to give its *Ad Hoc* Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT). The CD's decision followed the announcement in July that the US is extending its ban on nuclear testing, in place since October 1992, for a further 15 months, through September 1994. These historic developments are key steps towards a goal that has occupied a central position on the multilateral arms control and disarmament agenda for the better part of four decades, and that Canada has long advocated.

Background

Discussions and negotiations on limiting nuclear tests and pursuing a comprehensive test ban have been held on and off since the late 1950s: multilaterally, in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and its successor bodies (today the Conference on Disarmament); trilaterally, among the US, the USSR and the UK; and bilaterally, between the US and the USSR.

Although an underground test ban proved elusive during the Cold War, three other agreements concerning testing were reached. In 1963, due largely to public concern about the effects of radioactive fallout, the US, the USSR and the UK arrived at the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, commonly referred to as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT). Over 115 states, including Canada, are parties to the PTBT. France and China have not become parties. France announced in 1974 that it would refrain from conducting atmospheric tests. China conducted its last atmospheric test in 1980; in March 1986 it confirmed that it would no longer test in the atmosphere.

In 1974, the US and the USSR signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, usually called the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT). The TTBT prohibits any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield in excess of 150 kilotons and restricts testing to specified areas. Each party agreed to use its national technical means of verification and not to interfere with the means of verification of the other party.

The parties also agreed to exchange information necessary to improve assessments of the yields of explosions.

In 1976, the two states signed the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, known in short form as the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). This Treaty regulates the explosions each party may conduct outside its nuclear weapon test sites (and which may, therefore, be presumed to be for peaceful purposes). Like the TTBT, it establishes an upper limit of 150 kilotons for any such explosion. Any group explosion is also limited to 150 kilotons unless each of its individual explosions can be identified and each yield determined to be not more than 150 kilotons, and the aggregate yield does not exceed 1.5 megatons.

Following further negotiations and agreement on two protocols detailing verification arrangements for the TTBT and the PNET, both were ratified by the US and the USSR and entered into force on December 11, 1990.

Why a Test Ban?

Explosive tests are conducted to develop and refine the design of nuclear weapons and to check their reliability.

While a CTBT would not stop nuclear weapon states from making additional weapons using old designs, it could put a brake on their development of new and "improved" weapons. Some experts argue that nuclear weapons can be perfected using only laboratory methods. Indeed, a CTBT presumes that relatively trustworthy safety and reliability checks can be done in the lab. Even so, without a test in the field, a country could never be 100 percent certain that a weapon would work as intended. It thus might be reluctant to deploy an untested design, particularly when older, tested options are available. In terms of nuclear disarmament, though, a CTBT is no substitute for further negotiated reductions in existing nuclear arsenals.

It is harder to guess the impact of a test ban on states seeking nuclear weapons. Media reports suggest that some "threshold" states might have developed nuclear weapons without testing them; unlike the nuclear weapon states, they might be more

willing to rely on a deterrent based on laboratory results alone. Also, such states would not be bound by a CTBT unless they signed it, something they might be unlikely to do unless their broader security concerns were dealt with. A nuclear test ban is probably not sufficient in and of itself to encourage threshold states to renounce nuclear weapons. It certainly is not an alternative to universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

To a large extent, the importance of a CTBT lies in its symbolic value. The test ban has been at the heart of UN arms control and disarmament debates for the last 35 years. Its achievement would be further evidence of the willingness of existing nuclear powers to reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. Thus, the CTBT has the potential to give a boost to non-proliferation efforts, in particular, to efforts to reinforce the NPT.

The NPT contains a provision (Article VI) under which each of the parties undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The NPT also includes in the preamble a reference to the declared intention of the parties to the PTBT to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to that end.

In 1995, a conference will be convened to decide whether the NPT will continue in force indefinitely or be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. Many states support the view that a CTBT would be a significant fulfilment of the nuclear weapon states' obligations under Article VI. Some believe that without a cessation of nuclear testing, it might not be possible to extend the NPT well beyond 1995. Other states, including Canada, are of the opinion that the NPT independently offers benefits for the security of all states and, by its indefinite extension, will continue to do so. Nonetheless, a CTBT would undoubtedly improve the climate of the extension process. The CTBT has figured in past NPT review conference debates, to the extent that differences on the issue prevented agreement on a final docu-

ment in 1990.

A CTBT could also enhance the prospects for progress on other non-proliferation items, such as a ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes.

Verification

The question of whether and how a ban on testing could be adequately verified has been a major stumbling block in past testing negotiations and is likely to be at the heart of any new ones. The smaller the stocks of nuclear weapons, the greater the worry that even a little cheating could upset the balance.

A verification system for a CTBT would have two basic purposes: 1) to provide confidence that parties are obeying their treaty obligations; and 2) to deter parties from clandestine activities violating the treaty. A verification system must provide a high capability to detect and identify clandestine activities. It must further limit the risk of creating false alarms by misinterpreting naturally occurring events — such as earthquakes — as clandestine activities. A large number of false alarms would reduce the credibility of the verification system and thus of the treaty itself.

It is generally agreed that seismic monitoring will play a central role in CTBT verification. Seismic monitors, or seismographs, detect vibrations in the earth's crust, which can be caused by underground nuclear explosions, earthquakes or lesser tremors. When a sufficiently large number of suitably located seismographs sense the same event, it is often possible to compare their findings and determine with a fair degree of certainty the nature of the event causing the vibrations, its location, its depth below the surface and the approximate amount of energy involved. (For a more detailed discussion of seismic verification, see "Focus" in *The Disarmament Bulletin* No. 11, Fall 1989.)

Through the Conference on Disarmament, an *ad hoc* Group of Scientific Experts (GSE) was established in 1976 with a mandate to devise a conceptual design for an international seismic data exchange system and to test its various components. The GSE is open to all CD member states as well as to non-member states on request. Over the years, experts and representatives from 35 countries have participated in the work of the GSE.

The GSE has held two international seismic data exchange experiments, in

1984 and 1991, and has developed and refined a series of concepts that would form the backbone of a future international seismic verification network. It has also looked at such things as communications procedures and joint analysis of seismic data. The GSE is now starting to implement the results of its studies, to the level of selecting the seismograph stations that should be included in a global network and investigating sites in regions that will require new stations. The GSE has set a target date of January 1, 1995 to have enough of a global system in place to begin full-scale testing.

The system developed by the GSE is intended to be a service to those countries that are parties to a CTBT, by providing them with easily accessible information derived from globally collected data. The judgement as to whether a nuclear explosion has taken place would be left to the individual states parties.

Although seismic events can be monitored with considerable accuracy, there are some problems with relying solely on seismology to verify a CTBT. For example, countries can try to hide nuclear explosions by testing devices in an area that is prone to earthquakes, or by disguising the wave pattern of the nuclear test so that it blends in with the seismic background noise usually found in the area. It may be particularly difficult for seismologists to detect and pinpoint tests of relatively small nuclear explosive devices. In addition, the sheer number of seismic events occurring each year — over 10,000 — may make it impractical to monitor and analyze all of them, and then re-analyze the ones that look suspicious using additional data from other sources. On the other hand, the attempt to do so could well discourage illegal nuclear testing by providing a good chance that potential treaty offenders would be caught.

Seismic verification of a CTBT is likely to be supplemented by other measures. These might include:

- aerial and space surveillance;
- collection and analysis of atmospheric radionuclides; and
- on-site inspection.

CTBT Prospects

With the extension of the US moratorium and the agreement to negotiate a CTBT in the CD, prospects have never been better for a legally-binding global

ban on nuclear testing. Russia has been observing a moratorium on testing since October 1991 and France since April 1992. Since the UK tests only in the US, the American moratorium has meant an involuntary moratorium for that country as well. That leaves China as the sole declared nuclear weapon state that continues to reserve the option to test.

In making his July 3 announcement, President Clinton indicated the US willingness to proceed with CTBT negotiations. Russia is strongly in favour of a CTBT and has made clear its willingness to participate in negotiations. France has said that it would support a CTBT as long as the treaty is universal and verifiable. The UK has in the past expressed the view that as long as its security depends on deterrence based, in part, on nuclear weapons, there will be a continuing requirement to conduct underground nuclear tests to ensure that its nuclear weapons remain effective and up to date. China has indicated that it favours a prohibition on nuclear tests within the framework of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. Whether this means negotiations on the former would be contingent on parallel negotiations on the latter is unclear.

In 1990, the CD established an *ad hoc* committee to initiate substantive work on specific and interrelated test ban issues, including the structure and scope of a treaty as well as verification and compliance. Further to the CD's August 1993 decision to give this committee a general CTBT negotiating mandate, members are now consulting on the specific mandate for and the organization of negotiations. Consultations will continue until January 17, 1994, with the hope of beginning negotiations shortly thereafter. All nuclear weapon states are members of the CD.

Canada and a CTBT

Canada has been a long-standing and vocal advocate of a CTBT and has undertaken landmark research in seismic verification of nuclear tests. Canada plays an active role in consideration of a CTBT at the UN General Assembly, being among the members of a "core group" of countries that has, in the past, drafted a traditional resolution on this issue. In addition, Canada participates in the CD's *Ad Hoc* Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. A Canadian coordinated the GSE's second global seis-

mic data exchange experiment and Canada's seismological array at Yellowknife provided data for the test. Canadians continue to be at the forefront of CTB verification research.

Canada has congratulated France, Russia and the US for implementing testing moratoria, and these last two for making a commitment to negotiate a CTBT. We have called on the UK and China to join in.

Canada believes that CTBT negotiations are best undertaken in a multilateral forum like the CD. An early start to negotiations should help to create a more favourable atmosphere for the indefinite, unconditional extension of the NPT and should assist other non-proliferation efforts. In Canada's view, the treaty should contain strong verification provisions and provide for universal adherence. Canada will continue to promote efforts towards a CTBT in the CD and in other fora. ■

Forecast

Arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, October 1993 through January 1994.

Ongoing: CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Vienna

Ongoing: CFE Joint Consultative Group, Vienna

Ongoing: Open Skies Consultative Commission, Vienna

September 27 - October 1: CWC Preparatory Committee meeting, The Hague

October 18 - December 6: UN General Assembly First Committee, New York

November 2-4: Meeting of the Middle East peace process Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, Moscow


November 29 - December 3: Missile Technology Control Regime experts meeting, Interlaken, Switzerland

December: Australia Group meeting, Paris

December 13-14: International Seminar on the Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Oslo

January 1994: CTBT negotiations due to begin in the CD, Geneva

January 17-21, 1994: NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee meeting, New York



Commercially available overhead imagery is becoming more relevant to the verification of arms control agreements, including a CTBT, as resolutions improve and the number of sources increase. This is a Russian DD-5 satellite image of the US Nevada test site taken in August 1992. The ground spatial resolution is approximately 2 metres.

Acronyms

AFCCCL — Automatic Firearms Country Control List
 ASEAN (PMC) — Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Post-Ministerial Conference)
 CD — Conference on Disarmament
 CFE — Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
 C(S)BM — confidence- (and security-) building measure
 CTB(T) — comprehensive test ban (treaty)
 CWC — Chemical Weapons Convention
 EAITC — External Affairs and International Trade Canada
 GODOS — Group of Democratic and Other States
 GSE — Group of Scientific Experts
 GSETT — GSE Technical Test
 IDC — International Data Centre
 ISMS — International Seismic Monitoring System
 NPT — Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

OAS — Organization of American States
 PTBT — Partial Test Ban Treaty
 SOM — Senior Officials Meeting
 UNDC — UN Disarmament Commission
 UNGA — UN General Assembly

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The Disarmament Bulletin

A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

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CFE Reaches 25% Target

At midnight on November 16, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) passed a significant milestone: the end of the first reduction phase. By then, over 17,000 pieces of Treaty-limited equipment (TLE) had been destroyed or converted for non-military purposes under strict procedures and stringent verification measures. Although a number of issues remain unresolved, in practice CFE is serving as the foundation for a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe.

Signed on November 19, 1990, CFE provisions did not enter into force in their entirety until July 17, 1992. Briefly, CFE limits the NATO alliance and states that belonged to the now-defunct Warsaw Pact (or their successors) to equal holdings of TLE and requires extensive exchanges of information to record where this TLE is located and to whom it belongs. CFE also requires the destruction of TLE holdings that exceed national entitlements (collectively called the reduction liability), although limited quantities of some equipment types can be converted to non-military uses. Extensive on-site inspection provisions permit signatories to monitor whether other parties are fulfilling their obligations. Canada has conducted 10 on-site inspections to verify the (to page 2)



Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet with UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in New York on November 10. During his first official visit outside Canada, Mr. Ouellet met with Mr. Boutros-Ghali, Special UN Representative for Haiti Dante Caputo, and the ambassadors of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

Plus ça change? A Look at European Security

The fall of the Berlin Wall and all that it symbolized has not resulted in the hoped-for era of peace and stability in Europe. Ex-Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union are dotted with instability and war. Other parts of the continent face turmoil and uncertainty. Yet it is not entirely a case of unchanging change. CFE implementation is proceeding apace, promoting security cooperation among the parties and placing limits on future levels of major weapon systems in Europe. The CSCE has developed a small institutional structure and is active in fields ranging from arms

control to forestry to minority rights. NATO is encouraging the growth of democracy in its former enemies and providing support for UN peacekeeping.

Canada has been intimately involved in European security issues since the Second World War. Its interest in ensuring a stable Europe and a meaningful transatlantic relationship remains as vital as ever. This issue of the *Bulletin* looks in depth at Canada's efforts to help put in place a framework of agreements and institutions capable of successfully meeting European security challenges.

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Ouellet New Minister of Foreign Affairs



On November 4, the Honourable André Ouellet, Member of Parliament for the constituency of Papineau-Saint-Michel in Quebec, was named Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs. He replaces the Honourable Perrin Beatty, who had held the post since June 1993.

Mr. Ouellet has been a member of the House of Commons since 1967 and has held several Cabinet positions during his

years on Parliament Hill. He has served as Postmaster General, President of the Privy Council, Government House Leader, Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Minister of State for Urban Affairs, Minister of Public Works, Minister of Labour and Minister of State for Regional Economic Development. He has also served as Minister Responsible for various Crown Corporations, including the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, the Metric Commission and the Standards Council of Canada.

Mr. Ouellet was appointed the Official Critic for Transport in 1985, Official Critic for External Affairs in 1988 and Official Critic for Federal-Provincial Relations in 1990. Between 1990 and 1992, he sat on one royal commission and two parliamentary committees on Canada's constitution: the Belanger/Campeau Commission, as well as the Beaudoin/Edwards and Beaudoin/Dobbie Committees. He was Chair of the Quebec Liberal Caucus in 1968, Chief Political Organizer of the Federal Liberal Party in Quebec from 1977 to 1984, and Co-Chair of the National Liberal Campaign Committee in 1992.

Mr. Ouellet graduated from the University of Ottawa and the University of Sherbrooke Faculty of Law.

accuracy of exchanged information.

Forty-four months will be required to implement the various active phases of CFE, before a residual phase of unlimited duration commences. Following entry into force in mid-1992, states began an intensive program of verifying the initial exchanges of military information. This occurred during the 120-day baseline validation period. Most inspections were designed to verify the accuracy of exchanged information at a representative sampling of military units or facilities where TLE was located. However, some verification activities were conducted to monitor the destruction of TLE, known as "reduction" events. Following the conclusion of the baseline period, reduction activities intensified, particularly in the autumn of 1993 as signatories rushed to meet their obligations. CFE required that 25 percent of reduction targets had to be met by November 16, 1993. Targets of

60 percent and 100 percent exist for the two subsequent 12-month periods, ending respectively on November 16, 1994 and November 16, 1995.

After completion of the three-year reduction period in 1995, a second 120-day period known as the residual level validation period will again permit states to conduct an intensive program of verifying national holdings of TLE. This will be followed by the open-ended residual phase, during which a more modest level of on-site inspections will continue to be conducted.

CFE was originally conceived of as a treaty between two opposing blocs of states. However, the evolution in relations between the members of NATO and other CFE States Parties has exceeded the most optimistic intentions contained in the Treaty preamble, namely to "replace military confrontation with a new pattern of security relations among all the States Parties based on peaceful cooperation."

It is primarily in the implementation of verification activities that CFE participants have demonstrated a cooperative approach to Treaty implementation. CFE verification provisions fully embody the 16 verification principles endorsed by the UN General Assembly in December 1988. These stress that verification should build confidence among states by providing clear evidence of continued confirmation of compliance.

Some aspects of verifying CFE obligations are particularly suitable for implementation through a cooperative approach. For example, TLE reduction events must be notified to all other States Parties at least 15 days in advance of the start of the reduction period and must indicate the expected date of completion of the event. This enables other states to arrange, at minimum, to view TLE before and after it is destroyed and, if desired, to view the entire process. However, because the state conducting a reduction activity is obligated to receive only a single inspection team at any reduction site, States Parties wishing to monitor the activity are effectively encouraged to join forces and form a multi-national inspection team.

Since CFE entry into force, the members of NATO have been very active in coordinating their reduction monitoring activities. Under the guidance of a Verification Coordinating Committee (VCC) on which each ally is represented, more than 300 multinational inspection teams have been formed to monitor approximately 165 reduction events notified by other States Parties. Canada has led teams to 20 of these events and participated on the teams of other states at another 54 events.

To enhance the effectiveness of CFE implementation, the VCC initiated a cooperative program with the non-NATO CFE States Parties, which are collectively referred to as the Cooperation Partners. The program comprises jointly-conducted inspections, joint training, and access by Cooperation Partners to the NATO verification database VERITY. In addition, seminars designed to reinforce a cooperative approach to CFE implementation were held at NATO headquarters in January and November 1993. The establishment of this program was motivated by the desire to acknowledge the spirit of openness and cooperation demonstrated by Cooperation Partners during the initial months of application and implementation of CFE.

The program was also designed to



Russian armoured personnel carriers in Wunsdorf, Germany, awaiting reduction in accordance with CFE provisions (the flag decal is courtesy of a zealous Canadian inspector).

address NATO's concerns about the number of inspections that Cooperation Partners have conducted among themselves. Such inspections reduce the number of inspections that can be conducted by NATO allies. The VCC proposed that Cooperation Partners meet their security concerns by participating in inspections led by NATO members (who would be responsible under NATO rules for costs once the inspector joins the team). The VCC agreed to open a number of NATO inspection teams to inspectors from Cooperation Partners. As a result, more than 40 joint multilateral reduction inspection teams were formed and inspected TLE reduction events. In addition, about 25 joint multilateral teams conducted inspections to verify holdings of TLE. However, some Cooperation Partners have noted that the cost of transporting a single inspector by air to join a NATO team can sometimes exceed the cost of sending an entire nine-member inspection team by ground transportation to inspect a neighbouring Cooperation Partner. Issues such as these remain under consideration during NATO discussions with Cooperation Partners.

One of the problems arising at the end of the first phase of the reduction period was the failure of Soviet successor states

to account collectively for the total reduction liability of the former USSR. This obligation arises from an agreement reached by CFE States Parties in Oslo on June 5, 1992, designed to adapt CFE provisions to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The complexity of the accounting has been compounded by the failure of two succes-

sor states — Armenia and Azerbaijan — to notify reduction liabilities, and by differences of interpretation in how Russia and Ukraine calculate reduction liabilities for TLE held by coastal defence and naval infantry units.

For their part, Russia and Ukraine have raised another issue. Both have indicated dissatisfaction with the application of CFE rules that constrain their ability to deploy TLE anywhere on their national territories. These rules are the consequence of how CFE was designed to prevent States Parties from concentrating excessive levels of conventional forces on the flanks of the European theatre. For NATO, this includes Norway, Turkey and Greece. Other flank states include Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. In the case of Russia and Ukraine, portions of their territories are successors to areas of the Soviet Union to which the flank rules applied.

The flank rules make a key contribution towards establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional forces in Europe. However, all States Parties have the right to propose that consideration be given to possible modifications of CFE. Fortunately, CFE created a body — the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) — within which Treaty-related issues can be discussed. The JCG can be expected to examine the flank issue over the next few months, as well as the reduction liabilities of the Soviet successor states.

Canada's Contribution to Europe

In addition to contributions to UN peacekeeping and CSCE missions in Europe, Canada's commitment to European security includes:

- an infantry battalion group, with pre-positioned equipment, to serve in crisis or in war with either the NATO Composite Force or the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force (Land) in northern Norway;
- naval and air forces to NATO operations, including the Standing Naval Force Atlantic and the NATO Airborne Warning Force;
- a mechanized brigade group and two squadrons with up to 36 CF-18 aircraft based in Canada, available to NATO in the event of a crisis or war in Europe;
- some 460 personnel to serve on NATO staffs in Europe;
- participation in NATO common-funded programs;
- an offer to train Allied forces on Canadian territory; and
- resources devoted to arms control verification in Europe.

In 1993, Canada contributed \$183.6 million to NATO activities, plus an additional \$25 million in military aid to NATO countries under bilateral agreements.

Canada is also contributing to economic development in ex-Warsaw Pact countries, which is critical to democratic development and essential for stability. Among the G7, Canada is second only to Germany, per capita, in its economic assistance to the former Soviet Union.

CSCE Council Meeting: Building Cooperative Security

The Council of Foreign Ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) met in Rome on November 30 and December 1. Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet used the opportunity to send a strong message underlining Canada's commitment to the CSCE and to European security. In his opening remarks, he stated: "My government would like today to rededicate itself to the principles and commitments of the CSCE as our unique, transatlantic, pan-Eurasian forum for building cooperative security."

Canada's objectives at the Rome meeting were fourfold:

- 1) to underline our strong support for the CSCE as a vital, pan-European cooperative security institution and the only regional organization with the moral and political authority to deal with conflicts, build democracy and promote respect for human rights in the CSCE area;
- 2) to streamline the CSCE decision-making process, institutions and missions to make the CSCE more effective, particularly in its priority area of conflict prevention and resolution;
- 3) to stress the importance of integrating the "human dimension," which Canada considers to be at the heart of the CSCE concept and thus central to the CSCE's conflict management efforts, into the rest of the CSCE's activities; and


4) to stress the need for political will and realism in the CSCE.

Ministers at the Rome meeting faced a number of important questions. For example, how might the CSCE make better use of its existing offices, instruments, mechanisms and political dialogue for conflict management? How could the CSCE better integrate the human dimension into conflict management? Could the CSCE develop new practical forms of cooperation with NATO, the Western European Union (WEU) or other international and regional organizations?

Conflict Management

Ministers reviewed the situation in a number of regions of tension or conflict in Europe, and the CSCE role in managing conflicts. On the former Yugoslavia, they urged the early and unconditional return of the CSCE Missions of Long Duration to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, which had been working in these three regions of Serbia to prevent the spillover of conflict, to promote dialogue and to monitor human rights. The Missions were forced to depart Serbia last summer when the Belgrade authorities refused to extend their mandate.

The Council strongly endorsed the recommendations of the CSCE Mission to Moldova, until mid-November headed by



senior Canadian diplomat Timothy Williams. The CSCE would like to see negotiations on a special status for the Trans-Dniester region within the Republic of Moldova; progress in the early, orderly and complete withdrawal of Russian troops; and agreement that the CSCE Mission be allowed to participate in the negotiations over troop withdrawals.

The debate over Nagorno-Karabakh proved the most intractable of all issues before the Council. For almost two years, the CSCE has been leading international efforts to resolve the conflict over the largely ethnic Armenian enclave of Azerbaijan. The CSCE plans to dispatch a monitor mission to the region once a durable ceasefire and settlement have been agreed. In the meantime, to maintain momentum in the peace process, the CSCE had hoped to establish a small mission of diplomats and military officers. In the end, because of the tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan, this proposal was rejected.

The Council agreed that the mandate of the CSCE Mission to Georgia (Ossetia), currently focused on monitoring and promoting negotiations between the conflicting parties, should be broadened to include human rights and democratic development. The CSCE will consider the appointment of a joint UN-CSCE high-level representative to address the issue of UN-CSCE cooperation in Georgia. As well, Ministers agreed that the CSCE Mission should elaborate "possible arrangements for liaison with joint Georgian, Russian and Ossetian peacekeeping forces with a view to establishing more comprehensive monitoring and oversight." How this decision is implemented will have important implications for further CSCE cooperation with Russian and Commonwealth of Independent States "peacekeeping" missions in other parts of the former Soviet Union (see below).

Ministers decided to create a CSCE mission of four persons to Tajikistan to facilitate dialogue among the various forces in the country, to promote respect for human rights, and to promote and monitor compliance with CSCE principles. The Tajikistan mission will be the first CSCE long-term mission in Central Asia.

The general discussion on strengthening the CSCE's instruments for conflict prevention and crisis management was dominated by one overriding issue:

whether and under what conditions the CSCE should cooperate with Russian or CIS military peacekeeping operations within the area of the former Soviet Union. On the one hand, there is widespread recognition that instability in many areas bordering Russia constitutes a real security threat for Russia and for the CSCE as a whole; on the other, there are the legitimate concerns of Russia's neighbours, which are still uneasy about the process of political transition in Russia. Ministers decided, given the many difficult considerations attached to this issue, that it should be further considered by CSCE delegations in Vienna.

Human Dimension

Ministers' consideration of the human dimension followed closely upon the recommendations of the Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues, held earlier this fall in Warsaw. The Meeting acknowledged the centrality of the Human Dimension (those CSCE commitments, principles and mechanisms involving fundamental human rights and freedoms, democracy and the rule of law) to all CSCE efforts and affirmed that implementation of human dimension commitments by participating states must be a focus of attention in the CSCE's conflict prevention efforts.

Recognizing a worrying increase in intolerance in many CSCE states, Ministers adopted a Russian-proposed declaration condemning "growing manifestations of aggressive nationalism, such as territorial expansionism, as well as racism, chauvinism, xenophobia and anti-semitism."

A number of other specific decisions were taken:

- the decision-making bodies of the CSCE will consider human dimension issues as an integral part of deliberations relating to European security;
- greater emphasis will be given to the human dimension in the mandates of CSCE missions and in the follow-up to their efforts;
- the role and resources of the CSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw will be strengthened;
- future human dimension seminars (following those in 1992 and 1993 on tolerance, national minorities, migration and free media) will be held on migrant workers, local democracy and the

Roma (Gypsies).

The High Commissioner on National Minorities received very strong support for his work in addressing tensions involving national minorities. As a result, the Council decided to increase the resources for his office.

Forum for Security Cooperation

The CSCE has long been the principal multilateral forum for negotiations on arms control and confidence-building in Europe. The current institutional home for military-security negotiations is the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC).

Prior to Rome, CSCE states meeting in the FSC in Vienna had concluded work in four areas under the Program of Immediate Action mandated by the Helsinki Document of 1992 (see accompanying article). It was hoped that ministers would be able to endorse these agreements as well as one on principles governing non-proliferation. However, due to Ukrainian objections, accord on the last was not reached and, accordingly, none of the agreements was endorsed. Further work under the Program of Immediate Action, notably on harmonization of obligations and on a code of conduct, will continue in the FSC with a view to agreement by the time of the 1994 CSCE Review Conference and Summit in Budapest.

Links with Other Organizations

For the CSCE to improve its conflict management capacity, it is vital that it develop more sustained and coordinated relations with other international organizations active in this domain, such as the UN, NATO and the WEU. Canada has argued strongly for the necessity of enhanced complementary and pragmatic cooperation between various organizations, particularly with regard to on-the-ground conflict management missions. Canada has worked to reinforce the links between the CSCE and the UN, recognizing the key role to be played at the regional level by the CSCE in such areas as early warning and preventive diplomacy. Canada is also seeking operational links between the CSCE and NATO so that NATO might offer support to CSCE preventive diplomacy efforts. The Rome meeting endorsed recent efforts made by the Chairman-in-Office to develop more substantial relations with the UN.

Forum for Security Cooperation Considers New Measures for Europe

The CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) was established in Vienna in September 1992 pursuant to a decision reached at the CSCE Helsinki Summit in July 1992. The FSC was designed to build upon such achievements as CFE, the Vienna Document 1992 on confidence- and security-building measures, and the Open Skies Treaty. Work in the FSC is guided by a Program of Immediate Action covering 12 priority areas for new arms control and confidence-building measures. These are designed to maintain the momentum of enhancing arms control, disarmament, confidence- and security-building, security cooperation and conflict prevention in Europe. Unlike the negotiations that produced CFE and Open Skies, participation in the FSC is open to all CSCE participating states.

It is envisaged that work on the Program of Immediate Action will be completed in time for the CSCE Review Conference that begins in Budapest in October 1994. However, spurred by the desire to show progress to the Rome Council, negotiators completed work in the following four areas prior to the Ministers' meeting:

- stabilizing measures for localized crisis situations (to assist the CSCE in preventing areas of tension from escalating to armed conflict);
- principles governing conventional arms transfers (to encourage more responsible approaches to arms transfers);
- defence planning (to increase transparency about long-term planning for military policies and forces); and
- military contacts and cooperation (to facilitate further contacts and information exchanges between military forces).

In the coming months, the FSC will be challenged to conclude work on the more difficult issues under consideration in the framework of the Program of Immediate Action. One of these is a code of conduct governing relations between states. However, given the indivisibility of security within the CSCE, work at the conceptual stage reveals a strong interest on the part of many states in developing rules to standardize behaviour of national governments towards their own nationals, in particular those belonging to national minorities. Preliminary discussions indicate that it will be difficult to develop precise language that results in meaningful rules.

CSCE Structure

The Rome Meeting took decisions on the future structure and decision-making processes of the CSCE itself, guided by the principle that the institutional structure of the CSCE should remain modest, effective and responsive to the goals of the CSCE. To this end, Ministers established the "Permanent Committee" of the CSCE in Vienna, replacing the "Vienna Group." It will have enhanced decision-making authority and will be responsible for day-to-day operational tasks of the CSCE, including dispatching conflict management missions. The Council also endorsed the decision of the Committee of Senior Officials to establish a single CSCE Secretariat in Vienna, replacing the existing separate Secretariat and offices. The Secretariat in Prague will now function as a sub-office to the CSCE Secretariat. Finally, the Consultative Committee of the Conflict

Prevention Centre was dissolved and its functions allocated to the new Permanent Committee and the existing Forum for Security Cooperation, also in Vienna. These decisions should result in a more effective, action-oriented CSCE.

Economic Cooperation

The Rome Council reaffirmed the CSCE's role in contributing to sustainable economic development. Following the successful first Economic Forum held in March 1993, a second Economic Forum will be held in Prague in March 1994 and the Secretariat has been tasked with providing support to activities in the economic dimension. Canada has been a strong proponent of a continuing role for the CSCE in economic cooperation, as a forum for discussion that can complement the work going on in specialized bodies and as an essential element in the CSCE's comprehensive approach to security.

Looking Ahead

For Canada, the Rome Council meeting provided an excellent opportunity for Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet to underline the new government's commitment to European security and to the CSCE in particular. This reaffirmation, plus the Minister's own interest in the CSCE, was well received. Canada, which has played a major role in re-positioning the CSCE as a cooperative security organization focused on conflict management and the root sources of tensions, will continue to remain active in all aspects of CSCE work.

The next key event on the CSCE agenda is the Budapest Review Conference and Summit, to be held October-December 1994. Between now and then, CSCE states will focus on implementing the decisions taken by the Rome Council and on preparing the work program for Budapest.

The way ahead seems fairly clear, if not easy. The CSCE's institutional development is more or less complete; what is now required is fine-tuning to ensure the various institutions function in a coordinated and effective manner. The CSCE needs to continue to address its capacity to manage conflicts; for example, its response to proposed cooperation with "third party" peacekeepers will need to be clarified well before Budapest. The military-security negotiations under the aegis of the FSC will need to proceed smoothly if Heads of Government in Budapest are to approve further agreements under the Program of Immediate Action. Considerable effort will also be needed to ensure that the human dimension is effectively integrated into the mainstream of the CSCE's political and security work.

As evidenced by the Rome Council meeting, the CSCE will continue to face serious problems in its efforts to promote cooperative security in Europe: problems arising from conflicts in the CSCE area, from the difficult process of political and economic transition still underway, and in the CSCE's relationships to other regional organizations. In Canada's view, however, the CSCE has the framework of principles and commitments, institutions and operational instruments necessary to address effectively future challenges in Europe. The last obstacle to the CSCE's effectiveness is one that rests with each CSCE state: political will.

CSCE Network Aids Information Exchange

November 1993 marked the second anniversary of the inauguration of the CSCE Communications Network, which provides a direct means of exchanging electronic mail between participating states. The decision to establish the Network was contained in the Vienna Document 1990. Use of the Network complements existing diplomatic channels, but enables more rapid exchanges.

Like its predecessors, the "hot lines" of the Cold War, the CSCE Network is a classical confidence-building measure; however, it provides more than a channel for the timely and direct exchange of information during crises. The Network facilitates the implementation of information and notification measures designed to enhance military transparency. It has become an important tool in implementing the provisions of the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document 1992. Similarly, it may play a key role for the Open Skies Treaty.

Three CSCE institutions and the foreign ministries of 32 CSCE states are linked via the Network. All "stations," which consist of readily available personal computers, transfer and re-

ceive messages using public Packet Switched Data Network (PSDN) services. Messages are routed to a central computer switch located in the Foreign Ministry of the Netherlands, which automatically relays the messages to all intended recipients.

The Network has shown its usefulness in exchanges of information on CSCE meetings, military forces, annual calendars of military exercises, and military budgets. Its speed is particularly useful in sending notifications concerning verification inspections. Although users are free to send messages in any of the six official CSCE languages, most messages are sent using formats that reduce the need for translations.

Although a European company produced the overall design, the Network has a small but significant Canadian component, reflecting Canadian industry's strength in telecommunications. The electronic mail program is based on computer software developed by OSIware Incorporated of Burnaby, BC. In addition, the hardware interface between each station and the PSDN is produced by Eicon Technology Corporation of Montreal. ■

Open Skies Awaits Entry Into Force

The Open Skies Treaty was signed March 24, 1992 in Helsinki by Canada, the US and 23 European states. The aim of the Treaty is to develop greater openness and transparency by opening the airspace over signatory states to flights by unarmed surveillance aircraft. The agreement can be helpful in resolving uncertainties associated with the implementation of other arms control accords or confidence-building measures. Allowable sensors include cameras, synthetic aperture radars and infrared devices. Each of these systems complements the others to permit the acquisition of imagery on a 24-hour, all-weather basis.

By the end of 1992, Canada and the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic had deposited their Instruments of Ratification. In the first 11 months of 1993, the two co-depositaries — Canada and Hungary — received additional Instruments from Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary and Iceland. Several other states have indicated that they are close to completing national ratification procedures. The Treaty will enter into force (for those states that have deposited Instruments) after a total of 20 Instruments have been deposited, as long as these include those states assigned passive quotas of eight or more overflights (namely Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, the UK and the US).

The Treaty created an Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) with a mandate to oversee Treaty implementation and operation. The OSCC has held several sessions since Treaty signature. Within this body, decisions have been taken on such topics as the split in the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and the establishment of a new scale of distribution for common administrative costs. The OSCC has also agreed on extensions to the period of provisional application so that states have more time in which to deposit their Instruments of Ratification.

Working groups have met to discuss issues such as sensors, flight rules and procedures, notifications and formats, and communications and data. The texts of several OSCC decisions have been negotiated, and will enter into force simultaneously with the

Treaty. While awaiting the Treaty's entry into force, some states have held trial overflights for training purposes. Such flights are also useful for verifying the appropriateness of technical rules under consideration within the OSCC. In April, Canada participated in a trial conducted by the US over Alaska and western Canada. Subsequent trial flights were conducted in 1993 by the US over Hungary, by Germany and the UK over Russia, and by Russia over the UK and Germany.

In response to national programs of fiscal restraint and the economic restructuring affecting many signatories, efforts are underway to minimize the anticipated costs of implementing Open Skies. The Benelux states, for example, have invited other states that operate Lockheed Hercules C-130 aircraft to cooperate in acquiring and sharing a set of sensors suitable for use on that airframe. Canada and several other states have responded positively to this suggestion. As an additional cooperative venture, mem-

Working groups refine details of implementation.

bers of the Western European Union are considering the formation of a pool of aircraft that could be used to conduct overflights on a cost-recoverable basis for signatories.

With a view to broadening the potential usefulness of Open Skies flights, some signatories have proposed using the regime to conduct environmental monitoring flights. A two-day experts seminar was hosted by the OSCC in December 1992 to discuss the relevance of Open Skies sensors and operational procedures to monitoring environmental problems. While supportive of the need to address environmental issues on a priority basis, some states have expressed concern about the impact that environmental monitoring flights might have on conducting the flights for which the Treaty was originally designed. ■

North Atlantic Council Meets

Strengthening the integrity of the alliance, preparing for the NATO summit scheduled for January 10 to 11, and consulting with allies on the threats to peace and security in Europe were among Canada's objectives at the North Atlantic Council meeting held in Brussels on December 2. Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet represented Canada in the discussions, where allies considered NATO's ongoing support for UN peacekeeping and the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies in the former Yugoslavia. They also discussed NATO's role in implementing a potential peace plan in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the Brussels meeting, Canada continued to support NATO reform. The Soviet threat against which the alliance was constituted has been replaced by the risk of instability, unpredictability and uncertainty on NATO's periphery. NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted in November 1991, recognizes the changing security situation in Europe. The emphasis is now on the creation of a more flexible structure — relying on lighter, more mobile forces — and an increased capability to contribute to conflict prevention and management, including peacekeeping. A multinational Rapid Reaction Corps is being developed and is expected to be fully operational by 1995.

Canada is also encouraging further interaction and cooperation between NATO and other security structures in Europe. This includes refining the mechanisms necessary to provide support to organizations such as the UN and the CSCE in the areas of crisis management and peacekeeping. It also includes the further development of institutional relationships between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU). Canada is in favour of a strong European voice through the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). The security challenges in Europe can only be addressed through a framework of interlocking and complementary institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America. NATO, NACC, the CSCE, the EC, the WEU, and the Council of Europe together form the beams of the evolving European security architecture.

In the emerging security environment, NATO's *political* vocation, as embodied in Article 2 (the "Canada" article) of the North Atlantic Treaty, is assuming greater importance. More emphasis is placed on dialogue and cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In particular, NATO is playing a major role in assisting those countries to complete their transition to democracy. Through the NACC, the NATO allies are seeking to contribute to an overall climate of security and thereby to enable Cooperation Partners to direct their material resources to economic and social development. Substantive programs of regular consultation and practical cooperation are being pursued.

Canada is now preparing for the January NATO summit. Canada's primary objectives are to support efforts to reinforce NATO solidarity and to increase NATO's capacity to contribute to stability in Europe. In Canada's view, the summit should:

- promote the projection of security by NATO across Europe through peacekeeping, a partnership with Russia and Ukraine, and arms control;
- confirm that NATO can incorporate a positive expression of the ESDI;
- articulate an updated view of NACC's role; and
- discuss the issue of NATO expansion.

NACC Adopts 1994 Workplan

North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) foreign ministers met in Brussels on December 3 to adopt a workplan for 1994 and to discuss ethnic conflicts, minority rights and disputes between NACC member states. Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet attended on behalf of Canada.

NACC was created in November 1991 to provide a forum for dialogue between NATO allies and the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. Cooperation focuses on political and security issues where NATO allies can offer their expertise: defence planning, civilian-military relations, the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes, and scientific and environmental programs (see *Bulletin* #21). In addition to NACC ministerial meetings, there are regular consultations at the level of ambassadors.

NATO Contributes to UN Peacekeeping

Common to the recent conflicts in Europe — from Nagorno-Karabakh to Bosnia-Herzegovina — is the danger posed to the security of members of NATO, as well as to broader European security. NATO foreign ministers therefore agreed in June 1992 to make NATO's resources and expertise available for CSCE peacekeeping and, in December 1992, for UN peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Since then, NATO has taken a number of measures in support of UN peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia.

- In June 1993, NATO offered protective airpower for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the performance of its duties.
- In November 1992, NATO provided a staff unit consisting of some 100 personnel, plus equipment, supplies and financial support, to UNPROFOR's Bosnia-Herzegovina command headquarters, located near Zagreb.
- A joint NATO/Western European Union naval force was deployed in the Adriatic Sea in July 1992, in support of UN trade sanctions against the former Yugoslavia. In the first four months of operation, the force monitored some 1,700 ships and boarded approximately 200. As part of a normal rotation of NATO resources, HMCS Gatineau was on patrol with the task force in the Adriatic in September 1992.
- NATO has deployed airborne early-warning aircraft (AWACS) to enforce the UN-mandated no-fly zone over Bosnian airspace, from flight paths over the Adriatic and in Hungary.
- NATO prepared contingency plans for the delivery of UN humanitarian aid and for the monitoring of heavy weapons.
- NATO has been developing plans to support a peace agreement among the parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, under the overall political direction of the UN.

Canada Responds to the Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia

Canada participates fully in international efforts to promote a peaceful settlement to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and to provide relief to its victims. In September 1991, Canada led the call for the UN Security Council to deal with this issue. In August 1992 in London and again in December in Geneva, Canada took part in the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, co-chaired by the UN and the European Community (EC, now known as the European Union). Canada has been an active supporter of all Conference efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement to the crisis.

Peacekeeping

Canada has contributed one of the largest contingents to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR): more than 2,000 Canadian troops now monitor UN-protected zones in Croatia and provide protection for relief convoys and refugees in Bosnia. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is providing 44 monitors to UNPROFOR. Another 12 Canadian Forces members serve with an EC-CSCE mission monitoring ceasefire agreements throughout the former Yugoslavia.

Canadians have undertaken some of the most difficult UN assignments. In June 1992, some 750 Canadian troops were deployed to Sarajevo to reopen and secure the airport so that the airlift of relief supplies could begin. In January and February 1993, 180 Canadian troops were deployed temporarily to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to monitor developments in the border areas with Serbia. In April 1993, another 220 troops were sent to Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia to ensure the presence of UNPROFOR in the besieged city; a company of Canadian troops remains in this "safe area."

Humanitarian Assistance

Canada's total contribution in humanitarian assistance for the victims of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia since autumn 1991 now approaches \$40 million, including \$1.75 million for victims of sexual violence. These contributions have been used to support the purchase and delivery of food, medical supplies, clothing and shelter, and to assist refugees and displaced persons.

Canada also participates in the international airlift to the besieged city of Sarajevo. From the start of the airlift on July 3, 1992, a Canadian Forces Hercules C-130 transport airplane has conducted approximately 930 relief flights to Sarajevo, for a total delivery of more than 14,000 metric tons of food and medical supplies.

In September 1993, Canada announced a series of Canadian initiatives — totaling almost \$2 million — to help restore medical facilities in the war-torn regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They include: water purification equipment; support for

Slovenia and Croatia on January 15, 1992, and of Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 8, 1992. Diplomatic relations were established with Slovenia on January 8, 1993, and with Croatia on April 14, 1993. Canada supported the resolution of the UN General Assembly admitting the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia into the UN on April 8, 1993. Canada, along with other Western countries, has condemned Serb aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina and has urged Serbia and Croatia to stop interference in that country. On September 22, 1992, together with several other

Canadian Forces photo



Canadian peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia.

the emergency power supply for the two major Sarajevo hospitals; equipment and training by Canadian rehabilitation experts for five community health centres; medical supplies and medicine; and teams of Canadian medical specialists.

Diplomacy

As a member of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Canada maintains diplomatic contacts with all legitimate parties concerned by the crisis, inside and outside the former Yugoslavia. Canada has repeatedly called upon the parties to end the violence and to work towards a negotiated settlement.

Canada recognized the independence of

nations, Canada co-sponsored the resolution that suspended Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) from the proceedings of the UN General Assembly and called on Belgrade to submit a new application for UN membership. Canada also supported the temporary suspension of Yugoslavia from the CSCE.

Canada supports international efforts for a more effective implementation of trade sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). On April 27, 1993, Canada imposed strengthened UN sanctions against Yugoslavia, including the freezing of state assets in Canada and additional trade restrictions. Two Canadian naval vessels have

participated in NATO's enforcement of sanctions in the Adriatic. Canada also leads the multinational sanctions assistance mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which helps to ensure compliance with sanctions. In February 1993, Canada led a multinational fact-finding mission on sanctions monitoring in Albania.

Canada has taken part in CSCE conflict prevention missions in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina. Serbia refused to renew the mandate of the CSCE missions and the monitors were forced to leave at the end of July 1993. Canada also participated in a similar mission to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, led a CSCE fact-finding mission to Kosovo and took part in a CSCE mission to investigate human rights violations in detention camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Canada's financial contribution to various preventive diplomacy missions now totals more than \$2 million.

European Security: the Nuclear Dimension

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a number of steps were taken to bring the Soviet nuclear arsenal — left in the hands of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine — under unified control, to reaffirm negotiated and unilateral arms reduction measures, and to ensure that only one state — Russia — inherited the Soviet Union's status as a nuclear weapon state.

- Centralized control over the weapons was established in Moscow, with the governments of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan gaining a de facto veto over their use.
 - All tactical nuclear weapons were shipped to Russia for storage and eventual dismantlement and destruction.
 - All four successor states and the US signed in May 1992 a protocol to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) committing all five to fulfil the terms of the Treaty, to carry out the reductions in a certain time frame and committing Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to accede to the NPT "in the shortest period of time." This is known as the Lisbon Protocol.
- Since May 1992, Russia, Belarus and

Kazakhstan have ratified START and Belarus has acceded to the NPT. Kazakhstan is committed to acceding to the NPT but appears to be delaying formalization of the decision until President Clinton's scheduled visit in January.

More troubling is the position of Ukraine, which has procrastinated in fulfilling its commitments concerning the disposition and destruction of nuclear weapons, ratification of START and accession to the NPT. In November, the Ukrainian parliament agreed to a highly conditional ratification of START and the Lisbon Protocol. One of the conditions involves disavowing Article V of the Lisbon Protocol, which requires Ukraine to rid itself of nuclear weapons and to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Others concern the provision of financial and technical assistance for dismantling weapons, the provision of international security guarantees, and compensation for the value of nuclear weapons components. Ukraine's stance risks derailing the strategic arms reduction process and complicating the extension of the NPT in 1995.

On establishing diplomatic relations with Ukraine in 1992, Canada sought assurances that Ukraine would fulfil its arms control commitments, particularly pertaining to nuclear weapons. On several occasions since then, Canadian ministers and officials have urged Ukraine to follow through, most recently during discussions between Foreign Affairs Minister Ouellet and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Zlenko at the CSCE ministerial meeting in Rome.

Suffocating the Nuclear Threat

Canada's nuclear non-proliferation strategy is predicated on:

- 1) preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to states beyond the five acknowledged nuclear powers (the US, Russia, the UK, France and China); and
- 2) achieving reductions in existing nuclear arsenals, with the aim of eventual elimination.

Fundamental to this strategy is defence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A global non-proliferation regime is incon-

ceivable without the NPT. The norms established by the Treaty form the foundation of all other efforts aimed at counteracting the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Over the years, Canadian efforts have been tailored to achieve the greatest non-proliferation advances possible, in light of prevailing political and security circumstances. This has resulted in several notable achievements, including increased NPT adherence, tightened nuclear supplier guidelines and bilateral US-Soviet nuclear arms reduction treaties. Stronger, more targeted efforts are now in order.

The indefinite extension of the NPT at its 1995 extension and review conference is Canada's primary objective. The other two options available — extension for a fixed period or periods — do not guarantee preservation of the Treaty and the

Canada pursues a long-term, multi-faceted non-proliferation strategy, of which NPT is the cornerstone.

benefits it provides. In the context of the review portion of the 1995 conference, Canada is also pressing for a further strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system. Two regrettable examples underscore the importance of this goal: North Korea's defiance of the inspection obligations it freely entered into when it acceded to the NPT and concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and Iraq's conduct of a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

Canada is also working with other nuclear suppliers to promote more effective controls on the export of material, equipment and technology relevant to nuclear weapons. In addition, Canada is contributing to the International Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine, which aims to find peaceful employment for ex-Soviet nuclear weapon and missile specialists.

To supplement the NPT, Canada is working towards an early conclusion of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, scheduled to begin in the Conference on Disarmament in January (see *Bulletin* #22). In Canada's view, the resultant treaty should be open to signature by all and sustained by a strong verification system. Canada's expertise in verification is enabling us to play a leading role in ongoing CD consultations on a CTBT.

Canada believes that work to define precisely the issues involved in a convention prohibiting the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes (popularly known as a "FIZZ ban"), should begin as soon as possible, perhaps by an appropriate group of experts.

Recognizing that regional insecurity fosters the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, Canada is involved in processes aimed at reducing tensions and enhancing mutual confidence in several regions, including the Middle East and South Asia. Canada has supported nuclear weapon free zones in Latin America and the South Pacific, and favours the development of such zones elsewhere.

Canada's nuclear non-proliferation strategy is a long-term, multi-faceted one that demands considerable effort and patience. It aims at progressively creating a body of international law that will, over time, result in the elimination of nuclear weapons. There is, regrettably, no quick way to end the nuclear threat. In 1978, then-Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau enunciated a "strategy of suffocation" at the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament. Among other things, he called for the conclusion of a CTBT and a FIZZ ban. The 1993 session of the UN General Assembly saw, for the first time, the adoption by consensus of resolutions on both of these topics. It took 15 years and a sea change in international relations to bring Mr. Trudeau's agenda to the table. We are, as it were, only at the end of the beginning.

Canada Criticizes Chinese Test

Canada expressed deep concern and profound disappointment at China's detonation of a nuclear device at its testing facility in Xinjiang in early October. By conducting a test on the eve of negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty, China has failed to demonstrate the leadership that is essential on the part of nuclear powers in international non-proliferation efforts. Canada has on numerous occasions urged China not to engage in nuclear testing. We continue to call on China to join all other countries in ceasing nuclear testing immediately and to contribute positively to negotiation of a CTBT.

CWC Moves Closer to Implementation



Numbers of destroyed R 400 binary chemical weapon bombs being verified by UNSCOM inspectors in Iraq. LCol Jim Knapp of DND is on the left.

As of November 30, 151 countries had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Only four had ratified the Convention, a number that will have to increase dramatically to reach the minimum 65 necessary for the Convention to enter into force as early as January 1995. At the Hague, the CWC Preparatory Commission is increasingly active as it continues to build the foundations of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The Preparatory Commission has held four plenary sessions and several meetings of experts groups, studying different aspects of the practical application of the Convention. Groups have discussed issues related to verification, including equipment requirements and the procedures for challenge inspection, as well as the conversion of chemical factories and security procedures.

The Preparatory Commission will see a rapid expansion during 1994 to ensure a complete transition to the OPCW. Canada has increased its participation on the Commission by naming Mr. Ian Mundell of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade as its representative. Mr. Mundell will be joined in the new year by a counsellor specializing in technical questions. This permanent delegation demonstrates the importance Canada attaches to efforts to eliminate CW.

One of the most important elements of the CWC is the requirement for a national authority in each State Party. In Canada, the Authority will be responsible for coordination among the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, the relevant government departments and the OPCW. Its functions will include the following:

- (with the aid of Statistics Canada) collecting and compiling statistics on the Canadian chemical industry and transmitting these to the OPCW;
- supporting all routine and challenge inspections by OPCW personnel;
- distributing in Canada information provided by the OPCW;
- advising the Canadian delegation to the OPCW;
- participating in technical meetings of the OPCW; and
- ensuring liaison with the Canadian chemical industry.

The National Authority will begin operating during 1994 to prepare for CWC entry into force. The Authority will have to undertake a program to inform Canadian industry of the implications of the CWC. The impact of challenge and routine inspections, particularly on the protection of production patents, is of concern to industry. A series of consultations will enable businesses to be involved in the procedure of implementing the CWC in Canada.

BTWC Verification Experts Complete Study

The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) includes an undertaking to consult and cooperate in solving problems that may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. It also makes provision for lodging a complaint with the UN Security Council in relation to a breach of obligations. It makes no other provision for verification, a fact that has led to proposals from various quarters for strengthening the BTWC.

In September 1991, the Third Review Conference of the BTWC agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts, open to all States Parties, to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. This study, which completed its work in September 1993, is often referred to as VEREX.

Since one of the issues frequently raised in VEREX had to do with concerns about the potential loss of commercial proprietary information in the course of an inspection, the Netherlands and Canada decided to organize a trial inspection that would target such concerns as one purpose of the exercise. In May 1993, a trial multinational inspection (involving the

Netherlands, Canada and the UK) took place in the Netherlands at a state-of-the-art vaccine production facility to test inspection procedures that might eventually come to apply under the BTWC.

The inspection team concluded that its suspicions would have been aroused had there been a significant diversion of activity, equipment or materials to the production of biological weapons. The team also concluded that commercial confidentiality did not stand in the way of the effective conduct of the inspection. The report of the Netherlands/Canada trial — one of only two such trial inspections conducted — was submitted to VEREX and is reflected in the final report of the experts' study.

VEREX itself identified and evaluated 21 potential verification measures, all singly and some in combinations to highlight any synergies that might result. The experts' report was adopted by consensus, a significant achievement given the amount of work channelled into four intense sessions. The next step, if a majority of States Parties (68) requests it, will be for the depositaries (namely the US, the UK and Russia) to convene a conference to examine the experts' report and decide on

any further action.

By the end of November, Canada and some 49 other States Parties had already submitted their requests that such a conference be convened. At this rate, the chances are good that the conference will take place in the fall of 1994. This does not mean, however, that the establishment of a verification regime for the BTWC is just around the corner. The conference, and the States Parties as a whole, will need to decide what further action to take and how to go about taking it.

In the meantime, the UK has organized another multinational trial inspection for December, once again involving participants from the Netherlands and Canada. If a BTWC verification regime is to be established, answers will have to be found to the question of how to determine compliance or non-compliance with the Convention while at the same time taking into account the reality (as opposed to the anxiety) of concerns associated with the potential loss of commercial proprietary information. As was the case in negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the assistance and cooperation of industry will be particularly helpful in finding those answers.

Disarming Iraq: UNSCOM Sets Verification Precedents

For more than two and one half years, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have cooperated jointly in a monitoring and verification program to verify compliance by the government of Iraq with obligations it accepted under UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). Under that resolution, Iraq agreed unconditionally not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. It also accepted unconditionally the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of all chemical and biological weapons and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 km. The IAEA, with the support and cooperation of UNSCOM, assumed the international responsibilities relating to nuclear weapons; UNSCOM undertook the international supervision obligations in the other three areas of concern.

Between May 15, 1991 and November 1, 1993, UNSCOM and the IAEA undertook 64 on-site inspections in Iraq to ensure Iraqi compliance with its obligations under Resolution 687. Approximately one-third of the inspections were related to the nuclear weapons program, another third to the ballistic missile field, and the remainder to matters associated with Iraq's inventory of chemical weapons as well as with Iraq's biological weapons research program.

The hallmarks of UNSCOM's inspection program have been thoroughness, balance and innovation. In the chemical weapons area, with the completion of baseline inspections, action has focused on destruction activities relating to the massive inventory (numbering in the thousands) of chemical weapons and immense quantities of chemical agents and precursors amassed by Iraq. Destruction of precursors, chemical agents

and ammunition should be completed by mid-summer 1994.

In the ballistic missile area, efforts have concentrated on three aspects: establishing a definitive material balance for the SCUD missile inventory, acquiring an accounting of Iraq's production capability in the ballistic missiles area, and establishing a means for longer term monitoring as required by UN Security Council Resolution 715 (1991). UNSCOM's intensive ballistic missile inspection program has provided a degree of confidence that the total inventory of SCUD missiles has been accounted for and that a residual SCUD capability in Iraq is unlikely.

The importance of UNSCOM's activities for multilateral verification can hardly be overestimated. The credibility of the UNSCOM/IAEA inspection and monitoring program under difficult — often confrontational — conditions has established

a solid experience base for multilateral verification. In addition to on-site inspections, UNSCOM has pioneered the use of overhead imagery as a supporting tool. Such imagery has been used to reinforce the thoroughness and the objectivity of the inspection program. Helicopter imagery provides a time-series photographic record of sites that will need to be monitored under plans for ongoing monitoring and verification. Additional innovations in the application of technologies using sensors such as gamma radiation detection, forward-looking infrared radar and ground penetrating radar add a new dimension to the development of multilateral verification techniques.

The attempt by UNSCOM to implement a long-term monitoring of resolution-relevant activities in Iraq has been hampered by Iraq's persistent refusal to acknowledge its obligation under Resolution 715 (Iraq has recognized only Resolution 687). UNSCOM has thus attempted to move the process ahead by developing an interim monitoring capability, acting under the terms of the relevant resolution. The prime objectives include the continuing collection of data on missile programs in Iraq and the deterrence of covert programs in prohibited missile systems. Experience gained will be useful in implementing long-term monitoring once Iraq acknowledges its obligations.

Recent talks in New York between senior Iraqi ministers and UNSCOM officials suggest that a new period of cooperation may be at hand. Newspaper reports in late November stated that Iraq has now decided "to accept the obligations" (concerning mandatory long-term monitoring) as stated in Resolution 715. Rolf Ekéus, UNSCOM's Executive Chairman, was quoted as acknowledging that the Iraqi statement could constitute a "major breakthrough."

As a result, it could be possible to draft a public statement that spells out what Iraq might still do to be in full compliance. Presumably, a long-term monitoring and verification program would have to be in place for some months before UNSCOM and the IAEA would be prepared to confirm to the Security Council that Iraq was in full compliance with the provisions of applicable resolutions. Such a confirmation would be required to recommend an end to the sanctions presently being enforced against Iraq. ■

Successful First Committee

The 48th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA 48) met in New York from September to December. Canada's priorities in the First Committee, which considers arms control and disarmament issues, were to confirm and strengthen existing global non-proliferation instruments such as the NPT, the CWC and the BTWC, and to support negotiations for a CTBT in the CD. Canada played an active role in promoting these objectives, with largely successful results. Canada was also the lead sponsor of a verification resolution and of a resolution dealing with the prohibition of the production of fissionable material.

Virtually all western states called for the indefinite extension of the NPT and the negotiation of a CTBT. Many delegations chastised China for its recent nuclear test. China in turn stated that it supports a total test ban within the framework of a complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. Many countries called for a firm international response towards North Korea, which is not complying fully with its IAEA safeguards obligations. There was also strong support for effective implementation, on a universal basis, of the UN Arms Register.

Verification

Canada was successful in having its resolution on verification passed by a vote of 127 in favour, 0 against and 19 abstentions (EC, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, Malta, Norway and the US). The resolution calls for a UN Group of Experts study on the role of the UN in the field of verification.

The findings of a Canadian-chaired 1990 UN study on the subject were based on research conducted in the late 1980s, before the end of the Cold War. There has been a sea change in the international environment since that time, and the new study will examine the impact of these changes on verification and the role of the UN therein. Particular attention is to be paid to the ways verification can facilitate UN activities with respect to confidence-building, conflict management and disarmament. The study group is also asked to:

- explore the further development of guidelines and principles for UN involvement in verification; and
- review the conclusions of the 1990 Experts Group with particular attention to approaches for integrating verification information by the UN.

Cut-off

Canada was pleased to take the lead on the resolution entitled "Prohibition on the Production of Fissionable Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices." The resolution, which was adopted by consensus, calls for a treaty that would cut off the production of such fissionable material and for the treaty to be negotiated in an appropriate international forum.

CTBT

The First Committee adopted by consensus a decision supporting the commencement of negotiations in the CD on the comprehensive banning of nuclear tests. This was the first time in the First Committee's consideration of the issue that consensus was reached.

CWC

The Netherlands, as lead sponsor, was not successful in having this traditional consensus resolution passed by the General Assembly. Proposed Iranian amendments to what should have been a procedural matter led the resolution to be withdrawn. This was unfortunate as over 150 states have now become signatories to the landmark CWC.

Transparency in Armaments

This resolution was passed by consensus. A group of governmental experts will meet in 1994 to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development. Canada fully supports this process and on many occasions has called for the

expansion of the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production. Canada's submission to the Register included both the required data and information about our military holdings and production.

UNDC

The resolution adopted at UNGA 48 indicates that three items will be considered at the 1994 UNDC session. These items are:

- the process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons;
- the role of science and technology in the context of international peace and security; and
- international arms transfers.

First Committee Reform

A resolution regarding rationalization of the work of the First Committee was adopted by consensus. The resolution incorporates many suggestions that Canada has been advocating for a number of years regarding reform of the First Committee. These proposals include adopting realistic priorities and ensuring fewer resolutions, including combining similar resolutions and eliminating the obsolete. The resolution also reorganizes the annual agenda of the First Committee by adopting a thematic approach in which resolutions are clustered in broad topic areas such as:

- nuclear weapons;
- other weapons of mass destruction;
- conventional weapons;
- regional disarmament and security;
- confidence-building measures, including transparency in armaments;
- outer space;
- disarmament machinery;
- other disarmament measures;
- international security;
- related matters of disarmament and international security.

The next issue of the *Bulletin* will include a list of arms control and disarmament resolutions adopted by UNGA 48. ■

Moving Beyond Veneer of Agreement to Global Norms

The following are excerpts from the statement by Ms Peggy Mason, Ambassador for Disarmament, to the First Committee at UNGA 48, delivered on October 22 in New York.

CTBT

While it is all too obvious that the end of the Cold War has unleashed new threats of weapons proliferation, it has also opened the way for unparalleled cooperation and progress across the range of proliferation issues. No more compelling evidence of the new opportunities exists than the historic decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament on August 10, 1993 to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments for all time.... CD members are now in the process of defining a specific mandate for, and the organization of, the negotiations with the aim of beginning negotiations in January 1994. Our goal must be a multilaterally negotiated global agreement containing strong verification and sanctions procedures. This process would, in our view, increase in credibility and international acceptance if the CD could agree forthwith to expand its membership to include all those wishing to be members.

The decision to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty responds to a long-standing and central Canadian arms control objective. It comes at a particularly important juncture as a number of countries have linked the conclusion of a CTBT and indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Canada firmly rejects that negative linkage as a strategy more likely to shield potential proliferators than to promote the goals of vertical and horizontal non-proliferation.

At the same time, there is no doubt that further testing, for whatever reason and on whatever scale, will complicate the process of indefinitely extending the NPT and the goal of universal accession. Conversely, rapid completion of a CTBT would provide potent evidence of the determination of the nuclear weapon states to meet their Article VI commitments. This in turn would reinforce the moral authority of the nuclear weapon states —

that is, of the UN Security Council Permanent Five — and along with it their ability to exercise effective leadership in response to countries seeking to stand against this international norm. It is therefore with regret and concern that Canada responded to the Chinese nuclear explosive test as we are about to embark on the CTBT negotiation. A unique opportunity for China to play a leadership role in the negotiation and the NPT extension process is in danger of being frittered away. We urge China to reconsider its testing program in favour of unequivocally assuming its share of the burdens and responsibilities of leadership in this post-Cold War multipolar world....

NPT

As important as a CTBT is in precluding nuclear warhead modernization and in helping to constrain horizontal proliferation, it is no panacea. It is not a substitute for sustained action by the international community on all fronts to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the heart of which is the NPT and the IAEA system of safeguards.

We therefore continue to call upon the DPRK to comply with the safeguards agreements it freely entered into with the IAEA. Canada welcomes the accession to the NPT of Belarus and the progress that has recently taken place towards that end with respect to Kazakhstan. We call on the Ukraine to take similar steps.

Since this Committee last met during UNGA 47, the formal preparatory process has begun for the 1995 conference on the review and extension of the NPT. Canada brings to this process the firm belief that indefinite extension of the NPT is fundamental to our continuing efforts to forestall the horrendous consequences of unfettered horizontal proliferation, to provide the framework for peaceful nuclear commerce, and to promote vertical nuclear disarmament. We take great satisfaction in the number of expressions of support for indefinite extension that were made in the general debate at the opening of the General Assembly this year. Canada looks forward to working with other States Parties to the NPT to ensure that we are in a position by the second Preparatory

Correction

In *Bulletin* #22 (p. 16), GODOS was incorrectly named. The acronym stands for the Group of Democratically/Disarmament Oriented States.



Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason at UNGA 48.

Committee meeting in late January to address all outstanding procedural issues in a productive and forward looking manner.

Cut-off

A legally enforceable, multilaterally negotiated and credibly verifiable prohibition on the production of fissionable material for weapons or other nuclear explosive devices will be another important building block in our non-proliferation architecture. Canada has for many years introduced a resolution in this regard which has received overwhelming but not universal support. In light of recent very positive developments, including an initiative by President Clinton, it might not be overly optimistic to suggest that the time for a multilateral "cut-off" convention may well have come.

CWC

Canada is gratified that over 150 states have now become signatories to the landmark Chemical Weapons Convention. We would urge those that have not yet signed to do so at an early date. Canada also welcomes the considerable progress that is being made at the Preparatory Commission in The Hague in advance of the Convention's entry into force, hopefully in 1995. Just as last year's consensus resolution provided momentum for the signing conference in Paris, so we trust will this

year's resolution add renewed impetus to the vital work of bringing the Convention into force....

BTWC

With regard to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), Canada joins with others in welcoming the very substantial report of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts established to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint....

The experts' study has reinforced [Canada's] position that measures can be taken to strengthen the BTWC with regard to verification of compliance. We are, as a result, preparing our request to the depositary governments to convene a conference to examine the report and to decide on any further action. We commend the report to other BTWC States Parties and, without pre-judging the outcome of their consideration, trust that due attention will be given to the question of making a similar request to the depositary governments to convene such a conference.

Verification

Last year, Canada initiated a resolution on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification that called upon Member States to provide their views on: additional actions that might be taken to imple-

ment the recommendations of the 1990 United Nations Group of Experts Study on the role of the UN in the field of verification; how verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements can facilitate United Nations activities with respect to conflict resolution; and additional actions with respect to the role of the UN....

In Canada's view, a follow-on study to that of the 1990 Group of Experts would be timely and useful, particularly bearing in mind that the Cold War constraints that so limited the scope of the original study simply no longer apply....

Transparency in Armaments

In his annual report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General cited the "historic significance" of the establishment of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. We fully concur with his assessment of the potential of such confidence-building measures to contribute to the Organization's efforts in the field of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking and we wholeheartedly welcome his decision that the UN Register "become a priority task" for the Centre for Disarmament Affairs. It is indeed gratifying that 79 Member States of the UN have now complied with the Register in its first year of operation. But we must not be complacent. We must work to ensure universal adherence to this vital component of transparency in arms. The confidence-building goal of the register will be achieved only with both universal adherence to the register and its further expansion.

On this latter point, there is a clearly established path. A group of governmental experts will meet in 1994 to prepare a report on the continuing operation of the Register and its further development. Canada fully supports this process and on many occasions has called for the early expansion of the Register to include military holdings and procurement through national production. We have already made this additional information available in our own reporting to the Register and draw attention to the fact that a significant number of other countries have also done so....

UNDC

The value and the vitality of the Disarmament Commission as a multilateral forum for meaningful dialogue on a limited range of issues has been amply demonstrated in the last three years. Yet, on the

matter of new items for its agenda, we remain stymied despite intensive efforts during the last General Assembly, during the Resumed Session and during the 1993 session of the Disarmament Commission itself. Canada hopes that delegations will redouble their efforts towards finding a timely solution to this procedural problem so that we can turn our full attention to the substance of the work before us....

Reform and Revitalization

Disarmament at its core is concerned with creating the conditions under which countries will place less reliance on armaments and more reliance on alternative processes for ensuring their viability and well-being against all manner of threats, however defined. During the post-Cold War era of interdependence, integration and globalization at the international level, in contrast to increasing tribalization and fragmentation at the local level, it seems clear that the tools for building such alternative mechanisms must be increasingly regionally and cooperatively based.

In this new institution-building process, the United Nations has both a "top down" or global/normative/framework role to play and a "bottom up" or operational role to play, the latter at the regional, sub-regional and local levels.

Arms control and disarmament — both in the strict sense of negotiating agreements to limit/control/manage armaments and in the broader sense of building confidence among nations by promoting greater openness in military matters — are tools in the process of building collective/cooperative security, just as preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are tools to this end. All aspects along this continuum need to be addressed if the goal of collective/cooperative security is to be reached. Countries must be encouraged to develop concrete mechanisms to prevent and to resolve disputes peacefully. For such mechanisms to work, there must be an ever-enlarging consensus on the proper role of power, armaments, the use of force and, above all, on the limits of the use of force.

From this perspective, then, arms control and disarmament relates to cooperative efforts (at every level from local to global) to control the use of force and to promote collective security based on agreed rules of interstate, and increasingly intrastate, behaviour, including rules on

the use of force.

This assessment of the post-Cold War disarmament agenda and its implications for the multilateral disarmament machinery has led Canada to identify three goals in the reform and revitalization process: (1) practical integration of arms control and disarmament into the broader international security agenda in the work of the First Committee, along with its more effective functioning; (2) strengthening of the Centre for Disarmament Affairs as the institutional focal point of these efforts; and (3) increased priority to regional approaches to disarmament and to the "regional role" of the UN in this regard....

Canada strongly endorses the measures that the Secretary-General has taken to ensure that the UN Centre for Disarmament Affairs is fully capable of meeting the new opportunities and challenges we face. In particular, Canada shares the view that the Centre's work should be more directly geared to the Organization's efforts in the field of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping. Indeed, Canada believes that a very good start, under very difficult circumstances, has already been made to this end. I refer to the work of the three UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament, together with the UN-sponsored program of regional conferences.

I have been privileged to have been involved in the "Katmandu" regional cooperative security dialogue process since 1991. This "track two" process under the auspices of the Asia Pacific UN Regional

Centre has been instrumental in promoting discussions on confidence-building and transparency, non-proliferation in its global and regional dimensions, and conflict prevention and resolution. Such work by the United Nations in the regional context is an essential complement to activities at the global level....

Concrete steps have also been taken to rationalize the procedures in the First Committee. We commend in particular the full integration of our work on arms control and international security questions. Given this procedural breakthrough, delegations will have to work hard to ensure that the substance of the resolutions on the maintenance of international security are equally forward looking.... [T]he central question of how to integrate the work of the First Committee into the broader international security context so as to deepen understanding of the concepts of preventive diplomacy, confidence building and post-conflict peace-preserving measures...is work we must tackle in earnest if we are ever to be able to get beyond the thin veneer of agreement that currently exists on the practical implementation of global norms in concrete situations.

A genuine consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation norms lies at the heart of any enduring system of international peace and security. Under your able guidance, Mr. Chairman, we have begun the task in earnest of ensuring that the multilateral disarmament machinery plays its full part in elaborating that consensus. ■

First Report of UN Arms Register

On October 18, the Secretary-General presented to the UN General Assembly the first report of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. The report gives data on 79 countries' imports and exports of seven categories of conventional weapons systems for the year 1992. This is the first time in history that governments have made such data public as part of an international reporting exercise.

All major arms exporting countries supplied data, with the exception of South Africa and North Korea. Among importing states, major non-reporters include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Thailand, Taiwan, the United Arab Emirates and Syria. However, the data reported by major exporters makes

public the majority of arms transferred to these states. It has been estimated that more than 98 percent of arms exported in the seven categories during 1992 are publicized in the Register.

States participating in the register listed the transfer of 1,733 tanks, 1,625 armoured combat vehicles, 270 combat aircraft, 40 attack helicopters, 40 warships and 67,878 missiles and missile launchers. The US remained the principal exporter of arms in these categories, followed by Germany. Greece and Turkey were the major recipients of arms, due to the "cascade" effect of European states reducing inventories to meet the levels established by the CFE Treaty. ■

Peacekeeping: Rwandan Mission Expands, Haitian Mission Stalled

The UN has expanded its African operations with the creation of the UN Assistance Mission in **Rwanda** (UNAMIR). UNAMIR's task is to help implement the peace agreement worked out between the Rwandan government and opposition forces. The UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR), commanded by Canadian Brigadier General Romeo Dallaire, will be incorporated into the new mission. General Dallaire has been appointed the force commander of UNAMIR, which at its peak is expected to include over 2,500 military personnel.

Canada has completed the withdrawal of its infantry battalion from the United Nations Force in **Cyprus** (UNFICYP). To maintain its presence in the operation and to demonstrate its commitment to resolving the conflict in Cyprus, Canada has agreed to provide up to 10 military personnel to UNFICYP headquarters.

The withdrawal of all international military personnel from the UN Transitional Authority in **Cambodia** (UNTAC) was completed at the end of November, marking the successful conclusion of the operation to provide a stable environment for national elections. A democratically elected government is in place in Cambodia and has started the job of rebuilding the country.

In late September, the Security Council authorized the creation of the UN Mission in **Haiti** (UNMIH). The mission was designed to train a new police force once the Haitian Parliament passed legislation separating the existing police force from the armed forces. In addition, international military peacekeepers were mandated to undertake engineering and construction projects to help rebuild Haitian infrastructure.

Canada committed 100 RCMP officers, including the UNMIH commander, Chief

Superintendent Jacques Lemay, and 110 military engineers to help with the construction work and training. Canadian personnel had been only partially deployed when it became apparent that the Haitian military and police would not cooperate with UN forces in the implementation of UNMIH's mandate. With the mandate unachievable, Canada decided to withdraw its personnel from Haiti.

The UN has authorized the creation of an interdiction force to enforce sanctions imposed on Haiti for its non-compliance with the Governors Island Agreement, under which the Haitian military had agreed to the return of exiled President Aristide and his resumption of presidential power. The Canadian navy is contributing to the enforcement task force, which is commanded by the US. Canada will revisit the issue of redeployment with the UN, dependent on conditions in Haiti.

Sydney Workshop Aids Mid-East Peace Process

As Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization were signing their historic agreement in Washington, Canada hosted a workshop on maritime confidence-building measures (CBMs) at the Canadian Coast Guard College in Sydney, Nova Scotia, from September 12 to 14. The workshop was held under the auspices of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group of the Middle East Peace Process.

Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan/Palestinian delegation, Oman, Qatar and Tunisia attended the workshop, which was one of a series of such events taking place under the auspices of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group. In addition, the co-sponsors of the Middle East peace process (the US and Russia) sent delegations, as did Sweden, China and Japan.

The workshop concentrated on two types of maritime CBMs. The first was the negotiation and implementation of agreements aimed at the prevention of incidents at sea. The second was enhanced cooperation in regional maritime search and rescue activities. Hypothetical simulations were used to stimulate discussion in both areas. Canada's hope that the re-

gional parties would leave the workshop with fresh perspectives on how they might develop maritime CBMs was exceeded. Participants agreed that practical steps should be pursued to enhance regional co-operation both in preventing incidents at sea and in search and rescue operations. They expressed the hope that Canada would continue to act as a host and facilitator of the talks.

tator of the talks.

Canada presented a report on the workshop to the plenary meeting of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group in November in Moscow. The plenary directed Canada to organize a follow-on workshop, which will be held in the Middle East in the first two months of 1994.



Participants in the Sydney workshop.

Hemispheric CBMs Earth-to-Space Tracking Workshop

The OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security held its first ever meeting of governmental experts to discuss confidence-building measures (CBMs) from November 17 to 19 in Washington. The purpose of the meeting was two-fold: it permitted an exchange of views among governments on national perspectives towards CBMs, and it established the agenda for a subsequent workshop of experts, to be held in Buenos Aires in mid-March.

The Canadian delegation, led by Mr. Mark Moher, Director General of the International Security, Arms Control and CSCE Affairs Bureau of DFAIT, presented a paper on Canada's conceptual approach to CBMs. The presentation stressed the broad, interdisciplinary nature of CBMs and emphasized that confidence-building in any region must take account of the social, economic and political aspects of security. A second Canadian presentation was made by LCol Bernard Couture of the Directorate of Nuclear and Arms Control Policy at DND. Colonel Couture emphasized the Canadian approach to CBMs from a practical standpoint, discussing, among other things, the close cooperation between the Canadian Forces and the civilian authorities in the negotiation and implementation of CBMs.

Other national presentations provided overviews of the security situation throughout the hemisphere. It became clear that many regional states do not have security concerns bearing great resemblance to those of other regions. While traditional military CBMs may have some utility in dealing with specific concerns, the larger approach to regional security will have to focus on broader matters.

The March meeting will include:

- a more detailed discussion of the CBMs currently in force in the region;
- consideration of CBMs in force in other regions and their possible applicability to the Western hemisphere;
- examination of the political environment for successful confidence-building in the OAS region;
- examination of the extent of cooperation between the OAS and the UN on regional security matters, and the latest UN developments regarding CBMs.

Canada is consulting with the Chair of the Committee to determine where we can make the most useful contribution. ■

In September, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) held a unique workshop on Earth-to-space tracking at the Algonquin Space Complex in Algonquin Park, Ontario. The workshop, which ran from September 12 to 18, was hosted by the Toronto-based Institute for Space and Terrestrial Science (ISTS) as part of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's Verification Research Program.

Three UNIDIR representatives, eight scientific and political experts from Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, Russia and the United Nations, and six Canadian observers participated. While at the Space Complex, the group examined the political, technical and economic aspects of Earth-to-space tracking as part of efforts to control weapons in outer space. They also visited the facilities of Telesat Canada in Ottawa, where they continued their discussions with Telesat experts.

The workshop focused on current and future developments relating to arms control in outer space. Comparing diplomatic and scientific approaches, participants looked at confidence-building measures (CBMs) potentially applicable to space activities. These could involve formal or informal international measures, the aim of which is to establish confidence among states concerning the peaceful nature of their activities in or related to outer space and to assist in preventing the weaponization of outer space. Proposed CBMs and verification measures examined by the group include:

- international exchanges of information on planned and operational activities in outer space;
- the need for information exchange on rocket launches of all kinds;
- the need for international notification of such activities as launches, spacecraft functions, orbital parameters, planned manoeuvres, spacecraft lifetimes and disposal plans, and potential atmospheric re-entry; and
- specifics of Earth-to-space tracking, including the detection, recognition, description and identification of objects and manoeuvres in space.

Delegates also explored the increasingly critical problem of space debris. Between 7,000 and 9,000 objects currently orbit the Earth at a variety of altitudes and in varying sizes, ranging from paint chips one centimetre across to non-operational satellites in parking orbits. The proliferation of space debris may progress to such an extent that it eliminates space exploration. Some mathematical models have developed scenarios in which the increasing accumulation of debris in Earth orbit would destroy any spacecraft within a short period of its launch.

The workshop represented the initial meeting of an international study team set up by UNIDIR and is a natural extension of UNIDIR's earlier research on verification and on arms control in outer space. Dr. Wayne Cannon, head of the ISTS Space Geodynamics Laboratory, is one of the scientific experts on the team. UNIDIR plans a second workshop for the spring of 1994 in Europe, with the publication of the project's findings tentatively scheduled for the third quarter of 1994. ■

Focus: On the CSCE

With the end of the Cold War, a number of states, including Canada, have placed increased emphasis on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a vehicle for helping to maintain security and stability in Europe. It is widely acknowledged that CSCE meetings during the Cold War helped contribute to a lessening of East-West conflict by providing channels of communication. It is now hoped that the CSCE can serve as a tool for crisis management and prevention.

Origins of the CSCE

The idea of a conference of European states to discuss security on the continent was first advanced at a Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest in 1955. At the time, Western countries responded negatively, suspecting that the project's ultimate aim was to reduce the influence of the United States in Europe. The Warsaw Pact raised the notion again in 1966, and in 1969 Finland responded by exploring reactions towards the idea in the capitals of 30 Euro-

European states, Canada and the United States.

After a preliminary round of consultations and some political concessions, the first stage of the CSCE was convened in Helsinki on July 3, 1973. Participants agreed that given the number and diversity of matters on the agenda, items would be sorted into different "baskets," depending on their nature (the term comes from a British diplomat, who recalled that his mother used to sort balls of wool into different baskets according to their colour). They also agreed that all decisions would be taken by consensus.

The Helsinki conference concluded with the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act on August 1, 1975. The first basket of the Act deals with security and contains 10 principles guiding relations among participating states. The second basket contains recommendations on cooperation in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment. The third covers cooperation in humanitarian fields, such as human rights, information and culture.

Following the Helsinki conference, the principles and recommendations recorded in the Final Act were developed and extended by meetings of experts and larger "follow-up" meetings of all participating states. The first follow-up meeting took place in Belgrade from October 1977 to March 1978. Marked by rancour, it failed to reach any conclusions. The second took place in Madrid from November 1980 to September 1983.

CSBMs

The Madrid Follow-Up Meeting agreed on the establishment of negotiations on military confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Europe, which took place in Stockholm from January 1984 to September 1986. In the Stockholm Document (1986), the 35 participating states agreed on a series of CSBMs that improved on those agreed at Helsinki in 1975 and included notification and observation of major military activities.

The third CSCE Follow-Up Meeting, held in Vienna from November 1986 to January 1989, agreed on a second, bifurcated stage of security negotiations, involving: 1) another set of CSBM negotiations among the 35 CSCE states; and 2) a set of talks on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) conducted between the 13 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but remaining "within the frame-

work of the CSCE process." These talks resulted respectively in the Vienna Document and the CFE Treaty of November 1990. The Vienna Document 1990 contained 16 new CSBMs and subsumed measures from the Stockholm Document.

CSBM negotiators continued to meet, working towards a more comprehensive document which they completed in March 1992. The Vienna Document 1992, which encompasses the measures of the previous documents and includes all states of the former Soviet Union, mandates more detailed measures relating to exchanging information, providing advance notice of military exercises and limiting those exercises.

The fourth CSCE Follow-Up Meeting, held in Helsinki in 1992, approved the Helsinki Document 1992, which establishes the mandate for the Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). The FSC, a negotiating body for security issues, is designed to build upon such achievements as the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document 1992 and the Open Skies Treaty. It includes all CSCE members (now numbering 53). The FSC began meeting weekly in September 1992, not in traditional "rounds" but continuously, with occasional breaks.

The Institutional Framework

From its origins as a series of multilateral conferences, the CSCE has evolved into a regional organization with a modest institutional structure. The framework for political consultation and decision-making involves meetings of Heads of State or Government every two years, meetings of Foreign Ministers (the **Council**) at least once a year, periodic meetings of a **Committee of Senior Officials**, as well as the **Permanent Committee** of Ambassadors in Vienna, the CSCE's permanent forum. Responsibility for coordination of and consultation on all current business lies with the CSCE **Chairman-in-Office** (at present the Foreign Minister of Italy), who is appointed by the Council. The Chairman-in-Office may be assisted by the preceding and succeeding Chairs (known as the **Troika**). Review or follow-up conferences precede the meetings of Heads of State or Government. Their aim is to review activities and consider further steps to strengthen the CSCE. The next Heads of State or Government meeting is scheduled for December 1994 in Budapest.

In addition to political bodies, the CSCE has, since its first step in the direction of becoming an organization with the Charter of Paris in 1990, established a number of positions and permanent institutions. In June 1993, the CSCE appointed its first **Secretary-General**, Ambassador Wilhelm Hoeynck of Germany.

- A **CSCE Secretariat** in Prague provides administrative support to the political consultation process. It also maintains CSCE archives and provides information about the CSCE to the public.
- A **Conflict Prevention Centre** in Vienna, with a Mission Support Unit, assists the Committee of Senior Officials in its preventive diplomacy and conflict management missions, and gives support to the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures.
- The **Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights** in Warsaw promotes compliance with CSCE human dimension commitments, organizes seminars on human rights concerns, and facilitates contacts and the exchange of information on elections in CSCE states.
- The **High Commissioner on National Minorities** provides "early warning" and "early action" in regard to tensions involving national minorities issues.
- The **CSCE Parliamentary Assembly**, with a Secretariat in Copenhagen, encourages contacts and the exchange of information on parliamentary practices and democratic development.

All CSCE institutions and activities are financed by assessed contributions from CSCE participating states, with the exception of the salaries of seconded personnel, which are paid by the countries from which the individuals have been seconded.

Canada and the CSCE

Canada regards the CSCE as the principal regional security organization with the moral and political authority to deal with the root causes of insecurity in the European region. The CSCE's advantages include a membership that encompasses all European states — including all the states of the former Soviet Union — plus Canada and the United States. It has a set of underlying principles to guide its relations, it works by consensus, it is flexible, with a minimum of infrastructure, and it has at its core a strong commitment to human rights and democratic development.

Forecast

Arms control and disarmament activities involving Canada, January through April.

Ongoing: CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Vienna

Ongoing: CFE Joint Consultative Group, Vienna

Ongoing: Open Skies Consultative Commission, Vienna

January: CTBT negotiations due to begin in the CD, Geneva

January 17-21: NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee meeting, New York

January 25 - March 31: CD in session, Geneva

March 14-18: OAS meeting of experts on CBMs in the region, Buenos Aires

March 22-23: Australia Group regional seminar, Buenos Aires

March 28-31: Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting to review activities conducted under the provisions of the Vienna Document 1992, Vienna

April 18 - May 9: UN Disarmament Commission, New York

Since 1989 and the dramatic changes in Europe, Canada has worked hard and with great success to promote the evolution of the CSCE from an East-West forum into a co-operative security forum and a strong regional organization. Canada is encouraging the development of flexible and pragmatic CSCE relations with other regional organizations such as the European Union, NATO and the Council of Europe, as well as with the UN.

In 1990, recognizing that the new Europe was likely to be unstable, Canada put forward a series of proposals for establishing conflict prevention and management mechanisms, including the Conflict Prevention Centre. Canada promoted the concept of cooperative security, which recognizes that human rights, democratic development and economic stability are all integral and interdependent components of security.

At specialized meetings on the third basket, or "human dimension," Canada secured commitments in new areas, such as independence of the judiciary and women's rights, as well as additional commitments in the area of national minorities. Canada was instrumental in the development of a human dimension inter-state reporting mechanism, designed to encourage states to implement the commitments they had made.

At the CSCE Helsinki Summit in 1992, Canada played a key role in shaping the final document and was directly responsible for commitments in areas such as racism and intolerance, international humanitarian law, peacekeeping, humanitarian ceasefires and indigenous populations. As well, Canada secured commitments to continue cooperation on issues related to the transition to market economies by establishing this focus for one meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials each year, to be known as the Economic Forum.

In 1992, some of Canada's proposals on preventive diplomacy and conflict management became reality: CSCE states agreed to establish early warning mechanisms and fact-finding and long-duration missions. Since then, the CSCE has been active in conflict prevention efforts, deploying more than a dozen fact-finding missions, representatives and longer-term missions with differing mandates designed to assist in solving security problems. CSCE missions are or have been deployed in Estonia, Moldova, Latvia, Georgia-Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan and two states of the former Yugoslavia. In addition, the CSCE has sent a team to analyze the situation of ethnic minorities in Hungary and Slovakia, teams to assist states near Serbia-Montenegro in the application of UN sanctions, teams to inspect places of detention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and missions to new participating states to report on their human rights situations. Canadians have taken part in nearly all of these missions and have led two of them.

In September 1993, Canada hosted the CSCE's first-ever experts meeting on the sustainable development of forests. The event, which was held in Montreal, resulted in substantial progress, as experts developed a set of criteria for sustainable forest development.

For Canada, the CSCE represents a relatively low-cost investment in European security. Our assessed contributions, which cover institutions, meetings and missions, totalled approximately \$1.76 million in 1990-91, \$1.64 million in 1991-92 and \$1.84 million in 1992-93. At the CSCE Council meeting in Rome on November 30 and December 1, Canada reaffirmed its commitment to the CSCE as a vital, pan-Eurasian, transatlantic institution.

Acronyms

BTWC — Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

CD — Conference on Disarmament

CFE — Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

C(S)BM — confidence- (and security-) building measure

CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CTBT — comprehensive test ban treaty

CW(C) — Chemical Weapons (Convention)

DFAIT — Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

DND — Department of National Defence

EC — European Community (now Union)

ESDI — European Security and Defence Identity

FSC — Forum for Security Cooperation

IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency

ISTS — Institute for Space and Terrestrial Science

JCG — (CFE) Joint Consultative Group

NACC — North Atlantic Cooperation Council

NPT — Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

OAS — Organization of American States

OPCW — Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

OSCC — Open Skies Consultative Commission

START — Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

TLE — Treaty-limited equipment

UNDC — United Nations Disarmament Commission

UNGA — UN General Assembly

UNIDIR — UN Institute for Disarmament Research

UNSCOM — UN Special Commission

VCC — (CFE) Verification Coordinating Committee

WEU — Western European Union

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A review of Canada's arms control and disarmament activities

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Asia Pacific Security: The Dawn of Multilateralism?



Prime Minister Jean Chrétien with US President Bill Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin at the APEC Summit in Seattle last November. The Summit — the first APEC gathering at the head of state or government level — is one of a series of developments exemplifying the growth of multilateralism in Asia Pacific.

The "news" portions of North American news reports tend to turn to Europe — mainly Bosnia — and the "trade and business" portions to Asia Pacific. This is rather misleading. While Asia Pacific's importance to the global — and Canadian — economy has grown by leaps and bounds since the early 1980s, there is more to the region than dollars. Asia Pacific is filled with long-standing animosities, competing territorial claims, ethnic tensions and resource rivalries. While some conflicts have wound down, as in Cambodia, others still pose a high risk to peace, as in Korea and India-Pakistan. Partly as a consequence, the region has failed to parallel the global downward trend in military spending and arms acquisition, and is the focus of most current worries about

nuclear weapon and ballistic missile proliferation.

The Cold War in Asia Pacific was conducted through a set of bilateral relationships. The resulting absence of European-style alliances has left the region with few building blocks to reorient itself in the post-Cold War environment. Only recently have Asia Pacific countries come to recognize the merits of discussing security concerns multilaterally and of working together to prevent and resolve conflicts. Canada played a key role in changing regional perceptions with its launch in 1990 of the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD). Through the NPCSD, academics and officials from North Pacific countries (Canada, the US, Russia, China, Japan and the two Koreas) met during the course of six workshops and conferences to discuss various aspects of cooperative security in the region. Having achieved its objective of fostering dialogue, the NPCSD process was formally concluded last year.

Multilateralism in Asia Pacific is poised to enter a new phase with the remarkable decision, reached by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations last summer, to create a forum for region-wide discussion of security issues. This issue of the *Bulletin* looks at where the ASEAN Re-

Regional states increasingly see the merits of working together to prevent and resolve conflict.

gional Forum might lead and explores how Canada, with important political, economic, social and environmental interests in Asia Pacific, is continuing to promote security in the region. ■

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ASEAN Provides Forum for Region-Wide Security Dialogue

Asia Pacific's willingness to discuss security issues multilaterally has become most evident in a process spearheaded by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In recent years, security questions have been on the agenda of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC), an annual meeting between the ASEAN foreign ministers and their counterparts from so-called "dialogue partners" (Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the US and the European Union).

At last year's ASEAN meeting, participants announced the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an annual gathering devoted to the discussion of security issues. The ARF will hold its inaugural meeting this July in Bangkok, Thailand. In addition to PMC participants, foreign ministers from Russia, China, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea will attend.

A Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in Bangkok in May will prepare the agenda for the ASEAN PMC. At their 1993 meeting, senior officials tasked various countries with preparing papers for discussion. Canada was asked to present two papers: one on conflict prevention and dispute settlement, and one on non-proliferation. Australia was asked to prepare a paper on confidence-building measures and South Korea a paper on the situation in the Korean Peninsula. Canada has completed its papers and is circulating them to other participants for comment.

The ARF reflects two Canadian priorities: it brings together all major players, including Russia and China, and it has the ability to focus on regional security issues. Canada's principal goal now is to move the nascent dialogue from issues of process to issues of substance. We would like to see the ARF and SOM focus on, *inter alia*, conflict prevention and manage-

ment, peacekeeping and non-proliferation. These are areas in which Canada has recognized expertise and in which ARF participants could exchange views and develop a work program. As a first step, we would like to see participants develop a modest set of guiding principles for dealing with regional tensions and conflicts.

While the focus for multilateral regional security discussion remains with the ARF and SOM, some North Pacific countries are of the view that these dialogues will not adequately address their specific concerns. Unlike other Asia Pacific sub-regions, the North Pacific has no formal consultative arrangements, though efforts are underway to formalize a dialogue.

Canada has supported efforts to encourage dialogue at the sub-regional level — our own initiative, the NPCSD, was designed to promote this process. We continue to believe that a North Pacific security dialogue would be useful, and would want to be included in any discussions in the North Pacific devoted to broader cooperative security issues. Canada does not expect to be involved in every discussion, but seeks to participate in those where we have interests at stake and something to contribute to the process.

Potential for Progress in South Asia

South Asia — where the countries of Central Asia intersect with China, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, with Russia and Iran on the margins — remains an area afflicted with regional tensions. The most vexing problem in the region involves the confrontation between India and Pakistan. This arises from long-standing territorial disputes, including in the Siachen Glacier region, and Pakistan's alleged support for terrorist secessionist groups in Kashmir and Sikh separatists in Punjab.

Although the basic issues have not changed, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, combined with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, have transformed the overall dynamics of the situation. The Soviet demise ended the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace and Friendship, first signed in August 1971, and there have been other Russian diplomatic shifts away from India on various issues in international fora. While Russia has aligned itself with the desire of the US, Canada and others to promote a multilateral regional security dialogue, the policies of other states of the former Soviet Union, especially Ukraine and the Central Asian republics, towards India and Pakistan have been ambivalent.

At present there exists no regional security framework within which South Asian countries can systematically address security concerns. Canada and other G7 countries have tried to engage India and Pakistan in broader security policy discussions and to move through these to specific issue areas such as non-proliferation. The most recent initiative, launched by the US, appeared to make some headway in encouraging India to accept a multilateral regional security dialogue modelled on the Middle East peace process. However, India remains cautious in its relations with the US.

Until a multilateral framework for dialogue is agreed on, Canada will continue its efforts to encourage progress bilaterally between India and Pakistan and to engage both parties in broader security discussions on topics such as non-proliferation and verification. The government recently decided to fund a project by Canadian academics and non-governmental organizations, including the Canadian Centre for Global Security, to explore the feasibility of initiating an unofficial dialogue involving the two countries. The Centre's report is expected by the end of March.



Secretary of State for Asia Pacific Raymond Chan lays a wreath at the memorial in Saiwan Cemetery, Hong Kong. The memorial is dedicated to Canadians killed in the World War II Battle of Hong Kong.

North Korea Poses Nuclear Concern

The most immediate arms control concern in Asia Pacific — indeed, globally — is North Korea's continuing failure to comply with its obligations under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

In March 1993, North Korea indicated its intention to withdraw from the NPT — the first state in the Treaty's history to do so. Prior to its decision, North Korea had resisted the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency to conduct "special inspections" of two suspected, but undeclared, nuclear facilities, as provided for under North Korea's safeguards agreement with the Agency. In June, North Korea suspended its NPT withdrawal, pending the outcome of a series of bilateral talks with the US. However, North Korea did not permit the resumption of IAEA inspections.

While US-North Korean talks aimed at returning North Korea to the NPT continue, there are concerns about how much longer the IAEA will be able to provide assurances that no diversion of safeguarded material has taken place, since the film and batteries in IAEA monitoring equipment in North Korea need to be replaced. If the continuity of safeguards is broken, the IAEA may decide to report North Korea's continuing non-compliance to the UN Security Council.

Canada strongly supports the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula and a strong non-proliferation regime. We continue to urge North Korea to accept IAEA inspections, as required by its nuclear safeguards agreement. We also urge Pyongyang to fully implement its December 1991 denuclearization agreement with South Korea and to comply fully with the NPT.

Press-time update: In mid-February, North Korea agreed to allow a group of IAEA inspectors to check its seven declared nuclear installations. However, Pyongyang still has not agreed to comply fully with its safeguards agreement or to allow inspectors access to the two suspect sites.

Linking Asia Pacific and Global Security

The value of any Asia Pacific security initiative will depend not just on its ability to address "local" issues, but on its ability to relate those issues to broader global concerns. Just as multilateral Asia Pacific security cooperation should complement existing bilateral cooperation in the region, efforts taken at the regional level — whether bilaterally or multilaterally — should reinforce global efforts to build peace and security, primarily through the United Nations.

In *An Agenda for Peace* (1992), UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali challenged regional organizations to broaden their understanding of security and to place more emphasis on the prevention of conflict. He asked that action be taken to deal with problems locally before they require global attention. He also encouraged regional organizations to participate in UN efforts and to help build "international consensus on the nature of a problem and the measures required to address it."

Conflict Prevention

Asia Pacific is riddled with historical animosities, territorial and jurisdictional disputes, and potentially explosive ethnic mixes. However — the Korean Peninsula notwithstanding — the region to date presents a less gloomy post-Cold War picture than Europe. Increased economic interdependence and a desire to avoid anything that could jeopardize continued high growth rates have stimulated an interest among regional states in conflict prevention and management.

ASEAN has held three workshops with the UN on peace and preventive diplomacy, most recently in Bangkok on February 17-18. Canada provided funding for these workshops and presented papers on conflict prevention and resolution (1993) and dealing with conflict and dispute settlement (1994). The papers drew on Canadian experience and suggested some practical steps that could be taken to enhance cooperation and confidence in the region. These included:

- the development of a set of basic principles to ensure a common approach to regional cooperation;
- the development of conflict prevention and management mechanisms, such as a register of experts upon whom interested states could call to find facts, facilitate dialogue, or act as rapporteurs or conciliators;
- the consideration of measures to increase transparency, such as the publication of defence white papers and budgets, the prior notification of major military and naval exercises, and the invitation of observers to such exercises; and
- the promotion of dialogue among defence officials on issues of doctrine, strategy and threat perceptions.

Canada will be pursuing these ideas at the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting in May.

Peacekeeping

One of the most successful UN peacekeeping operations in recent years took place in Asia Pacific: the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). This was the most ambitious operation ever mounted by the UN and led to a fair election in a very difficult environment. Many Asia Pacific countries, including Canada, were deeply engaged in the long diplomatic process that led to the establishment of UNTAC and in UNTAC itself. Asia Pacific countries are also involved in the complex operation of peacebuilding that is succeeding UNTAC.

The Cambodian peace process is a good example of the potential for complementarity between regional and global efforts when dealing with issues that exceed regional capabilities, be these due to financial or political reasons, "spillover" outside the region, or the need for the unique political and moral authority of the UN Charter and Security Council in embargoes and peacekeeping.

Canada sees room for Asia Pacific countries to enhance their ability to contribute to UN peacekeeping efforts. Countries could share technical expertise and address logistical challenges in bilateral and multilateral exchanges, as well as in regional seminars. Seminars could also provide the UN with an Asia Pacific perspective on the implementation of *An Agenda for Peace*. Peacekeeping issues being discussed at the UN, such as



Canadians serving with the (now completed) UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia.

the development of common logistics, standby forces or peacekeeping training could be reviewed at the regional level.

Non-proliferation

As home to three nuclear-weapon states (the US, Russia and China), two major nuclear concerns (the Korean Peninsula and South Asia) and several of the world's leading importers and exporters of conventional arms, Asia Pacific demonstrates vividly the impossibility of severing the connection between the "local" and the "global" as far as weapons proliferation is concerned. To be viable, region-specific proposals aimed at preventing proliferation have to be placed within a framework that involves strong international non-proliferation instruments as well as general efforts to create a benign regional security environment.

Asia Pacific states have already taken steps towards this last. The ASEAN countries have long been active in the development of a political framework within which conflict would come to be regarded as impossible. Starting with the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, through proposals for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) and a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, to the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN nations have laid a firm foundation for

cooperation and dialogue on security issues.

In 1985, countries of the South Pacific established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in which the stationing, manufacture and testing of nuclear explosive devices and the dumping of nuclear waste is prohibited.

In South Asia, India and Pakistan have developed and implemented a number of bilateral confidence-building measures (CBMs), including:

- an agreement to give prior notification of troop movements within a certain distance of the border;
- a commitment not to attack each other's nuclear facilities;
- an agreement for regular contact by regional military commanders along the border; and
- a "hot line" agreement.

Prior to the recent difficulty over North Korea's adherence to the NPT, the two Koreas were slowly beginning to develop a dialogue that dealt with implementation of their December 1991 accord on a nuclear-weapon-free peninsula, as well as with broader issues.

Canada has been a supporter of Asia Pacific confidence-building efforts and is ready to provide assistance wherever Canadian experience might be relevant. Con-

fidence-building measures need not always take the form of steps like the notification of troop movements. The negotiation of political declarations and a regular process of dialogue are equally important in generating the political will required to reduce tensions. Within the ASEAN Regional Forum, specific military CBMs could be considered if participating states believe such measures would assist in moving cooperation beyond the declaratory stage.

At the global level, countries participating in the ARF may wish to consider steps they could take jointly to signal to other regions their commitment to non-proliferation. At the ASEAN SOM, Canada will be suggesting diplomatic efforts on behalf of:

- securing universal adherence to and the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995;
- the creation of an effective verification regime for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC);
- rapid implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC);
- adherence to the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); and
- submission of data to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

Canada is also proposing that Asia Pacific states consider taking regional or sub-regional steps to build upon global non-proliferation instruments. These might include such things as special verification provisions. For example, countries could agree to permit a larger number of inspections by other ARF participants, and those inspections might be more intrusive than usual. In addition, participants might wish to enhance transparency or information ex-

Successful non-proliferation strategies require both global and regional measures.

change mechanisms with respect to facilities, goods and services covered under the international agreements.

In terms of the UN Arms Register, Asia Pacific countries might want to agree to submit data on the production of conventional weapons and overall military holdings. In the ballistic missile area, countries could consider negotiating a regional or sub-regional agreement not to be the first to acquire or deploy ballistic missiles.

Opportunities

Creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum provides Asia Pacific countries with an opportunity to establish a distinctive security agenda that responds to the real concerns of regional states and reinforces the UN's work in building global peace and stability. The relationship between regional activity and that of the UN might be strengthened by inviting a UN representative to be an ARF observer.

While it is important not to overburden the ARF, there are many conflict prevention, peacekeeping and non-proliferation issues in Asia Pacific that could benefit from discussion at the ARF or in related working groups. The extent to which the ARF will help prevent and address conflict in the region remains to be seen. The potential is there. Its realization depends on the willingness of all Asia Pacific countries, including the major players, to make an intellectual contribution and political commitment to build cooperative security and reduce threats rather than simply meet them. ■

Canada Aids Conflict Prevention in the South China Sea

A notable example of preventive diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region is the South China Sea Initiative, co-sponsored by the Canadian and Indonesian governments and co-ordinated by the University of British Columbia's Centre for Asian Legal Studies. This "track two" (see below) initiative focuses on the Spratly Islands, which are variously claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, and the Paracel Islands, claimed by China and Vietnam. The surrounding waters are believed to hide rich oil and gas reserves. The Spratlys were the scene of military clashes between China and Vietnam as recently as 1988 and are still widely regarded as a potential flash-point in the region.

Experts from claimant countries as well as non-claimant "interested states" participate in a series of meetings on the history, legal and technical maritime issues surrounding the disputes. They also address the possible cooperative exploitation of resources in the South China Sea. Claimants have agreed not to enforce their claims militarily but to proceed through peaceful means.

The initiative is, in essence, a cooperative security dialogue — addressing a security issue at its roots, which in this case are found in questions of economics and resource management in addition to strict territorial questions. The experience reveals that it may be possible to deal with difficult, sensitive issues by focusing on modest efforts which, in themselves, provide opportunities to build confidence and enhance transparency, thus facilitating political settlement. The project has led to four workshops and two technical meetings. Two more technical meetings are scheduled for early this year, followed by a workshop in the summer. ■

Asia Pacific's "Track Two" Nourishes Official Dialogues

Although the ASEAN Regional Forum is Asia Pacific's first region-wide forum for governmental discussion of security issues, regional and sub-regional security dialogues have burgeoned over the past three years in non-governmental or "track two" fora. Track two activities, such as workshops and conferences, involve academics, researchers and journalists as well as officials acting in their private capacities.

The value of track two is multifold. It serves as a sounding board for new ideas. It encourages interaction between representatives of countries that have poor — or non-existent — diplomatic relations with one another. It moves thinking ahead when official dialogues are absent and contributes to a "habit of dialogue" that may later manifest itself at the official (or "track one") level. The fact that ASEAN has invited other countries to join it in a security forum is due in large part to ideas and momentum generated in track two.

Track two is not unique to Asia Pacific, but its breadth and depth in the region exceed that of anything similar elsewhere around the globe. Canada played a prominent role in encouraging Asia Pacific's second track with its North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue. NPCSD involved both official diplomatic contacts and non-official conferences, workshops and publications, with participation from around the region. The second track — coordinated by York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies and the University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies — developed multilateral dialogues on a range of proposals for enhancing security in the North Pacific and elicited regional reactions to those proposals.

Other ongoing track two dialogues include an annual ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies roundtable on Asia Pacific security (in Kuala Lumpur), an annual UN Meeting on peace and disarmament in the Asia Pacific region (in Katmandu), and an annual international defence conference in Seoul, sponsored by the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington. Countless other seminars and conferences are sponsored by think tanks and universities around the region.

The intensity and policy significance of track two is likely to grow as governments continue to seek support for progress at the official level. However, the proliferation of track two activities is already stretching the financial and human resources available in individual countries. This has led — internationally — to efforts to streamline track two, and — nationally — to efforts to improve Canadian participation.

Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security

The Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security (CANCAPS) is an initiative by scholars interested in maintaining and enhancing the Canadian interest in and profile on Asia Pacific security issues. It will pick up where NPCSD left off. The objective of CANCAPS is to promote research, publication, public awareness and exchange activities on Asia Pacific security issues and Canadian involvement in them. Participation is open to Canadians based in academic institutions, research institutes and the private and public sectors who have expertise, experience and an active engagement in questions related to the changing security

environment in the Asia Pacific region and Canada's role in this environment. Seed funding for the Consortium is being provided by DFAIT's Pacific 2000 Program and an administrative base has been established at the University of British Columbia and York University.

CANCAPS was formally launched at a meeting in Toronto on December 3-4. Officials from DFAIT, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian International Development Agency participated. They will continue to be involved in CANCAPS in their private capacities.

Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific

The Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) was founded in June 1993 by 10 institutes around the region, including the University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies. The purpose of CSCAP is to create a regularized, focused and inclusive non-governmental process on Asia Pacific security matters. The main focus of CSCAP activity will be working groups, which will undertake policy-oriented studies on specific regional political-security problems. CSCAP does not aspire to become the region's sole track two channel, but rather to help coordinate efforts and avoid redundancy.

Countries and territories participating in CSCAP (initially Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and the US) are required to create broadly based member committees composed of academics, government officials (acting in their private capacities) and other relevant individuals. The Canadian Member Committee is currently being formed.

For further information about CANCAPS, contact one of the following:

Institute of International Relations
University of British Columbia
C456-1866 Main Mall
Vancouver, B.C., V6T 1Z1
tel. 604-822-6595, fax 604-822-5540

or

Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies
270 York Lanes
York University
4700 Keele Street
North York, Ontario, M3J 1P3
tel. 416-736-5786, fax 416-736-5688.

The Joint Centre can also provide information about CSCAP.

L. Bianco, Geneva



Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason (fifth from left, middle row) with UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (front row, centre) and other members of the UN Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters at their meeting in Geneva on January 12-13. The Board considered practical ways of putting the tools and expertise of "disarmers" more directly at the disposal of UN preventive diplomacy and "peace" operations. Participants highlighted a new study by the UN Institute for Disarmament Research and a new UN Group of Governmental Experts Study on the role of the UN in verification (the latter is chaired by Ambassador Mason).

The Secretary-General expressed particular interest in the effort currently underway — chaired by Canada — in the UN Disarmament Commission to develop agreed principles among suppliers and recipients of sensitive dual-use technologies. He suggested this could be a first step towards a more cooperative and broadly based multilateral approach — perhaps similar to the IAEA safeguards system — that might allow equitable and responsible access by all states.

Canadian-Korean Verification Cooperation

Canada has been strongly supportive of the two Koreas' attempts to improve their mutual relations, including their steps to build confidence and reduce arms with appropriate verification. Canadian efforts have focused, in particular, on exchanges of information with South Korea, drawing on our experience in the verification process from a number of perspectives.

In June 1992, officials from DFAIT's Verification Research Unit were invited to participate in a verification workshop in Seoul sponsored by the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA). This was followed in December 1992 — at the request of the South Korean government — by a week-long seminar in Ottawa designed to familiarize 11 senior Korean military officials with conventional forces inspection techniques. This training seminar drew on the expertise of Department of National Defence and DFAIT officials with regard to the verification provisions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the CSCE Vienna Document.

In addition, representatives from KIDA and Korea's Research Institute for National Unification have participated in a number of symposiums and workshops in Canada — organized by Royal Roads Military College and York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies — as part of DFAIT's Verification Research Program. This informal Canadian-Korean cooperative research program on verification has proven to be of considerable mutual benefit and is continuing.

UN Encourages Asia Pacific Disarmament

A little-known aspect of the UN's work is its three regional centres for peace and disarmament: one in Latin America, one in Africa and one in Asia Pacific. This last, established in 1988 and located in Katmandu, Nepal, has a mandate to provide, on request, substantive support for peace and disarmament-related activities agreed by the states in the region. The Centre also coordinates the implementation of UN Disarmament Information Program (formerly World Disarmament Campaign) activities in Asia.

There is wide recognition among Asia Pacific states that the Centre should encourage regional and sub-regional dialogue to enhance confidence and promote disarmament and security. Towards this end, the Centre has held a series of regional meetings on confidence-building and security, with participation from governments, research institutes, the mass media and non-governmental organizations from around Asia Pacific. The meetings provide an opportunity for participants to review continuing changes in the international and regional security environment and to consider the implications for peace and disarmament. Canada has been represented at these meetings by Ambassador for Disarmament Peggy Mason. Below are excerpts from Ambassador Mason's address to the Sixth UN Meeting on Peace and Disarmament in the Asia Pacific Region, held from January 31 to February 2 in Katmandu.

I have been asked to discuss the "Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security" adopted by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1993....

Disarmament lies at the heart of the cooperative security-building process.

The very fact that we have consensus guidelines on regional approaches to disarmament de-

veloped in a global forum...is dramatic testimony to the post-Cold War disarmament agenda of which the heightened regional dimension is perhaps one of the most striking features....

Disarmament at its core is concerned with creating the conditions under which countries will place less reliance on armaments and more reliance on alternative processes for ensuring their viability and well-being against all manner of threats, however defined. During the post-Cold War era of interdependence, integration and globalization at the macro level, as against increasing tribalization and fragmentation at the local level, it seems clear that the tools for building such alternative mechanisms will be increasingly regionally and cooperatively based.

The UN has both a "top down" or global/normative/framework role to play and a "bottom up" or operational role to play, the latter at the regional, sub-regional and local levels. Arms control and disarmament — both in the strict sense of negotiating agreements to limit/control/manage armaments and in the broader sense of building confidence among nations by promoting greater openness in military matters — are tools in the process of building collective/cooperative security, just as preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacebuilding are tools to this end. All aspects along this continuum need to be addressed if the goal of collective/cooperative security is to be reached.

Countries must be encouraged to develop concrete mechanisms to prevent and to resolve disputes peacefully. For such mechanisms to work, there must be an ever-enlarging consensus on the proper roles of power, armaments, the use of force and, above all, on the limits of the use of force. From this perspective, arms control and disarmament relate to cooperative efforts (at every level from local to global) to control the use of force and to promote collective security based on agreed rules of interstate behaviour, including on the use of force. Increasingly, too, intrastate behaviour will be involved, including the specific issue of disarming both irregular and regular forces within the boundaries of one country.

There is an obvious role for the UN in respect of global agreements aimed at eliminating weapons of mass destruction or, at minimum, at limiting their spread.... Regarding conventional arms, the objectives are far less clear since it is not a matter of eliminating them but of encouraging barriers to excessive transfers and accumulations. Above all, a

greater common understanding must be developed with respect to what is legitimate and what is excessive, together with agreed parameters for the transfer of such armaments. To develop such an understanding, efforts must take place both at the global and regional levels. At the global level, the UN Arms Register is the main vehicle for stimulating such a discussion. Equally important is the UN's work in promoting transparency, confidence building and openness in military matters on a regional basis, particularly through the UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament.

Since 1990, Asia Pacific has seen a multitude of efforts at promoting a cooperative security dialogue process. The ASEAN Regional Forum is the tangible result of these many interlocking efforts....

Disarmament — both in the narrow and broad senses — has not diminished in importance but rather lies at the heart of the new collective/cooperative security-building process.

The [new UNDC guidelines] should be viewed as our common asset. Their applicability and their elaboration in specific regional and sub-regional contexts must now be worked out. ■

Canadians Help Demine Cambodia

Foreign Affairs Minister André Ouellet and Minister of National Defence David Collonette announced on February 24 that Canada will send 12 Canadian Forces personnel to Cambodia to provide training and administrative support to the Cambodia Mine Action Centre. The personnel will be provided through the United Nations Development Program, which is coordinating international support for demining operations in Cambodia. The Canadians will constitute half of the 25-member international technical advisory group to the Centre.

"Cambodia has the worst problem of uncleared landmines in the world. Agriculture is impossible because of mines littered in farmland. Trade is being strangled by mined roads. I'm proud of this Canadian effort to train Cambodians so that they can overcome this most serious obstacle to the country's development," said Mr. Ouellet. ■

Summit Adapts NATO to New Circumstances

PMO photo



Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (right) with British Prime Minister John Major.

The NATO Summit in Brussels on January 10 and 11 marked an important step in the evolution of the North Atlantic Alliance. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and the other NATO leaders took a number of key decisions enabling NATO to better respond to the new challenges confronting the Euro-Atlantic region.

Canada clearly affirmed that NATO should expand as the community of values that NATO represents extends to the East. The enlargement of the Alliance will be

an evolutionary process. Canada supported the proposal — adopted at the Summit — for a “Partnership for Peace” that will permit former Warsaw Pact states and other European countries to forge closer political and military relationships with NATO. The Partnership program provides a framework for joint military exercises and makes it possible for other European states to cooperate with NATO in peacekeeping operations.

In discussions about the situation in

Bosnia, Canada expressed its views on the use of air strikes, emphasizing the need for prudence given the strong negative effects such strikes could have on the security of troops on the ground and on the delivery of humanitarian aid. Canada also reaffirmed the essential role that the UN and the CSCE play in conflict prevention and management. NATO should continue to respond to the requests of these two organizations in the area of peacekeeping.

The concept of “combined joint task forces” was endorsed at the Summit. Thanks to this new approach, NATO’s military structure will be more flexible and better able to support peacekeeping operations in which the Alliance might become involved. The concept will also permit the Western European Union to use NATO resources, with the Alliance’s agreement.

Canada was pleased with the Summit’s outcome, which met several Canadian objectives: the US reaffirmed its engagement in Europe; increased European responsibility for security was acknowledged in the reaffirmation of the European Security and Defence Identity; relations between the UN, the CSCE and NATO were strengthened; NATO showed its openness to new members; and NATO improved its capacity to operate in peacekeeping operations.

Despite the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, there remains a great deal of insecurity in Europe. NATO continues to play an essential, stabilizing role — which is highlighted by the fact that several countries want to join the Alliance. ■

NATO Summit Declaration

Following is the text of the declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO Headquarters in Brussels on January 10-11.

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Brussels to renew our Alliance in light of the historic transformations affecting the entire continent of Europe. We welcome the new climate of cooperation that has emerged in Europe with the end of the pe-

riod of global confrontation embodied in the Cold War.

However, we must also note that other causes of instability, tension and conflict have emerged. We therefore confirm the enduring validity and indispensability of our Alliance. It is based on a strong transatlantic link, the expression of a shared destiny. It reflects a European Security and Defence Identity gradually emerging as the expression of a mature Europe. It is reaching out to establish new patterns of cooperation throughout Europe. It rests, as

also reflected in Article 2 of the Washington Treaty, upon close collaboration in all fields.

Building on our decisions in London and Rome and on our new Strategic Concept, we are undertaking initiatives designed to contribute to lasting peace, stability and well-being in the whole of Europe, which has always been our Alliance’s fundamental goal.

We have agreed:

- to adapt further the Alliance’s political and military structures to reflect both

the full spectrum of its roles and the development of the emerging European Security and Defence Identity, and endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces;

- we reaffirm that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries;
- to launch a major initiative through a Partnership for Peace, in which we invite partners to join us in new political and military efforts to work alongside the Alliance;
- to intensify our efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

Transatlantic Link

2. We reaffirm our strong commitment to the transatlantic link, which is the bedrock of NATO. The continued substantial presence of United States forces in Europe is a fundamentally important aspect of that link. All our countries wish to continue the direct involvement of the United States and Canada in the security of Europe. We note that this is also the expressed wish of the new democracies of the East, which see in the transatlantic link an irreplaceable pledge of security and stability for Europe as a whole. The fuller integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union into a Europe whole and free cannot be successful without the strong and active participation of all Allies on both sides of the Atlantic.

3. Today, we confirm and renew this link between North America and a Europe developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy and taking on greater responsibility on defence matters. We welcome the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht and the launching of the European Union, which will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and allow it to make a more coherent contribution to the security of all the Allies. We reaffirm that the Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.

ESDI

4. We give our full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity which, as called for in the Maastricht Treaty, in the longer term per-

spective of a common defence policy within the European Union, might in time lead to a common defence compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance. The emergence of a European Security and Defence Identity will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link and will enable European Allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defence. The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests.

5. We support strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defence component of the European Union. The Alliance's organization and resources will be adjusted to facilitate this. We welcome the close and growing cooperation between NATO and the WEU that has been achieved on the basis of agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. In future contingencies, NATO and the WEU will consult, including as necessary through joint Council meetings, on how to address such contingencies.

6. We therefore stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. We support the development of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security. Better European coordination and planning will also strengthen the European pillar and the Alliance itself. Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Security and Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common defence and other tasks.

Peacekeeping

7. In pursuit of our common transatlantic security requirements, NATO increasingly will be called upon to undertake missions in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective defence of its

members, which remains a core function. We reaffirm our offer to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. Participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.

8. Against this background, NATO must continue the adaptation of its command and force structure in line with requirements for flexible and timely responses contained in the Alliance's Strategic Concept. We also will need to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance by facilitating the use of our military capabilities for NATO and European/WEU operations, and assist participation of non-NATO partners in joint peacekeeping operations and other contingencies as envisaged under the Partnership for Peace.

9. Therefore, we direct the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, to examine how the Alliance's political and military structures and procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance's missions, including peacekeeping, as well as to improve cooperation with the WEU and to reflect the emerging European Security and Defence Identity.

NATO to improve capability to participate in UN, CSCE and WEU operations.

As part of this process, we endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance. We have directed the North Atlantic Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, to develop this concept and establish the necessary capabilities. The Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, and in coordination with the WEU, will work on implementation in a manner that provides separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU. The North Atlantic Council in Permanent Ses-

Defence Policy Review

On February 17, Defence Minister David Collenette launched the parliamentary phase of Canada's defence policy review by tabling a guidance document in the House of Commons. This document will provide the policy framework intended to assist a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons in focusing their deliberations and their consultations with Canadians. "We need to have a clear, realistic and affordable policy that spells out what we expect of the Canadian Forces," said Mr. Collenette while leading off the debate on a government motion to create the Committee. "The government wants to hear the views of Canadians on the future of Canadian defence. I urge them to take part in the process and to make their views known."

The Committee will be composed of 16 members (11 MPs and five Senators) empowered to hold public hearings in Canada and consultations abroad. The Committee's report will be tabled by the end of September and will form an important component of the policy development process. Following review of the Committee's report, the government will publish a white paper on defence.

sion will report on the implementation of these decisions to Ministers at their next regular meeting in June 1994.

10. Our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct and material concern to us, as they are to all other CSCE states under the commitments of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris.

We remain deeply committed to further strengthening the CSCE, which is the only organization comprising all European and North American countries, as an instrument of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, cooperative security, and the advancement of democracy and human rights. We actively support the efforts to enhance the operational capabilities of the CSCE for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management.

11. As part of our overall effort to promote preventive diplomacy, we welcome the European Union proposal for a Pact on Stability in Europe, will contribute to its elaboration, and look forward to the opening conference, which will take place in Paris in the spring.

Partnership for Peace

12. Building on the close and long-standing partnership among the North American and European Allies, we are committed to enhancing our security and stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our east. We reaffirm that

the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our east, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.

13. We have decided to launch an immediate and practical program that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new program goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership — a Partnership for Peace. We invite the other states participating in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this program, to join with us in this Partnership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.

14. The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and the Partners for Peace. Partner states will be invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities.

The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance.

NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.

15. To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 1994. To coordinate joint military activities within the Partnership, we will invite states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programs.

16. Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has greatly expanded the depth and scope of its activities. We will continue to work with all our NACC partners to build coop-

Partnership program will expand and intensify cooperation between NATO and other European countries.

erative relationships across the entire spectrum of the Alliance's activities. With the expansion of NACC activities and the establishment of the Partnership for Peace, we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC countries and other Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve our working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation.

Arms Control

17. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international security and is a matter of concern to NATO. We have decided to intensify and expand NATO's political and defence efforts against proliferation, taking into account the work already underway in other international fora and institutions. In this regard, we direct that work begin immediately in appropriate fora of the Alliance to develop an overall policy framework to consider how to reinforce ongoing prevention efforts and how to reduce the proliferation threat and protect against it.

18. We attach crucial importance to the full and timely implementation of existing arms control and disarmament agreements as well as to achieving further progress on key issues of arms control and disarmament, such as:

- the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and work towards an enhanced verification regime;
- the early entry into force of the Convention on Chemical Weapons and new measures to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention;
- the negotiation of a universal and verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- issues on the agenda of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation;
- ensuring the integrity of the CFE Treaty and full compliance with all its provisions.

19. We condemn all acts of international terrorism. They constitute flagrant violations of human dignity and rights and are a threat to the conduct of normal international relations. In accordance with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation possible to prevent and suppress the scourge.

20. We reaffirm our support for political and economic reform in Russia and welcome the adoption of a new constitution and the holding of democratic parliamentary elections by the people of the Russian Federation. This is a major step forward in the establishment of a framework for the development of durable democratic institutions. We further welcome the Russian government's firm commitment to democratic and market reform and to a reformist foreign policy. These

are important for security and stability in Europe.

We believe that an independent, democratic, stable and nuclear-weapon-free Ukraine would likewise contribute to security and stability. We will continue to encourage and support the reform processes in both countries and to develop cooperation with them, as with other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

21. The situation in Southern Caucasus continues to be of special concern. We condemn the use of force for territorial gains. Respect for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia is essential to the establishment of peace, stability and cooperation in the region. We call upon

building between the countries in the region. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to continue to review the overall situation, and we encourage all efforts conducive to strengthening regional stability.

Former Yugoslavia

23. As members of the Alliance, we deplore the continuing conflict in the former Yugoslavia. We continue to believe that the conflict in Bosnia must be settled at the negotiating table and not on the battlefield. Only the parties can bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. Only they can agree to lay down their arms and end the violence which for these many months has only served to demonstrate that no side

Canadian Forces photo



A CFE reduction inspection.

all states to join international efforts under the aegis of the United Nations and the CSCE aimed at solving existing problems.

22. We reiterate our conviction that security in Europe is greatly affected by security in the Mediterranean. We strongly welcome the agreements recently concluded in the Middle East peace process, which offer an historic opportunity for a peaceful and lasting settlement in the area. This much-awaited breakthrough has had a positive impact on the overall situation in the Mediterranean, thus opening the way to consider measures to promote dialogue, understanding and confidence

can prevail in its pursuit of military victory.

24. We are united in supporting the efforts of the United Nations and the European Union to secure a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Bosnia, agreeable to all parties, and we commend the European Union Action Plan of 22 November 1993 to secure such a negotiated settlement. We reaffirm our determination to contribute to the implementation of a viable settlement reached in good faith. We commend the front-line states for their key role in enforcing sanctions against those who continue to promote violence

and aggression. We welcome the cooperation between NATO and the Western European Union in maintaining sanctions enforcement in the Adriatic.

25. We denounce the violations by the parties of the agreements they have already signed to implement a ceasefire and to permit the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to the victims of this terrible conflict. This situation cannot be tolerated. We urge all the parties to respect their agreements. We are determined to eliminate obstacles

NATO reaffirms its readiness, under UN Security Council authority, to carry out air strikes to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo and other threatened areas.

to the accomplishment of the UNPROFOR mandate. We will continue operations to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia. We call for the full implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions regarding the reinforcement of UNPROFOR. We reaffirm our readiness, under the authority of the United Nations Security Council and in accordance with the Alliance decisions of 2 and 9 August 1993, to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this context, we urge the UNPROFOR authorities to draw up urgently plans to ensure that the blocked rotation of the UNPROFOR contingent in Srebrenica can take place and to examine how the airport at Tuzla can be opened for humanitarian relief purposes.

26. The past five years have brought historic opportunities as well as new uncertainties and instabilities to Europe. Our Alliance has moved to adapt itself to the new circumstances, and today we have taken decisions in key areas. We have given our full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity. We have endorsed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to adapt the Alliance to its future tasks. We have opened a new perspective of progressively closer relationships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union. In doing all this, we have renewed our Alliance as a joint endeavour of a North America and Europe permanently committed to their common and indivisible security. The challenges we face are many and serious. The decisions we have taken today will better enable us to meet them. ■

Canada Welcomes Ukrainian Ratification of START I

Canada welcomed the unconditional ratification by the Ukrainian parliament of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol, which commits Ukraine to rid itself of nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state.

"The government and parliament of Ukraine have acted courageously," said Foreign Minister André Ouellet of the February 3 decision. "They have recognized that denuclearization is the best way to ensure Ukraine's stability and promote security in the region."

The ratification follows a trilateral agreement announced January 14 by US President Bill Clinton, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, under which Ukraine will return all nuclear weapons from its territory to Russia for dismantling over the next seven years. Ukraine had been procrastinating on the fulfilment of its Lisbon Protocol obligations due to mistrust of Russia and a lack of resources to pay for the dismantling and removal process.

Mr. Ouellet noted that he will discuss Lisbon Protocol implementation and the prospects for increased Canada-Ukraine cooperation when he visits Ukraine in the near future. Canada has an extensive program of technical assistance in Ukraine and early NPT accession will open the door to full cooperation in the nuclear field, especially in the area of safety. ■

CSCE Missions Update

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has made conflict prevention and crisis management a central focus of its role in European cooperative security. To this end, over the past 18 months it has deployed a variety of missions to areas of potential or current conflict. These missions have had widely differing mandates, budgets and sizes. Their relationships with host authorities, other parties to conflicts and international organizations have also differed greatly.

The following long-term CSCE missions are currently in the field:

Skopje (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia)

The "Spillover Monitor Mission" is to monitor developments along the Macedonia-Serbia border and in other parts of Macedonia susceptible to spillover of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The aim is to promote respect for territorial integrity and the maintenance of peace, and to help prevent possible conflict in the region. This requires very close coordination with the UNPROFOR-Macedonia Command. The eight-member CSCE mission reports that there are no immediate symptoms of spillover but the deteriorating economic situation is of serious concern. Canada has participated in this mission.

Georgia

The objective of this mission is to promote negotiations between the parties to the conflict in Georgia. Although its mandate covers both the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts, the CSCE mission focuses on South Ossetia, while the UN takes the lead in Abkhazia. The CSCE mission, with eight members, has been instructed to develop a proposal for cooperation with the joint (Georgian, Russian, South Ossetian) peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia, which could see the CSCE playing a more concerted role in overseeing peacekeeping in the former USSR.

Moldova

The objective of this eight-member mission is to facilitate the achievement of a political settlement to the conflict in the

Left-Bank Dniester areas of Moldova. Forces in the Trans-Dniester are pressing for separation from the Republic of Moldova. The CSCE mission has developed a proposal for an autonomous status for the Trans-Dniester region within the Republic of Moldova. To date, however, there has been little tangible progress in bringing the sides closer to a settlement. Canada headed this mission for its first six months and a Canadian diplomat currently serves with the mission.

Estonia

The mission's objective is to promote understanding and dialogue between the "communities" of Estonia, widely understood to mean the Estonian majority and the Russian minority. The key issue is monitoring the treatment accorded the Russophones, given their status as a "national minority." Although the mission does not have a mandate to oversee the withdrawal of Russian troops, the CSCE has made it clear to Russia that it should not use the situation of the Russian minority in Estonia as a pretext for delaying the withdrawal of its troops. The mission has six members. Canada has served on it.

Latvia

The objectives of the four-person mission in Latvia are similar to those of the Estonian mission, namely to advise local authorities and relevant organizations on matters such as citizenship. As in Estonia, the key issue is the status of the Russian minority.

Tajikistan

Established by the CSCE in December, this mission will attempt to facilitate dialogue and confidence building between the various parties in conflict, and to promote respect for human rights, democracy and other CSCE norms and principles. The four-person mission is the first CSCE presence of its kind in Central Asia.

Sanctions Assistance Missions

Although not designed for conflict prevention, the CSCE has established sanctions assistance missions in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania and Ukraine. These missions are mandated to advise host governments on the implementation of sanctions against the former Yugoslavia. Canada heads the mission in Macedonia. ■

Canada Hopes for Pragmatism in CTBT Negotiations

The following are excerpts from a speech by Ambassador Gerald Shannon to the Conference on Disarmament, delivered on January 25 in Geneva.

Mr. Chairman, the Conference on Disarmament once again has the opportunity to serve the global non-proliferation effort, this time by means of the negotiation of a universal, non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty. A CTBT will provide an important element to the global security and non-proliferation architecture.

It is my hope that we will act with the utmost flexibility and pragmatism in order that a CTBT may soon become a reality. It is important, as we search for the parameters of the treaty, to bear in mind the expectation by the global community that we pursue our work expeditiously. We must avoid the temptation to become bogged down in needless procedural wrangles. As the 1995 Review Conference for the NPT approaches, we must remember that substantive progress towards a CTBT or, better, the conclusion of our work, will have an important salutary effect on the prospects for the indefinite extension of that Treaty.

A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty is a long-standing Canadian objective. We welcomed the announcement last August by President Clinton which opened the way for negotiations to begin. All the nuclear-weapon states have indicated their support for a CTBT and this support was reflected in the resolution adopted by consensus at the 48th General Assembly last fall. Four of the five nuclear-weapon states are currently observing testing moratoria and it is important to our work that all five nuclear-weapon states continue not to test. If this is the case, the world will have seen its last nuclear test.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to outline the principles that will guide the Canadian delegation during the negotiation of a CTBT.

- The treaty should ban all nuclear explosive testing in all environments for all time.
- The treaty should be non-discriminatory and universal, that is, open to signature by all states.



Mr. Gerald Shannon, Canada's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament.

- The verification regime should be international in character and have a baseline capacity to monitor compliance on a global basis using seismic methods of anomaly detection, reinforced by other systems and technologies, e.g., imagery and radionuclide sensing. These methods of verification would be supported, as required, by an on-site inspection process.
- The International Seismic Monitoring System should receive standardized data from a network of existing and proposed seismic stations. Management and resource responsibilities will require resolution. In this regard, the work of the Group of Scientific Experts and the third global seismic exchange experiment will support our efforts in a practical and pragmatic fashion.
- An independent, modestly staffed, international agency should be established to collect, analyze and distribute data and to conduct on-site inspections to determine if a violation of the treaty has occurred. It will be important to bear in mind the requirement that the system be cost-effective.
- It is our view that the UN Security Council would determine the response of the international community as a whole in the event of a confirmed violation of the treaty.

As for the structure of our work, I am grateful for the efforts of Ambassador

Tanaka, which have led to the generally accepted position that we should move quickly to establish two working groups: one on legal and institutional issues and the other on verification and compliance.

Mr. Chairman, while the comprehensive test ban treaty should remain the focus of our work in this session, we also have an opportunity to expand the global non-proliferation effort in yet another fashion and to enhance global security. The UN General Assembly also produced a consensus resolution on the "Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices." That text welcomed the substantive bilateral agreements between the Russian Federation and the United States of America regarding the disposition of their fissile material.

The effect of that resolution, however, is to express the wish of the community of nations for a non-discriminatory, multilateral

and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Despite having been proposed in one form or another for many years, this is a relatively new issue for the CD to consider. A period of reflection and consultation is therefore required to ascertain the best way to move ahead.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to indicate that Canada will shortly be tabling a compendium of CD documentation on the nuclear test ban issue, as well as a separate volume compiling treaty and draft treaty texts relating to nuclear test bans. Many of you will be familiar with similar compendiums we provided for the chemical weapons negotiations and on which I have received many favourable comments. It is our hope that this compendium will prove a useful reference tool for delegations in the coming months as we turn our attention to the negotiation of a CTBT. ■

CD to Negotiate Fissionable Material Cut-off

The Conference on Disarmament established in January an Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The treaty is to be non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable. The decision to negotiate a treaty is the result of a Canadian-initiated resolution adopted by consensus at last fall's UN General Assembly. The resolution also requests the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide assistance for examination of verification arrangements for a treaty.

Consideration of a ban or "cut-off" of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes has been before the CD and its predecessors since it was first raised in embryonic form by US President Eisenhower in his 1953 "Atoms for Peace" proposal. In 1978, at the First UN Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD I), then Prime Minister Trudeau proposed such a ban, in his strategy of suffocation, as a disarmament measure. Since then, there have been various proposals for a cut-off, none of which had the real prospect of leading to negotiations until this past September, when US President Bill Clinton announced his administration's commitment to a ban as part of the US nuclear non-proliferation program.

Fissionable (the US tends to use the term "fissile") material generally refers to highly enriched uranium (HEU), i.e., uranium enriched to more than 20 percent in the isotope U-235, and to plutonium. A modern warhead carries approximately 3-4 kilograms of plutonium and about 15 kilograms of HEU. Cruder devices require slightly more. The US stopped producing HEU for weapons purposes in 1964. In July 1992, Washington announced that it had permanently ended production of fissionable material for weapons, having determined that existing stocks are necessary to meet any conceivable need. The US is estimated to currently possess about 550 tons of HEU and 110 tons of plutonium. Russia continues to produce weapons-grade plutonium in three dual-purpose reactors, but has stated that it will stop completely by the year 2000. The dismantlement of warheads under START I and II will add about 750 tons of HEU and 150 tons of plutonium to the stockpiles of the US and Russia over the next decade.

The arguments in favour of a cut-off are that it would cap the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon states, halt the build-up of stockpiles of unsafeguarded fissionable materials by threshold states (assuming they signed the treaty) and, by universalizing safeguards commitments, strengthen non-proliferation efforts. However, a cut-off would not touch existing fissionable material stockpiles. In the nuclear-weapon states, these are large enough to make additional production unnecessary, regardless of a treaty. In the threshold states, stockpiles will continue to be the cause of great concern.

In Canada's view, a cut-off treaty should be open to signature by all states and all of its provisions should apply to all states. This would mean applying NPT-type safeguards to all of the fissionable material in the nuclear-weapon states parties. As the nuclear-weapon states will undoubtedly retain significant reserves of fissionable material for nuclear-weapon purposes, their tendency to violate the treaty is likely to be minimal. Verification — in the form of application of IAEA safeguards — should focus on

Proposed ban would stop the production of fissionable materials but leave existing stockpiles — being bolstered by nuclear disarmament — untouched.

the most sensitive facilities, namely those used for enrichment and reprocessing.

As all non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty have already made a "cut-off" commitment and accepted fullscope safeguards, no additional verification would be required for them. All non-NPT parties that sign a cut-off convention should be required to accept IAEA safeguards on all existing fissionable material and on all nuclear facilities, including explicit arrangements to deal with possible clandestine facilities. In other words, they should have to accept NPT-type fullscope safeguards. ■

Canada Increases Commitment in Golan Heights

In November, the United Nations restructured the UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights as a result of Finland's decision to withdraw its battalion of infantry. Poland committed an infantry battalion to replace the Finnish contingent but withdrew the logistics personnel it had been providing. Some logistics functions were contracted out to local companies and the infantry battalions were asked to have a higher level of self-sufficiency. To make up the shortfall, Canada increased its commitment to UNDOF by 31 personnel to take over the remaining logistics functions.

This restructuring left a smaller and more efficient UNDOF operation. Prior to this restructuring, two separate logistics units were necessary because the parties would not let the units operate on both sides of the ceasefire line. This led to an overlap in functions. In the current operation, Canadians are providing logistic support on both sides of the ceasefire line to the entire UNDOF force. This has created an operationally and economically more efficient operation.

The UN has not been able to deploy its peacekeeping mission to Haiti because of the refusal of the Haitian military and police authorities to abide by the Governor's Island agreement signed by President Aristide and General Cedras. Under the terms of this agreement, the Haitian military agreed to turn control of the government back to President Aristide by October 30, 1993. The UN continues its attempts to mediate a solution to this problem. ■

Canadian Forces photo



Peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia.

Canada's Peacekeeping Activities (as of February 1, 1994)

United Nations Operations

1. United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR — Former Yugoslavia)	Bosnia-Herzegovina	1,206
	Croatia	783
	RCMP	45
2. United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF — Golan Heights)		211
3. United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO)		30
4. United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ)		15
5. United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO — Middle East)		13
6. United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II)		7
7. United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)		6
8. United Nations Iraq/Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)		5
9. United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda/ United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNOMUR/UNAMIR)		2
10. United Nations Observer Mission In El Salvador (UNOSAL)		2
Total Canadian Forces Personnel		2,280
Total RCMP Personnel		45

Non-United Nations Operations

1. Multinational Force And Observers (MFO — Sinai: monitoring Camp David accords)	28
2. European Community Monitoring Mission in the Former Yugoslavia (ECMM)	12
Total	40

Resolutions on Arms Control and Disarmament and International Security Adopted at UNGA 48 (1993)

Resolutions Supported by Canada

RESOLUTION NUMBER (Lead sponsor or sponsors)	RESOLUTION	VOTE Yes-No-Abstain
48/61* (Belarus)	Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference on Disarmament	Consensus
48/62 (Germany/Romania)	Transparency of military expenditures	Consensus
48/63* (US)	Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements	Consensus
48/64* (Costa Rica)	Education and information for disarmament	Consensus
48/65* (Hungary)	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction	Consensus
48/67* (Germany)	The role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields	161-0-5
48/68* (Canada)	Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification	145-0-22
48/70* (Australia)	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty	Consensus
48/71 (Egypt)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East	Consensus
48/72 (Pakistan)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia	153-3-12
48/73 (Pakistan)	Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	166-0-4
48/74 A (Sri Lanka)	Prevention of an arms race in outer space	169-0-1
48/74 B (Argentina)	Study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space	Consensus
48/75 A (Indonesia)	Relationship between disarmament and development	Consensus
48/75 B (Indonesia)	Bilateral nuclear arms negotiations and nuclear disarmament	Consensus
48/75 C (Mexico)	General and complete disarmament	114-6-45
48/75 D (Algeria)	Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes	Consensus
48/75 E* (Netherlands)	Transparency in armaments	Consensus
48/75 F* (Colombia)	International arms transfers	Consensus
48/75 G* (Germany)	Regional disarmament	Consensus
48/75 I* (Pakistan)	Regional disarmament	170-0-1
48/75 J (India)	Conventional arms control at the regional and sub-regional levels	156-0-11
48/75 K (US)	Moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land mines	Consensus
48/75 L* (Canada)	Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices	Consensus
48/76 A (Cameroon)	Regional confidence-building measures	160-1-2
48/76 C (Nigeria)	United Nations Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Program	Consensus
48/76 D (Mexico)	United Nations Disarmament Information Program	Consensus
48/76 E (Nepal)	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean	Consensus

*Resolution co-sponsored by Canada.

RESOLUTION NUMBER (Lead sponsor or sponsors)	RESOLUTION	VOTE Yes-No-Abstain
48/77 A (Brazil)	Report of the Disarmament Commission	Consensus
48/77 B (Egypt)	Report of the Conference on Disarmament	Consensus
48/79* (Sweden)	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects	162-0-3
48/80	Question of Antarctica	96-0-7
48/81 (Malta)	Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region	Consensus
48/82 (Indonesia)	Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace	130-4-36
48/84 A (Russia)	Maintenance of international security	84-0-83
48/84 B (FYR Macedonia)	Development of good-neighbourly relations among Balkan States	Consensus
48/85 (Latin America and Caribbean)	Consolidation of the regime established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)	Consensus
48/86 (Algeria)	Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa	Consensus
48/87 (Chairman)	Rationalization of the work of the Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee)	Consensus

Resolutions Opposed by Canada

48/76 B (India)	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	120-23-24
48/78 (Arab League)	Israeli nuclear armament	53-45-65

Resolutions on which Canada Abstained

48/66 (India)	Scientific and technological developments and their impact on international security	126-4-35
48/69 (Indonesia)	Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water	118-3-45
48/75 H (Afghanistan)	Measures to curb the illicit transfer and use of conventional weapons	146-0-22
48/83 (Indonesia)	Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security	122-1-45

*Resolution co-sponsored by Canada.

Halfway to CWC Implementation

January 13 marked the first anniversary of the signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). At the midway point in the implementation process, the Provisional Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) continues its efforts to ensure the entry into force of the Convention, anticipated in January 1995. Djibouti, Guyana, Maldives and Turkmenistan have recently signed the Convention, bringing the total number of signatories to 154.

Expert groups are continuing their work in the following areas: industrial chemical manufacturing facilities, chemical weapons manufacturing facilities, training, materials, security procedures, chemical weapons storage facilities, and technical cooperation and assistance. The Chair of the group on chemical weapons storage facilities is a Canadian, Lieutenant-Colonel James Knapp of the Department of National Defence.

The staff of the OPCW's Provisional Secretariat will be augmented during the coming year from the present 78 to more than

120 for Phase 1 (1994). When the Convention has been ratified by 65 or more countries, Phase 2 will begin with a staff of 225 and a team of 140 inspectors. The budget of the OPCW, adopted in the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission, is C\$24,097,500. Canada's share has been determined in accordance with the UN scale, namely 3.11124 percent of the total budget, in this case, \$749,740.

National Authority being constituted in Ottawa.

Canada's OPCW delegation has been enlarged with the appointment of Mr. Ian Marrs as Scientific Advisor. Mr. Marrs had over 20 years experience in the chemical industry before joining the Department of Industry in 1981. His appointment demonstrates the importance placed by Canada on the work of the

OPCW Preparatory Commission. The National Authority in Ottawa will begin hiring its staff in late March.

In concert with the Department of Justice, DFAIT will begin a series of interdepartmental consultations on drafting a bill to ban chemical weapons. A number of departments along with various Canadian chemical and pharmaceutical associations will be involved in this process. The bill will lead to Canada ratifying the CWC during 1994.

January's Moscow Summit enabled presidents Clinton and Yeltsin to sign co-operation agreements for the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons. Beginning in March, information will be exchanged on chemical weapons and on inspections of the sites where such weapons are stored. A contribution of US\$30 million will be made for the construction of an analytical laboratory in Moscow by the Americans. An agreement also exists for a conceptual plan to destroy Russia's chemical weapons. The US administration will seek additional funds to support Russian efforts in this field. ■

MTCR Members Consider Regime's Future

Canada and other members of the Missile Technology Control Regime met in Interlaken, Switzerland from November 29 to December 2 to discuss the Regime's future direction. Partners agreed to build on their achievements in controlling the export of missile-related technologies by giving emphasis to dealing directly with the missile proliferation threat emanating from those outside the MTCR. Efforts will be redoubled to persuade potential exporters to abide by MTCR guidelines. In addition, MTCR countries will take steps to encourage proliferating countries to act more responsibly. At the same time, partners were pleased to note an increase in the number of countries outside the regime that have declared their intention to observe the MTCR guidelines.

Partner countries welcomed Argentina and Hungary to the Interlaken meeting, bringing to 25 the number of MTCR members. The next MTCR plenary will be held in Sweden in October. ■

Focus: On Canada in Asia Pacific

With its rich history and experience of multilateralism, it is not surprising that Canada was one of the first Asia Pacific countries to actively promote the idea of a more regularized security dialogue in the region. Canada's 1990 initiative to establish a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue (NPCSD) embracing Canada, China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea and the United States reflected worries that the progressive reduction of tensions in Europe (notwithstanding crises in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union) had not prompted a similar trend in Asia Pacific. This was of direct concern to Canada given our growing links with the region.

Canada has long been militarily involved in Asia Pacific, through our participation in World War II and the Korean conflict, our contributions to the various Indochina truce and supervisory commissions, and participation in all United Nations peacekeeping operations in the region. Over the last decade, economic and demographic trends have broadened Canadian engagement in Asia Pacific and heightened our stake in regional security.

Economics

Asia ranks as Canada's second most important trading region, after the United States. In 1992, 11 of Canada's top 25 markets were Asia Pacific economies and (not counting the US) the region was a market for over \$16 billion of Canadian exports — some 10 percent of Canada's total exports. Two-way trade with Asia Pacific states (again excluding the US) was worth \$37.8 billion, compared to our \$26 billion in trade with the European Union.

The Asia Pacific region is also becoming a vital source of foreign direct investment and new technology for Canada. Over the past decade, Japan moved from being the eighth-largest foreign investor in Canada to the third-largest, behind the US and the UK. Japanese direct investment in Canada has doubled since 1985 to \$5.7 billion, while portfolio investments, mainly in federal and provincial government bonds, are substantial. Other Asian economies, such as Hong Kong, Australia, Singapore and South Korea, have also become major foreign investors in Canada.

Canada and APEC

Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), founded in 1989, is the principal inter-governmental vehicle for cooperation in the region. In addition to Canada, APEC's members include the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Brunei. It is the only international organization in which all three "Chinas" (China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) are represented at the ministerial level.

APEC holds annual meetings of foreign and trade ministers and periodic meetings of senior officials. The organization has two trade and economic policy groups and 10 sectoral groups cooperating on projects in areas such as fisheries, transportation, energy and marine resource conservation. Canada chairs APEC's Economic Trends and Issues working group and is co-leader of the Human Resource Development and Marine Resources Conservation groups.

APEC is evolving into a key agenda-setting body, helping to define priorities for member countries. In 1993, APEC's focus was a trade and investment "action" agenda to increase transparency and regional cooperation, involving trade facilitation, expansion and liberalization. In November 1993, the first APEC summit was held in Seattle. Canada is scheduled to host the ninth ministerial meeting in 1997.

Participation in APEC gives Canada an opportunity to affirm its commitment to the region and helps to strengthen trans-Pacific ties. It ensures Canada's interests are taken into account and enables Canada to pursue a range of specific regional and bilateral objectives, such as expanding trade, promoting investment and protecting the marine environment. Equally important, APEC participation makes Canadians more informed about opportunities in the region and prompts citizens of other countries to consider Canada when making decisions about everything from business to tourism. It provides an opportunity to match the region's needs to Canadian capabilities. Participation in APEC com-



Secretary of State for Asia Pacific, Mr. Raymond Chan, with Canada World Youth participants in Phichit, Thailand. Mr. Chan visited Hong Kong, China, Thailand and Japan in January to discuss a range of bilateral issues and trade opportunities.

plements work in other regional and international bodies such as the OECD, GATT and the G7, and will become increasingly important as the Asia Pacific region itself takes on greater weight in global affairs.

Environment

Several Asia Pacific countries are important players in global environmental issues such as climate change and biodiversity cooperation. Canada cooperates with regional states on environmental issues through Canadian International Development Agency programs; through APEC's working groups on marine resource conservation, fisheries, energy and tourism; and through policy discussions and cooperative arrangements on issues like environmental protection, forestry management, water management, energy efficiency, science and technology.

The APEC focus on economic cooperation and trade liberalization would be enriched by incorporating the broader question of sustainable development. Canada has invited APEC environment ministers to meet in Vancouver March 24-25, on the margins of the Globe 94 exhibition and conference. The focus will be to assess opportunities for cooperation among APEC members, to discuss regional priorities and implementation of Agenda 21 follow-up to the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, and to consider how to promote the integration of sustainable development in the APEC agenda.

Canada and ASEAN

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) comprises Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Founded in 1967, it is the most successful organization in Asia Pacific, with an effective program of consultation and political cooperation. ASEAN began establishing "dialogue partnerships" with selected countries in 1972. Canada became a dialogue partner in 1977. Other such partners are Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, the US and the European Union.

Political links between Canada and ASEAN have developed through the Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) of ASEAN and dialogue partner foreign ministers that is held following the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting each year. The PMC, and the

Senior Officials Meeting that precedes it, provide opportunities for exchanges on regional and global issues, such as APEC, GATT, human rights and regional security. The 1993 PMC in Singapore endorsed the launching of an ASEAN Regional Forum for the discussion of security issues. The first meeting will be in Bangkok in July. Participants will include not only ASEAN countries and dialogue partners, but also China, Russia, Vietnam, Laos and Papua New Guinea (see p. 2 for details).


A Canada-ASEAN Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1981 to promote closer industrial, commercial and development cooperation between the parties. A revised Economic Cooperation Agreement was signed in July 1993. The new agreement will foster greater private sector cooperation, assist in the liberalization and expansion of trade relations, and target development to the mutual benefit of both Canada and ASEAN.

Human Rights

The Asia Pacific region has a mixed record on human rights, reflecting its political and cultural diversity. All Asian governments joined in the Vienna Declaration (1993) that human rights everywhere are the legitimate concern of the international community. Canada continues to monitor the situation in the region closely and has been active in making representations on general human rights situations and individual cases. An important aspect of Canada's development cooperation programs in Asia Pacific involves working with governments and non-governmental organizations to strengthen institutions for human rights and democratic development.

Forum on International Relations

University of Toronto professor Janice Gross Stein and Montreal business executive Pierre S. Pettigrew will act as co-chairs of the first National Forum on Canada's International Relations to be held March 21-22 in Ottawa. The purpose of the Forum is to provide an opportunity for Canadians to consider the implications of the rapidly changing international and domestic environments as they affect foreign affairs, and to offer views on the impact these changes should have on Canada's policy priorities. Some 120 people from a number of backgrounds and with involvement in business, labour, universities, non-governmental organizations, aboriginal affairs and the media are expected to participate in this first Forum. They have been invited in a personal capacity on the basis of their knowledge and experience. The National Forum, which will be held annually, is an important dimension of the foreign policy review process initiated by the government.



Prime Minister Chrétien with Japan's Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa at the APEC Summit in Seattle in November.

Cooperative Security

Canada's multi-faceted involvement in Asia Pacific stems from and promotes direct Canadian interests in specific issues, such as trade, the environment, immigration and human rights. It also, however, underscores the complex nature of security. Proliferation and armed conflict in Asia Pacific can adversely affect a range of economic, environmental and demographic interests for all states in the region. Yet it is from problems related to these very interests — pollution, overfishing, illegal migration and so on — that the disputes or insecurities that lead to the spread of weapons and conflict can arise. To successfully prevent conflict, it is necessary to deal with these root causes of insecurity.

Inter-state problems in Asia Pacific have traditionally been dealt with bilaterally. Only now is Asia Pacific beginning to develop the fora and mechanisms necessary to promote region-wide cooperation and raise the level of mutual trust. In Canada's view, one of the major achievements of the NPCSD was its contribution to building confidence in multilateral dialogue in the region.

One of the assets Canada brings to the region is experience in making multilateralism work. There is no substitute for the network of bilateral security arrangements which have guaranteed stability in Asia Pacific. But there are ways of complementing these arrangements so that security and stability are offered to all regional countries in an inclusive, rather than exclusive, setting. Through our activity in APEC, the ASEAN PMC, the new ASEAN Regional Forum and a variety of sub-regional cooperative arrangements, Canada will continue to help make multilateralism a credible, legitimate and workable instrument for fostering cooperative security in the Asia Pacific region.

Forecast

International security activities involving Canada, April through July.

Ongoing: CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Vienna

Ongoing: CFE Joint Consultative Group, Vienna

Ongoing: Open Skies Consultative Commission, Vienna

April 11-15: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Preparatory Committee, Geneva

April 18 - May 9: UN Disarmament Commission, New York

May 16-19: Australia Group meeting, Paris

May 16 - July 1: CD in session, Geneva

June 5-11: Organization of American States General Assembly, Belem (Brazil)

June 21-22: Chemical and Biological Export Control Seminar, Buenos Aires

July 15 - September 7: CD in session, Geneva

July 25: ASEAN Regional Forum, Bangkok

Acronyms

APEC — Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

ARF — ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN (PMC) — Association of South-east Asian Nations (Post Ministerial Conference)

CANCAPS — Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security

CBM — confidence-building measure

CD — Conference on Disarmament

CFE — Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

CSCAP — Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific

CSCE — Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CTBT — comprehensive test ban treaty

CWC — Chemical Weapons Convention

DFAIT — Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

ESDI — European Security and Defence Identity

HEU — highly enriched uranium

IAEA — International Atomic Energy Agency

MTCR — Missile Technology Control Regime

NACC — North Atlantic Cooperation Council

NPCSD — North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue

NPT — Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

OPCW — Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

SOM — Senior Officials Meeting

START — Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

UNDOF — UN Disengagement Force (Golan Heights)

UNGA — UN General Assembly

UNPROFOR — UN Protection Force (former Yugoslavia)

UNTAC — UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia

WEU — Western European Union

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